Gonzales vs. COMELEC G.R. No.
L-27833, April 18, This test then as a limitation on freedom of expression is justified by
1969 27 SCRA 835 (1969)
Facts: Petitioners so alleged in his action, which they entitled
Declaratory Relief with Preliminary Injunction, filed on July 22, 1967,
a proceeding that should have been started in the of Court of First
Instance but treated by this Court as one of prohibition in view of
the seriousness and the urgency of the constitutional issue raised.
Petitioners challenged the validity of two new sections now included
in the Revised Election Code, under Republic Act No. 4880, which
was approved and took effect on June 17, 1967, prohibiting the too
early nomination of candidates and limiting the period of election
campaign or partisan political activity. Petitioner Cabigao was, at the
time of the filing of the petition, an incumbent councilor in the 4th
District of Manila and the Nacionalista Party official candidate for
Vice-Mayor of Manila to which he was subsequently elected on
November 11, 1967; petitioner Gonzales, on the other hand, is a
private individual, a registered voter in the City of Manila and a
political leader of his co-petitioner. It is their claim that “the
enforcement of said Republic Act No. 4880 in question [would]
prejudice [their] basic rights…, such as their freedom of speech,
their freedom of assembly and their right to form associations or
societies for purpose not contrary to law, guaranteed under the
Philippine Constitution,” and that therefore said act is
unconstitutional.
Issue: Whether the Right of Expression of Speech is susceptible of
any limitation.
Held: Yes, Freedom of expression is not an absolute. The Court
spoke of two tests that may supply an acceptable criterion for
permissible restriction.
“The ‘clear and present danger’ rule means that the evil
consequence of the comment or utterance must be extremely
serious and the degree of imminence extremely high’ before the
utterance can be punished. The danger to be guarded against is
the ‘substantive evil’ sought to be prevented.” It has the
advantage of establishing according to the above decision “a
definite rule in constitutional law. It provides the criterion as to
what words may be public established.”
The “dangerous tendency” rule and explained “If the words
uttered create a dangerous tendency which the state has a right to
prevent, then such words are punishable. It is not necessary that
some definite or immediate acts of force, violence, or
unlawfulness be advocated. It is sufficient that such acts be
advocated in general terms. Nor is it necessary that the language
used be reasonably calculated to incite persons to acts of force,
violence, or unlawfulness. It is sufficient if the natural tendency
and probable effect of the utterance be to bring about the
substantive evil which the legislative body seeks to prevent.
Why repression is permissible only when the danger of substantive
evil is present? The evil apprehended is so imminent that it may
befall before there is opportunity for full discussion. If there be time
to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert
the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is
more speech, not enforced silence.” The apprehended evil must be
“relatively serious.” For “[prohibition] of free speech and assembly
is a measure so stringent that it would be inappropriate as the
means for averting a relatively trivial harm to society.”
the danger or evil a substantive character that the state has a right
to prevent. Unlike the dangerous tendency doctrine, the danger
must not only be clear but also present. The term clear seems to
point to a causal connection with the danger of the substantially evil
arising from the utterance questioned. Present refers to the time
element. It used to be identified with imminent and immediate
danger. The danger must not only be probable but very likely
inevitable.
National Press Club vs Comelec
207 SCRA 835
Facts:
R.A. 6646 was enacted which prohibits any newspaper, radio, any
person making the use of media to sell or give free of charge of
space or time for political purpose except COMELEC Petitioners who
were representatives of mass media assails its constitutionality on
the ground that it amounts to censorship because it single’s out for
suppression only publications of a particular content and it abridges
freedom of speech of candidates.
Issue:
Whether or not R.A. 6646 is valid.
Held:
Yes, the law banning political ads has since been repealed but the
court made important observation which is still pertinent.
The technical effects of Art. IX (C) (4) of the constitution may be
seen to that no presumption of invalidity arises in respect of
exercise of supervisory or regulatory authority on the part of the
COMELEC for the purpose of serving equal opportunity among
candidates for political office, although such supervision or
regulation may result in same limitation of the rights of free speech
and free press. The applicable issue is the general, time honored are
that statute is presumed to be constitutional that party asserting
unconstitutionality must discharge the burden of clearly and
convincing, proving that assertion.
Section II has not gone outside the permissible brands of supervision
and regulation of media operations. During election period Sec. II is
limited in duration of applicability and enforceability. Sec. II doesn’t
purport in any way to restrict the reporting by newspapers and
radio or TV stations on news events relating to qualified political
parties.
Petitoners: representatives of mass media which are prevented
from selling or donating space and time for political advertisements;
2 candidates for office (1 national, 1 provincial) in the coming May
1992 elections; taxpayers and voters who claim that their right to be
informed of election issues and of credentials of the candidates is
being curtailed.
LIBEL
Alonzo v. Court of Appeals
No. 110088, 1 February 1995
FACTS:
From 1984 to 1986, accused Dra. Merle A. Alonzo was the Field
Operations Officer of the Philippine Medical Care Commission
(PMCC) for Region XI. On June 13, 1985, accused was directed by
Executive Officer of the PMCC, Rossi Castro, to conduct inspections
of Medicare accredited clinics and hospitals. Among the Medicare-
accredited clinics inspected by accused were the Sto. Niño Medical
Clinic in Astorga, and Our Lady of Fatima Medical Clinic in Guihing,
Hagonoy. The clinics were owned and managed by complainant Dra.
Angeles Velasco, married to Judge Dan Velasco of the MTC-
Hagonoy, Davao del Sur. After the inspection, accused submitted
her report on her findings to Dr. Jesus Tamesis, PMCC Vice
Chairman, which reflected negative findings and indicated therein
the following statement:
In all, this particular clinic should be closely monitored
because, aside from the above-mentioned violations, the
husband is a judge and it gives them a certain amount of
"untouchability." In fact, they make court suits their
pastime.
Dr. Velasco and her husband, Judge Dan Velasco, then filed a
complaint for libel against the petitioner with the Office of the City
Fiscal of Davao City and, after preliminary investigation; Assistant
City Fiscal Raul Bendigo filed the corresponding information for libel
against the petitioner with the Regional Trial Court.
After due trial, the trial court promulgated on 19 November 1990 its
decision finding the petitioner "guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
two (2) crimes of libel, penalized under Article 355 of the Revised
Penal Code.
The trial court found defamatory the statement in the last
paragraph, which read: "the husband is a judge and it gives them
certain amount of 'untouchability.' In fact, they make court suits
their past time." The trial court said that this statement "conveys
the meaning that Judge Velasco abuses his powers and authority as
a judge thus enabling him and his wife to violate the law with
impunity and even 'make court suits their past time [sic]. '"
Regarding the requirement of publication, it held that there was
sufficient publication of the petitioner's subject report when she
sent it to Dr. Tamesis.
In its decision of 29 January 1993 affirming the trial court's
judgment, the Court of Appeals conceded that the subject report of
the petitioner was a "qualified privileged communication" under the
first paragraph of Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code but held
that the privilege was lost because of proof of actual malice. Hence,
this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the questioned report of the petitioner to is
libelous.
HELD:
NO
RATIO:
There can then be no doubt that the petitioner made her report in
the exercise of her official duty or function. She rendered it in due
course to her superior who had a duty to perform with respect to its
subject matter and which the latter faithfully did by filing the
appropriate complaint against Dr. Velasco after an evaluation of the
report. We thus fully agree with the Court of Appeals that the report
falls within the first paragraph of Article 354 of the Revised Penal
Code. Consequently, the privileged character of the report negated
the presumption of malice or malice in law. The privilege may only
be lost by proof of malice in fact. It is, nevertheless, settled that "[a]
privileged communication should not be subjected to microscopic
examination to discover grounds of malice or falsity. Such excessive
scrutiny would defeat the protection, which the law throws over
privileged communications. The ultimate test is that of bona fides."
Finally there was, in law, no publication of the questioned report.
The rule is settled that a communication made by a public officer in
the discharge of his official duties to another or to a body of officers
having a duty to perform with respect to the subject matter of the
communication does not amount to a publication within the
meaning of the law on defamation.
There was also no publication when Atty. Balasabas, a third person,
read the complaint against Dr. Velasco and the report of the
petitioner attached thereto. The private respondents entrusted
these documents to Atty. Balasabas with the request that he give
them to their counsel, Atty. David Montana. Where the plaintiff
himself communicated or by his acts caused the communication of
the libelous matter to a third person, there was no actionable
publication.
OBSCENITY
PITA VS. COURT OF APPEALS [178 SCRA 362; G.R.
NO.80806; 5 OCT 1989]
Facts: On December 1 and 3, 1983, pursuing an Anti-Smut Campaign
initiated by the Mayor of the City of Manila, Ramon D. Bagatsing,
elements of the Special Anti-Narcotics Group, Auxilliary Services
Bureau, Western Police District, INP of the Metropolitan Police
Force of Manila, seized and confiscated from dealers, distributors,
newsstand owners and peddlers along Manila sidewalks, magazines,
publications and other reading materials believed to be obscene,
pornographic and indecent and later burned the seized materials in
public at the University belt along C.M. Recto Avenue, Manila, in the
presence of Mayor Bagatsing and several officers and members of
various student organizations.
Among the publications seized, and later burned, was "Pinoy
Playboy" magazines published and co-edited by plaintiff Leo Pita.
Plaintiff filed a case for injunction with prayer for issuance of the
writ of preliminary injunction against Mayor Bagatsing and Narcisco
Cabrera, as superintendent of Western Police District of the City of
Manila, seeking to enjoin said defendants and their agents from
confiscating plaintiff’s magazines or from preventing the sale or
circulation thereof claiming that the magazine is a decent, artistic
and educational magazine which is not per se obscene, and that the
publication is protected by the Constitutional guarantees of
freedom of speech and of the press. Plaintiff also filed an Urgent
Motion for issuance of a temporary restraining order against
indiscriminate seizure, confiscation and burning of plaintiff's "Pinoy
Playboy" Magazines, pending hearing on the petition
for preliminary injunction. The Court granted the temporary
restraining order. The case was set for trial upon the lapse of the
TRO. RTC ruled that the seizure was valid. This was affirmed by the
CA.
Issue: Whether or Not the seizure violative of the freedom of
expression of the petitioner.
Held: Freedom of the press is not without restraint as the state has
the right to protect society from pornographic literature that is
offensive to public morals, as indeed we have laws punishing the
author, publishers and sellers of obscene publications. However, It is
easier said than done to say, that if the pictures here in question
were used not exactly for art's sake but rather for commercial
purposes, the pictures are not entitled to any constitutional
protection. Using the Kottinger rule: the test of obscenity is
"whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscene, is to
deprave or corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral Held: Newspaper publications tending to impede, obstruct,
influences and into whose hands a publication or other article embarrass, or influence the courts in administering justice in a
charged as being obscene may fall." Another is whether it shocks pending suit or proceeding constitutes criminal contempt which is
the ordinary and common sense of men as an indecency. Ultimately summarily punishable by the courts. The rule is otherwise after the
"whether a picture is obscene or indecent must depend upon the cause is ended. It must, however, clearly appear that such
circumstances of the case and that the question is to be decided by publications do impede, interfere with, and embarrass the
the "judgment of the aggregate sense of the community reached by administration of justice before the author of the publications
it." The government authorities in the instant case have not shown should be held for contempt. What is thus sought to be shielded
the required proof to justify a ban and to warrant confiscation of the against the influence of newspaper comments is the all-important
literature First of all, they were not possessed of a duty of the court to administer justice in the decision of a pending
lawful court order: (1) finding the said materials to be pornography, case. There is no pending case to speak of when and once the court
and (2) authorizing them to carry out a search and seizure, by way has come upon a decision and has lost control either to reconsider
of a search warrant. The court provides that the authorities or amend it. That is the present case, for here the letter complained
must apply for the issuance of a search warrant from a judge, if in of was published after the Court of First Instance of Pampanga had
their opinion an obscenity seizure is in order and that; decided the criminal case for robbery in band, and after that
decision had been appealed to the Court of Appeals. The fact that a
1. The authorities must convince the court that the materials sought motion to reconsider its order confiscating the bond of the accused
to be seized are obscene and pose a clear and present danger of an therein was subsequently filed may be admitted; but, the important
evil substantive enough to warrant State interference and action; consideration is that it was then without power to reopen or modify
2. The judge must determine whether or not the same are indeed the decision which it had rendered upon the merits of the case, and
obscene. The question is to be resolved on a case-to-case basis and could not have been influenced by the questioned publication. If it
on the judge’s sound discretion; be contended, however, that the publication of the questioned
letter constitutes contempt of the Court of Appeals where the
appeal in the criminal case was then pending, the interrelation of
the different courts forming our integrated judicial system, one
CONTEMPT court is not an agent or representative of another and may not, for
People vs. Alarcon 1939) this reason, punish contempts in vindication of the authority and de
corum which are not its own. The appeal transfers the proceedings
Facts: As an aftermath of the decision rendered by the Court of First to the appellate court, and this last court be comes thereby charged
Instance of Pampanga in criminal case 5733 (People s vs. Salvador with the authority to deal with contempts committed after the
Alarcon, et al.), convicting the accused therein except one — of the perfection of the appeal.
crime of robbery committed in band, a denunciatory letter, signed
by one Luis M. Taruc, was addressed to His Excellency, the President
of the Philippines. A copy of said letter found its way to Federico
Mangahas who, as columnist of the Tribune, a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines, quoted the letter in an article
published by him in the issue of that paper of 23 September 1937.
The article provides, in part, that "Fifty-two (52) tenants in
Floridablanca, Pampanga, have been charged and convicted on a
trumped up charge of robbery in band because they took each a few
cavans of palay for which they issued the corresponding receipts,
from the bodega in the hacienda where they are working. These
tenants contend that they have the right to take the palay for their
food as the hacienda owner has the obligation to give them rations
of palay for their maintenance and their families to be paid later
with their share of their crop. But this is not all. When the convicted
tenants appealed the case and were released on bail pending their
appeal, court and public officials exerted pressure upon one of their
bondsmen, as this bondsman informed the tenants, to withdraw his
bail for them, and the fifty two tenants were arrested again and put
in jail." On 29 September 1937, the provincial fiscal of Pampanga
filed with the Court of First Instance of that province to cite Federico
Mangahas for contempt. On the same date, the lower court ordered
Mangahas to appear and show cause. Mangahas appeared and filed
an answer,alleging, among others, that “the publication of the letter
in question is in line with the constitutional guarantee of freedom of
the press.” On 29 November 1937, the lower court entered an
order, imposing upon Mangahas the nominal fine of P25, or in case
of insolvency, 5 days in prison; this without prejudice to the action
for libel that the public prosecutor believes to be advisable to file
against Luis M. Taruc. Mañgahas appealed from this order to the
Court of Appeals — which later certified the case to the Supreme
Court as involving only a question of law.

Issue: Whether the trial court properly cited Mangahas for

contempt inasmuch as the robbery-in-band case is still pending
appeal.