G.R. No. L-24006 November 25, 1967 created by its own law.

 It is quite obvious then that the status of adoption,

JOSEFINA JUANA DE DIOS RAMIREZ MARCAIDA, petitioner-appellant, once created under the proper foreign law, will be recognized in this country,
vs. except where public policy or the interests of its inhabitants forbid its
LEONCIO V. AGLUBAT, in his capacity as Deputy Local Civil Registrar enforcement and demand the substitution of the lex fori. At any rate,
of Manila, respondent-appellee. whatever may be the effect of adoption, the rights of the State and adoptee
and other persons interested are fully safeguarded by Article 15 of our Civil
Facts: Code which, in terms explicit, provides that: "Laws relating to family rights
Refusal of the Local Civil Registrar of Manila to record an Escritura and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are
de Adopcion executed in Madrid, Spain, is now challenged before this Court binding upon citizens of the Philippines even though living abroad."
on appeal by registrant-adoptee from a judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Manila confirmatory of such refusal. An adoption created under the law of a foreign country is entitled to
registration in the corresponding civil register of the Philippines. It is to be
The disputed deed of adoption had its inception, thus: Prior to understood, however, that the effects of such adoption shall be governed by
October 21, 1958, proceedings for adoption were started before the Court of the laws of this country.
First Instance of Madrid, Spain by Maria Garnier Garreau, then 84 years of
age, adopting Josefina Juana de Dios Ramirez Marcaida, 55 years, a citizen
of the Philippines. Both were residents of Madrid, Spain. On that date,
October 21, 1958, the court granted the application for adoption and gave the
necessary judicial authority, once the judgment becomes final, to execute the
corresponding adoption document. In compliance, on November 29, 1958,
the notarial document of adoption — which embodies the court order of
adoption — whereunder Maria Garnier Garreau formally adopted petitioner,
was executed in Madrid.

In conformity with our law, this escritura de adopcion was, on

December 10, 1953, authenticated by Emilio S. Martinez, Philippine Vice
Consul, Philippine Embassy, Madrid, who issued the corresponding
certificate of authentication.

The document of adoption was filed in the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar of Manila on January 15, 1959. The Registrar, however, refused to
register that document upon the ground that under Philippine law, adoption
can only be had through judicial proceeding. And since the notarial document
of adoption is not a judicial proceeding, it is not entitled to registration.

Issue:
Is the trial court correct in concluding that what is registrable is only adoption
obtained through a judgment rendered by a Philippine court?

Ruling:
Private international law offers no obstacle to recognition of foreign
adoption. This rests on the principle that the status of adoption, created by
the law of a State having jurisdiction to create it, will be given the same effect
in another state as is given by the latter state to the status of adoption when
G.R. No. L-24006, November 25, 1967
JOSEFINA JUANA DE DIOS RAMIREZ MARCAIDA vs. LEONCIO V.
AGLUBAT, in his capacity as Deputy Local Civil Registrar of Manila,
respondent-appellee.
FACTS:
Prior to October 21, 1958, proceedings for adoption were started
before the CFI- Madrid, Spain by Maria Garnier Garreau, then 84 years of
age, adopting Josefina Juana de Dios Ramirez Marcaida, 55 years, a citizen
of the Philippines. Both were residents of Madrid, Spain. The court granted
the application for adoption and gave the necessary judicial authority, once
the judgment becomes final, to execute the corresponding adoption
document.
On November 29, 1958, the notarial document of adoption — which
embodies the court order of adoption — whereunder Maria Garnier Garreau
formally adopted petitioner, was executed before Notary Public Braulio
Velasco Carrasquedo of Madrid. In that document, Maria Gernier Garreau
instituted petitioner, amongst other conditions as here unica y universal
heredera de todos sus bienes, derechos y acciones, presentes y futuros.
In conformity with our law, this escritura de adopcion (deed of
adoption) was, on December 10, 1953, authenticated by Emilio S. Martinez,
Philippine Vice Consul, Philippine Embassy, Madrid, who issued the
corresponding certificate of authentication.
The document of adoption was filed in the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar of Manila. The Registrar refused to register it on the ground that
under Philippine law, adoption can only be had through judicial proceeding.
And since the notarial document of adoption is not a judicial proceeding, it is
not entitled to registration. Petitioner went to CFI- Manila on mandamus. The
lower court dismissed said petition and decided that what is registrable is
only adoption obtained through a judgment rendered by a Philippine court.
Solicitor General argues that petitioner’s case does not come within
the purview of Article 409 of the Civil Code, which states that:
“In cases of legal separation, adoption, naturalization and
other judicial orders mentioned in the preceding article it shall be the
duty of the clerk of the court which issued the decree to ascertain
whether the same has been registered, and if this has not been
done, to send a copy of said decree to the civil registry of the city or
municipality where the court is functioning”, and Section 11 of Act
3753, which reads:
“Duties of clerks of court to register certain
decisions. — In cases of legitimation, acknowledgment,
adoption, naturalization, and change of given or family name,
or both, upon the decree of the court becoming final, it shall
be the duty of the clerk of the court which issued the decree
to ascertain whether the same has been registered, and if
this has not been done, to have said decree recorded in the
office of the civil registrar of the municipality where the court
is functioning.:”
ISSUE:
WON the order of adoption issued by the CFI- Madrid can be registered in
the Philippines.
RULING:
Yes. The cited provisions refer to adoptions effected in the
Philippines.Article 409 of the Civil Code and Section 10 of the Registry Law
speak of adoption which shall be registered in the municipality or city where
the court issuing the adoption decree is functioning.
We perceive that Article 409 and Section 10 aforesaid were
incorporated into the statute books merely to give effect to our law which
required judicial proceedings for adoption. Limitation of registration of
adoptions to those granted by Philippine courts is a misconception which a
broader view allows us now to correct. For, if registration is to be narrowed
down to local adoptions, it is the function of Congress, not of this Court, to
spell out such limitation. We cannot carve out a prohibition where the law
does not so state. Excessive rigidity serves no purpose. And, by Articles 407
and 408 of our Civil Code, the disputed document of adoption is registrable.
No suggestion there is in the record that prejudice to State and
adoptee, or any other person for that matter, would ensue from the adoption
here involved. The validity thereof is not under attack. At any rate, whatever
may be the effect of adoption, the rights of the State and adoptee and other
persons interested are fully safeguarded by Article 15 of our Civil Code
which, in terms explicit, provides that: “Laws relating to family rights and
duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding
upon citizens of the Philippines even though living abroad.”
Private international law offers no obstacle to recognition of foreign
adoption. This rests on the principle that the status of adoption, created by
the law of a State having jurisdiction to create it, will be given the same effect
in another state as is given by the latter state to the status of adoption when
created by its own law. It is quite obvious then that the status of adoption,
once created under the proper foreign law, will be recognized in this country,
except where public policy or the interests of its inhabitants forbid its
enforcement and demand the substitution of the lex fori. Indeed, implicit in
Article 15 of our Civil Code just quoted, is that the exercise of incidents to
foreign adoption “remains subject to local law.”
 We hold that an adoption created under the law of a foreign country
is entitled to registration in the corresponding civil register of the Philippines.
It is to be understood, however, that the effects of such adoption shall be
governed by the laws of this country.

The lower court’s decision is hereby reversed; and the Local Civil
Registrar of Manila is hereby directed to register the deed of adoption
(Escritura de Adopcion) by Maria Garnier Garreau in favor of petitioner
Josefina de Dios Ramirez Marcaida.
GR No. L-223145 November 29, 1968
Testate Estate of Idonah Slade Perkins, Renato D. Tayag
vs.
Benguet Consolidated , Inc.
FACTS:
Idonah Slade Perkins, an American citizen who died in New York City, left
among others, two stock certificates issued by Benguet Consolidated, a
corporation domiciled in the Philippines. As ancillary administrator of Perkins’
estate in the Philippines, Tayag now wants to take possession of these stock
certificates but County Trust Company of New York, the domiciliary
administrator, refused to part with them. Thus, the probate court of the
Philippines was forced to issue an order declaring the stock certificates as
lost and ordering Benguet Consolidated to issue new stock certificates
representing Perkins’ shares. Benguet Consolidated appealed the order,
arguing that the stock certificates are not lost as they are in existence and
currently in the possession of County Trust Company of New York.
Probate court has authority to issue the order enforcing the ancillary
administrator’s right to the stock certificates when the actual situs of the
shares of stocks is in the Philippines.
It would follow then that the authority of the probate court to require that
ancillary administrator's right to "the stock certificates covering the 33,002
shares ... standing in her name in the books of [appellant] Benguet
Consolidated, Inc...." be respected is equally beyond question. For appellant
is a Philippine corporation owing full allegiance and subject to the
unrestricted jurisdiction of local courts. Its shares of stock cannot therefore be
considered in any wise as immune from lawful court orders.
Our holding in Wells Fargo Bank and Union v. Collector of Internal Revenue
finds application. "In the instant case, the actual situs of the shares of stock is
in the Philippines, the corporation being domiciled [here]." To the force of the
above undeniable proposition, not even appellant is insensible. It does not
dispute it. Nor could it successfully do so even if it were so minded.

ISSUE: Whether or not the order of the lower court is proper

HELD:

The appeal lacks merit.

Tayag, as ancillary administrator, has the power to gain control and

possession of all assets of the decedent within the jurisdiction of the
Philippines

It is to be noted that the scope of the power of the ancillary administrator

was, in an earlier case, set forth by Justice Malcolm. Thus: "It is often
necessary to have more than one administration of an estate. When a person
dies intestate owning property in the country of his domicile as well as in a
foreign country, administration is had in both countries. That which is granted
in the jurisdiction of decedent's last domicile is termed the principal
administration, while any other administration is termed the ancillary
administration. The reason for the latter is because a grant of administration
does not ex proprio vigore have any effect beyond the limits of the country in
which it is granted. Hence, an administrator appointed in a foreign state has
no authority in the [Philippines]. The ancillary administration is proper,
whenever a person dies, leaving in a country other than that of his last
domicile, property to be administered in the nature of assets of the deceased
liable for his individual debts or to be distributed among his heirs."
Tayag vs Benguet Consolidated Inc Assuming that a contrariety exist between the provision of the laws
26 SCRA 242 [GR No. L-23145 November 27,1968] and the command of a court decree, the latter is to be followed.
A corporation as known to Philippine jurisprudence is a creature
Facts: without any existence until it has received the imprimatur of state according
County Trust Company of New York, United States of America is the to law. It is logically inconceivable therefore it will have rights and privileges
domiciliary administration of the decedent, Idonah Slade Perkins who owned of a higher priority than that of its creator, more than that, it cannot
33,002 shares of stocks in the appellant, domestic corporation, Benguet legitimately refuse to yield obedience to acts of its state organs, certainly not
Consolidated Inc. located in the Philippines. A dispute arose between the excluding the judiciary, whenever called upon to do so.
appellee, Tayag who is the appointed ancillary of Perkins in the Philippines
and the domiciliary administration as to who is entitled to the possession of
the certificate of shares, however, County Trust Company refuses to transfer
the said certificate to Tayag despite the order of the court. Hence, the
appellee was compelled to petition the court for the appellant to declare the
subject certificates as lost to which appellant allegeed that no new certificate
can be issued and the same cannot be rendered as lost in accordance with
their by-laws.

Issue: Whether or not the certificate of shares of stock can be declared lost.

Held:
Yes. Administration whether principal or ancillary certainly extends to
the assets of a decedent found within the state or country where it was
granted.

It is often necessary to have more than one administration of an

estate. When a person dies intestate owning property located in the country
of his domicile as well as in a foreign country, administration is had in both
countries. That which is granted in the jurisdiction of decedent’s last domicile
is termed the principal administration, while any other administration is
termed the ancillary administration. The reason for the latter is because a
grant of administration does not ex proprio vigore have any effect beyond the
limits of the country in which it is granted.Hence, an administration appointed
in a foreign state has no authority in the Philippines. The ancillary
administration is proper, whenever a person dies, leaving in a country other
than that of his last domicile, property to be administered in the nature of the
deceased’s liable for his individual debts or to be distributed among his heirs.

Since there is refusal, persistently adhered to by the domiciliary

administration in New York, to deliver the shares of stocks of appellant
corporation owned by the decedent to the ancillary administration in the
Philippines, there was nothing unreasonable or arbitrary in considering them
lost and requiring the appellant to issue new certificates in lieu thereof.
Thereby the task incumbent under the law on the ancillary administration
could be discharged and his responsibility fulfilled.
G.R. No. L-27952, February 15, 1982

TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSE EUGENIO RAMIREZ, MARIA LUISA

PALACIOS, administratrix VS. MARCELLE D. VDA. DE RAMIREZ, ET AL.,
oppositors, JORGE AND ROBERTO RAMIREZ, legatees

FACTS:
Jose Eugenio Ramirez, a Filipino national, died in Spain with only his
widow as compulsory heir. His will was admitted to probate in Manila. The
administratrix submitted a project of partition as follows: the property of the
deceased is to be divided into two parts. One part shall go to the in
satisfaction of her legitime; the other part or "free portion" shall go to Jorge
and Roberto Ramirez. Furthermore, one third (1/3) of the free portion is
charged with the widow's usufruct and the remaining two-third (2/3) with a
usufruct in favor of Wanda.

Jorge and Roberto opposed the project of partition on the ground

that the provisions for fideicommissary substitutions are invalid because the
first heirs are not related to the second heirs or substitutes within the first
degree.

ISSUE: Whether the proposed partition is in accordance with law.

RULING:
NO. It may be useful to recall that Substitution is the appointment of
another heir so that he may enter into the inheritance in default of the heir
originally instituted. As regards the substitution in its fideicommissary aspect,
the appellants are correct in their claim that it is void for the reason that the
substitutes (Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace V. Ramirez) are not related to
Wanda, the heir originally instituted. Art. 863 of the Civil Code validates a
fideicommissary substitution "provided such substitution does not go beyond
one degree from the heir originally instituted."

From this, it follows that the fideicommissary can only be either a

child or a parent of the first heir. These are the only relatives who are one
generation or degree from the fiduciary. There is no absolute duty imposed
on Wanda to transmit the usufruct to the substitutes as required by Arts. 865
and 867 of the Civil Code. In fact, the appellee admits "that the testator
contradicts the establishment of a fideicommissary substitution when he
permits the properties subject of the usufruct to be sold upon mutual
agreement of the usufructuaries and the naked owners.
GR No. L-27962, February 15, 1982
Testate of Estate of Ramirez v. Ramirez, et al.

FACTS:

Jose Eugenio Ramirez died leaving as principal beneficiaries his widow,

MarcelleSemoron de Ramirez, a French woman; his two grandnephews
Roberto and Jorge Ramirez; and his companion Wanda de Wrobleski. His
will was admitted to probate by the Court of First Instance. According to the
will ½ shall go to Marcelle in full ownership plus usufruct of the 1/3 of the
whole estate; the grandsons shall have the ½ of the whole estate; and a
usufruct in favour of Wanda.

ISSUE:

Is the partition according to the will valid?

RULING:

No. As to the usufruct granted to Marcelle, the court ruled that to give
Marcelle more than her legitime will run counter to the testator’s intention for
his dispositions even impaired her legitime and tended to favor Wanda.As to
the usufruct in favour of Wanda, the Court upheld its validity. The
Constitutional provision which enables aliens to acquire private lands does
not extend to testamentary succession for otherwise the prohibition will be for
naught and meaningless. Any alien would be able to circumvent the
prohibition by paying money to a Philippine landowner in exchange for devise
of a piece of land. Notwithstanding this, the Court upholds the usufruct in
favour of Wanda because a usufruct does not vest title to the land in the
usufructuary and it is the vesting of title to aliens which is proscribed by the
Constitution.

The court distributed the estate by: ½ to his widow and ½ to the grandsons
but the usufruct of the second half shall go to Wanda.

GR No. 164584, June 22, 2009
Phillip Matthews
vs.
Benjamin Taylor and Joselyn Taylor
Facts:
Declaration of Nullity of Agreement of Lease with Damages.
On June 30, 1988, respondent Benjamin A. Taylor (Benjamin), a British
subject, married Joselyn C. Taylor (Joselyn), a 17-year old Filipina.
On June 9, 1989, while their marriage was subsisting, Joselyn bought from
Diosa M. Martin a 1,294... square-meter lot (Boracay property) situated at
Manoc-Manoc, Boracay Island, Malay, Aklan, for and in consideration of
P129,000.00.
The sale was allegedly financed by Benjamin.
Joselyn and Benjamin, also using the... latter's funds, constructed
improvements thereon and eventually converted the property to a vacation
and tourist resort known as the Admiral Ben Bow Inn.
All required permits and licenses for the operation of the resort were obtained
in the name of Ginna
Celestino, Joselyn's sister.
However, Benjamin and Joselyn had a falling out, and Joselyn ran away with
Kim Philippsen. On June 8, 1992, Joselyn executed a Special Power of
Attorney (SPA) in favor of Benjamin, authorizing the latter to maintain, sell,
lease, and sub-lease and otherwise enter into contract... with third parties
with respect to their Boracay property.
On July 20, 1992, Joselyn as lessor and petitioner Philip Matthews as lessee,
entered into an Agreement of Lease[10] (Agreement) involving the Boracay
property for a period of 25 years, with an annual rental of P12,000.00.  The
agreement was signed by... the parties and executed before a Notary Public.
Petitioner thereafter took possession of the property and renamed the resort
as Music Garden Resort.
Claiming that the Agreement was null and void since it was entered into by
Joselyn without his (Benjamin's) consent, Benjamin instituted an action for
Declaration of Nullity of Agreement of Lease with Damages[11] against
Joselyn and the petitioner.
Benjamin claimed that his funds were used in the acquisition and
improvement of the Boracay property, and coupled with the fact that he was
Joselyn's husband, any transaction involving said property required his
consent.
No Answer was filed, hence, the RTC declared Joselyn and the petitioner in
defeault.
On March 14, 1994, the RTC rendered judgment by default declaring the
Agreement null and void.
The decision was, however, set aside by the CA... petitioner claimed good
faith in transacting with Joselyn.  Since Joselyn appeared to be the owner of
the Boracay property, he found it unnecessary to obtain the consent of
Benjamin.
as appearing in the Agreement,... Benjamin signed as a witness to the
contract, indicating his knowledge of the transaction and, impliedly, his
conformity to the agreement entered into by his wife.  Benjamin was,
therefore, estopped from questioning the validity of the Agreement.
The RTC considered the Boracay property as community property of
Benjamin and Joselyn; thus, the consent of the spouses was necessary to
validate any contract involving the property.
Although the Agreement was evidenced by a public document, the trial court
refused to consider the alleged participation of Benjamin in the questioned
transaction primarily because his signature appeared... only on the last page
of the document and not on every page thereof.
CA affirmed the conclusions made by the RTC.
if, indeed, Benjamin was a willing... participant in the questioned transaction,
the parties to the Agreement should have used the phrase "with my consent"
instead of "signed in the presence of."
CA noted that Joselyn already prepared an SPA in favor of Benjamin
involving the Boracay property; it was... therefore unnecessary for Joselyn to
participate in the execution of the Agreement.
these circumstances yielded the inevitable conclusion that the contract was
null and void having been entered into by Joselyn without the consent of
Benjamin.
Issues:
MARITAL CONSENT OF RESPONDENT BENJAMIN TAYLOR IS NOT
REQUIRED IN THE AGREEMENT OF LEASE
THE PARCEL OF LAND SUBJECT OF THE AGREEMENT OF LEASE IS he had and has no capacity... or personality to question the subsequent
THE EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY OF JOCELYN C. TAYLOR, A FILIPINO lease of the Boracay property by his wife on the theory that in so doing, he
CITIZEN, was merely exercising the prerogative of a husband in respect of conjugal
property.
Ruling:
Principles:
The petition is impressed with merit.
Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, have been disqualified from
It is undisputed that Joselyn acquired the Boracay property in 1989.  Said acquiring lands of the public domain.  Hence, by virtue of the aforecited
acquisition was evidenced by a Deed of Sale with Joselyn as the vendee. constitutional provision, they are also disqualified from acquiring private
The property was also declared for taxation purposes under her name. lands.[19] The primary... purpose of this constitutional provision is the
conservation of the national patrimony.[20]  Our fundamental law cannot be
When Joselyn leased the property to... petitioner, Benjamin sought the any clearer.  The right to acquire lands of the public domain is reserved only
nullification of the contract on two grounds:... first, that he was the actual to Filipino citizens or corporations at least... sixty percent of the capital of
owner of the property since he provided the funds used in purchasing the which is owned by Filipinos.
same;... second, that Joselyn could not enter into a valid contract involving
the... subject property without his consent.
Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states:[18]
Section 7.  Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be
transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations
qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.
The rule is clear and inflexible: aliens are absolutely not allowed to acquire
public or private lands in the Philippines, save only in constitutionally
recognized exceptions
There is no rule more settled than this constitutional prohibition, as more...
and more aliens attempt to circumvent the provision by trying to own lands
through another.
In light of the foregoing jurisprudence, we find and so hold that Benjamin has
no right to nullify the Agreement of Lease between Joselyn and petitioner.
Benjamin, being an alien, is absolutely prohibited from acquiring private and
public lands in the Philippines.
Joselyn appeared to be the designated "vendee" in the Deed of Sale of said
property, she acquired sole ownership thereto.
This is true even if we sustain Benjamin's claim that he provided the funds for
such acquisition.
By entering into such contract... knowing that it was illegal, no implied trust
was created in his favor; no reimbursement for his expenses can be allowed;
and no declaration can be made that the subject property was part of the
conjugal/community property of the spouses.

G.R. No. 74833 January 21, 1991
NARVASA, J.
THOMAS C. CHEESMAN, petitioner
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ESTELITA PADILLA,
respondents
Keyword: american citizen, lack of consent of foreigner spouse of the sale of
Philippine property, prohibition of barring foreigners to own property in the
philippines
Summary: petitioner (an American citizen) and Criselda Cheesman acquired
a parcel of land that was later registered in the latter’s name. Criselda
subsequently sold the land to a third person without the knowledge of the
petitioner. The petitioner then sought the nullification of the sale as he did not
give his consent thereto. The Court held that assuming that it was his
(petitioner’s) intention that the lot in question be purchased by him and his
wife, he acquired no right whatever over the property by virtue of that
purchase; and in attempting to acquire a right or interest in land, vicariously
and clandestinely, he knowingly violated the Constitution; thus, the sale as to
him was null and void.
Facts:
Thomas Cheesman and Criselda P. Cheesman were married on
December 4, 1970 but have been separated since February 15,1981.
On June 4, 1974, a "Deed of Sale and Transfer of Possessory
Rights" was executed by Armando Altares conveying a parcel of unregistered
land and the house thereon (at No. 7 Neptune Street, Gordon Heights,
Olongapo City) in favor of "Criselda P. Cheesman, of legal age, Filipino
citizen, married to Thomas Cheesman, and residing at Lot No. 1, Blk. 8,
Filtration Road, Sta. Rita, Olongapo City . . ." Thomas Cheesman, although
aware of the deed, did not object to the transfer being made only to his wife.
Thereafter—and again with the knowledge of Thomas Cheesman
and also without any protest by him—tax declarations for the property
purchased were issued in the name only of Criselda Cheesman and Criselda
assumed exclusive management and administration of said property, leasing
it to tenants.
On July 1, 1981, Criselda Cheesman sold the property to Estelita M.
Padilla, without the knowledge or consent of Thomas Cheesman. The deed
described Criselda as being " . . . of legal age, married to an American
citizen,. . ."
Thirty days later, or on July 31, 1981, Thomas Cheesman brought
suit in the Court of First Instance at Olongapo City against his wife, Criselda,
and Estelita Padilla, praying for the annulment of the sale on the ground that
the transaction had been executed without his knowledge and consent. An
answer was filed in the names of both defendants, alleging that (1) the
property sold was paraphernal, having been purchased by Criselda with
funds exclusively belonging to her ("her own separate money"); (2) Thomas
Cheesman, being an American, was disqualified to have any interest or right
of ownership in the land; and (3) Estelita Padilla was a buyer in good faith.
CFI: Declared that the sale executed by Criselda Cheesman in favor of
Padilla is void ab initio and ordering the delivery of the property to thomas
cheesman as administrator of the conjugal partnership property.
Trial Court’s summary judgment: the sale between Criselda Cheesman and
Padilla is valid. Thomas Cheesman’s complaint is dismissed and is ordered
to immediately turn over the possession of the hous and lot to Padilla.
IAC: Found all of Thomas Cheesman’s contention to be without merit. IAC
affirmed summary judgment having found no reversible error.
Issue: Whether or not Thomas Cheesman has a right over the alleged
conjugal property sold by his Filipino Wife without his consent despiite him
being an American Citizen.
Held:
No.
Ratio:
The fundamental law prohibits the sale to aliens of residential land.
Section 14, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution ordains that, "Save in cases
of hereditary succession, no private land shall be transferred or conveyed
except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or
hold lands of the public domain." Petitioner Thomas Cheesman was, of
course, charged with knowledge of this prohibition. Thus, assuming that it
was his intention that the lot in question be purchased by him and his wife, he
acquired no right whatever over the property by virtue of that purchase; and
in attempting to acquire a right or interest in land, vicariously and
clandestinely, he knowingly violated the Constitution; the sale as to him was
null and void. In any event, he had and has no capacity or personality to
question the subsequent sale of the same property by his wife on the theory
that in so doing he is merely exercising the prerogative of a husband in
respect of conjugal property. To sustain such a theory would permit indirect
controversion of the constitutional prohibition. If the property were to be
declared conjugal, this would accord to the alien husband a not insubstantial
interest and right over land, as he would then have a decisive vote as to its
transfer or disposition. This is a right that the Constitution does not permit
him to have.

As already observed, the finding that his wife had used her own
money to purchase the property cannot, and will not, at this stage of the
proceedings be reviewed and overturned. But even if it were a fact that said
wife had used conjugal funds to make the acquisition, the considerations just
set out militate, on high constitutional grounds, against his recovering and
holding the property so acquired or any part thereof. And whether in such an
event, he may recover from his wife any share of the money used for the
purchase or charge her with unauthorized disposition or expenditure of
conjugal funds is not now inquired into; that would be, in the premises, a
purely academic exercise. An equally decisive consideration is that Estelita
Padilla is a purchaser in good faith, both the Trial Court and the Appellate
Court having found that Cheesman's own conduct had led her to believe the
property to be exclusive property of the latter's wife, freely disposable by her
without his consent or intervention. An innocent buyer for value, she is
entitled to the protection of the law in her purchase, particularly as against
Cheesman, who would assert rights to the property denied him by both letter
and spirit of the Constitution itself.

Ruling: WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED, with costs

against petitioner.