Review of General Psychology Copyright 1997 by the Educational Publishing Foundation

1997, Vol. L No. 2, 198-226 1089-268O/97/S3.0O

Early Development of Executive Function:

A Problem-Solving Framework
Philip David Zelazo Alice Carter and J. Steven Reznick
University of Toronto Yale University

Douglas Frye
University of Pennsylvania
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Executive function (EF) accounts have now been offered for several disorders with
childhood onset (e.g., attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder, autism, early-treated
phenylketonuria), and EF has been linked to the development of numerous abilities
(e.g., attention, rule use, theory of mind). However, efforts to explain behavior in terms
of EF have been hampered by an inadequate characterization of EF itself. What is the
function that is accomplished by EF? The present analysis attempts to ground the
construct of EF in an account of problem solving and thereby to integrate temporally
and functionally distinct aspects of EF within a coherent framework. According to this
problem-solving framework, EF is a macroconstruct that spans 4 phases of problem
solving (representation, planning, execution, and evaluation). When analyzed into
subfunctions, macroconstructs such as EF permit the integration of findings from
disparate content domains, which are often studied in isolation from the broader context
of reasoning and action. A review of the literature on the early development of EF
reveals converging evidence for domain-general changes in all aspects of EF.

Within the relatively new domain of develop-
mental neuropsychology (Spreen, Risser, &
Edgell, 1995), there is considerable interest in
the ontogeny of executive function, a construct
that is often used to characterize a diverse set of
processes impaired by damage to prefrontal
cortex in adults (e.g., Stuss & Benson, 1986).
Executive function accounts have now been
offered for several psychiatric conditions with
childhood onset (e.g., autism, Gilles de la
Tourette Syndrome, attention-deficit/hyperactiv-
ity disorder, obsessive-compulsive disorder; see
Philip David Zelazo, Department of Psychology, Univer-
sity of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario, Canada; Alice Carter and
J. Steven Reznick, Department of Psychology, Yale
University; Douglas Frye, Graduate School of Education,
University of Pennsylvania.
We would like to thank Janet Boseovski, Josephine
Rieser, Sophie Jacques, Natasha Kirkham, Stephanie
Lowell, and Margo Scharer for their assistance with the
preparation of this article. S. Jacques and J. Fueser also
provided extremely constructive comments on an earlier
version.
Correspondence concerning this article should be ad-
dressed to Philip David Zelazo, Department of Psychology,
University of Toronto, 100 Saint George Street, Toronto,
Ontario, Canada M5S 3G3. Electronic mail should he sent
via Internet to zelazo @psych.uloronto.ca.
Pennington & OzonorT, 1996,fora review), and
executive function has been linked to the
development of numerous psychological pro-
cesses, including attention, rule use, working
memory, and theory of mind (e.g., Diamond &
Taylor, 1996; Lyon & Krasnegor, 1996). The
construct of executive function thus promises to
explain important aspects of typical and atypical
development in terms that point toward neuro-
logical localization. Unfortunately, however,
efforts to explain behavior via executive func-
tion have been hampered by an inadequate
characterization of executive function itself.
Prefrontal cortical damage produces impair-
ments on a wide variety of tasks, including the
Wisconsin Card Sort Task (the WCST; e.g.,
Milner, 1964), the Stroop Color-Word Task
(Perret, 1974; Stroop, 1935), tower tasks (e.g.,
the Tower of London; Shallice, 1982), numerous
memory tasks (e.g., tasks assessing source
memory and memory for temporal order;
Milner, Petrides, & Smith, 1985; Shimamura,
Janowsky, & Squire, 1991), and the Porteus
Maze (Porteus, 1950), among many others (see
Stuss, Eskes, & Foster, 1994, for a review of
recent neuropsychological work). Often, descrip-

198
 EXECUTIVE FUNCTION 199

tions of executive function consist of heteroge- Executive Function

neous lists of processes presumed to underlie
performance on these tasks (e.g., Levin et al., Definition o/Executive
1991; Shute & Huertas, 1990; Stuss & Benson,
1984). The term executive can be understood both in
the sense of one who issues commands by virtue
A number of authors have recently proposed
of rank in a hierarchy (as in chief executive
unified descriptions of prefrontal impairments
officer [CEO]) and in the sense of one who
that emphasize basic processes such as inhibi-
carries out those commands (as in the executor
tion (e.g., Barkley, 1997; Dempster, 1992,1995) of a will). Disagreement concerning how best to
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or working memory (e.g., Kimberg & Farah, characterize executive function may depend in
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1993), but it remains unclear whether these part on which sense of the term is taken to be
unified descriptions can account for the full primary. Some authors (e.g., Baddeley, 1986;
range of observed impairments (Stuss et al., Goldstein & Scheerer, 1941; Shallice, 1988)
1994). Moreover, it seems unlikely that basic emphasize the role of a supervisory, reflective
processes will suffice to explain the way in agent, whereas other authors have stressed the
which different aspects of executive function executor sense of the term and focused instead
interact to accomplish the sophisticated metacog- on the production of action (e.g., Brown, 1987;
nitive functions subserved by prefrontal cortex Goldberg, 1987). Stuss and Benson's (1986,
(Perecman, 1987; Stuss & Benson, 1986). What p. 204) description of executive function as
is needed is a characterization of the complex involving "anticipation, goal establishment,
processes attributed to executive function that planning, response trials, monitoring of results,
captures their diversity without simply listing and use of feedback" seems to combine these
them. senses. However, we are still left with a list of
The current article attempts to ground the partially overlapping abilities that are not
obviously arranged in a coherent fashion (cf.
construct of executive function in an account of
Stuss & Benson, 1984, p. 23).
problem solving, which is much more tractable
than executive function from a psychological
perspective (cf. Holyoak, 1990). In the follow- Definition o/Function
ing sections, a functional framework for the
study of executive function is proposed based on As Luria noted in his 1973 book, the term
the temporal phases of problem solving (i.e., the function in this context refers to a complex
steps that are required to get from recognition of activity with a constant outcome that is capable
a problem to its solution). This problem-solving of being effected in a variety of ways (see also
framework serves to organize the diverse Bernstein, 1967). The function of communica-
aspects of executive function, illustrating the tion provides an example: Suppose you have a
way in which they can be fitted into a single message that you wish to communicate to
overarching structure. In addition to providing a another person. You can do so by speaking it,
coherent characterization of executive function, using sign language, or writing it. Moreover,
the framework permits us to review an extensive you can write it with your dominant hand or
literature on the normal development of execu- with your other hand (though perhaps less well).
tive function in preschool children. We focus on In any case, although the form of the communi-
the preschool period, which spans the transition cation changes, the function of communication,
from infancy to the school-age years, because and even the message that is communicated,
this period is marked by major changes in the remain the same.
control of thought and action (Zelazo & Jacques, Two general characteristics of complex func-
1997). The review reveals a convergence of tions are worth noting. First, with complex
findings that is bound to be overlooked in the functions such as communication or locomo-
absence of a broad framework like the one tion, there are many degrees of freedom—many
advanced here. In light of the literature review, means to the same end. Second, complex
we evaluate several theories of executive functions are inherently hierarchical in nature;
function and its development. the function of communication, for example,
depends on subfunctions such as motor control.
 200 ZELAZO, CARTER, REZNICK, AND FRYE
To a large extent, the task of characterizing a
complex function is a matter of describing its
hierarchical structure, characterizing its various
subfunctions, and organizing these subfunctions
around their constant common outcome.
Can sense be made of the diverse abilities
attributed to executive function and light thereby
be shed on the control of thought and action?
One approach is to consider the common
outcome of executive function. Consistent with
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earlier proposals (including those of Luria,
1980, and Shallice, 1988), the outcome of
executive function is taken to be the solution of
a problem. In the next section, we present a
problem-solving framework for studying execu-
tive function that is designed to integrate
temporally and functionally distinct aspects of
executive function. As we shall see, whether or
not a problem is solved is relatively straightfor-
ward to assess. However, when a problem
remains unsolved, it is often difficult to deter-
mine where in the process of problem-solving
performance breaks down.
A Problem-Solving Framework Applied to
Executive Function
Problem solving has been the subject of
considerable theoretical analysis since the start
of psychology as a scientific enterprise. Dewey
(1933/1985) placed it at the center of his
account of how we think, and it has remained a
central topic in cognitive psychology. Cyber-
netic theory (Weiner, 1948), hierarchical models
of action control (e.g., Miller, Galanter, &
Pribram, 1960; Powers, 1973), and early infor-
mation-processing approaches (e.g., Newell,
Shaw, & Simon, 1958) have contributed the
theoretical and methodological elements that
form the basis of most contemporary research
on problem solving.
According to Newell and Simon (1972), "A
person is confronted with a problem when he
wants something and does not know immedi-
ately what series of actions he can perform to get
it" (p. 72). Many authors have attempted to
delineate the separate steps or phases that lead
from recognition of a problem to its solution
(e.g., Bransford & Stein, 1993; Hayes, 1989;
Kagan, 1966; Polya, 1945; Scholnick & Fried-
man, 1987), and there is considerable overlap
among these accounts. Our own analysis of
problem solving suggests the following frame-
Problem Representation
Planning
Execution:
Intending/Rule Use
Evaluation:
Error Detection/Correction
Figure 1. A problem-solving framework that identifies
four temporally distinct phases of executive function.
work (see Figure 1). The framework involves
four temporally and functionally distinct steps
(plus substeps). To solve a problem, one must
first construct a problem space (i.e., a representa-
tion of the problem and possible solutions).
Work in the Gestalt tradition (e.g., Duncker,
1945; Kohler, 1917/1959; Maier, 1932) empha-
sized the importance of the problem representa-
tion phase of problem solving. According to the
Gestalt approach, problem solving consists
primarily in restructuring one's representation
of a problem (i.e., insight). Once one attains the
right problem representation (or set or Einstel-
lung), the rest of the steps follow straightaway.
In contrast, information-processing approaches
have emphasized the second phase, planning.
Newell and Simon (1972) conceptualized prob-
lem solving as search in a problem space for a
promising plan. Planning strategies such as
means-end analysis are often used to constrain
this search, and an important aspect of planning
is the selection of a plan from among alterna-
tives. Another aspect of planning is sequencing
actions in time. For Newell and Simon (1972),
planning was the crux of problem solving, with
a satisfactory plan yielding a problem solution.
In the present framework, after one has
selected a plan, the execution phase of problem
solving begins: In order for a plan to be
 EXECUTIVE FUNCTION
executed, one must (a) keep the plan in mind
long enough for it to guide one's thought or
action and (b) actually carry out the prescribed
behavior. Keeping a plan in mind to control
behavior is referred to as intending; translating a
plan into action is rule use. There is consider-
able evidence for abulic dissociations between
intending and rule use (i.e., cases where an
intention is not translated into action; see Luria,
1959a; Teuber, 1964; Zelazo, Frye, & Rapus,
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1996; Zelazo & Reznick, 1991). This prompts
us to consider intending and rule use as separate
subphases of execution.
Finally, if one keeps a plan in mind and
actually uses the plan to guide behavior, then the
final phase of problem solving may occur. In this
phase, one evaluates one's action and deter-
mines whether a solution has been obtained.
Evaluation involves both error detection and
error correction (cf. Konow & Pribram, 1970),
the latter of which entails revision of one of the
previous phases of problem solving.
This framework allows us to capture, in an
organized fashion, what we take to be the main
aspects of executive function. Different aspects
correspond to one or the other (or both) of the
senses of the term executive mentioned above
(e.g., planning corresponds primarily to the
CEO sense of the term). Normally, errors in
executive function tasks (e.g., the WCST) could
be attributed to any number of processes,
including an inflexible representation of the
problem space (akin to functional fixedness;
Duncker, 1945), the persistent use of a particular
plan (cf. Luchins, 1942), failures of rule use
(Zelazo et al., 1996), or inability to benefit from
error information (Konow & Pribram, 1970). A
major advantage of the problem-solving frame-
work is that it allows researchers to locate lapses
of executive function fairly precisely in a
temporal sequence of problem-solving phases.
Several authors have developed tasks that are
amenable to this type of problem-solving
analysis, and these tasks are likely to prove
useful in understanding executive function in
disorders in which it is implicated (Delis,
Squire, Bihrle, & Massman, 1992; Levine,
Stuss, & Milberg, 1995). However, there are
also a number of more traditional tasks from the
standard cognitive and developmental litera-
tures that are focused on particular phases of
problem solving and are therefore interpretable
in terms of the problem-solving framework.
201
Many of these tasks have not previously been
considered relevant to executive function.
Executive Function as a Macroconstruct
The present framework differs from other
recent approaches to executive function in that it
treats executive function as a macroconstruct
that captures the way in which subfunctions of
executive function work together to accomplish
the higher-order function of problem solution.
Aspects of executive function are organized
around four temporally and functionally distinct
phases of problem solving, making it possible to
distinguish between inflexibility at each of the
four phases. Conceptualizing executive function
as a macroconstruct acknowledges the inherent
complexity of the self-regulative processes
involved in problem solving and permits us to
proceed with the difficult task of mapping out
the interactions among subfunctions.
In contrast, recent approaches to executive
function have tended to emphasize particular
subfunctions. For example, some authors have
suggested that executive function necessarily
involves resistance to interference from auto-
matic (or prepotent) responses (e.g., Barkley,
1996, p. 313) and that most or all executive-
function impairments derive from primary
impairments in inhibition (Barkley, 1997; Demp-
ster, 1993). Failures to inhibit responding (i.e.,
instances of perseveration) are certainly indica-
tive of executive function difficulties. However,
from the perspective of the problem-solving
framework, basic processes such as inhibition
are too simple by themselves to provide an
adequate characterization of the complex strate-
gic and metacognitive processes involved in
executive function.
As an example, consider the difficulty that
3-year-old children have making causal predic-
tions about unusual events. Frye, Zelazo,
Brooks, and Samuels (1996) asked children to
predict the path of a marble in a ramp. In one
condition, the ramp had two input holes at the
top and two output holes at the bottom, and
marbles either rolled straight down the ramp or
they rolled across it, depending on the ramp's
configuration. Children in this condition dis-
played a strong, perseverative tendency to say
that the marble would roll straight down
regardless of the configuration of the ramp. One
might plausibly propose that this task taps
 202 ZELAZO, CARTER, REZNICK, AND FRYE

executive function and that children were unable that do not involve interference, and it often
to inhibit a well-established expectation for operates alongside of automatic processes in
marbles to roll straight down inclined planes. familiar situations in which habitual strategies
However, children's performance in another suffice.
condition reveals the inadequacy of this ac- One way to derive an accurate assessment of
count. When only a single input hole is used, executive function would be to create a task that
and the ramp is arranged so that the marble will is a "pure" executive function task and is
roll across, 3-year-olds accurately predict the sensitive only to variations in executive func-
behavior of the marble. Presumably, problem tion. However, this is probably impossible to do:
solving in both conditions involves executive Any task that taps executive function will be
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function, but the likelihood of observing an "contaminated" by automatic processes work-

interference effect depends at least in part on ing either in concert with, or in opposition to,
aspects of executive function other than the executive function. The alternative advocated
inhibition of a prepotent expectation. By itself, by Maier (1936) and Jacoby (1991) is to
the construct of inhibition fails to capture the capitalize on this contamination and compare a
difference between conditions. facilitation condition to an opposition condition.
Another feature of the problem-solving frame- By considering these conditions together, one
work is that it recognizes that executive function may derive estimates of executive function.
is required even in situations that do not demand Consider, for example, the dimensional change
resistance to interference (e.g., it is required for card sort (see Figure 2; Zelazo et al., 1996), in
planning in novel situations). This feature is which children are first told to sort test cards by
compatible with Maier's (e.g., 1932, 1937) one dimension (e.g., color) and then instructed
suggestion that human behavior always reflects to switch and to sort cards by the other
the joint operation of two qualitatively different dimension. On the preswitch phase, executive
processes, which he called learning and reason- function and automatic process will work
ing. Learning is a relatively automatic process together, so performance will be relatively
that "is reproductive in nature and makes for insensitive to individual and group differences
stereotyped behavior" (Maier, 1932, p. 71). in executive function. That is, over trials,
Reasoning, on the other hand, is intentional and children can sort successfully either because
is usually seen in the goal-directed integration of they are controlling their behavior on each trial
separately learned behaviors. Problem solving or because they are relying on relatively
normally depends on both types of process, and automatic processes. As it turns out, both 3- and
it is difficult to create "pure" tests of reasoning 5-year-olds almost always pass this phase of the
(cf. Jacoby, 1991). However, the relative contri- task (e.g., Zelazo et al., 1996). On the other
bution of learning and reasoning to behavior in a hand, on the postswitch phase, executive
particular situation can be estimated by compar- function and automatic processes are put into
ing performance in a facilitation condition in
which the processes work together towards a
common solution, versus performance in an
opposition condition in which the processes are Target Cards
put into conflict (see also Maier, 1936).
Recently, an elaboration of this logic has been
successfully used by Jacoby (1991) in his Test Cards
process-dissociation procedure.
The opposition or interference conditions are
useful because they challenge controlled pro-
cesses and are therefore more sensitive than
facilitation conditions or neutral (novel) condi-
tions to endogenous or induced variations in
controlled processing. It is perhaps because of Figure 2. Stimuli from the dimensional change card sort,
this sensitivity that researchers have highlighted in which children are firs: told to sort test cards with target
cards according to one dimension (e.g., color) and then told
the importance of inhibition. However, execu- to sort the cards by the other dimension (e.g., shape; Zelazo
tive function also operates in novel situations et al., 1996).
 EXECUTIVE FUNCTION
opposition. One might imagine that the task now
becomes an executive function task; indeed,
3-year-olds usually fail this phase by perseverat-
ing on the first dimension despite being told the
postswitch rules on every trial. However, this
phase of the task is not a pure executive function
task and it is likely to underestimate children's
executive function. What is needed to estimate
the contribution of executive function to card
sorting is both the pre- and the postswitch
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phases: both the facilitation condition and the
opposition condition. Performance in the facili-
tation condition reflects executive function plus
automatic processing (Pf = EF + AP). Perfor-
mance in the opposition condition reflects
executive function minus automatic processing
(Po — EF — AP). By obtaining values for Pf and
Po, and combining variations of the previously
mentioned equations through simple algebra,
one can derive estimates of EF and AP (see
Jacoby, 1991).
The basic structure of this logic should suffice
to support the following important points: (a)
executive function contributes to performance
not only in interference problems, but also in
problems in which executive function works in
conceit with other more automatic processes,
(b) interference paradigms are more sensitive
than facilitation conditions to individual and
group variations in executive function, but they
underestimate executive function (because they
correspond to EF — AP), and (c) accurate
estimates of EF will require comparison of both
interference and facilitation conditions. These
points should be kept in mind when considering
studies of executive function in children.
Different studies reveal more or less executive
function in children at different ages in part
because the tasks used vary in the extent to
which they put executive function into opposi-
tion with automatic processes (e.g., consider the
subsequent section on children's integration as
assessed by H. H. Kendler and Kendler, 1962,
versus Crisafi & Brown, 1986). Although there
have been no deliberate efforts yet to derive
estimates of executive function in children using
the process-dissociation logic (Jacoby, 1991;
Maier, 1936), some developmental studies have
been designed to permit the comparison be-
tween opposition and facilitation conditions
(e.g., Gerstadt, Hong, & Diamond, 1994;
Wellman, Fabricius, & Sophian, 1985; Zelazo et
al., 1996). Most of these studies reveal dissocia-
203
tions between various aspects of executive
function, which are particularly informative
regarding the course of typical and atypical
development (cf. Mundy, 1995), and which
support the analysis of executive function into
subfunctions.
Research on Executive Function in Early
Childhood
In this section, the problem solving frame-
work is used to organize the literature on the
development of executive function in early
childhood (roughly, between 2 and 5 years).
Studies are reviewed that correspond to each
phase in the framework. Many experimental
paradigms (e.g., the WCST) simultaneously
assess various aspects of executive function and
could potentially be reviewed under the rubric
of more than one of our four phases of problem
solving. However, we have made an effort to
restrict our review to just those findings that can
be clearly interpreted in terms of only one of our
four phases. After examining specific phases of
problem solving in isolation, it will be possible
to consider them collectively in relation to the
macroconstruct of executive function.
Problem Representation
In order to solve a problem, one must first
represent the problem in a way that is conducive
to solving it. That is, one must create an
adequate problem space (Keren, 1984). In the
Gestalt tradition, problem representation was
often assessed using insight problems that
demand that the problem representation be
restructured (e.g., Duncker, 1945). Similar work
with children would be informative, but, to our
knowledge, only one such study has been
conducted, and unfortunately, the particular
problem used was too difficult for preschoolers
(Antonietti & Nava, 1995). However, the
restructuring of representations has been as-
sessed in the perceptual domain, in which
several studies have used ambiguous figures to
examine the creation and modification of
perceptual sets.
Problem representation or set is also closely
related to selective attention. In order to achieve
a representation of a problem (or an interpreta-
tion of a figure), one must attend selectively to
 204 ZELAZO, CARTER, REZNICK, AND FRYE
some aspects of a situation and ignore others
(i.e., filtering). The top-down influence of
problem representation on filtering has recently
been demonstrated by Folk and his colleagues
(e.g., Folk, Remington, & Johnston, 1992) who
found that the ease of ignoring distracters
depends on their conceptual relevance to the
target items. Distracters outside of a partici-
pants' attentional control settings (or set) are
ignored relatively easily. Problem representation
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is also related to the flexibility of attentional sets
(studied under the rubric of priming; Enns &
Cameron, 1987). Finally, recent work by DeLoa-
che (e.g., 1987) on children's understanding of
scale models explores representational flexibil-
ity more directly.
Set. The influence of age on the creation of
perceptual sets has been studied extensively.
Reese (1963a) showed children between 3 and 8
years of age a series of pictures of animals or
people and then showed them Bugelski and
Alampay's (1961) ambiguous rat-man figure
and asked them to identify it. Even the youngest
children seemed to acquire a set to perceive the
ambiguous figure as a rat in the animal condi-
tion, but there was no evidence that preschool
children induced the relevant set from the
human pictures. Subsequent studies in which the
pictures of people were labeled as such also
failed to demonstrate set in this condition
(Reese, 1963b). One possible interpretation of
these findings is that children have difficulty
overcoming a bias to represent the ambiguous
figure as a rat. Perhaps the dnimal condition
capitalized on children's a priori bias whereas
the human condition required representational
flexibility. In any case, West and Abravanel
(1972) succeeded in inducing a human set in
4- and 5-year-olds. These authors required
children to identify and classify the set-inducing
pictures before the critical ambiguous figure was
presented, a manipulation that may have af-
fected the potency of children's a priori
representational bias to see the picture as a rat.
In another paradigm, Rock and his colleagues
(Rock, Gopnik, & Hall, 1994) asked 3- and
4-year-old children to name one of three
ambiguous figures, including the rat-man fig-
ure. During an initial 60-second inspection
period, no child spontaneously reversed his or
her perception. Children were then informed
about the alternative interpretation using a
graded series of increasingly explicit pieces of
information (e.g., disambiguated figures) and
were shown the ambiguous figures again. About
half of the children failed to reverse in this final
phase, and those who did reverse did so
considerably less often than is typical of adults
in a comparable test. The authors report that
there was a nonsignificant trend for the 4-year-
olds to reverse more often than the 3-year-olds.
One interpretation of this trend is that the older
children are less likely to perseverate on an
initial representation of an ambiguous stimulus.
Selective attention. Both filtering (i.e., ignor-
ing distracters) and priming (i.e., flexibility of
attentional sets) have been studied by Enns and
Cameron (1987) in children at 4 and 7 years of
age, but, unfortunately, the task that these
authors used seems to involve too many phases
of problem solving to be easily interpreted
within our framework. A more easily interpreted
task (for our purposes) was used by Humphrey
(1982), who manipulated the relation between
distracters and the focal aspects of a test of
verbal recall and recognition memory. Three
types of distracter were used: environmental
distracters (a mirror placed near the child during
test), simple task-internal distracters (irrelevant
stimulus characteristics that could be ignored by
a simple decision rule based on one stimulus
feature, e.g., "Ignore all the large ones"), and
complex task-internal distracters (irrelevant
stimulus characteristics that could be ignored by
a more complex decision rule based on two
features, e.g., "Ignore the large ones and/or the
ones that differ in number"). Preschoolers (4 to
5 years) were impaired by all types of distracter,
kindergartners (no age provided) by simple and
complex distracters, and second graders by
complex distracters. It was not until the fourth
grade that children were successful in the
presence of complex distracters. By the onset of
the school-age period (kindergarten), then,
children were able to ignore external distracters.
The use of more complex selective attention
strategies was not revealed until later. Hum-
phrey argued that the ability to inhibit responses
to the complex distracters requires "the use of
an intersection or a hierarchy of rules to be
discriminated from target information. . ."
(p. 737).
Understanding the dual nature of 3-dimen-
sional representations, DeLoache (1987) de-
veloped a scale-model task to study preschool-
ers' ability to understand and use representations
 EXECUTIVE FUNCTION
of the world to constrain their behavior.
Children at 2.5 and 3 years of age watched a toy
being hidden in a 3-dimensionaI scale model of
a room and were then required to use this
information to find an analogous toy that had
been hidden in the corresponding place in the
room itself. On 77% of trials, 3-year-olds found
the toy, whereas 2.5-year-olds only did so on
15% of trials. However, when asked to retrieve
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the small toy in the model, children at both ages
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were successful (83%-88% correct). DeLoache
interpreted these results in terms of a dual-
orientation hypothesis: to understand and use a
symbolic model, children need to think about it
both as an object and as a symbol. Younger
children tend to treat the model as a thing
itself—that is, to view it from its most salient
orientation. A considerable amount of research
now supports this hypothesis. For example,
DeLoache and Burns (1993) reported that
increasing the salience of the model as a
3-dimensional object (by giving children time to
play with it first) impaired 3-year-olds' perfor-
mance on the task. On the other hand,
decreasing the salience (by putting it behind a
window) improved performance in 2.5-year-
olds. Problem solving in this situation seems to
break down at the initial phase of problem
solving (i.e., representation).
Summary. The evidence reviewed reveals
age-related changes in children's performance
on perceptual set induction, selective attention,
and the flexible use of scale models to guide
search. Preschool children often appear to
represent situations in ways that are inflexible
and unlikely to support successful problem
solving. This finding is compatible with the
hypothesis that problem representation is an
important aspect of executive function that is
sensitive to developmental variation.
Planning
The second phase of problem solving is
planning. Planning has long been a topic of
interest to developmental psychologists (e.g.,
Friedman, Scholnick, & Cocking, 1987). One of
the simplest approaches to the study of planning
in preschoolers has been to note the extent to
which children are systematic in unstructured
situations (e.g., Goodman, 1981; Gottschalk,
Bryden, & Rabinovitch, 1964; Potter & Levy,
1968; Wellman, Somerville, Revelle, Haake, &
205
Sophian, 1984). These studies provide converg-
ing evidence that children's search becomes less
redundant, more exhaustive, and generally more
systematic between about 3 and 5 years of age.
Unfortunately, however, systematicity does not
seem to be a sufficient criterion to establish that
behavior has been planned. Perceptually driven
strategies such as sighting the next destination
(Wellman, Fabricius, & Sophian, 1985) could
lead to orderly behavior in the absence of
planning. Another, more convincing approach
has been to examine planful search in well-
defined problem spaces, such as that denned by
the Tower of Hanoi (TOH; Piaget, 1976). In the
TOH, planning is clearly required to solve the
problem posed by the experimental situation.
Other types of search have also been studied,
including route planning and logical search.
Finally, planning has been studied in paradigms
that require children to integrate component
behaviors to achieve a goal. In all of these
contexts, efforts have been made to develop
tasks that are relatively pure measures of
planning in order to minimize difficulties that
may be attributed to other phases of problem
solving such as the execution of plans (e.g.,
Hudson, Shapiro, & Sosa, 1995; Klahr &
Robinson, 1981). Furthermore, precautions have
been taken to reduce the risk that success on
planning tasks could result from the use of
perceptual strategies or other techniques that
guide behavior one step at a time (see Wellman
et al., 1985, for a discussion).
Search in a well-defined problem space.
Most research on planning in well-defined
problems (i.e., those that involve completely
specified initial states, end states, and operators;
Newell & Simon, 1972) has used the Tower of
Hanoi and its variants (e.g., Bidell & Fischer,
1994; Byrnes & Spitz, 1977; Klahr & Robinson,
1981; Piaget, 1976). In the original Hanoi Tower
task (Piaget, 1976), participants were presented
with three pegs on which were placed a certain
number of disks of variable size. The task
requires participants to rearrange the disks into a
predetermined goal configuration under the
constraints that only one disk can be moved at a
time and that a larger disk can never be placed
on a smaller disk. Klahr and Robinson (1981)
modified the task by using upside-down cans
instead of disks, thereby inverting one of the
arbitrary rules, "Don't put a smaller can on top
of a larger one," and embodying it as an
 206 ZELAZO, CARTER, REZNICK, AND FRYE
inviolable task constraint. These authors also
required children to describe their solution plans
without actually executing them. The difficulty
of the task was manipulated by varying the
number of moves (one to seven) required for
solution and the type of problem (i.e., tower-
ending, in which cans must be stacked, or
flat-ending, in which each can must be placed on
a particular peg). Early work on the original
TOH (Piaget, 1976) revealed poor performance
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even among school-age children. Using their
modified version, however, Klahr and Robinson
(1981) found that 4-year-olds typically did well
on two- and three-move problems, whereas
5-year-olds usually did well on four-move
problems, and 6-year-olds did well on six-move
problems. Thus, clear age differences emerged
in the length of the problems that children could
pass. In addition, problem type influenced
performance at all ages: Tower-ending problems
were solved more easily than flat-ending prob-
lems, possibly because flat-ending problems
have ambiguous subgoal ordering (see also
Klahr, 1985). Analysis of children's pass-fail
patterns in different versions of the task
indicates that there are changes in problem
analysis and depth of search (i.e., the number of
anticipated moves that must be remembered)
that correspond to improvements in planning
during the preschool years.
The fact that children were not required to
execute their plan (i.e., the fact that this was a
pure planning task; Klahr & Robinson, 1981,
p. 119) might account for why children did so
well compared to other investigations of TOH
performance (Byrnes & Spitz, 1977; Piaget,
1976). On the other hand, children's perfor-
mance in Klahr and Robinson's study was worse
than children's performance in an earlier study
(Klahr, 1978) in which the experimenter pro-
vided visual feedback by actually executing the
moves that the child proposed. In that earlier
study, half of the 3-year-olds could solve two-move
problems, most 4-year-olds solved four-move
problems, and all 5-year-olds solved the five-
move problems. In addition, children's perfor-
mance in Klahr and Robinson's study was worse
than the performance of children in a study by
Welsh (1991), who tested 3- to 12-year-old
children on the original TOH task. In Welsh's
study, children executed the moves themselves
and therefore received both visual and motoric
feedback about the adequacy of their plans.
More recently, Klahr (1985) examined 3.5- to
5.5-year-olds' problem-solving strategies on the
Dog-Cat-Mouse Task, a task with ambiguous
subgoal ordering. Children were presented with
a square apparatus that contained grooves along
all four sides and along one of the diagonals.
The objective of the task was to move a dog, a
cat, and a mouse to the corners containing their
respective foods (i.e., a bone, a fish, and a piece
of cheese), subject to three constraints: (a) only
one animal could be moved at a time, (b) only
one animal could occupy any given corner at a
time, and (c) animals always had to land on a
corner. Klahr found a low correlation between
age and proportion correct. Even 4-year-olds
avoided useless double moves, looked ahead
about two to three moves (i.e., evidence of
planning), and generally used a hill-climbing
technique (i.e., always move towards the goal)
rather than random trial and error. Hill climbing
is planful, but it is less sophisticated than
means-end analysis, and it is susceptible to local
maxima (i.e., children have difficulty tempo-
rarily moving away from the goal as a step
toward solving the problem).
Event planning. The TOH and the Dog-Cat-
Mouse Task are both well-defined problems
with clearly defined problem spaces. The tasks
are computationally tractable, but they are less
ecologically valid than most tasks designed to
assess event planning. Hudson et al. (1995)
argued that children's initial planning skills are
likely to be observed in the context of familiar,
as opposed to unfamiliar, events (because
children can draw on their generalized event
representations or scripts). These authors exam-
ined 3-, 4- and 5-year-olds' ability to construct
and provide verbal plans for familiar events.
In order to differentiate children's ability to
plan familiar events (e.g., going to the beach)
from their general ability to describe events,
children's verbal plans were compared to the
verbal descriptions of children who were simply
asked to report a script of the same events. Older
children's scripts and plans were more different
from one another than younger children's. For
example, 5-year-olds reported more activities
occurring at the onset of a plan than a script,
which perhaps reflects the fact that planning is
preparatory in nature, while script reporting is
not. The finding that 3-year-olds were less likely
than 5-year-olds to adjust their reports when
planning was required indicates that the younger
 EXECUTIVE FUNCTION 207

children had difficulty planning even in the then allowed them to maneuver through it.
context of real-world scenarios. Children at 25 months, but not 21 months,
Mazes and route planning. Mazes, particu- selected the correct side. Younger children
larly the Porteus maze (Porteus, 1950, 1959), frequently perseverated to the same side across
have long been used to study route planning. To repeated trials.
minimize errors (i.e., to avoid blind alleys), one Blades and Spencer (1987) required children
should locate the starting position and the end between the ages of 3 and 6 years to use a map to
position (goal) and plan a path (i.e., look ahead) plan a route through a maze in order to avoid
prior to entering the maze. In a study involving roadblocks positioned at various strategic points
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18- to 36-month-olds, Brockman (1977) used along the maze. Although all children could
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various slot mazes with slotted templates and a trace the correct path with their fingers on the
nonremovable stylus. On the easiest two-turn map, children in the two youngest age groups
maze, 18-month-olds successfully completed (3-11 and 4-6) did not use the map effectively
only 20% of trials. The majority of trials were to plan a correct route. As in Reiser et al.'s study
completed correctly by 24-month-olds for the (1982) with 2-year-olds, the performance of
two-turn maze, but they nonetheless made more these younger children was hindered by perse-
errors on this maze than the older children (30- veration. Out of 48 children in the younger two
and 36-month-olds). Tn addition, 24-month-olds age groups, 10 exhibited perseverative response
failed to complete the majority of five-turn and tendencies, such as always turning left at a
six-turn mazes. Thus, the results suggest that junction, regardless of the side on which the
age changes in route planning occur between the roadblock was located. The older age groups, on
ages of 24 and 36 months of age, especially on the other hand, performed better than would be
more complex maze problems. Brockman men- expected by chance.
tions that children were given assistance if they Fabricius (1988) has likewise found evidence
reentered the same blind alley three times. for the development of route planning in
Although she did not report data on the relative preschoolers. In that study, 4- and 5-year-olds
frequency of this type of perseverative response were required to plan a route in order to retrieve
pattern, perseverative tendencies may interfere items from several locations and subsequently
with planning. Support for this suggestion bring them to a final endpoint. Forward-search
comes from observations reported by Wertlieb planning was indexed by choosing a route in
and Rose (1979) in a study involving 3-, 4-, and which one did not have to backtrack. The results
5-year-old children who were required to indicated that 5-year-olds engaged in forward
navigate a large-scale maze. These authors search, whereas 4-year-olds used only a rudimen-
found that younger children made more errors tary form of forward search. In addition, there
during maze learning than did older children. were age changes in spontaneous self-correc-
Often these errors were perseverative (i.e., they tion.
involved repeatedly entering the same blind In one study by Fabricius, Wellman, and
alleys). Moreover, younger children were less Sophian (reported in Wellman et al., 1985), 3-,
likely than older children to change routes when 3.5-, 4.5-, and 5.5-year-olds' performance on
the maze conditions were rearranged. Rose various route-selection tasks was assessed to
(1980) has speculated that these findings reflect determine the relative contributions of planning
maturation of a functional system that involves and sighting (i.e., using proximity cues in a
prefrontal cortex in addition to subcortical sequential fashion) to route selection. The tasks
structures. differed in whether the shortest route could be
Large-scale mazes usually provide a better selected using (a) planning alone, (b) proximity
measure of learning than of planning (because it alone, (c) planning in conjunction with proxim-
is difficult or impossible to look ahead), but ity, or (d) planning as opposed to proximity.
planning is clearly emphasized when partici- When planning alone was required in order to
pants are provided with a map or an aerial view select the shortest route, only the 3.5-year-olds
of a large-scale maze. Reiser, Doxsey, McCar- and older children selected the planned route
rell, and Brooks (1982) showed toddlers an more often than chance. However, only the
aerial view of a simple maze (i.e., one barrier 5.5-year-olds selected a route based on planning
around which children must make a detour) and when it conflicted with proximity cues. These
 208 ZELAZO, CARTER, REZNICK, AND FRYE
findings suggest that the tendency to plan may
be disrupted when other competing perceptual
strategies are put into opposition with planning.
Logical search. In some search tasks, plan-
ning involves making inferences regarding
which of several locations is the best (or only)
place to search. DeLoache and Brown (1984)
reported that when searching for a missing toy,
older 2-year-olds, but not younger 2-year-olds,
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are likely to infer plausible new locations rather
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than simply to search in places where they have
found the toy in the past. Sophian and
Somerville (1988; Experiment 3) explicitly
addressed reasoning about the possible locations
of hidden objects. These authors created a
situation in which children had to infer from an
experimenter's behavior which of four locations
might possibly contain a toy. Two of the four
locations were logical possibilities. Before
children were allowed to search, the experi-
menter removed one of the logically possible
locations. If children had been able to consider
both possible locations simultaneously, they
would be in a position to infer the correct
location. Otherwise, if they had only focused on
one of the two possible locations, they would
search correctly on half of the trials (on
average). In contrast to 2.5- and 3-year-olds,
4-year-olds searched correctly more often than
would be expected based on random respond-
ing. Thus, it was not until 4 years of age that
there was reliable evidence of inferential
planning in this task.
Sequencing and integration of component
behaviors. The importance of integration as an
index of planning has long been noted (e.g.,
Baldwin, 1897; Piaget, 1952). However, the best
paradigm for the investigation of integration is
perhaps the one created by Maier (e.g., see
Maier, 1936), and modified by Hull (1935), in
which participants (rats or children) are taught
separate behavioral sequences and subsequently
required to combine them in a novel way to
achieve a goal. Maier found marked changes by
6 years of age in children's ability to integrate
learned experiences. In more recent work (e.g.,
Crisafi & Brown, 1986; Hewson, 1978; H. H.
Kendler & Kendler, 1956), integration tasks
have undergone considerable modification, but
they have retained the basic logic of the Hullian
version (for a discussion of important differ-
ences between various integration tasks, see
T. S. Kendler & Kendler, 1967).
In Hullian integration tasks, children are first
taught two subgoal-subgoal segments (A leads
to B; X leads to Y). Then they are taught one
subgoal-goal segment (B leads to G). In a final
test phase they are asked to attain the goal (G)
given a choice between A and X. To achieve the
goal, children must infer that A allows them to
obtain B, which in turn allows them to obtain G
(i.e., they must combine the A-B and B-G to
form A-B-G). In a series of studies, the
Kendlers (see T. S. Kendler & Kendler, 1967,
for a review) presented children with an
automated apparatus that had three panels (i.e.,
left, center, and right). In the first phase of
learning, children were shown that pressing a
button on one panel produced a marble (e.g., the
A-B segment) while pressing a button on the
other panel produced a ball-bearing (e.g., the
X-Y segment). Then, in the B-G segment,
children were taught that one of the two objects
(e.g., the marble) could be used to retrieve a
reward from the center panel. Finally, in the test
phase, all three panels were exposed. Children
had to infer that they could obtain the correct B
object (e.g., the marble) by pressing the
appropriate A button. In contrast to their earlier
work (H. H. Kendler & Kendler, 1956), even
kindergartners had considerable difficulty on
this integration task.
A number of authors have criticized the
Kendlers' automated box task, arguing that
aspects of the task that are irrelevant to
inferential integration obscured preschoolers'
ability to combine separately learned behaviors.
In support of these claims, slight modifications
to the original Kendler box, such as substituting
drawers for buttons in the A-B and X-Y
segments (Hewson, 1978), or otherwise modify-
ing the apparatus and instructions (Halliday,
1977), have elicited better performance by
preschool children.
Crisafi and Brown (1986) devised a set of
integration tasks involving familiar objects and
compared 2- to 4-year-olds' performance on
these new tasks with performance on the
original Kendler box. In the first study, Crisafi
and Brown tested 2-year-olds' ability to com-
bine separately learned behaviors using three
analogous tasks. The easiest task consisted of
familiar objects and separate associations that
capitalized on the objects5 familiar functions. In
the A-B and X-Y phases, children were taught
that a piggy bank and a purse contained pennies
 EXECUTIVE FUNCTION
and dimes, respectively. For the B-G segment,
they were taught that a gum-ball machine would
dispense a gum-ball only if the correct coin (a
penny) were used. The majority of 2-year-olds
did well on the two tasks involving familiar
objects. On the other hand, the vast majority of
4-year-olds performed poorly on a modified
version of the Kendler-box task unless it was
presented to children after the easier tasks.
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Together with other findings (e.g., Hewson,
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1978), Crisafi & Brown's (1986) results indicate
that integration in preschoolers depends on the
familiarity of the objects in the tasks. When
familiar objects were used, even 2-year-olds
were able to combine separately learned behav-
iors. On the other hand, it is not before the age of
5 years (Hewson, 1978) or even 7 years (T. S.
Kendler & Kendler, 1967) that the majority of
children exhibit integration on tasks involving
unfamiliar objects and relations among objects.
This discrepancy in performance illustrates that
preschoolers' ability to plan sequences of
separately learned behaviors is fairly fragile.
Planning to remember. In an effort to
examine the role of planning in memory,
Rogoff, Newcombe, and Kagan (1974) showed
4-, 6-, and 8-year-olds 40 pictures and told them
that they would be asked to remember these
pictures after either a few minutes, 1 day, or 1
week. The time to study each picture was
self-paced by the children. The authors hypoth-
esized that children who could plan should
adjust their study time depending on the length
of the delay period. They found that 8-year-olds
were more likely than 4- and 6-year-olds to
make appropriate adjustments. There are a
number of possible explanations of 4- and
6-year-olds' failure to adjust (e.g., difficulty
using strategies, lack of metamemory skills), but
it is clear that 8-year-olds modified their
behavior in anticipation of a subsequent re-
trieval.
In a more recent study, Heisel and Ritter
(1981; Experiment 1) tested 3-, 5-, 7- and
9-year-old children on a memory-for-location
task. They presented children with a 12 X 12
array of identical containers. Children were
asked to hide an object in one of the containers
in such a way "that will be easy to find
[remember] later" (p. 353). The authors rea-
soned that planful children should hide the
object in the corner locations because these were
the most distinctive (and easiest to remember).
209
Three-year-olds were less likely than older
children to hide the object in the corner location,
even though when they did hide the object there,
they were more likely to find it than when they
hid it elsewhere. There were no group differ-
ences in the tendency to search at the corner
locations on nonmemory control trials.
Young children might fail to plan for any
number of reasons. For example, they may not
appreciate the importance of planning (e.g.,
Flavell, Freidrichs, & Hoyt, 1970), they may
have difficulties implementing a strategy for
remembering, or they may have selected a plan
that turned out to be ineffective. However,
studies on planning to remember suggest that
children first begin to plan for retrieval toward
the end of the preschool period.
Social planning. Planning is not only impor-
tant for acting in the physical world, and for
regulating one's own behavior, but also for
negotiating the many social interactions in
which it is necessary to understand and influ-
ence the behavior of others. The large body of
literature on children's theory of mind (e.g.,
Astington, Harris, & Olson, 1988; Frye &
Moore, 1991; Lewis & Mitchell, 1994) indicates
that there are major changes between the ages of
about 3 and 5 years in children's appreciation of
their own and other people's mental states.
Recently, it has been proposed that the develop-
ment of executive function may account for
age-related changes in performance on theory-of-
mind problems (Harris, 1993; Russell, Mauth-
ner, Sharpe, & Tidswell, 1991). This conclusion
has typically been drawn from studies of
deception, which has been examined exten-
sively within theory-of-mind research (e.g.,
Chandler, Fritz, & Hala, 1989; Sodian, Taylor,
Harris, & Perner, 1991). Deception is a type of
social planning in which one must adopt a plan
of action to produce a false belief in another.
In one study of strategic deception, Russell et
al. (1991) presented 3- and 4-year-olds with two
boxes that had windows on them. The windows
faced the child and revealed the contents of the
boxes. On each trial, one of the boxes was
baited, and the child was instructed to tell the
experimenter (who could not see the contents of
the boxes) where to look. The experimenter
searched where instructed by the child and the
child received the contents of the other box.
Thus, this was a zero-sum competitive game in
which the successful strategy was to deceive the
 210 ZELAZO, CARTER, REZNICK, AND FRYE
experimenter by pointing to the incorrect,
unbaked box. Despite repeated failures to
receive the rewards, 3-year-olds (like autistic
children, but unlike 4-year-olds) continued to
point to the baited box. In a striking display of
extensive perseveration, many 3-year-olds perse-
verated for the full 20 trials (but see also
Samuels, Brooks, & Frye, 1996). Later studies
(Hughes & Russell, 1993; Russell, Jarrold, &
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Potel, 1994) demonstrated that the difficulties
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that 3-year-olds have in this task are executive
function difficulties rather than difficulties in
deception per se. The social aspect of deception
can be separated from the executive function
requirements by removing the opponent from
the task. Children were merely required to point
to a visibly empty box rather than a baited one,
whereupon they were given the concealed prize.
Russell et al. (1994) found that 3-year-olds still
perseverated extensively even in this version
(see Hughes & Russell, 1993, for similar
findings with adolescents with autism).
Brooks, Frye, and Samuels (1996) attempted
to determine which aspect of executive function
was responsible for 3-year-olds' poor perfor-
mance on deception tasks. It was reasoned that
3-year-olds might have difficulty selecting an
appropriate plan, or they might have difficulty
executing a plan when it is appropriate to do so.
To distinguish between these possibilities, the
authors showed children demonstrations of two
already-formulated plans, one deceptive and one
not, and asked children to select the one that
would trick another person. The children did not
have to execute the deceptive response them-
selves. Although 4-year-olds were able to
choose the deceptive plan, 3-year-olds could
not. These results suggest that there are
pronounced changes in preschoolers' planning
in the social realm, as in the realm of objects.
Moreover, young children's difficulties in choos-
ing a plan occur even when the need for
formulating and executing the plan is removed.
Summary. The studies reviewed in this
section span a variety of methods that research-
ers have used to assess planning abilities in
children. Research on planning in well-defined
problems, route planning, logical search, plan-
ning to remember, and social planning converge
to indicate that there are marked changes
between 3 and 5 years of age in children's ability
and inclination to plan, but that planning (e.g.,
planning to remember) probably continues to
develop well into the school-age years.
Execution
Execution involves keeping a plan in mind
and translating that plan into action. The first
process may be referred to as intending, whereas
the second has been studied under the rubric of
rule use (Zelazo & Jacques, 1997). The finding
that 3-year-olds can sometimes verbalize a new
plan even while perseverating on an old one
(Zelazo et al., 1996) supports the theoretical
distinction between these subphases of execu-
tion.
Intending. Intending per se has received
very little attention from developmental psy-
chologists. One way to assess intending is in the
context of prospective memory (i.e., remember-
ing to do something). However, prospective
memory has not been studied in preschoolers
(see Ceci & Bronfenbrenner, 1985, for work
with school-age children). Another approach to
intending is to examine children's ability to
sustain attention over time. Sustained attention
seems necessary for keeping a plan activated so
that it can control behavior. The standard
sustained-attention task is the continuous perfor-
mance task (CPT), originally created by Ros-
vold, Mirsky, Sarason, Brasome, and Beck
(1956). In this task, participants are presented
with a series of items and given instructions to
press a key when a target letter appears.
Although most of the existing CPT tasks either
rely on the recognition of letters or numbers or
are otherwise inappropriate for use with pre-
schoolers, Weissberg, Ruff, and Lawson (1990)
recently managed to use CPT tasks with
children as young as 3.5 years. In one task,
children were required to push a button in
response to a bell that rang after varying
intervals. Errors of commission and omission
declined from the first 10 trials to the second 10,
a finding that the authors interpreted in terms of
the "relative immaturity of attention and organi-
zation" (p. 61) in preschoolers.
A second study in the same paper (Weissberg
et al., 1990) used a simplified visual reaction
time (RT) task. Children at 2.5, 3.5, and 4.5
years of age were told to push a button in
response to the presentation of a rabbit on a TV
monitor. There was a significant decrease in RT
from 2.5 to 4.5 years, along with decreasing
 EXECUTIVE FUNCTION
numbers of omission errors. Based on analyses
that eliminated children who needed reminders
of what to do, the authors argued that the
changes in performance were not due solely to
increased understanding of instructions, but
rather reflected increases in the temporal span of
goal-directed attention.
Rule use. Rule use is the crux of execution,
when plans are translated into action. As Zelazo
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and Jacques (1997) note, the action plans that
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underlie intentional actions are necessarily
conditional: One does not simply act; one acts
when it is appropriate to do so. Perhaps the most
straightforward strategy for studying this aspect
of execution is the rule-use paradigm (see
Zelazo & Jacques, 1997, for a review). Tn any
rule-use task, children are presented with
explicit conditional statements and required to
use them to guide their behavior. In one seminal
set of studies (Luria, 1961), children were
instructed to squeeze a rubber bulb whenever a
light appeared. In contrast to 3-year-olds, who
were usually successful at this task, 2-year-olds
either made no response, or responded persevera-
tively even in the absence of the light. A more
complex task involved a two-light discrimina-
tion with one excitatory and one inhibitory rule.
Children were instructed to squeeze the bulb
when a red light came on, but to refrain from
squeezing when a green light was illuminated.
On this task, it was not until about 5 years of age
that children succeeded.
Luria's work has been difficult to evaluate due
to the lack of detailed descriptions of methods
and results, but recent work from a similar
theoretical perspective has supported and ex-
tended his observations concerning rule use.
Zelazo and Reznick (1991, Experiment 1)
investigated rule use in 2.5- to 3-year-olds using
a card sort in which children were presented
with a pair of ad hoc rules (e.g., "If it's
something found inside the house, then put it
here. If it's something found outside the house,
then put it there") and then asked to use these
rules to separate 10 test cards. 2.5-year-olds
failed to use the rules despite possessing
knowledge about the cards. A subsequent study
(Zelazo, Reznick, & Piflon, 1995, Experiments 1
& 2) found that 2.5-year-olds had difficulty even
when (a) cards were labeled by the correct rule's
antecedent on every trial (e.g., "Here's some-
thing that goes inside the house"), (b) children
were reminded of the rules, and (c) children
211
were rewarded for correct responding. In one
condition, children were told, "Remember,
inside things go here, outside things go there.
Look, here's something that goes outside, which
box does it go in?" and then given a reward for
correct responding. Despite these aids and
incentives, analyses of children's errors revealed
a tendency to repeat responses: when they erred,
it usually involved putting a card into the box in
which they had put a card on the previous trial.
These results resemble those described by Luria
(1961) for the one-light task in that 2.5-year-
olds seemed to understand the task and the rules,
and actually started to use the rules, but were
susceptible to perseverative errors.
The rule use of 3- to 5-year-olds has been
assessed using the dimensional change card sort
(see Figure 2; see Zelazo & Frye, in press, for a
review). This task puts two pairs of rules into
opposition. Frye, Zelazo, and Palfai (1995,
Experiment 2) presented children with colored
shapes that would be sorted differently if one
were sorting by color or by shape. Children were
first required to sort the cards by one dimension
(e.g., color—"All the red ones go here, but all
the blue ones go there. If it's red, put it here, but
if it's blue, put it there."), and then by the other
dimension (e.g., shape). Three-year-olds were
able to use the first set of rules that they were
given. However, in contrast to 5-year-olds, they
could not switch between rule pairs. Despite
being told to switch and told the new rules on
each trial, they systematically perseverated on
the preswitch rules during the postswitch phase.
Other studies have explored the nature of
3-year-olds' perseveration on the dimensional
change card sort. Results of these studies
indicate that the phenomenon is extremely
robust and occurs in a wide range of situations
with a wide variety of task materials. For
example, 3-year-olds perseverate even after a
single preswitch trial (Zelazo et al., 1996,
Experiment 2). These authors also found that
perseveration occurs even when verbal as
opposed to manual responses are required.
Figurines were attached to each of the boxes and
the boxes were labeled as Ernie's box and Big
Bird's box. Then, 3-year-olds were told rules
such as, "If it's red, then you have to put it over
here in Ernie's box; blue ones go there in Big
Bird's box." On each trial, children were asked,
"Whose box does this go in?" Nearly all
3-year-olds failed to switch. Zelazo and Frye (in
 212 ZELAZO, CARTER, REZNICK, AND FRYE
press) attributed 3-year-olds' failure on this task
to an inability to use a higher-order rule for
selecting between incompatible pairs of rules
(e.g., "If playing shape, then if blue rabbit, then
put it here").
Some support for the notion that 3-year-olds
have difficulty integrating incompatible pairs of
rules into a single system of rules via a
higher-order rule comes from the finding that
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3-year-olds seem to know both the pre- and the
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postswitch rules, even though they fail to switch
between them. Zelazo et al. (1996, Experiment
4) presented 3-year-olds with a dimensional
change card sort in which verbal responses were
required. However, after the postswitch trials,
children were given six additional trials that
assessed separately their knowledge of the
postswitch rules and their ability to use that
knowledge. On each trial, children were first
asked, "Whose box do the (e.g., red ones)
go in, in the (e-g-, color) game? Whose
box do the (e.g., blue ones) go in?" In
response to each knowledge question, children
had to name the appropriate box. Further,
children were told, "Play the (e.g., color)
game," and asked the rule use question, "Whose
box does this go in, in the (e-g-, color)
game?" Nearly all of the children who persever-
ated in the card sort itself answered the
knowledge questions correctly, but then pro-
ceeded to answer the use questions incorrectly
(i.e., according to the preswitch rules). This
abulic dissociation between knowledge and its
use supports the analysis of executive function
into temporally and functionally separate as-
pects. Furthermore, because 3-year-olds appear
to have difficulty using conscious information to
control their behavior, the dissociation raises
general questions about the relation between
consciousness and cognitive control.
Another rule use task that puts incompatible
rules into opposition is the Stroop task (Stroop,
1935), in which participants are presented with
color words (e.g., red) printed in nonmatching
colored ink (e.g., blue ink), and required to
name the color of the ink. A control condition
requires naming of color patches or of color
words printed in black ink. As Zelazo and
Jacques (1997) noted, the experimental condi-
tion of the Stroop task is comparable to the
dimensional change card sort because it requires
that children use a pair of rules that is
incompatible with their default, canonical re-
sponse pattern. Whenever individuals must
make a decision that contravenes their bias, they
need to employ an embedded rule (i.e., "If I'm
doing this unusual task, then if I see the word
red in blue ink, then say 'blue' "). The control
condition, on the other hand, is comparable to a
simpler rule use task because it only requires the
use a pair of rules (i.e., "If I see the color blue,
then say 'blue'; if I see the color red, then say
'red' "). The crucial difference between the
experimental condition and the control condi-
tion is that in the control condition, the rules do
not conflict with a preexisting pair of rules.
Together, the two conditions permit use of the
process-dissociation procedure to estimate con-
trolled processing (Lindsay & Jacoby, 1994).
School-age children's performance on the
Stroop task has been assessed in a number of
studies (e.g., Comalli, Wapner, & Werner, 1962;
Rand, Wapner, Werner, & McFarland, 1963; see
MacLeod, 1991, for a review), but the task is
inappropriate for children who cannot read.
However, Gerstadt et al. (1994) recently devel-
oped a Stroop-like task (based on the verbal
conflict task used by Passler, Isaac, & Hynd,
1985) that was suitable for use with younger
children (although the task was too difficult for
3-year-olds, so they were not tested). Children
between 3.5 and 7 years of age were instructed
to say the word night when shown a line
drawing of a sun and the word day when shown
a line drawing of a moon and stars. Children in a
control condition were instructed to respond
"day" to one abstract design and "night" to
another There were significant age-related
improvements in performance in the experimen-
tal condition, particularly between 3.5 and 4.5
years of age. Children tended to respond more
rapidly on later trials than on earlier ones, and
children (especially younger children) did better
on trials in which they took longer to respond
(cf. Tikhomirov, 1978). The most common error
patterns could all be described as perseverative
(e.g., alternating between saying "day" and
"night"; saying "day" to a drawing of a sun).
Whereas rule-use tasks like those just de-
scribed require children to comprehend and to
follow arbitrary verbal instructions, imitation
tasks provide children with a visual model of the
actions to be performed. In an early paper,
Pintner (1915) reported norms for the Knox
Cubes Test, which requires children to imitate
touching a set of blocks in sequence. The largest
 EXECUTIVE FUNCTION
improvement on this task occurred between 3
years (6% correct) and 7 years (63% correct).
On this task, children do not need to plan, but
only to remember and use the available
information to guide their behavior. More
recently, Alp (1994) used an imitation sorting
task, in which children were asked to reproduce
toy-sorting patterns that were demonstrated by
the experimenter. There were regular increases
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across the ages tested (12 to 36 months) in the
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length of the patterns that children reproduced.
Some imitation tasks have been designed
specifically to contain an interference compo-
nent, thereby increasing the complexity of the
rules that must be used. Reed, Pien, and
Rothbart (1984) developed a version of the
children's game Simon Says for use with
preschoolers. In the original game, one person
(the model) issues commands (e.g., "Clap your
hands") while concurrently performing the
behavior. Children must obey the command
only if the model prefaces the command with
the words "Simon says. . . . " Otherwise, they
must inhibit both their tendency to obey the
commands and their tendency to imitate the
behavior of the model. In Reed et al.'s study,
children in two age groups (40- to 44-months
and 45- to 49-months) were instructed to obey
the instructions of one stuffed animal and inhibit
responding to the instructions of another animal.
Unlike the original Simon Says task, the
inhibition trials were concretely marked by the
presence of cue (i.e., one of the animals).
Nonetheless, children still performed poorly.
Children in the younger age group inhibited
their responses on only 4.7 out of 20 inhibition
trials. Older children inhibited their responses
on 8.3 inhibition trials (see Zelazo & Jacques,
1997, for further discussion).
Diamond and Taylor (1996) recently reported
data from a study using Luria's (1980) tapping
task. Children aged 3.5 to 7 years were required
to follow a pair of verbal rules ("If the
experimenter taps once, then you tap twice; if
the experimenter taps twice, then you tap
once"). Considerable improvements in speed
and accuracy were observed over the age range
tested, but most of this improvement occurred
by 6 years of age. The most common error
pattern was to tap in a consistent way (e.g.,
always once) regardless of what the experi-
menter did. Thus, as in Gerstadt et al.'s (1994)
Stroop-like task, children simplified the task for
213
themselves and behaved in a way that could be
described as perseverative.
Rule use has also been studied in the context
of compliance with commands. For example,
Kopp and her colleagues (e.g., Vaughn, Kopp, &
Krakow, 1984) used a task in which a raisin was
hidden in front of the child, and the child was
required to inhibit responding during a delay
phase, and then retrieve the raisin. The capacity
for self-control in this kind of task, and the
stability of it across time and situations,
develops in the first few years of life. Kopp
(1982) described the following sequence: emer-
gence of "impulse control" in the second year,
"self-regulation" at 36 months, and further
changes in self-regulation during preschool
period, including "adoption of contingency
rules that guide behavior irrespective of situ-
ational pressures" (p. 200). As might be
expected from a variety of theoretical perspec-
tives (e.g., Luria, 1959a; Zelazo & Frye, in
press), changes in self-control are related to
various aspects of intellectual functioning,
especially language (Vaughn et al., 1984). Other
researchers have also noted increases in compli-
ance and in performance on delay tasks between
the ages of 2 and 4 (see Pressley, Reynolds,
Stark, and Gettinger, 1983, for a review). For
example, Schneider-Rosen and Wenz-Gross
(1990) found changes between 24 and 30
months on several measures of compliance,
including compliance in a situation in which the
child was instructed to persevere in attempting
to solve a problem that was too difficult.
Summary. Evidence from diverse studies
suggests that by 3 years of age, children acquire
the ability to represent and use a pair of arbitrary
rules. Sustained attention as assessed by continu-
ous performance tasks continues to improve
after 3 years of age, but in many situations even
3-year-olds follow arbitrary rules and behave
systematically across trials. However, 3-year-
olds are likely to perseverate if they are required
to shift from one set of rules to an incompatible
set, or if they are required to use rules that
conflict with their a priori biases (as in the
Stroop task). Thus, interference conditions are
sensitive to age-related changes in rule use. By
comparing interference conditions (i.e., where
executive function and automatic processes are
put into opposition) to facilitation conditions
(i.e., where executive function and automatic
processes work together) it should be possible to
 214 ZELAZO, CARTER, REZNICK, AND FRYE
derive estimates of the influence of executive
function on children's behavior at different ages
and in different situations. Abulic dissociations
between knowledge of rules and the use of these
rules raise interesting questions about the nature
of cognitive control and suggest that the
integration of simple rules via higher-order rules
may be an important, and heretofore ignored,
influence on executive function.
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Evaluation
Executive function is deemed successful
when it leads to the solution of a given problem
or when an intention is realized. However, it is
not always enough simply to have reached the
goal state: the recognition that a goal has been
attained is itself an important component of
executive function. A corollary skill is to be able
to detect when a goal has not been attained (or
when a subgoal does not allow progress toward
the goal), and to formulate and carry out a
remedy for the error. Successful error correction
could lead to a revision of the original plan, a
change in how the plan is executed, or a
modification of the goal or intention.
Especially for children, who usually have less
experience in a given domain than do adults,
error correction plays a central role in everyday
reasoning and action. When considered under
the aegis of evaluation, the development of this
aspect of executive function is of particular
interest because it sheds light on the develop-
ment of metacognition. Ultimately, errors are
also instructive in learning how to learn, as they
provide information on the relative efficacy of
one's strategies (e.g., Baldwin, 1897; DeLoache,
Sugarman, & Brown, 1985).
In trying to understand evaluation as an
aspect of executive function, many theorists
have found it useful to make a distinction
between error detection and error correction.
Research with normal adults (e.g., Ohlsson,
1996) and patients (e.g., Konow & Pribram,
1970) distinguishes these two processes as
logically separate and functionally dissociable
phases of problem solving. Developmental work
also underscores the importance of the distinc-
tion, and it leads to the inspection of several
aspects of evaluation that are sometimes seem-
ingly taken for granted in studies of adults, such
as recognition of the necessity of monitoring
progress towards a goal (rather than abandoning
the goal and pursuing a different direction
suggested by the activity). In the following
sections, we bring data from these sources to
bear on an analysis of the detection and
correction components of evaluation in the
context of problem solving.
Termination when goal achieved. In many
situations, termination occurs naturally when a
goal is achieved because the desire that gave rise
to the goal has been satisfied. However, in some
situations, this is not the case, and it is in these
situations that children's evaluation undergoes
development. Bullock and Ltitkenhaus (1988)
presented children with a goal (e.g., creating a
tower identical to a model). Children below 24
months often lost track of the goal and failed to
stop the activity once the given end point had
been reached. Likewise, Luria (1961) reported
that in the one-light bulb-pressing task, 2.5-year-
olds who were told to press the bulb when the
light comes on commenced pressing appropri-
ately, but continued to press even after the light
was extinguished.
Error detection. Ohlsson (1996) draws a
distinction between objective errors and subjec-
tive errors. Objective errors are defined from a
third-person perspective and they entail knowl-
edge of the consequences of every action.
Subjective errors are discrepancies between an
intention (or belief) and an outcome. Theories
of how human beings monitor and control their
own behavior (e.g., theories of executive
function) need to take the point of view of the
problem solver, thus entailing a focus on
subjective errors.
The notion that children compare the results
of their actions to an internal standard is central
to developmental theory. For Baldwin (1894),
the discrepancy between the infant's intention to
imitate and the infant's actual imitation allows
them to learn a novel fact or skill, as well as to
begin to develop a sense of self as agent. For
Piaget (1952), acts of assimilation or accommo-
dation that fail to produce a state of equilibrium
drive the infant to further exploration. Kagan
(1981) posits a similar mechanism to explain
why 18-20-month-olds are upset when asked to
imitate a complex set of actions that is clearly
beyond their competence.
By the third year of life, children are able to
detect errors in the performance of other people.
Bullock and Lutkenhaus (1988) gave children
between the ages of 15 and 35 months two
 EXECUTIVE FUNCTION
block-arrangement tasks and one blackboard-
cleaning task. The end-points of the tasks were
either described to the children (blackboard
task) or presented visually (block-arranging
tasks). Bullock and Liitkenhaus (1988) found
that 18- and 24-month-old children could
reliably distinguish between correctly and incor-
rectly-built towers, even when they themselves
failed to build the towers correctly. Moreover,
even 17-month-olds gave evidence of monitor-
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ing their own performance qualitatively (e.g., by
showing care about aligning blocks on a tower).
However, it is not until 26 months that children
consistently monitored their progress towards a
goal (e.g., creating a tower identical to a model).
The extent to which children monitor their
problem-solving behavior may be more likely
for younger than for older children to depend on
the degree to which the goal is intrinsic or
desired by the child (cf. DeLoache et al., 1985),
as opposed to arbitrary or provided by the
experimenter. Similar evidence of error detec-
tion and performance evaluation in preschoolers
was reported by Gelman and Meek (1983), who
found that 2.5-year-olds could detect errors in a
puppet's counting, despite making these errors
themselves on other trials (but see Briars &
Siegler, 1984; Frye, Braisby, Lowe, Maroudas,
&Nicholls, 1989).
Error correction. In many situations, the
ability to detect one's errors seems to precede
the ability to correct them, both logically and
developmentally. Let us now turn to the
development of error correction. DeLoache et
al. (1985) investigated children's spontaneous
seriation of five nested cups and found no
difference in the number of errors made between
18 and 42 months: approximately half of all
manipulations were errors. Moreover, at every
age, the number of attempts to rectify these
errors was approximately equivalent (on aver-
age, children tried to correct 61% of errors).
However, there was a significant change in
children's correction strategies in this age range.
Whereas younger children often tried to force
cups together, older children noticed their
errors, began to take a dual orientation to the
cups (i.e., viewing them as smaller than some
cups and bigger than others), and proceeded to
put a smaller cup into a base cup, and then treat
the base cup as a smaller cup to be put inside a
larger one. Not surprisingly, an age-related
increase in the use of this strategy was related to
215
an increase in the proportion of children
attaining a proper seriation of the cups. In terms
of the problem-solving framework, children at
all ages may have detected errors, but older
children were better able to correct them,
perhaps in part because of increased representa-
tional flexibility in the service of error correc-
tion.
Research on children's learning in situations
with an uncertain outcome also explicitly
addresses error correction (e.g., Stevenson &
Zigler, 1958). For example, Stevenson and Weir
(1961) studied preschoolers and young adults in
a simple operant task with a partial reinforce-
ment schedule. These authors used an apparatus
in which participants must press one of three
knobs when a light is illuminated. If they press
the correct knob, a marble rolls into a container.
In this task, 3-year-old children tended to repeat
their previous response following both rein-
forced and nonreinforced trials, whereas chil-
dren 5 years and older were more likely to
change their responses. The authors attributed
the older children's behavior to the testing of the
hypothesis that the rewards followed a pattern
(i.e., the older children were more likely to try to
maximize the reward). Only the younger group's
action could be easily modeled in stimulus-
response terms. This interpretation is consonant
with numerous suggestions regarding the devel-
opment of mediation (H. H. Kendler & Kendler,
1962; Luria, 1959a; Maier, 1936; Vygotsky,
1962/1934; White, 1965) and prediction hypoth-
eses as against response sets (e.g., position
preferences; Tumblin & Gholson, 1981). In any
case, however, the findings are important for our
purposes because they illustrate an age-related
insensitivity to error information (i.e., 3-year-
olds' behavior can be described as win-or-lose-
stay insofar as they stayed with their response
regardless of whether they were rewarded).
Stevenson and Weir's (1961) results have
been confirmed and extended by several studies.
Weir (1964) used the same apparatus but
differing conditions of reinforcement (i.e., the
correct knob paid off 33% or 66% of the time).
Again, preschoolers (3-5 years) tended to repeat
previous responses regardless of whether they
were correct. Several other studies have used
somewhat different paradigms to explore the
strategic use of error information in the
preschool years. Kessen and Kessen (1961)
showed children a deck of black or red cards,
 216 ZELAZO, CARTER, REZNICK, AND FRYE
and children were required to predict the color
of each card. On each trial, they received
feedback. Children were then shifted to a new
deck of cards, in which the ratio of black to red
cards differed. Despite the explicit error informa-
tion that they received, 3-year-olds, but not
4-year-olds, continued to make predictions
based on the ratio in the first deck of cards that
they saw. Furthermore, 3-year-olds were more
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likely than 4-year-olds to repeat an incorrect
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response on consecutive trials (again, their
behavior could be described as win-or-lose-
stay).
In a follow-up study, Jeffrey and Cohen
(1965) considered whether age-related changes
in probability learning might reflect a general
shift from perseveration at 3 years of age to
spontaneous alternation at 4 years. These
authors used a two-choice task with indiscrim-
inable stimuli and with reinforcements pre-
sented on either 100%, 50%, or 33% of trials
regardless of children's response. Results from
the 100% condition were striking: 3-year-olds
almost always perseverated on a particular
position, whereas all but one 4-year-old alter-
nated. (Similar results were found using a very
different paradigm by Douglas, Packouz, &
Douglas, 1972.)
Based on an earlier study by Cross and
Vaughter (1966), Berman (1973) presented 40
children between the ages of 31 and 60 months
with 24 two-trial object-discrimination prob-
lems. On the first trial in each pair, children were
shown an object that was either associated with
a reward or not. On the second trial, children
were shown that same object plus a new one.
Under different conditions, children were re-
warded on the second trials according to one of
the following rules: win-stay, win-shift, lose-
stay, or lose-shift. Age-related improvements
were found across conditions. However, in
contrast to the work we described that shows
tendencies in preschoolers toward perseveration
(versus alternation), Berman found that shift
problems were easier than stay problems
(perhaps because they capitalize on a preference
for novelty, or inhibition of return). More recent
work on the relative difficulty of delayed
matching-to-sample compared to delayed non-
matching-to-sample problems has also indicated
that young children have difficulty learning
rules that require them to inhibit a tendency to
respond to novel stimuli (e.g., Overman, 1990;
see also Diamond, Towle, & Boyer, 1994).
An important study by Gladstone (1969)
revealed that preschoolers' tendency to persever-
ate despite error information can be revealed
even in extremely simple situations that afford
only a single type of response. Gladstone
examined rate of extinction on an operant task in
which to-be-retrieved rewards were visible.
After a certain amount of responding, it could be
seen that the reward supply had been exhausted.
Nonetheless, children below 3.5 years kept
repeating their responses. Older children pro-
duced fewer responses during this extinction
phase, with the oldest children (around 4.5
years) immediately ceasing to respond when it
became apparent that the reward dispenser was
empty. Gladstone argued that the younger
children recognized the illogic of their extinc-
tion behavior, and were able to detect their
errors, but had difficulty using this information
to control their behavior.
Summary. Even young preschoolers appear
to be proficient at evaluating the products of
their own (and others') goal-directed activities.
However, age differences have been observed in
the termination of behavior when a goal is
achieved (e.g., Luria, 1961) and in error
correction (e.g., DeLoache et al., 1985). Chil-
dren's tendencies to repeat a previously correct
response without regard to its appropriateness
for a new situation, especially in motorically
complex tasks and other situations requiring
effort, suggests a general difficulty in using an
abstract or arbitrary goal to govern one's
activity. In broader terms, this might be
described as a difference between exhibiting
will and possessing the recursive evaluative
processes that are crucial for intentional action
(Zelazo & Jacques, 1997). The evidence previ-
ously cited suggests that it is particularly this
latter aspect of volitional behavior that seems to
undergo a change between 3 and 4 years of age
(e.g., Kessen & Kessen, 1961; Russell et al.,
1991).
Theoretical Approaches to Age-Related
Changes in Executive Function
A review of research on executive function in
early childhood indicates clearly that there are
age-related changes in all four aspects of
executive function identified in the problem-
 EXECUTIVE FUNCTION 217

solving framework. Preschool age children cases, it seems equally possible to treat inhibi-
exhibit inflexibility at the level of problem tion as a behavior to be explained rather than as
representation, planning, execution, and evalua- a separate explanatory construct (cf. Hayes,
tion. Behaviorally, this inflexibility is expressed Gifford, & Rucktuhl, 1996; Zelazo & Frye, in
as perseveration. The problem-solving frame- press). Observed failures of inhibition (i.e., in
work serves to organize instances of persevera- behavior) may turn out eventually to be
tion according to where in the process of explained by an inadequate inhibition mecha-
problem solving they occur (cf. Goldberg, 1986; nism, but in the absence of an independent
Goldberg & Bilder, 1987; Sandson & Albert, justification for invoking such a mechanism,
1984). Thus, the framework permits us to these explanations fail to add to our understand-
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recognize the commonalities among these in- ing of the behaviors themselves.
stances, but it also allows us to appreciate their One limitation of inhibition explanations is
differences. A coherent description of executive their inability to support predictions regarding
function at different ages is the first step toward the specific situations that will pose problems
an explanation of developmental changes in for children at different ages. Perseveration (i.e.,
executive function. Given that there are age- a persistent failure to inhibit responding) is
related changes in perseveration at different ubiquitous in the developmental literature, but it
problem solving phases, how might these is highly unlikely that it always reflects that
changes be explained? same underlying cognitive difficulties. Superfi-
Early efforts to explain age-related changes in cially, infants' perseveration in the A-not-B
executive function emphasized the role of search task (Piaget, 1952) resembles 3-year-
inhibition (e.g., Luria, 1959b; White, 1965). olds' perseveration on the dimensional change
Luria (e.g., 1973) provided an insightful and card sort (Zelazo et al., 1996), which, in turn,
comprehensive account of the ubiquitous role of resembles prefrontal patients' perseveration on
inhibition in attention, memory, reasoning, and the WCST (Milner, 1963). However, these are
problem solving. He noted that prefrontal very different tasks, and they are sensitive to
cortical damage produced disinhibition in all of perseveration in different populations; attribut-
these areas (although Luria is often portrayed as ing perseveration to lack of inhibition in each
having specifically emphasized the inhibition of case obscures potentially important differences
motor responses; cf. Shimamura, 1995). In light among them. One possible remedy is to suggest
of the possibility that maturation of prefrontal that children at different ages are more or less
cortex may lead to increased inhibitory control, susceptible to different 'formal' categories of
a number of recent theorists have attributed interference (i.e., motoric, perceptual, linguistic;
age-related changes in aspects of executive Dempster, 1993). This suggestion seems plau-
function to the growth of an inhibition mecha- sible and deserves to be investigated further, but
nism (e.g., Dagenbach & Carr, 1994; Dempster, it is undermined by the fact that perseveration at
1992; Diamond & Gilbert, 1989; Harnishfeger a given age can often be elicited in a number of
& Bjorklund, 1993; Tipper, 1992; see the special different tasks and in a number of different
issue of Brain and Cognition, 30, 1996). An response modalities (e.g., motoric and verbal;
inhibition mechanism provides a straightfor- Zelazo & Jacques, 1997). At the least, inefficient
ward explanation for numerous findings in the or ineffective inhibition must interact with memory
literature, including negative priming (e.g., demand (e.g., Cohen & Servan-Schreiber, 1992)
Tipper, 1992) and retrieval-induced forgetting or with task complexity (e.g., Halford, 1993;
(Anderson & Spellman, 1995). Moreover, re- Robin & Holyoak, 1992; Zelazo & Frye, in
search with monkeys has demonstrated that press) to produce perseveration at a particular
orbitofrontal lesions lead to impairments in the age and in a particular situation.
extinction of conditioned responses (Butter, Memory accounts of executive function
Mishkin, & Rosvold, 1963), which the authors typically invoke the construct of working
attributed to "abnormal difficulty suppressing memory (e.g., Gathercole, 1994; Goldman-
strong, habitual modes of response" (p. 74). Rakic, 1987; Pennington, 1994; Roberts, Hager,
Difficulty in such a simple situation seems to & Heron, 1994; Smith & Jonides, 1995), which
demand an explanation in terms of a basic is similar to, but different from, short-term
process such as inhibition. However, in most memory (Baddeley, 1986; Case, 1985). Whereas
 218 ZELAZO, CARTER, REZNICK, AND FRYE
short-term memory involves the passive storage
of information, as in digit span (Dempster,
1981), working memory is believed to be more
active and prospective. In a number of neo-
Piagetian accounts of cognitive development
(Case, 1985; Pascual-Leone, 1970), changes in
executive control are limited by changes in the
actual or functional space of working memory
(or M-power). Consistent with this approach,
work using delayed-response tasks (e.g., Hunter,
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This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
1917) and span tasks (e.g., the counting span
task; Case, 1985) has shown that there are
regular age-related increases in working memory.
These increases could affect children's execu-
tive function at any of the problem-solving
phases, but they seem to be especially important
for planning and execution (especially the
intending phase of execution). Future work
might profitably be directed at determining how
working memory interacts with other aspects of
executive function in specific instances of
problem solving (see Pennington, 1994, for
some preliminary suggestions).
A third approach to the development of
executive function has been to illustrate the way
in which age-related changes in reflection can
permit children to exercise increased control
over their thought and action. Reflection is
defined as a recursive process whereby the
contents of consciousness become an object of
consciousness so that they can be operated on
and modified (Zelazo & Jacques, 1997). Accord-
ing to the cognitive complexity and control
theory (the CCC theory; Frye, Zelazo, & Palfai,
1992; Zelazo & Frye, in press), higher order
rules mediate reflective awareness of lower
order rules and make possible the deliberate
selection of lower order rules for use. In the
absence of a higher order rule, children will
perseverate on whichever lower order rules are
most compelling. Furthermore, dissociations
between knowledge and the ability to use that
knowledge occur until knowledge is subordi-
nated to a higher order rule and integrated
within a single system of rules that applies to a
particular situation (Zelazo et al., 1996; Zelazo
&Reznick, 1991).
The CCC theory is designed to capture
age-related changes in rule use that have been
found in card sorting (e.g., Zelazo et al., 1996;
Zelazo & Reznick, 1991), social understanding
(e.g., Frye et al., 1995), physical causality (e.g.,
Frye et al., 1996), and morality (Zelazo, Helwig,
& Lau, 1996). In all of these cases (e.g., the
dimensional change card sort described above),
it is logically necessary to reflect on the possible
rules in order to make a deliberate decision
about which rules to use on a particular trial.
However, there is other, independent evidence
of increases in reflection during the preschool
years. For example, recent research has revealed
improvements at around age 4 years in source
monitoring (Lindsay, Johnson, & Kwon, 1991),
episodic memory (Perner & Ruffman, 1995),
and the recollection of one's own false beliefs
(Gopnik & Astington, 1988). Brain-imaging
data for adults (Fletcher et al., 1995) have linked
social reasoning to specific areas of prefrontal
cortex that have previously been linked to
conditional reasoning in human and nonhuman
primates (e.g., Petrides, 1990). These findings
are consistent with the view that conditional
reasoning is a prerequisite for the reflection that
permits understanding mental states (Frye et al.,
1995).
Summary. According to the problem-solv-
ing framework for understanding executive
function, disinhibition, as evidenced by perse-
veration, can occur in any of the four phases of
problem solving. The problem-solving frame-
work reveals the similarities among various
instances of perseveration, but it also permits an
appreciation of their differences. Ultimately,
instances of disinhibition must to be explained
by an appeal to other psychological processes,
such as inhibition, working memory (WM), or
reflection. Currently, theories that invoke WM
or reflection are better able to provide a
developmental account of executive function. In
order for inhibition to be a meaningful explana-
tory construct, it must be combined with a
specification of the way in which it operates at
different ages and in different situations. Other-
wise, it adds little to the current understanding
of the behavior to be explained.
Conclusion
Despite its appeal, executive function has
been plagued by definitional difficulties
(Borkowski & Burke, 1996, p. 244). Occasion-
ally, definitions of executive function have
seemed so broad as to span the whole range of
human cognition. On the other hand, more
specific definitions have typically overempha-
sized one aspect of executive function (e.g.,
 EXECUTIVE FUNCTION
resistance to interference) to the exclusion of
many others. These definitions fail to capture the
intuition (based on neuropsychological studies)
that processes ranging from flexible problem
representation to self-awareness belong to a
coherent (if complex) family of processes. In
this article, we have presented a functional
account of executive function according to
which the function of executive function is to
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
solve problems. Diverse aspects of executive
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
function are organized around four temporally
and functionally distinct phases of problem
solving. Executive function involves represent-
ing a problem flexibly, planning organized
sequences of thought or action, executing those
sequences, and evaluating the results of one's
rule use. The problem-solving framework makes
it possible to consider together behaviors that
are normally studied in isolation from one
another. One important conclusion to emerge
from this review is that between 2 and 5 years of
age, there are dramatic changes in all four
aspects of executive function as children gradu-
ally come to control their thought and behavior
when solving problems in a wide variety of
content domains. The problem-solving approach
to executive function not only reveals this
convergence of findings, but also provides a
useful framework for distinguishing between
inflexibility at each of the four phases of
problem solving.
In addition to organizing findings from the
developmental literature, the problem-solving
framework provides a perspective for under-
standing the cognitive and executive difficulties
associated with a variety of clinical disorders.
Children affected with several different child-
hood-onset psychiatric conditions (e.g., autism,
Gilles de laTourette syndrome, attention-deficit/
hyperactivity disorder, obsessive-compulsive
disorder) have been described as exhibiting
deficits in executive function, but it is unlikely
that the specific pattern of executive function
deficits in each of these groups is the same. For
example, the impulsivity observed in many
children with attention-deficit/hyperactivity dis-
order (e.g., Barkley, 1997) appears to be quite
different from the repetitive stereotypic behav-
iors seen in individuals with autism (e.g.,
Pennington & Ozonoff, 1996). Different disor-
ders may involve difficulties during different
phases of problem solving. If so, these disorders
might produce superficially similar impairments
219
on global assessments of executive function
(e.g., the WCST), but for different reasons.
Unified theories that reduce executive function
to a single underlying construct such as
inhibition would lack the theoretical tools
required to differentiate between different kinds
of executive function impairment. Although
there have been efforts to use tasks that target
specific aspects of executive function in clinical
populations (e.g., Ozonoff, Strayer, McMahon,
& Filloux, 1994; Zelazo, Jacques, Burack, &
Frye, 1996), more work is needed before the
promise of the problem-solving framework can
be fulfilled. Ideally, it will be possible to identify
specific psychopathologies by their problem-
solving profiles (cf. Pennington & Ozonoff,
1996).
Clinical research based on the problem-
solving framework may help to characterize
aspects of executive function in various disor-
ders and to distinguish between those aspects of
development that do, and those that do not,
continue to be related to one another even in
cases of markedly atypical development. Clini-
cal and age-related dissociations between differ-
ent phases of problem solving support theoreti-
cal efforts to analyze problem solving and
executive function into meaningful components
(cf. Mundy, 1995; Sigman & Ungerer, 1984). As
our literature review reveals, examination of
children's errors and the circumstances in which
they occur can contribute to an understanding of
these executive processes and of problem
solving in general. Interference conditions are
especially sensitive to developmental variation
and reveal age-related changes in inflexibility.
However, a comparison of both interference
and facilitation conditions is required for an
accurate assessment of executive function ver-
sus more automatic processes (Jacoby, 1991;
Maier, 1937).
The problem-solving framework presents
executive function as a macroconstruct that
captures the way in which a variety of
psychological processes work together to allow
an organism to solve problems in a wide range
of content domains. The wide applicability of
executive function is in keeping with the spirit
of Luna's (1980) emphasis on integrative
functional systems as opposed to narrowly
localized, modular mechanisms. Part of the
appeal of modular mechanisms consists in the
simplicity that attends their specificity. This
 220 ZELAZO, CARTER, REZNICK, AND FRYE
simplicity is theoretically satisfying insofar as it
yields easily stated theories (e.g., in which
Behavior X is explained by the operation of
Module X, which has evolved to do X).
However, in absence of elaboration, these
theories run the risk of simply substituting an
unobservable mechanism for the behavior to be
explained. Moreover, an assumption of specific-
ity invites psychologists to fractionate the field
and misconstrue cognitive constructs by consid-
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
ering them outside of the broader context of
reasoning and action (Jacques & Zelazo, 1994).
This, in turn, may lead to a proliferation of local
explanations that would be manifestly untenable
in light of a framework that reveals psychologi-
cal similarities across a range of situations.
In the case of executive function, what is
needed is a macroconstruct that captures the
way in which subfunctions work together to
accomplish a single higher-order function.
Conceptualizing executive function as a macro-
construct acknowledges the inherent complexity
of higher-order cognitive processes and permits
us to proceed with the difficult task of mapping
out the interactions among subprocesses. Just as
the human brain consists of interactive func-
tional systems that involve the integration of
subsystems (Luria, 1980), higher-order con-
trolled processes such as executive function are
likely to involve complex systems. Subsystems
have specific roles to play, but it is counterpro-
ductive to consider them outside of the larger
systems of which they are a part.
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Received August 26, 1996
Revision received January 27, 1997
Accepted January 28, 1997 •