Case Digest

ARSENIO DE LORIA and RICARDA DE LORIA vs. FELIPE APELAN FELIX

G.R. No. L-9005
June 20, 1958
BENGZON, J.:

Facts: Matea de la Cruz and Felipe Apelan Felix lived together as wife and husband at Cabrera Street,
Pasay City. They acquired properties but had no children. Matea became seriously ill. Knowing
her critical condition Carmen Ordiales and Judith Vizcarra visited and persuaded her to go to
confession. They fetched Father Gerardo Bautista, Catholic parish priest of Pasay. The latter
ratified the union the two. Whereupon the priest heard the confession of the bed-ridden old
woman, gave her Holy Communion, administered the Sacrament of Extreme Unction and then
solemnized her marriage with Felipe Apelan Felix in articulo mortis, Carmen Ordiales and Judith
Vizcarra acting as sponsors or witnesses. It was then January 29 or 30, 1945. After a few months,
Matea recovered from her sickness but died in January 1946. On May 12, 1952, Arsenio and
Ricarda de Loria, grandchildren of Matea’s sister filed a complaint to compel the delivery of the
property left the deceased however, Felipe resisted the action setting up his rights as widower.
The CFI ruled in favor of the complainants but the CA reversed and dismissed the complaint.
They appealed before this Court. The appellants contend that the marriage is invalid because,
first, there was no marriage contract signed as required by Sec. 3 of the Marriage Law; and
second, the priest did file an affidavit with the Local Civil Registry.

Issue: Whether or not the marriage is valid

Held: The marriage is valid. On the ground of lack of affidavit and non-registration of marriage, the
celebration of the marriage in articulo mortis, where all requisites for the validity were present,
the marriage is not voided by the failure of the priest to make and file the affidavit required in
Sec. 20 and 21 of the Marriage Law and to register said marriage in the Local Civil Registry.

The signing of the marriage contract is a formal requirement for evidentiary value, the omission
of which does not render the marriage a nullity. The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
Case Digest

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ARTURO MENDOZA

G.R. No. L-5877
September 28, 1954
PARAS, C.J.:

Facts: On August 5, 1936, the appellant and Jovita de Asis were married in Marikina, Rizal. On May 14,
1941, during the subsistence of the first marriage, the appellant was married to Olga Lema in the
City of Manila. On February 2, 1943, Jovita de Asis died. On August 19, 1949, the appellant
contracted another marriage with Carmencita Panlilio in Calamba, Laguna. This last marriage
gave rise to his prosecution for and conviction of the crime of bigamy.
The appellant contends that his marriage with Olga Lema on May 14, 1941 is null and void and,
therefore, non-existent, having been contracted while his first marriage with Jovita de Asis
August 5, 1936 was still in effect, and that his third marriage to Carmencita Panlilio on August
19, 1949 cannot be the basis of a charge for bigamy because it took place after the death of Jovita
de Asis. The Solicitor General, however, argues that, even assuming that appellant's second
marriage to Olga Lema is void, he is not exempt from criminal liability, in the absence of a
previous judicial annulment of said bigamous marriage; and the case of People vs. Cotas, 40 Off.
Gaz., 3134, is cited. The cited case was essentially different therefore the decision invoked by the
Solicitor General is not controlling.
Issue: Whether or not there is a need for a judicial annulment of a bigamous marriage
Ruling: In the case at bar, it is admitted that appellant's second marriage with Olga Lema was contracted
during the existence of his first marriage with Jovita de Asis. Section 29 of the marriage law (act
3613), in force at the time the appellant contracted his second marriage in 1941, provides as
follows:
Illegal marriages. — Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of
the first spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and
void from its performance, unless:
(a) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved;
(b) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second
marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or the
absentee being generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present
at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, the marriage so contracted being
valid in either case until declared null and void by a competent court.
This statutory provision plainly makes a subsequent marriage contracted by any person during the
lifetime of his first spouse illegal and void from its performance, and no judicial decree is
necessary to establish its invalidity, as distinguished from mere annulable marriages. There is
here no pretence that appellant's second marriage with Olga Lema was contracted in the belief
that the first spouse, Jovita de Asis, has been absent for seven consecutive years or generally
considered as dead, so as to render said marriage valid until declared null and void by a
competent court.
Case Digest

MATILDE ALAVADO vs. CITY GOVERNMENT OF TACLOBAN

G.R. No. L-49084
October 10, 1985
CUEVAS, J.:

Facts: Late Ricardo A. Alavado was employed as a carpenter-foreman by the City Engineer's Office,
Tacloban City with a daily wage of P13.12. His last day of service was on April 19, 1974 since he
was on leave from April 23, 1974 to May 23, 1974. On August 6, 1974 when he reported for
work, he was no longer under the supervision of respondent city. He suffered severe headache
when he was supervising laborers on a construction project in Tolosa, Leyte. He died the
following day of CVA-Cerebral Hemorrhage.

The surviving spouse filed a claim for death benefits in her own behalf and in behalf of her minor
children. Respondent city filed a notice of controversion of the claimant's right to compensation
however, on March 31, 1975, the hearing officer of Regional Office in Tacloban City issued an
award granting petitioner the sum of P5,200.00 as death benefits and P200.00 as reimbursement
of burial expenses.

Respondent city appealed. On November 29, 1975, a decision was rendered by the Commission
dismissing petitioner's death benefits claim on the ground of lack of filiation between the
claimant and the deceased. The Commission held that the marriage certificate from the Parish
where the claimant’s marriage was solemnized is not a valid proof. It should be the original
marriage contract or marriage certificate issued by the Local Civil Registrar. The baptismal
certificates of their children which was presented by the claimant, according to the commission
was not a valid proof of filiation.

Issue: Whether or not a marriage certificate attesting to the fact that claimant and deceased were in fact
married is considered satisfactory proof of marital status in the absence of any evidence to the
contrary

Ruling: Section 5(bb) of Rule 31 of the Rules of Court provides for the disputable presumptions which
states that such presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and
overcome by other evidence. It includes “That a man and a woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.”

Courts look upon this presumption with great favor and it could not be lightly repelled. It may be
rebutted only by cogent proof to the contrary or by evidence of a higher than ordinary quality.
The rationale behind this presumption could be found in the case of Adong vs. Cheong Seng
Gee, which runs this wise --- The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of
marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract but it is a new relation, an
institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every
intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent
matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the
case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the
parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant
violation of decency and of law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is
 'that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful
contract of marriage. (Sec. 334, No. 28) Semper — praesumitur pro matrimonio — Always
presume marriage.

Likewise, the declaration of the husband is competent evidence to show the fact of marriage.
Similarly a witness, who was present at the time the marriage was solemnized, is a competent
witness to establish the existence of said marriage. Indeed, public and open cohabitation as
husband and wife, birth and baptismal certificates of children born unto them after the celebration
of the questioned marriage, and a statement of such marriage in subsequent document were held
to be competent evidence as proof of said marriage. Therefore, the decision dated November 29,
1979 is set aside and the award of the earing Office of Tacloban City is reinstated. 

Case Digest
ARTURIO TRINIDAD vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 118904
April 20, 1998
PANGANIBAN, J.:

Facts: On August 10, 1978, petitioner filed with the Court of First Instance of Aklan, Kalibo, Aklan, an
action for partition of four (4) parcels of land, described therein, claiming that he was the son of
the late Inocentes Trinidad, one of three (3) children of Patricio Trinidad, who was the original
owner of the parcels of land. Patricio Trinidad died in 1940, leaving the four (4) parcels of land to
his three (3) children, Inocentes, Lourdes and Felix. In 1970, plaintiff demanded from the
defendants to partition the land into three (3) equal shares and to give him the one-third (1/3)
individual share of his late father, but the defendants refused and alleged in their answer filed on
September 07, 1978 that plaintiff was not the son of the late Inocentes Trinidad. Defendants
denied that plaintiff was the son of the late Inocentes Trinidad.

Defendants contended that Inocentes was single when he died in 1941, before plaintiff's birth.
Defendants also denied that plaintiff had lived with them, and claimed that the parcels of land
described in the complaint had been in their possession since the death of their father in 1940 and
that they had not givenplaintiff a share in the produce of the land. Patricio Trinidad and Anastacia
Briones were the parents of three (3) children, namely, Inocentes,Lourdes and Felix. When
Patricio died in 1940, survived by the above named children, he left four (4) parcels of land, all
situated at Barrio Tigayon, Kalibo Aklan. Arturio Trinidad, born on July 21, 1943, claimed to be
the legitimate son of the late Inocentes Trinidad. On October 28, 1982, Felix died without issue,
so he was not substituted as a party. On July 4, 1989, the trial court rendered a decision in favor
of the petitioner. Respondent Court reversed the trial court on the ground that petitioner failed to
adduce sufficient evidence to prove that his parents were legally married to each other and that
acquisitive prescription against him had set in.

Issue: Whether or not evidence of the marriage of Inocentes and Arturio’s filiation is sufficient.

Ruling: The merits of this petition are patent.  The partition of the late Patricio’s real properties requires
preponderant proof that petitioner is a co-owner or co-heir of the decedent’s estate.  His right as a
co-owner would, in turn, depend on whether he was born during the existence of a valid and
subsisting marriage between his mother (Felicidad) and his putative father (Inocentes). This Court
holds that such burden was successfully discharged by petitioner and, thus, the reversal of the
assailed Decision and Resolution is inevitable.
 In the absence of a marriage certificate, any of the four can be sufficient proof of marriage: fact of
marriage ceremony, open cohabitation of the parties, birth certificate of the child, and other
documents.  Arturio presented the first 3.  For filiation, when the birth certificate can’t be
produced, other evidence like the baptismal certificate, is admissible.  Use of surname without
objection is also presumptive evidence of legitimacy.

Case Digest

LILIA OLIVA WIEGEL vs. THE HONORABLE ALICIA V. SEMPIO-DIY and KARL HEINZ
WIEGEL
G.R. No. L-53703
August 19, 1986
PARAS, J.:

Facts: Respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel asked for the declaration of Nullity of his marriage celebrated on
July, 1978 at the Holy Catholic Apostolic Christian Church Branch in Makati, Metro Manila with
herein petitioner Lilia Oliva Wiegel on the ground of Lilia's previous existing marriage to one
Eduardo A. Maxion, the ceremony having been performed on June 25, 1972 at our Lady of
Lourdes Church in Quezon City. Lilia, while admitting the existence of said prior subsisting
marriage claimed that said marriage was null and void, she and the first husband Eduardo A.
Maxion having been allegedly forced to enter said marital union. In the pre-trial that ensued, the
issue agreed upon by both parties was the status of the first marriage, assuming the presence of
force exerted against both parties: Was said prior marriage void or was it merely voidable? It was
also asserted in the pre-trial that Eduardo was already married to someone else even before the
marriage with Lilia.

Issue: Whether or not there is a need to secure a judicial declaration of nullity of the previous marriage in
order to validly enter into a subsequent marriage.

Ruling: There is no need for petitioner to prove that her first marriage was vitiated by force committed
against both parties because assuming this to be so, the marriage will not be void but merely
voidable (Art. 85, Civil Code), and therefore valid until annulled. Since no annulment has yet
been made, it is clear that when she married respondent she was still validly married to her first
husband, consequently, her marriage to respondent is VOID (Art. 80, Civil Code).

There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first
husband at the time they married each other, for then such a marriage though void still needs
according to this Court a judicial declaration of such fact and for all legal intents and purposes
she would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her marriage with
respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel; accordingly, the marriage of petitioner and respondent would be
regarded VOID under the law.
Case Digest

MARIA APIAG vs. JUDGE ESMERALDO G. CANTERO

A.M. No. MTJ-95-1070
February 12, 1997
PANGANIBAN, J.:

Facts: The wedding of Maria Apiag (one of the complainants) and Esmeraldo Cantero(respondent-judge)
took place on August 11, 1947. They begot two children, Teresita andGlicero (complainants).
Thereafter, Esmeraldo left the conjugal home and abandoned his wife and children without any
means of support. Later on, the complainants learned that Esmeraldo contracted another marriage
with Nieves Ygay and they have 5 children of their own. In all the documents filed by Esmeraldo
such as his sworn statement of assets and liabilities, personal data sheet, income tax return, and
insurance policy with GSIS, he misrepresented himself as being married to Nieves. Herein
complainants charged Esmeraldo with gross misconduct for allegedly having committed bigamy
and for falsifying public documents. In his comment, Esmeraldo denied the validity of the
marriage alleging that it was dramatized and that his parents called him to appear in a certain
drama marriage and was forced to sign a duly prepared marriage contract. He pressed the idea
that his consent was not freely given. The fact, however, is undisputed that he and Maria were
engaged in a love affair which resulted in the pregnancy of the latter prior to the marriage. It is
only for the preservation of the family name that their parents agreed to their marriage but not to
live together as husband and wife. To bolster his defense, Esmeraldo alleged that Maria has been
living with another man during her public service as a teacher and have begotten a child, named
Manuel Apiag. He argued the “he who seek justice must seek justice with clean hands.” He didn’t
file any annulment or judicial declaration of the alleged marriage because he believed that said
marriage was void from the beginning. Thus, nothing is to be nullified because the marriage
never existed. However, in view of the complainants’ request in their letter to the respondent
dated September 21, 1993, both parties have agreed that Teresita shall: (1) get ¼ of the retirement
that Esmeraldo will receive from GSIS; (2) be included as one of the beneficiaries in case of the
latter’s death; (3) inherit the properties of the latter; and (2) receive and collect Php4000 monthly
as support

Issue: WON the previous marriage of the judge was valid.

Ruling: No. Since the second marriage occurred before the promulgation of Wiegel v Sempio-Diy and
before the effectivity of the FC, the doctrine of Odayat v. Amante (will be applied in favor of the
respondent. Although there did not exist any grave misconduct (since the acts were committed in
relation to the judge’s personal life), he will still be held administratively liable because of his
position as a judge of high principles and ethics.

Man is not perfect. At one time or another, he may commit a mistake. But we should not look
only at his sin. We should also consider the man's sincerity in his repentance, his genuine effort at
restitution and his eventual triumph in the reformation of his life. This respondent should not be
judged solely and finally by what took place some 46 years ago. He may have committed an
indiscretion in the past. But having repented for it, such youthful mistake should not forever
 haunt him and should not totally destroy his career and render inutile his otherwise unblemished
record. Indeed, it should not demolish completely what he built in his public life since then. Much
less should it absolutely deprive him and/or his heirs of the rewards and fruits of his long and
dedicated service in government. For these reasons, dismissal from service as recommended by
the Office of the Court Administrator would be too harsh.

Considering that he was remiss in attending to the needs of the children of his first marriage
(whose filiations he did not deny), the court would impose a penalty. But since he is dead, the
case will merely be dismissed.

Case Digest

LEONCIA BALOGBOG and GAUDIOSO BALOGBOG vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No.  83598
March 7, 1997
MENDOZA, J.:

Facts: In 1968, the respondents brought an action for the partition and accounting, claiming that they
were the legitimate children of Gavino, the brother of the petitioners who died in 1935 and as
such they were entitled to the one third share Gavino in Basilio’s estate. The petitioners denied
knowing the respondents. They alleged that Gavino died single and that they are not aware that he
has two sons. The petitioners further questioned the validity of marriage between their brother
and Catalina.
On the trial of the case, petitioners presented witnesses that will prove the invalidity of the
marriage between their brother and Catalina. They were contending that the marriage was not
valid because there was no record showing in the Local Civil Registry that a marriage transpired
between them. The respondent, on the other hand, averred that records were destroyed during the
time war as well as the certificate that there was no record of birth of Ramonito which were
presumable lost or destroyed.
Issue: Whether or not the marriage between Gavino and Catalina is valid even in the absence of a
marriage certificate.
Whether or not Ramonito and Generoso are legitimate children of Gavino and Catalina
Ruling: Yes. Under the Rules of Court, the presumption is that a man and a woman conducting
themselves as husband and wife are legally married. This presumption may be rebutted when
there is a proof to the contrary. Although a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of
marriage, the failure to present such is not a proof that no marriage took place. Other pieces of
evidence may be shown prove the marriage. In the case at bar, testimonial evidence was
presented.
Yes. The Supreme Court held that the fact the there was no record of birth in the civil registry
does not mean that the private respondents were not legitimate children. The legitimacy was
proved by the testimonies of the witnesses including Catalina. Moreover, although made in
another case, Gaudioso admitted that Ramonito is his nephew.
Case Digest

SERAFIA G. TOLENTINO vs. HON. EDGARDO L. PARAS

G.R. No. L-43905
May 30, 1983
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

Facts: Amado Tolentino had contracted a second marriage with private respondent herein, Maria
Clemente, at Paombong, Bulacan, on November 1, 1948, while his marriage with petitioner,
Serafia G. Tolentino, celebrated on July 31, 1943, was still subsisting. Petitioner charged Amado
with Bigamy in Criminal Case No. 2768 of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch II,
which Court, upon Amado's plea of guilty, sentenced him to suffer the corresponding penalty.
After Amado had served the prison sentence imposed on him, he continued to live with private
respondent until his death on July 25, 1974. His death certificate carried the entry "Name of
Surviving Spouse — Maria Clemente."

In Special Proceedings No. 1587-M for Correction of Entry, petitioner sought to correct the name
of the surviving spouse in the death certificate from "Maria Clemente" to "Serafia G. Tolentino",
her name. The lower Court dismissed the petition "for lack of the proper requisites under the law"
and indicated the need for a more detailed proceeding. Conformably thereto, petitioner filed the
case below against private respondent and the Local Civil Registrar of Paombong, Bulacan, for
her declaration as the lawful surviving spouse, and the correction of the death certificate of
Amado. In an Order, dated October 21, 1976, respondent Court, upon private respondent's
instance, dismissed the case (1) the correction of the entry in the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar is not the proper remedy because the issue involved is marital relationship; (2) the Court
has not acquired proper jurisdiction because as prescribed under Art. 108, read together with Art.
412 of the Civil Code — publication is needed in a case like this, and up to now, there has been
no such publication; and (3) in a sense, the subject matter of this case has been aptly discussed in
Special Proceeding No. 1587-M, which this Court has already dismissed, for lack of the proper
requisites under the law.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is the lawful surviving spouse of the deceased.

Whether or not the subsequent marriage is null and void.

Ruling: We rule for petitioner. The suit below is a proper remedy. It is of an adversary character as
contrasted to a mere summary proceeding. A claim of right is asserted against one who has an
interest in contesting it. Private respondent, as the individual most affected; is a party defendant,
and has appeared to contest the petition and defend her interests. The Local Civil Registrar is also
a party defendant. The publication required by the Court below pursuant to Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court is not absolutely necessary for no other parties are involved. After all, publication is
required to bar indifferently all who might be minded to make an objection of any sort against the
right sought to be established. Considering that Amado, upon his own plea, was convicted for
Bigamy, that sentence furnishes the necessary proof of the marital status of petitioner and the
deceased. There is no better proof of marriage than the admission by the accused of the existence
 of such marriage.  The second marriage that he contracted with private respondent during the
lifetime of his first spouse is null and void from the beginning and of no force and effect.  No
judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void marriage.  It can be safely
concluded, then, without need of further proof nor is remand to the Court below that private
respondent not the surviving spouse of the deceased Amado, but petitioner. Rectification of the
erroneous entry in the records of the Local Civil Registrar may, therefore, be validly made.

Case Digest

RODOLFO G. NAVARRO vs. JUDGE HERNANDO C. DOMAGTOY

A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088
July 19, 1996
ROMERO, J.:

Facts: On September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the wedding between Gaspar A. Tagadan
and Arlyn F. Borga, despite the knowledge that the groom is merely separated from his first wife.
It is also alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador Sumaylo and
Gemma G. del Rosario outside his court's jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. Respondent judge
holds office and has jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos,
Surigao del Norte.  The wedding was solemnized at the respondent judge's residence in the
municipality of Dapa, which does not fall within his jurisdictional area of the municipalities of
Sta. Monica and Burgos, located some 40 to 45 kilometers away from the municipality of Dapa,
Surigao del Norte.

Respondent judge now seeks exculpation from his act of having solemnized the marriage between
Gaspar Tagadan, a married man separated from his wife, and Arlyn F. Borga by stating that he
merely relied on the Affidavit issued by the Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar, which on the
other hand was just acknowledged and not a issued by the latter, confirming the fact that Mr.
Tagadan and his first wife have not seen each other for almost seven years because the wife, Ida
Penarada left the conjugal dwelling after 13 years of cohabitation thereby giving rise to the
presumption the she is dead. With respect to the second charge, he maintains that in solemnizing
the marriage between Sumaylo and del Rosario, he did not violate Article 7, paragraph 1 of the
Family Code which states that:  "Marriage may be solemnized by:  (1) Any incumbent member of
the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction”; and that Article 8 thereof applies to the case in
question.

Issue: Whether or not there is a need for the declaration of presumptive death in order to contract a
subsequent marriage

Whether or not the judge is correct in solemnizing the marriage outside the court’s jurisdiction

Ruling: For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under Art. 41, the spouse present must
institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death
of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.

In the case at bar, Gaspar Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of
his first wife's presumptive death.  Absent this judicial declaration, he remains married to Ida
Peñaranda.  Whether wittingly, or unwittingly, it was manifest error on the part of respondent
judge to have accepted the joint affidavit submitted by the groom.  Such neglect or ignorance of
the law has resulted in a bigamous, and therefore void, marriage.  Under Article 35 of the Family
 Code, "The following marriage shall be void from the beginning:  (4) Those bigamous marriages
not falling under Article 41."

The marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga is considered bigamous and void, there
being a subsisting marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Ida Peñaranda.

On the second issue, Art. 8 of the Family Code provides for the exception where the marriage can
be solemnized outside the court’s jurisdiction namely (1) at the point of death, (2) in remote
places in accordance with Article 29 or (3) upon request of both parties in writing in a sworn
statement to this effect. In the case at bar, there is no pretense that either Sumaylo or del Rosario
was at the point of death or in a remote place.  Moreover, the written request presented addressed
to the respondent judge was made by only one party, Gemma del Rosario.

Respondent judge's jurisdiction covers the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, he was not
clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del
Norte.  By citing Article 8 and the exceptions therein as grounds for the exercise of his misplaced
authority, respondent judge again demonstrated a lack of understanding of the basic principles of
civil law.

Respondent Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy is hereby SUSPENDED for a period of six (6) months
and given a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more
severely.

Case Digest
MERCEDITA MATA ARAÑES vs. JUDGE SALVADOR M. OCCIANO
A.M. No. MTJ-02-1390
April 11, 2002
PUNO, J.:

Facts: Petitioner Mercedita Mata Arañes charges respondent judge with Gross Ignorance of the Law via a
sworn Letter-Complaint dated 23 May 2001. Respondent is the Presiding Judge of the Municipal
Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur. Petitioner alleges that on 17 February 2000, respondent
judge solemnized her marriage to her late groom Dominador B. Orobia without the requisite
marriage license and at Nabua, Camarines Sur which is outside his territorial jurisdiction.

His husband died and because the marriage was a nullity, her right to inherit the properties of
Orobia was not recognized as well as her right to receive the pensions of her husband from the
Philippine Navy. Now petitioner prays for sanctions to be imposed upon respondent judge due to
the hardships and embarrassment caused by the same. On the comment of respondent Judge, he
averred that he first refused to solemnized the marriage because it was outside the court’s
jurisdiction and that there was no valid marriage license but because of human compassion,
pleadings of the parties, the influx of visitors, and the delivery of provisions for the occasion, and
the difficulty of Orobia to go in the court sala for the marriage, he proceeded to solemnize the
marriage out of human compassion. Respondent judge then was reassured that the marriage
license will be at his sala but no marriage license came.

Upon reading the comment of the respondent Judge, Aranes filed an affidavit of desistance
because she realized her shortcomings and was bothered by her conscience.
Issue: Whether or not the marriage is valid

Ruling: The Office of the Court Administrator, in its Report and Recommendation dated 15 November
2000, found the respondent judge guilty of solemnizing a marriage without a duly issued
marriage license and for doing so outside his territorial jurisdiction.  A fine of P5,000.00 was
recommended to be imposed on respondent judge.

In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited to the municipality of
Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua,
Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law and subjects him to administrative liability. His act
may not amount to gross ignorance of the law for he allegedly solemnized the marriage out of
human compassion but nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability for violating the law on marriage.

Respondent judge cannot be exculpated despite the Affidavit of Desistance filed by petitioner.
This Court has consistently held in a catena of cases that the withdrawal of the complaint does not
necessarily have the legal effect of exonerating respondent from disciplinary action. Otherwise,
the prompt and fair administration of justice, as well as the discipline of court personnel, would
be undermined. Disciplinary actions of this nature do not involve purely private or personal
matters. They can not be made to depend upon the will of every complainant who may, for one
reason or another, condone a detestable act. We cannot be bound by the unilateral act of a
complainant in a matter which involves the Court’s constitutional power to discipline judges.
Otherwise, that power may be put to naught, undermine the trust character of a public office and
impair the integrity and dignity of this Court as a disciplining authority.

The marriage is null and void.

Case Digest

ZENAIDA S. BESO vs. Judge JUAN DAGUMAN

A.M. No. MTJ-99-1211
January 28, 2000
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Facts: Zenaida S. Beso charged Judge Juan J. Daguman, Jr. of Sta. Margarita Municipal Trial Court, with
solemnizing marriage outside of his jurisdiction and not registering the marriage contract with the
office of the Local Civil Registrar. On the other hand, the respondent claimed that he solemnized
the marriage of Zenaida S. Beso and Bernardito Yman in Calbayog City Samar due to the
urgency of the situation, that Beso, on August 28, 1997, the day of the marriage, said that he will
be leaving the country for job purposes and considering her to be an Overseas Filipino Worker
and that if not solemnized that day, their marriage license would lapse because she will be
working abroad for a long period. Thus, this would necessitate spouses for a new marriage
license. The necessary documents that was supposedly to be forwarded by him to the Local Civil
Registrar was missing and claimed to be taken by someone. The Office of the Court
administration held that the respondent Judge committed non-feasance in office and was fined
PHP 5,000 with stern warning.
Issues: Whether or not the respondent can validly solemnized the marriage of the complainant outside
the court’s jurisdiction
 Whether or not the respondent committed negligence by not retaining a copy and not registering
the complainant’s marriage before the office of the Local Civil Regitrar.
Ruling: No. the judge solemnized the marriage outside of his jurisdiction. Article 7 of the Family Code
provides that the marriage be solemnized by, “any incumbent member of the judiciary with the
court’s jurisdiction”. In relation thereto, according to Article 8 of the Family Code, there are only
three instances with which a judge may solemnize a marriage outside of his jurisdiction: (1)
When either or both the contracting parties is at the point of death; (2) When the residence of
either party is located in a remote place; (3) Where both of the parties request the solemnizing
officer in writing in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by
them in a sworn statement to that effect.
In this case, none of the three instances is present.
Yes. The judge committed negligence. Pursuant to Article 23 of the Family Code, such duty to
register the marriage is the respondent’s duty. The same article provides, “it shall be the duty of
the person solemnizing the marriage… to send the duplicate and triplicate copies of the certificate
not later than 15 days after the marriage, to the local civil registrar of the place where the
marriage was solemnized. Proper receipts shall be issued by the local civil registrar to the
solemnizing officer transmitting the copies of the certificate. The solemnizing officer shall retain
in his file the quadruplicate copy of the marriage certificate, the original of the marriage license,
and in proper cases, the affidavit of the contracting party regarding the solemnization of the
marriage in the place other than those mentioned in Article 8.”
The recommendation of the OCA stands.

Case Digest
JUVY N. COSCA vs. HON. LUCIO P. PALAYPAYON, JR.
A.M. No. MTJ-92-721 September 30, 1994
237 SCRA 249
PER CURIAM, J.:
FACTS: The following are the complainants: Juvy N. Cosca (Stenographer 1), Edmundo B. Peralta
(Interpreter 1), Ramon C. Sambo (Clerk II) and Apollo Villamora (Process Server).  Respondents
are Judge Lucio Palaypayon Jr., the presiding judge, and Nelia B. Esmeralda-Baroy, clerk of
court II.  All work in MTC-Tinambac, Camarines Sur.
Complainants alleged that Palaypayon solemnized marriages even without the requisite of a
marriage license.  Hence, the following couples were able to get married just by paying the
marriage fees to respondent Baroy: Alano P. Abellano & Nelly Edralin; Francisco Selpo & Julieta
Carrido; Eddie Terrobias & Maria Gacer; Renato Gamay & Maricris Belga; Arsenio Sabater &
Margarita Nacario; Sammy Bocaya & Gina Bismonte.  As a consequence, the marriage contracts
of the following couples did not reflect any marriage license number.  In addition, Palaypayon did
not sign the marriage contracts and did not indicate the date of solemnization reasoning out that
he allegedly had to wait for the marriage license to be submitted by the parties which happens
usually several days after the marriage ceremony.
Palaypayon contends that marriage between Abellano & Edralin falls under Article 34 of the
Civil Code thus exempted from the marriage license requirement.  According to him, he gave
strict instructions to complainant Sambo to furnish the couple copy of the marriage contract and
to file the same with the civil registrar but the latter failed to do so.  In order to solve the problem,
the spouses subsequently formalized the marriage by securing a marriage license and executing
 their marriage contract, a copy of which was then filed with the civil registrar.   The other five
marriages were not illegally solemnized because Palaypayon did not sign their marriage contracts
and the date and place of marriage are not included.  It was alleged that copies of these marriage
contracts are in the custody of complainant Sambo.  The alleged marriage of Selpo & Carrido,
Terrobias & Gacer, Gamay & Belga, Sabater & Nacario were not celebrated by him since he
refused to solemnize them in the absence of a marriage license and that the marriage of Bocaya &
Bismonte was celebrated even without the requisite license due to the insistence of the parties to
avoid embarrassment with the guests which he again did not sign the marriage contract.
An illegal solemnization of marriage was charged against the respondents.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage solemnized by Judge Palaypayon were valid.
HELD: Bocaya & Besmonte’s marriage was solemnized without a marriage license along with the other
couples.   The testimonies of Bocay and Pompeo Ariola including the photographs taken showed
that it was really Judge Palaypayon who solemnized their marriage.  Bocaya declared that they
were advised by judge to return after 10 days after the solemnization and bring with them their
marriage license.  They already started living together as husband and wife even without the
formal requisite.  With respect to the photographs, judge explained that it was a simulated
solemnization of marriage and not a real one.  However, considering that there were pictures from
the start of the wedding ceremony up to the signing of the marriage certificates in front of him. 
The court held that it is hard to believe that it was simulated.
On the other hand, Judge Palaypayon admitted that he solemnized marriage between Abellano &
Edralin and claimed it was under Article 34 of the Civil Code so the marriage license was
dispensed with considering that the contracting parties executed a joint affidavit that they have
been living together as husband and wife for almost 6 years already.  However, it was shown in
the marriage contract that Abellano was only 18 yrs 2months and 7 days old.   If he and Edralin
had been living together for 6 years already before they got married as what is stated in the joint
affidavit, Abellano must have been less than 13 years old when they started living together which
is hard to believe.  Palaypayon should have been aware, as it is his duty to ascertain the
qualification of the contracting parties who might have executed a false joint affidavit in order to
avoid the marriage license requirement.
Article 4 of the Family Code pertinently provides that “in the absence of any of the essential or
formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio whereas an irregularity in the formal
requisite shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties responsible for the
irregularity shall be civilly, criminally, and administratively liable.

Case Digest
REPUBLIC vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 103047 September 2, 1994
236 SCRA 257
PUNO, J.
FACTS: Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were married in a civil ceremony without the
knowledge of the former’s parents. All the documents required for the celebration of the marriage
which includes procurement of marriage license, was attended by Cardenas. It was stated in the
marriage contract that marriage license no. 3196182 was issued. The cohabitation of Castro and
Cardenas lasted only for four (4) months after which they parted ways.
 Castro sought the advice of a lawyer for a possible annulment of her marriage with Cardenas
before leaving for the States to follow her daughter who was adopted by her brother with the
consent of Cardenas. The Civil Registrar of Pasig issued a certification stating that Castro and
Cardenas were allegedly married in the Pasay Court on June 21, 1970 under an alleged marriage
license no. 3196182 which was allegedly issued on June 20, 1970 but such cannot be located
since it does not appear in their records. It was then that she found out that there was no marriage
license issued prior to the celebration of her marriage with Cardenas.
Castro filed a petition seeking a judicial declaration of nullity of her marriage with Edwin
Cardenas. The Regional Trial Court denied her petition. It ruled that “inability of the certifying
official to locate the marriage license is not conclusive to show that there was no marriage license
issued.”  
Castro appealed to respondent appellate court contending that the certification from the local civil
registrar sufficiently established the absence of a marriage license. The respondent appellate court
reversed the ruling of the trial court declaring that the marriage between the contracting parties is
null and void and directed the Civil Registrar of Pasig to cancel the marriage contract.
However, the Republic of the Philippines, the petitioner herein, brought a petition for review on
certiorari which alleged that the certification and the uncorroborated testimony of Castro are not
sufficient to overthrow the legal presumption regarding the validity of a marriage.
ISSUE: Whether or not the documentary and testimonial evidence presented by private respondent are
sufficient to establish that no marriage license was issued prior to the celebration of marriage.
RULING: Yes. The Court ruled that the certification of "due search and inability to find" issued by the
civil registrar of Pasig enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep
a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
Unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion and pursuant to Section 29, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court, a certificate of "due search and inability to find" sufficiently proved that his office
did not issue marriage license no. 3196182 to the contracting parties.
The fact that private respondent Castro offered only her testimony in support of her petition is, in
itself, not aground to deny her petition. The failure to offer any other witness to corroborate her
testimony is mainly due to the peculiar circumstances of the case.
The finding of the appellate court that the marriage between the contracting parties is null and
void for lack of a marriage license does not discount the fact that indeed, a spurious marriage
license, purporting to be issued by the civil registrar of Pasig, may have been presented by
Cardenas to the solemnizing officer.
It was held that under the circumstances of the case, the documentary and testimonial evidence
presented by private respondent Castro sufficiently established the absence of the
subject marriage license.
Therefore, the petition is DENIED there being no showing of any reversible error committed by
respondent appellate court.

Case Digest
REPUBLIC vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 103047 September 2, 1994
236 SCRA 257
PUNO, J.
FACTS: Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were married in a civil ceremony without the
knowledge of the former’s parents. All the documents required for the celebration of the marriage
which includes procurement of marriage license, was attended by Cardenas. It was stated in the
marriage contract that marriage license no. 3196182 was issued. The cohabitation of Castro and
Cardenas lasted only for four (4) months after which they parted ways.
Castro sought the advice of a lawyer for a possible annulment of her marriage with Cardenas
before leaving for the States to follow her daughter who was adopted by her brother with the
consent of Cardenas. The Civil Registrar of Pasig issued a certification stating that Castro and
Cardenas were allegedly married in the Pasay Court on June 21, 1970 under an alleged marriage
license no. 3196182 which was allegedly issued on June 20, 1970 but such cannot be located
since it does not appear in their records. It was then that she found out that there was no marriage
license issued prior to the celebration of her marriage with Cardenas.
Castro filed a petition seeking a judicial declaration of nullity of her marriage with Edwin
Cardenas. The Regional Trial Court denied her petition. It ruled that “inability of the certifying
official to locate the marriage license is not conclusive to show that there was no marriage license
issued.”  
Castro appealed to respondent appellate court contending that the certification from the local civil
registrar sufficiently established the absence of a marriage license. The respondent appellate court
reversed the ruling of the trial court declaring that the marriage between the contracting parties is
null and void and directed the Civil Registrar of Pasig to cancel the marriage contract.
However, the Republic of the Philippines, the petitioner herein, brought a petition for review on
certiorari which alleged that the certification and the uncorroborated testimony of Castro are not
sufficient to overthrow the legal presumption regarding the validity of a marriage.
ISSUE: Whether or not the documentary and testimonial evidence presented by private respondent are
sufficient to establish that no marriage license was issued prior to the celebration of marriage.
RULING: Yes. The Court ruled that the certification of "due search and inability to find" issued by the
civil registrar of Pasig enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep
a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
Unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion and pursuant to Section 29, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court, a certificate of "due search and inability to find" sufficiently proved that his office
did not issue marriage license no. 3196182 to the contracting parties.
The fact that private respondent Castro offered only her testimony in support of her petition is, in
itself, not aground to deny her petition. The failure to offer any other witness to corroborate her
testimony is mainly due to the peculiar circumstances of the case.
The finding of the appellate court that the marriage between the contracting parties is null and
void for lack of a marriage license does not discount the fact that indeed, a spurious marriage
license, purporting to be issued by the civil registrar of Pasig, may have been presented by
Cardenas to the solemnizing officer.
It was held that under the circumstances of the case, the documentary and testimonial evidence
presented by private respondent Castro sufficiently established the absence of the
subject marriage license.
 Therefore, the petition is DENIED there being no showing of any reversible error committed by
respondent appellate court.

Case Digest
GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO vs. REDERICK A. RECIO
G.R. No. 138322 October 2, 2001
366 SCRA 437
PANGANIBAN, J.
Facts: Rederick Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson an Australian citizen, on March 1, 1987.
On May 18, 1989 a decree of divorce dissolving the marriage was issued by the
Australian Family Court. On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen.
Subsequently, respondent entered into marriage with petitioner a Filipina on January 12, 1994.
Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior judicial
dissolution of their marriage. On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a complaint for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy. Respondent contended that his prior marriage had
been validly dissolved by a decree of divorce obtained in Australia thus he is legally capacitated
to marry petitioner. The trial court rendered the decision declaring the marriage between
petitioner and respondent dissolved and both parties can now remarry.
ISSUE: Whether or not the divorce obtained by respondent in Australia ipso facto capacitated him to
remarry.
HELD: The SC remanded the case to the trial court to receive evidence. Based on the records, the court
cannot conclude that respondent who was then a naturalized Australian citizen was legally
capacitated to marry petitioner. Neither can the court grant petitioner’s prayer to declare her
marriage null and void on the ground of bigamy. After all it may turn out that under Australian
law, he was really capacitated to marry petitioner as result of the divorce decree.

Case Digest
MARILOU NAMA MORENO vs. JUDGE JOSE C. BERNABE
A.M. No. MTJ-94-963 July 14, 1995
246 SCRA 120
KAPUNAN, J
Facts: Marilou Nama Moreno and Marcelo Moreno were married before the respondent Judge Jose
Bernabe on October 4, 1993 but did not process the papers for the marriage contract because the
Office of the Local Civil Registrar failed to issue a marriage license. The complainant at that time
was pregnant and begged to the judge to have her and her husband to be married by him. The
complainant then filed a complaint allegedly for deceiving her that the marriage is valid.
 Respondent denied that he conspired with the relatives of Marcelo Moreno to solemnize the
marriage for the purpose of deceiving the complainant and that he did not violate the law nor did
he have the slightest intention to violate the law when he, in good faith, solemnized the marriage,
as he was moved only by a desire to help a begging and pleading complainant who wanted some
kind of assurance or security due to her pregnant condition.
Issue: Whether or not that a Judge who held a wedding without issuing a marriage contract should be
held liable even if the complaint had “expressly” withdrawn by the complainant.
Held: Even with the withdrawal of the complainant against the respondent the Supreme Court
insisted that it should still be dealt with accordingly as the accused was a member of the
judiciary and a conduct of a higher level were expected. The judge displayed ignorance
of the law which is unacceptable for his position and is therefore fined with 10, 000.00
pesos and is sternly warned that a repetition of a similar act should be punished severely.

Case Digest
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ERNESTO A. BORROMEO
G.R. No. 117154 March 25, 1999
133 SCRA 106
PURISIMA, J.
Facts: At high noon on July 3, 1981, the four year old niece of Susana & Elias Borromeo told Matilde
Taborada (mother of Susana) that Susana was screaming because Elias was killing her. Taborada
told her to inform her son, Geronimo Taborada. Geronimo, in turn, told his father and together,
they went to Susana’s hut. There they found Susana’s lifeless body next to her crying infant and
Elias mumbling incoherently still with the weapon in his hands. The accused-appellant, Elias,
said that because they were legally and validly married, he should only be liable for “homicide”
and not “parricide”. He thinks such because there was no marriage contract issued on their
wedding day and after that. However, in his testimony, he admitted that the victim was his wife
and that they were married in a chapel by a priest.
Issue: Does the non-execution of a marriage contract render a marriage void?
Held: In the view of the law, a couple living together with the image of being married, are presumed
married unless proven otherwise. This is attributed to the common order of society. Furthermore,
the validity of a marriage resides on the fulfillment or presence of the requisites of the marriage
which are : legal capacity and consent. The absence of the record of such marriage does not
invalidate the same as long as the celebration and all requisites are present.
Person living together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter
presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the
common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being,
they would be living in constant violation of decency and law. (Son Cui vs. Guepangco, 22 Phil.
216). And, the mere fact that no record of the marriage exists in the registry of marriage does not
invalidate said marriage, as long as in the celebration thereof, all requisites for its validity are
present. The forwarding of a copy of the marriage certificate to the registry is not one of said
requisites. (Pugeda vs. Trias, 4 SCRA 849).  The appealed decision is AFFIRMED and the
indemnity increased from 12,000 to 30,000

Case Digest
ABDON SEGUISABAL vs. HON. JOSE R. CABRERA
A.M. No. L-2209-CTJ August 27, 1981
106 SCRA 67
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.
Facts: Abdon Seguisabal has charged City Judge Jose R. Cabrera of Toledo City with gross misconduct
in office and gross ignorance of the law for having solemnized, on 14 April 1978, the marriage of
Jaime Sayson and Marlyn Jagonoy without the requisite marriage and for having failed to
transmit a copy of the marriage contract, signed by him and the parties, to the Office of the Local
Civil Registrar of Toledo City within fifteen (15) days from the date of solemnization as
mandatorily required.
That respondent actually solemnized said marriage without the requisite license, is shown by the
marriage contract issued to the contracting parties. The failure to transmit a copy of the marriage
contract to the Local Civil Registrar is substantiated by the Certifications, both issued on 5 June
1979, by the Local Civil Registrar of Toledo City
Issue: Whether or not Hon. Jose R. Cabrera is liable in solemnizing a marriage without requiring the
essential pre-requisite of a marriage license.
Ruling: Respondent must be held guilty of the charge filed for in solemnizing the marriage of Jaime
Sayson and Marlyn Jagonoy on 14 April 1978 without requiring the essential pre-requisite of a
marriage license, respondent had undoubtedly transgressed Article 53(4) of the Civil Code in the
absence of any showing that the subject marriage falls under marriages of an exceptional
character wherein a license is not mandatorily required. Respondent was likewise remiss in his
duty under Article 68 of the Civil Code to transmit to the Local Civil Registrar of Toledo City
within fifteen (15) days from the date of solemnization of the marriage in question, a copy of the
marriage contract duly signed by him as the solemnizing officer and by the contracting parties.
The defense of good faith interposed by respondent is unavailing. As a judicial officer, he is
expected to know the law on the solemnization of marriages. His feeling of sympathy and
fairness to the widow, Marlyn Jagonoy" cannot serve as a license for him to deliberately
transgress or dispense with legal requisites.
WHEREFORE, finding respondent Judge to be guilty of gross neglect of duty, he shall pay a fine
equivalent to three (3) months salary, the same to be deducted from his gratuity upon his
retirement from the service.

Case Digest
ENGRACE NIÑAL vs. NORMA BAYADOG
G.R. No. 133778             March 14, 2000
328 SCRA 122
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
Facts: Pepito Ninal was married with Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974.  They had 3 children—
Babyline Niñal, Ingrid Niñal, Archie Niñal and Pepito Niñal Jr.—the petitioners.  Due to the shot
inflicted by Pepito to Teodulfa, the latter died on April 24, 1985.  1 year and 8 months later on
December 11, 1986, Pepito and Norma Badayog got married without any marriage licence.  They
instituted an affidavit stating that they had lived together for at least 5 years exempting from
securing the marriage license.  Pepito died in a car accident on February 19, 1997.  After his
death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito and Norma
alleging that said marriage was void for lack of marriage license.
Issues: Whether or not the second marriage of Pepito was void.
Whether or not the heirs of the deceased may file for the declaration of the nullity of Pepito’s
marriage and even after his death.
Ruling:Yes, the second marriage of Pepito was void for absence of marriage licence.
Yes, the heirs of the deceased may file for the declaration of the nullity of Pepito’s marriage. The
marriage will be disregarded or treated as non-existent by the courts upon mere proof of facts
even after the latter’s death.
Even though Pepito and Norma instituted an affidavit and claimed that they cohabit for at least 5
years, the marriage would not be valid because from the time of Pepito’s first marriage was
dissolved to the time of his marriage with Norma, only about 20 months had elapsed. Pepito and
his first wife may had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and Norma had started living
with each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period
cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law.  Hence, his marriage to Norma is still
void.
Void marriages are deemed to have not taken place and cannot be the source of rights.  It can be
questioned even after the death of one of the parties and any proper interested party may attack a
void marriage.

Case Digest
HERMINIA BORJA-MANZANO vs. JUDGE ROQUE R. SANCHEZ, MTC
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329 March 8, 2001
354 SCRA 1
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.
FACTS: Complainant, HerminiaBorja-Manzano charges respondent Judge Roque R. Sanchez through
sworn Complaint-Affidavit filed with the Office of the Court Administrator on May 12, 1999,
with gross ignorance of the law by solemnizing a marriage between her husband and another
woman, who were both bound to prior existing marriage.

HerminiaBorja-Manzano affirms that she is the lawful wife of David Manzano, having been
married to him on 21 May 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish, Araneta Avenue, Caloocan
City.Four children were born out of that marriage.However, her husband contracted another
marriage to LuzvimindaPayao on March 22, 1993 before Judge Roque R. Sanchez, who then
knew or must know that such marriage is void or bigamous since both contracting parties were
separated as stated in their marriage contract.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent Judge is guilty.

RULING: Yes. The Respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a
void and bigamous marriage. Under Article 34 of Family Code, the requisites enumerated in the
provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to apply are not all present. It is clearly
stated in the affidavits executed by both David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao the fact of their
prior existing marriage and both were “separated.” Marital cohabitation for a long period of time
is a mere exemption from marriage license. Just like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation
with another person for at least five years does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous
marriage.The solemnizing officer knew and ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage is
 a diriment impediment, which would make the subsequent marriage null and void.  Clearly,
respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void and
bigamous marriage.

The Court Administrator recommended that respondent be found guilty of gross ignorance of the
law and be ordered to pay a fine of P2,000, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar
act would be dealt with more severely.  The recommendation of the Court Administrator is
adopted with modification that the fine of P2,000 is increased to P20,000.

Case Digest
SHIRLEY YAP vs. COURT OF APPEALS, NANCY J. YAP, MANING YAP, JR., JULIA YAP,
JASMIN YAP, and SAMUEL YAP
G.R. No. L-40003 October 28, 1986
145 SCRA 299
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.
FACTS: Maning Yap, married twice: first, to Talina Bianong in 1939 and second, to Nancy Yap on
December 11, 1948. Maning Yap and Talina Bianong were married at Bara-as Plantation,
Malabang, Lanao del Sur, in accordance with the Muslim rites and practices prescribed by the
Islam religion professed by both of them. Out of the marriage, four children were born; two of
them died in infancy during the Japanese occupation, while the two others are petitioners Shirley
Yap and Jaime Yap.
While the first marriage was still subsisting, Maning Yap married Nancy J. Yap on December 11,
1948 in a civil ceremony performed by District Judge Juan Sarenas of the Court of First Instance
of Cotabato. Nancy Yap entered into the marriage in the belief that Maning Yap was not a
married. They had four children namely respondents Maning Yap, Jr., Julia Yap, Jasmin Yap and
Samuel Yap. On February 21, 1964, Maning Yap died. At the time of his death he, therefore, had
two families living separately.
Talina Bianong Vda. De Yap filed a Special Proceesing No. 1334, seeking the issuance of letters
administration for the estate of Maning yap. The respondent Nancy J. Yap claim that she is the
legitimate widow and her minor children are their legitimate children.
ISSUE: Whether or not Talina Bianong Vda. de Yap and her children are the legal heirs of Maning Yap.
RULING: The Court of Appeals ruled that the estate of Maning Yap should be equally divided into two
equal parts: one-half (1/2) to Talina Bianong and her children and the other half (1/2) to Nancy
Yap and her children.
Under the law of succession in the New Civil Code, Maning Yap's legal heirs are Talina Bianong,
her children Shirley Yap and Jaime Yap and the children of Nancy Yap by Maning Yap namely:
Maning Yap, Jr., Julia Yap, Jasmin Yap and Samuel Yap. Talina Bianong, the first wife had not
lost or relinquished her status as putative heir of her husband. She is entitled to share in Maning
Yap's estate upon his death (Gomez v. Lipana, 33 SCRA 615). On the other hand, Nancy Yap, the
 second wife cannot inherit from Maning Yap because their marriage was void ab initio. (Art. 83,
New Civil Code; People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845) However, Nancy Yap's children by Maning
Yap have the status of natural children by legal fiction and are considered compulsory heirs of the
late Maning Yap. (Articles 89 and 887, New Civil Code).

Case Digest
SHIRLEY YAP vs. COURT OF APPEALS, NANCY J. YAP, MANING YAP, JR., JULIA YAP,
JASMIN YAP, and SAMUEL YAP
G.R. No. L-40003 October 28, 1986
145 SCRA 299
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.
FACTS: Maning Yap, married twice: first, to Talina Bianong in 1939 and second, to Nancy Yap on
December 11, 1948. Maning Yap and Talina Bianong were married at Bara-as Plantation,
Malabang, Lanao del Sur, in accordance with the Muslim rites and practices prescribed by the
Islam religion professed by both of them. Out of the marriage, four children were born; two of
them died in infancy during the Japanese occupation, while the two others are petitioners Shirley
Yap and Jaime Yap.
While the first marriage was still subsisting, Maning Yap married Nancy J. Yap on December 11,
1948 in a civil ceremony performed by District Judge Juan Sarenas of the Court of First Instance
of Cotabato. Nancy Yap entered into the marriage in the belief that Maning Yap was not a
married. They had four children namely respondents Maning Yap, Jr., Julia Yap, Jasmin Yap and
Samuel Yap. On February 21, 1964, Maning Yap died. At the time of his death he, therefore, had
two families living separately.
Talina Bianong Vda. De Yap filed a Special Proceesing No. 1334, seeking the issuance of letters
administration for the estate of Maning yap. The respondent Nancy J. Yap claim that she is the
legitimate widow and her minor children are their legitimate children.
ISSUE: Whether or not Talina Bianong Vda. de Yap and her children are the legal heirs of Maning Yap.
RULING: The Court of Appeals ruled that the estate of Maning Yap should be equally divided into two
equal parts: one-half (1/2) to Talina Bianong and her children and the other half (1/2) to Nancy
Yap and her children.
Under the law of succession in the New Civil Code, Maning Yap's legal heirs are Talina Bianong,
her children Shirley Yap and Jaime Yap and the children of Nancy Yap by Maning Yap namely:
Maning Yap, Jr., Julia Yap, Jasmin Yap and Samuel Yap. Talina Bianong, the first wife had not
lost or relinquished her status as putative heir of her husband. She is entitled to share in Maning
Yap's estate upon his death (Gomez v. Lipana, 33 SCRA 615). On the other hand, Nancy Yap, the
second wife cannot inherit from Maning Yap because their marriage was void ab initio. (Art. 83,
New Civil Code; People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845) However, Nancy Yap's children by Maning
Yap have the status of natural children by legal fiction and are considered compulsory heirs of the
late Maning Yap. (Articles 89 and 887, New Civil Code).
Case Digest

LEOUEL SANTOS vs COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIA ROSARIO BEDIA-SANTOS

G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995
240 SCRA 20
VITUG, J.:

FACTS: Leouel, a First Lieutenant in the Philippine Army, met Julia in Iloilo.  The two got married in
1986 before a municipal trial court followed shortly thereafter, by a church wedding.  The couple
lived with Julia’s parents at the J. Bedia Compound.  Julia gave birth to a baby boy in 1987 and
was named as Leouel Santos Jr.  Occasionally, the couple will quarrel over a number of things
aside from the interference of Julia’s parents into their family affairs. 
Julia left in 1988 to work in US as a nurse despite Leouel’s pleas to dissuade her.  Seven months
after her departure, she called her husband and promised to return home upon the expiration of
her contract in July 1989 but she never did.  Leouel got a chance to visit US where he underwent
a training program under AFP, he desperately tried to locate or somehow get in touch with Julia
but all his efforts were of no avail.
Leouel filed a complaint to have their marriage declared void under Article 36 of the Family
Code.  He argued that failure of Julia to return home or to communicate with him for more than 5
years are circumstances that show her being psychologically incapacitated to enter into married
life.
ISSUE: Whether their marriage can be considered void under Article 36 of the Family Code.
HELD: The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the
most serious cases of personal disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability
to give meaning and significance to the marriage.  This condition must exist at the time the
marriage is celebrated.
Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even desperate, in his present
situation.  Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can always provide all the specific answers
to every individual problem.  Wherefore, his petition was denied.
Case Digest

CHI MING TSOI vs. COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI

G.R. No. 119190 January 16, 1997
266 SCRA 324
TORRES, JR., J.:

FACTS: Private respondent Gina Lao and petitioner Chi Ming Tsoi were married at the Manila Cathedral
on May 22, 1988. Contrary to Gina’s expectations that the newlyweds were to enjoy making love
or having sexual intercourse with each other, the defendant just went to bed, slept on one side
thereof, then turned his back and went to sleep. No sexual intercourse occurred during their first
night, second, third and fourth night.
From May 22, 1988 until March 15, 1989, they slept together in the same room and on the same
bed but during this period, there was no attempt of sexual intercourse between them. A case was
then filed to declare the annulment of the marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Gina alleged that Chi Ming was impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not show him his penis
(clinically found to be only 3 inches and 1 cm. when erect). Defendant admitted that no sexual
contact was ever made and according to him every time he wanted to have sexual intercourse
with his wife, she always avoided him and whenever he caressed her private parts she always
removed his hands.
ISSUE: Is the refusal of private respondent to have sexual communion with petitioner a psychological
incapacity?
HELD: If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential
marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals
attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted
refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have
sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity.
Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is “To procreate
children based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation
is the basic end of marriage.” Constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the
integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of
one of the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual
love, respect and fidelity. (Art. 68, Family Code), the sanction therefore is actually the
“spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court
order. Love is useless unless it is shared with another. Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest act
of a partner in marriage is to say “I could not have cared less.” This is so because an un given self
is an unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but himself. In the natural order, it is sexual intimacy
which brings spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a participation in the
mystery of creation. It is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the
continuation of family relations.

Case Digest

REPUBLIC vs. COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINA

G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997
268 SCRA 198
PANGANIBAN, J.:

FACTS: The case at bar challenges the decision of CA affirming the marriage of the respondent Roridel
Molina to Reynaldo Molina void in the ground of psychological incapacity.  The couple got
married in 1985, after a year, Reynaldo manifested signs of immaturity and irresponsibility both
as husband and a father preferring to spend more time with friends whom he squandered his
money, depends on his parents for aid and assistance and was never honest with his wife in
regard to their finances.  In 1986, the couple had an intense quarrel and as a result their
relationship was estranged.  Roridel quit her work and went to live with her parents in Baguio
City in 1987 and a few weeks later, Reynaldo left her and their child.  Since then he abandoned
them.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage is void on the ground of psychological incapacity.
HELD: The marriage between Roridel and Reynaldo subsists and remains valid.  What constitutes
psychological incapacity is not mere showing of irreconcilable differences and confliction
personalities.  It is indispensable that the parties must exhibit inclinations which would not meet
the essential marital responsibilities and duties due to some psychological illness.  Reynaldo’s
action at the time of the marriage did not manifest such characteristics that would comprise
grounds for psychological incapacity.  The evidence shown by Roridel merely showed that she
and her husband cannot get along with each other and had not shown gravity of the problem
neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability.  In addition, the expert testimony by Dr Sison
showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility which is not considered as
psychological incapacity.
The following are the guidelines as to the grounds of psychological incapacity laid set forth in
this case:
 burden of proof to show nullity belongs to the plaintiff
 root causes of the incapacity must be medically and clinically inclined
 such incapacity should be in existence at the time of the marriage
 such incapacity must be grave so as to disable the person in complying with the essentials of
marital obligations of marriage
 such incapacity must be embraced in Art. 68-71 as well as Art 220, 221 and 225 of the Family
Code
 decision of the National Matrimonial Appellate Court or the Catholic Church must be
respected
 court shall order the prosecuting attorney and the fiscal assigned to it to act on behalf of the
state.

Case Digest
LUCITA ESTRELLA HERNANDEZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
MARIO C. HERNANDEZ
G.R. No. 126010.  December 8, 1999
320 SCRA 76
MENDOZA, J.:
Facts: Petitioner Lucita Estrella Hernandez and private respondent Mario C. Hernandez were married at
the Silang Catholic Parish Church in Silang, Cavite on January 1, 1981.Three children were born
 to them, namely, Maie, who was born on May 3, 1982, Lyra, born on May 22, 1985, and Marian,
born on June 15, 1989.
On July 10, 1992, petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Tagaytay City, a
petition seeking the annulment of her marriage to private respondent on the ground of
psychological incapacity of the latter.  She alleged that from the time of their marriage up to the
time of the filing of the suit, private respondent failed to perform his obligation to support the
family and contribute to the management of the household, devoting most of his time engaging in
drinking sprees with his friends.  She further claimed that private respondent, after they were
married, cohabited with another woman with whom he had an illegitimate child, while having
affairs with different women, and that, because of his promiscuity, private respondent endangered
her health by infecting her with a sexually transmissible disease (STD).  She averred that private
respondent was irresponsible, immature and unprepared for the duties of a married
life.  Petitioner prayed that for having abandoned the family, private respondent be ordered to
give support to their three children in the total amount ofP9,000.00 every month; that she be
awarded the custody of their children; and that she be adjudged as the sole owner of a parcel of
land located at Don Gregorio Subdivision I in Bo. Bucal, Dasmariñas, Cavite, purchased during
the marriage, as well as the jeep which private respondent took with him when he left the
conjugal home on June 12, 1992.
Issue: Whether or not the marriage of petitioner and private respondent should be annulled on the ground
of private respondent’s psychological incapacity.
Ruling: In Santos vs. Court of Appeals “Psychological incapacity” should  refer to no less than a mental
(not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly in cognitive of the basic marital covenants
that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so
expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together,
observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support.  There is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of “psychological incapacity” to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to
give meaning and significance to the marriage.  This psychological condition must exist at the
time the marriage is celebrated.  The law does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an
inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other.  This conclusion is implicit under
Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration
of nullity of the void marriage to be “legitimate.”
In the instant case, other than her self-serving declarations, petitioner failed to establish the fact
that at the time they were married, private respondent was suffering from a psychological defect
which in fact deprived him of the ability to assume the essential duties of marriage and its
concomitant responsibilities.  As the Court of Appeals pointed out, no evidence was presented to
show that private respondent was not cognizant of the basic marital obligations.  It was not
sufficiently proved that private respondent was really incapable of fulfilling his duties due to
some incapacity of a psychological nature, and not merely physical.  Petitioner says that at the
outset of their marriage, private respondent showed lack of drive to work for his family.  Private
respondent’s parents and petitioner supported him through college.  After his schooling, although
he eventually found a job, he availed himself of the early retirement plan offered by his employer
and spent the entire amount he received on himself.  For a greater part of their marital life, private
respondent was out of job and did not have the initiative to look for another.  He indulged in vices
and engaged in philandering, and later abandoned his family.  Petitioner concludes that private
respondent’s condition is incurable, causing the disintegration of their union and defeating the
very objectives of marriage.
Case Digest
BRENDA B. MARCOS vs. WILSON G. MARCOS
G.R. No. 136490. October 19, 2000
343 SCRA 755
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Facts: Petitioner Brenda Marcos and Respondent Wilson Marcos were married twice and had five
children. After the downfall of President Marcos, the respondent left the military service in1987.
Consequently, due to the respondent’s failure to engage in any gainful employment, they would
often quarrel and the respondent would hit and beat the petitioner. As a result, in
1992they were already living separately. Thus, petitioner filed for annulment of
marriage assailing A r t . 3 6 o f t h e F a m i l y C o d e . T h e c o u r t a q u o f o u n d t h e
r e s p o n d e n t t o b e p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y incapacitated to perform his marital
obligations. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC because
psychological incapacity had not been established by the totality of the evidence presented.
Issues: Whether personal medical or psychological examination of the respondent by a physician is a
requirement for a declaration of psychological incapacity.
Whether the totality of evidence presented in this case show psychological incapacity. 
Held: Psychological incapacity as a ground for declaring the nullity of a marriage, may be established by
the totality of evidence presented. There is no requirement, however that the respondent be
examined by a physician or a psychologist as a condition sine qua non for such declaration.
Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that respondent failed to provide material support to
the family and may have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the totality of his acts does
not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing
that his “defects” were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable.
Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact that he had lost his job and was not
gainfully employed for a period of more than six years. It was during this period that he became
intermittently drunk, failed to give material and moral support, and even left the family home.
Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said period and not to the inception of
the marriage. Equally important, there is no evidence showing that his condition is incurable,
especially now that he is gainfully employed as a taxi driver. In sum, this Court cannot declare
the dissolution of the marriage for failure of the petitioner to show that the alleged psychological
incapacity is characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability and for her failure to
observe the guidelines as outline in Republic v. CA and Molina.

Case Digest
BERNARDINO S. ZAMORA vs. COURT OF APPEALS and NORMA MERCADO ZAMORA
G.R. No. 141917             February 7, 2007
515 SCRA 19
AZCUNA, J.:
Facts: Petitioner and private respondent were married on June 4, 1970 in Cebu City. After their marriage,
they lived together at No. 50-A Gorordo Avenue, Cebu City. The union did not produce any
child. In 1972, private respondent left for the United States to work as a nurse. She returned to the
Philippines for a few months, then left again in 1974. Thereafter, she made periodic visits to Cebu
City until 1989, when she was already a U.S. citizen.
 Petitioner filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage anchored on the alleged
"psychological incapacity" of private respondent, as provided for under Article 36 of the Family
Code. To support his position, he alleged that his wife was "horrified" by the mere thought of
having children as evidenced by the fact that she had not borne petitioner a child. Furthermore, he
also alleged that private respondent abandoned him by living in the United States and had in fact
become an American citizen; and that throughout their marriage they lived together for not more
than three years.
On the other hand, private respondent denied that she refused to have a child. She portrayed
herself as one who loves children as she is a nurse by profession and that she would from time to
time borrow her husband’s niece and nephews to care for them. She also faulted her husband for
the breakup of their marriage, alleging that he had been unfaithful to her. He allegedly had two
affairs with different women, and he begot at least three children with them.
Issue: Whether there can be a declaration of nullity of the marriage between petitioner and private
respondent on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Ruling: No. In Marcos v. Marcos, stated that the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the
party’s psychological condition. If the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a
finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned
need not be resorted to. But, the evidence presented, considered in totality, is not sufficient to
convince the court of the psychological incapacity of the party concerned. Petitioner, however,
failed to substantiate his allegation that private respondent is psychologically incapacitated. His
allegations relating to her refusal to cohabit with him and to bear a child was strongly disputed, as
the records undeniably bear out. Furthermore, the acts and behavior of private respondent that
petitioner cited occurred during the marriage, and there is no proof that the former exhibited a
similar predilection even before or at the inception of the marriage.

Case Digest
JOSE C. SERMONIA vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 109454 June 14, 1994
233 SCRA 15
BELLOSILLO, J.:

FACTS: On 26 May 1992, Jose C. Sermonia was charged with bigamy before the RTC of Pasig, for
contracting marriage with Ma. Lourdes Unson on 15 February 1975 while his prior marriage to
Virginia C. Nievera remained valid and subsisting. Petitioner moved to quash the information on
the ground that his criminal liability for bigamy has been extinguished by prescription. In the
order of 1 October 1992, respondent judge denied the motion to quash. On 27 October 1992, he
likewise denied the motion to reconsider his order of denial. Petitioner challenged the above
orders before the Court of Appeals through a petition for certiorari and prohibition. In the assailed
decision of 21 January 1993, his petition was dismissed for lack of merit.
Petitioner contends that his criminal liability for bigamy has been obliterated by prescription. He
avers that since the second marriage contract was duly registered with the Office of the Civil
Registrar in 1975, such fact of registration makes it a matter of public record and thus constitutes
notice to the whole world. The offended party therefore is considered to have had constructive
notice of the subsequent marriage as of 1975; hence, prescription commenced to run on the day
the marriage contract was registered. For this reason, the corresponding information for bigamy
should have been filed on or before 1990 and not only in 1992.
 On the other hand, the prosecution maintains that the prescriptive period does not begin from the
commission of the crime but from the time of discovery by complainant which was in July 1991.
ISSUE: Whether or not the prosecution of Jose C. Sermonia for bigamy has already prescribed.
HELD: No. The non-application to the crime of bigamy of the principle of constructive notice is not
contrary to the well entrenched policy that penal laws should be construed liberally in favor of the
accused. To compute the prescriptive period for the offense of bigamy from registration thereof
would amount to almost absolving the offenders thereof for liability therefor. While the
celebration of the bigamous marriage may be said to be open and made of public record by its
registration, the offender however is not truthful as he conceals from the officiating authority and
those concerned the existence of his previous subsisting marriage. He does not reveal to them that
he is still a married person. He likewise conceals from his legitimate spouse his bigamous
marriage. And for these, he contracts the bigamous marriage in a place where he is not known to
be still a married person. And such a place may be anywhere, under which circumstance, the
discovery of the bigamous marriage is rendered quite difficult and would take time. It is therefore
reasonable that the prescriptive period for the crime of bigamy should be counted only from the
day on which the said crime was discovered by the offended party, the authorities or their agency.

Case Digest
NENITA BIENVENIDO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, LUISITA CAMACHO and LUIS FAUSTINO C.
CAMACHO
G.R. No. 111717 October 24, 1994
237 SCRA 676
MENDOZA, J.:
Facts: Aurelio P. Camacho married Consejo Velasco in Manila on October 3,1942. On February 6,
1962, without his marriage to Consejo Velasco being dissolved, Aurelio P. Camacho contracted
another marriage with respondent Luisita C. Camacho with whom he had been living since 1953
and by whom he begot a child, respondent Aurelio Luis Faustino C. Camacho (Chito) born on
May 22, 1961. The marriage was solemnized in Tokyo, Japan where Aurelio and Luisita had been
living since 1958.
There were instances during Luisita and Aurelio’s marriage when, because of their quarrels, one
or the other left the dwelling place for long periods of time. In her case Luisita stayed on those
occasions at various times in Davao City, Hongkong or Japan.
In 1967 Aurelio met petitioner Nenita T. Bienvenido, who had been estranged from her husband,
Luis Rivera. He lived with her from June 1968 until Aurelio’s death on May 28, 1988, he lived
with her, the last time in a duplex apartment in Quezon City. Petitioner’s daughter,
Nanette, stayed with them as did Aurelio’s son, Chito, who lived with them for about a year in
1976.
On April 30, 1982, Aurelio bought the house and the lot on Delgado Street in which they
were staying from the owners, Paz Lorenzo Infante and Suzette Infante-Moñozca. In the deed of
sale and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 288350 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon
City, issued in his name, Aurelio was described as single.

On November 26, 1984, Aurelio executed a deed of sale of the property in favor of petitioner
Nenita in consideration of the sum of P250,000.00, by virtue of which Transfer Certificate of
Title No.326681 was issued in petitioner’s name on January 11, 1985.
 On September 7, 1988, Luisita and her son Chito brought this case in the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, seeking the annulment of the sale of the property to petitioner and the payment to
them of damages. Luisita alleged that the deed of sale was a forgery and that in any
event it was executed in fraud of her as the legitimate wife of Aurelio.
In answer petitioner Nenita claimed that she and the late Aurelio had purchased the property in
question using their joint funds which they had accumulated after living together for fourteen
years, that the sale of the property by the late Aurelio to her was with respondent
Luisita’s consent; and that she was a purchaser in good faith.
Issue: Whether the marriage of Aurelio and Luisita is valid.
Whether the deed of sale between Aurelio and Nenita is valid.
Ruling: On August 29, 1989, the trial court rendered a decision upholding the sale of the property to
petitioner and dismissing the complaint of Luisita. It found the deed of sale in favor of petitioner
to be genuine and respondents Luisita and Chito to be in estoppel in not claiming the property
until 1988 despite knowledge of the sale by the late Aurelio who had represented himself to be
single. Respondents moved for a reconsideration but the trial court denied their motion.
On appeal the respondents prevailed. On June 4, 1993, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision
of the trial court and declared respondents to be the owners of the house and lot in dispute.
Although Luisita had admitted that as early as 1985 she knew that Nenita had
been staying in the premises, the appellate court held that respondents’ action was not barred by
laches because Luisita allegedly did not know that Nenita had obtained title to the property.
On the merit, the Court of Appeals ruled that in the absence of proof to the
contrary, Aurelio’s first wife must be presumed to have been absent for seven years without
Aurelio having news of her being alive when Aurelio contracted a second marriage. On this
premise, it held (1)that the property in dispute belonged to the conjugal partnership of
Aurelio and Luisita and (2) that the sale of the property to Nenita was void for the same reason
that donations between persons who are guilty of concubinage or adultery are declared void under
Art. 739 of the Civil Code.
The decision appealed from is REVERSED and another one is entered, DISMISSING the
complaint against petitioner and DECLARING the deed of sale executed in her favor and
Transfer Certificate of Title No.326681 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City issued in her
name to be VALID.
In the case at bar, the burden of proof was on respondents to show that Luisita and Aurelio’s
marriage falls under any of these exceptions in order to be considered valid. They failed to
discharge this burden. Instead the contrary appears. It has been held that the first exception refers
to the subsequent marriage of the abandoned spouse and not the remarriage of the deserting
spouse, after the period of seven years had lapsed.
This exception cannot be invoked in this case in order to sustain the validity of Aurelio’s
marriage to Luisita because apparently it was Aurelio who had left his first wife. At the time of
his second marriage to Luisita, he and Luisita had already been living together as husband and
wife for five years. In fact the couple begot a child, in 1961, even before their marriage in 1962.
Consequently, there is no basis for holding that the property in question was property of the
conjugal partnership of Luisita and the late Aurelio because there was no such partnership in the
first place. The sale to petitioner must be presumed. Petitioner’s ownership is
evidenced by a deed of absolute sale 7 executed with all the solemnity of a public document and
by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 326681 issued in due course in her name.
 Indeed, the property in question was acquired by Aurelio during a long period of cohabitation
with petitioner which lasted for twenty years (1968-1988). While petitioner knew respondent
Chito to be Aurelio’s son way back in 1976, there is nothing to show that she knew Aurelio
to be married to Luisita. To the contrary, Aurelio represented himself to be single. As far as
petitioner was concerned, Chito could have been Aurelio’s child by a woman not his wife. There
was, therefore, no basis for the Court of Appeals’ ruling that Nenita was not a buyer in
good faith of the property because she ought to have known that Aurelio was married to Luisita.

Case Digest
DOROTHY B. TERRE vs. ATTY. JORDAN TERRE
A.M. No. 2349 July 3, 1992
211 SCRA 6
PER CURIAM:
FACTS: Dorothy Terre was then married to a certain Merlito Bercenillo, her first cousin.  Atty. Jordan
Terre successfully convinced Dorothy that her marriage was void ab initio for the reason of
public policy and that they are free to contract marriage.  They got married in 1977 where he
wrote single under Dorothy’s status.  After getting Dorothy pregnant, Atty. Terre abandoned
them and subsequently contracted another marriage to Helina Malicdem in 1986.  Atty. Terre was
charged with abandonment of minor and bigamy.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Terre’s marriage with Dorothy is null and void.
HELD: Dorothy’s first marriage is indeed void ab initio considering that Merlito is her first cousin
thereby against public policy.  However, she did not file any declaration for the nullity of their
marriage before she contracted her marriage with Atty. Terre thus, her second marriage is void. 
Article 40 states that the absolute nullity of a former marriage may be invoked for the purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.

Case Digest
GODOFREDO BUCCAT vs. LUIDA MANGONON DE BUCCAT
G.R. No. 47101 April 25, 1941
72 PHIL 21
HORRILLENO, J.:
Facts: Godofredo Buccat and Luida Mangonon de Buccat met in March 1938, became engaged in
September, and got married in Nov 26.On Feb 23, 1939 (89 days after getting married) Luida,
who was 9 months pregnant, gave birth to a son. Godofredo left Luida and on March 23, 1939, he
 filed for an annulment of their marriage on the grounds that when he agreed to married Luida, she
assured him that she was a virgin. The Lower court decided in favor of Luida.
Issue: Whether or not Luida’s concealment of her pregnancy constituted a ground for the annulment of
marriage
Held: No. Clear and authentic proof is needed in order to nullify a marriage, a sacred institution in which
the State is interested. In this case, the court did not find any proof that there was concealment of
pregnancy constituting a ground for annulment; it was unlikely that Godofredo, a first-year law
student, did not suspect anything about Luida’s condition considering that she was in an advanced
stage of pregnancy when they got married. SC affirmed the lower court’s decision.

Case Digest
FERNANDO AQUINO vs. CONCHITA DELIZO
G.R. No. L-15853 July 27, 1960
109 PHIL 21
GUTIERREZ DAVID, J.:

Facts: Defendant Conchita Delizo, herein respondent, at the date of her marriage to plaintiff,
herein petitioner Fernando Aquino, on December 27, 1954, concealed from the latter that
fact that she was pregnant by another man, and sometime in April, 1955, or about four
months after their marriage, gave birth to a child. In her answer, defendant claimed that
the child was conceived out of lawful wedlock between her and the plaintiff.

The Petitioner claimed that he did not notice that her wife was four months pregnant at the time
of their marriage because the Respondent was naturally plump or fat.

During the trial, Provincial Fiscal Jose Goco represent the state in the proceedings to prevent
collusion. Only Aquino testified and the only documentary evidence presented was the marriage
contract between the parties. Delizo did not appear nor presented any evidence.

CFI-Rizal dismissed petitioner’s complaint for annulment of marriage, which was affirmed by
CA thus a petition for certiorari to review the decisions.

Issue: Whether or not concealment of pregnancy as alleged by Aquino does not constitute such fraud as
would annul a marriage.

Held: The concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man
other than her husband constitutes fraud and is a ground for annulment of marriage. Delizo was
allegedly to be only more than four months pregnant at the time of her marriage. At this stage, it
is hard to say that her pregnancy was readily apparent especially since she was “naturally plump”
or fat. It is only on the 6thmonth of pregnancy that the enlargement of the woman’s abdomen
reaches a height above the umbilicus, making the roundness of the abdomen more general and
 apparent. In the following circumstances, the court remanded the case for new trial and decision
complained is set aside.

Case Digest
AURORA A. ANAYA vs. FERNANDO O. PALAROAN
G.R. No. L-27930 November 26, 1970
36 SCRA 97
REYES, J.B.L., J.
FACTS: Aurora Anaya and Fernando Palaroan were married in 1953. Palaroan filed for an action for
annulment of the marriage in 1954 on the ground that his consent was obtained through force and
intimidation. The complaint was dismissed and upheld the validity of the marriage and granting
Aurora’s counterclaim. While the amount of counterclaim was being negotiated, Fernando
divulged to her that several months prior to their marriage, he had premarital relationship with a
close relative of his. According to her, the non-divulgement to her of such premarital secret
constituted fraud in obtaining her consent. She prayed for the annulment of her marriage with
Fernando on such ground.
ISSUE: Whether or not the concealment to a wife by her husband of his premarital relationship with
another woman is a ground for annulment of marriage.
RULING: The concealment of a husband’s premarital relationship with another woman was not one of
those enumerated that would constitute fraud as ground for annulment and it is further excluded
by the last paragraph providing that “no other misinterpretation or deceit as to…chastity” shall
give ground for an action to annul marriage. Hence, the case at bar does not constitute fraud and
therefore would not warrant an annulment of marriage.

Case Digest
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GREGORIO NOLASCO
G.R. No. 94053 March 17, 1993
220 SCRA 20
FELICIANO, J.
FACTS: Gregorio Nolasco is a seaman. He met Janet Parker, a British, in a bar in England. After that,
Janet started living with Nolasco in his ship for six months. It lasted until the contract of Nolasco
expired then he brought her to his hometown in Antique. They got married in January 1982. Due
 to another contract, Nolasco left the province. In 1983, Nolasco received a letter from his mother
informing him that his son had been born but 15 days after, Janet left. Nolasco went home and cut
short his contract to find Janet’s whereabouts. He did so by securing another seaman’s contract
going to London. He wrote several letters to the bar where they first met but it was all returned.
Gregorio petitioned in 1988 for a declaration of presumptive death of Janet.
ISSUE: Whether or not Nolasco had a well-founded belief that his wife, Janet, is already dead.
RULING: The Supreme Court ruled that Nolasco’s efforts to locate Janet were not persistent to show
that he has a well-founded belief that his wife was already dead because instead of seeking
assistance of local authorities and the British Embassy, he even secured another contract. More
so, while he was in London, he did not even try to solicit help of the authorities to find his wife.

Case Digest
EMILIO TUASON vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA VICTORIA L. TUASON
G.R. No. 116607 April 10, 1996
256 SCRA 15
PUNO, J.
FACTS: In 1989, private respondent Maria Victoria Lopez Tuason filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Makati a petition for annulment or declaration of nullity of her marriage to petition Emilio R.
Tuason. In her complaint, private respondent alleged that she and petitioner were married on June
3, 1972 and from this union, begot two children; that at the time of the marriage, petitioner was
already psychologically incapacitated to comply with his essential marital obligations which
became manifest afterward and resulted in violent fights between husband and wife; that
petitioner used prohibited drugs, was apprehended by the authorities and sentenced to a one-year
suspended penalty and has not been rehabilitated; that petitioner was a womanizer; that after he
left the conjugal dwelling, petitioner gave minimal support to the family and even refused to pay
for the tuition fees of their children compelling private respondent to accept donations and dole-
outs from her family and friends; that attempts at reconciliation were made but they all failed
because of petitioner’s refusal to reform. In addition to her prayer for annulment, private
respondent prayed for powers of administration to save the conjugal properties from further
dissipation.
After the issues were joined, the trial commenced on March 30, 1990. Private respondent
presented her evidences. On the scheduled reception of the petitioner’s evidences on May 11,
1990, petitioner’s counsel filed for postponed on the ground that the principal counsel was out of
the country. The court granted the motion and reset the hearing on June 8, 1990. On the said date,
petitioner failed to appear. On oral motion private respondent, the court declared petitioner to
have waived his right to present evidence and deemed the case submitted for decision on the basis
of the evidence presented. On June 29, 1990, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the
nullity of private respondent’s marriage to petitioner and awarding custody of the children to
private respondent.
 The petitioner appealed but was again denied by the CA. At the Supreme Court, petitioner alleges
that the proper process for annulment of marriage or legal separation was not properly followed
by the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in the process of rendering the marriage null and void.
RULING: A grant of annulment of marriage or legal separation by default is fraught with the danger of
collusion. Hence, in all cases for annulment, declaration of nullity of marriage and legal
separation, the prosecuting attorney or fiscal is ordered to appear on behalf of the state for the
purpose of preventing any collusion between the parties and to take care that their evidence is not
fabricated or suppressed. If the defendant spouse fails to answer the complaint, the court cannot
declare him/her in default but instead, should order the prosecuting attorney to determine if
collusion exists between the parties. The prosecuting attorney or fiscal may oppose the
application for legal separation or annulment through the presentation of his evidence, if in his
opinion, the proof adduced is dubious and fabricated. Our Constitution is committed to the policy
of strengthening the family as a basic social institution. Our family law is based on the policy that
marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution in which the state is vitally interested.
The facts at bar do not call for the strict implementation of Article 48 and 60 of the Family Code.
For one, petitioner was not declared in default by the trial court for failure to answer. Petitioner
actively participated in the proceedings below by filing several pleadings and cross-examining
the witnesses of private respondent. It is crystal clear that every stage of the litigation was
characterized by no-holds barred contest and not by collusion. The role of the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal in annulment of marriage and legal separation proceedings is to determine
whether collusion exists between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not suppressed
or fabricated. Petitioner’s vehement opposition to the annulment proceedings negates the
conclusion that collusion existed between the parties. There is no allegation by the petitioner that
evidence was suppressed or fabricated by any of the parties. Under these circumstances, we are
convinced that the non-intervention of a prosecuting attorney to assure lack of collusion between
the contending parties is not fatal to the validity of the proceedings of the court.

Case Digest
LUPO ALMODIEL ATIENZA vs. JUDGE FRANCISCO F. BRILLANTES, JR.
A.M. No. MTJ-92-706 March 29, 1995
243 SCRA 32
QUIASON, J.
FACTS: Lupo Atienza lived together with Yolanda de Castro with whom he has two children. He
purchased a house in Bel-Air, Makati where his family stayed. He stays there too whenever he’s
in Manila. In Dec., 1991, he was surprised to see Manila Metropolitan Trial Court Judge
Francisco Brillantes sleeping on his bed. Their boy informed him that Brillantes had been
cohabiting with de Castro. Later on, Brillantes prevented him from visiting his children. He
claims that Brillantes is married to Zenaida Ongkiko with whom he has five children. Atienza
filed a complaint for Gross Immorality & Appearance of Impropriety against Brillantes.
Brillantes claims that his marriage to Ongkiko is not valid because of lack of marriage license.
According to him, Ongkiko abandoned him 19 years ago leaving their children with him. He
claims that he believed that he was single when he married de Castro because his first marriage
was void.
ISSUE: Whether or not Brillantes can contract a second marriage without a judicial declaration of nullity.
RULING: No. He is dismissed from service, FC Art. 40: judicial declaration of nullity of previous
marriage is needed before one can enter into a second marriage. Rule has retroactive effect thus
applicable to Brillantes even if he got married under the Civil Code. Bad faith and sinister
motives of Brillantes proven by his marriage to Ongkiko. They underwent two ceremonies
however he never got a license. Then, he immorally and illegally cohabited with de Castro. Not
fit for the judiciary.

Case Digest
ROBERTO DOMINGO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 104818 September 17, 1993
226 SCRA 572
ROMERO, J.
FACTS: Delia Domingo, private respondent, filed a petition before RTC of Pasig for the declaration of
nullity of marriage and separation of property against Roberto Domingo, petitioner. She alleged
that they were married at Carmona, Cavite with evidences of marriage certificate and marriage
license, unknown to her, petitioner had a previous marriage with Emerlina dela Paz which is still
valid and existing. She came to know the prior marriage when Emerlina sued them for bigamy.
She prays that their marriage be declared null and void and, as a consequence, to declare that she
is the exclusive owner of all properties she acquired during the marriage and to recover them
from him.
Roberto moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that the marriage being void ab initio, the
petition of declaration of nullity is unnecessary. It added that private respondent has no property
which in his possession.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent may claim for the declaration of nullity of marriage and separation of
property against petitioner on the ground of bigamy.
RULING: There is no question that the marriage of petitioner and private respondent celebrated while the
former's previous marriage with one Emerlina de la Paz was still subsisting is bigamous. As such,
it is from the beginning. Petitioner himself does not dispute the absolute nullity of their marriage.
The Court had ruled that no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void,
bigamous marriage.
The Family Code has clearly provided the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage, one of
which is the separation of property according to the regime of property relations governing them.
 It stands to reason that the lower court before whom the issue of nullity of a first marriage is
brought is likewise clothed with jurisdiction to decide the incidental questions regarding the
couple's properties.

Case Digest
MEYNARDO L. BELTRAN vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 137567 June 20, 2000
334 SCRA 106
BUENA, J.
FACTS: In 1973, Beltran and Charmaine Felix married each other. They’ve had 4 children since then but
after 24 years of marriage Beltran filed an action for the declaration of the nullity of their
marriage due to Felix’s PI. Felix countered that Beltran left the conjugal home to cohabit with a
certain Milagros and that she filed a case of concubinage against Beltran. In 1997, the lower court
found probable cause against Beltran and Milagros. In order to forestall the issuance of a warrant
of arrest against him, Beltran raised the issue that the civil case he filed is a prejudicial question
to the criminal case filed by Milagros. He said that the courts hearing the cases may issue
conflicting rulings if the criminal case will not be suspended until the civil case gets resolved.
The lower court denied Beltran’s petition and so did Judge Tuazon of the RTC upon appeal.
Beltran then elevated the case to the SC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the absolute nullity of a previous marriage be invoked as a prejudicial question
in the case at bar.
RULING: The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions.
It has two essential elements: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to
the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or
not the criminal action may proceed. The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of
Beltran’s marriage is not a prejudicial question to the concubinage case. For a civil case to be
considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of the latter pending the
final determination of the civil case, it must appear not only that the said civil case involves the
same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that in the resolution of
the issue or issues raised in the aforesaid civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would
necessarily be determined.
The SC ruled that the import of said provision is that for purposes of remarriage, the only legally
acceptable basis for declaring a previous marriage an absolute nullity is a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void, whereas, for purposes of other than remarriage, other
evidence is acceptable.
In a case for concubinage, the accused (Beltran) need not present a final judgment declaring his
marriage void for he can adduce evidence in the criminal case of the nullity of his marriage other
than proof of a final judgment declaring his marriage void.
With regard to Beltran’s argument that he could be acquitted of the charge of concubinage should
his marriage be declared null and void, suffice it to state that even a subsequent pronouncement
that his marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense.

Case Digest
VINCENT PAUL G. MERCADO vs. CONSUELO TAN
G.R. No. 137110 August 1, 2000
337 SCRA 28
PANGANIBAN, J.
FACTS: Dr. Vicent Mercado was previously married with Thelma Oliva in 1976 before he contracted
marriage with Consuelo Tan in 1991 which the latter claims she did not know. Tan filed bigamy
against Mercado and after a month the latter filed an action for declaration of nullity of marriage
against Oliva. The decision in 1993 declared marriage between Mercado and Oliva null and void.
ISSUE: Whether Mercado committed bigamy in spite of filing the declaration of nullity of the former
marriage.
RULING: A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent one
can be legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining
such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier union is
characterized by statute as “void.”
In the case at bar, Mercado only filed the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Olivia right
after Tan filed bigamy case. Hence, by then, the crime had already been consummated. He
contracted second marriage without the judicial declaration of the nullity. The fact that the first
marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense in a bigamy charge.

Case Digest
JUANITA CARATING-SIAYNGCO vs. MANUEL SIAYNGCO
G.R. NO. 158896 October 27, 2004
441 SCRA 422
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Juanita Carating-Siayngco ("Petitioner Juanita") and respondent Manuel were married at civil
rites on 27 June 1973 and before the Catholic Church on 11 August 1973. After discovering that
they could not have a child of their own, the couple decided to adopt a baby boy in 1977, who
they named Jeremy.
On 25 September 1997, or after twenty-four (24) years of married life together, respondent
Manuel filed for the declaration of its nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity of
petitioner Juanita. He alleged that all throughout their marriage, his wife exhibited an over
domineering and selfish attitude towards him which was exacerbated by her extremely volatile
and bellicose nature; that she incessantly complained about almost everything and anyone
connected with him like his elderly parents, the staff in his office and anything not of her liking
like the physical arrangement, tables, chairs, wastebaskets in his office and with other trivial
matters; that she showed no respect or regard at all for the prestige and high position of his office
as judge of the Municipal Trial Court; that she would yell and scream at him and throw objects
around the house within the hearing of their neighbors; that she cared even less about his
professional advancement as she did not even give him moral support and encouragement; that
her psychological incapacity arose before marriage, rooted in her deep-seated resentment and
vindictiveness for what she perceived as lack of love and appreciation from her own parents since
 childhood and that such incapacity is permanent and incurable and, even if treatment could be
attempted, it will involve time and expense beyond the emotional and physical capacity of the
parties; and that he endured and suffered through his turbulent and loveless marriage to her for
twenty-two (22) years.
In her Answer, petitioner Juanita alleged that respondent Manuel is still living with her at their
conjugal home in Malolos, Bulacan; that he invented malicious stories against her so that he
could be free to marry his paramour; that she is a loving wife and mother; that it was respondent
Manuel who was remiss in his marital and family obligations; that she supported respondent
Manuel in all his endeavors despite his philandering; that she was raised in a real happy family
and had a happy childhood contrary to what was stated in the complaint.
ISSUE: Whether or not the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity against petitioner Juanita and/or respondent Manuel.
RULING: Sexual infidelity, per se, however, does not constitute psychological incapacity within the
contemplation of the Family Code. It must be shown that respondent Manuel’s unfaithfulness is a
manifestation of a disordered personality which makes him completely unable to discharge the
essential obligations of the marital state and not merely due to his ardent wish to have a child of
his own flesh and blood.
An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a null and void marriage. Mere showing of
"irreconcilable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological
incapacity. As we stated in Marcos v. Marcos:
Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the
marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifests themselves. It refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady
so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond one is about to assume.
We are not downplaying the frustration and misery respondent Manuel might be experiencing in
being shackled, so to speak, to a marriage that is no longer working. Regrettably, there are
situations like this one, where neither law nor society can provide the specific answers to every
individual problem.

Case Digest
LENI O. CHOA vs. ALFONSO C. CHOA
G.R. No. 143376 November 26, 2002
392 SCRA 198
PANGANIBAN, J.
FACTS: Leni Choa, petitioner, and Alfonso Choa, respondent, were married on March 15, 1981. Out of
this union, two children were born. On October 27, 1993, respondent filed a complaint for the
annulment of his marriage to petitioner. Also filed an amended complaint for the declaration of
nullity of his marriage based on her alleged psychological incapacity. The case went on trial with
the respondent presenting his evidence. However, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the
evidence. RTC denied petitioner’s demurrer to evidence on the ground that petitioner must
controvert the established quantum evidence of respondent. Petitioner elevated the case to CA
after the motion of reconsideration was denied. CA held that denial of the demurrer was merely
interlocutory and petitioner in her defense must present evidence.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner’s obligated to present her evidence despite the inadequate evidence of
respondent in the annulment of marriage case grounded on psychological incapacity.
RULING: The petition is meritorious. However, the evidence against petitioner is grossly insufficient to
support any finding of psychological incapacity that would warrant a declaration of nullity of the
parties’ marriage.
Respondent claims that the filing by petitioner of a series of charges against him are proof of the
latter’s psychological incapacity to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. These
charges included Complaints for perjury, false testimony, concubinage and deportation.
The documents presented by respondent during the trial do not in any way show the alleged
psychological incapacity of his wife. It is the height of absurdity and inequity to condemn her as
psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her marital obligations, simply because she filed cases
against him. The evidence presented merely establishes the prosecution of the cases against him.
To rule that the filings are sufficient to establish her psychological incapacity is not only totally
erroneous, but also grave abuse of discretion bordering on absurdity.
Court clearly explained that "psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b)
juridical antecedence and (c) incurability. The evidence adduced by respondent merely shows that
he and his wife could not get along with each other. There was absolutely no showing of the
gravity or juridical antecedence or incurability of the problems besetting their marital union.

Case Digest
REPUBLIC vs. CRASUS IYOY
G.R. No. 152577. September 21, 2005
470 SCRA 461
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Facts: On December 16, 1961 Crasus Iyoy and Ada Rosal-Iyoy got married. They had five children –
Crasus, Jr., Daphne, Debbie, Calvert, and Carlos. After the celebration of their marriage, Crasus
discovered that Fely was "hot-tempered, a nagger and extravagant." In 1984, Fely went to the US
and sent letters to Crasus asking him to sign divorce papers which he disregarded. In 1985,
Crasus learned, through the letters sent by Fely to their children, that Fely got married to an
American, with whom she eventually had a child. Fely went back to the Philippines on several
occasions – for the wedding of their eldest child, Crasus, Jr. in 1992 and for the brain operation of
their fourth child, Calvert. Fely continued to live with her American family in New Jersey. She
had been openly using the surname of her American husband. For the wedding of Crasus, Jr.,
Fely herself had invitations made in which she was named as "Mrs. Fely Ada Micklus." In March
25, 1997, Crasus filed a complaint for declaration of nullity alleging that Fely’s acts brought
“danger and dishonor” to the family and were manifestations of her psychological incapacity.
Crasus submitted his testimony, the certification of the recording of their marriage contract, and
the invitation where Fely used her new husband’s last name as evidences. Fely denied the claims
and asserted that Crasus was a drunkard, womanizer, had no job, and that since 1988 she was
already an American citizen and not covered by our laws.
Issue: Whether or not abandonment and sexual infidelity per se constitute psychological incapacity
Ruling: The Supreme Court arrives at a conclusion contrary to those of the RTC and the Court of
Appeals, and sustains the validity and existence of the marriage between respondent Crasus and
Fely. At most, Fely’s abandonment, sexual infidelity, and bigamy, give respondent Crasus
grounds to file for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code of the Philippines, but not
for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the same Code. The root cause of
psychological incapacity was not proven.
There was also improper application of Art. 26 of the Family Code. As it is worded, Article 26,
paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein one of the couple getting married is a Filipino
citizen and the other a foreigner at the time the marriage was celebrated. By its plain and literal
interpretation, the said provision cannot be applied to the case of respondent Crasus and his wife
Fely because at the time Fely obtained her divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen.
Furthermore, Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and
to assume the basic marital obligations; not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill
will, on the part of the errant spouse. Irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities,
emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity
or perversion, and abandonment, by themselves, also do not warrant a finding of psychological
incapacity under the said Article. Article 36 is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the
marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of marriage. It is a malady so
grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond one is about to assume.

Case Digest
LORNA PESCA vs. ZOSIMO PESCA
G.R. No. 136921. April 17, 2001
356 SCRA 588
VITUG, J.:

Facts: Lorna G. Pesca and Zosimo A. Pesca got married on March 3, 1975. Initially, the young couple
did not live together as petitioner was still a student in college and respondent, a seaman, had to
leave the country on board an ocean-going vessel barely a month after the marriage. Six months
later, the young couple established their residence in Quezon City until they were able to build
their own house in Caloocan City where they finally resided. The union begot four children, 19-
year old Ruhem, 17-year old Rez, 11-year old Ryan, and 9-year old Richie. In 1988, the
petitioner said she noticed that respondent surprisingly showed signs of psychological incapacity.
His true colors of emotionally immature and irresponsible husband became apparent. The
respondent allegedly would slap, beat and kick her and one time with a loaded shotgun threatened
to kill her in the presence of their children. After some other beating, a case was filed against the
respondent for slight physical injuries and was sentenced to eleven days of imprisonment. On
November 15, 1995, the trial court rendered its decision declaring the marriage between
petitioner and respondent to be null and void ab initio on the basis of psychological incapacity on
the part of the respondent and ordered a liquidation of conjugal partnership. The respondent
appealed the above decision to the Court of Appeals, contending that the trial court erred, and
particularly in holding that there was legal basis to declare the marriage null and void. The Court
 of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and declared the marriage between the
petitioner and respondent valid and subsisting.
Issue: Whether or not the marriage is null and void for the ground of psychological incapacity
Ruling: The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the appellate court thereby dismissing the petition.
At all events, petitioner has utterly failed, both in her allegations in the complaint and in her evidence, to
make out a case of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent, let alone at the time of
solemnization of the contract, so as to warrant a declaration of nullity of the marriage. Emotional
immaturity and irresponsibility, invoked by her, cannot be equated with psychological incapacity. The
Court reiterates its reminder that marriage is an inviolable social institution and the foundation of the
family that the State cherishes and protects. While the Court commiserates with petitioner in her unhappy
marital relationship with respondent, totally terminating that relationship, however, may not necessarily
be the fitting denouement to it. In these cases, the law has not quite given up, neither should we.

Case Digest

MA. ARMIDA-FERRARIS vs. BRIX FERRARIS

G.R. No. 162368, July 17, 2006
495 SCRA 396
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Facts: The Regiona Trial Court denied the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage between
petitioner Ma. Armida-Ferraris with Brix Ferraris. It found that his "violence" during episodes of
epilepsy did not constitute psychological incapacity. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision
and cited that the evidence on record did not convincingly establish that respondent was suffering
from psychological incapacity or that his "defects" were incurable and already present at the
inception of the marriage. The Court of Appeals also found that Dr. Dayan's testimony failed to
establish the substance of respondent's psychological incapacity; that she failed to explain how
she arrived at the conclusion that the respondent has a mixed personality disorder; that she failed
to clearly demonstrate that there was a natal or supervening disabling factor or an adverse integral
element in respondent's character that effectively incapacitated him from accepting and
complying with the essential marital obligations. The petitioner then filed a motion to the
Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or not epilepsy constitute psychological incapacity
Ruling: The Supreme Court denied the petition with finality. The Supreme Court found respondent's
alleged mixed personality disorder, the "leaving-the-house" attitude whenever they quarreled, the
violent tendencies during epileptic attacks, the sexual infidelity, the abandonment and lack of
support, and his preference to spend more time with his band mates than his family, are not
rooted on some debilitating psychological condition but a mere refusal or unwillingness to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. In determining the import of
"psychologicalincapacity" under Article 36, it must be read in conjunction with, although to be
taken as distinct from Articles 35, 37, 38, and 41 that would likewise, but for different reasons,
render the marriage void ab initio, or Article 45 that would make the marriage merely voidable,
or Article 55 that could justify a petition for legal separation. Care must be observed so that these
various circumstances are not applied so indiscriminately as if the law were indifferent on the
matter. Article 36 should not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the
time the causes therefor manifest themselves. Neither it is to be equated with legal separation, in
which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral
pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual
infidelity, abandonment and the like.

Case Digest
DAVID DEDEL vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 151867. January 29, 2004
421 SCRA 461
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Facts: David B. Dedel married Sharon L. Corpuz Dedel before the City Court of Pasay on September
28, 1966. The civil marriage was ratified in a church wedding on May 20, 1967. Petitioner avers
that during the marriage, Sharon turned out to be an irresponsible and immature wife and mother.
She had extra-marital affairs with several men: a dentist in the Armed Forces of the Philippines; a
Lieutenant in the Presidential Security Command and later a Jordanian national.
Sharon was once confirmed in the Manila Medical City for treatment by Dr. Lourdes Lapuz, a
clinical psychiatrist. Petitioner alleged that despite the treatment, Sharon did not stop her illicit
relationship with the Jordanian national named Mustafa Ibrahim, whom she married and with
whom she had two children. However, when Mustafa Ibrahim left the country, Sharon returned
to petitioner bringing along her two children by Ibrahim. Petitioner accepted her back and even
considered the two illegitimate children as his own. On December 9, 1995, Sharon abandoned
petitioner to join Ibrahim in Jordan with their two children. The petitioner then filed a motion
for the declaration of nullity of the marriage based on psychological incapacity. The petitioner
presented Dr. Dayan Natividad who alleged that Sharon suffered from Anti-Social disorder
exhibited by her blatant display of infidelity and abandonment. These characteristics render her
 unable to perform essential marital obligations.
The Regional Trial Court declared the marriage as null and void. The Office of the Solicitor
General appealed and the Court of Appeals reversed the earlier ruling. The petitioner then filed a
motion to the Supreme Court alleging that there was error in the judgment of the Court of
Appeals.
Issue: Whether or not aberrant sexual behavior of respondent adverted to by petitioner fall within the
term psychological incapacity
Ruling: The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and affirmed the ruling the ruling of the Court of
Appeals. In this case, respondent’s sexual infidelity can hardly qualify as being mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that she could not have known the obligations she was assuming,
or knowing them, could not have given a valid assumption thereof. It appears that respondent’s
promiscuity did not exist prior to or at the inception of the marriage. What is, in fact, disclosed
by the records is a blissful marital union at its celebration, later affirmed in church rites, and
which produced four children. Respondent’s sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do
not by themselves constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family
Code. Neither could her emotional immaturity and irresponsibility be equated with psychological
incapacity.

Case Digest
ORLANDO TONGOL vs. FILIPINAS TONGOL
G.R. No. 157610 October 19, 2007
537 SCRA 135
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Facts: Orlando G. Tongol and Filipinas M. Tongol were married on August 27, 1967. They had four
children: Crisanto, Olivia, Frederick, and Ma. Cecilia. On August 19, 1996, Orlando filed a
petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Filipinas on the ground that the latter is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with her essential marital obligations. Orlando
contended that their marriage was not a happy one because of her parents' continued interference
and attempt to break up their union. Filipinas ridiculed Orlando when he started a junk shop
business and put up a pharmaceutical company which also became profitable. Filipinas became
interested and began to interfere in the operation of the business; however, their continued
fighting persisted and affected their children. In 1990, Orlando decided to live separately from
Filipinas. Filipinas admitted that efforts at reconciliation have been fruitless and that their
marriage is a failure because their differences had become irreconcilable. However, she claims
that it is Orlando who is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his obligations as a married man.
On June 30, 1999, the RTC of Makati City, dismissed the petition.
Issue: Whether or not the totality of the evidence presented in the present case is enough to sustain a
finding that herein respondent is psychologically incapacitated to comply with her essential
marital obligations
Ruling: The Court finds no error in the findings of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, that the aversive
behavior of petitioner and respondent towards each other is a mere indication of incompatibility
brought about by their different family backgrounds as well as their attitudes, which developed
after their marriage. In her testimony, Dr. Villegas explained that Mrs. Tongol is suffering from
an Inadequate Personality Disorder, with hysterical coloring, which renders her psychologically
incapacitated to perform the duties and responsibilities of marriage. She is unable to cope with
the sudden work and environmental shifts that overwhelmed her, due to insufficient
psychological inner resources.
In sum, it is not disputed that respondent is suffering from a psychological disorder. However, the
totality of the evidence presented in the present case does not show that her personality disorder
is of the kind contemplated by Article 36 of the Family Code as well as jurisprudence as to render
her psychologically incapacitated or incapable of complying with the essential obligations of
marriage.
It remains settled that the State has a high stake in the preservation of marriage rooted in its
recognition of the sanctity of married life and its mission to protect and strengthen the family as a
basic autonomous social institution. Hence, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
Case Digest
ANTONIOvs. REYES
G.R. No. 155800. March 10, 2006
484 SCRA 353
TINGA, J.:

Facts: Leonilo N. Antonio and Marie Ivonne F. Reyes met in August 1989 when petitioner was 26 years
old and respondent was 36 years of age. Barely a year after their first meeting, they got married
on December 6, 1990. Out of their union, a child was born on April 19, 1991, who sadly died five
(5) months later.
On March 8, 1993, petitioner filed a petition to have his marriage to respondent declared null and
void on the ground of psychological incapacity. As manifestations of respondent’s alleged
psychological incapacity, petitioner claimed that respondent persistently lied about herself, the
people around her, her occupation, income, educational attainment and other events or things, to
wit:
(1) She concealed the fact that she previously gave birth to an illegitimate son, and
instead introduced the boy to petitioner as the adopted child of her family. She only confessed the
truth about the boy’s parentage when petitioner learned about it from other sources after their
marriage.
(2) She fabricated a story that her brother-in-law, Edwin David, attempted to rape and kill
her when in fact, no such incident occurred.
(3) She misrepresented herself as a psychiatrist to her obstetrician, Dr. Consuelo
Gardiner, and told some of her friends that she graduated with a degree in psychology, when she
was neither.
(4) She claimed to be a singer or a free-lance voice talent affiliated with Blackgold
Recording Company (Blackgold); yet, not a single member of her family ever witnessed her
alleged singing activities with the group. In the same vein, she postulated that a luncheon show
was held at the Philippine Village Hotel in her honor and even presented an invitation to that
effect but petitioner discovered per certification by the Director of Sales of said hotel that no such
occasion had taken place.
(5) She invented friends named Babes Santos and Via Marquez, and under those names,
sent lengthy letters to petitioner claiming to be from Blackgold and touting her as the "number
one moneymaker" in the commercial industry worth P2 million. Petitioner later found out that
respondent herself was the one who wrote and sent the letters to him when she admitted the truth
in one of their quarrels. He likewise realized that Babes Santos and Via Marquez were only
figments of her imagination when he discovered they were not known in or connected with
Blackgold.
(6) She represented herself as a person of greater means, thus, she altered her payslip to
make it appear that she earned a higher income. She bought a sala set from a public market but
told petitioner that she acquired it from a famous furniture dealer. She spent lavishly on
unnecessary items and ended up borrowing money from other people on false pretexts.
(7) She exhibited insecurities and jealousies over him to the extent of calling up his
officemates to monitor his whereabouts. When he could no longer take her unusual behavior, he
separated from her in August 1991. He tried to attempt a reconciliation but since her behavior did
not change, he finally left her for good in November 1991
The Trial Court declared the marriage as null and void since it found that respondent's propensity
to lie rendered her incapable of giving meaning and significance to her marriage. The Church also
 annuled the Catholic marriage of the parties. The Court of Appeals nevertheless held that the
totality of the evidence presented was insufficient to establish respondent’s psychological
incapacity and thus reversed the decision of the trial court. The petitioner then filed a motion to
the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or not pathological lying constitute psychological incapacity
Ruling: The Supreme Court granted the petition and reinstated the decision of the Trial Court. The
Molina guidelines did not foreclose the grant of a decree of nullity under Article 36, even as it raised the
bar for its allowance. The guidelines are in fact used to interpret incapacity in the present case. From the
totality of the evidence, we are sufficiently convinced that the incurability of respondent’s psychological
incapacity has been established by the petitioner. Any lingering doubts are further dispelled by the fact
that the Catholic Church tribunals, which indubitably consider incurability as an integral requisite of
psychological incapacity, were sufficiently convinced that respondent was so incapacitated to contract
marriage to the degree that annulment was warranted. It should be noted that the lies attributed to
respondent were not adopted as false pretenses in order to induce petitioner into marriage. More
disturbingly, they indicate a failure on the part of respondent to distinguish truth from fiction, or at least
abide by the truth. Petitioner’s witnesses and the trial court were emphatic on respondent’s inveterate
proclivity to telling lies and the pathologic nature of her mistruths, which according to them, were
revelatory of respondent’s inability to understand and perform the essential obligations of marriage.
Indeed, a person unable to distinguish between fantasy and reality would similarly be unable to
comprehend the legal nature of the marital bond, much less its psychic meaning, and the corresponding
obligations attached to marriage, including parenting. One unable to adhere to reality cannot be expected
to adhere as well to any legal or emotional commitments.

Case Digest
VILLANUEVA vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 132955 October 27, 2006
505 SCRA 564
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Facts: Petitioner Orlando Villanueva and private respondent Lilia Canalita-Villanueva got married on
April 13, 1988 in Puerto Princesa, Palawan.  On November 17, 1992, Orlando filed with the trial
court a petition for annulment of his marriage alleging that threats of violence and duress forced
him into marrying Lilia, who was already pregnant; that he did not get her pregnant prior to the
marriage; that he never cohabited with her after the marriage; and that he later learned that private
respondent's child died during delivery on August 29, 1988. In her counterclaim, Lilia prayed for
the dismissal of the petition, arguing that petitioner freely and voluntarily married her; that
petitioner stayed with her in Palawan for almost a month after their marriage; that petitioner
wrote letters to her after he returned to Manila, during which private respondent visited him
personally; and that petitioner knew about the progress of her pregnancy, which ended in their
son being born prematurely.  
Issue: Whether or not the marriage may be annulled on the ground of vitiated consent
Ruling: We affirm the findings of the Court of Appeals that petitioner freely and voluntarily married
private respondent and that no threats or intimidation, duress or violence compelled him to do so.
The Court is not convinced that appellant’s apprehension of danger to his person is so
 overwhelming as to deprive him of the will to enter voluntarily to a contract of marriage. It is not
disputed that at the time he was allegedly being harassed, appellant worked as a security guard in
a bank. Given his employment at that time, it is reasonable to assume that appellant knew the
rudiments of self-defense, or, at the very least, the proper way to keep himself out of harm’s way.
For sure, it is even doubtful if threats were indeed made to bear upon appellant, what with the fact
that he never sought the assistance of the security personnel of his school nor the police regarding
the activities of those who were threatening him. And neither did he inform the judge about his
predicament prior to solemnizing their marriage. Appellant also invoked fraud to annul his
marriage, as he was made to believe by appellee that the latter was pregnant with his child when
they were married. Appellant’s excuse that he could not have impregnated the appellee because
he did not have an erection during their tryst is flimsy at best, and an outright lie at worst. The
complaint is bereft of any reference to his inability to copulate with the appellee.
The petitioner’s petition for the annulment of his marriage with private respondent is dismissed.

Case Digest
NGO TE vs. YU-TE
G.R. No. 161793
February 13, 2009
NACHURA, J.:

Facts: The parties’ whirlwind relationship lasted more or less six (6) months. They met in January 1996,
eloped in March, exchanged marital vows in May, and parted ways in June. After almost four
years, on January 18, 2000, Edward filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court in Quezon
City for the annulment of his marriage to Rowena on the basis of the latter’s psychological
incapacity. The psychologist who provided expert testimony found both parties psychologically
incapacitated. Petitioner’s behavioral pattern falls under the classification of dependent
personality disorder, and the respondent’s, that of the narcissistic and antisocial personality
disorder.

The trial court, on July 30, 2001, rendered its decision declaring the marriage of the parties null
and void on the ground that both parties were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations. On review, the appellate court reversed and set aside the trial’s court
ruling. It ruled that petitioner failed to prove the psychological incapacity of respondent, for the
clinical psychologist did not personally examine respondent, and relied only on the information
provided by petitioner. Further, the psychological incapacity was not shown to be attended by
gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability. In sum, the evidence adduced fell short of the
requirements stated in the Molina case needed for the declaration of nullity of the marriage under
Art. 36 of the Family Code. Dissatisfied, petitioner filed before the SC the instant petition for
review on certiorari. He posited that the trial court declared the marriage void, not only because
of respondent’s psychological incapacity, but rather due to both parties’ psychological incapacity.
He also pointed out that there is no requirement for the psychologist to personally examine
respondent.
Issue: Whether or not based on Article 36 of the Family Code, the marriage between the parties is null
and void
Ruling: The fulfillment of the obligations of marriage depends on the strength of this interpersonal
relationship. A serious incapacity for interpersonal sharing and support is held to impair the
relationship and consequently, the ability to fulfill the essential marital obligations. The marital
capacity of one spouse is not considered in isolation but in reference to the fundamental
relationship to the other spouse.
The petitioner, who is afflicted with dependent personality disorder, cannot assume the essential
marital obligations of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering help and
support, for he is unable to make everyday decisions without advice from others, allows others to
make most of his important decisions (such as where to live), tends to agree with people even
when he believes they are wrong, has difficulty doing things on his own, volunteers to do things
that are demeaning in order to get approval from other people, feels uncomfortable or helpless
when alone and is often preoccupied with fears of being abandoned. As clearly shown in this
case, petitioner followed everything dictated to him by the persons around him. He is insecure,
weak and gullible, has no sense of his identity as a person, has no cohesive self to speak of, and
has no goals and clear direction in life. Although on a different plane, the same may also be said
of the respondent. Her being afflicted with antisocial personality disorder makes her unable to
assume the essential marital obligations. This finding takes into account her disregard for the
rights of others, her abuse, mistreatment and control of others without remorse, her tendency to
blame others, and her intolerance of the conventional behavioral limitations imposed by society.
Moreover, as shown in this case, respondent is impulsive and domineering; she had no qualms in
manipulating petitioner with her threats of blackmail and of committing suicide.
Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable psychological incapacity, the
precipitous marriage which they contracted on April 23, 1996 is thus, declared null and void.