MONZON, JESSA MARIE M.
LAW 3E
Special Proceedings
01 STUDY GUIDE ON VENUE AND JURISDICTIONSETTLEMENT OF ESTATE
ASSESMENT FOR SUBMISSION AS PART OF FINAL EXAM:
1. Read the 4 cases indicated in the syllabus under the topic : VENUE AND
JURISDICTION
2. Identify the following:
a) Parties
b) Petition filed in the Court of Origin
c) Jurisdiction of the Court of Origin
d) Venue of the Court of Origin
e) Decision of the Court of Origin
f) Decision of the Supreme Court
3. Did the court of origin validly acquire jurisdiction?
4. Was the venue proper?
ANSWERS:
Case #1: Frianela vs Banayad, G.R. No. 169700, July 30, 2009
a.
The parties in the case are APOLONIA BANAYAD FRIANELA, the petitioner and
SERVILLANO BANAYAD, JR., the respondent.
b.
Following the death of her uncle, the testator Moises F. Banayad, petitioner, who was
named as devisee in the will, filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City, on June
3, 1991, Sp. Proc. No. 3664-P3 for the allowance of the November 18, 1985
holographic will of the decedent.
c.
The jurisdiction of the court of origin is original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Court
(RTC)
d.
The venue of the court of origin is Pasay City.
e.
After trial on the merits, the RTC, on September 29, 1995, rendered its Decision
declaring the September 27, 1989 holographic will as having revoked the November
18, 1985 will, allowing the former, and appointing respondent as administrator of
Moises’s estate.
f.
Since the RTC has no jurisdiction over the action, all the proceedings therein, including
the decision rendered, are null and void. With the above disquisition, the Court finds it
unnecessary to discuss and resolve the other issues raised in the petition. Sp. Proc. No. 3664-P
before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.
3.
No. The court of origin did not validly acquire jurisdiction. Nowhere in the petition is
there a statement of the gross value of Moises’s estate. Thus, from a reading of the original
petition filed, it cannot be determined which court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over
the proceedings.18 The RTC therefore committed gross error when it had perfunctorily
assumed jurisdiction despite the fact that the initiatory pleading filed before it did not call for
the exercise of its jurisdiction.
4.
Yes. The venue was proper. Pursuant to Rule 73, Section 1, residence of the decedent
at the time of his death is determinative of the venue of the proceeding. In the averments, it
was stated that the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines and residing at 2237 P. Burgos
St., Pasay City at the time of his death.
Case #2: San Luis vs San Luis,G.R. No. 133743, February 06,2007
a.
The case are consolidated petition. The parties in the first petition are EDGAR SAN
LUIS, the petitioner and FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, the respondent. In the other petition
RODOLFO SAN LUIS, the petitioner, FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS alias FELICIDAD SAN
LUIS, the respondent
b.
On December 17, 1993, Felicidad filed a petition for letters of administration
before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, docketed as SP. Proc. No. M-3708 which
was raffled to Branch 146 thereof.
c.
The jurisdiction of the court of origin is original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Court
(RTC)
d.
The venue of the court of origin is Makati City.
e.
On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of
administration. It held that, at the time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor
and a resident of the Province of Laguna. Hence, the petition should have been filed in Sta.
Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City.
f.
The Supreme Court ruled that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for
purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate. Consequently, the subject petition
for letters of administration was validly filed in the Regional Trial Court which has territorial
jurisdiction over Alabang, Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed on December 17, 1993. At
that time, Muntinlupa was still a municipality and the branches of the Regional Trial Court of the
National Capital Judicial Region which had territorial jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were then
seated in Makati City as per Supreme Court Administrative Order No. [Link], the subject
petition was validly filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals reinstating
and affirming the February 28, 1994 Order of the Regional Trial Court which denied petitioners’
motion to dismiss and its October 24, 1994 Order which dismissed petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration is AFFIRMED. Let this case be REMANDED to the trial court for further
proceedings.
3.
Yes. The court of origin acquire jurisdiction. It was stated in the petition that the value
of the gross estate of Felicisimo is ₱30,304,178.00 more or less. Thus, The Regional Trial Court
has jurisdiction over proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person (probate
proceedings) since the gross value of the estate exceeds P400, 000.
4.
Yes. The venue was proper. Based from the ruling of the Supreme Court, Felicisimo was
a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his
estate. Consequently, the subject petition for letters of administration was validly filed in the
Regional Trial Court which has territorial jurisdiction over Alabang, Muntinlupa. The subject
petition was filed on December 17, 1993. At that time, Muntinlupa was still a municipality and
the branches of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region which had
territorial jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were then seated in Makati City as per Supreme Court
Administrative Order No. [Link], the subject petition was validly filed before the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City.
Case #3: Cuenco vs Court of Appeals, L- 24742, October 26, 1973
a.
The parties in the case are are ROSA CAYETANO CUENCO, the petitioner and THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DIVISION, MANUEL CUENCO, LOURDES
CUENCO, CONCEPCION CUENCO MANGUERRA, CARMEN CUENCO, CONSUELO
CUENCO REYES, and TERESITA CUENCO GONZALEZ, the respondents.
b.
There are two petitions filed in two different courts in this case.
On 5 March 1964, (the 9th day after the death of the late Senator) respondent Lourdes
Cuenco filed a Petition for Letters of Administration with the court of first instance of
Cebu (Sp. Proc. No. 2433-R), alleging among other things, that the late senator died intestate
in Manila on 25 February 1964.
In the meantime, or specifically on 12 March 1964, (a week after the filing of the Cebu
petition) herein petitioner Rosa Cayetano Cuenco filed a petition with the court of first
instance of Rizal (Quezon City) for the probate of the deceased's last will and
testament and for the issuance of letters testamentary in her favor, as the surviving
widow and executrix in the said last will and testament. The said proceeding was docketed as
Special Proceeding No. Q-7898
c.
The jurisdiction of the court of origin on the first petition filed is original jurisdiction of
Court of First Instance (CFI). The other petition was filed in also in Court of First
Instance (CFI) in its original jurisdiction.
d.
The venue of the court of origin is Cebu City on the first petition and Rizal (Quezon
City) for the second petition.
e.
Respondent Lourdes Cuenco's motion for reconsideration of the Quezon City court's said
order of 11 April 1964 asserting its exclusive jurisdiction over the probate proceeding as
deferred to by the Cebu court was denied on 27 April 1964 and a second motion for
reconsideration dated 20 May 1964 was likewise denied.
The Quezon City court in its said order of 15 May 1964 admitted to probate the late
senator's last will and testament as having been "freely and voluntarily executed by the
testator" and "with all formalities of the law" and appointed petitioner-widow as executrix of his
estate without bond "following the desire of the testator" in his will as probated.
f.
The Supreme Court finds under the above-cited facts that the appellate court erred in
law in issuing the writ of prohibition against the Quezon City court from proceeding with the
testate proceedings and annulling and setting aside all its orders and actions, particularly its
admission to probate of the deceased's last will and testament and appointing petitioner-widow
as executrix thereof without bond pursuant to the deceased testator's express wish.
The Court therefore holds under the facts of record that the Cebu court did not act
without jurisdiction nor with grave abuse of discretion in declining to take cognizance of the
intestate petition and instead deferring to the testate proceedings filed just a week later by
petitioner as surviving widow and designated executrix of the decedent's last will, since the
record before it (the petitioner's opposition and motion to dismiss) showed the falsity of the
allegation in the intestate petition that the decedent had died without a will. It is noteworthy
that respondents never challenged by certiorari or prohibition proceedings the Cebu court's
order of 10 April 1964 deferring to the probate proceedings before the Quezon City court, thus
leaving the latter free (pursuant to the Cebu court's order of deference) to exercise jurisdiction
and admit the decedent's will to probate.
For the same reasons, neither could the Quezon City court be held to have acted
without jurisdiction nor with grave abuse of discretion in admitting the decedent's will to
probate and appointing petitioner as executrix in accordance with its testamentary disposition,
in the light of the settled doctrine that the provisions of Rule 73, section 1 lay down only a rule
of venue, not of jurisdiction.
Finally, it should be noted that in the Supreme Court's exercise of its supervisory
authority over all inferior courts, it may properly determine, as it has done in the case at bar,
that venue was properly assumed by and transferred to the Quezon City court and that it is the
interest of justice and in avoidance of needless delay that the Quezon City court's exercise of
jurisdiction over the testate estate of the decedent (with the due deference and consent of the
Cebu court) and its admission to probate of his last will and testament and appointment of
petitioner-widow as administratrix without bond in pursuance of the decedent's express will and
all its orders and actions taken in the testate proceedings before it be approved and authorized
rather than to annul all such proceedings regularly had and to repeat and duplicate the same
proceedings before the Cebu court only to revert once more to the Quezon City court should
the Cebu court find that indeed and in fact, as already determined by the Quezon City court on
the strength of incontrovertible documentary evidence of record, Quezon City was the conjugal
residence of the decedent.
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered reversing the appealed decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals and the petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction originally filed by respondents with the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 34104-R) is
ordered dismissed. No costs.
3.
Under Rule 73, section 1 itself, the Quezon City court's assumption of jurisdiction over
the decedent's estate on the basis of the will duly presented for probate by petitioner-widow
and finding that Quezon City was the first choice of residence of the decedent, who had his
conjugal home and domicile therein — with the deference in comity duly given by the Cebu
court — could not be contested except by appeal from said court in the original case. The
jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent,
or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an
appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the
record. (Rule 73)
The exception therein given, viz, "when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record"
could probably be properly invoked, had such deference in comity of the Cebu court to the
Quezon City court not appeared in the record, or had the record otherwise shown that the Cebu
court had taken cognizance of the petition before it and assumed jurisdiction.
4.
Notwithstanding that petitioner resides in Quezon City, and the proper venue of the
testate proceeding was in Quezon City and the Quezon City court properly took cognizance and
exercised exclusive jurisdiction with the deference in comity and consent of the Cebu court,
such proper exercise of jurisdiction would be nullified and petitioner would have to continually
leave her residence in Quezon City and go to Cebu to settle and liquidate even her own
community property and conjugal estate with the decedent.
It may properly determine, as it has done in the case at bar, that venue was properly
assumed by and transferred to the Quezon City court and that it is the interest of justice and in
avoidance of needless delay that the Quezon City court's exercise of jurisdiction over the testate
estate of the decedent (with the due deference and consent of the Cebu court) and its
admission to probate of his last will and testament and appointment of petitioner-widow as
administratrix without bond in pursuance of the decedent's express will and all its orders and
actions taken in the testate proceedings before it be approved and authorized rather than to
annul all such proceedings regularly had and to repeat and duplicate the same proceedings
before the Cebu court only to revert once more to the Quezon City court should the Cebu court
find that indeed and in fact, as already determined by the Quezon City court on the strength of
incontrovertible documentary evidence of record, Quezon City was the conjugal residence of the
decedent.
Case #4: Uriarte vs CFI, G.R. Nos. L-21938-39, May 29,1970
a.
The parties in the case are VICENTE URIARTE, the petitioner and THE COURT OF
FIRST INSTANCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL (12th Judicial District) THE COURT OF
FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, BRANCH IV, JUAN URIARTE ZAMACONA and HIGINIO
URIARTE, the respondents.
b.
On November 6, 1961 petitioner filed with the Negros Court a petition for the
settlement of the estate of the late Don Juan Uriarte y Goite (Special Proceeding No.
6344) alleging therein, inter alia, that, as a natural son of the latter, he was his sole heir, and
that, during the lifetime of said decedent, petitioner had instituted Civil Case No. 6142 in the
same Court for his compulsory acknowledgment as such natural son. Upon petitioner’s motion
the Negros Court appointed the Philippine National Bank as special administrator on November
13, 1961 and two days later it set the date for the hearing of the petition and ordered that the
requisite notices be published in accordance with law. The record discloses, however, that, for
one reason or another, the Philippine National Bank never actually qualified as special
administrator.
On August 28, 1962, Juan Uriarte Zamacona, the other private respondent,
commenced Special Proceeding No. 51396 in the Manila Court for the probate of a
document alleged to be the last will of the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite, and on the
same date he filed in Special Proceeding No. 6344 of the Negros Court a motion to dismiss the
same on the following grounds: (1) that, as the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite had left a last
will, there was no legal basis to proceed with said intestate proceedings, and (2) that petitioner
Vicente Uriarte had no legal personality and interest to initiate said intestate proceedings, he
not being an acknowledged natural son of the decedent. A copy of the Petition for Probate and
of the alleged Will were attached to the Motion to Dismiss.
c.
The jurisdiction of the court of origin on the first petition filed is original jurisdiction of
Court of First Instance (CFI). The other petition was filed in also in Court of First
Instance (CFI) in its original jurisdiction.
d.
The venue of the court of origin is Negros Occidental on the first petition and Manila
for the second petition.
e.
The record discloses that the special proceeding before the Negros Court has not gone
farther than the appointment of a special administrator in the person of the Philippine National
Bank who, as stated heretofore, failed to qualify.
On the other hand, it is not disputed that, after proper proceedings were had in Special
Proceeding No. 51396, the Manila Court admitted to probate the document submitted to it as
the last will of Juan Uriarte y Goite, the petition for probate appearing not to have been
contested. It appears further that, as stated heretofore, the order issued by the Manila Court on
July 1, 1963 denied petitioner Vicente Uriarte’s Omnibus Motion for Intervention, Dismissal of
Petition and Annulment of said proceedings
f.
In his order of April 19, 1963 dismissing Special Proceeding No. 6344, Judge Fernandez
of the Negros Court said that he was "not inclined to sustain the contention of the petitioner
that inasmuch as the herein petitioner has instituted Civil Case No. 6142 for compulsory
acknowledgment by the decedent such action justifies the institution by him of this
proceedings. If the petitioner is to be consistent with the authorities cited by him in support of
his contention, the proper thing for him to do would be to intervene in the testate estate
proceedings entitled Special Proceedings No. 51396 in the Court of First Instance of Manila
instead of maintaining an independent action, for indeed his supposed interest in the estate of
the decedent is of his doubtful character pending the final decision of the action for compulsory
acknowledgment.
The Court believes in connection with the above matter that petitioner is entitled to
prosecute Civil Case No. 6142 until it is finally determined, or intervene in Special Proceeding
No. 51396 of the Manila Court, if it is still open, or to ask for its reopening if it has already been
closed, so as to be able to submit for determination the question of his acknowledgment as
natural child of the deceased testator, said court having, in its capacity as a probate court,
jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs of the deceased testator and whether or not a
particular party is or should be declared his acknowledged natural child.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, judgment is hereby rendered denying
the writs prayed for and, as a result, the petition for certiorari filed in G.R. No. L-21938, as well
as the supplemental petition for mandamus docketed as G.R. No. L-21939, are hereby
dismissed. The writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued is set aside. With costs against
petitioner.
3.
Yes. The Court of origin has jurisdiction. The following considerations and the facts of
record would seem to support the view that he should have submitted said will for probate to
the Negros Court, either in a separate special proceeding or in an appropriate motion for said
purpose filed in the already pending Special Proceeding No. 6344.
In the first place, it is not in accord with public policy and the orderly and inexpensive
administration of justice to unnecessarily multiply litigation, especially if several courts would be
involved. This, in effect, was the result of the submission of the will aforesaid to the Manila
Court. In the second place, when respondent Higinio Uriarte filed an opposition to Vicente
Uriarte’s petition for the issuance of letters of administration, he had already informed the
Negros Court that the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite had left a will in Spain, of which a copy
had been requested for submission to said court; and when the other respondent, Juan Uriarte
Zamacona, filed his motion to dismiss Special Proceeding No. 6344, he had submitted to the
Negros Court a copy of the alleged will of the decedent, from which fact it may be inferred that,
like Higinio Uriarte, he knew before filing the petition for probate with the Manila Court that
there was already a special proceeding pending in the Negros Court for the settlement of the
estate of the same deceased person.
As far as Higinio Uriarte is concerned, it seems quite clear that in his opposition to
petitioner’s petition in Special Proceeding No. 6344, he had expressly promised to submit said
will for probate to the Negros Court.
But the fact is that instead of the aforesaid will being presented for probate to the
Negros Court, Juan Uriarte Zamacona filed the petition for the purpose with the Manila Court.
The Supreme Court cannot accept petitioner’s contention in this regard that the latter court had
no jurisdiction to consider said petition, albeit the Supreme Court ordered that it was not the
proper venue therefor.
4.
No. It was not the proper venue. It is well settled in this jurisdiction that wrong venue is
merely a waiveable procedural defect, and, in the light of the circumstances obtaining in the
instant case, we are of the opinion, and so hold, that petitioner has waived the right to raise
such objection or is precluded from doing so by laches. It is enough to consider in this
connection that petitioner knew of the existence of a will executed by Juan Uriarte y Goite since
December 19, 1961 when Higinio Uriarte filed his opposition to the initial petition filed in Special
Proceeding No. 6344; that petitioner likewise was served with notice of the existence
(presence) of the alleged last will in the Philippines and of the filing of the petition for its
probate with the Manila Court since August 28, 1962 when Juan Uriarte Zamacona filed a
motion for the dismissal of Special Proceeding No. 6344.
All these notwithstanding, it was only on April 15, 1963 that he filed with the Manila
Court in Special Proceeding No. 51396 an Omnibus motion asking for leave to intervene and for
the dismissal and annulment of all the proceedings had therein up to that date; thus enabling
the Manila Court not only to appoint an administrator with the will annexed but also to admit
said will to probate more than five months earlier, or more specifically, on October 31, 1962. To
allow him now to assail the exercise of jurisdiction over the probate of the will by the Manila
Court and the validity of all the proceedings had in Special Proceeding No. 51396 would put a
premium on his negligence. Moreover, it must be remembered that this Court is not inclined to
annul proceedings regularly had in a lower court even if the latter was not the proper venue
therefor, if the net result would be to have the same proceedings repeated in some other court
of similar jurisdiction; more so in a case like the present where the objection against said
proceedings is raised too late.
