NDASMARINAS GARMENTS V.

REYES
G.R. 108229
AUGUST 24, 1993

FACTS: The American President Lines, Ltd. Sued Dasmarinas Garments, Inc,
the petitioner, to recover the sum of 53,228.45 USD as well as an amount
equivalent to twenty-five percent (25%) thereof as attorney’s fees and litigation
expenses

In its answer, the petitioner specifically denied liability to the plaintiff

and set up compulsory counterclaims against it. APL presented its first witness
around whose testimony was completed around November 1998. The case was
reset to May 1989 for reception of the testimony of two more witnesses in APL’s
behalf.

At the May 1989 hearing, APL filed a motion praying that it intended to
take the depositions of H. Lee and Yeong Fang Yeh in Taiwan and for that
purpose, a commission or letters rogatory be issued addressed to the consulary
officers of the Philippines in Taiwan. Five days later, however, they filed an
amended motion that Taiwan did not have a Philippine consulary office in
Taiwan in view of its one-China policy, and as such, the commissions or
letters be sent to Director Joaquin Roces of the Asian Exchange Center, Inc.
instead.

The petitioner opposed the motion, claiming that the motion was; (a)
fatally defective; (b) the issuance of letters rogatory was unnecessary because
the witnessed could be examined before the Philippine court; and (c) the Rules
of Court expressly require that the testimony of a witness must be taken orally
in open court and not by deposition.

During the course of extensive arguments, APL’s counsel received a letter

from Roces which states that depositions may only be taken by the office upon
previous authority from the Department of Foreign affairs, along with
procedural guidelines from a Taipei Law Firm.

The RTC ruled in favor of APL, commissioning the Asian Exchange

Center to take down the deposition of the Lee and Yeh. The CA affirmed the
propriety of the RTC’s order.

The petitioner has now reached the Supreme Court to appeal the Court’s
order. Among other things, the petitioner alleges that a deposition is a mode of
pretrial discovery to be availed of before the action comes to trial.

ISSUE: Whether or not the taking of a deposition is strictly a mode of pretrial

discovery.
RULING: No. Depositions are chiefly a mode of discovery. They are intended as
a means to compel disclosure of facts resting in the knowledge of a party or
other person which are relevant in some suit or proceeding in court. Being a
mode of discovery, it is meant to enable a party to learn all the material and
relevant facts, not only to enable a party to learn all the material and relevant
facts, not only known to him and his witnesses, but also those known to the
adverse party and the latter’s own witnesses.

Petitioner, however, wanted to prevent the carrying out of the

commission on various grounds, one of which is their argument that
depositions are strictly a mode of pretrial discover. The Supreme Court held
otherwise. Depositions may be taken at any time after the institution of any
action, whenever necessary or convenient. There is no rule that limits
deposition taking only to the period of pre-trial or before it. The law authorizes
the taking of depositions of witnesses before or after an appeal is taken from
the judgment of a Regional Trial Court to perpetuate their testimony for use in
the event of further proceedings in the said court, and even during the process
of execution of a final and executory judgment.

The petitioner further claimed that the taking of depositions under the
circumstances was a departure from the “accepted and usual judicial
proceedings of examining witness in open court where their demeanor could be
observed by the trial judge. It further argued that it was inherently unfair to
allow APL, “a foreign entity suing in the Philippines, to present its evidence by
mere deposition of its witnesses away from the 'penetrating scrutiny' of the trial
Judge while petitioner is obligated to bring and present its witnesses in open
court subject to the prying eyes and probing questions of the Judge."

The SC noted that it is naturally a departure from the usual procedure,

not because it is illegal or inadmissible, but precisely because it falls within
one of the exceptions where the law permits such a situation, provided that it
follows the applicable Rules of Court.

THUS, the taking down of depositions is a mode of discovery available to

the parties at any time, before or after trial, and such is not illegal nor unfair.

The petition was dismissed.

RULE 23 DEPOSITIONS

Depositions are principally made available by law to the parties as a means of

informing themselves of all the relevant facts; they are not therefore generally
meant to be a substitute for the actual testimony in open court of a party or
witness. The deponent must as a rule be presented for oral examination in
open court at the trial or hearing. This is a requirement of the rules of
evidence. Section 1, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides:
"SECTION 1. Examination to be done in open court. -- The examination of
witnesses presented in a trial or hearing shall be done in open court, and
under oath or affirmation. Unless the witness is incapacitated to speak, or the
question calls for a different mode of answer, the answers of the witness shall
be given orally."

The principle conceding admissibility to a deposition when the deponent is

dead, out of the Philippines, or otherwise unable to come to court to testify, is
consistent with another rule of evidence, found in Section 47, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court.

"SEC. 47. Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding. -- The testimony or

deposition of a witness deceased or unable to testify, given in a former case or
proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving the same parties and subject
matter, may be given in evidence against the adverse party who had the
opportunity to cross-examine him."

Depositions may be used without the person actually being called to the
witness stand under certain conditions and limited purposes [Sec. 4(c2), Rule
24 was applied (Now Rule 23; from 50km to 100km)]

“The Regional Trial Court saw fit to permit the taking of the depositions of the
witnesses in question only by written interrogatories, removing the proponent's
option to take them by oral examination, i.e., by going to Taipei and actually
questioning the witnesses verbally with the questions and answers and
observations of the parties being recorded stenographically. The imposition of
such a limitation, and the determination of the cause thereof, are to be sure
within the Court's discretion. The ostensible reason given by the Trial Court for
the condition -- that the depositions be taken "only upon written
interrogatories" -- is "so as to give defendant (Dasmariñas) the opportunity to
cross-examine the witnesses by serving cross-interrogatories." The statement
implies that opportunity to cross-examine will not be accorded the defendant if
the depositions were to be taken upon oral examination, which, of course, is
not true. For even if the depositions were to be taken on oral examination
in Taipei, the adverse party is still accorded full right to cross-examine
the deponents by the law, either by proceeding to Taipei and there
conducting the cross-examination orally, or opting to conduct said cross-
examination merely by serving cross-interrogatories.”
Republic of the Philippines (PCGG) v. Sandiganbayan
GR No 90478
November 21, 1991

FACTS: This case one for reconvenyance, reversion, accounting, restitution,

and damages commenced by PCGG in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines
against Tantoco, Jr. and Sr. together with Sps. Marcos and other Tantocos.

 After being served with summons Tantoco Jr. and Sr. did not file an answer
but jointly filed a “MOTION TO STRIKE OUT SOME PORTIONS OF THE
COMPLAINT AND FOR BILL OF PARTILCULARS OF OTHER PORTIONS.”

 They also presented a “motion for leave to file interrogatories” and

“interrogatories” under Rule 25 questioning “Who were the Commissioners
of the PCGG who approved or authorized the inclusion of Tantoco Jr. and
Sr. as defendants in the case?”

Sandiganbayan’s Decision: Denied the repondents’ motion to strike out, for

bill of particulars, and for leave to file interrogatories, holding them to be
without legal and factual basis.

 Tantoco and Santiago filed with the Sandiganbayan a pleading

“denominated “Interrogatories to Plaintiff” and later on, “Interrogatories to
Plaintiff” as well as a Motion for Production and Inspection of Documents.

 The amended interrogatories chiefly sought factual details relative to specific

averments of PCGG's amended complaint, through such questions.
Sandiganbayan admitted the Amended Interrogatories and granted the
motion for production and inspection of documents.

 Sandiganbayan promulgated two (2) Resolutions on September 29, 1989,

the first, denying reconsideration (of the Resolution allowing production of
documents), and the second, reiterating by implication the permission to
serve the amended interrogatories on the plaintiff (PCGG).

ISSUE: WON Sandiganbayan erred in admitting the Amended Interrogatories

and granting the motion for production and inspection of documents filed by
the respondents.

RULING: NO.

This Court issued a temporary restraining order on October 27, 1989, directing
the Sandiganbayan to desist from enforcing its questioned resolutions.
 The resolution of controversies is, as everyone knows, the raison d'etre of
courts. This essential function is accomplished by first, the ascertainment
of all the material and relevant facts from the pleadings and from the
evidence adduced by the parties, and second, after that determination of the
facts has been completed, by the application of the law thereto to the end
that the controversy may be settled authoritatively, definitively and finally.

 The office of a bill of particulars is, however, limited to making more

particular or definite the ultimate facts in a pleading. It is not its office to
supply evidentiary matters. And the common perception is that said
evidentiary details are made known to the parties and the court only during
the trial, when proof is adduced on the issues of fact arising from the
pleadings.

 The truth is that "evidentiary matters" may be inquired into and learned by
the parties before the trial. Civil trials should not be carried on in the dark;
and the Rules of Court make this ideal possible through the deposition-
discovery mechanism set forth in Rules 24 to 29. It not only eliminates
unessential issues from trials thereby shortening them considerably, but
also requires parties to play the game with the cards on the table so that the
possibility of fair settlement before trial is measurably increased.

 The objective is as much to give every party the fullest possible information
of all the relevant facts before the trial as to obtain evidence for use upon
said trial. The principle is reflected in Section 2, Rule 24 (governing
depositions) which generally allows the examination of a deponent -
"regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject
of the pending action, whether relating to the claim or defense of any
other party;" as well as "the existence, description, nature, custody,
condition and location of any books, documents, or other tangible
things" and "the identity and location of persons having knowledge of
relevant facts."

 The petitioner's objections to the interrogatories served on it in accordance

with Rule 25 of the Rules of Court cannot be sustained.

 Respondents were correct to seek leave to serve interrogatories, because

discovery was being availed of before an answer had been served. In such a
situation, i.e., "after jurisdiction has been obtained over any defendant or
over property subject of the action" but before answer, Section 1 of Rule 24
(treating of depositions), in relation to Section 1 of Rule 25 (dealing with
interrogatories to parties) explicitly requires "leave of court."
 That the interrogatories deal with factual matters which will be part of the
PCGG's proof upon trial, is not ground for suppressing them, either. This is
why either party may compel the other to disgorge whatever facts he has in
his possession; and the stage at which disclosure of evidence is made is
advanced from the time of trial to the period preceding it.

CONCLUSION: PCGG’s petition is denied and the TRO is lifted and set aside.

______________________________________________________________________________

G.R. No. L-25481 October 31, 1969

GERONIMO CAGUIAT, RUFINA CAGUIAT, FELICIDAD CAGUIAT, FABIAN

CAGUIAT, and APOLONIA CAGUIAT,
vs.
THE HONORABLE GUILLERMO E. TORRES and FRANCISCO CAGUIAT,
respondents

FACTS:
Petitioners are plaintiffs in Civil Case of the Court of First Instance presided
over by respondent Judge, while respondent Francisco Caguiat is the
defendant therein.

After defendant had filed his answer with counterclaim, and the plaintiffs, their
reply to defendant's answer, the herein petitioners served on respondent
Caguiat a notice to take his deposition. Respondent Caguiat, however, filed
with the lower court an urgent motion to prevent the taking of the deposition or
to restrict its scope, which urgent motion the petitioners. The respondent
Judge then issued an order, to hold in abeyance the resolution of his co-
respondent's urgent motion until after the pre-trial.

After a failure to arrive in amicable settlement, herein petitioners again served

on respondent Caguiat a second notice for the taking of his deposition upon
oral examination, to prevent which, the Caguiat filed an urgent motion.
Petitioners opposed respondent Caguiat's urgent motion. Resolving the urgent
motion and the opposition thereto, the respondent Judge, granted his co-
respondent's urgent motion and ordered the petitioners to refrain from taking
the contemplated deposition. Then again, Petitioner's motion for
reconsideration was denied after its hearing.

The petitioners' avowed purpose in securing the deposition of respondent

Caguiat is to get the latter to lay his cards on the table and/or to simplify or
abbreviate the proceedings. Respondent Caguiat, on the other hand, affirms
that he has already revealed practically his entire defense, even to the extent of
naming his witnesses, during the pre-trial, so that the necessity of a deposition
has been obviated.

Appellants assign the following alleged errors of the Court of Appeals.

ISSUES:

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN MAKING ITS DECISION DEPEND ON

THE UNSUPPORTED CONCLUSION THAT 'SINCE THE RESPONDENT
FRANCISCO CAGUIAT HAD PRACTICALLY DISCLOSED ALL HIS EVIDENCE
DURING THE PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE' THE NECESSITY OF A DEPOSITION
THROUGH ORAL EXAMINATION BY THE PETITIONERS WAS OBVIATED.

II. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THERE WAS A DISCLOSURE OF EVIDENCE

BY THE RESPONDENT CAGUIAT DURING THE PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE
AND THAT THE PERSONAL ANIMOSITIES BETWEEN THE PARTIES MIGHT BE
HEIGHTENED, THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN MAKING SAID
'FINDINGS' AS GROUNDS TO COMPLETELY PREVENT AND BAR DISCOVERY
THROUGH DEPOSITION ON EXAMINATION.

III.THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN LIMITING PETITIONERS' MODE OF

DISCOVERY TO OTHER MEANS THAN ORAL EXAMINATION IGNORING
THEREBY THE SPIRIT BEHIND THE RULES OF DISCOVERY.

RULING: Case is absolutely without merit.

Anent the first alleged error, it is readily to be noted that the conclusions of fact
of the Court of Appeals being assailed are binding upon the parties and this
Court. Indeed, the finding of that appellate court to the effect that appellee has
already disclosed all his evidence during the pre-trial and that personal
animosities between the parties "might endanger the peaceful and objective
conduct of the deposition upon oral examination" proposed appears well
substantiated in the records before Us.

It is significant that the respondent Judge deferred the resolution of his co-
respondent's first motion to prevent the taking of his deposition or to restrict
its scope, until after the pre-trial. Likewise, the second urgent motion of the
same tenor and the petitioners' opposition thereto were resolved only after the
completion of the pre-trial and in fact after the parties' joint petition for hearing
on the merits had been granted. The fact that the controverted orders were
issued only after the pre-trial supports respondent Caguiat's affirmation that
he had revealed his defense during the trial, and that the respondent Judge
had satisfied himself that after such revelation there was no more need to take
the former's deposition upon oral examination. Indubitably this view must have
been shared by the petitioners, otherwise they would not have filed a joint
motion for hearing on the merits even before the orders in question were
issued.

In their second assignment of error, appellants contend that the disclosure by

appellee of practically all his evidence at the pre-trial and the danger of
heightening the animosities between the parties during the proposed taking of
the deposition of appellee are not enough to warrant the trial court's order
preventing completely the taking of said deposition. Such contention is
untenable.

There can be no question that the trial court has jurisdiction to direct, in its
discretion, that a deposition shall not be taken, if there are valid reasons for so
ruling. (Cojuangco v. Caluag, L-7952, July 30, 1955, unreported) That the right
of a party to take depositions as means of discovery is not exactly absolute is
implicit in the provisions of the Rules of Court cited by appellants themselves,
sections 16 and 18 of Rule 24, which are precisely designed to protect parties
and their witnesses, whenever in the opinion of the trial court, the move to take
their depositions under the guise of discovery is actually intended to only
annoy, embarrass or oppress them. In such instances, these provisions
expressly authorize the court to either prevent the taking of a deposition or
stop one that is already being taken.

In the case at bar, aside from having practically disclosed all his evidence at
the pre-trial, appellee expressed willingness to enter into a stipulation of facts,
which offer, appellants rejected. Moreover, according to Court of Appeals, the
parties herein filed a joint motion for hearing on the merits even before the
orders in question were issued. Under these circumstances, it is inevitable to
conclude that there was indeed no further need for the deposition desired by
appellants. It could have served no useful purpose, for there was nothing
anymore to discover. Appellants have not shown any real concrete reason for
such deposition.

Appellants' inference in their third assignment of error that the Court of

Appeals has limited their modes of discovery only to other means than a
deposition is entirely baseless. All that has been done here is to hold, and
rightly, that appellants have failed to show that the trial court gravely abused
its discretion in holding that, under the circumstances proven in the records,
there existed good reasons to prevent them from taking the deposition of
appellee.

It is Our conclusion that this appeal is absolutely without merit. Instead of

availing themselves of the modes of discovery provided in the Rules in the
manner that would accomplish one of the basic purposes for which they have
been designed, namely, to cut down trivial discussion about issues of fact
which are better agreed upon rather than formally tried, appellants have
chosen to unduly delay this case by taking the simple incident herein involved
to the Court of Appeals and later to this Court.

G.R. No. 143561      June 6, 2001

JONATHAN D. CARIAGA, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and DAVAO LIGHT
and POWER CO., respondents.

FACTS:

In an amended Information3 dated October 3, 1989, petitioner was charged

with qualified theft.

"Luis Miguel Aboitiz, employed at the time of the incident in question and for
sometime prior thereto as Systems Analyst of the DLPC, whose duty was to
devise systems, procedures or controls to promote efficiency, prevent losses
due to waste, pilferage or theft of company property, etc., received reports that
some private electricians were engaged in the clandestine sale of DLPC
materials and supplies. He initiated a covert operation with the following
objectives: (1) ascertain how DLPC materials were being stolen, the frequency
of the thefts, who were perpetrating the thefts; and (2) `catch' at least one (1)
DLPC employee that may be involved.

he sought the assistance of Sgt. Fermin Villasis, Chief, Theft & Robbery
Section, San Pedro Patrol Station, Davao METRODISCOM. He also hired one
Florencio Siton, a welder by occupation and a Civilian Home Defense Forces
(CHDF) member, as his undercover agent under the pseudonym 'Canuto
Duran', an 'electrician from Kabakan, Cotabato.'

Ricardo offered to supply 'Canuto Duran' with electrical materials, saying that
he has a cousin from whom he can procure the same. 'Canuto' purchased
small electrical wires which, according to Ricardo, came from his cousin,
Jonathan Cariaga, nicknamed Totoy.

On November 17, 1988, Ricardo introduced 'Canuto' to Jonathan at Miguel

Store. It turned out that Jonathan was the assigned driver of DLPC Service
Truck 'S-143' assigned to Work Gang 'Venus'. 'Canuto' inquired from Jonathan
if he could supply him with two (2) 15 KVA transformers. Jonathan replied that
he could for P16,000. 'Canuto' placed an order for the transformers. The deal
did not materialize, however, as 'Canuto's' boss (Miguel Aboitiz) who would
provide the funds happened to be out of town. Jonathan appeared piqued. To
appease him, 'Canuto' assured him that they shall continue their 'business'
relationship. Not long after, he placed an order for a lightning arrester. Ricardo,
Jonathan and 'Canuto' agreed to meet at the corner of Jacinto and Arellano
Streets.

On January 23, 1989, Ricardo accompanied 'Canuto' to Jonathan's house at

Doña Pilar Village, Sasa, Davao City, to get a roll of Electrical Wire No. 2 (300
meters long) valued P5,010 (Exh. J) and 2 lightning arresters with cutout,
valued P1,185.75 each, or P2,371.50 for both (Exhs. I and I-1) from Jonathan.
'Canuto' paid P2,500.00 only for the items. He gave the money to Ricardo;
Ricardo, in turn, gave it to Jonathan.

The prosecution was unable to present Ricardo as its witness as the subpoena
could not be personally served upon him as according to his wife, Antonieta
Cariaga, he was in Sultan Kudarat and the date of his return to Davao City was
not certain

According to the trial court, "the prosecution's evidence considered as a whole

is strong, clear and convincing. The statements in the extrajudicial confessions
of Ricardo implicative of the accused as the source of the stolen articles,
corroborated by Siton's testimony and the police records (Exhs. D to F-2,
inclusive) are formidable compared to the mere puny denial of the accused."

On appeal by Jonathan Cariaga, the Court of Appeals affirmed on April 24,

1995, the decision of the trial court. The Court of Appeals reasoned out that
the sworn statement of Ricardo Cariaga who did not testify in open court
during the criminal proceedings against petitioner is admissible in evidence
and properly considered by the trial court as this was annexed as part of
DLPC's position paper submitted to the National Labor Relations Commission
in Case No. RAB-11-05-00308-89, a complaint filed by the accused for illegal
dismissal, as an exception to the hearsay rule under Section 47, Rule 130 of
the Revised Rules of Court. The Court of Appeals likewise upheld the credibility
of Siton's testimony which corroborated that of Ricardo Cariaga's sworn
statement.

ISSUE:

I. The trial court erred in admitting in evidence the sworn statement of Ricardo
Cariaga without him taking the witness stand since it violates the fundamental
right of the accused to meet the witnesses against him face to face. Hence,
Ricardo Cariaga's sworn statement is not admissible under Section 1(f), Rule
115 of the Revised Rules of Court for failure of the prosecution to comply with
the strict requirements of said rule.
II. The appellate court erred in holding that the lone testimony of the
prosecution's alleged eyewitness who is a paid witness and whose testimony
was admittedly corrected or revised on the witness stand and which materially
and significantly varies with his previous sworn statement on very vital and
pivotal details is sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt.

III. The appellate court erred in failing to appreciate the reasonable doubt
engendered by the exculpatory statements of the superiors of the accused in
favor of the latter.

RULING:

I. YES. Section 1. Rights of accused at the trial. - In all criminal prosecutions,

the accused shall be entitled:

f) To confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him at the trial. Either
party may utilize as part of its evidence the testimony of a witness who is
deceased, out of or can not with due diligence be found in the Philippines,
unavailable or otherwise unable to testify, given in another case or proceeding,
judicial or administrative, involving the same parties and subject matter, the
adverse party having had the opportunity to cross-examine him;

II. No.

III. No.

ANALYSIS:

I. The records reveal that witness Ricardo Cariaga was subpoenaed only once
and did not appear to testify in the criminal case against petitioner.
Concededly, this witness was not deceased or out of the Philippines. In fact,
the private prosecutor informed the court that he is in Sultan Kudarat, 9 and
previously, his wife informed the sheriff that he was in Sultan Kudarat which is
in Cotabato, a mere four hours drive from Davao City. Against this backdrop,
can this witness be categorized as one that cannot be found despite due
diligence, unavailable or unable to testify. We are inclined to rule in the
negative and reverse the Court of Appeals on this point.

II. As we have so frequently ruled, the trial judge who sees and hears witnesses
testify has exceptional opportunities to form a correct conclusion as to the
degree of credit which should be accorded their testimonies. 11 Next, the rule
has also always been that the contradictions between the contents of an
affiant's affidavit and his testimony on the witness stand do not always militate
against the witness' credibility because we have long taken judicial notice that
affidavits, which are usually taken ex parte, are often incomplete and
inaccurate.12 Indeed, a sworn statement taken ex parte is generally considered
to be inferior to a testimony given in open court as the latter is subject to the
test of cross examination.

III. A more accurate reading of the testimonies of the said witnesses reveals
that Rodolfo Sauro14 testified that petitioner is permanently assigned as driver
to the S-143 truck; that he is in charge of all the equipment and supplies
stored in the truck; that there were always reserve materials kept in the truck
for emergency operations during the night and that he trusted him that these
materials were being used for emergencies. 15 He also testified that he took
Jonathan's word that the reserve materials were used for emergencies because
he found him trustworthy.16 On the other hand, Engr. Estelito Saligan was
recalled to the witness stand to clarify Mr. Aboitiz's statement that "he was
ordered to make inventories and that he did not find any missing." He clarified
that he only inventoried the materials inside the warehouse which are within
his jurisdiction, but he did not conduct inventory of materials or properties
already in the possession of the operations department 17 of which petitioner
belonged to. In sum, nothing in the cited testimonies confirm petitioner's
insistence that there were no stolen electrical supplies and materials from
DLPC.

CONCLUSION:

I. In the instant case, no efforts were exerted to have the witness arrested
which is a remedy available to a party-litigant in instances where witnesses
who are duly subpoenaed fail to appear. On this score alone, the sworn
statement of Ricardo Cariaga should not have been admitted as evidence for
the prosecution, and we shall no longer delve into the other aspects of this
rule.

II. We have carefully gone over the records and evidence in this case and we
are persuaded that Siton's testimony in court deserves credence. We further
find the same sufficient for conviction. Siton was consistent and
straightforward in his testimony and had not been shaken by the lengthy and
exhaustive cross-examination by the defense counsel. Having thoroughly
convinced the trial and appellate courts as well as this Court of the truth of his
testimony, we do not see how he could have fabricated the entire story. The
fact that he stated on direct examination that he "corrected" his statement and
that he was offered compensation for his undercover work does not necessarily
discredit him. There is no rule of evidence to the effect that omission of certain
particulars in a sworn statement would estop an affiant from making an
elaboration thereof or from correcting inaccuracies during the trial. It appears
that he was paid for his services rendered as an undercover agent and not for
purposes of concocting a story and imputing a crime as that made out in the
information. Similarly, the alleged inaccuracies in the testimony of Siton in
open court relating to such minute details as whether the petitioner's house
was two-stories high and located in a corner are too negligible to consider.

III. we are satisfied that the participation of the petitioner in the commission of
the crime at bar was well established by the testimony of witness Siton. In the
determination of the sufficiency of evidence, what matters is not the number of
witnesses but their credibility and the nature and quality of their
testimonies.18 It is axiomatic that witnesses are weighed, not numbered and the
testimony of only one witness, if credible and positive and if it satisfies the
court beyond reasonable doubt, is sufficient to convict. The inadmissibility of
Ricardo Cariaga's sworn statement as discussed above will not exculpate him.