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# 2006 Institution of Chemical Engineers
www.icheme.org/psep Trans IChemE, Part B, May 2006
doi: 10.1205/psep.05113 Process Safety and Environmental Protection, 84(B3): 208– 221

CAN WE PREDICT OCCUPATIONAL

ACCIDENT FREQUENCY?
D. ATTWOOD1, F. KHAN2
and B. VEITCH2
1
Lloyd’s Register EMEA, Aberdeen, UK
2
Faculty of Engineering & Applied Science, Memorial University, St John’s, NL, Canada

A
model has been developed to predict the frequency and associated costs of occu-
pational accidents in the offshore oil and gas industry. Model inputs include (1)
direct factors such as quality of personal protective equipment, (2) corporate factors
such as training programme effectiveness, and (3) external factors such as royalty regime.
Model development was based on a review of related literature, expert opinion, and reliability
analysis concepts. The model accounts for the differing relative importance of influencing
factors, using quantitative data derived from a survey of safety experts. The influences of
external elements on corporate actions and of corporate actions on the direct accident process
are also included in a quantitative manner, again benefiting from the expert opinion survey.
An introduction to the problem is provided, followed by a brief summary of the literature
reviewed, a description of the model and example runs demonstrating the model’s versatility
and capability.
Taking a broader perspective, the work offers an example of quantifying something which,
at first, seems unquantifiable. Tools such as this offer valuable aids to management and
provide an improvement on qualitative opinion, hunches and similar.

Keywords: occupational accidents; offshore; oil and gas; quantitative prediction; reliability
approach.

INTRODUCTION accidents, i.e., ‘accidents will happen’. An unfortunate

Occupational accidents constitute an area of significant and
continuing risk for the oil and gas industry. The statistical
data show (Figure 1) that fatalities are more likely to
be caused by occupational accidents (e.g., falls, caught
between, struck by) than by more catastrophic events such
as explosions or air transport incidents. By some measures,
in 2004, oil and gas workers were six times more likely to
die from a fall than from an explosion/burn (International
Association of Oil & Gas Producers, 2005).
The situation is consistent with that observed in the general
workplace, where it has been reported (UK HSE, 1996) that
over a third of all major injuries reported each year result
from a slip or trip, this being the single most common cause
of injuries at work. Whilst occupational safety is regulated
under various national legislative schemes, analysis of these
types of accidents is not nearly so rigorous as for major
accident hazards. This is likely due to the relatively more
ruinous potential consequences of major accidents.
A potentially contributing factor to the problem is the
presence of an attitude adopting a certain inevitability to


Correspondence to: Professor F. Khan, Faculty of Engineering and zAp-
plied Science, Memorial University, St John’s, NL, Canada A1B 3X5.
E-mail: fkhan@engr.mun.ca
reaction to this position would be a relaxation of efforts
to reduce accident frequency. Fortunately, this view is not
widespread within the oil and gas community or industry
in general. Following a review (International Labour
Organisation, 2003) of global industrial accidents, the
ILO makes the following comments: ‘Fatalities are not
fated; accidents don’t just happen; illness is not random;
they are caused.’ Most oil and gas operators’ policies
mirror these comments. Particularly in projects being
executed in mature markets, safety culture, systems, and
equipment are well developed and effective, resulting in a
relatively low likelihood of accident. However, as reserves
are depleted in traditional locations and companies turn to
frontier regions (e.g., Africa and China), the implemen-
tation of an effective safety programme becomes more
difficult.
Attempts to address the problem have been ongoing for
at least a quarter of a century. Despite all the excellent
efforts, however, the problem remains. Current occu-
pational accident research is mostly qualitative in nature,
compared to the more quantitative efforts directed toward
major hazards. A specific gap in the body of research is
assigning sufficient quantification to the analysis of occu-
pational accidents, in terms of data gathering, model
development, and analysis (Attwood et al., 2005a).

208
 CAN WE PREDICT OCCUPATIONAL ACCIDENT FREQUENCY?
Figure 1. Fatality causes, 1999– 2003 (excludes unknown) (International
Association of Oil & Gas Producers, 2005).
Whilst occupational accidents occur through a direct
(unsatisfactory) interaction between worker and workplace,
it is the basic premise of the presently proposed model that
workers’ behaviours are influenced by corporate culture,
and their workplace environment and procedures are
controlled corporately. Furthermore, corporate decisions
and actions are, in turn, influenced by external elements.
LITERATURE REVIEW
A comprehensive discussion of the literature is presented
in Attwood et al. (2005a). A summary is presented here,
highlighting only information considered essential to this
discussion.
Review of Accident Models
Early accident models were developed in reaction to the
specific needs they tried to address. Medicine and the
nuclear industry have historically demanded overwhelming
attention to accident causation, prevention, and mitigation
(Gordon, 1949; Le Bot, 2004). This is probably due to
the high emotional attachment associated with problems
in these industries—medicine due to the distress caused
by loved ones’ illnesses, and the nuclear industry due to
the catastrophic consequences of nuclear accidents. It is
no surprise therefore, that many of the earliest accident
models, which provided valuable basic philosophical direc-
tion to subsequent efforts, originated in these industries.
One group of models studied (e.g., UK HSE, 2001, 2002b;
Balkey and Phillips, 1993) concentrates on direct causes, for
example quality of personal protective equipment, number of
shifts worked and time of injury, effect of prescriptive safety
regulations, and similar. These models help to produce
improvements in specific areas, but they do not adopt a
comprehensive view of the occupational accident problem.
Other models take a more holistic view of accidents
(Geyer and Bellamy, 1991; McCauley-Bell and Badiru,
1996a, b; Trontin and Bejean, 2004; Embrey, 1992; Hopkins,
2000), including corporate factors in the analysis. However,
these models, in general, study catastrophic accidents such as
Trans IChemE, Part B, Process Safety and Environmental Protection, 2006, 84(B3): 208–221
209
explosions and toxic releases. The present work’s specific
application to occupational accidents and inclusion of
external factors differentiates it from these efforts.
Human performance and personal reaction to dangerous
situations provide the basis for some models (UK HSE,
2002a, 2003; Gordon et al., 2001; Strutt et al., 1998;
Mosleh and Chang, 2004). Accident occurrence is
considered to be a question of how well individuals react
with their environment to prevent, mitigate the results
of, or recover from, a potential accident. These models
offer insight into the human element of the problem, but
the present work considers human performance as just
one of a series of factors in a holistic analysis.
Other literature describes models which adopt a
statistical approach (Kjellen, 1995; Luo, 1998; Thompson
et al., 1998; Tomas et al., 1999; Guastello, 1989; Brown
et al., 2000; Cheyne et al., 1999; Pate-Cornell and
Murphy, 1996), suggesting methods for quantifying
relationships between influencing elements. The present
work expands on these concepts, providing a holistic and
predictive approach specifically tailored to offshore oil
and gas occupational accidents.
Existing accident models contribute expertise to the off-
shore occupational accident problem from a wide range of
perspectives. However, while some deal specifically with
occupational accidents, some take a holistic approach to
more catastrophic types of offshore accidents, and others
consider non-traditional elements (i.e., societal, human)
of the accident process, none adopt the holistic, quantitative
approach to offshore occupational accidents proposed by
this research.
Occupational Accident Data Sources
Since this work includes a significant quantitative
element, an evaluation of the related available statistical
data was undertaken. The available sources may be
grouped as follows:
. internet sources (e.g., United Kingdom Health & Safety
Executive (HSE) website, Norwegian Petroleum Direc-
torate (NPD) website);
. company annual reports (e.g., Shell, ConocoPhillips,
Exxonmobil);
. open literature (International Association of Oil & Gas
Producers, 2004, UK HSE, 2000, 2001, 2002b.
The internet sources, developed by regulatory bodies in
established offshore regions such as the UK North Sea
and Norway, provide, amongst other things, unprocessed
accident statistics. These data have been used to compare
accident rates between regions and also between groups
(i.e., contractors versus operators) within regions.
Company annual reports provide a source of comparison
between major operators. The data are limited, including a
few annual indicators only for each operator, for example
lost time incident rate, total recordable incident rate, and
sometimes occupational illness frequency.
The open literature offers various analyses of offshore
occupational accident data, for example investigating the
relative frequencies of accidents when performing certain
activities, and comparisons of accident rates in various reg-
ions. Company comparisons are available, but only on an
anonymous basis.
210 ATTWOOD et al.

Factors Affecting Occupational Accidents Table 1. Frequency of mention of factors affecting safety results.

Model development necessarily includes the identifi- Factors affecting occupational accidents (frequency of mention in brackets)
cation of constituent factors and the determination of
their interrelationships. Literature offering suggestions for External Corporate Direct
choice of factors and possible inter-relationships has been Political Economic pressure (3) Personnel experience (3)
reviewed. Some examples are presented here. influence (2) Corporate culture (11) Staff knowledge/
BOMEL proposes a two-level series of factors Regulatory Procedure/permit learning (5)
influence (1) syst. (8) Safety design/layout (10)
considered to affect occupational accidents in the UK off- Market Corporate supervision/ Staff errors (2)
shore oil and gas industry (see UK HSE, 2002b for details). influence (1) audit programme (3) Safety behaviour (6)
Whilst the factors suggested by BOMEL are similar to Societal Safety management (2) Fatigue (2)
those proposed by the present work, their interdependency influence (2) Labour relations (2) Housekeeping (1)
and the quantification method presently proposed is entirely Accident Physical fitness (1)
management (3) Weather (2)
different. Training (10) Quality of PPE (3)
Similar to BOMEL, Kjellen and Hovden (1993) view the Human resources (4) Attentiveness (2)
accident process as having two levels—the accident Motivation (2)
sequence, and the underlying determining factors. The Compliance (1)
Visual environment (1)
two approaches differ in the specific choice of factors and Personnel attitude (4)
the degree to which non-direct factors are considered (see
Kjellen and Hovden, 1993; UK HSE, 2002b for specifics).
Wilson and McCutcheon (2003) recognize the importance
of corporate factors (e.g., inadequate programmes and failure a degree of interpretation. However, the factors proposed
to comply with standards) in the industrial accident investi- most frequently by others have been included in the present
gation process. The incident causation model used for their model, which provides confirmation and validation to the
analysis was developed by Bird and Germain (1992). choices. The relative scarcity of factors outside the organ-
Hopkins (2000) applies the ‘AcciMap’ approach devel- ization proposed by previous researchers confirms the
oped by Rasmussen (1997) to the Longford (Australia) novelty of the present approach, which includes external
gas plant explosion. Hopkins recognized the role of the societal and economic forces.
following external elements in the accident:
MODEL DESCRIPTION
. market forces—specifically pressure to reduce costs;
. market ideology (the notion that ‘the market is the best Model Structure
way to satisfy human wants and needs, and that govern- Occupational accidents result from an unsatisfactory
ments should play as small a role as possible in this interaction between workers and their environment.
process’); Direct factors affecting the process include staff behaviour
. inadequate regulatory systems; and capabilities, weather conditions, safety related design
. government shortcomings—for example failure to of the workplace, and quality of protective equipment.
provide alternative domestic gas supplies. Many of these factors are influenced by decisions taken
Whilst the roles of the external elements were noted by the at the corporate level. For example, worker attitudes and
author, the government appointed Royal Commission of resulting behaviours are influenced by corporate ‘safety
enquiry was criticized for failing to do so. culture’. Additionally, the organization determines the
Other sets of factors, proposed by various researchers, quality of safety training, procedures and equipment.
have been reviewed (Pate Cornell and Murphy, 1996; UK Other researchers (e.g., Cheyne et al., 1999; Thompson
HSE, 2003; Balkey and Phillips, 1993; McCauley-Bell et al., 1998; Tomas et al., 1999) have considered the
and Badiru, 1996a, b; Embrey, 1992; Hurst, 1998; effect of corporate actions on the occupational accident
Thompson et al., 1998; Tomas et al., 1999; Brown et al., process. Hopkins (2000) included external elements in the
2000; Cheyne et al., 1999). Almost all of the proposed fac- study of a gas plant explosion. Similar to Hopkins’
tors and groupings include a series of direct factors, and approach, the present model includes an external level,
some also include a set of corporate factors affecting the but as applied to the analysis of occupational accidents,
workers’ environment. There is less emphasis on external instead of major events. Region-based cultural and finan-
elements such as price of oil and regulatory regime, and cial pressures are considered to influence corporate actions
the application of an external extension to the occupational and decisions which, in turn, directly affect occupational
accident problem constitutes one of the primary contri- accident frequency.
butions made by the present work. The following sections describe the components of the
It was felt worthwhile to introduce a degree of rigour to different levels, or layers. These components were chosen
the review of factors suggested by others. Therefore, the based on (1) discussions with offshore oil industry
groupings proposed in the literature were reviewed colleagues, (2) personal experience in the industry, and
and the number of occurrences of specific factors in the (3) the previously described literature review. The basic
direct, corporate, and external categories counted. The schematic of the model is shown in Figure 2.
result of this exercise is shown in Table 1, with the numbers
in brackets indicating the total number of times the factors The direct layer
were proposed. Because researchers often use slightly The five components considered to directly affect
different terms to describe the factors, the process required accident frequency are (1) worker behaviour, (2) worker

Trans IChemE, Part B, Process Safety and Environmental Protection, 2006, 84(B3): 208–221
 CAN WE PREDICT OCCUPATIONAL ACCIDENT FREQUENCY?
Figure 2. Basic schematic of model.
capability, (3) weather, (4) safety design, and (5) personal
protective equipment.
. Behaviours are personal choices which are influenced by
one’s attitude and motivation. Collective staff attitude
can sometimes be altered but is best affected at the
hiring stage. Motivation to operate in a safe manner
must be clearly provided by management and super-
visors. Positive reinforcement is the more frequent
option and usually takes the form of safety awards, finan-
cial or otherwise. Penalties for poor safety behaviour are
less common, but may become more so in reaction to
increasing corporate penalties for inferior safety per-
formance. Some question the effectiveness of the safety
award/penalty system, citing the encouragement of
inappropriate non-reporting of accidents. Nevertheless,
Figure 3. Specific elements of model.
Trans IChemE, Part B, Process Safety and Environmental Protection, 2006, 84(B3): 208–221
211
the system probably, on balance, encourages behaviour
beneficial to both workers and the organization.
. Capabilities can be divided into mental and physical.
Mental capabilities are of two categories, knowledge
based, and intelligence based (Hurst, 1998). The ‘know-
ledge’ component comprises the safety related information
retained by the worker following training sessions. The
‘intelligence’ component allows the worker to cope
with safety issues not specifically covered by training
and procedures. The physical capabilities associated
with avoiding occupational accidents are considered to
be good coordination, a reasonable degree of fitness,
and lack of fatigue.
. Weather conditions at the time the work is performed can
affect the likelihood of accidents. For example, rain or
snow can make surfaces slippery, and extreme tempera-
tures can affect concentration.
. Efforts to optimize safety related design can reduce acci-
dent frequency. Examples of measures taken are the use
of non-slip walkways and clearly visible warning signs.
. Standard personal protective equipment (PPE), including
for example safety boots, helmets, glasses and gloves, can
be seen on just about all offshore installations.
The architecture of the direct layer is shown in the right-
hand columns of Figure 3.
The corporate support layer
The second fundamental layer (see middle column of
Figure 3) is the safety related support provided by the com-
pany, comprised of (1) corporate safety culture, (2) safety
training, and (3) safety procedures.
Almost all offshore operators today expend considerable
effort in developing a strong, positive safety culture, pro-
claiming ‘commitment to safety’ as their foremost concern.
Corporate documents issue promises such as ‘safety
takes precedence over production’, ‘safety is job one’,
212 ATTWOOD et al.
and similar. Safety culture is often developed by enforcing
day-to-day safety rules which may seem to border on the
trivial, for example always placing plastic covers on
coffee cups, backing into car parking spaces, holding hand-
rails in offices, and so on. The motivation behind such rules
is the belief that if staff are continuously aware of such
detail, they will not need to ‘shift’ into a ‘careful’ mode
when faced with more dangerous situations.
In ‘mature’ oil and gas industry areas, the safety training
programmes and procedures offered by most companies are
well developed and effective. In some frontier regions,
however, further efforts are required to raise the
programmes’ level of quality to an acceptable standard.
The external layer
The view that safety results can be significantly improved
solely by enhancements at the direct level is not supported
by this or previous research (Hopkins, 2000; Pate-Cornell
and Murphy, 1996; Cheyne et al., 1999; Thompson et al.,
1998; Tomas et al., 1999). Better safety boots, a more
stringent tank entry procedure, and similar initiatives may
prevent an accident or two, but fundamental change requires
improvement at least at the corporate level, which is, in
turn, often driven by external factors such as the relative
regional value placed on human life and the financial press-
ures exerted on the organization.
Oil companies need to operate in regions where hydro-
carbon reserves are discovered. Societal expectations differ
throughout the world (and occasionally even within
countries), and the associated forces affect an organization’s
safety results. For example, some regions place a higher
value on a human life than others. In regions where
the value is high, operators will receive, usually through
the regulatory process, relatively higher pressure to enact a
‘strict’ safety programme. This pressure will take many
forms—including requirements for high expenditure on
safety equipment through demanding prescriptive regu-
lations, stiff corporate penalties for injuries, and require-
ments for expensive pre-project public safety performance
forums. The opposite effect will be seen in regions with a
comparatively lower societal value placed on life.
Financial pressures on oil companies originate from
several sources, including price of oil, corporate share-
holder pressure, and regionally based royalty regime (see
Figure 3 for the location of these items in the model
architecture).
An inverse correlation has been discovered between
price of oil and accident frequency. This may be due to
an effect which is more easily seen from a negative pers-
pective—when money is scarce, i.e., when the price of
oil is low, there is an increased pressure to ‘cut corners’
everywhere, and this includes, unfortunately, the quality
of the safety programmes enacted by operators.
Shareholder pressure is the degree to which a company is
encouraged by its owners to improve performance. Unduly
high pressure to retain extra money within corporate coffers
rather than spending it on (what some shareholders per-
ceive to be) an unnecessary expense lacking an obvious
payback will negatively affect safety results.
The royalty regime is heavily region-specific. It is interes-
ting to observe government and public behaviour following
the euphoria of an area’s first hydrocarbon discovery.
Trans IChemE, Part B, Process Safety and Environmental Protection, 2006, 84(B3): 208–221
Usually the initial reaction is to make life very attractive
for the companies, and a lucrative (for the company) roy-
alty scheme is discussed and proposed. Gradually, how-
ever, the region’s historical economic situation is brought
to bear on the process. If long term economics have been
satisfactory and environmental concerns are considered
important (usually due to valuable tourism or fishing indus-
tries), pressure is placed on government to enforce a strict
royalty regime, which erodes project profitability and pro-
duces a negative ‘knock-on’ effect on safety results. On
the other hand, in areas where the population has suffered
from poor long-term economics, it is more likely that the
public will encourage government to ensure that oil and
gas operators are ‘made to feel welcome’ in every way,
including financially. This will have a positive effect on
disposable cash and, indirectly, safety results.
Method of Analysis
Many methods are available to study probabilistic events
such as offshore accidents, including fault tree analyses and
event tree analyses. Based on a review of existing research,
it was decided that the accident process could be best mod-
elled by a modified reliability network. The notion to use
this approach originated with the recognition of similarities
between a physical engineering system and a corporate
safety programme, as described below.
. Similar to an engineering system, safety programme
success depends on the reliability of individual
components.
. Individual components will perform at different levels of
reliability.
. System improvements are usually enacted by making
improvements in individual components.
. The overall system can be realistically subdivided into
sub-systems.
. Some engineering system element subsets are configured
in ‘series’ setups having the properties that (1) the
reliability of the subset is the product of component
reliabilities and (2) the subset reliability is always less
than that of the least reliable component (see Figure 4).
This corresponds to the concept that for some subsets
of the safety system, all elements must be operating
relatively efficiently to produce a satisfactory result.
. Other engineering system elements are configured
in ‘parallel’ setups having the properties that (1) the
Figure 4. Series versus parallel subsets.
 CAN WE PREDICT OCCUPATIONAL ACCIDENT FREQUENCY?
reliability of the subset is calculated by subtracting the
product of component probabilities of failure from
unity, and (2) the reliability of the subset is always
greater than that of the most reliable component (see
Figure 4). This corresponds to the concept that for
some subsets of the safety system, poor performance in
some elements can be ‘compensated for’ by superior
performance by others within the subset.
A mathematical example can be used to illustrate the
final two points above, with reference to the equations in
Figure 4. Consider two subsets of elements, each contain-
ing two elements, one connected in series, the other in
parallel. Assume a situation where the system reliabilities
are approximately equal, produced (for example) when
the component reliabilities of the series subset are 0.6
and 0.7, giving a system reliability of (0.6  0.7 ¼ 0.42),
and the component reliabilities of the parallel subset are
0.2 and 0.3, producing a system reliability of (1 –
(1 2 0.2)  (1 2 0.3) ¼ 0.44). Suppose system failure is
proposed to occur when overall reliability falls below
approximately 0.35. In the series arrangement, this would
occur if the first component reliability were to fall below
0.5, a drop of only 17% from the original value of 0.6.
However, in the parallel arrangement, a fall below system
reliability of 0.35 would require the first component
Figure 5. Internal arrangement of the elements in the model.
Trans IChemE, Part B, Process Safety and Environmental Protection, 2006, 84(B3): 208–221
213
reliability to drop from 0.2 to approximately 0.06, a fall
of 70%. A failure of the parallel system requires a much
greater percentage component reliability drop than is the
case for the series system. This example shows how the
effect of ‘compensation’ by elements in the safety system
is modelled by the parallel arrangement of components in
the reliability network.
Arrangement of elements
The arrangement of elements in the model is shown in
Figure 5. A few points to note are as follows:
. The direct layer elements (behaviour, capability, weather,
safety design, PPE and their subcomponents) are con-
nected in a reliability network. The reliability of the
overall safety system is calculated from these direct
elements in much the same way as would be done for
a physical network (Billinton and Allan, 1983). The
only departure from formal system reliability calcul-
ation methodology is the necessary inclusion of rela-
tive strength factors, which is discussed in the next
subsection.
. The external elements influence corporate factors, and
these in turn influence the direct components, as shown
in Figure 5. The mathematics of this process is described
in the next subsection.
214 ATTWOOD et al.
. The main direct elements (behaviour, capability,
weather, safety design and PPE), are connected in a
series configuration, reflecting the belief that all must
work well in an efficient safety programme.
. Some element subsets, for example (1) knowledge and
intelligence and (2) coordination, fitness and lack of fati-
gue, are connected in parallel arrangements. This reflects
the belief that a degree of compensation is available
in the process. Examples of this would be when good
intelligence facilitated accident avoidance for a worker
having a less than ideal knowledge of safety procedures,
or when a high level of coordination and fitness allowed
a fatigued worker to successfully avoid an accident. Note
the analogy in this analysis to a redundant, parallel –
connected, pump providing increased system reliability
in a multi-unit pump house.
Strength of individual elements
The model accounts for the fact that not all elements
affect overall safety performance equally. Consistent with
the overall model structure, choices about levels of import-
ance have been made on a layer by layer basis. First, the
relative importance of the five overall elements directly
affecting accidents (behaviour, capability, weather, safety
design and PPE) has been quantified. Moving to the next
level, within the group of capability elements, is physical
capability more important than mental, and, by how
much? And moving down still further in the structure,
which of the physical capability elements (coordination,
fitness and lack of fatigue) is the most important, and by
how much? These choices are required for all the direct
elements.
The specific decisions regarding relative element import-
ance were based on information gained from a survey of
safety experts representing industry, regulatory agencies
and the academic community. The experts were asked to
assess, using a 1 –10 scale, each direct element’s ability
to affect occupational accident frequency. The arrangement
of survey questions was consistent with the model sub-
groups shown in Figure 3. The results were then normalized
to ensure that the relative importance of each element
Figure 6. Element strengths.
Trans IChemE, Part B, Process Safety and Environmental Protection, 2006, 84(B3): 208–221
within each group was extracted in a consistent manner
(Attwood et al., 2005b). The resulting ‘relative importance’
values (Figure 6) were then used within the mathematical
model, utilizing a process of ‘strengthening’ or ‘weakening’
individual components in the reliability network, analogous
to adding redundant units to a physical system.
Note that, following the normalisation process, the
strengths of components within the following subgroups
sum to unity.
. primary direct level ¼ behaviour, capability, weather,
safety design, PPE
. behavioural subgroup ¼ attitude, motivation
. capability subgroup ¼ mental, physical
. mental capability subgroup ¼ knowledge, intelligence
. physical capability subgroup ¼ coordination, fitness,
lack of fatigue
Influence at the external—corporate and corporate—
direct interfaces
The model philosophy proposes that external elements
affect corporate decisions and actions, and these, in turn,
influence factors directly affecting the accident process.
An example would be the multiple positive effects of oper-
ating in a regime with an increased value placed on life,
which would result in increased pressure on companies
to improve corporate safety culture, which in turn would
result in improvements in things such as personal protective
equipment and staff motivation.
Using an approach similar to that proposed by Sadiq
et al. (2003), these effects have been accounted for in the
calculation. Matrices of ‘influence coefficients’ have been
generated for both the external—corporate (Table 2) and
corporate—direct interfaces. As was the case for the
strength values discussed previously, the specific values
used to populate the matrices were extracted from the
expert survey. The relevant survey questions in this case
asked the respondents to quantitatively assess each external
and corporate element’s level of influence on the corporate
and direct level factors respectively.
 CAN WE PREDICT OCCUPATIONAL ACCIDENT FREQUENCY? 215

Table 2. External—corporate influencing coefficients. Table 3. Method of element influence on junior elements.

Safety Safety Corporate (Component

training procedures safety culture reliability) 
Safety training Component Influencing (influencing
Value placed on life 0.43
0.43 0.44 reliability reliability coefficient coefficient)
Price of oil 0.18 0.19
0.18
Shareholder pressure 0.27 0.26 0.25
Value of life 0.60 0.43 0.26
Royalty regime 0.12 0.12 0.13 Price of oil 0.50 0.18 0.09
Shareholder pressure 0.40 0.27 0.11
Royalty regime 0.60 0.12 0.07
Sum of the products ¼ reliability value 0.53
There was a high degree of consistency between individ-
ual questionnaire responses. The following points can be
made for illustration.
the purposes of this example only, the initial reliabilities
. Ninety-six percent of the respondents considered value of the external factors to be 0.60, 0.50, 0.40 and 0.60, the
of life to be the external element having the most influ- reliability for safety training is calculated as shown in
ence on safety training. Table 3.
. Eighty-nine percent of the respondents considered This process does not preclude the adjustment of any
royalty regime to be the external element having the element reliability based on ‘stand alone’ specific changes
least influence on corporate safety culture. made in the respective area. For example, improvements in
. The sample standard deviations for the normalised co- personal protective equipment may be made in isolation of
efficients asterisked (
) in Table 2 were all calculated changes in the more senior elements.
as 0.07 or 0.08. It can be shown (Johnson, 2005) that
for the present sample size and these standard deviations,
the maximum error in the prediction of the mean, with
95% confidence, is about 0.02. The reliability calculation
. Figure 7 shows the relative frequency of occurrence of Overall system reliability is a function of the direct layer
normalised influence coefficients for the effect of (1) components’ reliabilities. The latter can either be directly
value of life on training, and (2) royalty regime on input, intentionally over-written, or determined from the
safety culture. corporate element reliabilities using the method described
in the previous subsection. The corporate element
The coefficients shown in Table 2 are used to adjust the reliabilities can in turn be determined from external
lower level element reliabilities whenever the higher level element values. This is consistent with the work’s general
values change. For example, the ‘reliability’ of corporate philosophy of accidents being caused directly at the work-
safety culture is automatically increased with increases in place, but being affected by corporate and external
the values associated with either ‘Value placed on life’, elements. This means that predictions can be made on the
‘Price of oil’, ‘Shareholder pressure’, or ‘Royalty regime’. basis of a complete set of direct, corporate, or external
The specific calculation is as follows (Sadiq et al., 2003). element reliabilities.
The more junior reliability (at this interface the corporate Once component reliabilities have been assigned, system
element) is the sum of the products of the reliabilities of reliability is calculated according to the following for-
those more senior elements (at this interface the external mula. The method is based on standard reliability
elements) considered to have an effect on the element, theory (Billinton and Allan, 1983), adjusted to account
and the respective influencing coefficients. For example, for relative element strength, as discussed previously.
training, as shown in Table 2, is considered to be affected
by value of life (0.43), price of oil (0.18), shareholder Rsys ¼ (Rb )sb  (Rc )sc  (Rw )sw  (Rsd )ssd  (Rppe )sppe
pressure (0.27), and royalty regime (0.12). Assuming, for
(1)

where
Rb ¼ reliability of behaviour
Rc ¼ reliability of capability
Rw ¼ reliability of weather
Rsd ¼ reliability of safety design
Rppe ¼ reliability of personal protective equipment
sb ¼ strength of behaviour
sc ¼ strength of capability
sw ¼ strength of weather
ssd ¼ strength of safety design
sppe ¼ strength of personal protective equipment
Equations to calculate these reliabilities are given in
Figure 7. Frequency of influence coefficients. Appendix A.

Trans IChemE, Part B, Process Safety and Environmental Protection, 2006, 84(B3): 208–221
216
Expected number of accidents
Once system reliability has been calculated, the expected
accident rate (usually accidents per year) is calculated
according to the well known reliability model (Billinton
and Allan, 1983) shown below.

ðt  Management time in replacement
R(t) ¼ exp  l dt ¼ elt , t.0
0 Reputational cost
where
l ¼ accident rate
R(t) ¼ system reliability
t ¼ time
Taking natural logarithms of both sides and setting t ¼ 1,
we get:
l ¼  ln (R(t))
The suitability of this approach depends upon the validity of
an assumption of constant failure rate. The relationship
between failure rate and time for physical components is
characterized by (1) a high initial rate, usually caused by
start-up problems (burn-in period), (2) a period of constant
failure rate (useful life), and finally (3) a period of increasing
failure rate (wear out) (Billinton and Allan, 1983). Because a
plot of this relationship has a shape similar to a bathtub, it is
sometimes referred to as ‘the bathtub philosophy’. Applying
the philosophy to offshore occupational accident frequen-
cies, the parallel could be drawn that until accident causation
became relatively well understood (i.e., during the ‘burn-in’
period), the accident rate was relatively high. However,
evidence (see Figure 8, overall industry Fatal Accident
Rate, or FAR, defined as fatalities per 100 million hours
worked) exists to confirm that the industry has reached a
state of relatively constant accident rate, which validates
the required constant failure rate assumption.
The cost of accidents
The model provides a method to evaluate cost savings
associated with accident frequency reduction. Financial
rewards can be immediately observed upon improvements
made in individual components, which will encourage an
optimisation of safety spending. The model assumes an aver-
age offshore accident will have costs as detailed in Table 4
(Attwood, 2005). It has been assumed that the worker will
Figure 8. Overall oil and gas fatal accident rate versus time (International
Association of Oil & Gas Producers, 2004).
Trans IChemE, Part B, Process Safety and Environmental Protection, 2006, 84(B3): 208–221
ATTWOOD et al.
Table 4. Occupational accident cost.
Element Cost ($ Canadian)
First aid 500.00
Procure and provide replacement worker 2500.00
Salary cost of replacement worker 7000.00
3500.00
Accident investigation costs 4500.00
(2) Rehabilitation costs 2500.00
10 000.00
Total 30 500.00
remain unable to work for an average period of two weeks.
The cost element is determined by multiplying the cost of
an accident by the expected number of accidents.
(3) PARAMETRIC ANALYSIS
In order to demonstrate individual elements’ relative
importance to overall system performance, a series of
hypothetical model runs have been executed. Base case
component reliabilities were determined by calibrating
the model so that the output corresponded to the number
of accidents on an average platform assuming global
industry average total recordable incident rate. Individual
component reliabilities were then incrementally increased
from the calibrated starting positions and the output
noted. Figure 9 shows predicted numbers of accidents as
six factors’ individual component reliabilities are increased
from the starting position to 30% improvement.
The greatest system improvement is seen with improve-
ments in ‘value placed by society on life’, which might be
expected, since the results of the expert survey showed that
it heavily affects all three corporate elements, which in turn
affect the direct elements. The next most important
elements are safety culture and safety design. Safety culture
heavily influences the direct elements, and safety design
‘improvements’ prove more influential than weather, lack
of fatigue, and price of oil, due to the following
considerations.
. safety design (0.21) carries a higher “strength” value than
weather (0.15), as derived from the poll of safety experts;
. whilst capability and safety design carry similar strength
values (0.21), lack of fatigue is a sub-element of capa-
bility only, and is a member of the group of physical
Figure 9. Number of accidents versus improvement in component
reliability.
 CAN WE PREDICT OCCUPATIONAL ACCIDENT FREQUENCY?
Table 5. Cost savings versus individual component
reliability improvement.
Cost savings on
Factor 30% improvement ($)
Value placed on life 2876
Safety culture 2416
Safety design 1657
Price of oil 1252
Weather 1185
Lack of fatigue 251
elements, which carry relatively lower strength values
(0.36) than mental factors (0.64);
. price of oil was, on average, assigned a relatively low
influencing coefficient (0.18) (compared to its external
factor competitors value of life (0.43) and shareholder
pressure (0.26)).
At first glance these results might encourage operators to
immediately attempt to increase the value placed by society
on life. It is noted that this suggestion represents a reversal
in the direction of influence proposed by this research, from
external through corporate to direct factors, but as oil
companies grow over more influential and operate in
sometimes impoverished countries, such a thought is not
inconceivable. Also, a 30% change in a cultural attitude
such as value placed on life would be next to impossible
to achieve. On the other hand, organisations have it
within their power to produce a 30% enhancement in
things such as safety design, corporate safety culture, and
lack of worker fatigue.
The large effect produced by changes in the value of life
factor also highlights the difficulties organisations face when
oil and gas reserves are discovered in regions where societal
value of life is lower than that in more developed regions.
This will continue to be a challenge for operators as reserves
in more safety conscious areas are depleted.
Table 5 shows cost savings (based on the method and
estimated cost of a single accident documented previously)
realized with a 30% improvement in six individual compo-
nents. In the current financial environment where the price
of a barrel of oil exceeds USD $50, possibly the only value
which would get the attention of a major operator is that
obtained with a 30% improvement in the ‘value placed on
life’ element, and, as mentioned earlier, this would likely
prove very costly to implement. Discussions with operator
safety representatives indicate, however, that despite the rela-
tively modest financial rewards, there is no lack of appetite for
attempts to improve safety. Political and reputational benefits
are sufficiently attractive to maintain a strong desire to pro-
duce the best possible safety results.
EXAMPLE CASES
The model can be used for a variety of purposes. Three
examples are presented here. The first compares safety
results in an ‘ideal’ situation to those obtained in a ‘worst
case’ scenario. Two subsequent examples show how the
model can be used to predict changes in occupational acci-
dent probability as an asset moves through different stages
in its operational life, i.e. from ‘off hire’ to operating in a
given regime, or during the de-mobilization process.
Trans IChemE, Part B, Process Safety and Environmental Protection, 2006, 84(B3): 208–221
217
Example 1: Ideal Situation versus Worst
Case Scenario
Consider a drilling contractor interested in comparing
predicted safety results under the opposite extremes
described below:
Ideal case:
. operating in a region where society places a high value
on life;
. the client demands, and is offered, the very best safety
equipment, procedures, and training schemes;
. the weather conditions are benign;
. the available workforce has a generally cautious attitude
toward safety concerns;
. the price of oil is at a relatively high level.
Worst case:
. operating in a region where societal value of life is less
than average;
. the client is interested in developing a marginal field and
is therefore satisfied with safety equipment, proce-
dures and training schemes which (only) comply with
regulatory requirements;
. the weather conditions are extreme;
. the workforce is generally categorised as more risk-
taking than average;
. the price of oil is at a relatively low level.
The model can be used to predict the number of acci-
dents under these two extremes, as compared to average
conditions. To do this the model is run three times:
. a ‘base case’ with all factor reliabilities set at average
value;
. an ‘ideal’ case where all factor reliabilities are set at
average value þ20%;
. a ‘worst case’ scenario where all factor reliabilities are
set at average value – 20%.
The result is shown in Figure 10. The actual figures
resulting from these extremes (4.8 for worst case versus
3.8 for ideal) indicate that for a typical 100 POB (persons
on board) platform, one less accident per year is predicted
for the ideal situation than for the worst case scenario. The
cost saving associated with this would be about CAD $30K,
which is not very significant in today’s world of oil
company finance. However, since occupational accidents
periodically result in fatalities, the avoidance of a single
accident can be quite attractive from other (for example
public relations) perspectives. On a percentage basis, a
21% improvement in safety results is achieved when the
change from worst to best case conditions is made, which
seems appropriate.
Example 2: Rig Hired and Moved to Location
The model can be used to predict changes in safety
results as an asset moves through stages in its life cycle.
For mobile drilling units (MDU), a typical cycle
includes idle time, hiring, mobilization, operating, and
de-mobilization. The corresponding stages for a fixed
installation include construction, installation, commission-
ing, operating and decommissioning. The examples in
this and the next section concern a MDU.
218 ATTWOOD et al.
Figure 10. Results of Example 1.
Upon hire of an idle MDU, an operator will specify things
such as operational and training requirements, safety targets,
and so on, all of which will affect safety results. The drilling
location will be specified, and this will, by definition, deter-
mine the reliability values assigned to weather, value placed
by society on life, and royalty regime.
Furthermore, crew make-up will be a determining factor
in safety results. In most cases operators will be required by
national legislation to employ local workers for most jobs.
If this is not the case, however, some operators prefer to
avoid the perceived risk associated with using a local work-
force that may, for many reasons, be more likely to experi-
ence accidents than a group more familiar to the operator,
the unit, and the offshore business. Alternatively, the oper-
ator may insist on replacing the MDU’s normal crew with
another deemed more safety conscious. In any event, these
decisions will have a significant affect on safety results.
Figure 11 presents results of model runs conducted to
predict changes in accident probability as a MDU moves
from an idle condition to one where enhanced safety pro-
cedures and training programmes are implemented, a work-
force with superior safety attitude is hired, better PPE is
purchased, and the MDU is moved to a harsh weather
area where value placed on life is lower than average.
To study this scenario, the model is run seven times—
once for each of the changes in situation indicated below.
Note the changes are sequential, and factor reliabilities
are not reset to average between runs.
(1) Base case—all factors set at average value.
(2) Improve safety procedures—this factor adjusted to
average þ20%.
(3) Improve safety training process—this factor adjusted to
average þ20%.
Trans IChemE, Part B, Process Safety and Environmental Protection, 2006, 84(B3): 208–221
Figure 11. Accidents versus position in hiring/operational cycle.
(4) Take on staff with superior safety attitude—this factor
adjusted to average þ20%.
(5) Purchase enhanced PPE—this factor adjusted to aver-
age þ20%.
(6) Move to region with lower than average value placed
on life—this factor adjusted to average – 20%.
(7) Move to area with poor operating (weather) con-
ditions—this factor adjusted to average –20%.
Note that the number of predicted accidents reduces with
each positive change, but moving to an area with lower
than average value placed on life and harsh weather con-
ditions returns the value close to the original prediction.
Example 3: Rig Taken Off-Hire
Similar to Example 2, Figure 12 shows accident prob-
ability as a rig is taken off hire. In this case, it is proposed
that a local and unfamiliar crew is replaced by one more
familiar with the rig and its safety arrangements, the rig
is moved from harsh to calmer weather conditions, and
the company decides to abandon enhanced safety training
and procedures.
To study this scenario, the model is run five times—once
for each of the changes indicated below. The ‘base case’ in
this scenario is the ‘on hire’ condition—subsequent runs
predict incremental changes in accident rate from this
base case. Note the changes are sequential, and factor
reliabilities are not reset to average between runs.
(1) Base case—all factors set at average value.
(2) Replace unfamiliar crew with one more familiar with
rig—this factor adjusted to average þ20%.
(3) Return to benign weather conditions—this factor
adjusted to average þ20%.
 CAN WE PREDICT OCCUPATIONAL ACCIDENT FREQUENCY?
Figure 12. Rig taken off hire.
(4) Abandon enhanced safety training—this factor adjusted
to average 220%.
(5) Abandon enhanced safety procedures—this factor
adjusted to average 220%.
The number of predicted occupational accidents is
reduced upon crew replacement and weather improvement,
but again approaches the on-hire levels with the abandon-
ment of the enhanced training and procedures.
CONCLUSIONS
An accurate prediction of occupational accidents is a
difficult and complicated endeavour. If accidents could be
reliably foreseen, they could all be prevented. Unfortu-
nately, a satisfactorily low frequency of occupational acci-
dents has not been achieved today.
Many different approaches to accident reduction have
been taken over the years. The model proposed here
relies on the similarities between a physical engineering
system and a safety programme utilized by a company in
its efforts to reduce occupational accidents.
The model’s approach recognizes several fundamental
beliefs, as follows:
. for some sub-sets of a safety system, individual factors
must all be working efficiently to produce good results;
for others, a degree of compensation is available;
. both external and corporate elements affect the accident
process;
. the degrees to which the component factors affect the
accident process differ.
The model accounts for these beliefs in a quantitative
way, incorporating the views of safety experts. It can be
used to predict safety results following enhancements of
individual elements at the direct, corporate, or external
level. Also, the model can be used to evaluate relative prob-
ability of occupational accidents under various scenarios or
during stages in an asset’s deployment cycle.
Trans IChemE, Part B, Process Safety and Environmental Protection, 2006, 84(B3): 208–221
219
The model predicts financial rewards and penalties
associated with changes in various safety factors. Users can
conveniently see the effects of changes in safety elements,
offering them a practical means of deciding where to spend
their available capital.
As with any research, possibilities for enhancements
exist. Improved knowledge with respect to strength of indi-
vidual factors and influence of senior factors on junior
members can be directly input. Changes in structural
relationships are possible with very little effort, as are
additions of newly considered elements. For example, it
would be interesting to consider the inclusion of a function
to model the reputation and political benefits associated
with a reduction in accident frequency, or to include
these types of pressures as external input factors.
The authors believe that the proposed reliability based
model, with its capability to predict occupational accidents
and offers direction and focus to the safety improvement
effort in the offshore oil and gas industry. The next stage
in the research will be the application of the model to a
real offshore oil and gas project.
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height offshore, Offshore Technology Report 2002/001, Prepared by Rsp ¼ reliability of shareholder pressure (direct input)
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The manuscript was received 13 May 2005 and accepted for publication
after revision 19 September 2005.
Ivlt ¼ influence coefficient of value of life on safety
training
Ipopr ¼ influence coefficient of price of oil on safety
procedures
APPENDIX A Isppr ¼ influence coefficient of shareholder pressure on
Rw (reliability value for weather conditions) is a direct safety procedures
input (independent variable not based on the values of Irrpr ¼ influence coefficient of royalty regime on safety
other elements). Reliabilities of the other elements are procedures

Trans IChemE, Part B, Process Safety and Environmental Protection, 2006, 84(B3): 208–221
 CAN WE PREDICT OCCUPATIONAL ACCIDENT FREQUENCY? 221

Ivlpr ¼ influence coefficient
procedures
Iposc ¼ influence coefficient
culture
Ispsc ¼ influence coefficient
safety culture
Irrsc ¼ influence coefficient
culture
Ivlsc ¼ influence coefficient
culture
of value of life on safety
of price of oil on safety
of shareholder pressure on
of royalty regime on safety
of value of life on safety
slf ¼ strength of lack of fatigue
sc ¼ strength of coordination
Mental capability:
Rme ¼ (1  (1  Rk )sk  (1  Ri )si ) composed of:
Knowledge:
Rk ¼ Rt  Itk þ Rpr  Iprk þ Rsc  Isck
Intelligence:
Ri ¼ direct input

Capability: where:
sp sme
Rc ¼ (Rp )  (Rme ) composed of: Itk ¼ influence coefficient of safety training on
Physical capability: knowledge
Rp ¼ (1  (1  Rf )sf  (1  Rlf )slf  (1  Rc )sc ) Iprk ¼ influence coefficient of safety procedures on
knowledge
composed of: Isck ¼ influence coefficient of safety culture on
Fitness: knowledge
Rf ¼ Rt  Itf þ Rpr  Iprf þ Rsc  Iscf sk ¼ strength of knowledge
Lack of fatigue: si ¼ strength of intelligence
Rlf ¼ Rt  Itlf þ Rpr  Iprlf þ Rsc  Isclf Safety Design:
Coordination: Rsd ¼ Rt  Itsd þ Rpr  Iprsd þ Rsc  Iscsd
Rc ¼ direct input
where:
where: Itsd ¼ influence coefficient of safety training on
Itf ¼ influence coefficient of safety training on fitness safety design
Iprf ¼ influence coefficient of safety procedures on Iprsd ¼ influence coefficient of safety procedures on
fitness safety design
Iscf ¼ influence coefficient of safety culture on fitness Iscsd ¼ influence coefficient of safety culture on
Itlf ¼ influence coefficient of safety training on lack of safety design
fatigue
PPE:
Iprlf ¼ influence coefficient of safety procedures on lack
of fatigue Rppe ¼ Rt  Itppe þ Rpr  Iprppe þ Rsc  Iscppe
Isclf ¼ influence coefficient of safety culture on lack of
where:
fatigue
sp ¼ strength of physical capability Itppe ¼ influence coefficient of safety training on PPE
sme ¼ strength of mental capability Iprppe ¼ influence coefficient of safety procedures on PPE
sf ¼ strength of fitness Iscppe ¼ influence coefficient of safety culture on PPE

Trans IChemE, Part B, Process Safety and Environmental Protection, 2006, 84(B3): 208–221