RULE 111

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 165027 : October 12, 2006]
PROTON PILIPINAS CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the
BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This case is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure
seeking to annul and set aside the Court of Appeals Decision 1 in CA-G.R. SP No. 77684 entitled, Proton
Pilipinas Corporation v. Hon. Juan C. Nabong, dated 29 April 2004 and its Resolution 2 dated 2 August 2004,
which respectively dismissed the Petition for Certiorari filed by petitioner and denied its Motion for
Reconsideration, thereby affirming the Orders issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila dated 24
January 20033 and 15 April 2003.4
The controversy arose from the following facts:
Herein petitioner Proton Pilipinas Corporation (Proton) is a corporation duly organized and existing under
Philippine laws and duly registered 5 with the Board of Investments (BOI). It is engaged in the business of
importing, manufacturing, and selling vehicles.
Sometime in 1997, Devmark Textile Industries, Inc. (Devmark), a corporation duly registered with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and with the BOI, and engaged in the business of spinning,
knitting, weaving, dyeing, and finishing all types of textile, yarns, and fabrics, together with Texasia, Inc.
(Texasia), expressed the intention to purchase the various vehicles distributed and marketed by petitioner. In
payment thereof, the above named companies offered petitioner their Tax Credit Certificates (TCCs)
worth P30,817,191.00. The companies, through their officers, guaranteed petitioner that the TCCs were valid,
genuine, and subsisting. They further assured petitioner that said TCCs were a safe and a valid mode of
payment for import duties and taxes as they were issued by the Department of Finance (DOF) and duly
honored and accepted by the Bureau of Customs (BOC).
Persuaded by the representations and assurances made by the two companies as to the legality of the
transaction, Paul Y. Rodriguez, in his capacity as Executive Vice-President of Proton, signed a Deed of
Assignment6 with Eulogio L. Reyes, General Manager of Devmark. The terms and conditions of the Deed of
Assignment are as follows:
1. That the acceptance by the ASSIGNEE of the above duty/taxes credit certificate being assigned by
ASSIGNOR shall be subject to condition that the [DOF] approves the proposed assignment.

2. For the purpose of this assignment, the above duty/taxes certificates being assigned hereby to
ASSIGNEE shall not be credited as payment of ASSIGNOR's account unless and until ASSIGNEE
has in turn utilized/applied the same with the [BOC] or Bureau of Internal Revenue [BIR] for
payment of each duty/tax obligations.

3. ASSIGNEE undertakes to issue to ASSIGNOR the Tax Credit corresponding credit notes, as
when the above duty/taxes credit certificates was (sic) use[d]/applied, either partially or fully by the
ASSIGNEE, in payment of ASSIGNEE's duty/taxes obligation with the [BOC] or [BIR], respectively.

4. Withstanding the above-stated arrangement, such Tax Credit assigned and transferred by the
ASSIGNOR to ASSIGNEE shall be subject to post-audit by the Government and shall be credited
to the ASSIGNOR only upon actual availment thereof by ASSIGNEE.

5. If the whole or any portion of the Tax Credit assigned and transferred by ASSIGNOR to the
ASSIGNEE is disallowed by the Government upon post-audit or cannot be utilized for any cause or
reason not attributable to the fault negligence of the ASSIGNEE, the whole amount corresponding
such Tax Credit or such portion thereof as is disallowed by the Government or cannot be utilized by
ASSIGNEE shall be paid in cash to ASSIGNEE by the ASSIGNOR immediately upon receipt of
written notice of such event.7

Consequently, the TCCs, as well as their transfers to petitioner, were submitted to the DOF for evaluation and
approval. Thereafter, the DOF, through its Undersecretary Antonio P. Belicena, cleared said TCCs for
transaction and approved them for transfer. For that reason, petitioner delivered 13 vehicles with a total value
of P10,778,500.00 and post-dated checks worth P10,592,618.00, in exchange for the said TCCs, to Devmark
and Texasia in accordance with their agreement. In turn, petitioner used the TCCs for payment of its customs
duties and taxes to the BOC.
In the interim, the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) under Hon. Aniano Desierto began conducting an
investigation on the alleged "P60 Billion DOF Tax Credit Scam" in July 1998. On 30 March 1999, Silverio T.
Manuel, Jr., as Graft Investigator II, was given the assignment to look into the alleged irregular issuances of
four TCCs to Devmark and its subsequent transfer to and utilization by petitioner. Based on the Fact-Finding
Report8 dated 29 October 1999 of the Fact Finding and Investigation Bureau, Ombudsman, the TCCs were
found to be irregularly and fraudulently issued by several officers of the DOF, including its Department
Undersecretary Belicena, to Devmark. As revealed in the said Report, all the pertinent documents submitted
by Devmark in support of its application for the TCCs were fake and spurious. As a consequence thereof, the
transfers of the subject TCCs to petitioner and their subsequent use of the same was declared invalid and
illegal. The Report recommended among other things, that the directors of the petitioner and Devmark, along
with several DOF officers, be criminally charged with violation of Section 3(e) and (j) of Republic Act No.
3019,9 otherwise known as The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
On the weight of the Fact-Finding Report, the Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan, Criminal Cases No.
26168 to 7110 charging DOF Undersecretary Belicena together with Reyes, General Manager of Devmark,
Peter Y. Rodriguez and Paul Y. Rodriguez, in their capacity as Director and Executive Vice-President/Chief
Operating Officer of the petitioner, respectively, for violation of Section 3(e) and (j) of Republic Act No. 3019.
In turn, petitioner filed a criminal case for Estafa against the officers of Devmark with the City Prosecutor of
Mandaluyong, docketed as I.S. No. 00-42921-K, entitled, Proton Pilipinas, Inc. v. Robert Liang. The BOC on
the other hand, filed Civil Case No. 02-102650 11 against petitioner before the RTC for the collection of taxes
and customs duties, which remain unpaid because the subject TCCs had been cancelled brought about by
petitioner's use of fraudulent TCCs in paying its obligations.
Petitioner then filed a Motion to Dismiss 12 the aforesaid civil case filed against it by BOC on the grounds of
lack of jurisdiction, prematurity of action, and litis pendentia. The said Motion, however, was denied by the trial
court in its Order dated 24 January 2003. Petitioner sought reconsideration of the above-mentioned Order, but
the same was likewise denied in another Order dated 15 April 2003.
Feeling aggrieved, petitioner filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure seeking to annul the Orders of the trial court.
On 29 April 2004, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision dismissing the Petition for lack of merit and
affirming the RTC Orders. On 7 June 2004, petitioner moved for reconsideration but the same was denied in
the Court of Appeals Resolution dated 2 August 2004.
Hence, this Petition.
In the petitioner's Memorandum,13 it ascribes the following errors committed by the Court of Appeals:
I.

The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in affirming the RTC Orders and, consequently, in not
dismissing the Civil Case because, per Section 4, RA 8249, the Sandiganbayan has sole and
exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter thereof.

1. Per Section 4, RA 8249, the Sandiganbayan has sole and exclusive jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the Civil Case to the exclusion of the RTC.

A. The expanded jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan under RA 8249 covers the subject
matter of the Civil Case.

i. Before, the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over civil actions

was limited only to "civil liability arising from the offense charged" per
[Presidential Decree] PD 1861 and RA 7975. But now under RA 8249,
Sandiganbayan has the exclusive expanded jurisdiction over all civil actions
for recovery of civil liability regardless of whether or not they arise from the
offense charged.

ii. In fact, the language of the law is clear and extant that this expanded
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan supersedes "any provision of law or the
rules of court."

iii. The subject matter of the Civil Case, being the civil aspect of the Criminal
Cases, is deemed simultaneously instituted in the latter.
 II.

The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in holding that the litis pendentia rule is inapplicable and that
the civil case is not premature.

1. The requisites of litis pendentia are present in the Criminal Cases and the Civil Case.

A. There is identity of parties or at least such as representing the same interest in both
actions -

b. There is identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on
the same facts -

c. The identity in the two (2) cases is such that the judgment that may be rendered in the
pending case would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in
the other -

d. Even assuming that not all the requisites of litis pendentia under the Rules of Court
are present, the pendency of the Criminal Cases constitute some form of litis
pendentia by express provision of Section 4, RA 8249.

2. In any event, the Civil Case is premature since the validity or invalidity of the TCCs is a
prejudicial issue that has yet to be resolved with finality by the Sandiganbayan in the Criminal
Cases.

Given the foregoing, this Court restates the issues for resolution in the Petition at bar, as follows:
I. Whether or not the jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 02-102650, involving collection of unpaid customs duties
and taxes of petitioner, belongs to the Sandiganbayan and not to the RTC, as it can be considered the civil
aspect of the Criminal Cases filed before the Sandiganbayan, hence, deemed instituted in the latter.

II. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that, the rule on litis pendentia is
inapplicable in the present case.

III. Whether or not the institution of the aforesaid Civil Case is premature as the determination of
the validity or invalidity of the TCCs is a prejudicial issue that must first be resolved with finality in
the Criminal Cases filed before the Sandiganbayan.

The Petition is bereft of merit.

In the instant case, petitioner argues that since the filing of the criminal cases was anchored on the alleged
conspiracy among accused public officials, including the corporate officers, regarding the anomalous and
illegal transfer of four TCCs from Devmark to petitioner and the latter's subsequent use of three TCCs in
paying their customs duties and taxes to the detriment of the government, the civil case regarding collection
of unpaid customs duties and taxes was deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal cases before the
Sandiganbayan, being the civil aspect of the criminal cases. To buttress its assertion, petitioner quoted the
last paragraph of Section 4, Republic Act No. 8249, which states that:
Any provision of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the criminal action and the
corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability shall at all times be simultaneously instituted with,
and jointly determined in, the same proceeding by the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts, the filing of
the criminal action being deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil action, and no right to
reserve the filing of such civil action separately from the criminal action shall be recognized: x x x.

It is a truism beyond doubt that the jurisdiction of the court over a subject matter is conferred only by the
Constitution or by law.14 In addition, it is settled that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the
complaint.15
Accordingly, as can be gleaned from the Complaint for Collection of Money with Damages 16 filed by the
Government against petitioner, what the former seeks is the payment of customs duties and taxes due from
petitioner, which remain unpaid by reason of the cancellation of the subject TCCs for being fake and spurious.
Said Complaint has nothing to do with the criminal liability of the accused, which the Government wants to
enforce in the criminal cases filed before the Sandiganbayan. This can be clearly inferred from the fact that
only petitioner was impleaded in the said Complaint.
While it is true that according to the aforesaid Section 4, of Republic Act No. 8249, the institution of the
criminal action automatically carries with it the institution of the civil action for the recovery of civil liability,
however, in the case at bar, the civil case for the collection of unpaid customs duties and taxes cannot be
simultaneously instituted and determined in the same proceedings as the criminal cases before the
Sandiganbayan, as it cannot be made the civil aspect of the criminal cases filed before it. It should be borne
in mind that the tax and the obligation to pay the same are all created by statute; so are its collection and
payment governed by statute. 17 The payment of taxes is a duty which the law requires to be paid. Said
obligation is not a consequence of the felonious acts charged in the criminal proceeding nor is it a mere civil
liability arising from crime that could be wiped out by the judicial declaration of non-existence of the criminal
acts charged.18 Hence, the payment and collection of customs duties and taxes in itself creates civil liability
on the part of the taxpayer. Such civil liability to pay taxes arises from the fact, for instance, that one has
engaged himself in business, and not because of any criminal act committed by him. 19
Undoubtedly, Republic Act No. 3019 is a special law but since it is silent as to the definition of civil liability,
hence, it is only proper to make use of the Revised Penal Code provisions relating to civil liability as a
supplement. This is in accordance with the provision of Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code, which make the
said Code supplementary to special laws unless the latter should especially provide the contrary. 20 Article 104
of the Revised Penal Code enumerates the matters covered by the civil liability arising from crimes, to wit:
Article 104. What is included in civil liability. - The civil liability established in articles 100, 101, 102 and 103 of
this Code includes:

1. Restitution;21

2. Reparation of the damage caused; 22

3. Indemnification for consequential damages.23

With the above provision of the Revised Penal Code, it is far-fetched that the civil case for the collection of
unpaid customs duties and taxes can be simultaneously instituted with the criminal cases for violation of
Section 3(e) and (j) of Republic Act No. 3019 filed before the Sandiganbayan nor can it be made the civil
aspect of such criminal cases. All the matters covered by the civil liability in the aforesaid article have
something to do with the crimes committed by the wrongdoer. Clearly, the civil liability for violation of any
criminal statute, like Republic Act No. 3019, exists because of the criminal act done by the offender. In other
words, the civil obligation flows from and is created by the criminal liability, 24 thus, the civil liability arising from
crimes is different from the civil liability contemplated in the case of taxation.
Since the present case took place at the time when Republic Act No. 1125, 25 otherwise known as, An Act
Creating the Court of Tax Appeals, was still in effect and when the Court of Tax Appeals had no jurisdiction yet
over tax collection cases, this case therefore, still falls under the general jurisdiction of the RTC. Section 19(6)
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended, provides that:
Section 19. Jurisdictional in civil cases. - Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:

xxx

(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising
jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; x x x.

Consequently, the RTC, not the Sandiganbayan, has jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 02-102650. The
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is only with respect, among other things, to the criminal cases for violation
of Republic Act No. 3019, particularly in this case, Section 3(e) and (j) thereof, but it has no authority to take
cognizance of the civil case to collect the unpaid customs duties and taxes of the petitioner.
On the second and third issues. Petitioner avers that the Court of Appeals erred in not applying the rule
on litis pendentia despite the fact that all its requisites are present in both criminal and civil cases. Petitioner
also avows that the institution of the civil case for collection of unpaid customs duties and taxes was
premature since the validity or invalidity of the TCCs was a prejudicial issue that has yet to be resolved with
finality by the Sandiganbayan in the Criminal Cases before it. Conversely, the Government claims that in
Criminal Cases No. 26168 to 71 filed before the Sandiganbayan, the petitioner was not the party accused, but
its corporate officers, whereas in Civil Case No. 02-102650 the party sued is not the corporate officers, but
the corporation. Accordingly, there can be no litis pendentia as the requisite of identity of parties was absent.
Litis pendentia is a Latin term, which literally means "a pending suit." Litis pendentia as a ground for the
dismissal of a civil action refers to that situation wherein another action is pending between the same parties
for the same cause of action, such that the second action becomes unnecessary and vexatious. For litis
pendentia to be invoked, the concurrence of the following requisites is necessary:
(a) identity of parties or at least such as represent the same interest in both actions;
 (b) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts;
andcralawlibrary

(c) the identity in the two cases should be such that the judgment that may be rendered in one
would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the other.26

In the case at bar, in Criminal Cases No. 26168 to 71 only the responsible officers of the petitioner are
charged in the Information, while in Civil Case No. 02-102650, it is only the corporation that is impleaded,
holding it liable for the unpaid customs duties and taxes as a corporate taxpayer. Taxes being personal to the
taxpayer, it can only be enforced against herein petitioner because the payment of unpaid customs duties and
taxes are the personal obligation of the petitioner as a corporate taxpayer, thus, it cannot be imposed on its
corporate officers, much so on its individual stockholders, for this will violate the principle that a corporation
has personality separate and distinct from the persons constituting it. 27 Having said that, the parties in the two
actions are entirely different, hence, petitioner failed to establish the first requisite of litis pendentia as to
identity of parties.
Going to the second requisite of litis pendentia, this Court finds that the causes of action, as well as the reliefs
prayed for in the criminal and civil actions are considerably different. In the criminal cases, the cause of action
of the Government, as the Court of Appeals mentioned in its Decision, was founded on the fact that it was
defrauded as a result of the alleged conspiracy among the corporate officers of the petitioner and some public
officials in the procurement and use of the spurious TCCs, amounting to violation of Section 3(e) and (j) of
Republic Act No. 3019. Therefore, the primordial relief sought by the Government is the conviction of the
accused for their fraudulent acts. On the contrary, the cause of action in the civil case was established on the
basis that since the TCCs were not honored, the customs duties and taxes remain unpaid so the civil action
was filed in order to collect the unpaid taxes due to petitioner. The relief sought by the Government in the civil
case is the collection of unpaid customs duties and taxes. Thus, the conviction of the accused in the criminal
cases and the collection of unpaid taxes in the civil case are totally unrelated causes of action that will not
justify the application of the rule on litis pendentia.
As regards the third requisite of litis pendentia, again, the petitioner failed to meet the same. This Court
deems it necessary to quote the very wordings of the Court of Appeals in its Decision dated 29 April 2004, as
follows:
Moreover, a judgment in the criminal cases, to our mind, will not be determinative of the civil case upon which
the principle of res judicata will operate. A judgment in the criminal cases will only lead to either conviction or
acquittal of the accused officers of the petitioner as the crime only attaches to them but will not in anyway
affect the liability of the petitioner as it is a distinct and separate juridical person. Nor do we believe that a
finding on the efficacy of the TCCs will change the dire situation in which the Government finds itself in as the
tax and the customs duties remain unpaid. The fate of the TCCs for whatever it's worth is already fait
accompli. It is not disputed by the parties concerned that the subject TCCs have already been cancelled by
the [DOF] for which reason the twin suits have been brought. It is on this basis too, that petitioner filed a
[C]omplaint for [E]stafa against Devmark's officers before the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City. Hence, it
is absurd for the petitioner to anchor its complaint on the alleged worthlessness of the TCCs only to argue in
the present action that the same must await final determination in the criminal cases before the
Sandiganbayan.28

Attention must be given to the fact that taxes are the lifeblood of the nation through which the government
agencies continue to operate and with which the State effects its functions for the welfare of its
constituents.29 It is also settled that taxes are the lifeblood of the government and their prompt and certain
availability is an imperious need. 30 So then, the determination of the validity or invalidity of the TCCs cannot
be regarded as a prejudicial issue that must first be resolved with finality in the Criminal Cases filed before the
Sandiganbayan. The Government should not and must not await the result of the criminal proceedings in the
Sandiganbayan before it can collect the outstanding customs duties and taxes of the petitioner for such will
unduly restrain the Government in doing its functions. The machineries of the Government will not be able to
function well if the collection of taxes will be delayed so much so if its collection will depend on the outcome of
any criminal proceedings on the guise that the issue of collection of taxes is a prejudicial issue that need to be
first resolved before enforcing its collection.
Therefore, it is the obligation of the petitioner to make good its obligation by paying the customs duties and
taxes, which remain unpaid by reason of the cancellation of the subject TCCs for having been found as fake
and spurious. It should not make the Government suffer for its own misfortune.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant Petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision as well as the Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 77684 dated 29 April 2004 and 2 August 2004, respectively, affirming the
Orders of the RTC are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, C.J. (Chairperson), Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 147703 April 14, 2004
PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
When the accused-employee absconds or jumps bail, the judgment meted out becomes final and executory.
The employer cannot defeat the finality of the judgment by filing a notice of appeal on its own behalf in the
guise of asking for a review of its subsidiary civil liability. Both the primary civil liability of the accused-
employee and the subsidiary civil liability of the employer are carried in one single decision that has become
final and executory.
The Case
Before this Court is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the March 29,
20002 and the March 27, 20013 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 59390.
Petitioner’s appeal from the judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Fernando, La Union in
Criminal Case No. 2535 was dismissed in the first Resolution as follows:
"WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED and the appeal is
ordered DISMISSED."4
The second Resolution denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.5
The Facts
The facts of the case are summarized by the CA in this wise:
"On July 27, 1994, accused [Napoleon Roman y Macadangdang] was found guilty and convicted of the
crime of reckless imprudence resulting to triple homicide, multiple physical injuries and damage to
property and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of four (4) years, nine (9) months and eleven (11)
days to six (6) years, and to pay damages as follows:
‘a. to pay the heirs of JUSTINO TORRES the sum of ₱50,000.00 as indemnity for his death, plus
the sum of ₱25,383.00, for funeral expenses, his unearned income for one year at ₱2,500.00 a
month, ₱50,000.00 as indemnity for the support of Renato Torres, and the further sum of
₱300,000.00 as moral damages;
‘b. to the heirs of ESTRELLA VELERO, the sum of ₱50,000.00 as indemnity for her death, the
sum of ₱237,323.75 for funeral expenses, her unearned income for three years at ₱45,000.00
per annum, and the further sum of ₱1,000,000.00 as moral damages and ₱200,000.00 as
attorney’s fees[;]
‘c. to the heirs of LORNA ANCHETA, the sum of ₱50,000.00 as indemnity for her death, the sum
of ₱22,838.00 as funeral expenses, the sum of ₱20,544.94 as medical expenses and her loss of
income for 30 years at ₱1,000.00 per month, and the further sum of ₱100,000.00 for moral
damages;
‘d. to MAUREEN BRENNAN, the sum of ₱229,654.00 as hospital expenses, doctor’s fees of
₱170,000.00 for the orthopedic surgeon, ₱22,500.00 for the [n]eurologist, an additional
indemnity [of] at least ₱150,000.00 to cover future correction of deformity of her limbs, and moral
damages in the amount of ₱1,000,000.00;
‘e. to ROSIE BALAJO, the sum of ₱3,561.46 as medical expenses, ₱2,000.00 as loss of
income, and ₱25,000.00 as moral damages;
‘f. to TERESITA TAMONDONG, the sum of ₱19,800.47 as medical expenses, ₱800.00 for loss
of income, and ₱25,000.00 as moral damages;
‘g. to JULIANA TABTAB, the amount of ₱580.81 as medical expenses, ₱4,600.00 as actual
damages and her loss earnings of ₱1,400.00 as well as moral damages in the amount of
₱10,000.00;
‘h. to MIGUEL ARQUITOLA, the sum of ₱12,473.82 as hospital expenses, ₱14,530.00 as
doctor’s fees, ₱1,000.00 for medicines and ₱50,000.00 as moral damages;
 ‘i. to CLARITA CABANBAN, the sum of ₱155.00 for medical expenses, ₱87.00 for medicines,
₱1,710.00 as actual damages and ₱5,000.00 as moral damages;
‘j. to MARIANO CABANBAN, the sum of ₱1,395.00 for hospital bills, ₱500.00 for medicine,
₱2,100.00 as actual damages, ₱1,200.00 for loss of income and ₱5,000.00 as moral damages;
‘k. to La Union Electric Company as the registered owner of the Toyota Hi-Ace Van, the amount
of ₱250,000.00 as actual damages for the cost of the totally wrecked vehicle; to the owner of the
jeepney, the amount of ₱22,698.38 as actual damages;’
"The court further ruled that [petitioner], in the event of the insolvency of accused, shall be liable for the
civil liabilities of the accused. Evidently, the judgment against accused had become final and executory.
"Admittedly, accused had jumped bail and remained at-large. It is worth mention[ing] that Section 8,
Rule 124 of the Rules of Court authorizes the dismissal of appeal when appellant jumps bail. Counsel
for accused, also admittedly hired and provided by [petitioner], filed a notice of appeal which was
denied by the trial court. We affirmed the denial of the notice of appeal filed in behalf of accused.
"Simultaneously, on August 6, 1994, [petitioner] filed its notice of appeal from the judgment of the trial
court. On April 29, 1997, the trial court gave due course to [petitioner’s] notice of appeal. On December
8, 1998, [petitioner] filed its brief. On December 9, 1998, the Office of the Solicitor General received [a]
copy of [petitioner’s] brief. On January 8, 1999, the OSG moved to be excused from filing
[respondents’] brief on the ground that the OSG’s authority to represent People is confined to criminal
cases on appeal. The motion was however denied per Our resolution of May 31, 1999. On March 2,
1999, [respondent]/private prosecutor filed the instant motion to dismiss."6 (Citations omitted)
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA ruled that the institution of a criminal case implied the institution also of the civil action arising from the
offense. Thus, once determined in the criminal case against the accused-employee, the employer’s subsidiary
civil liability as set forth in Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code becomes conclusive and enforceable.
The appellate court further held that to allow an employer to dispute independently the civil liability fixed in the
criminal case against the accused-employee would be to amend, nullify or defeat a final judgment. Since the
notice of appeal filed by the accused had already been dismissed by the CA, then the judgment of conviction
and the award of civil liability became final and executory. Included in the civil liability of the accused was the
employer’s subsidiary liability.
Hence, this Petition.7
The Issues
Petitioner states the issues of this case as follows:
"A. Whether or not an employer, who dutifully participated in the defense of its accused-employee, may
appeal the judgment of conviction independently of the accused.
"B. Whether or not the doctrines of Alvarez v. Court of Appeals (158 SCRA 57) and Yusay v. Adil (164
SCRA 494) apply to the instant case."8
There is really only one issue. Item B above is merely an adjunct to Item A.
The Court's Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
Main Issue:
Propriety of Appeal by the Employer
Pointing out that it had seasonably filed a notice of appeal from the RTC Decision, petitioner contends that the
judgment of conviction against the accused-employee has not attained finality. The former insists that its
appeal stayed the finality, notwithstanding the fact that the latter had jumped bail. In effect, petitioner argues
that its appeal takes the place of that of the accused-employee.
We are not persuaded.
Appeals in Criminal Cases
Section 1 of Rule 122 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure states thus:
"Any party may appeal from a judgment or final order, unless the accused will be placed in double
jeopardy."
Clearly, both the accused and the prosecution may appeal a criminal case, but the government may do so
only if the accused would not thereby be placed in double jeopardy.9 Furthermore, the prosecution cannot
appeal on the ground that the accused should have been given a more severe penalty.10 On the other hand,
the offended parties may also appeal the judgment with respect to their right to civil liability. If the accused has
the right to appeal the judgment of conviction, the offended parties should have the same right to appeal as
much of the judgment as is prejudicial to them.11
Appeal by the Accused Who Jumps Bail
Well-established in our jurisdiction is the principle that the appellate court may, upon motion or motu proprio,
dismiss an appeal during its pendency if the accused jumps bail. The second paragraph of Section 8 of Rule
124 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
"The Court of Appeals may also, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if the
appellant escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the
pendency of the appeal."12
This rule is based on the rationale that appellants lose their standing in court when they abscond. Unless they
surrender or submit to the court’s jurisdiction, they are deemed to have waived their right to seek judicial
relief.13
Moreover, this doctrine applies not only to the accused who jumps bail during the appeal, but also to one who
does so during the trial. Justice Florenz D. Regalado succinctly explains the principle in this wise:
"x x x. When, as in this case, the accused escaped after his arraignment and during the trial, but the
trial in absentia proceeded resulting in the promulgation of a judgment against him and his counsel
appealed, since he nonetheless remained at large his appeal must be dismissed by analogy with the
aforesaid provision of this Rule [Rule 124, §8 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure]. x x x"14
The accused cannot be accorded the right to appeal unless they voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction of the
court or are otherwise arrested within 15 days from notice of the judgment against them.15 While at large,
they cannot seek relief from the court, as they are deemed to have waived the appeal.16
Finality of a Decision in a Criminal Case
As to when a judgment of conviction attains finality is explained in Section 7 of Rule 120 of the 2000 Rules of
Criminal Procedure, which we quote:
"A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the accused, be modified or set aside before it becomes
final or before appeal is perfected. Except where the death penalty is imposed, a judgment becomes
final after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence has been partially or
totally satisfied or served, or when the accused has waived in writing his right to appeal, or has applied
for probation."
In the case before us, the accused-employee has escaped and refused to surrender to the proper authorities;
thus, he is deemed to have abandoned his appeal. Consequently, the judgment against him has become final
and executory.17
Liability of an Employer in a Finding of Guilt
Article 102 of the Revised Penal Code states the subsidiary civil liabilities of innkeepers, as follows:
"In default of the persons criminally liable, innkeepers, tavernkeepers, and any other persons or
corporations shall be civilly liable for crimes committed in their establishments, in all cases where a
violation of municipal ordinances or some general or special police regulation shall have been
committed by them or their employees.
"Innkeepers are also subsidiary liable for restitution of goods taken by robbery or theft within their
houses from guests lodging therein, or for payment of the value thereof, provided that such guests
shall have notified in advance the innkeeper himself, or the person representing him, of the deposit of
such goods within the inn; and shall furthermore have followed the directions which such innkeeper or
his representative may have given them with respect to the care and vigilance over such goods. No
liability shall attach in case of robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons unless committed
by the innkeeper’s employees."
Moreover, the foregoing subsidiary liability applies to employers, according to Article 103 which reads:
"The subsidiary liability established in the next preceding article shall also apply to employers,
teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed by their
servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties."
Having laid all these basic rules and principles, we now address the main issue raised by petitioner.
Civil Liability Deemed Instituted in the Criminal Prosecution
At the outset, we must explain that the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure has clarified what civil actions are
deemed instituted in a criminal prosecution.
Section 1 of Rule 111 of the current Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
"When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the
offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives
 the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the
criminal action.
"x x x xxx x x x"
Only the civil liability of the accused arising from the crime charged is deemed impliedly instituted in a criminal
action; that is, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately, or
institutes it prior to the criminal action.18 Hence, the subsidiary civil liability of the employer under Article 103
of the Revised Penal Code may be enforced by execution on the basis of the judgment of conviction meted
out to the employee.19
It is clear that the 2000 Rules deleted the requirement of reserving independent civil actions and allowed
these to proceed separately from criminal actions. Thus, the civil actions referred to in Articles
32,20 33,21 3422 and 217623 of the Civil Code shall remain "separate, distinct and independent" of any
criminal prosecution based on the same act. Here are some direct consequences of such revision and
omission:
1. The right to bring the foregoing actions based on the Civil Code need not be reserved in the criminal
prosecution, since they are not deemed included therein.
2. The institution or the waiver of the right to file a separate civil action arising from the crime charged
does not extinguish the right to bring such action.
3. The only limitation is that the offended party cannot recover more than once for the same act or
omission.24
What is deemed instituted in every criminal prosecution is the civil liability arising from the crime or delict per
se (civil liability ex delicto), but not those liabilities arising from quasi-delicts, contracts or quasi-contracts. In
fact, even if a civil action is filed separately, the ex delicto civil liability in the criminal prosecution remains, and
the offended party may -- subject to the control of the prosecutor -- still intervene in the criminal action, in
order to protect the remaining civil interest therein.25
This discussion is completely in accord with the Revised Penal Code, which states that "[e]very person
criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable."26
Petitioner argues that, as an employer, it is considered a party to the criminal case and is conclusively bound
by the outcome thereof. Consequently, petitioner must be accorded the right to pursue the case to its logical
conclusion -- including the appeal.
The argument has no merit. Undisputedly, petitioner is not a direct party to the criminal case, which was filed
solely against Napoleon M. Roman, its employee.
In its Memorandum, petitioner cited a comprehensive list of cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of
employers. Thereafter, it noted that none can be applied to it, because "in all th[o]se cases, the accused’s
employer did not interpose an appeal."27 Indeed, petitioner cannot cite any single case in which the employer
appealed, precisely because an appeal in such circumstances is not possible.
The cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of employers uniformly declare that, strictly speaking, they are
not parties to the criminal cases instituted against their employees.28 Although in substance and in effect,
they have an interest therein, this fact should be viewed in the light of their subsidiary liability. While they may
assist their employees to the extent of supplying the latter’s lawyers, as in the present case, the former
cannot act independently on their own behalf, but can only defend the accused.
Waiver of Constitutional Safeguard Against Double Jeopardy
Petitioner’s appeal obviously aims to have the accused-employee absolved of his criminal responsibility and
the judgment reviewed as a whole. These intentions are apparent from its Appellant’s Brief29 filed with the CA
and from its Petition30 before us, both of which claim that the trial court’s finding of guilt "is not supported by
competent evidence."31
An appeal from the sentence of the trial court implies a waiver of the constitutional safeguard against double
jeopardy and throws the whole case open to a review by the appellate court. The latter is then called upon to
render judgment as law and justice dictate, whether favorable or unfavorable to the appellant.32 This is the
risk involved when the accused decides to appeal a sentence of conviction.33 Indeed, appellate courts have
the power to reverse, affirm or modify the judgment of the lower court and to increase or reduce the penalty it
imposed.34
If the present appeal is given course, the whole case against the accused-employee becomes open to review.
It thus follows that a penalty higher than that which has already been imposed by the trial court may be meted
out to him. Petitioner’s appeal would thus violate his right against double jeopardy, since the judgment against
him could become subject to modification without his consent.
We are not in a position to second-guess the reason why the accused effectively waived his right to appeal by
jumping bail. It is clear, though, that petitioner may not appeal without violating his right against double
jeopardy.
Effect of Absconding on the Appeal Process
Moreover, within the meaning of the principles governing the prevailing criminal procedure, the accused
impliedly withdrew his appeal by jumping bail and thereby made the judgment of the court below
final.35 Having been a fugitive from justice for a long period of time, he is deemed to have waived his right to
appeal. Thus, his conviction is now final and executory. The Court in People v. Ang Gioc36 ruled:
"There are certain fundamental rights which cannot be waived even by the accused himself, but the
right of appeal is not one of them. This right is granted solely for the benefit of the accused. He may
avail of it or not, as he pleases. He may waive it either expressly or by implication. When the accused
flees after the case has been submitted to the court for decision, he will be deemed to have waived his
right to appeal from the judgment rendered against him. x x x."37
By fleeing, the herein accused exhibited contempt of the authority of the court and placed himself in a position
to speculate on his chances for a reversal. In the process, he kept himself out of the reach of justice, but
hoped to render the judgment nugatory at his option.38 Such conduct is intolerable and does not invite
leniency on the part of the appellate court.39
Consequently, the judgment against an appellant who escapes and who refuses to surrender to the proper
authorities becomes final and executory.40
Thus far, we have clarified that petitioner has no right to appeal the criminal case against the accused-
employee; that by jumping bail, he has waived his right to appeal; and that the judgment in the criminal case
against him is now final.
Subsidiary Liability Upon Finality of Judgment
As a matter of law, the subsidiary liability of petitioner now accrues. Petitioner argues that the rulings of this
Court in Miranda v. Malate Garage & Taxicab, Inc.,41 Alvarez v. CA42 and Yusay v. Adil43 do not apply to the
present case, because it has followed the Court’s directive to the employers in these cases to take part in the
criminal cases against their employees. By participating in the defense of its employee, herein petitioner tries
to shield itself from the undisputed rulings laid down in these leading cases.
Such posturing is untenable. In dissecting these cases on subsidiary liability, petitioner lost track of the most
basic tenet they have laid down -- that an employer’s liability in a finding of guilt against its accused-employee
is subsidiary.
Under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, employers are subsidiarily liable for the adjudicated civil
liabilities of their employees in the event of the latter’s insolvency.44 The provisions of the Revised Penal
Code on subsidiary liability -- Articles 102 and 103 -- are deemed written into the judgments in the cases to
which they are applicable.45 Thus, in the dispositive portion of its decision, the trial court need not expressly
pronounce the subsidiary liability of the employer.
In the absence of any collusion between the accused-employee and the offended party, the judgment of
conviction should bind the person who is subsidiarily liable.46 In effect and implication, the stigma of a
criminal conviction surpasses mere civil liability.47
To allow employers to dispute the civil liability fixed in a criminal case would enable them to amend, nullify or
defeat a final judgment rendered by a competent court.48 By the same token, to allow them to appeal the final
criminal conviction of their employees without the latter’s consent would also result in improperly amending,
nullifying or defeating the judgment.
The decision convicting an employee in a criminal case is binding and conclusive upon the employer not only
with regard to the former’s civil liability, but also with regard to its amount. The liability of an employer cannot
be separated from that of the employee.49
Before the employers’ subsidiary liability is exacted, however, there must be adequate evidence establishing
that (1) they are indeed the employers of the convicted employees; (2) that the former are engaged in some
kind of industry; (3) that the crime was committed by the employees in the discharge of their duties; and (4)
that the execution against the latter has not been satisfied due to insolvency.50
The resolution of these issues need not be done in a separate civil action. But the determination must be
based on the evidence that the offended party and the employer may fully and freely present. Such
determination may be done in the same criminal action in which the employee’s liability, criminal and civil, has
been pronounced;51 and in a hearing set for that precise purpose, with due notice to the employer, as part of
the proceedings for the execution of the judgment.
Just because the present petitioner participated in the defense of its accused-employee does not mean that
its liability has transformed its nature; its liability remains subsidiary. Neither will its participation erase its
subsidiary liability. The fact remains that since the accused-employee’s conviction has attained finality, then
the subsidiary liability of the employer ipso facto attaches.
According to the argument of petitioner, fairness dictates that while the finality of conviction could be the
proper sanction to be imposed upon the accused for jumping bail, the same sanction should not affect it. In
effect, petitioner-employer splits this case into two: first, for itself; and second, for its accused-employee.
The untenability of this argument is clearly evident. There is only one criminal case against the accused-
employee. A finding of guilt has both criminal and civil aspects. It is the height of absurdity for this single case
to be final as to the accused who jumped bail, but not as to an entity whose liability is dependent upon the
conviction of the former.
The subsidiary liability of petitioner is incidental to and dependent on the pecuniary civil liability of the
accused-employee. Since the civil liability of the latter has become final and enforceable by reason of his
flight, then the former’s subsidiary civil liability has also become immediately enforceable. Respondent is
correct in arguing that the concept of subsidiary liability is highly contingent on the imposition of the primary
civil liability.
No Deprivation of Due Process
As to the argument that petitioner was deprived of due process, we reiterate that what is sought to be
enforced is the subsidiary civil liability incident to and dependent upon the employee’s criminal negligence. In
other words, the employer becomes ipso facto subsidiarily liable upon the conviction of the employee and
upon proof of the latter’s insolvency, in the same way that acquittal wipes out not only his primary civil liability,
but also his employer’s subsidiary liability for his criminal negligence.52
It should be stressed that the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process.53 It is merely
a procedural remedy of statutory origin, a remedy that may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by the
provisions of law authorizing such exercise.54 Hence, the legal requirements must be strictly complied
with.55
It would be incorrect to consider the requirements of the rules on appeal as merely harmless and trivial
technicalities that can be discarded.56 Indeed, deviations from the rules cannot be tolerated.57 In these times
when court dockets are clogged with numerous litigations, such rules have to be followed by parties with
greater fidelity, so as to facilitate the orderly disposition of those cases.58
After a judgment has become final, vested rights are acquired by the winning party. If the proper losing party
has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period, then the former has the correlative right to enjoy
the finality of the resolution of the case.59
In fact, petitioner admits that by helping the accused-employee, it participated in the proceedings before the
RTC; thus, it cannot be said that the employer was deprived of due process. It might have lost its right to
appeal, but it was not denied its day in court.60 In fact, it can be said that by jumping bail, the accused-
employee, not the court, deprived petitioner of the right to appeal.
All told, what is left to be done is to execute the RTC Decision against the accused. It should be clear that
only after proof of his insolvency may the subsidiary liability of petitioner be enforced. It has been sufficiently
proven that there exists an employer-employee relationship; that the employer is engaged in some kind of
industry; and that the employee has been adjudged guilty of the wrongful act and found to have committed
the offense in the discharge of his duties. The proof is clear from the admissions of petitioner that "[o]n 26
August 1990, while on its regular trip from Laoag to Manila, a passenger bus owned by petitioner, being then
operated by petitioner’s driver, Napoleon Roman, figured in an accident in San Juan, La Union x x
x."61 Neither does petitioner dispute that there was already a finding of guilt against the accused while he
was in the discharge of his duties.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED, and the assailed Resolutions AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 145823. March 31, 2005
OSCAR MACCAY and ADELAIDA POTENCIANO, Petitioners,
vs.
SPOUSES PRUDENCIO NOBELA and SERLINA NOBELA, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This petition for review1 seeks to reverse the Court of Appeals’ Decision dated 25 September 2000 and its
Resolution dated 7 November 2000 in CA-G.R. CV No. 49822. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision of
the Regional Trial Court, Pasig, Branch 70 ("trial court"), dated 26 January 1995, dismissing the case for
Estafa through Falsification of Public Documents filed by petitioner Oscar Maccay ("Maccay") against
respondent spouses Prudencio Nobela ("Prudencio") and Serlina Nobela ("Serlina") in Criminal Case No.
85961.
Antecedent Facts
The facts, as found by the trial court and affirmed by the appellate court, are as follows:
In the first week of May, 1990, Adelaida E. Potenciano went to the public market of Pasig, Metro Manila, to
look for a prospective buyer or mortgagee of a parcel of land belonging to Oscar Maccay. She was introduced
by a vendor, Lydia Reyes, to the spouses Prudencio and Serlina Nobela who were engaged in lending money
to market vendors on a daily basis.
Potenciano introduced herself as Angelita N. Barba, wife of Oscar Maccay, who desired to sell or mortgage
any of his two parcels of land, one in Guadalupe and one in Antipolo. She went to the Nobelas’ at 145
Buayang Bato at Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. She brought with her many titles. She became friendly with the
spouses. Potenciano went on to brag about her connections, that she is related to the late President
Ferdinand E. Marcos; and that the PCGG is after her so she has to dispose of her properties.
After two (2) days, she called Oscar Maccay, who came. They comported themselves as husband and wife.
Maccay was in uniform. He is a police colonel who had jurisdiction over Mandaluyong, according to
Potenciano. The Nobelas were impressed. They were pleased when the couple became very close to them.
They confided their family problems. They even went to the office of Maccay in Fort Bonifacio.
In this setting, the relationship flourished. Potenciano persuaded the spouses that they should be the ones to
buy the property because it will only cost ₱300,000.00. They would be able to make a profit because the
current price was ₱1,500.00 per square meter.
Potenciano used to call Maccay to join her in the Nobela residence. They partook of the hospitality of the
accused spouses almost two to three times a week. Potenciano was treated like a queen. She was fanned
and massaged. She was served her meals in the sala.
After pooling together their savings, the Nobelas decided to purchase the property. They advised Maccay and
Potenciano that they were ready to buy the property.
On May 17, 1990, Potenciano with Serlina went to Barba’s lawyer, Atty. Alfonso Jimenez, at Las Piñas where
she had the Deed of Sale (Exh. "1") prepared and notarized. She signed it there. They were riding in the jeep
of the Nobelas and passed by the office of Maccay ar (sic) Fort Bonifacio. Potenciano went alone to his office
and returned with him. They then proceeded to the house of both accused at Buayang Bato, Mandaluyong.
Serlina paid the ₱300,000.00 to the couple and in turn she was given the Deed of Sale, TCT No. 473584, the
tax declaration, the tax receipt and other documents. When she offered to take them, they declined saying
they were going home to their Magallanes house.
Maccay and Potenciano continued to frequent the house of the accused spouses where they were given VIP
treatment. Potenciano slept, bathed and was allowed to use the phone for her transactions and to drive the
couple’s jeep.
xxx
On June 19, 1990, the taxes to the purchased property had to be paid. The title had not been transferred to
the names of the Nobelas. Serlina and Potenciano with the latter driving, rode the Nobela jeep to Antipolo. On
the way to town, the jeep broke down. The engine fell off. Potenciano volunteered to go to Antipolo herself,
pay the taxes and bring a mechanic to repair the jeep. The taxes had been paid.
The good relationship continued until June 30, 1990, Prudencio Nobela suffered a stroke. He was brought to
the Polymedic Hospital. That same afternoon, Potenciano called and talked to Prudencio’s doctor. She had
Prudencio transferred to a suite and confided to Serlina that she is also known as Adelaida Potenciano; that
the owners of the hospital are her mother and father. Serlina need not worry about the bill. Potenciano started
sleeping in the hospital.
After one week, Prudencio was to be discharged, Potenciano went to the accounting department. She tried to
pay with her dollars and yens but the hospital would not accept. She asked Serlina to go with her to a money
changer at Kalentong to change the money to pesos but the foreign exchange dealer refused saying the
foreign currency was fake.
Serlina had to go back to the house to borrow from the son of her husband by his first marriage. Maccay
drove the sick man and two women home in the Nobela jeep.
At this time, the trust and confidence on the Maccay couple by the Nobelas was beginning to slip off. The
Polymedic Hospital incident was a letdown. It was then that Potenciano, who has boasted of being not only
wealthy but also influential, invited Serlina to engage in the buy and sell of appliances which she claimed
were brought by her nephew from Japan. To Serlina’s dismay, she was only brought to a store in the pier
where she had to pay for the appliances herself. She had receipts from De Lara Merchandising (Exhs. "15" to
"15-C") showing her payments. The last receipt is dated July 29, 1990. Serlina brought the appliances home.
Naturally, when Potenciano saw Serlina selling the appliances herself, her pretensions having been exposed,
the relationship began to sour.
Before the last purchase of appliances, without the knowledge of the accused couple, Potenciano executed
an Affidavit of Loss (Exh. "3-B"). She related that when she went to Antipolo on June 19, 1990 in her stainless
steel jeep, the jeep broke down. She got a mechanic and when she returned the jeep was gone or carnapped.
In the meantime, Serlina was beginning to doubt Potenciano. She heard that Potenciano was trying to sell
their jeep. She inquired at the NBI and was told that Potenciano had a string of cases against her.
On July 30, 1993, Potenciano went to the Eastern Police District Headquarters and executed an affidavit-
complaint (Exh. 4) against the accused spouses before P/Lt. Col. Nestor E. Cruz relating that she was fooled
by Prudencio and Serlina Nobela on July 14, 1990. She related how the accused spouses cheated her by
stealing TCT No. 473584 and her appliances. Her affidavit related how she was prayed over and mesmerized
by Serlina. She stated that ‘ginawa panloloko sa akin at pagnanakaw ng Transfer Certificate of [T]itle’ (par. 12,
p. 1, Exh. 4) and the TCT ho ay maaring nawala noong pecha 25 ng Hunyo, 1990 natuklasan ko nawala ito
noong 27 ng Hunyo, nang itong nasabing TCT, ay aking ipa-seserox’ (par. 16, p. 1. Exh. 4).
xxx
In the meantime, Prudencio and Serlina, who had not been able to register the sale to them because of the
ailment of Prudencio asked a real estate agent, Anita de la Vega, to help them in the registration of Deed of
Sale (Exh. 1, Exh. B.). They knew de la Vega as she used to frequent a real estate agent living in their place.
When they were told that for the ₱300,000.00 consideration, they would need around ₱20,000.00 to include
capital gains taxes, she gave ₱21,000.00. The mother of de la Vega was supposed to know many people in
the Register of Deeds. The new title (Exh. "C") was delivered on August 10, 1990 to Serlina. She had to give
an additional "2,000.00 to de la Vega for other expenses.
Prudencio and Serlina Nobela were surprised to receive an invitation from Col. Nestor E. Cruz (Exh. "5") on
August 17, 1990, to go to his office regarding the complaint of Potenciano for Estafa and Theft.
When they went to Col. Cruz nothing happened but they were shocked to receive a subpoena from the
Fiscal’s Office. Maccay was not there and Prudencio was quite sick.
Serlina went to the Register of Deeds of Marikina to find out why they were accused and she was astonished
to discover (Exh. "6") as the Deed of Sale registered by de la Vega under the name of Linda Cruz. She also
found the payments of the capital gains tax as only ₱1,000.00 plus. Then she realized the reason for the
alleged falsification charge of Potenciano alias Angelita Barba and Oscar Maccay. The deed of sale given to
them (Exh. "1") for ₱300,000.00 which they paid the Maccays was not the one registered but one which
obviously was forged by de la Vega and her mother Juanita Magcaling in order to make more money from the
registration transaction. They filed a complaint against de la Vega and Juanita Magcaling which is still pending
in court at Judge Alfredo Flores’ sala.2
Petitioner Maccay filed the criminal complaint against respondent spouses for Estafa through Falsification of
Public Document before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal. The Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal
filed the Information for Estafa with the Regional Trial Court, Pasig, Branch 70, docketed as Criminal Case
No. 85961.
After trial, the trial court found respondent spouses innocent and ordered petitioners to reimburse respondent
spouses ₱300,000 and to pay damages and attorney’s fees. Petitioners appealed the civil aspect of the case
to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court denied petitioners’ appeal and affirmed the trial court’s Decision.
The appellate court also denied petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration.
Hence, this petition.
The Rulings of the Trial and Appellate Courts
The trial court acquitted respondent spouses and found that petitioners swindled respondent spouses. The
trial court declared that petitioner Maccay filed the Estafa charge against respondent spouses to turn the
tables on respondent spouses, the victims of the swindling. The trial court ordered petitioners to pay
respondent spouses ₱390,000 as damages, to wit:
In view of the foregoing, this court finds that the prosecution has not proven the Accused Prudencio Nobela
and Serlina Nobela guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and hereby acquits them. The
complainants Oscar Maccay and Adelaida E. Potenciano are hereby ordered to reimburse Prudencio Nobela
and Serlina Nobela the amount of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱300,000.00) paid to them by the
accused spouses in the sale of the litigated property. Further the complainants Oscar Maccay and Adelaida
Potenciano are hereby ordered to pay ₱50,000.00 to Prudencio Nobela and Serlina Nobela as moral
damages and ₱40,000.00 as attorney’s fees.
SO ORDERED.3
The Court of Appeals upheld the ruling of the trial court. The appellate court reasoned that the award of
damages was justified because it was "in the nature of a counterclaim and as the very defense put up by the
accused [respondents] in the criminal proceedings x x x."4
The Issues
Petitioners seek a reversal and raise the following issues for resolution:
1. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT MAY RULE ON THE CIVIL LIABILITY OF COMPLAINANT IN A CRIMINAL
CASE WHERE THE CIVIL ACTION WAS NOT RESERVED OR FILED SEPARATELY;
2. WHETHER A WITNESS, WHO IS NOT A PARTY TO THE CASE, MAY BE HELD LIABLE FOR DAMAGES.
The third issue raised by the petitioners, assailing the appellate court’s affirmation of the trial court’s factual
findings, deserves no consideration. A Rule 45 petition is limited to questions of law.5 Findings of fact are not
reviewable, except in clearly meritorious instances.6 This Court is not a trier of facts.
The Ruling of the Court
We grant the petition.
A court trying a criminal case cannot award damages in favor of the accused. The task of the trial court is
limited to determining the guilt of the accused and if proper, to determine his civil liability. A criminal case is
not the proper proceedings to determine the private complainant’s civil liability, if any.
The trial court erred in ordering complainant petitioner Maccay and prosecution witness Potenciano, as part of
the judgment in the criminal case, to reimburse the ₱300,000 and pay damages to the accused respondent
spouses. This Court ruled in Cabaero v. Hon. Cantos7 that a court trying a criminal case should limit itself to
the criminal and civil liability of the accused, thus:
[Thus,] the trial court should confine itself to the criminal aspect and the possible civil liability of the accused
arising out of the crime. The counterclaim (and cross-claim or third-party complaint, if any) should be set
aside or refused cognizance without prejudice to their filing in separate proceedings at the proper time.
The Court recently reiterated this ruling in Casupanan v. Laroya8 and Republic v. Court of Appeals.9
The appellate court erred in affirming the trial court’s award of damages by justifying it as a counterclaim.
Nothing in the records shows that respondent spouses filed or attempted to file a counterclaim. The 2000
Rules on Criminal Procedure prohibit counterclaims in criminal cases. Section 1 of Rule 111 provides:
SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. —
(a) x x x
No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the accused in the criminal case, but
any cause of action which could have been the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action.
This paragraph addresses the lacuna mentioned in Cabaero on the "absence of clear-cut rules governing the
prosecution of impliedly instituted civil action and the necessary consequences and implications thereof." In
the present case, the civil liability of petitioners for swindling respondent spouses and for maliciously filing a
baseless suit must be litigated in a separate proceeding.
The trial court also erred in holding prosecution witness petitioner Potenciano, together with complainant
petitioner Maccay, liable for damages to respondent spouses. A judgment cannot bind persons who are not
parties to the action.10 A decision of a court cannot operate to divest the rights of a person who is not a party
to the case.11 The records clearly show that petitioner Potenciano is not a party to this case. The Information
filed by the prosecutor had only petitioner Maccay as its complainant.12 The Verification attached to the
Information had only petitioner Maccay signing as complainant. Nothing in the records shows that petitioner
Potenciano played a role other than being a witness for the prosecution. To rule otherwise would violate
petitioner Potenciano’s constitutional right to due process.
Petitioners admit that title to the lot is now in the name of respondent spouses. Petitioners admit the validity of
the cancellation of TCT No. 473584 and the issuance of TCT No. 188289 in favor of respondent spouses.
Petitioners argue that since respondent spouses already acquired the lot in exchange for ₱300,000, there is
no basis for the order requiring petitioners to reimburse respondent spouses the ₱300,000.13
However, petitioners also argue that respondent spouses acquired their title through fraud. Petitioners must
decide which version they want to advance. Petitioners cannot argue that the title of respondent spouses is
valid to avoid reimbursing respondent spouses, at the same time claim that respondent spouses acquired
their title through fraud to turn the tables on respondent spouses who might sue petitioners for swindling.
Petitioners’ inconsistent arguments reveal their dishonesty even to the courts. Petitioners should not forget
that the trial and appellate courts found that petitioners perpetrated a vicious scam on respondent spouses
who are clearly the hapless victims here.
Respondent spouses have suffered enough. Respondent Prudencio died while trying to defend their property.
Respondent Serlina is ailing and suffering from severe complications due to the strain of litigation. While this
Court is constrained to grant the instant petition due to the trial court’s procedural error, we stress that the trial
court adjudicated correctly the substantive matter of the case. Petitioners unconscionably used their
intelligence and position to swindle the respondent spouses of their life savings, abusing their hospitality and
kindness in the process. Petitioners have the temerity to turn the tables on the poor couple by abusing the
legal processes. This Court will not allow the legal processes to serve as tool for swindlers. We promulgate
this Decision without prejudice to the filing by respondent Serlina of a claim for damages against petitioners.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the instant petition. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Pasig, Branch 70
dated 26 January 1995 in Criminal Case No. 85961 is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
1. The order to reimburse the ₱300,000 to respondent spouses Prudencio and Serlina Nobela is deleted;
2. The award of ₱50,000 as moral damages and the award of ₱40,000 as attorney’s fees are likewise
deleted.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 150785 September 15, 2006
EMMA P. NUGUID, petitioner,
vs.
CLARITA S. NICDAO,1 respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, Emma P. Nuguid assails the
decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated October 30, 2001 in CA-G.R. No. 23054:
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review is hereby GRANTED and the Assailed Decision dated May
10, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court [RTC], Branch 5, Bataan, affirming the Decision dated January 11,
1999 of the First Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Dinalupihan-Hermosa, Bataan is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.
The petitioner CLARITA S. NICDAO is hereby ACQUITTED of the offense charged. NO COSTS.
SO ORDERED.2
Petitioner seeks a review of the decision with respect to the alleged lack of civil liability of respondent Clarita
S. Nicdao. Stemming from two cases of violation of BP 22,3 this petition involves the following facts:
xxx xxx xxx
Accused Clarita S. Nicdao is charged with having committed the crime of Violation of BP 22 in fourteen
(14) counts. The criminal complaints allege that sometime in 1996, from April to August thereof,
[respondent] and her husband [,] of Vignette Superstore [,] approached [petitioner] and asked her if
they [could] borrow money to settle some obligations. Having been convinced by them and because of
the close relationship of [respondent] to [petitioner], the latter lent the former her money. Thus, every
month, she was persuaded to release P100,000.00 to the accused until the total amount reached
P1,150,000.00.
As security for the P1,150,000.00, [respondent] gave [petitioner] the following open dated Hermosa
Savings Bank (HSLB) (sic) with the assurance that if the entire amount is not paid within one (1) year,
[petitioner] can deposit the check:
Check No. Amount

7277 P100,000.00 (Exhibit "A")

7348 150,000.00 (Exhibit "A")

12118 100,000.00 (Exhibit "A")

8812 50,000.00 (Exhibit "A")

12102 100,000.00 (Exhibit "A")

7255 100,000.00 (Exhibit "A")

 2286 50,000.00 (Exhibit "A")

8128 100,000.00 (Exhibit "A")

7254 50,000.00 (Exhibit "A")

7278 100,000.00 (Exhibit "A")

4540 50,000.00 (Exhibit "A")

4523 50,000.00 (Exhibit "A")

12103 50,000.00 (Exhibit "A")

7294 100,000.00 (Exhibit "A")

P1,150,000.00

In June 1997, [petitioner] together with Samson Ching demanded payment of the sums [above-
mentioned], but [respondent] refused to acknowledge the indebtedness. Thus, on October 6, 1977,
[petitioner] deposited all aforementioned checks in the bank of Samson Ching totaling P1,150,000.00
since all the money given by her to [respondent] came from Samson Ching. The checks were all
returned for having been drawn against insufficient funds (DAIF).
A verbal and written demand was made upon [respondent] to pay the amount represented by the
bounced checks, but [to] no avail. Hence, a complaint for violation of BP 22 was filed against the
[respondent]. 4(Citation omitted)
After petitioner instituted 14 criminal cases5 (docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 9458-9471) for violation of BP
22 involving the sum of P1,150,000, corresponding warrants of arrest were issued against respondent. On
November 12, 1997, respondent was arraigned. She pleaded not guilty and trial ensued.
In a decision dated January 11, 1999, Judge Manuel M. Tan of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Dinalupihan, Bataan found respondent guilty of the charges against her. Respondent was sentenced to
pay P1,150,000, plus interest, and to suffer imprisonment equivalent to one year for each violation of BP 22,
or a total of 14 years of imprisonment.
On appeal, the decision was affirmed in toto by the Regional Trial Court of Dinalupihan, Bataan. Respondent
elevated the case to the CA. On October 30, 2001, the CA reversed the decision of the lower courts and
acquitted respondent. According to the CA, certain substantial facts were overlooked by the trial court. These
circumstances, if properly considered, justified a different conclusion on the case.6
Petitioner now comes to us, raising this main issue: whether respondent remains civilly liable to her for the
sum of P1,150,000. In this connection, she asserts that respondent obtained loans from her in the aggregate
amount of P1,150,000 and that these loans have not been paid.
From the standpoint of its effects, a crime has a dual character: (1) as an offense against the State because
of the disturbance of the social order and (2) as an offense against the private person injured by the crime
unless it involves the crime of treason, rebellion, espionage, contempt and others (wherein no civil liability
arises on the part of the offender either because there are no damages to be compensated or there is no
private person injured by the crime7). What gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation of everyone to
repair or to make whole the damage caused to another by reason of his act or omission, whether done
intentionally or negligently and whether or not punishable by law.8
Extinction of penal action does not carry with it the eradication of civil liability, unless the extinction proceeds
from a declaration in the final judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.9
On one hand, as regards the criminal aspect of a violation of BP 22, suffice it to say that:
[t]he gravamen of BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or one that is dishonored
upon its presentment for payment [and] the accused failed to satisfy the amount of the check or make
arrangement for its payment within 5 banking days from notice of dishonor. The act is
malum prohibitum, pernicious and inimical to public welfare. Laws are created to achieve a goal
intended to guide and prevent against an evil or mischief. Why and to whom the check was issued is
irrelevant in determining culpability. The terms and conditions surrounding the issuance of the checks
are also irrelevant.10
On the other hand, the basic principle in civil liability ex delicto is that every person criminally liable is also
civilly liable, crime being one of the five sources of obligations under the Civil Code. 11 A person acquitted of a
criminal charge, however, is not necessarily civilly free because the quantum of proof required in criminal
prosecution (proof beyond reasonable doubt) is greater than that required for civil liability
(mere preponderance of evidence12). In order to be completely free from civil liability, a person's acquittal
must be based on the fact that he did not commit the offense.13 If the acquittal is based merely on
reasonable doubt, the accused may still be held civilly liable since this does not mean he did not commit the
act complained of.14 It may only be that the facts proved did not constitute the offense charged.15
Acquittal will not bar a civil action in the following cases: (1) where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt
as only preponderance of evidence is required in civil cases; (2) where the court declared the accused's
liability is not criminal but only civil in nature and (3) where the civil liability does not arise from or is not based
upon the criminal act of which the accused was acquitted.16
In this petition, we find no reason to ascribe any civil liability to respondent. As found by the CA, her supposed
civil liability had already been fully satisfied and extinguished by payment. The statements of the appellate
court leave no doubt that respondent, who was acquitted from the charges against her, had already been
completely relieved of civil liability:
[Petitioner] does not dispute the fact that payments have already been made by petitioner in [the
stated] amounts but argues that the Demand Draft represented payment of a previous
obligation. However, no evidence of whatever nature was presented by the prosecution to
substantiate their claim that there was indeed a previous obligation involving the same amount
for which the demand draft was given. Except for this bare allegation, which is self-serving, no
documentary evidence was ever adduced that there were previous transactions involving the
subject amount.
Likewise, [petitioner] admitted having received the cash payments from petitioner on a daily basis but
argues that the same were applied to interest payments only. It however appears that [petitioner] was
charging [respondent] with an exorbitant rate of interest…on a daily basis. xxx In any event, the cash
payments [made] were recorded at the back of the cigarette cartons by [petitioner] in her own
handwriting as testified to by [respondent] and her employees, Melanie Tolentino and Jocelyn
Nicdao. Indeed, the daily cash payments marked in evidence as Exhibits 7 to 15 reveal that
[respondent] had already paid her obligation to [petitioner] in the amount of P5,780,000.00 as of
July 21, 1997 and that she stopped making further payments when she realized that she had
already paid such amount.
From the foregoing, it would appear that [respondent] made a total payment of P6,980,000.00,
inclusive of the P1,200,000.00 Demand Draft, which is definitely much more than P1,150,000.00,
the amount she actually borrowed from [petitioner]. These facts were never rebutted by
[petitioner].
Moreover, we find no evidence was presented by the prosecution to prove that there was a stipulation
in writing that interest will be paid by [respondent] on her loan obligations [as required under Article
1956 of the Civil Code].
xxx xxx xxx
By and large, the obligation of [respondent] has already been extinguished long before the encashment
of the subject checks. A check is said to apply for account only when there is still a pre-existing
obligation. In the case at bench, the pre-existing obligation was extinguished after full payment was
made by [respondent]. We therefore find the clear and convincing documentary evidence of payment
presented by [respondent] worthy of credence.17 (emphasis supplied)
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The October 30, 2001 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. No. 23054 is AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Chairperson, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Azcuna, Garcia, J.J., concur.

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 116463 June 10, 2003
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES thru the DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS and HIGHWAYS
(DPWH), Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. AMANDA VALERA-CABIGAO in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 73, Malabon, Metro Manila, and NAVOTAS INDUSTRIAL
CORPORATION, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before this Court is a Petition for Review of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated 18 July 1994, in CA-
G.R. CV No. 33094.2 The Court of Appeals affirmed the Order of the Regional Trial Court of Malabon
("Malabon trial court") which denied the motion of petitioner to consolidate Civil Case No. 1153-MN pending
before it with Criminal Cases Nos. 16889-16900 filed with the Sandiganbayan. This petition seeks to restrain
permanently the Malabon trial court from further hearing Civil Case No. 1153-MN and to dismiss the case.
The Antecedent Facts
Private respondent Navotas Industrial Corporation ("NIC") is a corporation engaged in dredging operations
throughout the Philippines. On 27 November 1985, then Public Works and Highways Minister Jesus Hipolito
requested former President Ferdinand E. Marcos to release ₱800 million to finance the immediate
implementation of dredging, flood control and related projects in Metro Manila, Bulacan, Pampanga and
Leyte. Of the total funds approved for release, ₱615 million went to the National Capital Region of the
Ministry3 of Public Works and Highways ("DPWH").
The DPWH allocated the ₱615 million to several projects covered by twenty-one contracts. The DPWH
awarded one of the contractors, NIC, ₱194,454,000.00 worth of dredging work in four contracts for completion
within 350 calendar days.
NIC alleges that the dredging work proceeded pursuant to specific work schedules and plan approved by
DPWH. NIC contends that it accomplished 95.06 percent of the required total volume of work or
₱184,847,970.00 worth of services based on an alleged evaluation by DPWH. However, NIC maintains that
DPWH paid only 79.22 percent of the accomplished work, leaving a balance of ₱30,799,676.00.
On 20 September 1988, NIC filed a complaint for sum of money with the Malabon trial court against the
Republic of the Philippines, thru the DPWH. The case, docketed as Civil Case No. 1153-MN, was raffled to
Branch 73 of the court, presided by Judge Amanda Valera-Cabigao.
In its Answer, petitioner contends that NIC is not entitled to the amount claimed. Soon after the February 1986
Revolution, DPWH created a fact-finding committee to audit the flood control projects in the National Capital
Region, Bulacan, Pampanga and Leyte. Then DPWH Minister Rogaciano Mercado, who replaced Minister
Jesus Hipolito, ordered the suspension of all projects funded by special budget released or issued before the
snap elections on February 1986, pending inventory and evaluation of these projects.
Petitioner contends that upon verification and investigation, the DPWH fact-finding committee discovered that
the dredging contracts of NIC with DPWH were null and void. Petitioner claims that NIC worked on the project
five or six months before the award of the dredging contracts to NIC. The contracts of NIC were awarded
without any public bidding. Moreover, DPWH discovered that NIC, through its corporate officers, connived
with some DPWH officials in falsifying certain public documents to make it appear that NIC had completed a
major portion of the project, when no dredging work was actually performed. The scheme enabled NIC to
collect from DPWH ₱146,962,072.47 as payment for work allegedly accomplished. Petitioner thus filed a
counterclaim for the return of the ₱146,962,072.47 plus interest and exemplary damages of ₱100 million.
On 14 July 1986, the DPWH fact-finding committee filed with the Office of the Tanodbayan 4 a case for estafa
thru falsification of public documents and for violation of Republic Act No. 3019 against former Minister
Hipolito. Other DPWH officials5 involved in awarding the dredging contracts to NIC, as well as Cipriano
Bautista,6 president of NIC, were also named respondents. The charges7 were for four counts corresponding
to the four contracts that DPWH entered into with NIC. The case was docketed as TBP Case No. 86-01163.
However, it was only on 17 June 1991 that former Ombudsman Conrado Vasquez approved the resolution of
the Office of the Special Prosecutor finding probable cause for estafa thru falsification of public documents
and for violation of Section 3 (e) and (g)8 of RA No. 3019. Subsequently, the Ombudsman filed the
corresponding Informations with the First Division of the Sandiganbayan against all the respondents in TBP
Case No. 86-01163. The cases were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 16889-16900.
On 14 April 1993, petitioner filed before the Malabon trial court a Motion to Consolidate Civil Case No. 1153-
MN with Criminal Cases Nos. 16889-16900 in the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner argued that the civil case for
collection and the criminal cases arose from the same incidents and involve the same facts. Thus, these
cases should be consolidated as mandated by Section 4(b) of Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended.
On 18 June 1993, the Malabon trial court issued a Resolution denying petitioner’s Motion for Consolidation.
Thereafter, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which the Malabon trial court denied on 7 November
1993.
On 19 January 1994, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with the Court of
Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 33094. In a Decision dated 18 July 1994, the Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition. On 12 September 1994, petitioner filed with the Court this petition for review.
On 26 September 1994, the Court resolved to issue the temporary restraining order prayed for by petitioner.
Consequently, the Malabon trial court desisted from hearing further Civil Case No. 1153-MN.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In dismissing the petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus filed by petitioner, the Court of Appeals
ruled as follows:
It is clear that in the same manner that the RTC would have no jurisdiction relative to violations of Republic
Act Nos. 3019, as amended, and 1379, neither could the Sandiganbayan acquire jurisdiction over collection of
sum of money, the latter not involving recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged. More
specifically, the said Sandiganbayan would have no power whatsoever to order the defendant in the civil case
(the Republic of the Philippines thru the DPWH) to pay the private respondent the amount of ₱30,799,676.00
claimed by the latter. One of the averred purposes then of consolidation (to avoid multiplicity of suits) could
not be realized. A civil action would still have to be instituted by the private respondent to recover the amount
allegedly due.
The Issues
I.

WHETHER THE PETITION WAS FILED ON TIME.

II.

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT ORDERING THE CONSOLIDATION OF

CIVIL CASE NO. 1153-MN WITH CRIMINAL CASES NOS. 16889-16900 WITH THE
SANDIGANBAYAN AS REQUIRED BY SECTION 4(B) OF P.D. 1606.9

The Ruling of the Court

The petition is devoid of merit.
First Issue: Timeliness of the filing of the petition
We first resolve a minor issue raised by NIC regarding the timeliness of the filing of this petition.
In its Comment, NIC seeks the dismissal of the petition on the ground that it was not served on time.
Petitioner admittedly filed two motions for extension of time, each for fifteen days. The last day for filing the
second motion for extension was on 11 September 1994. NIC, however, asserts that a copy of the petition
was sent by registered mail to its counsel only on 12 September 1994 or a day after the last day for filing.
NIC, believing that this petition was filed out of time, now asks the Court to consider the instant petition as not
having been filed, making the Resolution of the Court of Appeals final and executory.
We do not agree.
NIC harps on the fact that the petition was sent by registered mail only on 12 September 1994, when the last
day for filing was on 11 September 1994. NIC, however, overlooked one significant fact. The last day for filing,
11 September 1994, fell on a Sunday.
Based on Section 1,10 Rule 22 of the Rules of Court, and as applied in several cases,11 "where the last day
for doing any act required or permitted by law falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday in the place
where the court sits, the time shall not run until the next working day." Thus, petitioner filed on time its petition
on 12 September 1994, the next working day, following the last day for filing which fell on a Sunday.
Second Issue: Consolidation of the Cases
The main issue before us is whether Civil Case No. 1153-MN pending with the Malabon trial court should be
consolidated with Criminal Cases Nos. 16889-16900 filed with the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner argues that the civil case for collection of sum of money and the criminal cases for estafa thru
falsification of public documents and for violation of RA No. 3019 arose from the same transaction and involve
similar questions of fact and law. Petitioner claims that all these cases pertain to only one issue, that is,
whether NIC performed dredging work. Petitioner argues that a determination in the civil case that NIC
performed dredging work will entitle NIC to the balance of the contract price. Similarly, petitioner claims that
the criminal cases also involve the same issue since petitioner charges that the accused connived in falsifying
documents and in fraudulently collecting payments for non-existing dredging work. In sum, petitioner asserts
that since the issues in all these cases are the same, the parties will have to present the same evidence.
Therefore, the consolidation of these cases is in order.
We do not agree.
Consolidation is a matter of discretion with the court. Consolidation becomes a matter of right only when the
cases sought to be consolidated involve similar questions of fact and law, provided certain requirements are
met. The purpose of consolidation is to avoid multiplicity of suits, prevent delay, clear congested dockets,
simplify the work of the trial court, and save unnecessary expense.12
We cannot order the consolidation of the civil case for collection with the criminal cases for two reasons. First,
the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the collection case. Second, the Rules of Court do not allow the
filing of a counterclaim or a third-party complaint in a criminal case.
First, the Sandiganbayan was created as a special court to hear graft cases against government officials of a
particular salary grade for violations of specific laws.13 Presidential Decree No. 1606,14 as amended by
Republic
Act No. 8249,15 outlines the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction as follows:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. — The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal
Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the
government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the
offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise
classified as Grade '27' and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989
(Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
xxx
B. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public
officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to their office.
C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and
14-A, issued in 1986.
In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to Salary Grade '27' or higher, as
prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original
jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial
court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as
provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or order of
regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as
herein provided.
xxx
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public officers or
employees, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried
jointly with said public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction
over them.
x x x.
The law does not include civil cases for collection of sum of money among the cases falling under the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. If we consolidate the collection case in the Malabon trial court with the
criminal cases, the Sandiganbayan will have no jurisdiction to hear and decide the collection case. Even if
NIC proves it is entitled to payment, the Sandiganbayan will have no jurisdiction to award any money
judgment to NIC. NIC will still have to file a separate case in the regular court for the collection of its claim.
Thus, the avowed purpose of consolidation which is to avoid multiplicity of suits will not be achieved.
Petitioner invokes Naguiat v. Intermediate Appellate Court16 in claiming that a civil action not arising from
the offense charged may be consolidated with the criminal action. Indeed, Naguiat allowed the consolidation
of the criminal case with a civil case arising ex contractu. In consolidating the two cases, Naguiat relied
on Canos v. Peralta17 where the Court consolidated a civil action for the recovery of wage differential with a
criminal action for violation of the Minimum Wage Law. Canos, however, made an important qualification
before a court may order the consolidation of cases. Canos held that:
A court may order several actions pending before it to be tried together where they arise from the same act,
event or transaction, involve the same or like issues, and depend largely or substantially on the same
evidence, provided that the court has jurisdiction over the cases to be consolidated x x x. (Emphasis
supplied)
Thus, an essential requisite of consolidation is that the court must have jurisdiction over all the cases
consolidated before it. Since the Sandiganbayan does not have jurisdiction over the collection case, the same
cannot be consolidated with the criminal cases even if these cases involve similar questions of fact and law.
Obviously, consolidation of the collection case with the criminal cases will be a useless and empty formality
since the Sandiganbayan, being devoid of jurisdiction over the collection case, cannot act on it.
Second, we cannot order the consolidation of the civil action filed by NIC with the criminal cases in the
Sandiganbayan because the civil case amounts to a counterclaim or a third-party complaint in a criminal
case. While NIC, as a corporate entity, is not an accused in the criminal cases, a consolidation of NIC’s
collection case with the criminal cases will have the same effect of a counterclaim or a third-party complaint
against petitioner and DPWH. In such case, the rule against counterclaims and third-party complaints in
criminal cases may be applied by analogy.
Section 1, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure expressly requires the accused to litigate his
counterclaim separately from the criminal action.
SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions.-
(a) xxx
No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the accused in the criminal
case, but any cause of action which could have been the subject thereof may be litigated in a
separate civil action. (Emphasis supplied)
This paragraph was incorporated in the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure to address the lacuna mentioned
in Cabaero v. Cantos18 where the Court noted the "absence of clear-cut rules governing the prosecution of
impliedly instituted civil action and the necessary consequences and implications thereof."19 In the same
vein, the Court in Cabaero clarified that:
[T]he counterclaim of the accused cannot be tried together with the criminal case because, as already
discussed, it will unnecessarily complicate and confuse the criminal proceedings. Thus, the trial court should
confine itself to the criminal aspect and the possible civil liability of the accused arising out of the crime. The
counterclaim (and cross-claim or third party complaint, if any) should be set aside or refused cognizance
without prejudice to their filing in separate proceedings at the proper time.
Thus, a counterclaim in a criminal case must be litigated separately to avoid complication and confusion in the
resolution of the criminal cases. This is the rationale behind Section 1 of Rule 111.1âwphi1 The same
rationale applies to NIC’s collection case against petitioner and DPWH. Thus, NIC’s collection case must be
litigated separately before the Malabon trial court to avoid confusion in resolving the criminal cases with the
Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner lodged its own counterclaim to the collection case filed with the Malabon trial court, praying for the
return of the payment DPWH made to NIC arising from the dredging contracts. However, petitioner’s
counterclaim is deemed abandoned by virtue of Section 4 of PD No. 1606, as amended. 20 The last
paragraph of Section 4 of PD No. 1606, as amended, provides that:
Any provision of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the criminal action and the
corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability shall at all times be simultaneously instituted with,
and jointly determined in, the same proceeding by the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts, the filing of
the criminal action being deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil action, and no right to
reserve the filing of such civil action separately from the criminal action shall be recognized: Provided,
however, That where the civil action had heretofore been filed separately but judgment therein has not
yet been rendered, and the criminal case is hereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate
court, said civil action shall be transferred to the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, as the case
may be, for consolidation and joint determination with the criminal action, otherwise the separate civil
action shall be deemed abandoned. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner’s counterclaim in the civil case pending with the Malabon trial court for the return of the amount
DPWH paid NIC is an action to recover civil liability ex delicto. However, this action to recover civil liability ex
delicto is by operation of law included in the criminal cases filed with the Sandiganbayan. By mandate of RA
No. 8249, the counterclaim filed earlier in the separate civil action with the Malabon trial court "shall be
deemed abandoned."
The only question left is whether NIC’s civil case before the Malabon trial court for collection of sum of money
can proceed independently of the criminal cases filed with the Sandiganbayan. NIC’s collection case for
unpaid services from its dredging contracts with DPWH obviously does not fall under Articles 32, 33 or 34 (on
Human Relations) of the Civil Code. Neither does it fall under Article 2176 (on quasi-delict) of the Civil Code.
Under Section 3 of Rule 111, civil actions falling under Articles 32, 33, 34 or 2176 may proceed independently
and separately from the criminal case. However, NIC cannot invoke any of these articles.
The only other possibility is for NIC’s civil action to fall under Article 31 of the Civil Code which provides:
Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a
felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of
the latter.
An example of a case falling under Article 31 is a civil action to recover the proceeds of sale of goods covered
by a trust receipt. Such civil action can proceed independently of the criminal action for violation of the trust
receipt law.21 In such a case, the validity of the contract, on which the civil action is based, is not at issue.
What is at issue is the violation of an obligation arising from a valid contract - the trust receipt.
However, when the civil action is based on a purported contract that is assailed as illegal per se, as when the
execution of the contract is alleged to violate the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Article 31 does not
apply. In such a situation, the contract if proven illegal cannot create any valid obligation that can be the basis
of a cause of action in a civil case. Under Article 140922 of the Civil Code, a contract "whose cause, object or
purpose is contrary to law," or a contract that is "expressly prohibited or declared void by law," is void from the
very beginning. No party to such void contract can claim any right under such contract or enforce any of its
provisions.
Under Section 3 (g) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, entering into a contract that is manifestly and
grossly disadvantageous to the government is "declared to be unlawful." If the act of entering into the contract
is assailed as a crime in itself, then the issue of whether the contract is illegal must first be resolved before
any civil action based on the contract can proceed. Only the Sandiganbayan has the jurisdiction to decide
whether the act of entering into such contract is a crime, where the salary grade of one of the accused is
grade 27 or higher,23 as in Criminal Cases Nos. 16889-16900 filed with the Sandiganbayan.1âwphi1
Article 31 speaks of a civil action "based on an obligation not arising from the act x x x complained of as a
felony." This clearly means that the obligation must arise from an act not constituting a crime . In the
instant case, the act purporting to create the obligation is assailed as a crime in itself. That act, which is
prohibited by law, is the entering into dredging contracts that are manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to
the government.24 A contract executed against the provisions of prohibitory laws is void.25 If the dredging
contracts are declared illegal, then no valid obligation can arise from such contracts. Consequently, no civil
action based on such contracts can proceed independently of the criminal action.
In contrast, where the civil action is based on a contract that can remain valid even if its violation may
constitute a crime, the civil action can proceed independently. Thus, in estafa thru violation of the trust receipt
law, the violation of the trust receipt constitutes a crime. However, the trust receipt itself remains valid,
allowing a civil action based on the trust receipt to proceed independently of the criminal case.
Clearly, NIC’s civil case before the Malabon trial court does not fall under Article 31 of the Civil Code. This
calls then for the application of the second paragraph of Section 2 of Rule 111 which states that "if the criminal
action is filed after the said civil action has already been instituted, the latter shall be suspended in whatever
stage it may be found before judgment on the merits." Consequently, the civil case for collection pending in
the Malabon trial court must be suspended until after the termination of the criminal cases filed with the
Sandiganbayan.
The suspension of the civil case for collection of sum of money will avoid the possibility of conflicting
decisions between the Sandiganbayan and the Malabon trial court on the validity of NIC’s dredging contracts.
If the Sandiganbayan declares the dredging contracts illegal and void ab initio, and such declaration becomes
final, then NIC’s civil case for collection of sum of money will have no legal leg to stand on. However, if the
Sandiganbayan finds the dredging contracts valid, then NIC’s collection case before the Malabon trial court
can then proceed to trial.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 18 July 1994 is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The counterclaim of petitioner in Civil Case No. 1153-MN pending with the
Regional Trial Court of Malabon, Branch 73, is deemed abandoned. The Regional Trial Court of Malabon,
Branch 73, is ordered to suspend the trial of Civil Case No. 1153-MN until the termination of Criminal Cases
Nos. 16889-16900 filed with the Sandiganbayan.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Vitug, Ynares-Santiago, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 151452. July 29, 2005
SPS. ANTONIO C. SANTOS and ESPERANZA C. SANTOS, NORA BARNALO, BELINDA LUMACTAD,
MARIENELA DY, NIKKA SANTOS and LEONARDO FERRER, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. NORMANDIE B. PIZARDO, as Presiding Judge, RTC of Quezon City, Branch 101, DIONISIO M
SIBAYAN, and VIRON TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, INC., represented by VIRGILIO Q. RONDARIS,
President/Chairman, Respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari1 dated March 1, 2002, petitioners assail the Resolutions of the Court
of Appeals dated September 10, 2001 and January 9, 2002, respectively dismissing their petition for certiorari
and denying their motion for reconsideration, arising from the dismissal of their complaint to recover civil
indemnity for the death and physical injuries of their kin.
The following facts are matters of record.
In an Information dated April 25, 1994, Dionisio M. Sibayan (Sibayan) was charged with Reckless Imprudence
Resulting to Multiple Homicide and Multiple Physical Injuries in connection with a vehicle collision between a
southbound Viron Transit bus driven by Sibayan and a northbound Lite Ace Van, which claimed the lives of
the van’s driver and three (3) of its passengers, including a two-month old baby, and caused physical injuries
to five (5) of the van’s passengers. After trial, Sibayan was convicted and sentenced to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment for two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months.
However, as there was a reservation to file a separate civil action, no pronouncement of civil liability was
made by the municipal circuit trial court in its decision promulgated on December 17, 1998.2
On October 20, 2000, petitioners filed a complaint for damages against Sibayan, Viron Transit and its
President/Chairman, Virgilio Q. Rondaris, with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, pursuant to their
reservation to file a separate civil action.3 They cited therein the judgment convicting Sibayan.
Viron Transit moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds of improper service of summons, prescription
and laches, and defective certification of non-forum shopping. It also sought the dropping of Virgilio Q.
Rondaris as defendant in view of the separate personality of Viron Transit from its officers.4
Petitioners opposed the motion to dismiss contending, among others, that the right to file a separate action in
this case prescribes in ten (10) years reckoned from the finality of the judgment in the criminal action. As there
was no appeal of the decision convicting Sibayan, the complaint which was filed barely two (2) years thence
was clearly filed within the prescriptive period.
The trial court dismissed the complaint on the principal ground that the cause of action had already
prescribed. According to the trial court, actions based on quasi delict, as it construed petitioners’ cause of
action to be, prescribe four (4) years from the accrual of the cause of action. Hence, notwithstanding the fact
that petitioners reserved the right to file a separate civil action, the complaint ought to be dismissed on the
ground of prescription.5
Improper service of summons was likewise cited as a ground for dismissal of the complaint as summons was
served through a certain Jessica Ubalde of the legal department without mentioning her designation or
position.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration pointing out yet again that the complaint is not based on quasi
delict but on the final judgment of conviction in the criminal case which prescribes ten (10) years from the
finality of the judgment.6 The trial court denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration reiterating that
petitioners’ cause of action was based on quasi delict and had prescribed under Article 1146 of the Civil Code
because the complaint was filed more than four (4) years after the vehicular accident.7 As regards the
improper service of summons, the trial court reconsidered its ruling that the complaint ought to be dismissed
on this ground.
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals which dismissed the same for error in the
choice or mode of appeal.8 The appellate court also denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration reasoning
that even if the respondent trial court judge committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order of
dismissal, certiorari is still not the permissible remedy as appeal was available to petitioners and they failed to
allege that the petition was brought within the recognized exceptions for the allowance of certiorari in lieu of
appeal.9
In this petition, petitioners argue that a rigid application of the rule that certiorari cannot be a substitute for
appeal will result in a judicial rejection of an existing obligation arising from the criminal liability of private
respondents. Petitioners insist that the liability sought to be enforced in the complaint arose ex delicto and is
not based on quasi delict. The trial court allegedly committed grave abuse of discretion when it insisted that
the cause of action invoked by petitioners is based on quasi delict and concluded that the action had
prescribed. Since the action is based on the criminal liability of private respondents, the cause of action
accrued from the finality of the judgment of conviction.
Assuming that their petition with the appellate court was procedurally flawed, petitioners implore the Court to
exempt this case from the rigid operation of the rules as they allegedly have a legitimate grievance to
vindicate, i.e., damages for the deaths and physical injuries caused by private respondents for which no civil
liability had been adjudged by reason of their reservation of the right to file a separate civil action.
In their Comment10 dated June 13, 2002, private respondents insist that the dismissal of the complaint on the
ground of prescription was in order. They point out that the averments in the complaint make out a cause of
action for quasi delict under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code. As such, the prescriptive period of four
(4) years should be reckoned from the time the accident took place.
Viron Transit also alleges that its subsidiary liability cannot be enforced since Sibayan was not ordered to pay
damages in the criminal case. It is Viron Transit’s contention that the subsidiary liability of the employer
contemplated in Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code presupposes a situation where the civil aspect of the
case was instituted in the criminal case and no reservation to file a separate civil case was made.
Private respondents likewise allege that the recourse to the Court of Appeals via certiorari was improper as
petitioners should have appealed the adverse order of the trial court. Moreover, they point out several other
procedural lapses allegedly committed by petitioners, such as lack of certification against forum-shopping;
lack of duplicate original or certified true copy of the assailed order of the trial court; and non-indication of the
full names and addresses of petitioners in the petition.
Petitioners filed a Reply11 dated September 14, 2002, while private respondents filed a Rejoinder12 dated
October 14, 2002, both in reiteration of their arguments.
We grant the petition.
Our Revised Penal Code provides that every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. 13 Such
civil liability may consist of restitution, reparation of the damage caused and indemnification of consequential
damages.14 When a criminal action is instituted, the civil liability arising from the offense is impliedly instituted
with the criminal action, subject to three notable exceptions: first, when the injured party expressly waives the
right to recover damages from the accused; second, when the offended party reserves his right to have the
civil damages determined in a separate action in order to take full control and direction of the prosecution of
his cause; and third, when the injured party actually exercises the right to maintain a private suit against the
offender by instituting a civil action prior to the filing of the criminal case.
Notably, it was the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended in 1988, which governed the institution of
the criminal action, as well as the reservation of the right to file a separate civil action. Section 1, Rule 111
thereof states:
Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions.—When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the
civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles
32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused.
A waiver of any of the civil actions extinguishes the others. The institution of, or the reservation of the right to
file, any of said civil actions separately waives the others.
The reservation of the right to institute the separate civil actions shall be made before the prosecution starts to
present its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make
such reservation.
In no case may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the accused.
When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of moral, nominal,
temperate or exemplary damages, the filing fees for such action as provided in these Rules shall constitute a
first lien on the judgment except in an award for actual damages.
In cases wherein the amount of damages, other than actual, is alleged in the complaint or information, the
corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon filing thereof in court for trial.
Petitioners expressly made a reservation of their right to file a separate civil action as a result of the crime
committed by Sibayan. On account of this reservation, the municipal circuit trial court, in its decision
convicting Sibayan, did not make any pronouncement as to the latter’s civil liability.
Predicating their claim on the judgment of conviction and their reservation to file a separate civil action made
in the criminal case, petitioners filed a complaint for damages against Sibayan, Viron Transit and its
President/Chairman. Petitioners assert that by the institution of the complaint, they seek to recover private
respondents’ civil liability arising from crime. Unfortunately, based on its misreading of the allegations in the
complaint, the trial court dismissed the same, declaring that petitioners’ cause of action was based on quasi
delict and should have been brought within four (4) years from the time the cause of action accrued, i.e., from
the time of the accident.
A reading of the complaint reveals that the allegations therein are consistent with petitioners’ claim that the
action was brought to recover civil liability arising from crime. Although there are allegations of negligence on
the part of Sibayan and Viron Transit, such does not necessarily mean that petitioners were pursuing a cause
of action based on quasi delict, considering that at the time of the filing of the complaint, the cause of
action ex quasi delicto had already prescribed. Besides, in cases of negligence, the offended party has the
choice between an action to enforce civil liability arising from crime under the Revised Penal Code and an
action for quasi delict under the Civil Code.
An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part of the
offender, i.e., (1) civil liability ex delicto, under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; and (2) independent
civil liabilities, such as those (a) not arising from an act or omission complained of as a felony, e.g., culpa
contractual or obligations arising from law under Article 31 of the Civil Code, intentional torts under Articles 32
and 34, and culpa aquiliana under Article 2176 of the Civil Code; or (b) where the injured party is granted a
right to file an action independent and distinct from the criminal action under Article 33 of the Civil
Code.15 Either of these liabilities may be enforced against the offender subject to the caveat under Article
2177 of the Civil Code that the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the
defendant and the similar proscription against double recovery under the Rules above-quoted.
At the time of the filing of the complaint for damages in this case, the cause of action ex quasi delicto had
already prescribed. Nonetheless, petitioners can pursue the remaining avenue opened for them by their
reservation, i.e., the surviving cause of action ex delicto. This is so because the prescription of the action ex
quasi delicto does not operate as a bar to an action to enforce the civil liability arising from crime especially as
the latter action had been expressly reserved.
The case of Mendoza v. La Mallorca Bus Company16 was decided upon a similar set of facts. Therein, the
driver of La Mallorca Bus Company was charged with reckless imprudence resulting to damage to property.
The plaintiff made an express reservation for the filing of a separate civil action. The driver was convicted
which conviction was affirmed by this Court. Later, plaintiff filed a separate civil action for damages based
on quasi delict which was ordered dismissed by the trial court upon finding that the action was instituted more
than six (6) years from the date of the accident and thus, had already prescribed. Subsequently, plaintiff
instituted another action, this time based on the subsidiary liability of the bus company. The trial court
dismissed the action holding that the dismissal of the earlier civil case operated as a bar to the filing of the
action to enforce the bus company’s subsidiary liability.
We held that the dismissal of the action based on culpa aquiliana is not a bar to the enforcement of the
subsidiary liability of the employer. Once there is a conviction for a felony, final in character, the employer
becomes subsidiarily liable if the commission of the crime was in the discharge of the duties of the
employees. This is so because Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code operates with controlling force to
obviate the possibility of the aggrieved party being deprived of indemnity even after the rendition of a final
judgment convicting the employee.
Seen in this light, the trial court should not have dismissed the complaint on the ground of prescription, but
instead allowed the complaint for damages ex delicto to be prosecuted on the merits, considering petitioners’
allegations in their complaint, opposition to the motion to dismiss17 and motion for reconsideration18 of the
order of dismissal, insisting that the action was to recover civil liability arising from crime.
This does not offend the policy that the reservation or institution of a separate civil action waives the other civil
actions. The rationale behind this rule is the avoidance of multiple suits between the same litigants arising out
of the same act or omission of the offender.19 However, since the stale action for damages based on quasi
delict should be considered waived, there is no more occasion for petitioners to file multiple suits against
private respondents as the only recourse available to them is to pursue damages ex delicto. This
interpretation is also consistent with the bar against double recovery for obvious reasons.
Now the procedural issue. Admittedly, petitioners should have appealed the order of dismissal of the trial court
instead of filing a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. Such procedural misstep, however, should
be exempted from the strict application of the rules in order to promote their fundamental objective of securing
substantial justice.20 We are loathe to deprive petitioners of the indemnity to which they are entitled by law
and by a final judgment of conviction based solely on a technicality. It is our duty to prevent such an
injustice.21
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered SETTING ASIDE the resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated
September 10, 2001 and January 9, 2002, respectively dismissing the present action and denying petitioners’
motion for reconsideration, as well as the orders of the lower court dated February 26, 2001 and July 16,
2001. Let the case be REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 127934 August 23, 2000
ACE HAULERS CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND EDERLINDA ABIVA, respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The case is an appeal via certiorari seeking to set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals1 affirming that of
the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 106, except for the award of thirty thousand pesos
(P30,000.00) as exemplary damages, which was deleted. The dispositive portion of the trial court's decision
reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff:
"1. the amount of Two Hundred Thousand (P200,000.00) as actual damages;
"2. the amount of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) as moral damages;
"3. the amount of Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00) as exemplary damages;
"4. the amount of Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00) as attorney’s fees;
"5. Costs of suit.
"SO ORDERED."2
The facts, culled from the findings of the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
"The case was an action for damages arising from a vehicular mishap which took place on June 1, 1984,
involving a truck owned by petitioner Ace Haulers Corporation and driven by its employee, Jesus dela Cruz,
and a jeepney owned by Isabelito Rivera, driven by Rodolfo Parma. A third vehicle, a motorcycle, was
bumped and dragged by the jeepney, and its rider, Fidel Abiva, was run over by the truck owned by petitioner
Ace Haulers Corporation, causing his death. Upon his untimely demise, Fidel Abiva left behind a wife,
respondent Erderlinda Abiva and their three (3) children.
"On July 27, 1984, a criminal information for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide was filed against the
two drivers, Dela Cruz and Parma, docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-37248 before the RTC of Quezon City,
Branch 103.
"While the criminal action was pending, on March 11, 1985, respondent Ederlinda Abiva filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 93, a separate civil action for damages against the two accused in
the criminal case, as well as against Isabelito Rivera and petitioner Ace Haulers Corp., the owners of the
vehicles involved in the accident and employers of the accused.
"In her complaint, respondent Abiva prayed that:
"1. A Writ of Preliminary Attachment be immediately issued against the properties of the defendants as
security for the satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered;
"2. Defendants in solidum, to pay plaintiff the amount of P200,000.00 as actual damage;
"3. Defendants, in solidum, to pay plaintiff the sum of P50,000.00 as attorney’s fees;
"4. Defendants, in solidum, to pay plaintiff the amount of moral and exemplary damages which this Court may
reasonably assess."
"On January 31, 1986, petitioner Ace Haulers Corp. and Jesus dela Cruz filed a motion to dismiss bringing to
the trial court’s attention the fact that a criminal action was pending before another branch of the same court,
and that under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, the filing of an independent civil action arising from
a quasi-delict is no longer allowed. Furthermore, said defendants alleged that respondent’s private counsel
actively participated in the criminal proceedings, showing that the respondent was in fact pursuing the civil
aspect automatically instituted with the criminal case.
"On February 21, 1986, respondent filed an opposition to the motion arguing that she was not pursuing the
civil aspect in the criminal case as she, in fact, manifested in open court in the criminal proceedings that she
was filing a separate and independent civil action for damages against the accused and their employers, as
allowed under Articles 2177 and 2180 of the Civil Code.
"On February 28, 1986, the trial court dismissed the action for damages on the ground that "no civil action
shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution in a case for reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide". Respondent Abiva’s motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal was also denied by the
trial court. She then elevated the case before the Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) by way of a petition for
certiorari, docketed as Civil Case No. 09644. The appellate court reversed the dismissal order of the trial
court. It was then petitioner Ace Haulers Corporation and Jesus dela Cruz’s turn to appeal the judgment of the
IAC before the Supreme Court. On August 3, 1988, the Supreme Court issued a resolution denying the
petition for review of Ace Haulers Corp. and Jesus dela Cruz for failure "to sufficiently show that the Court of
Appeals had committed any reversible error in the questioned error". The case was remanded to the trial
court for further proceedings.
"In the meantime that the petition for review was pending before the Supreme Court, fire razed the portion of
the Quezon City Hall building which housed the trial courts and the records of the case were among those
that the fire reduced to ashes. It was not until March 26, 1992 that the records of the case was reconstituted
by the trial court.
"While the pre-trial proceedings in the civil action for damages was still being set and reset upon motion of the
opposing parties, on July 6, 1992, the RTC, Quezon City, Branch 83 rendered judgment in the criminal case,
finding as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the prosecution having established beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of both accused
Rodolfo Parma and Jesus dela Cruz for the offense of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide, this Court
finds them guilty of said offense charged and hereby sentences each of them to suffer and undergo
imprisonment of ONE (1) YEAR AND ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional as minimum to FOUR (4) YEARS,
NINE (9) MONTHS and TEN (10) DAYS also of prision correccional as maximum, and to pay the costs.
"Accused Rodolfo Parma and Jesus dela Cruz are hereby ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased Fidel O.
Abiva, jointly or pro rata, the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as indemnification for his
death and the amount of FOUR THOUSAND PESOS (P4,000.00) by way of actual damages.
"SO ORDERED."
"On March 9, 1993, the pre-trial conference of the civil case was finally set on April 6, 1993, and notices
thereof were sent to the parties and their respective counsel. On the appointed date, however, no
representative nor counsel for petitioner Ace Haulers Corporation appeared. Consequently, upon motion of
respondent Abiva, the petitioner was declared as in default. Furthermore, defendants Jesus dela Cruz,
Isabelito Rivera and Rodolfo Parma were discharged as defendants, and the case against them dismissed.
"On June 30, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision, ruling against petitioner Ace Haulers Corporation. The
trial court summarized its findings thus:
"Hence, Mrs. Ederlinda Abiva as part of plaintiff’s evidence, testified that she is 43 years old, a widow and
housekeeper, residing at Cefels Subdivision, Deparo, Novaliches, Quezon City. She told the Court that she is
the widow of Fidel Abiva, who died on June 1, 1984 after he was ran over by Isuzu Cargo Truck Plate No.
NWY-T Phil 93 owned and operated by the defendant Ace Haulers Corporation, then driven by Jesus dela
Cruz and that because of the death of her husband, she suffered damages, among which, moral, exemplary
and actual damages for her expenses and attorney’s fees. She claimed that she is lawfully married to the late
Fidel Abiva as evidenced by their Marriage Contract (Exhibits ‘A’ and ‘A-1’). Out of their wedlock, (sic) they
begot three (3) children, namely: Noel, Gina and Argentina with ages 25, 21 and 15, respectively. Her
husband died on June 1, 1984 at around 11:45 p.m. (Exhibits ‘B’, ‘B-1’ and ‘B-2’), because of the vehicular
accident which involved the wheeler truck of Ace Haulers Corporation driven by Jesus dela Cruz, a jeepney
owned by Isabelito Rivera, then driven by Rodolfo Parma and a motorcycle driven by her husband. Her
husband, after his death, was autopsied, as reflected in an Autopsy Report (Exhibit ‘C’) and by the
Postmortem Finding (Exhibit ‘C-1’). This was also covered by a police report (Exhibit ‘D’) which shows that
Jesus dela Cruz is the driver of the defendant (Exhibit ‘D-1’). This fact is reiterated in a sworn statement which
she executed relative to this vehicular accident (Exhibit ‘E’) wherein the said driver mentioned and confirmed
the name of his employer (Exhibit ‘E-1’). A criminal case was lodged against the drivers of the two vehicles
and a Decision was rendered thereon in Criminal Case No. Q-37248 entitled ‘People of the Philippines versus
Jesus dela Cruz and Rodolfo Parma’ finding both of them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged. (Exhibits ‘F’, ‘F-1’, ‘F-2’, ‘F-3’, ‘F-4’ and ‘F-5’). This decision has now acquired finality as no appeal
was taken by the accused. It is established, however, that prior to the filing of the instant case, Mrs. Abiva
pleaded to Ace Haulers to compensate her for the death of her husband. But her plea went (sic) to deaf ears.
She was thus constrained to file this case for damages.
"Further testimony of Mrs. Abiva revealed that before the death of her husband, he was employed with
Philippine Airlines (PAL) earning P4,600.00.00 a month, as evidenced by the Pay Statement covering the
period of 4-15-84 in the amount of P2,065.00 (Exhibits ‘G’, ‘G-1’, ‘G-2’ and ‘G-3’); that when he died, he was
only 40 years old and healthy, and that based on the life history and pedigree of his family where some of its
members lived up to 100 years, she expects her husband to live for no less than 15 years more and could
have earned no less than P828,000.00 for the family. But this, her family was deprived, because his life was
snatched away by this accident while her husband was riding in a motorcycle which he bought for P11,850.00
(Exhibits ‘H’ and ‘H-1’) which was also totally wrecked.
"Resulting from her husband’s death, Mrs. Abiva told the Court that she incurred expenses for his burial and
funeral in the total amount of no less than P30,000.00 and for his wake of six days, in the amount of about
P40,600.00 (Exhibits ‘J’, ‘J-1’, ‘J-2’, ‘J-3’, ‘J-4’, ‘J-5’, and ‘J-6’). She also spent around P80,000.00 as litigation
expenses, in her quest for justice since she has to engage the services of four (4) counsels from the time of
the filing of this case before the Hon. Miriam Defensor-Santiago, then Presiding Judge of this Court who once
dismissed this case, and which led eventually to an appeal by certiorari which was later elevated up to the
Supreme Court. (Exhibits ‘K’, ‘K-1’, ‘K-2’, ‘K-3’, ‘K-4’, ‘K-5’ and ‘K-6’). Blaming the defendant, Mrs. Abiva
claimed that had Ace Haulers exercised diligence, care and prudence in the selection and supervision of its
employees, her husband would have been spared from this accident. Hence, her prayer for the award of
P200,000.00 for the death of her husband, who by now, could have risen in the promotional ladder to a senior
Executive of PAL and could be earning about P30,000.00 salary per month by now. She further prays for
award of moral damages in the amount of P200,000.00 exemplary damages of P100,000.00, attorney’s fees
of P50,000.00 and litigation expenses of P50,000.00.
"After the testimony of Mrs. Abiva as the lone witness for the plaintiff, counsel formally offered his exhibits and
rested his case.
"Gathered from the evidence presented, testimonial and documentary, the Court finds enough legal and
factual basis to grant the claim for damages by the plaintiff. The insinuations of negligence on the part of
defendant’s driver is amply shown as one, who drove his vehicle fast, impervious to the safety of life and
property of others, his utter lack of care and caution and his unmitigated imprudence, rolled into one, all these
predicated the occurrence of this accident which took away a precious human life.
"‘Whoever by act or omission causes damages to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay
for the damages done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, is called a quasi-delict x x x’ (Article 2176, New Civil Code).
"Corollary to this, is the civil law concept that:
"‘The obligations imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts or omissions, but also for
those persons for whom one is responsible’ (Art. 2180, 1st paragraph, New Civil Code)
‘x x x x x x
"‘Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within
the scope of their assigned tasks, x x x’ (Article 2180 paragraph 5, New Civil Code).
"Taken in their appropriate context, and predicated on the evidence adduced which has not been evidentiarily
traversed by the defendant, this Court is left to (sic) no other recourse but to grant the remedies and reliefs
which in her complaint plaintiff prays for, all of them having been by her adduced evidence, preponderantly
shown and established and out of which, she has shown herself to be completely deserving."3
On September 13, 1993, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals.4
On January 17, 1997, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:
"WHEREFORE, except for the award of thirty thousand (P30,000.00) as exemplary damages, which is hereby
set aside, the Decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in all other respect.
"SO ORDERED."
Hence, this appeal.5
The issues raised are whether or not in an action for damages arising from a vehicular accident plaintiff may
recover damages against the employer of the accused driver both in the criminal case (delict) and the civil
case for damages based on quasi delict, but not recover twice for the same act; (2) whether the Court of
Appeals erred in not lifting the order declaring petitioner as in default for failure to appear at the pre-trial
conference; and (3) whether the damages awarded in the civil case were excessive, much more than the
previous award in the criminal case.
In Padua v. Robles,5 we held that "Civil liability coexists with criminal responsibility. In negligence cases, the
offended party (or his heirs) has the option between an action for enforcement of civil liability based
on culpa criminal under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code and an action for recovery of damages based
on culpa aquiliana under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. x x x Article 2177 of the Civil Code, however,
precludes recovery of damages twice for the same negligent act or omission."6
Consequently, a separate civil action for damages lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he
is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is
actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality
only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary.7
Hence, in this case, respondent Abiva shall have the choice which of the awards to take, naturally expecting
that she would opt to recover the greater amount. It has not been shown that she has recovered on the award
in the criminal case, consequently, she can unquestionably recover from petitioner in the civil case.
As to the second issue raised, we find that petitioner was rightly declared as in default for its failure to appear
during the pre-trial conference despite due notice. This is a factual question resolved by the Court of Appeals
which we cannot review.8
As to the third issue regarding the award of damages to respondent Abiva, we find the award of actual
damages to be supported by preponderant evidence. "Basic is the rule that to recover actual damages, the
amount of loss must not only be capable of proof but must actually be proven with reasonable degree of
certainty, premised upon competent proof or best evidence obtainable of the actual amount
thereof."9 However, there is no basis for the award of moral damages, which is hereby deleted. The person
claiming moral damages must prove the existence of bad faith by clear and convincing evidence for the law
always presumes good faith. It is not enough that one merely suffered sleepless nights, mental anguish,
serious anxiety as the result of the actuations of the other party. Invariably such action must be shown to have
been willfully done in bad faith or with ill motive.10
The attorney's fees awarded is reduced to P20,000.00 which is ten (10%) percent of the amount of actual
damages.1âwphi1
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari and AFFIRMS the decision of the Court
of Appeals,11 with modification. The Court deletes the award of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as moral
damages, and reduces the attorney fees to twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00).
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-51183 December 21, 1983
CARMEN L. MADEJA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. FELIX T. CARO and EVA ARELLANO-JAPZON, respondents.
Ernesto P. Miel for petitioner.
Gorgonio T. Alvarez for respondents.

ABAD SANTOS, J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1

In Criminal Case No. 75-88 of the defunct Court of First Instance of Eastern Samar, DR. EVA A. JAPZON is
accused of homicide through reckless imprudence for the death of Cleto Madeja after an appendectomy. The
complaining witness is the widow of the deceased, Carmen L. Madeja. The information states that: "The
offended party Carmen L. Madeja reserving her right to file a separate civil action for damages." (Rollo, p. 36.)
The criminal case still pending, Carmen L. Madeja sued Dr. Eva A. Japzon for damages in Civil Case No. 141
of the same court. She alleged that her husband died because of the gross negligence of Dr. Japzon. The
respondent judge granted the defendant's motion to dismiss which motion invoked Section 3(a) of Rule 111 of
the Rules of Court which reads:têñ.£îhqwâ£
Sec. 3. Other civil actions arising from offenses. — In all cases not included in the preceding
section the following rules shall be observed:
(a) Criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense may be instituted separately, but
after the criminal action has been commenced the civil action can not be instituted until final
judgment has been rendered in the criminal action. ...
According to the respondent judge, "under the foregoing Sec. 3 (a), Rule 111, New Rules of Court, the instant
civil action may be instituted only after final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action." (Rollo, p. 33.)
The instant petition which seeks to set aside the order of the respondent judge granting the defendant's
motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 141 is highly impressed with merit.
Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court in relation to Article 33 of the Civil Code is the applicable provision.
The two enactments are quoted hereinbelow:têñ.£îhqwâ£
Sec. 2. Independent civil action. — In the cases provided for in Articles 31,32, 33, 34 and 2177
of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct
from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal
case, provided the right is reserved as required in the preceding section. Such civil action shall
proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence." (Rule 111, Rules of Court.)
Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely
separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil
 action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence. (Civil Code,)
There are at least two things about Art. 33 of the Civil Code which are worth noting, namely:
1. The civil action for damages which it allows to be instituted is ex-delicto. This is manifest from the provision
which uses the expressions "criminal action" and "criminal prosecution." This conclusion is supported by the
comment of the Code Commission, thus:têñ.£îhqwâ£
The underlying purpose of the principle under consideration is to allow the citizen to enforce his
rights in a private action brought by him, regardless of the action of the State attorney. It is not
conducive to civic spirit and to individual self-reliance and initiative to habituate the citizens to
depend upon the government for the vindication of their own private rights. It is true that in many
of the cases referred to in the provision cited, a criminal prosecution is proper, but it should be
remembered that while the State is the complainant in the criminal case, the injured individual is
the one most concerned because it is he who has suffered directly. He should be permitted to
demand reparation for the wrong which peculiarly affects him. (Report, p. 46.)
And Tolentino says:têñ.£îhqwâ£
The general rule is that when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil
liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the
offended party reserves his right to institute it separately; and after a criminal action has been
commenced, no civil action arising from the same offense can be prosecuted. The present
articles creates an exception to this rule when the offense is defamation, fraud, or physical
injuries, In these cases, a civil action may be filed independently of the criminal action, even if
there has been no reservation made by the injured party; the law itself in this article makes such
reservation; but the claimant is not given the right to determine whether the civil action should be
scheduled or suspended until the criminal action has been terminated. The result of the civil
action is thus independent of the result of the civil action." (I Civil Code, p. 144 [1974.])
2. The term "physical injuries" is used in a generic sense. It is not the crime of physical injuries defined in the
Revised Penal Code. It includes not only physical injuries but consummated, frustrated and attempted
homicide.têñ.£îhqwâ£
The Article in question uses the words 'defamation', 'fraud' and 'physical injuries.' Defamation
and fraud are used in their ordinary sense because there are no specific provisions in the
Revised Penal Code using these terms as means of offenses defined therein, so that these two
terms defamation and fraud must have been used not to impart to them any technical meaning
in the laws of the Philippines, but in their generic sense. With this apparent circumstance in
mind, it is evident that the terms 'physical injuries' could not have been used in its specific sense
as a crime defined in the Revised Penal Code, for it is difficult to believe that the Code
Commission would have used terms in the same article-some in their general and another in its
technical sense. In other words, the term 'physical injuries' should be understood to mean bodily
injury, not the crime of physical injuries, bacause the terms used with the latter are general
terms. In any case the Code Commission recommended that the civil action for physical injuries
be similar to the civil action for assault and battery in American Law, and this recommendation
must hove been accepted by the Legislature when it approved the article intact as
recommended. If the intent has been to establish a civil action for the bodily harm received by
the complainant similar to the civil action for assault and battery, as the Code Commission
states, the civil action should lie whether the offense committed is that of physical injuries, or
frustrated homicide, or attempted homicide, or even death," (Carandang vs. Santiago, 97 Phil.
94, 96-97 [1955].)
Corpus vs. Paje, L-26737, July 31, 1969, 28 SCRA 1062, which states that reckless imprudence or criminal
negligence is not included in Article 33 of the Civil Code is not authoritative. Of eleven justices only nine took
part in the decision and four of them merely concurred in the result.
In the light of the foregoing, it is apparent that the civil action against Dr. Japzon may proceed independently
of the criminal action against her.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted; the order dismissing Civil Case No. 141 is hereby set aside; no
special pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.1äwphï1.ñët
Makasiar (Chairman), Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, De Castro and Escolin, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 150157 January 25, 2007
MAURICIO MANLICLIC and PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., Petitioners,
vs.
MODESTO CALAUNAN, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Assailed before Us is the decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 55909 which affirmed in toto
the decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City, Branch 42, in Civil Case No. D-10086,
finding petitioners Mauricio Manliclic and Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. (PRBLI) solidarily liable to pay
damages and attorney’s fees to respondent Modesto Calaunan.
The factual antecedents are as follows:
The vehicles involved in this case are: (1) Philippine Rabbit Bus No. 353 with plate number CVD-478, owned
by petitioner PRBLI and driven by petitioner Mauricio Manliclic; and (2) owner-type jeep with plate number
PER-290, owned by respondent Modesto Calaunan and driven by Marcelo Mendoza.
At around 6:00 to 7:00 o’clock in the morning of 12 July 1988, respondent Calaunan, together with Marcelo
Mendoza, was on his way to Manila from Pangasinan on board his owner-type jeep. The Philippine Rabbit
Bus was likewise bound for Manila from Concepcion, Tarlac. At approximately Kilometer 40 of the North
Luzon Expressway in Barangay Lalangan, Plaridel, Bulacan, the two vehicles collided. The front right side of
the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the rear left side of the jeep causing the latter to move to the shoulder on the
right and then fall on a ditch with water resulting to further extensive damage. The bus veered to the left and
stopped 7 to 8 meters from point of collision.
Respondent suffered minor injuries while his driver was unhurt. He was first brought for treatment to the
Manila Central University Hospital in Kalookan City by Oscar Buan, the conductor of the Philippine Rabbit
Bus, and was later transferred to the Veterans Memorial Medical Center.
By reason of such collision, a criminal case was filed before the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan, charging petitioner
Manliclic with Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Physical Injuries, docketed as
Crim. Case No. 684-M-89. Subsequently on 2 December 1991, respondent filed a complaint for damages
against petitioners Manliclic and PRBLI before the RTC of Dagupan City, docketed as Civil Case No. D-
10086. The criminal case was tried ahead of the civil case. Among those who testified in the criminal case
were respondent Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos.
In the civil case (now before this Court), the parties admitted the following:
1. The parties agreed on the capacity of the parties to sue and be sued as well as the venue and the
identities of the vehicles involved;
2. The identity of the drivers and the fact that they are duly licensed;
3. The date and place of the vehicular collision;
4. The extent of the injuries suffered by plaintiff Modesto Calaunan and the existence of the medical
certificate;
5. That both vehicles were going towards the south; the private jeep being ahead of the bus;
6. That the weather was fair and the road was well paved and straight, although there was a ditch on
the right side where the jeep fell into.3
When the civil case was heard, counsel for respondent prayed that the transcripts of stenographic notes
(TSNs)4 of the testimonies of respondent Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in the criminal
case be received in evidence in the civil case in as much as these witnesses are not available to testify in the
civil case.
Francisco Tuliao testified that his brother-in-law, respondent Calaunan, left for abroad sometime in November,
1989 and has not returned since then. Rogelio Ramos took the stand and said that his brother, Fernando
Ramos, left for Amman, Jordan, to work. Rosalia Mendoza testified that her husband, Marcelo Mendoza, left
their residence to look for a job. She narrated that she thought her husband went to his hometown in Panique,
Tarlac, when he did not return after one month. She went to her husband’s hometown to look for him but she
was informed that he did not go there.1awphil.net
The trial court subpoenaed the Clerk of Court of Branch 8, RTC, Malolos, Bulacan, the court where Criminal
Case No. 684-M-89 was tried, to bring the TSNs of the testimonies of respondent Calaunan, 5 Marcelo
Mendoza6 and Fernando Ramos7 in said case, together with other documentary evidence marked therein.
Instead of the Branch Clerk of Court, it was Enrique Santos Guevara, Court Interpreter, who appeared before
the court and identified the TSNs of the three afore-named witnesses and other pertinent documents he had
brought.8 Counsel for respondent wanted to mark other TSNs and documents from the said criminal case to
be adopted in the instant case, but since the same were not brought to the trial court, counsel for petitioners
compromised that said TSNs and documents could be offered by counsel for respondent as rebuttal
evidence.
For the defendants, petitioner Manliclic and bus conductor Oscar Buan testified. The TSN9 of the testimony of
Donato Ganiban, investigator of the PRBLI, in Criminal Case No. 684-M-89 was marked and allowed to be
adopted in the civil case on the ground that he was already dead.
Respondent further marked, among other documents, as rebuttal evidence, the TSNs10 of the testimonies of
Donato Ganiban, Oscar Buan and petitioner Manliclic in Criminal Case No. 684-M-89.
The disagreement arises from the question: Who is to be held liable for the collision?
Respondent insists it was petitioner Manliclic who should be liable while the latter is resolute in saying it was
the former who caused the smash up.
The versions of the parties are summarized by the trial court as follows:
The parties differed only on the manner the collision between the two (2) vehicles took place. According to the
plaintiff and his driver, the jeep was cruising at the speed of 60 to 70 kilometers per hour on the slow lane of
the expressway when the Philippine Rabbit Bus overtook the jeep and in the process of overtaking the jeep,
the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the rear of the jeep on the left side. At the time the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the
jeep, it was about to overtake the jeep. In other words, the Philippine Rabbit Bus was still at the back of the
jeep when the jeep was hit. Fernando Ramos corroborated the testimony of the plaintiff and Marcelo
Mendoza. He said that he was on another jeep following the Philippine Rabbit Bus and the jeep of plaintiff
when the incident took place. He said, the jeep of the plaintiff overtook them and the said jeep of the plaintiff
was followed by the Philippine Rabbit Bus which was running very fast. The bus also overtook the jeep in
which he was riding. After that, he heard a loud sound. He saw the jeep of the plaintiff swerved to the right on
a grassy portion of the road. The Philippine Rabbit Bus stopped and they overtook the Philippine Rabbit Bus
so that it could not moved (sic), meaning they stopped in front of the Philippine Rabbit Bus. He testified that
the jeep of plaintiff swerved to the right because it was bumped by the Philippine Rabbit bus from behind.
Both Mauricio Manliclic and his driver, Oscar Buan admitted that the Philippine Rabbit Bus bumped the jeep in
question. However, they explained that when the Philippine Rabbit bus was about to go to the left lane to
overtake the jeep, the latter jeep swerved to the left because it was to overtake another jeep in front of it.
Such was their testimony before the RTC in Malolos in the criminal case and before this Court in the instant
case. [Thus, which of the two versions of the manner how the collision took place was correct, would be
determinative of who between the two drivers was negligent in the operation of their respective vehicles.]11
Petitioner PRBLI maintained that it observed and exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of its employee, specifically petitioner Manliclic.
On 22 July 1996, the trial court rendered its decision in favor of respondent Calaunan and against petitioners
Manliclic and PRBLI. The dispositive portion of its decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants ordering the said
defendants to pay plaintiff jointly and solidarily the amount of P40,838.00 as actual damages for the towing as
well as the repair and the materials used for the repair of the jeep in question; P100,000.00 as moral
damages and another P100,000.00 as exemplary damages and P15,000.00 as attorney’s fees, including
appearance fees of the lawyer. In addition, the defendants are also to pay costs.12
Petitioners appealed the decision via Notice of Appeal to the Court of Appeals.13
In a decision dated 28 September 2001, the Court of Appeals, finding no reversible error in the decision of the
trial court, affirmed it in all respects.14
Petitioners are now before us by way of petition for review assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals.
They assign as errors the following:
I

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL

COURT’S QUESTIONABLE ADMISSION IN EVIDENCE OF THE TSN’s AND OTHER
DOCUMENTS PRESENTED IN THE CRIMINAL CASE.

II
 THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL
COURT’S RELIANCE ON THE VERSION OF THE RESPONDENT ON HOW THE ACCIDENT
SUPPOSEDLY OCCURRED.

III

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL

COURT’S UNFAIR DISREGARD OF HEREIN PETITIONER PRBL’s DEFENSE OF EXERCISE OF
DUE DILIGENCE IN THE SELECTION AND SUPERVISION OF ITS EMPLOYEES.

IV

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL

COURT’S QUESTIONABLE AWARD OF DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY’S FEE.

With the passing away of respondent Calaunan during the pendency of this appeal with this Court, we
granted the Motion for the Substitution of Respondent filed by his wife, Mrs. Precila Zarate Vda. De Calaunan,
and children, Virgilio Calaunan, Carmelita Honeycomb, Evelyn Calaunan, Marko Calaunan and Liwayway
Calaunan.15
In their Reply to respondent’s Comment, petitioners informed this Court of a Decision16 of the Court of
Appeals acquitting petitioner Manliclic of the charge17 of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to
Property with Physical Injuries attaching thereto a photocopy thereof.
On the first assigned error, petitioners argue that the TSNs containing the testimonies of respondent
Calaunan,18 Marcelo Mendoza19 and Fernando Ramos20 should not be admitted in evidence for failure of
respondent to comply with the requisites of Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
For Section 47, Rule 13021 to apply, the following requisites must be satisfied: (a) the witness is dead or
unable to testify; (b) his testimony or deposition was given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or
administrative, between the same parties or those representing the same interests; (c) the former case
involved the same subject as that in the present case, although on different causes of action; (d) the issue
testified to by the witness in the former trial is the same issue involved in the present case; and (e) the
adverse party had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness in the former case.22
Admittedly, respondent failed to show the concurrence of all the requisites set forth by the Rules for a
testimony given in a former case or proceeding to be admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule.
Petitioner PRBLI, not being a party in Criminal Case No. 684-M-89, had no opportunity to cross-examine the
three witnesses in said case. The criminal case was filed exclusively against petitioner Manliclic, petitioner
PRBLI’s employee. The cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of employers uniformly declare that, strictly
speaking, they are not parties to the criminal cases instituted against their employees.23
Notwithstanding the fact that petitioner PRBLI was not a party in said criminal case, the testimonies of the
three witnesses are still admissible on the ground that petitioner PRBLI failed to object on their admissibility.
It is elementary that an objection shall be made at the time when an alleged inadmissible document is offered
in evidence; otherwise, the objection shall be treated as waived, since the right to object is merely a privilege
which the party may waive. Thus, a failure to except to the evidence because it does not conform to the
statute is a waiver of the provisions of the law. Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that these documents are
inadmissible for being hearsay, but on account of failure to object thereto, the same may be admitted and
considered as sufficient to prove the facts therein asserted.24 Hearsay evidence alone may be insufficient to
establish a fact in a suit but, when no objection is made thereto, it is, like any other evidence, to be
considered and given the importance it deserves.25
In the case at bar, petitioner PRBLI did not object to the TSNs containing the testimonies of respondent
Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in the criminal case when the same were offered in
evidence in the trial court. In fact, the TSNs of the testimonies of Calaunan and Mendoza were admitted by
both petitioners.26 Moreover, petitioner PRBLI even offered in evidence the TSN containing the testimony of
Donato Ganiban in the criminal case. If petitioner PRBLI argues that the TSNs of the testimonies of plaintiff’s
witnesses in the criminal case should not be admitted in the instant case, why then did it offer the TSN of the
testimony of Ganiban which was given in the criminal case? It appears that petitioner PRBLI wants to have its
cake and eat it too. It cannot argue that the TSNs of the testimonies of the witnesses of the adverse party in
the criminal case should not be admitted and at the same time insist that the TSN of the testimony of the
witness for the accused be admitted in its favor. To disallow admission in evidence of the TSNs of the
testimonies of Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in the criminal case and to admit the TSN
of the testimony of Ganiban would be unfair.
We do not subscribe to petitioner PRBLI’s argument that it will be denied due process when the TSNs of the
testimonies of Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in the criminal case are to be admitted in
the civil case. It is too late for petitioner PRBLI to raise denial of due process in relation to Section 47, Rule
130 of the Rules of Court, as a ground for objecting to the admissibility of the TSNs. For failure to object at the
proper time, it waived its right to object that the TSNs did not comply with Section 47.
In Mangio v. Court of Appeals,27 this Court, through Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno,28 admitted in
evidence a TSN of the testimony of a witness in another case despite therein petitioner’s assertion that he
would be denied due process. In admitting the TSN, the Court ruled that the raising of denial of due process
in relation to Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, as a ground for objecting to the admissibility of the
TSN was belatedly done. In so doing, therein petitioner waived his right to object based on said ground.
Petitioners contend that the documents in the criminal case should not have been admitted in the instant civil
case because Section 47 of Rule 130 refers only to "testimony or deposition." We find such contention to be
untenable. Though said section speaks only of testimony and deposition, it does not mean that documents
from a former case or proceeding cannot be admitted. Said documents can be admitted they being part of the
testimonies of witnesses that have been admitted. Accordingly, they shall be given the same weight as that to
which the testimony may be entitled.29
On the second assigned error, petitioners contend that the version of petitioner Manliclic as to how the
accident occurred is more credible than respondent’s version. They anchor their contention on the fact that
petitioner Manliclic was acquitted by the Court of Appeals of the charge of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Damage to Property with Physical Injuries.
To be resolved by the Court is the effect of petitioner Manliclic’s acquittal in the civil case.
From the complaint, it can be gathered that the civil case for damages was one arising from, or based on,
quasi-delict.30 Petitioner Manliclic was sued for his negligence or reckless imprudence in causing the
collision, while petitioner PRBLI was sued for its failure to exercise the diligence of a good father in the
selection and supervision of its employees, particularly petitioner Manliclic. The allegations read:
"4. That sometime on July 12, 1988 at around 6:20 A.M. plaintiff was on board the above-described
motor vehicle travelling at a moderate speed along the North Luzon Expressway heading South
towards Manila together with MARCELO MENDOZA, who was then driving the same;
"5. That approximately at kilometer 40 of the North Luzon Express Way, the above-described motor
vehicle was suddenly bumped from behind by a Philippine Rabbit Bus with Body No. 353 and with
plate No. CVD 478 then being driven by one Mauricio Manliclic of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac, who
was then travelling recklessly at a very fast speed and had apparently lost control of his vehicle;
"6. That as a result of the impact of the collision the above-described motor vehicle was forced off the
North Luzon Express Way towards the rightside where it fell on its driver’s side on a ditch, and that as
a consequence, the above-described motor vehicle which maybe valued at EIGHTY THOUSAND
PESOS (P80,000) was rendered a total wreck as shown by pictures to be presented during the pre-trial
and trial of this case;
"7. That also as a result of said incident, plaintiff sustained bodily injuries which compounded plaintiff’s
frail physical condition and required his hospitalization from July 12, 1988 up to and until July 22, 1988,
copy of the medical certificate is hereto attached as Annex "A" and made an integral part hereof;
"8. That the vehicular collision resulting in the total wreckage of the above-described motor vehicle as
well as bodily (sic) sustained by plaintiff, was solely due to the reckless imprudence of the defendant
driver Mauricio Manliclic who drove his Philippine Rabbit Bus No. 353 at a fast speed without due
regard or observance of existing traffic rules and regulations;
"9. That defendant Philippine Rabbit Bus Line Corporation failed to exercise the diligence of a good
father of (sic) family in the selection and supervision of its drivers; x x x"31
Can Manliclic still be held liable for the collision and be found negligent notwithstanding the declaration of the
Court of Appeals that there was an absence of negligence on his part?
In exonerating petitioner Manliclic in the criminal case, the Court of Appeals said:
To the following findings of the court a quo, to wit: that accused-appellant was negligent "when the bus he
was driving bumped the jeep from behind"; that "the proximate cause of the accident was his having driven
the bus at a great speed while closely following the jeep"; x x x
We do not agree.
The swerving of Calaunan’s jeep when it tried to overtake the vehicle in front of it was beyond the control of
accused-appellant.
xxxx
Absent evidence of negligence, therefore, accused-appellant cannot be held liable for Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Damage to Property with Physical Injuries as defined in Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.32
From the foregoing declaration of the Court of Appeals, it appears that petitioner Manliclic was acquitted not
on reasonable doubt, but on the ground that he is not the author of the act complained of which is based on
Section 2(b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure which reads:
(b) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds
from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist.
In spite of said ruling, petitioner Manliclic can still be held liable for the mishap. The afore-quoted section
applies only to a civil action arising from crime or ex delicto and not to a civil action arising from quasi-delict or
culpa aquiliana. The extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111 [now Section 2 (b)
of Rule 111], refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the
civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by
a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed
by the accused.33
A quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its
own, and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime – a distinction exists
between the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual.
The same negligence causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code,
or create an action for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code.34 It is now settled that
acquittal of the accused, even if based on a finding that he is not guilty, does not carry with it the extinction of
the civil liability based on quasi delict.35
In other words, if an accused is acquitted based on reasonable doubt on his guilt, his civil liability arising from
the crime may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. However, if an accused is acquitted on the
basis that he was not the author of the act or omission complained of (or that there is declaration in a final
judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist), said acquittal closes the door to civil
liability based on the crime or ex delicto. In this second instance, there being no crime or delict to speak of,
civil liability based thereon or ex delicto is not possible. In this case, a civil action, if any, may be instituted on
grounds other than the delict complained of.
As regards civil liability arising from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana, same will not be extinguished by an
acquittal, whether it be on ground of reasonable doubt or that accused was not the author of the act or
omission complained of (or that there is declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil liability
might arise did not exist). The responsibility arising from fault or negligence in a quasi-delict is entirely
separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code.36 An acquittal or
conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the civil case37 based on quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana.
Petitioners ask us to give credence to their version of how the collision occurred and to disregard that of
respondent’s. Petitioners insist that while the PRBLI bus was in the process of overtaking respondent’s jeep,
the latter, without warning, suddenly swerved to the left (fast) lane in order to overtake another jeep ahead of
it, thus causing the collision.
As a general rule, questions of fact may not be raised in a petition for review. The factual findings of the trial
court, especially when affirmed by the appellate court, are binding and conclusive on the Supreme
Court.38 Not being a trier of facts, this Court will not allow a review thereof unless:
(1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjecture; (2) the inference
made is manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) the Court of Appeals went beyond the
issues of the case and its findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellees; (7) the
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) said findings of fact are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) the facts set forth in the petition
as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) the findings
of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the
evidence on record.39
After going over the evidence on record, we do not find any of the exceptions that would warrant our
departure from the general rule. We fully agree in the finding of the trial court, as affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, that it was petitioner Manliclic who was negligent in driving the PRBLI bus which was the cause of
the collision. In giving credence to the version of the respondent, the trial court has this say:
x x x Thus, which of the two versions of the manner how the collision took place was correct, would be
determinative of who between the two drivers was negligent in the operation of their respective vehicle.
In this regard, it should be noted that in the statement of Mauricio Manliclic (Exh. 15) given to the Philippine
Rabbit Investigator CV Cabading no mention was made by him about the fact that the driver of the jeep was
overtaking another jeep when the collision took place. The allegation that another jeep was being overtaken
by the jeep of Calaunan was testified to by him only in Crim. Case No. 684-M-89 before the Regional Trial
Court in Malolos, Bulacan and before this Court. Evidently, it was a product of an afterthought on the part of
Mauricio Manliclic so that he could explain why he should not be held responsible for the incident. His attempt
to veer away from the truth was also apparent when it would be considered that in his statement given to the
Philippine Rabbit Investigator CV Cabading (Exh. 15), he alleged that the Philippine Rabbit Bus bumped the
jeep of Calaunan while the Philippine Rabbit Bus was behind the said jeep. In his testimony before the
Regional Trial Court in Malolos, Bulacan as well as in this Court, he alleged that the Philippine Rabbit Bus
was already on the left side of the jeep when the collision took place. For this inconsistency between his
statement and testimony, his explanation regarding the manner of how the collision between the jeep and the
bus took place should be taken with caution. It might be true that in the statement of Oscar Buan given to the
Philippine Rabbit Investigator CV Cabading, it was mentioned by the former that the jeep of plaintiff was in the
act of overtaking another jeep when the collision between the latter jeep and the Philippine Rabbit Bus took
place. But the fact, however, that his statement was given on July 15, 1988, one day after Mauricio Manliclic
gave his statement should not escape attention. The one-day difference between the giving of the two
statements would be significant enough to entertain the possibility of Oscar Buan having received legal advise
before giving his statement. Apart from that, as between his statement and the statement of Manliclic himself,
the statement of the latter should prevail. Besides, in his Affidavit of March 10, 1989, (Exh. 14), the
unreliability of the statement of Oscar Buan (Exh. 13) given to CV Cabading rear its "ugly head" when he did
not mention in said affidavit that the jeep of Calaunan was trying to overtake another jeep when the collision
between the jeep in question and the Philippine Rabbit bus took place.
xxxx
If one would believe the testimony of the defendant, Mauricio Manliclic, and his conductor, Oscar Buan, that
the Philippine Rabbit Bus was already somewhat parallel to the jeep when the collision took place, the point of
collision on the jeep should have been somewhat on the left side thereof rather than on its rear. Furthermore,
the jeep should have fallen on the road itself rather than having been forced off the road. Useless, likewise to
emphasize that the Philippine Rabbit was running very fast as testified to by Ramos which was not
controverted by the defendants.40
Having ruled that it was petitioner Manliclic’s negligence that caused the smash up, there arises the juris
tantum presumption that the employer is negligent, rebuttable only by proof of observance of the diligence of
a good father of a family.41 Under Article 218042 of the New Civil Code, when an injury is caused by the
negligence of the employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part
of the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after
selection or both. The liability of the employer under Article 2180 is direct and immediate; it is not conditioned
upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior showing of the insolvency of such employee.
Therefore, it is incumbent upon the private respondents to prove that they exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employee.43
In the case at bar, petitioner PRBLI maintains that it had shown that it exercised the required diligence in the
selection and supervision of its employees, particularly petitioner Manliclic. In the matter of selection, it
showed the screening process that petitioner Manliclic underwent before he became a regular driver. As to
the exercise of due diligence in the supervision of its employees, it argues that presence of ready
investigators (Ganiban and Cabading) is sufficient proof that it exercised the required due diligence in the
supervision of its employees.
In the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to examine them as to their qualifications,
experience and service records. In the supervision of employees, the employer must formulate standard
operating procedures, monitor their implementation and impose disciplinary measures for the breach thereof.
To fend off vicarious liability, employers must submit concrete proof, including documentary evidence, that
they complied with everything that was incumbent on them.44
In Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of Appeals,45 it was explained that:
Due diligence in the supervision of employees on the other hand, includes the formulation of suitable rules
and regulations for the guidance of employees and the issuance of proper instructions intended for the
protection of the public and persons with whom the employer has relations through his or its employees and
the imposition of necessary disciplinary measures upon employees in case of breach or as may be warranted
to ensure the performance of acts indispensable to the business of and beneficial to their employer. To this,
we add that actual implementation and monitoring of consistent compliance with said rules should be the
constant concern of the employer, acting through dependable supervisors who should regularly report on their
supervisory functions.
In order that the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees may be deemed
sufficient and plausible, it is not enough to emptily invoke the existence of said company guidelines and
policies on hiring and supervision. As the negligence of the employee gives rise to the presumption of
negligence on the part of the employer, the latter has the burden of proving that it has been diligent not only in
the selection of employees but also in the actual supervision of their work. The mere allegation of the
existence of hiring procedures and supervisory policies, without anything more, is decidedly not sufficient to
overcome such presumption.
We emphatically reiterate our holding, as a warning to all employers, that "the formulation of various company
policies on safety without showing that they were being complied with is not sufficient to exempt petitioner
from liability arising from negligence of its employees. It is incumbent upon petitioner to show that in recruiting
and employing the erring driver the recruitment procedures and company policies on efficiency and safety
were followed." x x x.
The trial court found that petitioner PRBLI exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection
but not in the supervision of its employees. It expounded as follows:
From the evidence of the defendants, it seems that the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines has a very good
procedure of recruiting its driver as well as in the maintenance of its vehicles. There is no evidence though
that it is as good in the supervision of its personnel. There has been no iota of evidence introduced by it that
there are rules promulgated by the bus company regarding the safe operation of its vehicle and in the way its
driver should manage and operate the vehicles assigned to them. There is no showing that somebody in the
bus company has been employed to oversee how its driver should behave while operating their vehicles
without courting incidents similar to the herein case. In regard to supervision, it is not difficult to observe that
the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. has been negligent as an employer and it should be made responsible
for the acts of its employees, particularly the driver involved in this case.
We agree. The presence of ready investigators after the occurrence of the accident is not enough to exempt
petitioner PRBLI from liability arising from the negligence of petitioner Manliclic. Same does not comply with
the guidelines set forth in the cases above-mentioned. The presence of the investigators after the accident is
not enough supervision. Regular supervision of employees, that is, prior to any accident, should have been
shown and established. This, petitioner failed to do. The lack of supervision can further be seen by the fact
that there is only one set of manual containing the rules and regulations for all the drivers of PRBLI. 46 How
then can all the drivers of petitioner PRBLI know and be continually informed of the rules and regulations
when only one manual is being lent to all the drivers?
For failure to adduce proof that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of its employees, petitioner PRBLI is held solidarily responsible for the damages caused by
petitioner Manliclic’s negligence.
We now go to the award of damages. The trial court correctly awarded the amount of P40,838.00 as actual
damages representing the amount paid by respondent for the towing and repair of his jeep.47 As regards the
awards for moral and exemplary damages, same, under the circumstances, must be modified.
The P100,000.00 awarded by the trial court as moral damages must be reduced to P50,000.00.48 Exemplary
damages are imposed by way of example or correction for the public good.49 The amount awarded by the
trial court must, likewise, be lowered to P50,000.00.50 The award of P15,000.00 for attorney’s fees and
expenses of litigation is in order and authorized by law.51
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 55909 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that (1) the award of moral
damages shall be reduced to P50,000.00; and (2) the award of exemplary damages shall be lowered
to P50,000.00. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

G.R. No. 182210, October 05, 2015 - PAZ T. BERNARDO, SUBSTITUTED BY HEIRS, MAPALAD G.
BERNARDO, EMILIE B. KO, MARILOU B. VALDEZ, EDWIN T. BERNARDO AND GERVY B. SANTOS,
Petitioners, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.:

G.R. No. 182210, October 05, 2015 - PAZ T. BERNARDO, SUBSTITUTED BY HEIRS, MAPALAD G.
BERNARDO, EMILIE B. KO, MARILOU B. VALDEZ, EDWIN T. BERNARDO AND GERVY B. SANTOS,
Petitioners, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

SECOND DIVISION
 G.R. No. 182210, October 05, 2015
PAZ T. BERNARDO, SUBSTITUTED BY HEIRS, MAPALAD G. BERNARDO, EMILIE B. KO, MARILOU B.
VALDEZ, EDWIN T. BERNARDO AND GERVY B. SANTOS, Petitioners, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by accused petitioner Paz T. Bernardo (Bernardo) under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Court of Appeals (CA) August 31, 2007 decision 1 and the March
14, 2008 resolution2 in CA-G.R. CR 28721, entitled "People of the Philippines v. Paz T. Bernardo." The
appellate court affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 56, Makati City, finding
Bernardo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of five (5) counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (B.P. 22).
The Factual Antecedents

In June 1991, Bernardo obtained a loan from the private complainant Carmencita C. Bumanglag (Bumanglag)
in the amount of P460,000.00 payable on or before its maturity on November 30, 1991. That loan was
evidenced by a promissory note3 Bernardo and her husband had executed, whereby the couple solidarity
bound themselves to pay the loan with corresponding interest at 12% per annum payable upon default. 4 As
additional security, Bernardo gave Bumanglag the owner's duplicate copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No.
(T-1034) 151841.

Prior to the loan's maturity, Bernardo took back the title from Bumanglag to use as a collateral in another
transaction. In place of the title, Bernardo issued to Bumanglag the following five (5) Far East Bank and Trust
Company (FEBTC) checks,5 posted on different dates in June 1992, covering the loan's aggregate
amount:cralawlawlibrary
Check No. Amount Date
FEBTC No. 391033 Php 100,000.00 June 1, 1992
FEBTC No. 391034 Php 100,000.00 June 8, 1992
FEBTC No. 391035 Php 100,000.00 June 15, 1992
FEBTC No. 391036 Php 100,000.00 June 22, 1992
FEBTC No. 391037 Php 60,000.00 June 29, 1992
In September 1992, Bumanglag deposited these checks to Bernardo's account but they were dishonored; the
reason given was "Account Closed." Bumanglag thus sent Bernardo a notice informing her of the dishonor of
the checks. The demand went unheeded, prompting Bumanglag to initiate a criminal complaint against
Bernardo with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati for five (5) counts of violation of B.P. 22.

After the requisite preliminary investigation, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City found probable
cause to indict Bernardo for the offenses charged. Bernardo entered a not guilty plea on arraignment.

The prosecution rested its case on September 21, 1994. Bernardo took the witness stand only on May 9,
1996, to present her defense evidence.

In her testimony, Bernardo argued that she could not be held liable for violation of B.P. 22 because the
questioned checks were presented beyond the 90-day period provided under the law. She also denied having
received any notice of dishonor, which she insisted was essential to prove the material element of knowledge
of insufficiency of funds.

In any case, she maintained that the checks were never meant to be presented as she had always paid her
loans in cash, which she claimed to have done in the aggregate amount of P717,000.00. According to
Bernardo, although Bumanglag returned to her the title to the property after payment, Bumanglag never
bothered to issue her receipts. Bumanglag did not return the checks either.

Following Bernardo's cross-examination, the RTC reset the hearing for redirect examination to September 4,
1996.6 That hearing, however, was again reset to April 3, 1997, in view of the absence of Bernardo's counsel.
When Bernardo and her counsel again failed to appear during the April 3, 1997 hearing, and in view of the
numerous previous postponements the defense had asked for, the RTC considered her right to present
additional evidence waived.

Bernardo moved for reconsideration but the RTC denied her motion. The RTC, however, gave her ten (10)
days within which to submit her formal offer of evidence, which she failed to do. As a result, the RTC declared
that Bernardo had waived her right to submit her formal offer of evidence.
RTC Ruling
On May 28, 2003, the RTC issued its ruling finding Bernardo guilty of five counts of violation of B.P. 22. 7 The
RTC held that Bernardo failed to substantiate her claim of payment. The RTC further ruled that it is not the
nonpayment of the obligation but the issuance of a worthless check that B.P. 22 punishes.

The RTC sentenced Bernardo to one (1) year imprisonment for each count of the offense charged and
ordered her to indemnify Bumanglag the amount of P460,000.00, plus 12% interest and 5% penalty charges,
from December 1, 1991, until full payment. 8
CA Ruling

On appeal, the CA affirmed Bernardo's conviction but deleted the penalty of imprisonment and in lieu thereof,
imposed a P460,000.00 fine.9 The CA also retained the civil indemnity of P460,000.00 that the lower court
imposed, plus 12% interest from the time of the institution of the criminal charges until full payment. 10

In denying Bernardo's appeal, the CA noted that Bernardo failed to adduce sufficient evidence of payment.
The CA further held that the 90-day period within which to present a check under B.P. 22 is not an element of
the crime.

The CA also did not recognize any merit in Bernardo's claim that she had been denied due process, in view of
the RTC's order waiving her right to present additional evidence. 11 To the CA, Bernardo had sufficient
opportunity to present her defense but did not avail of these opportunities. Instead, she and her counsel
moved for postponement at least nine (9) times, not to mention their subsequent failure to appear four (4)
times despite due notice of the scheduled hearings. These developments led the RTC to consider Bernardo's
right to present additional evidence waived. 12

Bernardo moved for reconsideration but the CA denied her motion; 13 hence, the present petition.14
The Petition and Comment

Bernardo insists in her present petition 15 that the CA erred in finding that she had been accorded due
process; she was denied the full opportunity to present her defense and was thus deprived of the chance to
prove her innocence of the crime charged.

She likewise avers that the CA erred in affirming her criminal and civil liabilities because the prosecution failed
to prove her knowledge of insufficiency of funds. According to Bernardo, there was no violation of B.P. 22
because the checks were presented beyond the mandatory 90-day period. Moreover, Bernardo claimed that
these subject checks were issued without consideration as she had already paid the loan.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) posits in its Comment that Bernardo was given the opportunity to
present her defense evidence.16 Citing Wong v. CA,17 the OSG further points out that the 90-day period
provided in the law is not an element of the offense; 18 it is simply one of the conditions to establish a prima
facie presumption of knowledge of lack of funds. 19

The OSG also claims that Bumanglag failed to substantiate her claim that she had settled the obligation. 20 In
any event, the OSG asserted B.P. 22 penalizes the act of making and issuing a worthless check, not the
nonpayment of the obligation.21
Subsequent Developments

On March 14, 2011, Bernardo's counsel informed the Court of the petitioner's death on February 3, 2011, and
provided, as well, the names of her heirs (her widower, Mapalad Bernardo, and children: Emilie B. Ko, Marilou
B. Valdez, Edwin T. Bernardo, and Gervy B. Santos), and their address (26 Magdiwang St., Real Village 2,
Tandang Sora, Quezon City). In due course, in our March 7, 2012 Resolution, 22 we required Bernardo's heirs
to appear as substitutes for the deceased Bernardo in the present petition for purposes of Bernardo's civil
liability.

Bernardo's heirs moved to reconsider our March 7, 2012 resolution. They argued that Bernardo's death
extinguished her civil liability. In the alternative, they contended that any civil liability should be settled in a
separate civil case.

We denied the heirs' motion in our June 27, 2012 resolution. We explained that Bernardo's civil liability
survived her death as it is based on contract. Moreover, we observed that it would be costly, burdensome,
and time-consuming to dismiss the present case and require the Bumanglags to file a separate civil action.
 The Court's Ruling

We deny the petition for lack of merit. Preliminary Matters

Classes of Civil Liabilities

An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to several distinct civil liabilities on the part of
the offender.23 If the conduct constitutes a felony, the accused may be held civilly liable under Article 100 of
the Revised Penal Code (ex delicto).24 This particular civil liability due the offended party is rooted on facts
that constitute a crime.25 Otherwise stated, civil liability arises from the offense charged.26 It is not required
that the accused be convicted to be entitled to civil liability based on delict. As long as the facts constituting
the offense charged are established by preponderance of evidence, civil liability may be
awarded.27 Moreover, the civil liability based on delict is deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the
offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action
prior to the criminal action.28

The same act or omission, however, may also give rise to independent civil liabilities based on other sources
of obligation. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil
liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission: (a) law (b) contracts; (c) quasi-contracts, and (d)
quasi-delicts. Among these are the civil liabilities for intentional torts under Articles 32 29 and 3430 of the Civil
Code and for quasi-delicts under Article 2176 of Civil Code. 31 For conduct constituting defamation, fraud, and
physical injuries, the Civil Code likewise grants the offended party the right to institute a civil action
independently of the criminal action under Article-33 of the Civil Code.

Thus, it is entirely possible for one to be free from civil ability directly arising from a violation of the penal law
and to still be liable civilly based on contract or by laws other than the criminal law. 32 Such civil actions may
proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the criminal
action,33 subject however, to the caveat that the offended party cannot recover damages twice for the same
act or omission.34

Bernardo's civil liability may be enforced in the present case despite her death.

As a general rule, the death of an accused pending appeal extinguishes her criminal liability and the
corresponding civil liability based solely on the offense (delict). The death amounts to an acquittal of the
accused based on the constitutionally mandated presumption of innocence in her favor, which can be
overcome only by a finding of guilt - something that death prevents the court from making. 35 In a sense, death
absolves the accused from any earthly responsibility arising from the offense — a divine act that no human
court can reverse, qualify, much less disregard. 36 The intervention of death of the accused in any case is an
injunction by fate itself so that no criminal liability and the corresponding civil liability arising from the offense
should be imposed on him. 37

The independent civil liabilities, however, survive death and an action for recovery therefore may
be generally pursued but only by filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the Rules
on Criminal Procedure as amended. 38 This separate civil action may be enforced against the estate of the
accused.39

In B.P. 22 cases, the criminal action shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil actions. Instead of
instituting two separate cases, only a single suit is filed and tried. 40 This rule was enacted to help declog court
dockets, which had been packed with B.P. 22 because creditors used the courts as collectors. As we
observed in Hyatt v. Asia Dynamic Electrix Corp.:41cralawlawlibrary
Because ordinarily no filing fee is charged in criminal cases for actual damages, the payee uses
the intimidating effect of a criminal charge to collect his credit gratis and sometimes, upon being
paid, the trial court is not even informed thereof. The inclusion of the civil action in the criminal case
is expected to significantly lower the number of cases filed before the courts for collection based on
dishonored checks. It is also expected to expedite the disposition of these cases. Instead of
instituting two separate cases, one for criminal and another for civil, only a single suit shall be filed
and tried. It should be stressed that the policy laid down by the Rules is to discourage the separate
filing of the civil action.chanrobleslaw

As a necessary consequence of this special rule, the civil liabilities arising from the issuance of a worthless
check are deemed instituted in a case for violation of B.P. 22; the death of Bernardo did not automatically
extinguish the action. The independent civil liability based on contract, which was deemed instituted in the
criminal action for B.P. 22, may still be enforced against her estate in the present case. We thus rule on the
present action to determine Bumanglag's civil liability.

Substantive Aspect

Bernardo was not denied due process.

We meticulously went over the entire record, and confirmed that Bernardo had not at all been deprived of her
day in court. She was afforded ample opportunity to present evidence in her defense but she did not give this
case the serious attention it deserved. For good reason - i.e., the repeated absences of Bernardo and her
counsel - the trial court eventually considered her right to present defense evidence waived.

To be sure, the postponement of the trial of a case to allow the presentation of evidence is a matter that lies
with the discretion of the trial court; but it is a discretion that must be exercised wisely, considering the
peculiar circumstances of each case and with a view to doing substantial justice. 42 In the present case, the
records show that the RTC took all the steps necessary to safeguard Bernardo's rights and to accord her the
opportunity to present whatever evidence she had in her defense.

In particular, the prosecution formally rested its case on September 21, 1994. Bernardo, through counsel,
thereupon moved for leave to file a demurrer to evidence prompting the RTC to reset the hearing for initial
presentation of defense evidence to December 15 and 20, 1994. 43 Bernardo filed her demurrer to evidence
on November 10, 1994,44 after previously requesting the RTC for a 10-day extension.

The pendency of the demurrer to evidence prompted several resettings until the RTC finally denied it on
March 30, 1995.45 The RTC then set the initial presentation of defense evidence on April 11, 18, and 25,
1995,46 but these were reset to May 9, 18, and 25, 1995, 47 at the motion of Bernardo's counsel who
expressed his desire to seek relief from the CA for the denial of the demurrer.

Despite the RTC's accommodation, Bernardo's counsel failed to appear during the May 9, 1995 hearing as he
was busy attending to the canvassing of votes in Quezon City.48 Eventually, the initial presentation of defense
evidence was reset to July 20, 1995, and August 3, 1995. 49

Notably, during the July 20, 1995 hearing, Bernardo's counsel again moved for another resetting as he was
not prepared to conduct a direct examination. 50 Despite this flimsy ground, the RTC granted the request and
allowed Bernardo to testify on August 3, 1995.

Bernardo and her counsel, however, failed to appear during the August 3, 1995 hearing despite due notice,
prompting the RTC to waive their right to present defense evidence. 51 Bernardo moved for reconsideration
and the RTC granted her motion in the interest of substantial justice. 52 Thus, the hearing for the presentation
of defense evidence was reset to November 28, 1995. 53chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Bernardo and her counsel again failed to appear during the November 28, 1995 hearing, despite due
notice, prompting the RTC again to consider that Bernardo had waived her right to present defense
evidence.54chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Bernardo again moved for reconsideration on the ground that it was the first time she and her counsel were
absent at the same time.55 Despite this hollow excuse, the RTC granted the motion in the spirit of
compassionate justice and gave Bernardo the final opportunity to present her defense evidence.56 The
parties mutually agreed to set the hearing for initial presentation of defense evidence on April 18,
1996.57chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Bernardo again failed to appear during the scheduled April 18, 1996 hearing.58 Although Bernardo did not
offer any excuse for this absence,59 RTC exercised compassion and permitted Bernardo to testify, as she did
in fact testify, on May 9, 1996, 60 - one (1) year and eight (8) months after the prosecution had rested its case.
At the conclusion of the cross-examination, the parties mutually agreed to adjourn the hearing for September
4, 1996, for redirect examination. 61

Bernardo's counsel, however, failed to appear during the scheduled September 4, 1996 hearing, prompting
the RTC to consider her failure as a waiver on her part to present additional evidence. 62 Bernardo moved for
reconsideration; she claimed that her counsel had to attend another hearing in a different sala. Why
Bernardo's counsel accepted another engagement on the same day, which was in conflict with the RTC's
hearing dates, was never properly explained. Nonetheless, the RTC granted the motion to give her the last
chance to complete the presentation of evidence on April 3, 17, and 22, 1997.63chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Despite the RTC's warning, Bernardo and her counsel again failed to appear at the April 3,1997
hearing.64 Instead, they filed a motion to reset because Bernardo's counsel was to attend a wedding in the
United States of America.65 This time, the RTC, mindful that there should be a limit to postponements,
ordered the case submitted for decision sans the presentation of evidence from the defense. 66

Under these facts, the RTC was clearly driven by Bernardo and her counsel's repeated failure, without
justifiable reason, to appear at the scheduled hearing dates. 67 The order considering Bernardo's right to
present evidence waived, followed as a necessary and unavoidable consequence. As we held in People v.
Angco:68cralawlawlibrary
His failure to appear with counsel of his choice at the hearing of the case, notwithstanding repeated
postponements and warnings that failure to so appear would be deemed a waiver to present
evidence in his defense, and that the case would be deemed submitted for judgment upon the
evidence presented by the prosecution, was sufficient legal justification for the trial court to proceed
and render judgment upon the evidence before it.chanrobleslaw

The records show that the RTC leniently granted repeated continuances to safeguard Bernardo's rights as an
accused. But Bernardo obviously did not recognize the need for expeditious handling of her case and was
already trifling with judicial process. 69

Bernardo failed to adduce sufficient

evidence of payment; thus she is civilly
liable.

Bernardo's death pending appeal converted the present action to purely an enforcement of the civil liability
incurred. In particular, the focal issue in the present petition is no longer Bernardo's criminal liability for
violation of B.P. 22 but her civil liability, which is principally based on contract and the corresponding damage
Bumanglag suffered due to Bernardo's failure to pay. Under these circumstances, Bernardo's B.P. 22 defense
(that the checks were presented beyond the 90-day period and that she never received a notice of dishonor)
were no longer relevant.

Jurisprudence tells us that one who pleads payment carries the burden of proving it. 70 Indeed, once the
existence of an indebtedness is established by evidence, the burden of showing with legal certainty that the
obligation has been discharged by payment rests with the debtor. 71 After the debtor introduces evidence of
payment, the burden of going forward with the evidence - as distinct from the general burden of proof - again
shifts to the creditor, who then labors under a duty to produce evidence to show nonpayment. 72

In the present case, the existence of the obligation to pay has sufficiently been established through the
promissory note73 and the checks74 submitted in evidence. Notably, Bernardo even confirmed due execution
of these instruments during her testimony. During the offer of Bernardo's testimony, her counsel
stated:cralawlawlibrary
ATTY. MIRAVITE:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

With the court's permission. Your Honor, we are presenting the witness for the following purposes:
to x x x show that she borrowed money from [Bumanglag] x x x and that in 1991 her total obligation
reached Php460,000.000; x x x that all the checks issued by the accused were only as proof of her
obligation to the private complainant x x x.75 [emphasis supplied]chanrobleslaw

In the course of Bernardo's testimony, she even confirmed the issuance of the checks and promissory note. In
particular, she stated:cralawlawlibrary
ATTY. MIRAVITE:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Q: I am showing to you this promissory note marked as Exhibit H for the prosecution and Exhibit 2
for the defense. There appears a signature over the name Paz T. Bernardo at the middle portion
thereof, do you know whose signature is that?

A: It is mine sir.
 xxxx

Q: This document, Madame Witness, mentions of your loan obligations of Php 460,000.00. Can
you tell us, Madame Witness, what is covered by this promissory note?

xxxx

A: The promissory note covers the principal loan, plus interest and penalties, sir.

Q: So, are you saying that this promissory note of Php 460,000.00 was your total obligation as of
June 1991 and includes all other charges?

A: Yes, sir.

x xxx

Q: Madam Witness, can you remember when you issued the checks subject of these cases?

A: It was on June 20, 1991, sir.76chanrobleslaw

Bernardo's principal defense rests on the supposition that she had settled the obligation, which settlement led
Bumanglag to return to her the title to the property. 77 A meticulous review, of the records, however, firmly
dissuades us from believing Bernardo's bare allegation.

At the outset, the handwritten note78 evidencing that transaction, which was submitted by the prosecution in
evidence, states that:cralawlawlibrary
10/28/91
Received original copy of Title No. T-151841 in the name of Mapalad Bernardo for loan purposes to
pay Mrs. Carmencita Bumanglag

Sgd
Paz T. Bernardo
10/28/91
chanrobleslaw

The document evidencing this transaction strongly suggests that she asked for the title from Bumanglag to
obtain another loan whose proceeds she would use to pay Bumanglag. Notably, the defense even admitted
the genuineness of Bernardo's signature in this document. 79 When Bernardo therefore failed to fulfill her
promise to pay, Bumanglag had to request for checks to secure the obligation, which checks were eventually
dishonored upon presentment.

Under the circumstances, we find that Bernardo's claim of payment was nothing more than an allegation
unsupported by adequate proof. If indeed there had been payment, she should have redeemed or taken back
the checks and the promissory note, in the ordinary course of business. 80 Instead, the checks and the
promissory note remained in the possession of Bumanglag, who had to demand the satisfaction of Bernardo's
obligation when the checks became due and were subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank.
Bumanglag's possession of the promissory note, coupled with the dishonored checks, strongly buttresses her
claim that Bernardo's obligation had not been extinguished. 81

We thus find that the weight of evidence preponderates in favor of Bumanglag's position that Bernardo has
not yet settled her obligation.82chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the August 31, 2007 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.' CR
No. 28721 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The heirs of Paz T. Bernardo are ordered to pay the amount
of P460,000.00, with interest at 12% per annum from the time of the institution of criminal charges in court.

The total amount adjudged shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum on the balance and interest due,
from the finality of this Decision until fully paid.

The fine in the amount of P460,000.00 is DELETED.

SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC
G.R. No. 148193 January 16, 2003
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
RAFAEL JOSE CONSING, JR., respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Before us is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the May 31, 2001
decision 1 of the Court of Appeals 2 in CA-G.R. SP No. 63712, which reversed and set aside the January 23,
2001 order 3 of the Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite, Branch 21, in Criminal Case No. 7668-00 denying
respondent's motion for deferment of arraignment.
Sometime in February 1997, respondent Rafael Jose Consing, Jr. and his mother, Cecilia de la
Cruz, 4 represented to Plus Builders, Inc. (PBI) that they are the true and lawful owners of a 42,443 square
meter lot situated in Imus, Cavite and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 687599 in the name of
Cecilia de la Cruz. They further represented that they acquired said lot, which was previously covered by TCT
No. 191408 from Juanito Tan Teng and Po Willie Yu. Relying on the representations of respondent and his
mother, PBI purchased the questioned lot.
In April 1999, PBI discovered that respondent and his mother did not have a valid title over the subject lot. PBI
came to know that Juanito Tan Teng and Po Willie Yu never sold said lot to respondent and his mother and
that TCT No. 191408 upon which TCT No. 687599 was based is not on file with the Register of Deeds.
In August 1999, PBI was ousted from the possession of the disputed lot by Juanito Tan Teng and Po Willie Yu.
Despite written and verbal demands, respondent and his mother refused to return the amount of
P13,369,641.79 alleged to have been initially paid by PBI.
On July 22, 1999, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 68, an action for
"Injunctive Relief" docketed as Civil Case No. SCA 1759, against PBI, Unicapital Inc, Unicapital Realty Inc.,
Jaime Martires, Mariano D. Martinez, Cecilia de la Cruz and 20 other John Does. 5 Respondent sought a
declaration that he was merely an agent of his mother, Cecilia de la Cruz, and therefore was not under any
obligation to PBI and to the other defendants on the various transactions involving TCT No. 687599.
On October 13, 1999, PBI filed against respondent and his mother a complaint for "Damages and
Attachment," docketed as Civil Case No. 99-95381, with Branch 12 of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila. 6 Respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of forum shopping and pendency of Civil Case
No. SCA 1759. 7
On January 21, 2000, a criminal case for estafa through falsification of public document was filed against
respondent Rafael Jose Consing, Jr. and his mother with the RTC of Imus, Cavite. 8
On April 7, 2000, respondent filed a motion to defer arraignment on the ground of prejudicial question, i. e.,
the pendency of Civil Case Nos. SCA 1759 and 99-95381. 9 On January 27, 2000, the trial court denied
respondent's motion.
A motion for reconsideration thereof was likewise denied on February 27, 2001. 10
Respondent filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or
writ of preliminary injunction with the Court of Appeals seeking to enjoin the arraignment and trial of the estafa
through falsification case. 11 The Court of Appeals granted respondent's prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order in a resolution dated March 19, 2001. 12
On May 31, 2001, a decision was rendered setting aside the January 27, 2000 order of the, trial court and
permanently enjoining it from proceeding with the arraignment and trial of the criminal case until the civil
cases for Injunctive Relief and for Damages and Attachment shall have been finally decided.
Hence, the People of the Philippines, represented by the Solicitor General, filed the instant petition seeking
the reversal of the May 31, 2001 decision of the Court of Appeals.
The issue to be resolved in this petition is whether or not the pendency of Civil Case Nos. SCA 1759 and 99-
95381, for Injunctive Relief and for Damages and Attachment, is a prejudicial question justifying the
suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case for estafa through falsification of public document, filed
against the respondent.
A prejudicial question is defined as that which arises in a case, the resolution of which is a logical antecedent
of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. The prejudicial
question must be determinative of the case before the court but the jurisdiction to try and resolve the question
must be lodged in another court or tribunal. It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the
crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. For a civil
action to be considered prejudicial to a criminal case as to cause the suspension of the criminal proceedings
until the final resolution of the civil action, the following requisites must be present: (1) the civil case involves
facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based; (2) in the resolution of
the issue or issues raised in the civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be
determined; and (3) jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged in another tribunal. 13
If both civil and criminal cases have similar issues or the issue in one is intimately related to the issues raised
in the other, then a prejudicial question would likely exist, provided the other element or characteristic is
satisfied. It must appear not only that the civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal
prosecution would be based, but also that the resolution of the issues raised in the civil action would be
necessarily determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused. If the resolution of the issue in the civil
action will not determine the criminal responsibility of the accused in the criminal action based on the same
facts, or there is no necessity that the civil case be determined first before taking up the criminal case,
therefore, the civil case does not involve a prejudicial question. 14
In the case at bar, we find no prejudicial question that would justify the suspension of the proceedings in the
criminal case. The issue in Civil Case No. SCA 1759 for Injunctive Relief is whether or not respondent merely
acted as an agent of his mother, Cecilia de la Cruz; while in Civil Case No. 99-95381, for Damages and
Attachment, the question is whether respondent and his mother are liable to pay damages and to return the
amount paid by PBI for the purchase of the disputed lot. Even if respondent is declared merely an agent of his
mother in the transaction involving the sale of the questioned lot, he cannot be adjudged free from criminal
liability. An agent or any person may be held liable for conspiring to falsify public documents. Hence, the
determination of the issue involved in Civil Case No. SCA 1759 for Injunctive Relief is irrelevant to the guilt or
innocence of the respondent in the criminal case for estafa through falsification of public document.
Likewise, the resolution of PBI's right to be paid damages and the purchase price of the lot in question will not
be determinative of the culpability of the respondent in the criminal case for even if PBI is held entitled to the
return of the purchase price plus damages, it does not ipso facto follow that respondent should be held guilty
of estafa through falsification of public document. Stated differently, a ruling of the court in the civil case that
PBI should not be paid the purchase price plus damages will not necessarily absolve respondent of liability in
the criminal case where his guilt may still be established under penal laws as determined by other evidence.
Moreover, neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can, according to law,
proceed independently of each other. 15 Under Rule 111, Section 3 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure, in the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the independent civil action
may be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require
only a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover damages twice for
the same act or omission charged in the criminal action.
Thus, in Rojas v. People, 16 the petitioner was accused in a criminal case for violation of Article 319 of the
Revised Penal Code, for executing a new chattel mortgage on personal property in favor of another party
without consent of the previous mortgagee. Thereafter, the offended party filed a civil case for termination of
management contract, one of the causes of action of which consisted of petitioner having executed a chattel
mortgage while the previous chattel mortgage was still valid and subsisting. Petitioner moved that the
arraignment and trial of the criminal case be held in abeyance on the ground that the civil case was a
prejudicial question, the resolution of which was necessary before the criminal proceedings could proceed.
The trial court denied the suspension of the criminal case on the ground that no prejudicial question exist. We
affirmed the order of the trial court and ruled that:
. . . the resolution of the liability of the defendant in the civil case on the eleventh cause of action based
on the fraudulent misrepresentation that the chattel mortgage the defendant executed in favor of the
said CMS Estate, Inc. on February 20, 1957, that his D-6 "Caterpillar" Tractor with Serial No. 9-U-6565
was "free from all liens and encumbrances" will not determine the criminal liability of the accused in the
said Criminal Case No. 56042 for violation of paragraph 2 of Article 319 of the Revised Penal Code . . .
(i) That, even granting for the sake of argument, a prejudicial question is involved in this case, the fact
remains that both the crime charged in the information in the criminal case and the eleventh cause of
action in the civil case are based upon fraud, hence both the civil and criminal cases could proceed
independently of the other pursuant to Article 33 of the new Civil Code which provides: "In cases of
defamation, fraud and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from
the criminal action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence." (j) That, therefore, the act of respondent judge in issuing the orders
referred to in the instant petition was not made with "grave abuse of discretion."
In the instant case, Civil Case No. 99-95381, for Damages and Attachment on account of the alleged fraud
committed by respondent and his mother in selling the disputed lot to PBI is an independent civil action under
Article 33 of the Civil Code. As such, it will not operate as a prejudicial question that will justify the suspension
of the criminal case at bar.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition is GRANTED. The May 31, 2001 decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 63712 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The permanent injunction
issued by the Court of Appeals is LIFTED and the Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite, Branch 21
is ORDERED to proceed with the arraignment and trial in Criminal Case No. 7668-00.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C .J ., Vitug, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 166836 September 4, 2013
SAN MIGUEL PROPERTIES, INC., PETITIONER,
vs.
SEC. HERNANDO B. PEREZ, ALBERT C. AGUIRRE, TEODORO B. ARCENAS, JR., MAXY S. ABAD,
JAMES G. BARBERS, STEPHEN N. SARINO, ENRIQUE N. ZALAMEA, JR., MARIANO M. MARTIN,
ORLANDO O. SAMSON, CATHERINE R. AGUIRRE, AND ANTONIO V. AGCAOILI, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The pendency of an administrative case for specific performance brought by the buyer of residential
subdivision lots in the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) to compel the seller to deliver the
transfer certificates of title (TCTs) of the fully paid lots is properly considered a ground to suspend a criminal
prosecution for violation of Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 9571 on the ground of a prejudicial
question. The administrative determination is a logical antecedent of the resolution of the criminal charges
based on non-delivery of the TCTs.
Antecedents
Petitioner San Miguel Properties Inc. (San Miguel Properties), a domestic corporation engaged in the real
estate business, purchased in 1992, 1993 and April 1993 from B.F. Homes, Inc. (BF Homes), then
represented by Atty. Florencio B. Orendain (Orendain) as its duly authorized rehabilitation receiver appointed
by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC),2 130 residential lots situated in its subdivision BF
Homes Parañaque, containing a total area of 44,345 square meters for the aggregate price of
₱106,248,000.00. The transactions were embodied in three separate deeds of sale.3 The TCTs covering the
lots bought under the first and second deeds were fully delivered to San Miguel Properties, but 20 TCTs
covering 20 of the 41 parcels of land with a total area of 15,565 square meters purchased under the third
deed of sale, executed in April 1993 and for which San Miguel Properties paid the full price of
₱39,122,627.00, were not delivered to San Miguel Properties.
On its part, BF Homes claimed that it withheld the delivery of the 20 TCTs for parcels of land purchased under
the third deed of sale because Atty. Orendain had ceased to be its rehabilitation receiver at the time of the
transactions after being meanwhile replaced as receiver by FBO Network Management, Inc. on May 17, 1989
pursuant to an order from the SEC.4
BF Homes refused to deliver the 20 TCTs despite demands. Thus, on August 15, 2000, San Miguel Properties
filed a complaint-affidavit in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Piñas City (OCP Las Piñas) charging
respondent directors and officers of BF Homes with non-delivery of titles in violation of Section 25, in relation
to Section 39, both of Presidential Decree No. 957 (I.S. No. 00-2256).5
At the same time, San Miguel Properties sued BF Homes for specific performance in the HLURB (HLURB
Case No. REM-082400-11183),6 praying to compel BF Homes to release the 20 TCTs in its favor.
In their joint counter-affidavit submitted in I.S. No. 00-2256,7 respondent directors and officers of BF Homes
refuted San Miguel Properties’ assertions by contending that: (a) San Miguel Properties’ claim was not legally
demandable because Atty. Orendain did not have the authority to sell the 130 lots in 1992 and 1993 due to his
having been replaced as BF Homes’ rehabilitation receiver by the SEC on May 17, 1989; (b) the deeds of
sale conveying the lots were irregular for being undated and unnotarized; (c) the claim should have been
brought to the SEC because BF Homes was under receivership; (d) in receivership cases, it was essential to
suspend all claims against a distressed corporation in order to enable the receiver to effectively exercise its
powers free from judicial and extra-judicial interference that could unduly hinder the rescue of the distressed
company; and (e) the lots involved were under custodia legis in view of the pending receivership proceedings,
necessarily stripping the OCP Las Piñas of the jurisdiction to proceed in the action.
On October 10, 2000, San Miguel Properties filed a motion to suspend proceedings in the OCP Las
Piñas,8 citing the pendency of BF Homes’ receivership case in the SEC. In its comment/opposition, BF
Homes opposed the motion to suspend. In the meantime, however, the SEC terminated BF Homes’
receivership on September 12, 2000, prompting San Miguel Properties to file on October 27, 2000 a reply to
BF Homes’ comment/opposition coupled with a motion to withdraw the sought suspension of proceedings due
to the intervening termination of the receivership.9
On October 23, 2000, the OCP Las Piñas rendered its resolution,10 dismissing San Miguel Properties’
criminal complaint for violation of Presidential Decree No. 957 on the ground that no action could be filed by
or against a receiver without leave from the SEC that had appointed him; that the implementation of the
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 957 exclusively pertained under the jurisdiction of the HLURB; that
there existed a prejudicial question necessitating the suspension of the criminal action until after the issue on
the liability of the distressed BF Homes was first determined by the SEC en banc or by the HLURB; and that
no prior resort to administrative jurisdiction had been made; that there appeared to be no probable cause to
indict respondents for not being the actual signatories in the three deeds of sale.
On February 20, 2001, the OCP Las Piñas denied San Miguel Properties’ motion for reconsideration filed on
November 28, 2000, holding that BF Homes’ directors and officers could not be held liable for the non-delivery
of the TCTs under Presidential Decree No. 957 without a definite ruling on the legality of Atty. Orendain’s
actions; and that the criminal liability would attach only after BF Homes did not comply with a directive of the
HLURB directing it to deliver the titles.11
San Miguel Properties appealed the resolutions of the OCP Las Piñas to the Department of Justice (DOJ), but
the DOJ Secretary denied the appeal on October 15, 2001, holding:
After a careful review of the evidence on record, we find no cogent reason to disturb the ruling of the City
Prosecutor of Las Piñas City. Established jurisprudence supports the position taken by the City Prosecutor
concerned.
There is no dispute that aside from the instant complaint for violation of PD 957, there is still pending with the
Housing and Land Use Resulatory Board (HLURB, for short) a complaint for specific performance where the
HLURB is called upon to inquire into, and rule on, the validity of the sales transactions involving the lots in
question and entered into by Atty. Orendain for and in behalf of BF Homes.
As early as in the case of Solid Homes, Inc. vs. Payawal, 177 SCRA 72, the Supreme Court had ruled that the
HLURB has exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving real estate business and practices under PD 957. This
is reiterated in the subsequent cases of Union Bank of the Philippines versus HLURB, G.R. [No.] 953364,
June 29, 1992 and C.T. Torres Enterprises vs. Hilionada, 191 SCRA 286.
The said ruling simply means that unless and until the HLURB rules on the validity of the transactions
involving the lands in question with specific reference to the capacity of Atty. Orendain to bind BF Homes in
the said transactions, there is as yet no basis to charge criminally respondents for non-delivery of the subject
land titles. In other words, complainant cannot invoke the penal provision of PD 957 until such time that the
HLURB shall have ruled and decided on the validity of the transactions involving the lots in question.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.12 (Emphasis supplied)
The DOJ eventually denied San Miguel Properties’ motion for reconsideration.13
Ruling of the CA
Undaunted, San Miguel Properties elevated the DOJ’s resolutions to the CA on certiorari and mandamus
(C.A.-G.R. SP No. 73008), contending that respondent DOJ Secretary had acted with grave abuse in denying
their appeal and in refusing to charge the directors and officers of BF Homes with the violation of Presidential
Decree No. 957. San Miguel Properties submitted the issue of whether or not HLURB Case No. REM-
082400-11183 presented a prejudicial question that called for the suspension of the criminal action for
violation of Presidential Decree No. 957.
In its assailed decision promulgated on February 24, 2004 in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 73008, 14 the CA dismissed
San Miguel Properties’ petition, holding and ruling as follows:
From the foregoing, the conclusion that may be drawn is that the rule on prejudicial question generally applies
to civil and criminal actions only.
However, an exception to this rule is provided in Quiambao vs. Osorio cited by the respondents. In this case,
an issue in an administrative case was considered a prejudicial question to the resolution of a civil case
which, consequently, warranted the suspension of the latter until after termination of the administrative
proceedings.
Quiambao vs. Osorio is not the only instance when the Supreme Court relaxed the application of the rule on
prejudicial question.
In Tamin vs. CA involving two (2) civil actions, the Highest Court similarly applied the rule on prejudicial
question when it directed petitioner therein to put up a bond for just compensation should the demolition of
private respondents’ building proved to be illegal as a result of a pending cadastral suit in another tribunal.
City of Pasig vs. COMELEC is yet another exception where a civil action involving a boundary dispute was
considered a prejudicial question which must be resolved prior to an administrative proceeding for the holding
of a plebiscite on the affected areas.
In fact, in Vidad vs. RTC of Negros Oriental, Br. 42, it was ruled that in the interest of good order, courts can
suspend action in one case pending determination of another case closely interrelated or interlinked with it.
It thus appears that public respondent did not act with grave abuse of discretion x x x when he applied the
rule on prejudicial question to the instant proceedings considering that the issue on the validity of the sale
transactions x x x by x x x Orendain in behalf of BF Homes, Inc., is closely intertwined with the purported
criminal culpability of private respondents, as officers/directors of BF Homes, Inc., arising from their failure to
deliver the titles of the parcels of land included in the questioned conveyance.
All told, to sustain the petitioner’s theory that the result of the HLURB proceedings is not determinative of the
criminal liability of private respondents under PD 957 would be to espouse an absurdity. If we were to assume
that the HLURB finds BFHI under no obligation to delve the subject titles, it would be highly irregular and
contrary to the ends of justice to pursue a criminal case against private respondents for the non-delivery of
certificates of title which they are not under any legal obligation to turn over in the first place. (Bold emphasis
supplied)
On a final note, absent grave abuse of discretion on the part of the prosecutorial arm of the government as
represented by herein public respondent, courts will not interfere with the discretion of a public prosecutor in
prosecuting or dismissing a complaint filed before him. A public prosecutor, by the nature of his office, is under
no compulsion to file a criminal information where no clear legal justification has been shown, and no
sufficient evidence of guilt nor prima facie case has been established by the complaining party.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus is hereby DENIED.
The Resolutions dated 15 October 2001 and 12 July 2002 of the Department of Justice are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. 15
The CA denied San Miguel Properties’ motion for reconsideration on January 18, 2005.16
Issues
Aggrieved, San Miguel Properties is now on appeal, raising the following for consideration and resolution, to
wit:
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE, SERIOUS AND REVERSIBLE ERRORS WHEN IT
DISMISSED PETITIONER’S CERTIORARI AND MANDAMUS PETITION TO ORDER AND DIRECT
RESPONDENT SECRETARY TO INDICT RESPONDENTS FOR VIOLATION OF SECTION 25, PD. 957 IN
THAT:

THE OBLIGATION OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS TO DELIVER TO PETITIONER THE TITLES

TO 20 FULLY-PAID LOTS IS MANDATED BY SECTION 25, PD 957. IN FACT, THE OFFICE OF
THE PRESIDENT HAD DULY CONFIRMED THE SAME PER ITS DECISION DATED 27
JANUARY 2005 IN O.P. CASE NO. 03-E-203, ENTITLED "SMPI V. BF HOMES, INC.".

A FORTIORI, PRIVATE RESPONDENTS’ FAILURE AND/OR REFUSAL TO DELIVER TO

PETITIONER THE SUBJECT TITLES CONSTITUTES CRIMINAL OFFENSE PER SECTIONS 25
AND 39, PD 957 FOR WHICH IT IS THE MINISTERIAL DUTY OF RESPONDENT SECRETARY
TO INDICT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS THEREFOR.

IN ANY EVENT, THE HLURB CASE DOES NOT PRESENT A "PREJUDICIAL QUESTION" TO
THE SUBJECT CRIMINAL CASE SINCE THE FORMER INVOLVES AN ISSUE SEPARATE AND
DISTINCT FROM THE ISSUE INVOLVED IN THE LATTER. CONSEQUENTLY, THE HLURB
CASE HAS NO CORRELATION, TIE NOR LINKAGE TO THE PRESENT CRIMINAL CASE
WHICH CAN PROCEED INDEPENDENTLY THEREOF.

IN FACT, THE CRIMINAL CULPABILITY OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS EMANATE FROM THEIR

MALA PROHIBITA NON-DELIVERY OF THE TITLES TO TWENTY (20) FULLY-PAID PARCELS
OF LAND TO PETITIONER, AND NOT FROM THEIR NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE HLURB’S
RULING IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE CASE.

NONETHELESS, BY DECREEING THAT PETITIONER’S CRIMINAL COMPLAINT IS

PREMATURE, BOTH THE COURT OF APPEALS AND RESPONDENT SECRETARY HAD
 IMPLIEDLY ADMITTED THE EXISTENCE OF SUFFICIENT PROBABLE CAUSE AGAINST
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FOR THE CRIME CHARGED.17

It is relevant at this juncture to mention the outcome of the action for specific performance and damages that
San Miguel Properties instituted in the HLURB simultaneously with its filing of the complaint for violation of
Presidential Decree No. 957. On January 25, 2002, the HLURB Arbiter ruled that the HLURB was inclined to
suspend the proceedings until the SEC resolved the issue of Atty. Orendain’s authority to enter into the
transactions in BF Homes’ behalf, because the final resolution by the SEC was a logical antecedent to the
determination of the issue involved in the complaint before the HLURB. Upon appeal, the HLURB Board of
Commissioners (HLURB Board), citing the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, affirmed the HLURB Arbiter’s
decision, holding that although no prejudicial question could arise, strictly speaking, if one case was civil and
the other administrative, it nonetheless opted to suspend its action on the cases pending the final outcome of
the administrative proceeding in the interest of good order.18
Not content with the outcome, San Miguel Properties appealed to the Office of the President (OP), arguing
that the HLURB erred in suspending the proceedings. On January 27, 2004, the OP reversed the HLURB
Board’s ruling, holding thusly:
The basic complaint in this case is one for specific performance under Section 25 of the Presidential Decree
(PD) 957 – "The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers’ Protective."
As early as August 1987, the Supreme Court already recognized the authority of the HLURB, as successor
agency of the National Housing Authority (NHA), to regulate, pursuant to PD 957, in relation to PD 1344, the
real estate trade, with exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide cases "involving specific performance
of contractual and statutory obligation filed by buyers of subdivision lots … against the owner, developer,
dealer, broker or salesman," the HLURB, in the exercise of its adjudicatory powers and functions, "must
interpret and apply contracts, determine the rights of the parties under these contracts and award[s] damages
whenever appropriate."
Given its clear statutory mandate, the HLURB’s decision to await for some forum to decide – if ever one is
forthcoming – the issue on the authority of Orendain to dispose of subject lots before it peremptorily resolves
the basic complaint is unwarranted, the issues thereon having been joined and the respective position papers
and the evidence of the parties having been submitted. To us, it behooved the HLURB to adjudicate, with the
usual dispatch, the right and obligation of the parties in line with its own appreciation of the obtaining facts
and applicable law. To borrow from Mabubha Textile Mills Corporation vs. Ongpin, it does not have to rely on
the finding of others to discharge this adjudicatory functions.19
After its motion for reconsideration was denied, BF Homes appealed to the CA (C.A.-G.R. SP No. 83631),
raising as issues: (a) whether or not the HLURB had the jurisdiction to decide with finality the question of Atty.
Orendain’s authority to enter into the transaction with San Miguel Properties in BF Homes’ behalf, and rule on
the rights and obligations of the parties to the contract; and (b) whether or not the HLURB properly suspended
the proceedings until the SEC resolved with finality the matter regarding such authority of Atty. Orendain.
The CA promulgated its decision in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 83631,20 decreeing that the HLURB, not the SEC, had
jurisdiction over San Miguel Properties’ complaint. It affirmed the OP’s decision and ordered the remand of
the case to the HLURB for further proceedings on the ground that the case involved matters within the
HLURB’s competence and expertise pursuant to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, viz:
[T]he High Court has consistently ruled that the NHA or the HLURB has jurisdiction over complaints arising
from contracts between the subdivision developer and the lot buyer or those aimed at compelling the
subdivision developer to comply with its contractual and statutory obligations.
Hence, the HLURB should take jurisdiction over respondent’s complaint because it pertains to matters within
the HLURB’s competence and expertise. The proceedings before the HLURB should not be suspended.
While We sustain the Office of the President, the case must be remanded to the HLURB. This is in recognition
of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. The fairest and most equitable course to take under the circumstances
is to remand the case to the HLURB for the proper presentation of evidence.21
Did the Secretary of Justice commit grave abuse of discretion in upholding the dismissal of San Miguel
Properties’ criminal complaint for violation of Presidential Decree No. 957 for lack of probable cause and for
reason of a prejudicial question?
The question boils down to whether the HLURB administrative case brought to compel the delivery of the
TCTs could be a reason to suspend the proceedings on the criminal complaint for the violation of Section 25
of Presidential Decree No. 957 on the ground of a prejudicial question.
Ruling of the Court
The petition has no merit.
1.
Action for specific performance, even if pending in the HLURB, an administrative agency, raises a prejudicial
question BF Homes’ posture that the administrative case for specific performance in the HLURB posed a
prejudicial question that must first be determined before the criminal case for violation of Section 25 of
Presidential Decree No. 957 could be resolved is correct.
A prejudicial question is understood in law to be that which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical
antecedent of the issue involved in the criminal case, and the cognizance of which pertains to another
tribunal. It is determinative of the criminal case, but the jurisdiction to try and resolve it is lodged in another
court or tribunal. It is based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but is so intimately connected with
the crime that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused.22 The rationale behind the principle of
prejudicial question is to avoid conflicting decisions.23 The essential elements of a prejudicial question are
provided in Section 7, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, to wit: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves
an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the
resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
The concept of a prejudicial question involves a civil action and a criminal case. Yet, contrary to San Miguel
Properties’ submission that there could be no prejudicial question to speak of because no civil action where
the prejudicial question arose was pending, the action for specific performance in the HLURB raises a
prejudicial question that sufficed to suspend the proceedings determining the charge for the criminal violation
of Section 2524 of Presidential Decree No. 957. This is true simply because the action for specific
performance was an action civil in nature but could not be instituted elsewhere except in the HLURB, whose
jurisdiction over the action was exclusive and original.25
The determination of whether the proceedings ought to be suspended because of a prejudicial question
rested on whether the facts and issues raised in the pleadings in the specific performance case were so
related with the issues raised in the criminal complaint for the violation of Presidential Decree No. 957, such
that the resolution of the issues in the former would be determinative of the question of guilt in the criminal
case. An examination of the nature of the two cases involved is thus necessary.
An action for specific performance is the remedy to demand the exact performance of a contract in the
specific form in which it was made, or according to the precise terms agreed upon by a party bound to fulfill
it.26 Evidently, before the remedy of specific performance is availed of, there must first be a breach of the
contract.27 The remedy has its roots in Article 1191 of the Civil Code, which reads:
Article 1191. The power to rescind obligations is implied in reciprocal ones, in case one of the obligors should
not comply with what is incumbent upon him.
The injured party may choose between the fulfillment and the rescission of the obligation, with the payment of
damages in either case. He may also seek rescission, even after he has chosen fulfillment, if the latter should
become impossible. x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Accordingly, the injured party may choose between specific performance or rescission with damages. As
presently worded, Article 1191 speaks of the remedy of rescission in reciprocal obligations within the context
of Article 1124 of the former Civil Code which used the term resolution. The remedy of resolution applied only
to reciprocal obligations, such that a party’s breach of the contract equated to a tacit resolutory condition that
entitled the injured party to rescission. The present article, as in the former one, contemplates alternative
remedies for the injured party who is granted the option to pursue, as principal actions, either the rescission or
the specific performance of the obligation, with payment of damages in either case.28
On the other hand, Presidential Decree No. 957 is a law that regulates the sale of subdivision lots and
condominiums in view of the increasing number of incidents wherein "real estate subdivision owners,
developers, operators, and/or sellers have reneged on their representations and obligations to provide and
maintain properly" the basic requirements and amenities, as well as of reports of alarming magnitude of
swindling and fraudulent manipulations perpetrated by unscrupulous subdivision and condominium sellers
and operators,29 such as failure to deliver titles to the buyers or titles free from liens and encumbrances.
Presidential Decree No. 957 authorizes the suspension and revocation of the registration and license of the
real estate subdivision owners, developers, operators, and/or sellers in certain instances, as well as provides
the procedure to be observed in such instances; it prescribes administrative fines and other penalties in case
of violation of, or non-compliance with its provisions.
Conformably with the foregoing, the action for specific performance in the HLURB would determine whether
or not San Miguel Properties was legally entitled to demand the delivery of the remaining 20 TCTs, while the
criminal action would decide whether or not BF Homes’ directors and officers were criminally liable for
withholding the 20 TCTs. The resolution of the former must obviously precede that of the latter, for should the
HLURB hold San Miguel Properties to be not entitled to the delivery of the 20 TCTs because Atty. Orendain
did not have the authority to represent BF Homes in the sale due to his receivership having been terminated
by the SEC, the basis for the criminal liability for the violation of Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 957
would evaporate, thereby negating the need to proceed with the criminal case.
Worthy to note at this juncture is that a prejudicial question need not conclusively resolve the guilt or
innocence of the accused. It is enough for the prejudicial question to simply test the sufficiency of the
allegations in the information in order to sustain the further prosecution of the criminal case. A party who
raises a prejudicial question is deemed to have hypothetically admitted that all the essential elements of the
crime have been adequately alleged in the information, considering that the Prosecution has not yet
presented a single piece of evidence on the indictment or may not have rested its case. A challenge to the
allegations in the information on the ground of prejudicial question is in effect a question on the merits of the
criminal charge through a non-criminal suit.30
2.
Doctrine of primary jurisdiction is applicable
That the action for specific performance was an administrative case pending in the HLURB, instead of in a
court of law, was of no consequence at all. As earlier mentioned, the action for specific performance, although
civil in nature, could be brought only in the HLURB. This situation conforms to the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction. There has been of late a proliferation of administrative agencies, mostly regulatory in function. It is
in favor of these agencies that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is frequently invoked, not to defeat the resort
to the judicial adjudication of controversies but to rely on the expertise, specialized skills, and knowledge of
such agencies in their resolution. The Court has observed that one thrust of the proliferation is that the
interpretation of contracts and the determination of private rights under contracts are no longer a uniquely
judicial function exercisable only by the regular courts.31
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction has been increasingly called into play on matters demanding the special
competence of administrative agencies even if such matters are at the same time within the jurisdiction of the
courts. A case that requires for its determination the expertise, specialized skills, and knowledge of some
administrative board or commission because it involves technical matters or intricate questions of fact, relief
must first be obtained in an appropriate administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the
courts although the matter comes within the jurisdiction of the courts. The application of the doctrine does not
call for the dismissal of the case in the court but only for its suspension until after the matters within the
competence of the administrative body are threshed out and determined.32
To accord with the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the courts cannot and will not determine a controversy
involving a question within the competence of an administrative tribunal, the controversy having been so
placed within the special competence of the administrative tribunal under a regulatory scheme. In that
instance, the judicial process is suspended pending referral to the administrative body for its view on the
matter in dispute. Consequently, if the courts cannot resolve a question that is within the legal competence of
an administrative body prior to the resolution of that question by the latter, especially where the question
demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience, and
services of the administrative agency to ascertain technical and intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of
ruling is essential to comply with the purposes of the regulatory statute administered, suspension or dismissal
of the action is proper.33
3.
Other submissions of petitioner are unwarranted
It is not tenable for San Miguel Properties to argue that the character of a violation of Section 25 of
Presidential Decree No. 957 as malum prohibitum, by which criminal liability attached to BF Homes’ directors
and officers by the mere failure to deliver the TCTs, already rendered the suspension unsustainable. 34 The
mere fact that an act or omission was malum prohibitum did not do away with the initiative inherent in every
court to avoid an absurd result by means of rendering a reasonable interpretation and application of the
procedural law. Indeed, the procedural law must always be given a reasonable construction to preclude
absurdity in its application.35 Hence, a literal application of the principle governing prejudicial questions is to
be eschewed if such application would produce unjust and absurd results or unreasonable consequences.
San Miguel Properties further submits that respondents could not validly raise the prejudicial question as a
reason to suspend the criminal proceedings because respondents had not themselves initiated either the
action for specific performance or the criminal action.1âwphi1 It contends that the defense of a prejudicial
question arising from the filing of a related case could only be raised by the party who filed or initiated said
related case.
The submission is unfounded. The rule on prejudicial question makes no distinction as to who is allowed to
raise the defense. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. When the law makes no distinction, we
ought not to distinguish.36
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on February 24, 2004 by the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP NO. 73008; and ORDERS petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 134887 July 27, 2006
PHILIPPINE AGILA SATELLITE, INC. represented by MICHAEL C. U. DE GUZMAN, petitioner,
vs.
SEC. JOSEFINA TRINIDAD LICHAUCO and the HON. OMBUDSMAN, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
On June 6, 1994, a Memorandum of Understanding1 (MOU) was entered into by a consortium of private
telecommunications carriers and the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) represented
by then Secretary Jesus B. Garcia, Jr. relative to the launching, ownership, operation and management of a
Philippine satellite by a Filipino-owned or controlled private consortium or corporation.
Pursuant to Article IV of the MOU, the consortium of private telecommunications carriers formed a corporation
and adopted the corporate name Philippine Agila Satellite, Inc. (PASI), herein petitioner.
By letter2 dated June 28, 1996, PASI president Rodrigo A. Silverio (Silverio) requested the then DOTC
Secretary Amado S. Lagdameo, Jr. for official government confirmation of the assignment of Philippine orbital
slots 161ºE and 153ºE to PASI for its AGILA satellites.
In response to Silverio’s letter, Secretary Lagdameo, by letter3 dated July 3, 1996, confirmed the
government’s assignment of Philippine orbital slots 161ºE and 153ºE to PASI for its AGILA satellites.
PASI thereupon undertook preparations for the launching, operation and management of its satellites by,
among other things, obtaining loans, increasing its capital, conducting negotiations with its business partners,
and making an initial payment of US$ 3.5 million to Aerospatiale, a French satellite manufacturer.
Michael de Guzman (de Guzman), PASI President and Chief Executive Officer (CEO), later informed Jesli
Lapuz (Lapuz), President and CEO of the Landbank of the Philippines, by letter 4 of December 3, 1996, of the
government’s assignment to PASI of orbital slots 161ºE and 153ºE and requested the bank’s confirmation of
its participation in a club loan in the amount of US$ 11 million, the proceeds of which would be applied to
PASI’s interim satellite.
It appears that Lapuz sent a copy of De Guzman’s letter to then DOTC Undersecretary Josefina T. Lichauco,
(Lichauco) who, by letter5 of December 5, 1996, wrote Lapuz as follows:
1. Kindly be informed that there is simply no basis for Michael de Guzman to allege that the DOTC has
assigned two (2) slots to PASI. He conveniently neglected to attach as another annex, in addition to
Sec. Lagdameo’s letter of 3 July 1996 (Annex "A") the letter of 28 June (Annex "B") in response to
which the July 3rd letter had been sent to PASI. Annex "B" precisely provides that one slot (153º E, to
which the interim satellite was supposed to migrate) was to be used for the migration of the Russian
satellite in time for the APEC Leaders’ Summit. This particular endeavor was not successful. The
interim satellite "Gorizont" never moved from its orbital location of 130ºE Longitude. Annex "C" is a
letter from an official of the Subic Bay Satellite Systems Inc., with its attachments, addressed to me
stating that as of the 13th of November, no such voyage to 153ºE orbital slot had been commenced. In
fact DHI hid this fact from me, and in fact stated that Gorizont had already moved and was on its way
to 153ºE.
Since this timely migration did not happen in time for the APEC Leaders Meeting on 24 November, this
153ºE Longitude slot can no longer be assigned to PASI.
The other slot 161ºE Longitude is the one that can be made available for PASI’s eventual launch, in
1998 most likely, in exchange for one free satellite transponder unit utilization, for all requirements of
Government. These have yet to be embodied in a contract between PASI and the DOTC.
2. I understand from my meeting with DHI/PASI this morning, and from the de Guzman letter you sent
to me, that the latter are still interested in pursuing their "interim satellite project" and are applying for a
loan with your bank. Of course they can always pursue this as a business venture of DHI/PASI which is
their own corporate business decision. The DOTC supports this venture but they will be getting only
one orbital slot for both the Interim Satellite Project and for the Launch Project. I understand from
today’s meeting with them that this is technically feasible.
3. As regards the use of the name "Agila", Mr. de Guzman’s allegation that DHI/PASI has registered
"Agila" as a "corporate alias/trademark" is FALSE. There is no such thing as registration of a "corporate
alias". Nor for that matter can the trade name of a satellite be registered for just any satellite, where it
was the President who chose the name for the first Philippine satellite in orbit. No one else coined that
name but he. He has therefore given the name "Agila I" to the Mabuhay satellite now in orbit at 144ºE,
 being the first Philippine satellite in orbit. He made this announcement in the presence of all the APEC
Heads of State just before the presentation to him of the Manila Action Plan for APEC. (Underscoring
supplied)
Lichauco subsequently issued, in December 1997, a Notice of Offer6 for several orbital slots including 153ºE.
PASI, claiming that the offer was without its knowledge and that it subsequently came to learn that another
company whose identity had not been disclosed had submitted a bid and won the award for orbital slot 153ºE,
filed on January 23, 1998 a complaint7 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaluyong City against
Lichauco and the "Unknown Awardee," for injunction to enjoin the award of orbital slot 153ºE, declare its
nullity, and for damages.
PASI also filed on February 23, 1998 a complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman against Secretary
Josefina Trinidad Lichauco. In his affidavit-complaint, de Guzman charged Lichauco with gross violation of
Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as
amended, reading:
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial
functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision
shall apply to officers and employees of officers or government corporations charged with the grant of
licenses or permits or other concessions.
The complaint was docketed as OMB Case No. 0-98-0416. The Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation
Bureau (EPIB) of the Office of the Ombudsman, by Evaluation Report8 dated April 15, 1998, found the
existence of a prejudicial question after considering that "the case filed with the RTC involves facts intimately
related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based and that the guilt or the innocence of the
accused would necessarily be determined in the resolution of the issues raised in the civil case." It thus
concluded that the filing of the complaint before the Ombudsman "is premature since the issues involved
herein are now subject of litigation in the case filed with the RTC," and accordingly recommended its
dismissal. Then Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto approved on April 24, 1998 the recommendation of the
EPIB.
PASI moved to reconsider9 the dismissal of the complaint, but was denied by Order10 dated July 17, 1998.
In the meantime, a motion to dismiss the civil case against respondent was denied by the trial court. On
elevation of the order of denial to the Court of Appeals, said court, by Decision dated February 21, 2000,
ordered the dismissal of the case. This Court, by Decision dated May 3, 2006, ordered the reinstatement of
the case, however.11
PASI is now before this Court via petition for review on certiorari, arguing that the Ombudsman erred in
dismissing the complaint.
In issue are 1) whether there exists a prejudicial question and, if in the affirmative, 2) whether the dismissal of
the complaint on that account is in order.
Section 7, Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
Section 7. Elements of prejudicial question. – The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the
previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the
subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal
action may proceed.
The rationale for the principle of prejudicial question is that although it does not conclusively resolve the guilt
or innocence of the accused, it tests the sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint or information in order
to sustain the further prosecution of the criminal case.12 Hence, the need for its prior resolution before further
proceedings in the criminal action may be had.
PASI concedes that the issues in the civil case are similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the
criminal case. It contends, however, that the resolution of the issues in the civil case is not determinative of
the guilt or innocence of Lichauco, it arguing that even if she is adjudged liable for damages, it does not
necessarily follow that she would be convicted of the crime charged.
To determine the existence of a prejudicial question in the case before the Ombudsman, it is necessary to
examine the elements of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 for which Lichauco was charged and the causes of action
in the civil case.
Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 which was earlier quoted has the following elements:
1. The accused is a public officer discharging administrative or official functions or private persons
charged in conspiracy with them;
2. The public officer committed the prohibited act during the performance of his official duty or in
relation to his public position;
 3. The public officer acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross, inexcusable negligence;
and
4. His action caused undue injury to the Government or any private party, or gave any party any
unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference to such parties.13
The civil case against Lichauco on the other hand involves three causes of action. The first, for injunction,
seeks to enjoin the award of orbital slot 153ºE, the DOTC having previously assigned the same to PASI; the
second, for declaration of nullity of award, seeks to nullify the award given to the undisclosed bidder for being
beyond Lichauco’s authority; and the third, for damages arising from Lichauco’s questioned acts.
If the award to the undisclosed bidder of orbital slot 153ºE is, in the civil case, declared valid for being within
Lichauco’s scope of authority to thus free her from liability for damages, there would be no prohibited act to
speak of nor would there be basis for undue injury claimed to have been suffered by petitioner. The finding
by the Ombudsman of the existence of a prejudicial question is thus well-taken.
Respecting the propriety of the dismissal by the Ombudsman of the complaint due to the pendency of a
prejudicial question, PASI argues that since the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman is silent
on the matter, the Rules of Court, specifically Section 6, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, which now reads:
SECTION 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. – A petition for suspension of the criminal
action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the office of
the prosecutor or the court conducting the preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has been
filed in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action at any time before
the prosecution rests. (Underscoring supplied),
applies in a suppletory character.
The Ombudsman, on the other hand, argues that the above-quoted provision of the Rules of Court applies to
cases which are at the preliminary or trial stage and not to those, like the case subject of the present petition,
at the evaluation stage.
The Ombudsman goes on to proffer that at the evaluation stage, the investigating officer may recommend any
of several causes of action including dismissal of the complaint for want of palpable merit or subjecting the
complaint to preliminary investigation, and the evaluation of the complaint involves the discretion of the
investigating officer which this Court cannot interfere with.
While the evaluation of a complaint involves the discretion of the investigating officer, its exercise should not
be abused14 or wanting in legal basis.
Rule II, Section 2 of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman reads:
SECTION 2. Evaluation. – Upon evaluating the complaint, the investigating officer shall recommend
whether it may be:
a) dismissed outright for want of palpable merit;
b) referred to respondent for comment;
c) indorsed to the proper government office or agency which has jurisdiction over the case;
d) forwarded to the appropriate office or official for fact-finding investigation;
e) referred for administrative adjudication; or
f) subjected to a preliminary investigation. (Underscoring supplied)
From the above-quoted provision, a complaint at the evaluation stage may be dismissed outright only for want
of palpable merit. Want of palpable merit obviously means that there is no basis for the charge or charges. If
the complaint has prima facie merit, however, the investigating officer shall recommend the adoption of any of
the actions enumerated above from (b) to (f).15
When, in the course of the actions taken by those to whom the complaint is endorsed or forwarded, a
prejudicial question is found to be pending, Section 6, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court should be applied in a
suppletory character.16 As laid down in Yap v. Paras,17 said rule directs that the proceedings may only
be suspended, not dismissed, and that it may be made only upon petition,and not at the instance of the
judge alone or as in this case, the investigating officer.
To give imprimatur to the Ombudsman’s dismissal of petitioner’s criminal complaint due to prejudicial question
would not only run counter to the provision of Section 6 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. It would sanction
the extinguishment of criminal liability, if there be any, through prescription under Article 89 vis a vis Articles
90 and 91 of the Revised Penal Code which respectively read:
ART. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. — Criminal liability is totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties,
liability therefore is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final
judgment;
 2. By service of the sentence;
3. By amnesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty and all its effects;
4. By absolute pardon;
5. By prescription of the crime;
6. By prescription of the penalty;
7. By the marriage of the offended woman, as provided in Article 344 of this Code.
(Underscoring supplied)
ART. 90. Prescription of crimes. — Crimes punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or reclusion
temporal shall prescribe in twenty years.
Crimes punishable by other afflictive penalties shall prescribe in fifteen years.
Those punishable by a correctional penalty shall prescribe in ten years; with the exception of those
punishable by arresto mayor, which shall prescribe in five years.
The crime of libel or other similar offenses shall prescribe in one year.
The offenses of oral defamation and slander by deed shall prescribe in six months.
Light offenses prescribe in two months.
When the penalty fixed by law is a compound one, the highest penalty shall be made the basis of the
application of the rules contained in the first, second, and third paragraphs of this article. x x x
ART. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. — The period of prescription shall commence to run
from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents,
and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information, and shall commence to run again
when such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are
unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him.
x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
WHEREFORE, the Order dated July 17, 1998 of respondent Ombudsman dismissing OMB Case No. 0-98-
0416 against respondent then Secretary Josefina Trinidad Lichauco is SET ASIDE.
The Ombudsman is ORDERED to REINSTATE to its docket for further proceedings, in line with the foregoing
ratiocination, OMB Case No. 0-98-0416.
SO ORDERED
Quisumbing, Chairman, Carpio, Tinga, Velasco, Jr., J.J., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 181089 October 22, 2012
MERLINDA CIPRIANO MONTAÑES, Complainant,
vs.
LOURDES TAJOLOSA CIPRIANO, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
For our resolution is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to annul the Order1 dated September 24,
2007 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 31, issued in Criminal Case No. 4990-
SPL which dismissed the lnformation for Bigamy filed against respondent Lourdes Tajolosa Cipriano. Also
assailed is the RTC Resolution2 dated January 2, 2008 denying the motion for reconsideration.
On April 8, 1976, respondent married Socrates Flores (Socrates) in Lezo, Aklan. 3 On January 24, 1983,
during the subsistence of the said marriage, respondent married Silverio V. Cipriano (Silverio) in San Pedro,
Laguna.4 In 2001, respondent filed with the RTC of Muntinlupa, Branch
256, a Petition for the Annulment of her marriage with Socrates on the ground of the latter’s psychological
incapacity as defined under Article 36 of the Family Code, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 01-204. On
July 18, 2003, the RTC of Muntinlupa, Branch 256, rendered an Amended Decision5 declaring the marriage
of respondent with Socrates null and void. Said decision became final and executory on October 13, 2003.6
On May 14, 2004, petitioner Merlinda Cipriano Montañez, Silverio’s daughter from the first marriage, filed with
the Municipal Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna, a Complaint7 for Bigamy against respondent, which was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 41972. Attached to the complaint was an Affidavit8 (Malayang Sinumpaang
Salaysay) dated August 23, 2004, thumb-marked and signed by Silverio,9 which alleged, among others, that
respondent failed to reveal to Silverio that she was still married to Socrates. On November 17, 2004, an
Information10 for Bigamy was filed against respondent with the RTC of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 31. The
case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 4990-SPL. The Information reads:
That on or about January 24, 1983, in the Municipality of San Pedro, Province of Laguna, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously contract a second or subsequent marriage with one SILVERIO CIPRIANO VINALON while her first
marriage with SOCRATES FLORES has not been judicially dissolved by proper judicial authorities.11
On July 24, 2007 and before her arraignment, respondent, through counsel, filed a Motion to Quash
Information (and Dismissal of the Criminal Complaint)12 alleging that her marriage with Socrates had already
been declared void ab initio in 2003, thus, there was no more marriage to speak of prior to her marriage to
Silverio on January 24, 1983; that the basic element of the crime of bigamy, i.e., two valid marriages, is
therefore wanting. She also claimed that since the second marriage was held in 1983, the crime of bigamy
had already prescribed. The prosecution filed its Comment13 arguing that the crime of bigamy had already
been consummated when respondent filed her petition for declaration of nullity; that the law punishes the act
of contracting a second marriage which appears to be valid, while the first marriage is still subsisting and has
not yet been annulled or declared void by the court.
In its Order14 dated August 3, 2007, the RTC denied the motion. It found respondent's argument that with the
declaration of nullity of her first marriage, there was no more first marriage to speak of and thus the element
of two valid marriages in bigamy was absent, to have been laid to rest by our ruling in Mercado v.
Tan15 where we held:
In the instant case, petitioner contracted a second marriage although there was yet no judicial declaration of
nullity of his first marriage. In fact, he instituted the Petition to have the first marriage declared void only after
complainant had filed a letter-complaint charging him with bigamy. For contracting a second marriage while
the first is still subsisting, he committed the acts punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
That he subsequently obtained a judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial. To
repeat, the crime had already been consummated by then. x x x16
As to respondent's claim that the action had already prescribed, the RTC found that while the second
marriage indeed took place in 1983, or more than the 15-year prescriptive period for the crime of bigamy, the
commission of the crime was only discovered on November 17, 2004, which should be the reckoning period,
hence, prescription has not yet set in.
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration17 claiming that the Mercado ruling was not applicable, since
respondent contracted her first marriage in 1976, i.e., before the Family Code; that the petition for annulment
was granted and became final before the criminal complaint for bigamy was filed; and, that Article 40 of the
Family Code cannot be given any retroactive effect because this will impair her right to remarry without need
of securing a declaration of nullity of a completely void prior marriage.
On September 24, 2007, the RTC issued its assailed Order,18 the dispositive portion of which reads:
Wherefore, the Order of August 3, 2007 is reconsidered and set aside. Let a new one be entered quashing
the information. Accordingly, let the instant case be DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
In so ruling, the RTC said that at the time the accused had contracted a second marriage on January 24,
1983, i.e., before the effectivity of the Family Code, the existing law did not require a judicial declaration of
absolute nullity as a condition precedent to contracting a subsequent marriage; that jurisprudence before the
Family Code was ambivalent on the issue of the need of prior judicial declaration of absolute nullity of the first
marriage. The RTC found that both marriages of respondent took place before the effectivity of the Family
Code, thus, considering the unsettled state of jurisprudence on the need for a prior declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage before commencing a second marriage and the principle that laws should be interpreted
liberally in favor of the accused, it declared that the absence of a judicial declaration of nullity should not
prejudice the accused whose second marriage was declared once and for all valid with the annulment of her
first marriage by the RTC of Muntinlupa City in 2003.
Dissatisfied, a Motion for Reconsideration was filed by the prosecution, but opposed by respondent. In a
Resolution dated January 2, 2008, the RTC denied the same ruling, among others, that the judicial
declaration of nullity of respondent's marriage is tantamount to a mere declaration or confirmation that said
marriage never existed at all, and for this reason, her act in contracting a second marriage cannot be
considered criminal.
Aggrieved, petitioner directly filed the present petition with us raising the following issues:
I. Whether the judicial nullity of a first marriage prior to the enactment of the Family Code and the
pronouncement in Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy on the ground of psychological incapacity is a valid defense for a
charge of bigamy for entering into a second marriage prior to the enactment of the Family Code and the
pronouncement in Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy?
II. Whether the trial court erred in stating that the jurisprudence prior to the enactment of the Family Code and
the pronouncement in Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy regarding the necessity of securing a declaration of nullity of the
first marriage before entering a second marriage ambivalent, such that a person was allowed to enter a
subsequent marriage without the annulment of the first without incurring criminal liability.19
Preliminarily, we note that the instant petition assailing the RTC's dismissal of the Information for bigamy was
filed by private complainant and not by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) which should represent the
government in all judicial proceedings filed before us.20
Notwithstanding, we will give due course to this petition as we had done in the past. In Antone v.
Beronilla,21 the offended party (private complainant) questioned before the Court of Appeals (CA) the RTC's
dismissal of the Information for bigamy filed against her husband, and the CA dismissed the petition on the
ground, among others, that the petition should have been filed in behalf of the People of the Philippines by the
OSG, being its statutory counsel in all appealed criminal cases. In a petition filed with us, we said that we had
given due course to a number of actions even when the respective interests of the government were not
properly represented by the OSG and said:
In Labaro v. Panay, this Court dealt with a similar defect in the following manner:
It must, however, be stressed that if the public prosecution is aggrieved by any order ruling of the trial judge in
a criminal case, the OSG, and not the prosecutor, must be the one to question the order or ruling before us. x
xx
Nevertheless, since the challenged order affects the interest of the State or the plaintiff People of the
Philippines, we opted not to dismiss the petition on this technical ground. Instead, we required the OSG to
comment on the petition, as we had done before in some cases. In light of its Comment, we rule that the OSG
has ratified and adopted as its own the instant petition for the People of the Philippines. (Emphasis
supplied)22
Considering that we also required the OSG to file a Comment on the petition, which it did, praying that the
petition be granted in effect, such Comment had ratified the petition filed with us.
As to the merit of the petition, the issue for resolution is whether or not the RTC erred in quashing the
Information for bigamy filed against respondent.
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes bigamy as follow:
Art. 349. Bigamy. – The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a
second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent
spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
The elements of the crime of bigamy are: (a) the offender has been legally married; (b) the marriage has not
been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed
dead according to the Civil Code; (c) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (d) the second
or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. The felony is consummated on the
celebration of the second marriage or subsequent marriage.23 It is essential in the prosecution for bigamy
that the alleged second marriage, having all the essential requirements, would be valid were it not for the
subsistence of the first marriage.24
In this case, it appears that when respondent contracted a second marriage with Silverio in 1983, her first
marriage with Socrates celebrated in 1976 was still subsisting as the same had not yet been annulled or
declared void by a competent authority. Thus, all the elements of bigamy were alleged in the Information. In
her Motion to Quash the Information, she alleged, among others, that:
xxxx
2. The records of this case would bear out that accused's marriage with said Socrates Flores was
declared void ab initio on 14 April 2003 by Branch 256 of the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City.
The said decision was never appealed, and became final and executory shortly thereafter.
3. In other words, before the filing of the Information in this case, her marriage with Mr. Flores had
already been declared void from the beginning.
4. There was therefore no marriage prior to 24 January 1983 to speak of. In other words, there was
only one marriage.
5. The basic element of the crime of bigamy, that is, two valid marriages, is therefore wanting.25
Clearly, the annulment of respondent's first marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity was declared
only in 2003. The question now is whether the declaration of nullity of respondent's first marriage justifies the
dismissal of the Information for bigamy filed against her.
We rule in the negative.
In Mercado v. Tan,26 we ruled that the subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was
immaterial, because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime of bigamy had already been consummated.
And by contracting a second marriage while the first was still subsisting, the accused committed the acts
punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
In Abunado v. People,27 we held that what is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first
marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted.28 Even if the accused eventually
obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the first and the second
marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled.29
In Tenebro v. CA,30 we declared that although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the
vinculum between the spouses is concerned, it is significant to note that said marriage is not without legal
effects. Among these effects is that children conceived or born before the judgment of absolute nullity of the
marriage shall be considered legitimate. There is, therefore, a recognition written into the law itself that such a
marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences. Among these legal consequences is
incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To hold otherwise would render the State’s penal laws on bigamy
completely nugatory, and allow individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some
manner, and to thus escape the consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of
hapless women with the promise of futurity and commitment.31
And in Jarillo v. People,32 applying the foregoing jurisprudence, we affirmed the accused's conviction for
bigamy, ruling that the moment the accused contracted a second marriage without the previous one having
been judicially declared null and void, the crime of bigamy was already consummated because at the time of
the celebration of the second marriage, the accused’s first marriage which had not yet been declared null and
void by a court of competent jurisdiction was deemed valid and subsisting.
Here, at the time respondent contracted the second marriage, the first marriage was still subsisting as it had
not yet been legally dissolved. As ruled in the above-mentioned jurisprudence, the subsequent judicial
declaration of nullity of the first marriage would not change the fact that she contracted the second marriage
during the subsistence of the first marriage. Thus, respondent was properly charged of the crime of bigamy,
since the essential elements of the offense charged were sufficiently alleged.
Respondent claims that Tenebro v. CA33 is not applicable, since the declaration of nullity of the previous
marriage came after the filing of the Information, unlike in this case where the declaration was rendered
before the information was filed. We do not agree. What makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when
he contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.
Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be
submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it
be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage
exists.34 Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first
marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.35
Anent respondent's contention in her Comment that since her two marriages were contracted prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code, Article 40 of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect because this
will impair her right to remarry without need of securing a judicial declaration of nullity of a completely void
marriage.
We are not persuaded.
In Jarillo v. People,36 where the accused, in her motion for reconsideration, argued that since her marriages
were entered into before the effectivity of the Family Code, then the applicable law is Section 29 of the
Marriage Law (Act 3613),37 instead of Article 40 of the Family Code, which requires a final judgment
declaring the previous marriage void before a person may contract a subsequent marriage. We did not find
the argument meritorious and said:
As far back as 1995, in Atienza v. Brillantes, Jr., the Court already made the declaration that Article 40, which
is a rule of procedure, should be applied retroactively because Article 256 of the Family Code itself provides
that said "Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired
rights." The Court went on to explain, thus:
The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants' rights may not preclude their retroactive
application to pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a
person who may feel that he is adversely affected. The reason is that as a general rule, no vested right may
attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws.1âwphi1
In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis, the Court pointed out the danger of not enforcing the provisions of Article 40 of the
Family Code, to wit:
In the case at bar, respondent’s clear intent is to obtain a judicial declaration nullity of his first marriage and
thereafter to invoke that very same judgment to prevent his prosecution for bigamy. He cannot have his cake
and eat it too. Otherwise, all that an adventurous bigamist has to do is disregard Article 40 of the Family
Code, contract a subsequent marriage and escape a bigamy charge by simply claiming that the first marriage
is void and that the subsequent marriage is equally void for lack of a prior judicial declaration of nullity of the
first. A party may even enter into a marriage license and thereafter contract a subsequent marriage without
obtaining a declaration of nullity of the first on the assumption that the first marriage is void. Such scenario
would render nugatory the provision on bigamy.38
WHEREFORE, considering the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The Order dated September 24, 2007
and the Resolution dated January 2, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 31,
issued in Criminal Case No. 4990-SPL, are hereby SET ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 4990-SPL is ordered
REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 137010 August 29, 2003
ARK TRAVEL EXPRESS, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
The Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 150, HON. ZEUS ABROGAR,
VIOLETA BAGUIO and LORELEI IRA, Respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to nullify the Order dated
October 2, 1998 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City (Branch 150) in Civil Case No. 98-
21251 which considered Criminal Cases Nos. 200894 and 200895 pending before the Metropolitan Trial
Court (MTC) of Makati (Branch 67) as withdrawn; and, the Order dated November 23, 1998 which denied
petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.
The facts of the case:
Herein petitioner Ark Travel Express, Inc. (Ark Travel for brevity) filed with the City Prosecutor of Makati a
criminal complaint for False Testimony in a Civil Case under Article 182 of the Revised Penal Code against
herein private respondents Violeta Baguio and Lorelei Ira. In a resolution dated November 20, 1996, the City
Prosecutor found probable cause to indict private respondents for violation of said law and accordingly filed
the respective Informations against each of them before the MTC, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 200894
and 200895, which, except for the names of the accused, uniformly read as follows:
The undersigned 2nd Assistant Prosecutor accuses VIOLETA S. BAGUIO of the crime of Violation of Article
182 of the Revised Penal Code (False Testimony), committed as follows:
That on or about the 19th day of February, 1996, in the City of Makati, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously give
false testimony upon a material fact in Civil Case No. 95-1542, relative to a complaint for Collection of sum of
money, torts and damages filed by Ark Travel Express, Inc. (Ark Inc. for short) against New Filipino Maritime
Agencies, Inc. (NFMA, Inc. for short) in the following manner, to wit: during the trial of the aforesaid civil case
on aforestated date before Branch 137 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Metro Manila, in which one
of the principal issues was whether or not payment of the claim of ARK, Inc. has been made by NFMA, Inc.,
the said accused while testifying for NFMA, Inc., with malicious intent, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously and knowingly testified on direct testimony, by way of a sworn statement, and while under
oath on the witness stand, that the claims of ARK, Inc. supported by a statements of accounts (Exhibit "E" to
"GG") sent to and received by defendant-corporation NFMA, Inc. is baseless and/or been paid, which
testimony as accused very well knew and ought to know, by reason of accused’s position as cashier, was
false inasmuch as the claim based on the statement of accounts of ARK, Inc. (Exhibits "E" to "GG" are, in
truth and in fact, valid, legal and unpaid accounts of NFMA, Inc. with ARK Travel Inc., herein represented by
private complainant MA. PAZ ALBERTO, to the damage and prejudice of the latter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
Private respondents filed a petition for review of the City Prosecutor’s resolution dated November 20, 1996
with the Department of Justice (DOJ). In a resolution dated March 9, 1998,3 Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito
P. Zuño reversed the City Prosecutor’s resolution dated November 20, 1996. The prosecution office of Makati
then filed with the MTC a Motion to Withdraw Information.4
However, on May 15, 1998, Ark Travel filed an "Urgent Petition for Automatic Review" with the DOJ. In a letter
dated May 27, 1998, Secretary Silvestre H. Bello III resolved to treat the urgent petition as a motion for
reconsideration, reversed its resolution dated March 9, 1998 and directed the City Prosecutor to proceed with
the prosecution of Criminal Cases Nos. 200894 and 200895.5 For this reason, the MTC issued an Order
dated June 10, 1998, denying the aforesaid Motion to Withdraw Information filed by the prosecution, to wit:
It appearing that the Department of Justice had reconsidered its previous ruling directing the City Prosecutor
of Makati City to withdraw the information filed against the accused in the above-entitled cases, the Motion to
Withdraw Information filed by the prosecution is hereby DENIED.
Set these cases therefore for arraignment on July 30, 1998 at 8:30 in the morning.
SO ORDERED.6
In the meanwhile, private respondents Baguio and Ira filed a Motion for Reconsideration 7 of the May 27, 1998
resolution of then Secretary Bello III, alleging that: (1) the March 9, 1998 resolution of Chief State Prosecutor
Zuño finding no probable cause to indict them has become final and executory because the Urgent Petition
for Automatic Review was filed way beyond the 10-day reglementary period; and (2) the said resolution of
May 27, 1998 did not reverse the finding of the March 9, 1998 resolution that respondents did not really act
with malice/criminal intent because the resolution of the Secretary merely stated that there was false
testimony.
DOJ Undersecretary Jesus A. Zozobrado, Jr., signing "For the Secretary", granted the Motion for
Reconsideration in a resolution dated June 26, 1998, disposing thus:
WHEREFORE, our resolution dated May 27, 1998 is reconsidered and set aside; and consequently, our
resolution dated March 9, 1998 is reinstated. You are accordingly, directed to immediately cause, with leave of
court, the withdrawal of the informations for false testimony in a civil case filed against Violeta S. Baguio and
Lorelei Ira. Report to us the action taken within ten (10) days from receipt hereof.
Consequently, private respondents filed with the MTC a Motion for Reconsideration of its June 10, 1998 Order
alleging that there is no longer any obstacle, legal or otherwise, to the granting of the Motion to Withdraw
Information previously filed by the prosecution. The MTC denied the motion in an Order, dated July 21, 1998,
which we quote verbatim, as follows:
Submitted for resolution is a Motion for Reconsideration filed by the accused through counsel which seeks a
reversal of the court’s order denying the Motion to Withdraw filed by the prosecution.
In the Crespo Mogul case, it was held by the Supreme Court that once an information is filed in court, such
filing sets in motion the criminal action against the accused before the court, and any motion to dismiss or
withdraw information is always addressed to the discretion of the court. The denial or grant of any motion is
done by the court not out of subservience to the secretary of justice but in faithful exercise of its judicial
prerogative. This is the ruling in the case of Robert Jr. et al. vs. CH et al. vs. CA G.R. No. 113930 promulgated
on March 5, 1996.
A reading of the information sufficiently alleges the facts which make out the offense charged and in keeping
with the above ruling of the Supreme Court, this court hereby denies the Motion for Reconsideration.
Set this case for arraignment of both accused on July 30, 1998 at 8:30 in the morning.
SO ORDERED.8
Private respondents questioned the MTC Orders dated June 10, 1998 and July 21, 1998 via a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 with the respondent RTC of Makati.
The RTC issued herein assailed Order dated October 2, 1998, portions of which read:
...
As aptly stated in Ledesma vs. CA (Supra) and Marcelo vs. CA (Aug. 4, 1994) the trial Court nonetheless
should make its own study and evaluation of the said motion and not reply merely on the awaited action of the
secretary.
No such evaluation was ever conducted by the respondent Court before it issued the two (2) questioned
orders.
In view hereof, it is this Court’s opinion and stand that the respondent Court may have indeed acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it denied the Motion to Withdraw
and the motion for reconsideration based solely on its bare and ambiguous reliance on the Crespo Doctrine,
since an independent evaluation and assessment of the existence of a probable cause is necessary before
such orders denying the said motions could be issued.
Foregoing Premises Considered, the petition for Certiorari is hereby granted. The questioned orders dated
June 10 and July 21, 1998 are hereby set aside and the Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 200894 and
200895 are hereby considered withdrawn.9 (Emphasis ours)
SO ORDERED.
The RTC denied Ark Travel’s motion for reconsideration in its Order dated November 23, 1998,10 to wit:
This resolves the motion for reconsideration filed by private respondent which was temporarily held in
abeyance on account of the manifestation of movant’s counsel that they intend to file a motion to inhibit;
however, despite the lapse of the 10-day period given to them to do so, the intended motion has not been
filed.
After an extensive study of the motion as well as the opposition thereto, and with careful consideration and
assessment of the circumstances which led to its earlier order, the Court finds no compelling reason to alter,
amend and/or reconsider its order dated October 2, 1998.
Wherefore, the above-mentioned motion is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, the present petition for certiorari which raises the following issue:
WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OF OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, WHEN IT NULLIFIED THE ORDERS OF
THE COURT A QUO, ENJOINED THE SAID COURT A QUO FROM HEARING CRIMINAL CASES NOS.
200894 AND 200895, AND THEREAFTER, ORDERED THE OUTRIGHT DISMISSAL OF SAID CRIMINAL
CASES.11
Ark Travel argues that the ruling of the RTC contravenes the doctrine laid down by this Court in the case
of Crespo vs. Mogul12 which enunciated that once a complaint or information is filed in court any disposition
of the case such as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of
the court. Ark Travel likewise insists that criminal prosecutions cannot be enjoined.
In their Comment, private respondents counter: (1) Appeal and not certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court is the appropriate remedy. But even if the petition at bar is treated as an appeal, the filing thereof way
beyond the 15-day reglementary period within which to appeal, renders the instant petition outrightly
dismissable; (2) Assuming arguendo that petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is the correct remedy, the
petition should still be denied and/or dismissed outright for having been filed beyond the 60-day reglementary
period provided by Rule 65 of the Rules of Court; (3) The RTC’s Orders have become final and executory,
and consequently may no longer be disturbed; (4) The filing of the petition with this Court is grossly violative
of the principle of hierarchy of courts; (5) There is no ground to reverse public respondent RTC’s Orders
which considered the criminal cases as withdrawn because the petition does not rebut the validity of the ruling
of the DOJ that there is no probable cause to charge herein private respondents with the crime of false
testimony.
In its Reply, Ark Travel argues that herein petition for certiorari is the proper remedy and not appeal because
what is being questioned is not the correctness of the subject Orders but the jurisdiction of the RTC in
considering the criminal cases as withdrawn when said cases are not pending with it but the MTC; that appeal
is not a speedy and/or adequate remedy; and that herein petition does not violate the principle of hierarchy of
court because it presents a question of law.
We shall first address the procedural aspect.
The issue raised in the present petition concerns the jurisdiction of the RTC in ordering the dismissal of the
criminal cases pending before the MTC and therefore, the proper remedy is certiorari. As such, the present
petition for certiorari ought to have been dismissed for late filing. The assailed Order dated October 2, 1998
was received by Ark Travel on October 16, 1998. Ark Travel filed the Motion for Reconsideration fourteen
days later or on October 30, 1998. On November 27, 1998, Ark Travel received the Order of the denial of the
Motion for Reconsideration. Pursuant to Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, then prevailing, the
petition should have been filed on the forty-sixth day (60 days minus 14 days) from November 27, 1998 or on
January 12, 1999, the last day of the 60-day reglementary period; instead, the petition was filed on January
26, 1999.
However, during the pendency of herein petition, the Court promulgated A.M. No. 00-2-03, amending Section
4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, effective September 1, 2000, to wit:
SEC. 4. When and where petition filed. – The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of
judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such
motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of said motion.
in which case, the filing of the petition on January 26, 1999 was filed on the 60th day from November 27,
1998, Ark Travel’s date of receipt of notice of the order denying Ark Travel’s motion for reconsideration.
We have consistently held that statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable
to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage – procedural laws are retroactive in that
sense and to that extent.13 In view of such retroactive application of procedural laws, the instant petition
should be considered as timely filed.14
Further, herein case is a clear exception to the principle of hierarchy of courts. The Court has full discretionary
power to take cognizance of the petition filed directly to it for compelling reasons or if warranted by the nature
of the issues raised.15 This case commenced in the MTC way back 1996 and still pends. We therefore set
aside such principle for this particular case, in the interest of speedy justice.16
Anent the substantive aspect.
The general rule is that the denial of a motion to withdraw information, just like a motion to dismiss a
complaint, is an interlocutory order and therefore it cannot be the proper subject of an appeal or certiorari until
a final judgment on the merits of the case is rendered.17 However, there are certain situations where
recourse to certiorari or mandamus is considered appropriate, to wit:
a) when the trial court issued the order without or in excess of jurisdiction; (b) where there is patent grave
abuse of discretion by the trial court; or, (c) appeal would not prove to be a speedy and adequate remedy as
when an appeal would not promptly relieve a defendant from the injurious effects of the patently mistaken
order maintaining the plaintiffs baseless action and compelling the defendant needlessly to go through a
protracted trial and clogging the court dockets by another futile case.18
All three situations are present in this case. Thus, the petition for certiorari filed with this Court is the proper
remedy.
In the petition for certiorari filed with the RTC, Ark Travel claims that the MTC committed grave abuse of
discretion in denying the Motion to Withdraw Informations on the ground that the MTC disregarded the DOJ’s
finding of lack of probable cause without making an independent evaluation of the same.
Indeed, the MTC Order dated June 10, 1998 shows that the Motion to Withdraw Informations was denied by
the MTC solely on the basis of the ruling of the DOJ that there exists a probable cause; while the MTC Order
dated July 21, 1998 denied the motion for reconsideration of the June 10, 1998 order on the basis of the
principle laid down in the Crespo vs. Mogul case that once an Information was filed in court, its disposition
rests in the discretion of the court and that the allegations of facts in the Information make out the offense
charged.
It is settled that when confronted with a motion to withdraw an Information on the ground of lack of
probable cause based on a resolution of the Secretary of the Department of Justice, the bounden duty
of the trial court is to make an independent assessment of the merits of such motion.19 Having
acquired jurisdiction over the case, the trial court is not bound by such resolution but is required to
evaluate it before proceeding further with the trial20 and should embody such assessment in the
order disposing the motion.21
The subject MTC Orders do not show that the MTC made an independent assessment of the merits of the
Motion to Withdraw Informations. The MTC merely based its first order on the ruling of the DOJ that probable
cause existed. In the second order, the MTC merely stated that from its reading of the Informations, and in
keeping with the Crespo ruling, it is denying the motion for reconsideration.1âwphi1
The MTC should have made an independent evaluation and embodied its assessment in at least one of its
assailed orders, especially considering that the DOJ had issued contradicting rulings on the existence of
probable cause. Hence, on this point, we agree with the RTC that the MTC committed grave abuse of
discretion.
But the RTC, acting on the petition for certiorari before it, not only committed grave abuse of discretion but
acted in excess of or beyond its jurisdiction in considering the criminal cases pending in the MTC as
withdrawn, which in effect, causes the dismissal of the two criminal cases. First, the subject cases are not
within the jurisdiction of the RTC to dismiss. The only issue brought to it is whether or not the MTC committed
grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to withdraw without making any independent evaluation as to
whether or not there is a probable cause. Second, while ruling that the MTC should have made an
independent assessment on the merits of the Motion to Withdraw Informations, the RTC itself omitted to do
the very thing that it prescribed the MTC to do. It unceremoniously considered the criminal cases as
withdrawn, without evaluation or determination of the existence of the probable cause.
The RTC should have only nullified the subject MTC Order and remanded the case to the MTC for its
determination of the existence of probable cause pursuant to the
aforementioned Crespo and Ledesma cases.
However, inasmuch as we have taken cognizance of this case in the interest of speedy justice and
considering that the entire records have been forwarded to us, it is befitting that we determine the existence of
probable cause to put an end to this issue which had been unresolved since 1998, not to mention the fact that
the subject Informations were initially filed in 1996. A remand of the case to the MTC for an independent
evaluation of the existence of probable cause will only delay the disposition of the case and contribute in the
clogging of the dockets.
To constitute the crime of False Testimony in a Civil Case under Article 182 of the Revised Penal Code, the
following requisites must concur:
 1. the testimony must be given in a civil case;
2. the testimony must relate to the issues presented in the case;
3. the testimony is false;
4. the false testimony must be given by the defendant knowing the same to be false; and
5. such testimony must be malicious and given with and intent to affect the issues presented in the
case.22
There is no doubt that the first two requisites are extant in this case. The records show that Ark Travel filed a
complaint for collection of sum of money, torts and damages against New Filipino Maritime Agencies, Inc.
(NFMAI) and Angelina T. Rivera with the Regional Trial Court of Makati (Branch 137), docketed as Civil Case
No. 95-1542. In said civil case, private respondents were presented by NFMAI as witnesses. They executed
their respective sworn statements and testified before the trial court that NFMAI has no outstanding obligation
with Ark Travel as the same had been paid in full.
The existence of the last three requisites is quite dubious. The falsity of the subject testimonies of private
respondents is yet to be established. It is noted that at the time of the filing of the criminal complaints, the civil
case filed by Ark Travel is still pending decision.23 Ark Travel has yet to prove the validity of its monetary
claims and damages against NFMAI. It is only after trial that the RTC can assess the veracity or falsity of the
testimony and correspondingly render a decision. Thus, the civil case is so intimately connected with the
subject crime that it is determinative of the guilt or innocence of the respondents in the criminal cases. In
other words, whether or not the testimonies of private respondents in the civil cases are false is a prejudicial
question. It is clear that the elements of a prejudicial question are present as provided in Section 7, Rule 111
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit:
SEC. 7 Elements of Prejudicial question. – The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously
instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent
criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed.
Section 6, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedures provides:
SEC. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. – A petition for suspension of the criminal action based
upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the office of the prosecutor or the
court conducting the preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has been filed in court for trial,
the petition to suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action at any time before the prosecution
rests. (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, pending determination of the falsity of the subject testimonies of private respondents in the civil case,
the criminal action for false testimony must perforce be suspended. As such, under the attendant
circumstances, although there is no motion to suspend proceedings on the part of the private respondents,
orderly administration of justice dictates that the criminal cases should be suspended.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Orders dated October 2, 1998 and November 23, 1998 of the Regional Trial
Court are NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE insofar only as said court, acting as an appellate court, considered
Criminal Cases Nos. 200894 and 200895 as withdrawn.
The Orders dated June 10, 1998 and July 21, 1998 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati (Branch 67) in
Criminal Cases Nos. 200894 and 200895 are likewise NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE for having been issued
with grave abuse of discretion. In lieu thereof, the said Metropolitan Trial Court is directed to SUSPEND the
criminal proceedings until after the final decision in Civil Case No. 95-1542 of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City (Branch 137).
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.