DatuAmpatuan, Jr. vs. Sec.

Leila de Lima
G.R. No. 197291
April 3, 2013
Remedial Law
FACTS:On November 23, 2009, 57 innocent civilians were massacred in SitioMasalay,
Municipality of Ampatuan, Maguindanao Province. Among the principal suspects was petitioner,
then the Mayor of the Municipality of Datu Unsay, Maguindanao Province. Inquest proceedings
were conducted against petitioner. Department of Justice (DOJ) resolved to file the
corresponding informations for murder against petitioner, and to issue subpoenae to several
persons. 41 informations for murder were also filed against petitioner. Secretary of Justice
Devanadera transmitted her letter to Chief Justice Puno requesting the transfer of the venue of
the trial of the Maguindanao massacre from Cotabato City to Metro Manila, either in Quezon
City or in Manila, to prevent a miscarriage of justice. The Court granted the request for the
transfer of venue. Dalandag was admitted into the Witness Protection Program of the DOJ. QC
RTC issued its amended pre-trial order, wherein Dalandag was listed as one of the Prosecution
witnesses. petitioner, through counsel, wrote to respondent Secretary of Justice Leila De Lima
and Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Richard Fadullon to request the inclusion of Dalandag in
the informations for murder considering that Dalandag had already confessed his participation
in the massacre through his two sworn declarations.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner may compel the respondents through mandamus to
prosecute Dalandag

HELD: No The prosecution of crimes pertains to the Executive Department of the Government
whose principal power and responsibility are to see to it that our laws are faithfully executed.
The two modes by which a participant in the commission of a crime may become a state
witness are, namely: (a) by discharge from the criminal case pursuant to Section 17 of Rule 119
of the Rules of Court; and (b) by the approval of his application for admission into the Witness
Protection Program of the DOJ in accordance with Republic Act No. 6981 (The Witness
Protection, Security and Benefit Act).39 These modes are intended to encourage a person who
has witnessed a crime or who has knowledge of its commission to come forward and testify in
court or quasi-judicial body, or before an investigating authority, by protecting him from
reprisals, and shielding him from economic dislocation. The admission of Dalandag into the
Witness Protection Program of the Government as a state witness since August 13, 2010 was
warranted by the absolute necessity of his testimony to the successful prosecution of the
criminal charges. Apparently, all the conditions prescribed by Republic Act No. 6981 were met in
his case. That he admitted his participation in the commission of the Maguindanao massacre
was no hindrance to his admission into the Witness Protection Program as a state witness, for
all that was necessary was for him to appear not the most guilty. Accordingly, he could not
anymore be charged for his participation in the Maguindanao massacre, as to which his
admission operated as an acquittal, unless he later on refuses or fails to testify in accordance
with the sworn statement that became the basis for his discharge against those now charged
for the crimes. Mandamus shall issue when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act that the law specifically enjoins as a duty
resulting from an office, trust, or station. It is proper when the act against which it is directed is
one addressed to the discretion of the tribunal or officer. In matters involving the exercise of
judgment and discretion, mandamus may only be resorted to in order to compel respondent
tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person to take action, but it cannot be used to direct the
manner or the particular way discretion is to be exercised, or to compel the retraction or
reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of judgment or discretion. As such,
respondent Secretary of Justice may be compelled to act on the letter-request of petitioner, but
may not be compelled to act in a certain way, i.e., to grant or deny such letter-request.
Considering that respondent Secretary of Justice already denied the letter-request, mandamus
was no longer available as petitioner's recourse.

18. Heirs of Marcelo Sotto vs. Matilde Palicte

G.R. No. 159691
June 13, 2013
Civil Law/Remedial Law

FACTS:Filemon had four children, namely: Marcelo Sotto (Marcelo), Pascuala Sotto-Pahang
(Pascuala), Miguel Barcelona (Miguel), and Matilde. In June 1967, Pilar Teves (Pilar) and other
heirs of Carmen Rallos (Carmen), the deceased wife of Filemon, filed in the Court of First
Instance (CFI) of Cebu City a complaint against the Estate of Sotto (Civil Case No. R-10027)
seeking to recover certain properties that Filemon had inherited from Carmen, and damages.
The CFI rendered judgment awarding to Pilar and other heirs of Carmen damages of
P233,963.65, among other reliefs. To satisfy the monetary part of the judgment, levy on
execution was effected against six parcels of land and two residential houses belonging to the
Estate of Sotto. The levied assets were sold at a public auction. Later on, Matilde redeemed
four of the parcels of land in her own name (i.e., Lots No. 1049, No. 1051, No. 1052 and No.
2179-C), while her sister Pascuala redeemed one of the two houses because her family was
residing there. On July 9, 1980, the Deputy Provincial Sheriff of Cebu executed a deed of
redemption in favor of Matilde, which the Clerk of Court approved. Matilde filed in Civil Case
No. R-10027 a motion to transfer to her name the title to the four properties. However, the CFI
denied her motion, and instead declared the deed of redemption issued in her favor null and
void, holding that Matilde, although declared in Special Proceedings No. 2706-R as one of the
heirs of Filemon, did not qualify as a successor-in-interest with the right to redeem the four
properties. Matilde directly appealed the adverse ruling to the Court via petition for review, and
on September 21, 1987, the Court, reversing the CFI’s ruling, granted Matilde’s petition for
review but allowed her co-heirs the opportunity to join
Matilde as co-redemptioners for a period of six months before the probate court (i.e., RTC of
Cebu City, Branch 16) would grant her motion to transfer the title to her name. On September
10, 1999, the heirs of Marcelo, specifically: Lolibeth Sotto Noble, Danilo C. Sotto, Cristina C.
Sotto, Emmanuel C. Sotto, Filemon C. Sotto, and Marcela C. Sotto; and the heirs of Miguel,
namely: Alberto, Arturo and Salvacion, all surnamed Barcelona (herein petitioners), instituted
the present action for partition against Matilde in the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 20 (Civil Case
No. CEB-24293). the Estate of Sotto, through the administrator, moved in the probate court
(Special Proceedings No. 2706-R) to require Matilde to account for and turn over the four
properties that allegedly belonged to the estate, presenting documentary evidence showing that
Matilde had effected the redemption of the four properties with the funds of the estate in
accordance with the express authorization of Marcelo. The probate court granted the motion,
but subsequently reversed itself upon Matilde’s motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE: Whether or not the judgment was barred by res judicata

HELD: Yes. For this the fifth case to reach us, we still rule that res judicata was applicable to
bar petitioners’ action for partition of the four properties. Res judicata exists when as between
the action sought to be dismissed and the other action these elements are present, namely; (1)
the former judgment must be final; (2) the former judgment must have been rendered by a
court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties; (3) the former judgment must be
a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be between the first and subsequent actions (i)
identity of parties or at least such as representing the same interest in both actions; (ii) identity
of subject matter, or of the rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the
same facts; and, (iii) identity of causes of action in both actions such that any judgment that
may be rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res
judicata in the action under consideration. The first three elements were present. The decision
of the Court in G.R. No. 55076 (the first case), the decision of the Court in G.R. No. 131722
(the second case), the order dated October 5, 1989 of the RTC in Civil Case No. R-10027 as
upheld by the Court in G.R. No. 154585 (the third case), and the decision in G.R. No. 158642
(the fourth case) – all of which dealt with Matilde’s right to the four properties – had upheld
Matilde’s right to the four properties and had all become final. Such rulings were rendered in
the exercise of the respective courts’ jurisdiction over the subject matter, and were
adjudications on the merits of the cases. Civil Case No. CEB-24293 was no different from the
previous cases as far as parties, subject matter, causes of action and issues were concerned. In
other words, Civil Case No. CEB-24293 was an undisguised relitigation of the same settled
matter concerning Matilde’s ownership of the four properties. In all the five cases (Civil Case
No. CEB24293 included), an identity of parties existed because the parties were the same, or
there was privity among them, or some of the parties were successors-in-interest litigating for
the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity. The subject matter of all the
actions (Civil Case No. CEB24293 included), was the same, that is, Matilde’s right to the four
properties.

Stronghold Insurance Company, Inc. vs. Tomas Cuenca, Marcelina Cuenca et al

G.R. No. 173297
March 6, 2013
Remedial Law
FACTS:Marañon filed a complaint in the RTC against the Cuencas for the collection of a sum of
money and damages. His complaint included an application for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary attachment. the RTC granted the application for the issuance of the writ of
preliminary attachment conditioned upon the posting of a bond of P1,000,000.00 executed in
favor of the Cuencas. Less than a month later, Marañon amended the complaint to implead
Tayactac as a defendant. Marañon posted SICI Bond No. 68427 JCL (4) No. 02370 in the
amount of P1,000,000.00 issued by Stronghold Insurance. Two days later, the RTC issued the
writ of preliminary attachment. The sheriff served the writ, the summons and a copy of the
complaint on the Cuencas on the same day. Enforcing the writ of preliminary attachment, the
sheriff levied upon the equipment, supplies, materials and various other personal property
belonging to Arc Cuisine, Inc. that were found in the leased corporate office-cum-commissary or
kitchen of the corporation. RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss and to Quash Writ of Preliminary
Attachment, stating that the action, being one for the recovery of a sum of money and
damages, was within its jurisdiction. CA remanded to the RTC for hearing and resolution of the
Cuencas and Tayactac’s claim for the damages sustained from the enforcement of the writ of
preliminary attachment. Cuencas and Tayactac filed a Motion to Require Sheriff to Deliver
Attached Properties and to Set Case for Hearing. RTC commanded Marañon to surrender all the
attached properties to the RTC through the sheriff within 10 days from notice. RTC rendered its
judgment on April 28, 2003, holding Marañon and Stronghold Insurance jointly and solidarily
liable for damages to the Cuencas and Tayactac.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents are real parties in interest

RULING: No. To ensure the observance of the mandate of the Constitution, Section 2, Rule 3
of the Rules of Court requires that unless otherwise authorized by law or the Rules of Court
every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest. Under
the same rule, a real party in interest is one who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit, or one who is entitled to the avails of the suit. Accordingly, a person , to
be a real party in interest in whose name an action must be prosecuted, should appear to be
the present real owner of the right sought to be enforced, that is, his interest must be a present
substantial interest, not a mere expectancy, or a future, contingent, subordinate, or
consequential interest. Where the plaintiff is not the real party in interest, the ground for the
motion to dismiss is lack of cause of action. The reason for this is that the courts ought not to
pass upon questions not derived from any actual controversy. Truly, a person having no
material interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as the plaintiff in an
action. Nor does a court acquire jurisdiction over a case where the real party in interest is not
present or impleaded. The purposes of the requirement for the real party in interest
prosecuting or defending an action at law are: (a) to prevent the prosecution of actions by
persons without any right, title or interest in the case; (b) to require that the actual party
entitled to legal relief be the one to prosecute the action; (c) to avoid a multiplicity of suits; and
(d) to discourage litigation and keep it within certain bounds, pursuant to sound public policy.
Indeed, considering that all civil actions must be based on a cause of action, defined as the act
or omission by which a party violates the right of another, the former as the defendant must be
allowed to insist upon being opposed by the real party in interest so that he is protected from
further suits regarding the same claim. Under this rationale, the requirement benefits the
defendant because “the defendant can insist upon a plaintiff who will afford him a setup
providing good res judicata protection if the struggle is carried through on the merits to the
end.” The rule on real party in interest ensures, therefore, that the party with the legal right to
sue brings the action, and this interest ends when a judgment involving the nominal plaintiff will
protect the defendant from a subsequent identical action. Such a rule is intended to bring
before the court the party rightfully interested in the litigation so that only real controversies
will be presented and the judgment, when entered, will be binding and conclusive and the
defendant will be saved from further harassment and vexation at the hands of other claimants
to the same demand. There is no dispute that the properties subject to the levy on attachment
belonged to Arc Cuisine, Inc. alone, not to the Cuencas and Tayactac in their own right. They
were only stockholders of Arc Cuisine, Inc., which had a personality distinct and separate from
that of any or all of them. The damages occasioned to the properties by the levy on
attachment, wrongful or not, prejudiced Arc Cuisine, Inc., not them. As such, only Arc Cuisine,
Inc. had the right under the substantive law to claim and recover such damages. This right
could not also be asserted by the Cuencas and Tayactac unless they did so in the name of the
corporation itself. But that did not happen herein, because Arc Cuisine, Inc. was not even joined
in the action either as an original party or as an intervenor. The Cuencas and Tayactac were
clearly not vested with any direct interest in the personal properties coming under the levy on
attachment by virtue alone of their being stockholders in Arc Cuisine, Inc. Their stockholdings
represented only their proportionate or aliquot interest in the properties of the corporation, but
did not vest in them any legal right or title to any specific properties of the corporation. Without
doubt, Arc Cuisine, Inc. remained the owner as a distinct legal person. Given the separate and
distinct legal personality of Arc Cuisine, Inc., the Cuencas and Tayactac lacked the legal
personality to claim the damages sustained from the levy of the former’s properties. According
to Asset Privatization Trust v. Court of Appeals, even when the foreclosure on the assets of the
corporation was wrongful and done in bad faith the stockholders had no standing to recover for
themselves moral damages; otherwise, they would be appropriating and distributing part of the
corporation’s assets prior to the dissolution of the corporation and the liquidation of its debts
and liabilities.

Rolando Sofio and RufioSofio vs. Alberto Valenzuela et al

G.R. No. 157810
February 15, 2012
Remedial Law

FACTS: Respondents Alberto, Gloria, Remedios, and Cesar, all surnamed Valenzuela, are
brothers and sisters. They are the co-owners of a parcel of agricultural land designated as Lot
No. 970-B and located in Barangay Ayungon, Valladolid, Negros Occidental. Alberto had been
planting sugarcane in the entire property, but poor drainage had led him to abandon his
cultivation in 1978 of an .80-hectare portion of the property. Unknown to the respondents,
petitioner Rolando Sofio, a son of their tenant in another lot, had obtained permission to farm
the abandoned area for free from Socorro Valenzuela, the respondents mother who was then
still managing the property. She had acceded to the request on condition that Rolando would
return the portion once the owners needed it. In succeeding years, Alberto had also left other
portions of the property uncultivated because of the low price of sugar. Apparently, Rolando
had also taken over the vacated portions to plant palay. He shared the cultivation with his
brother, co-petitioner RufioSofio. In 1985, respondent Gloria learned for the first time that
Rolando had been permitted by her mother to cultivate the .80 hectare portion without paying
any rentals; and that the petitioners had actually expanded their cultivation to a total area of
1.8 hectares. After the petitioners refused her demand for the return of the 1.8 hectares, she
lodged a complaint against Rolando with the Barangay Chairman of Ayungon, Valladolid, Negros
Occidental, and the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO). The parties did not reach an
amicable settlement. The petitioners, along with Wilma Sofio, their sister who had succeeded
their father as the tenant of respondents other property, informed Gloria that, being the
identified tenants under Presidential Decree No. 27, they had already paid the rentals on the
portions they were cultivating, and that they would be paying subsequent rentals to the Land
Bank of the Philippines (LBP). Emancipation patents (EPs) were issued to Rolando and Rufio
covering their respective areas of tillage. Respondents brought in the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) a complaint against the petitioners, seeking the
cancellation of the EPs, recovery of possession, and damages, alleging that the petitioners
cultivation of their land had been illegal because they had not consented to it. Provincial
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of Negros Occidental, ordered the cancellation of
petitioners EPs. DARAB reversed the ruling of the PARAD. The respondents elevated the
DARABs decision to the CA. CA granted the petition for review. The decision of May 27, 1998
became final and executory on October 27, 1998 after the petitioners neither moved for
reconsideration nor appealed by certiorari to the Court. The writ of execution was issued on
January 23, 2002. The petitioners, represented by new counsel, filed in the PARAD a motion for
relief from judgment, motion for reconsideration of the order dated November 27, 2001, and
motion to recall writ of execution dated January 23, 2002.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition must be denied

RULING: Yes. The Court finds no cause to disturb the decision of the and cannot undo the
decision upon the grounds cited by the petitioners, especially as the decision had long become
final and executory. A decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable
and may no longer be modified in any respect even if the modification is intended to correct
erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be made by the court that rendered it
or by the highest court of the land. This doctrine of finality and immutability of judgments is
grounded on fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice to the effect that,
at the risk of occasional error, the judgments of the courts must become final at some definite
date set by law. The reason is that litigations must end and terminate sometime and
somewhere; and it is essential for the effective and efficient administration of justice that once
a judgment has become final the winning party should not be deprived of the fruits of the
verdict. Given this doctrine, courts must guard against any scheme calculated to bring about
that result, and must frown upon any attempt to prolong controversies. The only exceptions to
the general rule are: (a) the correction of clerical errors; (b) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries
that cause no prejudice to any party; (c) void
judgments; and (d) whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the judgments
rendering execution unjust and inequitable. None of the exceptions obtains here.

The petitioners claim that their former counsel was guilty of gross negligence for letting the CA
decision lapse into finality by not filing a motion for reconsideration or by not appealing in due
course to the Court. Although the petitioners former counsel was blameworthy for the track
their case had taken, there is no question that any act performed by the counsel within the
scope of his general or implied authority is still regarded as an act of the client. In view of this,
even the negligence of the former counsel should bind them as his clients. To hold otherwise
would result to the untenable situation in which every defeated party, in order to salvage his
cause, would simply claim neglect or mistake on the part of his counsel as a ground for
reversing the adverse judgment. There would then be no end to litigation, for every
shortcoming of the counsel could become the subject of challenge by his client through another
counsel who, if he should also be found wanting, would similarly be disowned by the same
client through yet another counsel, and so on ad infinitum. Nonetheless, the gross negligence
of counsel alone would not even warrant a deviation from the principle of finality of judgment,
for the client must have to show that such negligence resulted in the denial of due process to
the client. When the counsels mistake is so great and so serious that the client is prejudiced
and is denied his day in court, or when the counsel is guilty of gross negligence resulting in the
clients deprivation of his property without due process of law, the client is not concluded by his
counsels mistakes and the case can be reopened in order to give the client another chance to
present his case. As such, the test herein is whether their former counsels negligence deprived
the petitioners of due process of law. For one to properly claim gross negligence on the part of
his counsel, he must show that the counsel was guilty of nothing short of a clear abandonment
of the clients cause. Considering that the Court has held that the failure to file the appellant’s
brief can qualify as simple negligence but cannot amount to gross negligence that justifies the
annulment of the proceedings, the failure to file an appellee’s brief may be similarly treated.
The petitioners were able to participate in the proceedings before the PARAD and the DARAB,
and, in fact, obtained a favorable judgment from the DARAB. They also had a similar
opportunity to ventilate their cause in the CA. That they had not been able to avail themselves
of all the remedies open to them did not give them the justification to complain of a denial of
due process. They could not complain because they were given the opportunity to defend their
interest in due course, for it was such opportunity to be heard that was the essence of due
process.

Brenda Nazareth, Regional Director, Department of Science and Technology ,

Regional Office No. IX vs. Hon. Reynaldo Villar, Hon. Juanito Espino Jr. (CHR
Commissioners) and Dir. KhemInok
G .R. No. 188635
January 29, 2013
Remedial Law

FACTS:Congress enacted R.A. No. 8439 to address the policy of the State to provide a program
for human resources development in science and technology in order to achieve and maintain
the necessary reservoir of talent and manpower that would sustain the drive for total science
and technology mastery. Section 7 of R.A. No. 8439 grants the following additional allowances
and benefits (MagnaCarta benefits) to the covered officials and employees of the DOST. Under
R.A. No. 8439, the funds for the payment of the Magna Carta benefits are to be appropriated
by the General Appropriations Act (GAA) of the year following the enactment of R.A. No. 8439.
The DOST Regional Office No. IX in Zamboanga City released the Magna Carta benefits to the
covered officials and employees commencing in CY 1998 despite the absence of specific
appropriation for the purpose in the GAA. Subsequently, following the post-audit conducted by
COA State Auditor Ramon E. Vargas, several NDs were issued disapproving the payment of the
Magna Carta benefits. The disallowance by the COA prompted then DOST Secretary Dr.
FilemonUriarte, Jr. to request the Office of the President (OP) through his Memorandum for the
authority to utilize the DOST’s savings to pay the Magna Carta benefits. Executive Secretary
Ronaldo Zamora, acting by authority of the President, approved the request of Secretary
Uriarte, Jr. Petitioner, in her capacity as the DOST Regional Director in Region IX, lodged an
appeal with COA Regional Cluster Director Ellen Sescon, urging the lifting of the disallowance of
the Magna Carta benefits.

ISSUE: Did the COA commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing their report?

HELD: No The authority granted to the President was subject to two essential requisites in
order that a transfer of appropriation from the agency’s savings would be validly effected. The
first required that there must be savings from the authorized appropriation of the agency. The
second demanded that there must be an existing item, project, activity, purpose or object of
expenditure with an appropriation to which the savings would be transferred for augmentation
purposes only. Clearly and indubitably, the prohibition against the transfer of appropriations is
the general rule. Consequently, the payment of the Magna Carta benefits for CY 2001 without a
specific item or provision in the GAA and without due authority from the President to utilize the
DOST’s savings in other items for the purpose was repugnant to R.A. No. 8439, the
Constitution, and the re-enacted GAA for 2001. The COA is endowed with sufficient latitude to
determine, prevent, and disallow the irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or
unconscionable expenditures of government funds. It has the power to ascertain whether
public funds were utilized for the purposes for which they had been intended by law. The Court
has accorded not only respect but also finality to their findings especially when their decisions
are not tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness that would amount to grave abuse of discretion.
Only when the COA has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, may the Court entertain and grant a
petition for certiorari brought to assail its actions. Section 1 of Rule 65, Rules of Court, demands
that the petitioner must show that, one, the tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and, two, there is neither an appeal nor
any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the purpose of
amending or nullifying the proceeding. Inasmuch as the sole office of the writ of certiorari is the
correction of errors of jurisdiction, which includes the commission of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction, the petitioner should establish that the COA gravely abused its
discretion. Nonetheless, the Court opines that the DOST officials who caused the payment of
the Magna Carta benefits to the covered officials and employees acted in good faith in the
honest belief that there was a firm legal basis for the payment of the benefits. Evincing their
good faith even after receiving the NDs from the COA was their taking the initiative of earnestly
requesting the OP for the authorization to use the DOST’s savings to pay the Magna Carta
benefits. On their part, the DOST covered officials andemployees received the benefits because
they considered themselves rightfully deserving of the benefits under the long-awaited law.
The Court declares and holds that the disallowed benefits received in good faith need not be
reimbursed to the Government.

10. Office of the Ombudsman vs. Samson de Leon

G.R. No. 154083
February 27, 2013
Remedial Law

FACTS: Acting on a report of illegal quarrying being committed in the Municipality of Baras,
Rizal, Graft Investigation Officer Dante D. Tomilla of the Fact Finding Investigation Bureau
(FFIB) of the Office of the Ombudsman conducted an investigation pursuant to a mission order.
Tornilla filed his report to Ombudsman AnianoDesierto, through Assistant Ombudsman Abelardo
L. Aportadera, Jr. and Director Agapito B. Rosales, confirming the illegal quarrying. Tornilla
recommended that a preliminary investigation be conducted against Baras Municipal Mayor
Roberto Ferrera, Baras Municipal Planning and Coordinator Jonathan Llagas, and property
owner Venancio Javier for the probable violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act); and that administrative proceedings for violations of the Civil
Service Rules be also undertaken. DILG Resident Ombudsman Rudiger G. Falcis II sought the
inclusion in the investigation of De Leon as the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources
Officer (PENRO) and as concurrently the Chairman of the Provincial Mining Regulatory Board
(PMRB) of Rizal. After the preliminary investigation, Graft Investigation Officer II Edgardo V.
Geraldez of the FFIB, Office of the Ombudsman, issued a decision dismissing the complaint
against all the respondents for lack of substantial evidence. The case was then referred to Atty.
Sabino M. Cruz, Resident Ombudsman for the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR), who ultimately submitted a memorandum, duly approved by the
Ombudsman, finding De Leon liable for gross neglect of duty. CA promulgated its assailed
decision and held that petitioner SAMSON DE LEON is penalized with 3 months suspendion
without pay for SIMPLE NEGLECT OF DUTY.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA committed reversible error in modifying the findings and
reducing the penalty imposed by the Office of the Ombudsman.

HELD: Yes. An examination of the records persuasively shows that the Office of the
Ombudsman correctly held De Leon guilty of gross neglect of duty, a grave offense punishable
by dismissal even for the first offense. A PENRO, who is appointed by the Secretary of the
DENR, has the responsibility toimplement DENR policies, programs and projects in the province
of his assignment. De Leon was appointed as the PENRO of Rizal and concurrently the
Chairman of the PMRB of Rizal. Based on the Civil Service Position Description Form, De Leon
as the PENRO of Rizal was the highest executive officer of the DENR at the provincial level. He
had the authority to coordinate all the DENR agencies within his jurisdiction, including the
PMRB. In his concurrent positions as the PENRO and Chairman of the PMRB, therefore, his
paramount function was to ensure that the laws enforced by the DENR as well as the rules and
regulations promulgated by the DENR in implementation of such laws were complied with and
effectively implemented and enforced. Verily, he was the primary implementor and enforcer
within his area of responsibility of all the laws and administrative orders concerning the
environment, and because of such character of his concurrent offices should have made sure
that he efficiently and effectively discharged his functions and responsibilities. In the matter
that is now before us, De Leon evidently neglected to efficiently and effectively discharge his
functions and responsibilities. Except for issuing the investigation order and for denying having
granted any permit to quarry, he did nothing affirmative to put a stop to the illegal quarrying
complained of, or to do any other action that was entirely within his power to do as the PENRO
that the complaint demanded to be done. Gross neglect of duty or gross negligence “refers to
negligence characterized by the want of even slight care, or by acting or omitting to act in a
situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but wilfully and intentionally, with a
conscious indifference to the consequences, insofar as other persons may be affected. It is the
omission of that care that even inattentive and thoughtless men never fail to give to their own
property.” It denotes a flagrant and culpable refusal or unwillingness of a person to perform a
duty. In cases involving public officials, gross negligence occurs when a breach of duty is
flagrant and palpable. In contrast, simple neglect of duty means the failure of an employee or
official to give proper attention to a task expected of him or her, signifying a “disregard of a
duty resulting from carelessness or indifference.” Conformably with these concepts, De Leon,
given his rank and level of responsibility, was guilty of gross neglect in not performing the act
expected of him as the PENRO under the circumstances obtaining. He was precisely assigned to
perform tasks that imposed on him the obligation to do everything reasonably necessarily and
permissible under the law in order to achieve the objectives of environmental protection.
Whether or not the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman was immediately executory, we
hereby hold that the decision is immediately executory, and that an appeal does not stop the
decision from being executory.

People of the Philippines vs. ErlandSabadlab

G.R. No. 175924,
March 14, 2012
Criminal Law/ Remedial Law

FACTS: AAA was then walking at around noon of March 12, 2002 on Dapitan Street in Makati
City, proceeding towards MA Montessori to fetch her employer’s son who was studying there.
Suddenly, a man (later identified as Sabadlab) grabbed her by the shoulder and ordered her to
go with him. She recognized him to be the man who had persistently greeted her every time
she had bought pandesal at 5 o’clock am near her employers house in the past two weeks.
Alarmed, she refused to do his bidding, but Sabadlab poked a gun at her throat. Two other men
whom she did not recognize joined Sabadlab at that point. They forced her into the backseat of
a parked car, and one of Sabadlab’s cohorts blindfolded her with a handkerchief. The car
moved forward, and stopped after twenty minutes of travel. Still blindfolded, she was brought
out of the car. Sabadlab said that he would remove her clothes. Sabadlab then undressed her,
leaving only the blindfold on her. One of them tied her hands behind her back. Sabadlab began
kissing her body from the neck downwards. Although blindfolded, she knew that it was
Sabadlab because his cohorts were calling out his name as he was kissing her body. Then they
made her lie flat on the ground with her hands still tied behind her back. Sabadlab raped her in
that position. The others took their turns in raping her after Sabadlab. To prevent her from
shouting for help, Sabadlab stuffed her mouth with crumpled newspapers. The three ravished
her again and again, that she could not remember the number of times they did so. At around
3:00 oclock pm, Sabadlab and his cohorts returned a blindfolded AAA by car back to Dapitan
Street, but let her go only after sternly warning that they would surely kill her if she told anyone
about the rapes. Once they left, she proceeded to MA Montessori to fetch her ward. Upon her
arrival at the house, AAAs employer noticed the kiss marks on her neck. AAA at first lied about
the kiss marks, but she ultimately disclosed the rapes because her irritated employer slapped
and boxed her on the stomach to force her to disclose. Her employer brought AAA to the Makati
Police Station to report the rapes. The policemen apprehended Sabadlab and brought him to
the station, where he gave his name as ErlandSabadlab y Bayquel. These antecedents impelled
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati to immediately charge Sabadlab and two John Does
with forcible abduction with rape. RTC convicted Sabadlab for forcible abduction with rape.

ISSUE: Whether or not the conviction is correct

RULING: Yes, because both the RTC and the CA unanimously regarded AAA as a credible and
spontaneous witness, he has now to present clear and persuasive reasons to convince us to
reverse both lower courts determination of credibility and to resolve the appeal his way.
Sabadlab has not tendered any clear and persuasive reasons that may warrant the reversal or
modification of the findings of both lower courts on the credibility of AAA and his criminal
liability. The supposed inconsistencies dwelled on minor details or collateral matters that the CA
precisely held to be badges of veracity and manifestations of truthfulness due to their tendency
of demonstrating that the testimony had not been rehearsed or concocted. It is also basic that
inconsistencies bearing on minor details or collateral matters should not adversely affect the
substance of the witness declaration, veracity, or weight of testimony. The only inconsistencies
that might have discredited the victim’s credible testimony were those that affected or related
to the elements of the crime. Alas, that was not true herein. witnesses and of weighing their
credibility is best left to the trial judge by virtue of the first-hand impressions he derives while
the witnesses testify before him. AAA’s recollection of the principal occurrence and her positive
identification of the rapists, particularly Sabadlab, were firm. It is reassuring, too, that her
trustworthiness in identifying Sabadlab as one of the rapists rested on her recognition of him as
the man who had frequently flirted with her at the store where she had usually bought
pandesal for her employers table. As such, the identification of him as one of the rapists
became impervious to doubt. AAA’s failure to shout for help and her failure to escape were not
factors that should diminish credibility due to their being plausibly explained, the first by the
fact that her mouth had been stuffed by Sabadlab with crumpled newspaper, preventing her
from making any outcry, and the second by the fact that the culprits had blindfolded her and
had also tied her hands behind her back. 10 Sabadlab’s allegation that AAA did not sustain any
bodily injuries was actually contrary to the medical certification showing her several physical
injuries and the penetration of her female organ. This should debunk without difficulty his
submission that she did not offer any resistance to the sexual assaults she suffered. Her
resistance to Sabadlabs order for her to go with him was immediately stifled by his poking of
the gun at her throat and by appearance of his two cohorts. We next deal with the
characterization of the crime as forcible abduction with rape. The principal objective of
Sabadlab and his two cohorts in abducting AAA from Dapitan Street and in bringing her to
another place was to rape and ravish her. This objective became evident from the successive
acts of Sabadlab immediately after she had alighted from the car in completely undressing her
as to expose her whole body (except the eyes due to the blindfold), in kissing her body from
the neck down, and in having carnal knowledge of her (in that order). Although forcible
abduction was seemingly committed, we cannot hold him guilty of the complex crime of forcible
abduction with rape when the objective of the abduction was to commit the rape. Under the
circumstances, the rape absorbed the forcible abduction.

Sps. Celso Dico Sr. and Angeles Dico vs. Vizcaya Management Corp.
G.R. No. 161211
July 17, 2013
Remedial Law/Civil Law

FACTS: Celso Dicois the registered owner of Lot No. 486 of the Cadiz Cadastre with an area of
67,300 square meters and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 22922 of the land
records of Negros Occidental. Lot No. 486 is adjacent to Lot No. 29-B and Lot No. 1412
(formerly Lot No. 1118-B), both also of the Cadiz Cadastre. Celso and his wife Angeles resided
on Lot No. 486 since 1958. On May 30, 1964, Angeles filed in the District Office of the Bureau
of Lands in Bacolod City, her free patent application covering a portion of Lot No. 29-B. On his
part, Celso also filed in the same office an application for free patent covering Lot No. 1412. It
does not appear, however, that the Bureau of Lands acted on their applications. Respondent
Vizcaya Management Corporation (VMC) was the registered owner under TCT No. T-41835 of
Lot No. 29-B, also of the Cadiz Cadastre, comprising an area of 369,606 square meters, more or
less. VMC derived its title to Lot No. 29-B from Eduardo and Cesar, both surnamed Lopez, the
registered owners under TCT No. T-14827, which emanated from TCT No. RT-9933 (16739) in
the names of Victoria, Eduardo and Cesar, all surnamed Lopez. TCT No. RT-9933 (16739) was
a transfer from TCT No. T-14281, which had been transferred from Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) No. 21331 in the name of Negros Philippines Lumber Company. OCT No. 21331 was
issued pursuant to Decree No. 190483 of G.L.R.O. Cadastral Record No. 196. VMC likewise
claimed to be the owner of Lot No. 1412, formerly known as Lot No. 1118-B, also of the Cadiz
Cadastre, containing an area of 85,239 square meters, more or less, and registered in its name
under TCT No. T-41834.4 Lot Nos. 1426-B, with an area of 6,635 square meters covered by
TCT No. T-24135, and 1426-C, with an area of 6,107 square meters covered by TCT No. T-
24136, appear to be registered in the names of Eduardo Lopez and Cesar Lopez, who had
earlier formed VMC.

In 1967, VMC, then newly formed, caused the consolidation and subdivision of Lot No. 29-B,
Lot No. 1412, Lot No. 1426-B, and Lot No. 1426-C. The consolidation-subdivision plan was
prepared by Engr. Ricardo Quilop and filed in the Land Registration Commission (LRC),
renamed National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration, but presently known as
the Land Registration Authority. The consolidationsubdivision plan was assigned the number
(LRC) PCS-6611. On July 26, 1967, LRC Commissioner Antonio L. Noblejas approved the
consolidation-subdivision plan, resulting in Lot No. 29-B, Lot No. 1412, Lot No. 1426B, and Lot
No. 1426-C being consolidated and subdivided. VMC filed against the Dicos a complaint for
unlawful detainer in the City Court of Cadiz (Civil Case No. 649). On April 24, 1981, the City
Court of Cadiz rendered its decision in favor of VMC, ordering the Dicos to demolish the
concrete water gate or sluice gate (locally known as trampahan) located inside Lot No. 1, Block
3 of the Cristina Village Subdivision. Inasmuch as the Dicos did not appeal, the decision
attained finality. On July 3, 1981, the City Court of Cadiz issued a writ of execution. On
November 11, 1985, a second alias writ of execution was issued. On May 12, 1986, the Dicos
commenced an action for the annulment and cancellation of the titles of VMC (Civil Case No.
180-C), impleading VMC, the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration, and
the Director of the Bureau of Lands. On March 12, 1987, the Dicos amended the complaint.
They averred, among others, that they were the registered owners of Lot No. 486 and the
possessors-by-succession of Lot No. 1412 (formerly Lot No. 1118) and Lot No. 489; that VMC
had land-grabbed a portion of their Lot No. 486 totaling 111,966 square meters allegedly
brought about by the expansion of Cristina Village Subdivision; and that on May 30, 1964 they
had filed free patent applications in the Bureau of Lands for Lot No. 1412 and Lot No. 489.6
They prayed that the possession of Lot No. 486, Lot No. 1412, and Lot No. 489 be restored to
them; and that the judgment in Civil Case No. 649 be annulled.

ISSUE: Whether or not CA erred in holding that prescription and/or laches already barred them
from asserting their right

HELD: No We find and hold that the action of the Dicos for reconveyance was properly
dismissed. CA correctly pointed out that under Article 1456 of the Civil Code, the person
obtaining property through mistake or fraud is considered by force of law a trustee of an
implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes. Under Article 1144,
Civil Code, an action upon an obligation created by law must be brought within 10 years from
the time the right of action accrues. Consequently, an action for reconveyance based on implied
or constructive trust prescribes in 10 years. Here, the CA observed that even granting that
fraud intervened in the issuance of the transfer certificates of title, and even assuming that the
Dicos had the personality to demand the reconveyance of the affected property on the basis of
implied or constructive trust, the filing of their complaint for that purpose only on May 12, 1986
proved too late for them. The reckoning point for purposes of the Dicos’ demand of
reconveyance based on fraud was their discovery of the fraud. Such discovery was properly
pegged on the date of the registration of the transfer certificates of title in the adverse parties’
names, because registration was a constructive notice to the whole world.19 The long period of
29 years that had meanwhile lapsed from the issuance of the pertinent transfer certificate of
title on September 30, 1934 (the date of recording of TCT No. RT-9933 (16739) in the name of
the Lopezes) or on November 10, 1956 (the date of recording of TCT No. T-41835 in VMC’s
name) was way beyond the prescriptive period of 10 years.

People of the Philippines vs. AvelinoFelan

G.R. No. 176631
February 2, 2011
Criminal Law/Remedial Law
FACTS:At about 10:00 p.m. on February 12, 1995, the accused roused his daughter AAA, the
complainant, then 14 years old, from sleep inside their house; that he told her not to be afraid;
that he removed her panty, spread her legs, and went on top of her; that she resisted but he
overpowered her; that he inserted his penis into her vagina and made pumping movements
until he satisfied himself; that she cried due to vaginal pain; that she left the house and stayed
with her friends, who advised her to report the rape to Mrs. Charito Aris, a social worker of the
Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) in Ormoc City; that Mrs. Aris later
brought her first to the police station for reporting of the rape, and then to Dr. Gloria Esmero
Pastor, City Health Officer of Ormoc City, for medical examination; that Dr. Pastor found that
AAAs hymen was torn; and that Dr. Pastor concluded that the hymenal laceration could be
caused by sexual intercourse.

The accused denied the accusation, branding it as the fabrication of AAA out of anger at him for
not giving her basic needs and for admonishing her to stop using illegal drugs.

In his appeal to this Supreme Court, the accused contends that the RTC and the CA erred in
relying mainly on AAAs testimony, despite her not being a credible witness and although her
testimony was doubtful by reason of her having used illegal drugs and having engaged in
prostitution, aside from possessing a poor memory. He insists that he could control his sexual
urge. 

ISSUE: Was the ruling of the lower court correct?

HELD: The ruling is affirmed. The law applicable is Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659, which provides:Article 335. When and how
rape is committed. Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances: 1.      By using force or intimidation;2.      When the woman is
deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and3.      When the woman is under twelve years
of age or is demented.

The State competently and sufficiently established these elements beyond reasonable doubt.
AAA rendered a complete and credible narration of her ordeal at the hands of the accused,
whom she positively identified. In a prosecution for rape, the accused may be convicted solely
on the basis of the testimony of the victim that is credible, convincing, and consistent with
human nature and the normal course of things, as in this case. It is notable that the RTC and
the CA both found and considered AAA as a credible witness whose testimony should be
believed. We accord great weight to the trial judges assessment of the credibility of AAA and of
her testimony because the trial judge, having personally observed AAAs conduct and demeanor
as a witness, was thereby enabled to discern if she was telling or inventing the truth. The trial
judges evaluation, when affirmed by the CA, is binding on the Court, and it becomes the burden
of the accused to project to us facts or circumstances of weight that were overlooked,
misapprehended, or misinterpreted which, when duly considered, would materially affect the
disposition of the case differently. We do not vary from this rule now, however, considering that
the accused did not make any showing that the RTC, in the first instance, and the CA, on
review, ignored, misapprehended, or misinterpreted facts or circumstances supportive of or
crucial to his defense.

The denial of the accused, being worthless, was properly disregarded. It was both self-serving
and uncorroborated. It could not, therefore, overcome the positive declarations against the
accused and the positive identification of the accused by AAA, [11] whose good motive to impute
such a heinous act to her own father was not disproved or refuted. We do consider to be highly
inconceivable for a daughter like AAA to impute against her own father a crime as serious and
despicable as incest rape, unless the imputation was the plain truth. In fact, as we observed
before, it takes a certain amount of psychological depravity for a young woman to concoct a
story which would put her own father to jail for the rest of his remaining life and drag the rest
of the family including herself to a lifetime of shame.

The attempt to discredit AAA on the ground of her being a user of illegal drugs and of her
having engaged in prostitution deserved no consideration. First of all, AAAs use of illegal drugs
and engaging in prostitution, even if true, did not destroy her credibility as a witness or negate
the rape. Indeed, the Court has ruled that the victims moral character was immaterial in the
prosecution and conviction of an accused for rape, there being absolutely no nexus between it
and the odious deed committed. Moreover, even a prostitute or a woman of loose morals could
fall victim of rape, for she could still refuse a man’s lustful advances.

The CA correctly pronounced the accused liable for simple rape and properly punished him
with reclusion perpetua. Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section
11 of Republic Act No. 7659, supra, rape is qualified and punished by death if it is alleged and
proved that the victim was a minor during the commission of the crime and that the offender
was her parent. Although the information alleged that the victim was only 14 years of age at
the time of the rape, the State did not duly establish such circumstance because no birth
certificate, or baptismal certificate, or other competent document showing her age was
presented. Her testimony regarding her age without any independent proof is not sufficient. As
a result, the penalty for simple rape was properly reclusion perpetua.

Simon V. Chua G.R. No. 157547 February 23, 2011 (REMEDIAL LAW)

FACTS:

 December 1996: Eduard Simon issued a check to Elvin Chan a Landbank Check dated December 26,
1996 worth P336,000.00
 December 26, 1996: It was dishonored due to account closed.
 After a formal demand, Simon filed for preliminary attachmen - MeTC in Pasay City issued a writ of
preliminary attachment
 Simon filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of litis pendentia because there is already a charge of
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 - granted by the MeTC
 Chan appealed to the CA - reversed and set aside the decision of the MeTC

ISSUE: W/N the case should be dismissed due to litis pendentia because the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure pertaining to independent civil actions which became effective on December 1, 2000 are
applicable to this case renders Chan's civil action to recover as an independent civil action

HELD: YES. Reversa CA and reinstate MeTC

Procedural laws may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and undetermined at the time of
their passage. There are no vested rights in the rules of procedure.

Surely, it could not have been the intendment of the framers of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 to leave the
offended private party defrauded and empty-handed by excluding the civil liability of the offender,
giving her only the remedy, which in many cases results in a Pyrrhic victory, of having to file a separate
civil suit. To do so may leave the offended party unable to recover even the face value of the check due
her, thereby unjustly enriching the errant drawer at the expense of the payee. The protection which the
law seeks to provide would, therefore, be brought to naught. However, there is no independent civil
action to recover the value of a bouncing check issued in contravention of BP 22. Applying Rule 111 of
the Rules of Court, effective December 1, 200 that the criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil action
separately shall be allowedDMPI Employees Credit Association v. Velez (different facts): issuance of a
bouncing check may result in two separate and distinct crimes of estafa and violation of BP 22, the
procedures for the recovery of the civil liabilities arising from these two distinct crimes are different and
non-interchangeable. In prosecutions of estafa, the offended party may opt to reserve his right to file a
separate civil action, or may institute an independent action based on fraud pursuant to Article 33 of the
Civil Code. In prosecutions of violations of BP 22, however, the Court has adopted a policy to prohibit
the reservation or institution of a separate civil action to claim the civil liability arising from the issuance
of the bouncing check.