GIL MIGUEL T. PUYAT, petitioner, v. RON ZABARTE, respondent.

G.R. No. 1411536. February 26, 2001

Facts:

On January 24, 1994, Ron Zabarte commenced to enforce the money judgment
rendered by the Superior Court for the State of California on petitioner. On 18 March
1994, petitioner said that the said court had no jurisdiction over the people involved.
Respondent on the other hand said that petitioner’s appeal is not material. Petitioner
maintained that that said Judgment on Stipulations for Entry in Judgment was obtained
without the assistance of counsel and without sufficient notice to him and therefore, was
rendered in violation of his constitutional rights to substantial and procedural due
process.

Respondent said that petitioner can no longer question the judgment of the said court
because he failed to raise the issue of jurisdiction in his answer. The RTC rendered
judgment in favor of Zabarte. The claim for moral damages, not having been
substantiated, is denied. Petitioner said that the RTC should have dismissed
the action for the enforcement of a foreign judgment, on the ground of forum non
conveniens. It reasoned out that the recognition of the foreign judgment was based on
comity, reciprocity and res judicata. The CA denied this appeal, hence this case.

Issue:

Whether or not the CA acted in a manner contrary to law when it affirmed the Order of
the trial court granting respondent’s Motion for Summary Judgment and rendering
judgment against the petitioner.

Ruling:

Summary judgment is a procedural device for the prompt disposition of actions in which
the pleadings raise only a legal issue, and not a genuine issue as to any material fact. It is
resorted to in order to avoid long drawn out litigations and useless delays. Petitioner
contends that by allowing summary judgment, the two courts a quo prevented him from
presenting evidence to substantiate his claims. The court does not agree. Summary
judgment is based on facts directly proven by affidavits, depositions or admissions. In
this case, the CA and the RTC both merely ruled that trial was not necessary to resolve
the case. Petitioner’s affidavit of facts had raised no genuine issue, thus no necessity for
a resolution of issues.

In the absence of proof of California law on the jurisdiction of courts, we presume that

such law, if any, is similar to Philippine law. The court based this conclusion on the
presumption of identity or similarity, also known as processual presumption. Petitioner
failed to establish substantial proof that the foreign court had no jurisdiction over the
case. In any event, contrary to petitioner’s contention, unjust enrichment or solutio
indebiti does not apply to this case. This doctrinecontemplates payment when there is
no duty to pay, and the person who receives the payment has no right to receive it. In
this case, petitioner merely argues that the other two defendants whom he represented
were liable together with him. This is not a case of unjust enrichment. The court does
not also see this case to be contrary to law, morals, public policy or the canons of
morality obtaining in the country. Petitioner owed money, and the judgment required
him to pay it. That is the long and the short of this case. The petition is denied.

U.S. dollars $241,991.33, with the interest 

The amount of P30,000.00 as attorney’s fees;

The CA also ruled that summary judgment was proper, because petitioner had failed to tender any
genuine issue of fact and was merely maneuvering to delay the full effects of the judgment.

“Whether or not the Court of Appeals acted in a manner x x x contrary to law when it affirmed the
Order of the trial court granting respondent’s Motion for Summary Judgment and rendering judgment
against the petitioner.” 10

In his discussion, petitioner contends that the CA erred in ruling in this wise:

1. That his Answer failed to tender a genuine issue of fact regarding the following:

(a) the jurisdiction of a foreign court over the subject matter

(b) the validity of the foreign judgment

(c) the judgment’s conformity to Philippine laws, public policy, canons of morality, and norms against
unjust enrichment

2. That the principle of forum non conveniens was inapplicable to the instant case.

First Question: Summary Judgment

Petitioner vehemently insists that summary judgment is inappropriate to resolve the case at bar,
arguing that his Answer allegedly raised genuine and material factual matters which he should have
been allowed to prove during trial.

On the other hand, respondent argues that the alleged “genuine issues of fact” raised by petitioner
are mere conclusions of law, or “propositions arrived at not by any process of natural reasoning from
a fact or a combination of facts stated but by the application of the artificial rules of law to the facts
pleaded.”

The RTC granted respondent’s Motion for Summary Judgment because petitioner, in his Answer,
admitted the existence of the Judgment on Stipulation for Entry in Judgment. Besides, he had
already paid $5,000 to respondent, as provided in the foreign judgment sought to be
enforced. 12 Hence, the trial court ruled that, there being no genuine issue as to any material fact, the
case should properly be resolved through summary judgment. The CA affirmed this ruling.

By genuine issue is meant a question of fact that calls for the presentation of evidence. It should be
distinguished from an issue that is sham, contrived, set in bad faith and patently unsubstantial.  

In short, since the facts are not in dispute, the court is allowed to decide the case summarily by
applying the law to the material facts.

For summary judgment to be valid, Rule 34, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, requires (a) that there
must be no genuine issue as to any material fact, except for the amount of damages; and (b) that the
party presenting the motion for summary judgment must be entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law. 17 As mentioned earlier, petitioner admitted that a foreign judgment had been rendered against
him and in favor of respondent, and that he had paid $5,000 to the latter in partial compliance
therewith. Hence, respondent, as the party presenting the Motion for Summary Judgment, was
shown to be entitled to the judgment.

pSecond Question: Forum Non Conveniens

Petitioner argues that the RTC should have refused to entertain the Complaint for enforcement of
the foreign judgment on the principle of forum non conveniens. He claims that the trial court had no
jurisdiction, because the case involved partnership interest, and there was difficulty in ascertaining
the applicable law in California. All the aspects of the transaction took place in a foreign country, and
respondent is not even Filipino.

We disagree. Under the principle of forum non conveniens, even if the exercise of jurisdiction is
authorized by law, courts may nonetheless refuse to entertain a case for any of the following
practical reasons:

“1) The belief that the matter can be better tried and decided elsewhere, either because the main
aspects of the case transpired in a foreign jurisdiction or the material witnesses have their residence
there;

2) The belief that the non-resident plaintiff sought the forum[,] a practice known as forum shopping[,]
merely to secure procedural advantages or to convey or harass the defendant;

3) The unwillingness to extend local judicial facilities to non-residents or aliens when the docket may
already be overcrowded;

4) The inadequacy of the local judicial machinery for effectuating the right sought to be maintained;
and

The difficulty of ascertaining foreign law.” 27

etitioner’s undated Opposing Affidavit states: “[A]lthough myself and these entities were initially
represented by Atty. Lawrence L. Severson of the Law Firm Kouns, Quinlivan & Severson, x x x I
discharged x x x said lawyer. Subsequently, I assumed the representation for myself and these firms
and this was allowed by the Superior Court of the State of California without any authorization from
G.G.P. & Sons, Inc. and the Genesis Group.”  24 Clearly, it was petitioner who chose to represent the
other defendants; hence, he cannot now be allowed to impugn a decision based on this ground.

In any event, contrary to petitioner’s contention, unjust enrichment or solutio indebiti does not apply
to this case. This doctrine contemplates payment when there is no duty to pay, and the person who
receives the payment has no right to receive it. 25 In this case, petitioner merely argues that the other
two defendants whom he represented were liable together with him. This is not a case of unjust
enrichment.

None of the aforementioned reasons barred the RTC from exercising its jurisdiction. In the present
action, there was no more need for material witnesses, no forum shopping or harassment of
petitioner, no inadequacy in the local machinery to enforce the foreign judgment, and no question
raised as to the application of any foreign law

G.R. Nos. 146184-85             January 31, 2008

MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY and ANTONIO P. GANA, petitioners, 

vs.
OLONGAPO MAINTENANCE SERVICES, INC. and TRIPLE CROWN SERVICES,
INC., respondents.

The first petition, docketed as G.R. Nos. 146184-85, assails the November 24, 2000 Decision1 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in consolidated cases CA-G.R. SP Nos. 50087 and 50131. The CA affirmed
the November 18, 1998 Order2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 119, Pasay City in Civil
Case No. 98-1875 entitled Olongapo Maintenance Services, Inc. v. Manila International Airport
Authority and Antonio P. Gana, granting an injunctive writ to respondent Olongapo Maintenance
Services, Inc. (OMSI).

The same CA Decision likewise upheld the November 19, 1998 Order 3 of the RTC, Branch 113,
Pasay City, granting an injunctive writ to respondent Triple Crown Services, Inc. (TCSI) in Civil Case
No. 98-1885 entitled Triple Crown Services, Inc. v. Antonio P. Gana (In his capacity as General
Manager of the Manila International Airport Authority) and Goodline Staffers & Allied Services, Inc.

The second, docketed as G.R. No. 161117,4 assails the November 28, 2003 CA Decision 5 in CA-
G.R. SP No. 67092, which affirmed the Decision 6 dated February 1, 2001 of the RTC, Branch 113,
Pasay City and its April 16, 2001 Order7 in Civil Case No. 98-1885, extending the November 19,
1998 injunctive writ adverted to earlier, ordering petitioners to conduct a public bidding for the areas
serviced by respondent TCSI, and denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration, respectively.

In the third, docketed as G.R. No. 167827,8 TCSI assails the September 9, 2004 CA Decision9 in CA-
G.R. SP No. 76138, as veritably reiterated in the CA’s April 13, 2005 Resolution, 10 which granted
Manila International Airport Authority’s (MIAA’s) petition for certiorari charging TCSI with forum
shopping. The CA lifted the March 19, 2003 Writ of Mandamus 11 issued by the RTC, Branch 115 in
Civil Case No. 03-0025 entitled Triple Crown Services, Inc. v. Manila International Airport
Authority for Mandamus with Damages.

We consolidated G.R. Nos. 146184-85 with G.R. No. 161117 and G.R. No. 167827 as they all arose
from the cancellation of the service contracts of OMSI and TCSI with MIAA. 12

Before us are three separate petitions from service contractors that question the legality of awarding
government contracts without public bidding.

OMSI and TCSI were among the five contractors of MIAA which had janitorial and maintenance
service contracts covering various areas in the Ninoy Aquino International Airport. Before their
service contracts expired on October 31, 1998, the MIAA Board of Directors, through Antonio P.
Gana, then General Manager (GM) of MIAA, wrote OMSI and TCSI informing them that their
contracts would no longer be renewed after October 31, 1998. 13

On September 28, 1998, TCSI, in a letter to Gana, expressed its concern over the award of its
concession area to a new service contractor through a negotiated contract. It said that to award
TCSI’s contract by mere negotiation would violate its right to equal protection of the law. TCSI thus
suggested that a public bidding be conducted and that the effectivity of its service contract be
meanwhile extended until a winning bid is declared.

in reply, MIAA wrote TCSI and OMSI reiterating its disinclination to renew the latter’s contracts,
adding that it was to the government’s advantage to instead just negotiate with other contractors.

Consequently, OMSI and TCSI instituted civil cases against MIAA to forestall the termination of their
contracts and prevent MIAA from negotiating with other service contractors.

OMSI filed with the Pasay City RTC a Complaint for Injunction and Damages with Prayer for
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction 16 against MIAA 

TCSI filed Civil Case No. 98-1885 (first TCSI case) for Prohibition, Mandamus and Damages with
Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and Injunction 17 against Gana 

Without filing any motion for reconsideration, MIAA assailed as void the issuance of the injunctive
writs before the CA through petitions for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, 

Meanwhile, even as the cases were pending before the CA, Branch 113 continued to hear the first
TCSI case. On February 1, 2001, the trial court rendered a Decision declaring as null and void the
negotiated contract award.

In its Comment, MIAA denied all of TCSI’s allegations and accused TCSI of forum shopping.

On March 4, 2003, in the third TCSI case for mandamus, Branch 115 granted 32 the Writ of
Mandamus to TCSI and ordered MIAA to comply with the Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued by
Branch 113 in the first TCSI case.
A week after and because MIAA refused to allow TCSI to peacefully continue its contract services,
TCSI filed an Urgent Manifestation With Prayer for the Court to Cite Respondent Motu Proprio in
Contempt.33

After the trial court denied MIAA’s Motion for Reconsideration, 34 Manda, in compliance with the trial
court’s show cause order, explained that the writ of mandamus had not yet become final and
executory and a writ of execution was still needed before mandamus could be enforced.

On March 24, 2003, MIAA assailed the March 4, 2003 and March 19, 2003 Orders of the trial court
before the CA through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 in CA-G.R. SP No. 76138, praying for a
TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction for the trial court to desist from further proceedings with the
third TCSI case for mandamus.

A day after, in the second TCSI case for contempt, the RTC directed the arrest of Manda for his
failure to comply with the orders of the court. This did not materialize because two days after, the CA
granted a TRO enjoining the enforcement of the assailed orders and the writ of mandamus and,
consequently, lifted the warrant of arrest for Manda.

Thereafter, Manda filed a Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss the second TCSI case for contempt
on the ground of forum shopping. The trial court denied the motion on the ground that the contempt
case was an entirely distinct and separate cause of action from the mandamus case pending in
another RTC branch. It said the contempt case was grounded on the alleged disobedience of Manda
of the RTC, Branch 113 Order and injunctive writ in the first TCSI case appealed before the CA
which could not be considered final and executory. Hence, the trial court ruled that the contempt
case was prematurely filed and it thus had not acquired jurisdiction over it.

Forum shopping exists

TCSI contends that the CA committed reversible error when it held TCSI resorted to forum shopping.
TCSI argues it was not guilty of forum shopping when it filed the second TCSI case for contempt and
the third TCSI case for mandamus. According to TSCI, as these are two distinct and separate cases,
the elements of litis pendentiaamounting to res judicata do not exist.

TCSI’s contention is devoid of merit.

Forum shopping exists when the elements of litis pendentia are present, or when a final judgment in
one case will amount to res judicata in another.63 There is forum shopping when the following
elements concur: (1) identity of the parties or, at least, of the parties who represent the same interest
in both actions; (2) identity of the rights asserted and relief prayed for, as the latter is founded on the
same set of facts; and (3) identity of the two preceding particulars, such that any judgment rendered
in the other action will amount to res judicata in the action under consideration or will constitute litis
pendentia.64

We uphold the CA’s finding that TCSI was guilty of forum shopping:

An examination of the two petitions filed by [TCSI] reveals that the elements of litis
pendentia are present. Both petitions are based on the alleged violation by petitioner of the
writ of preliminary injunction dated November 19, 1998 issued in Civil Case No. 98-1885 [first
TCSI case] enjoining the latter to maintain the status quo until after a qualified winning bidder
is chosen by way of a public bidding. The reliefs prayed for in the two petitions are likewise
founded on the same fact, i.e., the alleged disobedience or violation of the writ of preliminary
injunction by petitioner.

In the assailed Order dated March 4, 2003 granting the writ of mandamus, respondent Judge
directed petitioner to immediately comply with the writ of preliminary injunction. In the Order
dated March 12, 2003, respondent Judge directed petitioner’s General Manager, Edgardo
Manda, to explain why he should not be cited for contempt for defying the Order dated
March 4, 2003. Respondent Judge found the explanation of Manda devoid of merit and
directed the latter to allow private respondent to re-assume its post at the airport terminal
immediately, otherwise, a warrant of arrest shall be issued against him, pursuant to Section
8, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. In fact, a warrant of arrest was issued against Manda on
March 25, 2003 for his failure to comply with the Orders dated March 4, 2003 and March 19,
2003. In other words, the same penalty could be imposed on Manda in the petition for
contempt filed by private respondent with the RTC, Branch 108, Pasay City, should the
Presiding Judge thereof find him guilty of violating the writ of preliminary injunction.
Moreover, Section 7, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court provides that if the contempt consists in
the violation of writ of injunction, temporary restraining order or status quo order, the person
adjudged guilty of contempt may also be ordered to make complete restitution to the party
injured by such violation of the property involved or such amount as may be alleged and
proved. Thus, private respondent could likewise claim damages in the petition for contempt
filed by it with Branch 108. That private respondent did not find the petition for contempt to
be an adequate and speedy remedy as no action has been taken by Branch 108 as of the
date of the filing of the petition for mandamus with damages only shows that private
respondent indulged in forum shopping.65