[No. 20374.

 October 11, 1923]

In re will of Dolores Coronel, deceased. LORENZO PECSON, applicant and

appellee, vs. AGUSTIN CORONEL ET AL., opponents and appellants.
 

ROMUALDEZ, J.;                                                           

 
FACTS:        On November 28, 1922, the Court of First Instance of Pampanga probated as the
last will and testament of Dolores Coronel (testatrix) who named as her sole heir Lorenzo
Pecson, the husband of her niece. The relatives of testatrix by consanguinity questioned the
genuineness of the will on the following grounds: First, that it was improbable and exceptional
that Dolores Coronel should dispose of her estate by excluding her blood relatives; and second,
that if such will was not expressed in fact, it was due to extraneous illegal influence.
 

ISSUE:        Whether the decedent can exclude her blood relatives in the disposition of her
estate.
 

HELD:        YES. It is true that the ties of relationship in the Philippines are very strong but we
understand that cases of preterition of relatives from the inheritance are not rare. The liberty to
dispose of one’s estate by will when there are no forced (compulsory) heirs is rendered sacred by
the Civil Code in force in the Philippines since 1989.
 

The SC held that nothing is strange in the preterition made by Dolores Coronel of her blood
relatives, nor in the designation of Lorenzo Pecson as her sole beneficiary. Furthermore,
although the institution of the beneficiary here would not seem the most usual and customary,
still this would not be null per se.
 

“In the absence of any statutory restriction every person possesses absolute dominion over his
property, and may bestow it upon whomsoever he pleases without regard to natural or legal
claim upon his bounty. If the testator possesses the requisite capacity to make a will, and the
disposition of his property is not affected by fraud or undue influence, the will is not rendered
invalid by the fact that it is unnatural, unreasonable, or unjust. Nothing can prevent the testator
from making a will as eccentric, as injudicious, or as unjust as caprice, frivolity, or revenge can
dictate. X X X ” (40 Cyc., 1079.)

Testate Estate of the late Reverend Father Pascual Rigor, The Parish Priest, G.R. No. L-22036,
April 30, 1979.
20
JUL

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[AQUINO, J.]

FACTS

Father Rigor died leaving a will naming as devisees the testator’s three sisters. The will also
contained a bequest to be given to the nearest male relative who shall pursue an ecclesiastical
career until his ordination as priest. Inasmuch as no nephew of the testator claimed the devise
and as the administratrix and the legal heirs believed that the parish priest of Victoria had no
right to administer the ricelands, the same were not delivered to that ecclesiastic.

ISSUE

Whether the testator’s nearest male relative who took the priesthood after the testator’s death
falls within the intention of the testator in providing to whom the bequest is to be given.

RULING

NO. The Court held that the said bequest refers to the testator’s nearest male relative living at the
time of his death and not to any indefinite time thereafter. “In order to be capacitated to inherit,
the heir, devisee or legatee must be living at the moment the succession opens, except in case of
representation, when it is proper” (Art. 1025, Civil Code).Inasmuch as the testator was not
survived by any nephew who became a priest, the unavoidable conclusion is that the bequest in
question was ineffectual or inoperative. Therefore, the administration of the rice lands by the
parish priest of Victoria, as envisaged in the will was likewise inoperative.

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Lopez v. Gonzaga
No. L-18788
January 31, 1964

FACTS:
This case involves Soledad Gonzaga Vda. de Ferrer who died in intestate on April 11, 1935
without any issue and leaving real and personal properties worth 400,000 PHP. She was survived
by the plaintiffs, who are her nearest of kin—her brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces. During
the lifetime of the deceased, she expressed that as long as her brother, Luis Gonzaga, the
principal defendant was engaged in his coconut oil experimentation he could use the products
and rentals of her properties for his experiments. The scientific venture by the defendant was
discontinued when he became totally blind in October, 1955. Due to this, plaintiff Lopez (I have
no idea how are they related since the case did not say) asks for a partition of the estate and
cancellation of titles of lands fraudulently transferred in the name of defendant.

Defendant filed MTD for res judicial and non-inclusion parties which was denied. Defendant
filed their answer, stating that there was no intestacy and the a will of Soledad Gonzaga who
instituted Luis Gonzaga, as sole heir, and such will was allowed and probated. After trial, the
court a quo rendered judgment and both parties appealed.

ISSUE: Whether or not appellee had the burden to produce the copy of the original will which
was destroyed during the last war?

HELD:
The argument is misleading. There is proof that copies of the will existed other than the one

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burned while in appellee’s possession. From the deposition of appellee it cannot be inferred that
Atty. Hornillas kept a copy of the original submitted to the court. In this case, the appellee is not
contending whether the will was executed properly BUT if the will was probated—which was
established, conclusively.

The contention of appellant that Gonzaga has no need to ask the court for an order of
adjudication is erroneous. The order of adjudication is the judicial recognition that in appointing
Luis as her only heir the testatrix did not contravene the law and that the heir was in no way
disqualified. Just as a final order admitting a will to probate concludes all contending the
statutory formal requirements have not been observed.Instead of contradicting the testamentary
institution of heir, the order of adjudication confirms it in this case. The order of Feb 8, 1936
speaks of approval of a “project of partition” while the petition of Jan 29, 1936 referred spoked
of an order of adjudication to a single heir. Such difference in the terminology was an
inadvertent mistake.

Failure of the defendant Gonzaga to file with the Register of Deeds a certified copy of his letters
of administration and the will provided in Section 90 of Act 496 and to records the attested
copies of the will and of the allowance by the court does NOT negate the validity of the
judgment or decree of probate nor the rights of the devisee under the will. The judicial orders
sufficed as notice to interested parties and was substantial compliance with the required
recording of the will itself.

As a witness, defendants counsel, Atty. Rosario testified that the records of the probate court of
Iloilo were discovered by her among the records of the cadastral court in Negros Occidental. Due
to the destruction of the court and property records of Iloilo as a result of the war, no will or
probate order was produced and neither were attested copies with the Register of Deed that result
to an assurance that Soledad died leaving a will instituting his nephew appellee Gonzaga as her
sole testamentary heir (huh? I know).

In the course of the years prior to this case in 1958, appellee held the properties and dealt with
them as sole owner, leasing, encumbering and selling some of them. The court is impressed by
the statements made by Atty. Hortillas, counsel for appellee, averring under oath in clear and
unmistakable terms, twice, before the CFI of Iloilo Negros that deceased made appellee the sole
heir to her properties. Considering the fact that Atty. Hortillas was married to Monserrat
Gonzaga, a sister of Soledad, who would have been one of the heirs intestate had it not been for
the testament in favor of appellee.

This is coupled with possession as owner who exercised dominical acts over the properties of
Gonzaga for 22 years (1936-1958) that constitute conclusive proof of the truth.

MARINA DIZON-RIVERA EXECUTOR-APPELLEE, VS. ESTRELLA DIZON ET AL. ,

OPPOSITORS-APPELLANTS
No L-24561 30 June 1970
AVANCEÑA, C. J.:
FACTS: The testator, Agripina J. Valdez died in Angeles, Pampanga and was survived by seven
compulsory heirs, six legitimate children named Estela Dizon, Tomas V. Dizon, Bernardita
Dizon, Marina Dizon, Angelina Dizon and Josefina Dizon, and a legitimate granddaughter
named Lilia Dizon, who is the only legitimate child and heir of Ramon Dizon, a pre-deceased
legitimate son of the said decedent.
The deceased testator left a will written in Pampango dialect. In her will she named her
compulsory heirs with seven other legitimate grandchildren as her beneficiaries, amounting to

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P1, 801,960.00. She divided, distributed and disposed of all her properties. The distribution is as
follows: (1) Estela Dizon-P98,474.80; (2) Angelina Dizon-P106,307.06; (3) Bernardita Dizon-
P51,968.17; (4) Josefina Dizon-P52,056.39; (5) Tomas Dizon-P131,987.41; (6) Lilia Dizon-
P72,182.47; (7) marina Dizon-P1,148,063.71; (8) Pablo Rivera, Jr.-P69,280.00; and (9) Lilia
Dizon and the other grandchildren-P72,540.00, having a total value of P1,801,960.01.
The last will and testament was admitted to probate, and Marina Dizon was appointed executor.
She filed the project of partition; however, oppositors Tomas Dizon and the others filed a
counter-project of partition.
The lower court approved the partition filed by Marina Dizon.
ISSUE: Whether or not the testator is correct in her distribution of properties to her compulsory
heirs and grandchildren.
RULING: Yes, the institution and partition made by the testator is correct. The testator expressly
provided for in her will that her property be divided in accordance with her dispositions, where
she specified each real property in her estate and designated the particular heir among her seven
compulsory heirs and seven other grandchildren to whom she bequeathed the same. Such was a
valid partition of her estate, as contemplated and authorized in the first paragraph of Article 1080
of the Civil Code, providing that ― Should a person make a partition of his estate by an act inter
vivos or by will, such partition shall be respected, insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of
compulsory heirs

ONESIMA D. BELEN, petitioner-appellant, vs. BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and

MILAGROS BELEN DE OLAGUERA, oppositors-appellees.
G.R. No. L-14474 October 31, 1960
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
FACTS:Filomena Diaz died on February 8, 1954, leaving two legitimate children, Milagros
Belen de Olsguera, married, with seven (7) legitimate children, and Onesima D. Belen, single.
On March 19, 1958, Onesima D. Belen filed a petition in Special Proceedings No. 9226,
contending that the amount that would have appertained to Filomena Diaz under the codicil
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should now be divided(equally) only between herself and Milagros Belen de Olaguera, as the
surviving children of the said deceased, to the exclusion, in other words, of the seven (7)
legitimate children of Milagros Belen de Olaguera.
According to appellant, the term "sus descendeintes legitimos," as used in the codicil, should be
interpreted to mean descendants nearest in the degree to the original legatee Filomena Diaz. In
the present case, they are her two daughters (Milagros and Onesima Belen), thereby excluding
the seven grandchildren of said legatee.
ISSUE: Is the appellant correct in her contention?
HELD: As to her first point, the appellant is the correct ion her view that the trial court's
interpretation of clause 10 of the codicil to the will of Benigno Diaz has not been affirmed in our
previous decision (G.R. No. L-10164). Perusal of that judgment will show that this Court left the
issue open at the time, contenting itself with pointing out that the then appellant Administrator of
the estate of Folimena Diaz was not the proper party to the raise the particular issue.
As the actual meaning of the provision —
El restro se distribuira a las siguientes personas que aun viven, o a sus descendientes legitimos,
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it is undeniable that but this clause the testator ordained a simple substitution (sustitucion vulgar)
with a plurality of substitutes for each legatee. This form of substitution authorized by the first
poart of Article 860 of the Civil Code (Art. 778 of the Code of 1889):
Two or more persons may be substituted for one and one person for two or more heirs.
The issue is now squarely before us : do the words "sus descendientes legitimos" refer conjointly
to all living descendant (children and grandchildren) of the legatee, as a class; or they refer to the
descendants nearest in degree?
Appellant Onesima Belen contends that the phrase should be taken to mean the relatives nearest
in degree to Filomena Diaz; and that the legacy should be therefore divided equally between her
and her sister Milagros Belen de Olaguera, to the exclusion of the latter's sons and daughters,
grand children of the original legatee, Filomena Diaz. As authority in support of her thesis,
appellant invokes Article 959 of the Civil Code of the Philippines (reproducing ne varieter
Article 751 of the Code of 1889):
A distribution made in general terms in favor of the testator's relatives shall be understood as
made in favor of those nearest in degree.
The argument fails to note that this article is specifically limited in its application to the case
where the beneficiaries are relatives of the testator, not those of the legatee. In such an
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event, the law assumes that the testator intended to refer to the rules of intestacy, in order to
benefit the relatives closest to him.
But the ratios legis (that among a testator's relative the closest are dearest) obviously does not
supply where the beneficiaries are relatives of another person (the legatee) and noot of the
testator . There is no logical reason in this case to presume that the testator intended to refer to
the rules of intestacy, for he precisely made a testament and provided substitutes for each
legatee; nor can it be said that his affections would prefer the nearest relatives of the legatee to
those more distant, since he envisages all of them in a group, and only as mere substitutes for a
preferred beneficiary.
Should Article 959 (old Art. 751) be applied by analogy? There are various reasons against this.
The most important one is that under this article, as recognized by the principal commentators on
the Code of 1889, the nearest of exclude all the farther relatives and right of representation does
not operate.
The result would be that by applying to the descendants of Filorema Diaz the "nearest relatives"
rule of Article 959, the inheritance would be limited to her children, or anyone of them,
excluding the grandchildren altogether. This could hardly be the intention of the testator who, in
the selfsame clause 10 of his council (ante), speaks of "cuatro hijos de mi difunto hermano
Fabian" and of "los hijos de Domingo Legarda," as well as of "descendientes legitimos" of the
other legates, to us indicating clearly that he understood well that hijos and descendientes are not
synonymous terms.
We conclude that in the absence of other indications of contrary intent, the proper rule to apply
in the instant case is that the testator, by designating a class or group of legatees, intended all
members thereof to succeed per capita, in consonance with article 846. So that the original
legacy to Filomena Diaz should be equally divided among her surviving children and
grandchidren.
The order appealed from is affirmed, with costs to the appellant..

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