Dr.

V Orestes Romualdez Educational Foundation

Calanipawan Rd. Tacloban City

STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION

Compilation of
Case Digest
(Modules B, C and D)

MIKKO P. SOLIS

1
 Table of Contents

Case Page
1. Caltex Philippines, Inc. v. Palomar, G.R. No. L-19650, 29 Sep .................... 12-14
1966
2. Philippine Apparel Workers Union vs. NLRC, G.R. No. L-50320, .................... 14-15
31 Jul 1981 

....................
3. Corpus v. People, G.R. No. 180016, 29 April 2014

....................
4. Director of Lands v. CA, G.R. No. 102858, 28 July 1997 
5. Secretary of the DPWH and District Engineer Contreras v. Sps.
....................
Tecson, G.R. No. 179334, 21 April 2015

....................
6. People v. Mapa, G.R. No. L-22301, 30 Aug 1967

....................
7. People v. Amigo, G.R. No. 116719, 18 Jan 1996

....................
8. Lokin, Jr. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179431-32, 22 June 2010

....................
9. Maglasang v. People, G.R. No. 90083, 4 Oct 1990
10. In re Appointments dated March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo A.
Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallaria, A.M. No. 98-5-01-SC, 9 ....................
Nov 1998

....................
11. De Castro v. JBC, G.R No. 1991149, 17 March 2010
12. Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez, G.R. No. ....................
113105, 19 Aug 1994 
13. Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty v. Secretary of Budget ....................
and Management, G.R. No. 164987, 24 April 2012

....................
14. Belgica v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 208556, 19 Nov 2013
15. Remman Enterprises, Inc. and Chamber of Real Estate and
Builders’ Association v. Professional Regulatory Board of Real
....................
Estate Service and Professional Regulation Commission, G.R. No.
197676, 4 Feb 2014
16. Roos Industrial Construction, Inc v. NLRC, G.R. No. 172409, 4 ....................
Feb 2008
17. Estrada v. Sandiganbayan and People, G.R. No. 148560, 19 Nov ....................
2001
18. First Metro Investment Corp, v. Este Del Sol Mountain Reserve, ....................
G.R. No. 141811, 15 Nov 2001

2
19. Norma Del Socorro v. Ernst Johan Brickman Van Wilsem, G.R. ....................
No. 193797, 10 Dec 2014
20. Tawang Multi-Purpose Cooperative v. La Trinidad Water ....................
District, G.R. No. 116471
21. Barangay Association for National Advancement and
Transparency (BANAT) Party-list v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 177508, ....................
7 Aug 2009
22. Hon. Ma. Lourdes Fernando v. St. Scholastica’s College, G.R.
....................
No. 161107, 12 March 2013 
23. White Light Corp. v. City of Manily, G.R. No. 122846, 20 Jan ....................
2009 

....................
24. Ortega v. People, G.R. No.151085, 20 Aug 2008

....................
25. CIR v. Philippine Airlines, Inc., G.R. No. 160528
26. Commissioner of Customs v. Esso Standard, Inc., G.R. No. L- ....................
28329, 7 Aug 1975
27. Soccoro Ramirez v. CA and Ester S. Garcia, G.R. No. 93833, 25 ....................
Sep 1995 

....................
28. Philippine National Bank v. Tejano, G.R. No. 173615, 16 Oct 2009 

....................
29. Domingo v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 112371, 7 Oct 1998. 
30. Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 103882 & 105276, 25 Nov ....................
1998 

....................
31. Espiritu v. Cipriano, G.R. No. L-32723, 15 Feb 1974

....................
32. Bolos v. Bolos, G.R. No. 186400, 10 Oct 2010

33. Quijano v. Development Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. L-26419, ....................
16 Oct 1970

....................
34. Security Bank and Trust Company v. RTC of Makati, G.R. No.
113926, 23 Oct 1996

....................
35. Go v. Distinction Properties Development and Construction, Inc.,
G.R. No. 194024

3
 ....................
36. Luzon Development Bank v. Enriquez, G.R. Nos. 168464 &
168666, 12 Jan 2011

....................
37. Municipality of Nueva Era, Ilocos, Norte v. Municipality of Marcos,
Ilocos, Norte, G.R. No. 169435, 27 Feb 2008

....................

38. Brent School, Inc. v. Zamor, G.R. NNNo. L-48494, 5 Feb 1990

....................
39. Gonzales III v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 196231, 4 Sep
2012

....................
40. Galicto v. Aquino III, G.R. No. 193978, 28 Feb 2012

Page

.................... 8
41. Wa-acon v. People, G.R. No.164575, 6 Dec 2006. 

....................
42. Lastrilla v. Granda, G.R. No. 160257, 31 Jan 2006. 

....................
43. Samson v. Aguirre, G.R. No. 133076, 22 Sep 1999.

....................
44. LAMP v. Secretary of Budget and Management, supra. 
45. Belgica v. Ochoa, supra.  ....................

46. Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, G.R. No. 192935, 7 ....................
Dec 2010. 
47. Francisco, Jr. et. al. v. Toll Regulatory Board, G.R. No. 166910, 19 ....................
Oct 2010. 

....................
48. Guingona v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125532, 10 Jul 1998. 

....................
49. Quiño v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 197466, 13 Nov 2012. 
....................
50. Gancho-on v. Secretary of Labor and Employment, G.R. No. 108033,

4
14 Apr 1997. 

....................
51. David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, 3 May 2006. 

....................
52. Velarde v. Social Justice Society, G.R. No. 159357, 28 Apr 2004. 

....................
53. Lozano v. Nograles, G.R. Nos. 187883-187910, 16 Jun 2009. 
54. Carbonilla v. Board of Airline Representatives, G.R. No. 193247, 14 ....................
Sep 2011. 
55. Hacienda Luisita, Inc. v. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council, G.R. ....................
No. 171101, 5 Jul 2011. 

....................
56. Tropical Homes, Inc. v. NHA, G.R. No. L-48672, 31 Jul 1987. 

....................
57. Abakada Guro Party-list v. Purisima, G.R. No. 166715, 14 Aug 2008. 
58. Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy, G.R. No. 124360, 5 ....................
Nov 1997. 

....................
59. Deutsche Bank AG Manila v. CIR, G.R. No. 188550, 28 Aug 2013. 
60. Sa L-acion v. Central Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 94723, 21 ....................
Aug 1997. 

....................
61. Gamboa v. Teves, G.R. No. 176579, 28 Jun 2011. 
62. Privatization and Management Office v. Strategic Management and/or ....................
Philippine Estate Corporation, G.R. No. 200402, 13 Jun 2013. 

....................
63. Agbayani v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 183623, 25 Jun 2012. 
64. Makati Shangri3la Hotel and Resort, Inc. v. Harper, G.R. No. 189998, ....................
29 Aug 2012. 

....................
65. Ursua v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112170, 10 Apr 1996. 

....................
66. Mecano v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 103982, 11 Dec 1992. 

....................
67. Penera v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 181613, 11 Sep 2009. 

....................
68. Lledo v. Lledo, A.M. No. P-95-1167, 9 Feb 2010. 
69. Executive Secretary, et. al. v. Forerunner Multi Resources, Inc., G.R. ....................
No. 199324, 7 Jan 2013. 

5
 ....................
70. Obiasca v. Basallote, G.R. No. 176707, 17 Feb 2010. 
71. Dabalos v. RTC of Angeles City, Pampanga, G.R. No. 193960, 7 Jan ....................
2013. 

72. Sps. Plopenio v. DAR and Land Bank, G.R. No. 161090, 4 Jul 2012 a ....................
Plopenio v. DAR and Land Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 161092, 4
Jul 2012. 

73. Gutierrez v. The House of Representatives Committee on Justice, ....................

G.R. No. 193459, 15 Feb 2011. 
74. People v. Sandiganbayan and Amante, G.R. No. 167304, 25 Aug ....................
2009. 

....................
75. Gatchalian v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. L-32560-61, 22 Oct 1970. 

....................
76. City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr. G.R. No. 118127, 12 Apr 2005. 

....................
77. Amadora v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-47745, 15 Apr 1988. 

....................
78. Miranda v. Abaya, G.R. No. 136351, 28 Jul 1999. 
79. National Power Corporation v. Angas, G.R. Nos. 60225-26, 8 May ....................
1992. 
80. Pelizloy Realty Corporation v. Province of Benguet, G.R. No. ....................
183137, 10 Apr 2013. 

....................
81. People v. Bello, G.R. Nos. 166948-59, 29 Aug 2012. 

....................
82. GSIS v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 162372, 11 Oct 2011. 

....................
83. People v. Delantar, G.R. No. 169143, 2 Feb 2007. 
84. Chavez v. JBC, G.R. No. 202242, 16 Apr 2013.  ....................

....................
85. Canet v. Mayor Julieta Decena, G.R. No. 155344, 20 Jan 2004. 

....................
86. Atienza v. Villaros, G.R. No. 161081, 10 May 2005. 
87. Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Dando, G.R. No. 177456, 4 Sep ....................
2009. 
88. Diokno v. Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, G.R. No. L-4712, 11 ....................
Jul 1952. 

6
 ....................
89. Gachon v. Devera, Jr., G.R. No. 116695, 20 Jun 1997. 

90. Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Court of ....................

Appeals, G.R. No. 117188, 7 Aug 1997. 
91. Hacienda Luisita, Inc. v. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council, ....................
supra. 

....................
92. Radaza v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 177135, 15 Oct 2008. 
93. Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 98382, 17 ....................
May 1993.

....................
94. Borromeo v. Mariano, G.R. No. L-16808, 3 Jan 1921. 

....................
95. People v. Mediado, G.R. No. 169871, 2 Feb 2011. 

....................
96. Office of the Ombudsman v. Apolonio, G.R. No. 165132, 7 Mar 2012
97. Tuna Processing, Inc. v. Philippine Kingford, Inc., G.R. No. 185582, ....................
29 Feb 2012. 
98. Go v. Distinction Properties, supra.  ....................
99. People v. Sandiganbayan, supra.  ....................

100. In the matter of the Estate of Emil H. Johnson, Ebba Ingeborg ....................
Johnson, G.R. No. 12767, 16 Nov 1918. 

....................
101. De Villa v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 87416, 8 Apr 1991. 
102. Gonzales III v. Office of the President, supra.  ....................

103. Samar II Electric Cooperative, Inc., et. al. v. Seludo, Jr., G.R. No. ....................
173840, 25 Apr 2012. 
104. Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 83896, 22 ....................
Feb 1991. 
105. Ursua v. Court of Appeals, supra.  ....................

106. In the matter of charges of plagiarism against Associate Justice ....................

Mariano C. Del 
Castillo, A.M. No. 10-7-17, 8 Feb 2011.  ....................
107. Pelizloy v. Benguet, supra.  ....................

108. Moreno, Jr. v. Private Management Office, G.R. No. 159373, 16 ....................
Nov 2006. 
109. De Castro v. JBC, supra.  ....................
110. Floresca, et. al. v. Philex Mining Corp., G.R. No. 30642, 30 Apr ....................

7
1985. 

....................
111. Ting v. Velez-Ting, G.R. No. 166562, 31 Mar 2009. 
112.  CIR v. Bicolandia Drug Corporation, G.R. No. 148083, 21 Jul ....................
2006. 
113. Nestle Philippines v. Uniwide Sales, Inc., G.R. No. 174674, 20 Oct ....................
2010. 
114. Maria Luisa Park Association, Inc. v. Almendras, G.R. No. 171763, ....................
5 Jun 2009. 
115. Estate of Nelson R. Dulay v. Aboitiz Jebsen Maritime, Inc., G.R. No. ....................
172642, 13 Jun 2012. 

....................
116. Eslao v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 108310, 1 Sep 1994. 
117. CIR v. San Roque Power Corporation, G.R. No. 187485, 12 Feb ....................
2013. 
118. Gamboa v. Teves, supra.  ....................

119. PDIC v. Stockholders of Intercity Savings and Loan Bank, Inc., G.R. ....................
No. 181556, 14 Dec 2009. 

....................
120. People v. Temporada, G.R. No. 173473, 17 Dec 2008. 
121. Dabalos v. RTC, supra.  ....................
122. Lledo v. Lledo, supra.  ....................

....................
123. Pacanan v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 186224, 25 Aug 2009. 

....................
124. Barroso v. Ampig, G.R. No. 138218, 17 Mar 2000. 
125. Violago, Sr. v. COMELEC and Alarilla, G.R. No. 194143, 4 Oct ....................
2011. 

....................
126. Maquiling v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 195649, 16 Apr 2013. 
127. Suico Industrial Corp. v. Lagura-Yap, G.R. No. 177711, 5 Sep ....................
2012. 

....................
128. Tomas v. Santos, G.R. No. 190448, 26 Jul 2010. 
129. BPI v. Dando, supra.  ....................

....................
130. Sec. Leila De Lima v. Gatdula, G.R. No. 204528, 19 Feb 2013. 
131. CIR v. Filinvest Development Corporation, G.R. No. 163653, 19 Jul ....................
2011. 
132. Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v. Hon. Ferdinand J. ....................

8
Marcos, G.R. No. 120082, 11 Sep 1996. 
133. Republic v. Intermediate Appellate Court and Sps. Pastor, G.R. No. ....................
69344, 26 Apr 1991. 

134. Lincoln Philippine Life Insurance Company, Inc. v. Court of ....................

Appeals, et. al., G.R. No. 118043, 23 Jul 1998. 

135. Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation v. CIR, ....................

G.R. No. 159471, 26 Jan 2011. 

....................
136. Accenture, Inc. v. CIR, G.R. No. 190102, 11 Jul 2012. 

....................
137. CIR v. SC Johnson and Son, Inc. G.R. No. 127105, 25 Jun 1999. 
138. CIR v. Eastern Telecommunications Phils., Inc., G.R. No. 163835, 7 ....................
Jul 2010. 

....................
139. CIR v. Procter & Gamble Philippines, G.R. No.  66838, 2 Dec 1991. 

....................
140. Republic v. Kerry Lao Ong, G.R. No. 175430, 18 Jun 2012. 
141. Department of Health v. Phil Pharmawealth, Inc., G.R. No. 182358, ....................
20 Feb 2013. 
142. Salvacion v. Central Bank, supra. ....................

....................
143. Hagad v. Gozo Dadole, G.R. No. 108072, 12 Dec 1995. 

....................
144. Social Justice Society v. Atienza, G.R. No. 156052, 13 Feb 2008. 

....................
145. Koruga v. Arcenas, Jr., G.R. No. 169053, 19 Jun 2009. 

....................
146. Hacienda Luisita v. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council, supra. 

....................
147. Tuna Processing, Inc. v. Philippine Kingford, Inc., supra. 
148. Remo v. Secretary of Foreign Affairs, G.R. No. 169202, 5 Mar ....................
2010. 

150. Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation v. Stockholders of ....................

Intercity Savings and Loan Bank, supra. 
151. Lintag v. National Power Corporation, G.R. No. 158609, 27 Jul ....................
2007. 

9
152. Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines, Inc. ....................
v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 206844-45, 23 Jul 2013. 
153. Dueñas v. Santos Subdivision Homeowners Association, G.R. No. ....................
149417, 4 Jun 2004. 
154. Eugenio v. Executive Secretary Drilon, G.R. No. 109404, 22 Jan ....................
1996. 
155. People s Industrial and Commercial Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. ....................
No. 112733, 24 Oct 1997. 

....................
156. Salvador v. Mapa, G.R. No. 135080, 28 Nov 2007. 

....................
157. People v. Adviento, G.R. No. 175781, 20 Mar 2012. 
158. Eastern Mediterranean Maritime Ltd. V. Surio, et. al., G.R. No. ....................
154213, 23 Aug 2012. 

....................
159. Narzoles v. NLRC, G.R. No. 141959, 29 Sep 2000. 

....................
160. Hon. Ma. Lourdes Fernando v. St. Scholastica s College, supra. 

....................
161. Maxey v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-45870, 11 May 1984. 

....................
162. Valencia v. Surtida, G.R. No. L-17277, 31 May 1961. 

....................
163. Ponce v. Guevarra, G.R. No. L-19629 & L-19672-92, 31 Mar 1964. 

....................
164. Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156, 3 Feb 1997. 

165. Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board, G.R. No. 157870, ....................
158633, & 161658, 3 Nov 2008. 

....................
166. Sabio v. Gordon, G.R. No. 174340, 17 Oct 2006. 

....................
167. Macalintal v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 157013, 10 Jul 2003. 
168. Chavez v. JBC, supra.  ....................

169. Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, 10 Sep ....................
2003. 
170. Tawang Multi-Purpose Cooperative v. La Trinidad Water District, ....................
supra. 
171. Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. ....................

10
 147589 & 147613, 26 Jun 2001. 
172. J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration, G.R. No. L- ....................
21064, 18 Feb 1970. 

....................
173. Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, supra. 

....................
174. Nitafan v. CIR, G.R. No. L-78780, 23 Jul 1987. 

....................
175. Malacora v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-51042, 30 Sep 1982. 
176. Gamboa v. Teves, supra.  ....................

....................
177. Tañada v. Angara, G.R. No. 118295, 2 May 1997. 

....................
178. Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., G.R. No. 101083, 30 Jul 1993. 
179. Boy Scouts of the Philippines v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. ....................
177131, 7 Jun 2011. 

....................
180. Espina v. Zamora, G.R. No. 143855, 21 Sep 2010. 
181. Basco v. Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation, G.R. No. ....................
91649, 14 May 1991. 

....................
182. Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, G.R. No. 115455, 25 Aug 1994. 
183. Gamboa v. Teves, supra. ....................

CASE #1
Caltex (Philippines), Inc. vs. Palomar

11
No. L-19650 September 29, 1966
Petitioner/Appellee: CALTEX (PHILIPPINES), INC
Respondents/Appellant: ENRICO PALOMAR, in his capacity as THE POSTMASTER
GENERAL
Ponente: CASTRO, J.

Facts:
Caltex created a promotional scheme to increase its sales called the "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest", it
calls for participants therein to estimate the actual number of liters a hooded gas pump at each Caltex
station will dispense during a specified period.

MECHANICS
To join, no fee or consideration is required to be paid, no purchase of Caltex products required to be
made. Interested participants must fill up entry forms which are to be made available upon request at
each Caltex station where a sealed can will be provided for the deposit of accomplished entry stubs.

Different prizes await the several winners, in cash or in kind. In order to publicize the said scheme,
representations were made by Caltex with the postal authorities for the contest to be cleared in
advance for mailing, having in view sections 1954 (a), 1982 and 1983 of the Revised Administrative
Code.

This was later formalized in a letter to the Postmaster General, dated October 31, 1960, in which the
Caltex, thru counsel, enclosed a copy of the contest rules and endeavored to justify its position that the
contest does not violate the anti-lottery provisions of the Postal Law.

POSTMASTER GENERAL DENIES CLEARANCE

Unimpressed, the then Acting Postmaster General opined that scheme falls within the purview of the
provisions aforesaid and declined to grant the requested clearance.

Caltex sought a reconsideration of the foregoing stand, stressing that there being involved no
consideration on the part of any contestant, the contest was not, under controlling authorities,
condemnable as a lottery.

Postmaster General maintained his view that the contest involves consideration, or that, if it does not,
it is nevertheless a "gift enterprise" which is equally banned by the Postal Law. He even threatened
that if the contest was conducted, "a fraud order will have to be issued against it (Caltex) and all its
representatives"

Issue:
Whether or not the scheme proposed by the appellee is within the coverage of the prohibitive
provisions of the Postal Law inescapably requires an inquiry into the intended meaning of the words
used therein.

Ruling:
No, the scheme proposed by Caltex is not within the coverage of the prohibitive provisions of the
Postal Law.

12
Statutes; Construction defined.
Construction is the art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning 'and intention of the
authors of the law with respect to its application to a given case, where that intention is rendered
doubtful, amongst others, by reason of the fact that the given case is not explicitly provided for in the
law (Black, Interpretation of Laws, p. 1).

In the present case, the question of whether or not the scheme proposed by the appellee is within the
coverage of the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law inescapably requires an inquiry into the
intended meaning of the words used therein. This is as much a question of construction or
interpretation as any other.

Essential elements of lottery

The term "lottery" extends to all schemes for' the distribution of prizes by chance, such as policy
playing, gift exhibitions, prize concerts, raffles at fairs, etc., and various forms of gambling. The three
essential elements of a Iottery are: first, consideration; second, prize: and third, chance.

Gratuitous distribution of property by chance

When element of consideration is not present. In respect to the element of consideration, the law does
not condemn the gratuitous distribution of property by chance, if no consideration is derived directly
or indirectly from the party receiving the chance, but does condemn as criminal schemes in which a
valuable consideration of some kind is paid directly or indirectly for the chance to draw a prize ("El
Debate", Inc. vs. Topacio, supra).

Under the rules of the proposed contest there is no requirement that any fee be paid, any merchandise
be bought, any service be rendered, or any value whatsoever be given for the privilege to participate.

A prospective contestant has but to go to a Caltex station, request for the entry form which is available
on demand, and accomplish and submit the same for the drawing of the winner.
Viewed from all angles, the contest fails to exhibit any discernible consideration which would brand it
as a lottery, The scheme is but a gratuitous distribution of property by chance.

Meaning of "gift enterprise

The term "gift enterprise" is commonly applied to a sporting artifice under which goods are sold for
their market value, but by way of inducement each purchaser is given a chance to win a prize.

As thus conceived, the term clearly cannot embrace the scheme at bar, where there is no sale of
anything to which the chance offered is attached as an inducement to the purchaser, and where the
contest is open to all qualified contestants irrespective of whether or not they buy the appellee's
products.

When gift enterprises are condemnable

Under the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law, gift enterprises and similar schemes therein
contemplated are condemnable only if, like lotteries, they involve: the element of consideration.
Because there is none in the contest herein, in question, the appellee may not be denied the use of the
mails for purposes thereof.

13
Finding none in the contest here in question, we rule that the Caltex, the appellee may not be denied
the use of the mails for purposes thereof.

Recapitulating, we hold that the petition herein states a sufficient cause of action for declaratory relief,
and that the "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest” as described in the rules submitted by the appellee does
not transgress the provisions of the Postal Law.

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment appealed from is affirmed. No costs

CASE #2
Philippine Apparel Workers Union vs. National Labor Relations Commission
No. L-50320. July 31, 1981
PHILIPPINE APPAREL WORKERS UNION, petitioner vs. THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION and PHILIPPINE APPAREL, INC., respondents.
MAKASIAR, J.:

FACTS
The Philippine Apparel Workers Union (petitioner) renewed their collective bargaining agreement
with the respondent and one of the provisions stipulated that effective April 1, 1977, EIGHTY
CENTAVOS [P0.80] will be added to the basic daily wages of all said employees.

The controversy arose when the petitioner union sought the implementation of the negotiated wage
increase of P0.80 as provided for in the collective bargaining agreement. Respondent company asserts
that since there was already a meeting of the minds between the parties as early as April 2, 1977 about
the wage increases which were made retroactive to April 1, 1977, it fell well within the exemption
provided for in the Rules Implementing P.D. 112, as follows: “Those that have granted in addition to
the allowance under P.D. 525, at least P60.00 monthly wage increase on or after January 1, 1977,
provided that those who paid less than this amount shall pay the difference."

The petitioner maintains that the living allowance under P.D. 1123 (originally P.D. 525) is distinct
and separate from the negotiated wage increase of P0.80 daily February 13, 1978, the petitioner filed a
complaint dated February 10, 1978 for unfair labor practice and violation of the CBA against the
respondent company.

The case was dismissed, and is referred to the parties or disputants for them to resolve their disputes,
grievances or matters arising from the implementation, application or interpretation of their Collective
Bargaining Agreement in accordance with the Machinery established in the CBA." Both parties
appealed to the respondent Commission.

ISSUE
Whether or not the P0.80 per day increase should be paid in addition to other increase in wages.
RULING
Yes. such P 0.80 per day increase should be paid in addition to other increase in wages.

14
Statutory Construction
Great weight should be given to the interpretation of a given statute by the government agency called
upon to implement it. One thing is for sure. The Department had the right to construe the word
"granted", as used in Section 1 (k). The construction it had adopted cannot be viewed as so wrong as
to allow us to reverse it. The rule followed in this jurisdiction since Madrigal vs. Rafferty (38 Phil.
414 [1918]) is that great weight shall be given to the interpretation or construction given to a statute
by the Government agency called upon to implement the statute. In this case, the weight in favor of
the Department of Labor should be greater, because the Department is not interpreting or construing a
statute, but it had explained the extent of its own rule.

The meaning of the rule is that when an employer had "granted" increases to his employees after
January 1, 1977, such increases shall be credited against the P60.00 ECOLA provided in PD 1123.

Considering that the Secretary of Labor could exempt distressed employers from complying with PD
1123, it is believed that the regulation to debit the P60.00 ECOLA with wage increases granted to
employees after January 1, 1977 was within the authority of the Secretary to make.

The writ of certiorari is hereby granted, the decision of the respondent commission is hereby set aside,
and private respondent is hereby directed to pay, in addition to the increased allowance provided for
in P.D. 1123, the negotiated wage increase of P0.80 daily effective april 1, 1977 as well as all other
wage increases embodied in the collective bargaining agreement, to all covered employees. costs
against private respondent. this decision is immediately executory.

CASE #3
Corpuz vs. People
G.R. No. 180016. April 29, 2014.
LITO CORPUZ, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
PERALTA, J.

FACTS
Petitioner Lito Corpuz and private complainant Danilo Tangcoy had an agreement that the former
would sell the latter’s pieces of jewelry on a commission basis.

They both agreed that the petitioner shall remit the proceeds of the sale, and/or, if unsold, to return the
same items, within a period of 60 days.

15
The period expired without petitioner remitting the proceeds of the sale or returning the pieces of
jewelry. When private complainant was able to meet petitioner, the latter promised the former that he
will pay the value of the said items entrusted to him, but to no avail.

A complaint was filed and subsequently the RTC held that petitioner was found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the felony of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph one (1), subparagraph (b) of the
Revised Penal Code.

The accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of deprivation of liberty consisting of
imprisonment under the Indeterminate Sentence Law of FOUR (4) YEARS AND TWO (2) MONTHS
of Prisión Correccional in its medium period AS MINIMUM, to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS AND
EIGHT (8) MONTHS of Reclusion Temporal in its minimum period AS MAXIMUM; to indemnify
private complainant Danilo Tangcoy the amount of P98,000.00 as actual damages, and to pay the
costs of suit.

The case was elevated to the CA, however, the latter denied the appeal of petitioner and affirmed the
decision of the RTC.

The CA affirmed with modification on the imposable prison term, such that accused-appellant shall
suffer the indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prisión correccional, as minimum, to 8
years of prisión mayor, as maximum, plus 1 year for each additional P10,000.00, or a total of 7 years.
Hence, the petition.

ISSUE
Whether or not, applying the rules of statutory construction, the Court may, rather than declare the
relevant statutory penalties unconstitutional, determine the legislative intent with respect to them and,
accordingly, adjust the amount of the present fraud to its 1932 equivalent and impose the proper
penalty.

RULING
The Court is in no position to conclude as to the intentions of the framers of the Revised Penal Code
by merely making a study of the applicability of the penalties imposable in the present times. Such is
not within the competence of the Court but of the Legislature.

The primordial duty of the Court is merely to apply the law in such a way that it shall not usurp
legislative powers by judicial legislation and that in the course of such application or construction, it
should not make or supervise legislation, or under the guise of interpretation, modify, revise, amend,
distort, remodel, or rewrite the law, or give the law a construction which is repugnant to its terms.

Moreover, it is to be noted that civil indemnity is, technically, not a penalty or a Fine; hence, it can be
increased by the Court when appropriate. Article 10 of the Civil Code mandates a presumption that
the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.

Statutory Construction; View that in case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is
presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail. Article 10 of the Civil Code
states: “In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking
body intended right and justice to prevail.” The Code Commission found it necessary to include this

16
provision to “strengthen the determination of the Court to avoid an injustice which may apparently be
authorized in some way of interpreting the law.”

Verba Legis; View that the cardinal canon in statutory construction — the plain meaning rule or verba
legis — requires that “the meaning of a statute should, in the first instance, be sought in the language
in which the act is framed; if the language is plain, the sole function of the courts is to enforce it
according to its terms.”

The cardinal canon in statutory construction — the plain meaning rule or verba legis — requires that
“the meaning of a statute should, in the first instance, be sought in the language in which the act is
framed; if the language is plain, the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms.”
In interpreting any statute in the exercise of its judicial power of applying the law, the Court should
always turn to this cardinal canon before all others. “Courts should always presume that a legislature
says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there,” and that the legislature
knows “the meaning of the words, to have used them advisedly, and to have expressed the intent by
use of such words as are found in the statute.” Thus, when the law is clear and free from any doubt or
ambiguity, and does not yield absurd and unworkable results, the duty of interpretation, more so of
construction, does not arise; the Court should resort to the canons of statutory construction only when
the statute is ambiguous.

CASE #4
Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 102858. July 28, 1997
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and TEODORO
ABISTADO, substituted by MARGARITA, MARISSA, MARIBEL, ARNOLD and MARY
ANN, all surnamed ABISTADO, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:

FACTS
Private Respondent Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original registration of his title over 648
square meters of land under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529

However, during the pendency of his petition, the applicant died. Hence, his heirs—Margarita,
Marissa, Maribel, Arnold and Mary Ann, all surnamed Abistado— represented by their aunt Josefa
Abistado, who was appointed their guardian ad litem, were substituted as applicants.

The land registration court in its decision dated June 13, 1989 dismissed the petition “for want of
jurisdiction.”

However, it found that the applicants through their predecessors-in-interest had been in open,
continuous, exclusive and peaceful possession of the subject land since 1938. The trial court
dismissed the petition.

17
Private respondents appealed to Respondent Court of Appeals which, as earlier explained, set aside
the decision of the trial court and ordered the registration of the title in the name of Teodoro Abistado.
The subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied in the challenged CA Resolution. The Director
of Lands represented by the Solicitor General thus elevated this recourse to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE
Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed “grave abuse of discretion” in holding that
publication of the petition for registration of title in LRC Case No. 86 need not be published in a
newspaper of general circulation, and in not dismissing LRC Case No. 86 for want of such
publication.”

RULING
This Court agrees with the Petitioner. In Statutory Construction; The word “shall” denotes an
imperative and thus indicates the mandatory character of a statute; If mailing of notices is essential,
then by parity of reasoning, publication in a newspaper of general circulation is likewise imperative
where the law includes such requirement in its detailed provision.

The law used the term “shall” in prescribing the work to be done by the Commissioner of Land
Registration upon the latter’s receipt of the court order setting the time for initial hearing. The said
word denotes an imperative and thus indicates the mandatory character of a statute.

While concededly such literal mandate is not an absolute rule in statutory construction, as its import
ultimately depends upon its context in the entire provision, we hold that in the present case the term
must be understood in its normal mandatory meaning.

In Republic vs. Marasigan, the Court through Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. held that Section 23
of PD No. 1529 requires notice of the initial hearing by means of:
1. publication,
2. mailing and
3. posting,

All of which must be complied with. The respondents did not comply with the explicit publication
requirement of the law. Private respondents did not proffer any excuse; even if they had, it would not
have mattered because the statute itself allows no excuses.

VERBA LEGIS The law is unambiguous and its rationale clear. Time and again, this Court has
declared that where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for
interpretation, vacillation or equivocation; there is room only for application.

There is no alternative. Thus, the application for land registration filed by private respondents must be
dismissed without prejudice to reapplication in the future, after all the legal requisites shall have been
duly complied with.

The petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision and Resolution are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The application of private respondent for land registration is DISMISSED without prejudice.

18
CASE #5
Secretary of the Department of Public Works and Highways vs. Tecson
G.R. No. 179334. April 21, 2015
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS and DISTRICT
ENGINEER CELESTINO R. CONTRERAS, petitioners, vs. SPOUSES HERACLEO and
RAMONA TECSON, respondents.
PERALTA, J.:

FACT
For the construction of the MacArthur Highway DPWH took the respondents’ property without the
benefit of expropriation proceedings while respondents demanded the payment of the fair market
value of the land.

The District Engineer of DPWH offered to pay for the subject land at Seventy Centavos (P0.70) per
square meter. However, the respondents demanded the return of their property, or the payment of
compensation at the current fair market value.

And so the respondents filed a complaint for recovery of possession with damages and they were
favored by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and the Court of Appeals (CA), with the subject property
valued at One Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P1,500.00) per square meter, with interest at six percent
(6%) per annum. The respondents moved for the reconsideration of said decision .

ISSUE
Whether or not the respondents should be paid for their property at the current fair market value plus
the interest of 12% per annum.

RULING
No. In previous cases the Court has uniformly ruled that the fair market value of the property at the
time of taking is controlling for purposes of computing just compensation.

Just compensation due respondents-movants in this case should, therefore, be fixed not as of the
time of payment but at the time of taking in 1940 which is Seventy Centavos (P0.70) per square
meter, and not One Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P1,500.00) per square meter, as valued by the
RTC and CA.

While disparity in the above amounts is obvious and may appear inequitable to respondents-movants
as they would be receiving such outdated valuation after a very long period, it should be noted that the
purpose of just compensation is not to reward the owner for the property taken but to compensate him
for the loss thereof. As such, the true measure of the property, as upheld by a plethora of cases, is the
market value at the time of the taking, when the loss resulted.

In the Court’s own words: The Bulacan trial court, in its 1979 decision, was correct in imposing
interests on the zonal value of the property to be computed from the time petitioner instituted
condemnation proceedings and “took” the property in September 1969.

This allowance of interest on the amount found to be the value of the property as of the time of the
taking computed, being an effective forbearance, at 12% per annum should help eliminate the issue of
the constant fluctuation and inflation of the value of the currency over time.

19
Indeed, the State is not obliged to pay premium to the property owner for appropriating the latter’s
property; it is only bound to make good the loss sustained by the landowner, with due consideration of
the circumstances availing at the time the property was taken. More, the concept of just compensation
does not imply fairness to the property owner alone.

We hold that putting to rest the issue on the validity of the exercise of eminent domain is neither
tantamount to condoning the acts of the DPWH in disregarding the property rights of respondents-
movants nor giving premium to the government’s failure to institute an expropriation proceeding.

This Court had steadfastly adhered to the doctrine that its first and fundamental duty is the
application of the law according to its express terms, interpretation being called for only when
such literal application is impossible.

To entertain other formula for computing just compensation, contrary to those established by
law and jurisprudence, would open varying interpretation of economic policies — a matter which
this Court has no competence to take cognizance of. Time and again, we have held that no process of
interpretation or construction need be resorted to where a provision of law peremptorily calls for
application.

CASE #6
People vs. Mapa
No. L-22301. August 30, 1967
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MARIO MAPA Y MAPULONG,
defendant-appellant
FERNANDO, J.

FACTS
Mario Mapa wilfully and unlawfully have in his possession and under his custody and control one
home-made revolver (Paltik), Cal. 22, without serial number, with six (6) rounds of ammunition, but
lacks the necessary license or permit.

Consequently, he is accused of a violation of Section 878 in connection with Section 2692 of the
Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 56 and as further amended by
Republic Act No. 4.

Gov. Leviste claims that he directed the accused to proceed to Manila, Pasay and Quezon City on a
confidential mission, and produced a certificate dated March 11, 1963, to the effect that the accused
"is a secret agent" of his.

The lower court rendered a decision convicting the accused "of the crime of illegal possession of
firearms.

20
 ISSUE
Whether or not Mapa’s appointment to the position of a secret agent to the provincial governor would
constitute a sufficient defense to a prosecution for the crime of illegal possession of firearm and
ammunition.

RULING
No. Being a secret agent of the governor is not a defense.—The fact that a person, found in possession
of an unlicensed firearm, is a secret agent of a provincial governor does not exempt him from criminal
liability. The law does not contain any exception for a secret agent.

The first and fundamental duty of the courts is to apply the law. "Construction and interpretation
come only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them."
It is not within the power of a court to set aside the clear and explicit mandate of a statutory provision.

The law cannot be any clearer. No provision is made for a secret agent. As such he is not exempt. Our
task is equally clear. The first and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law. "Construction and
interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate
without them." The conviction of the accused must stand. It cannot be set aside.

CASE #7
People vs. Amigo G.R. No. 196231 September 4, 2012
G.R. No. 116719. January 18, 1996
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PATRICIO AMIGO alias “BEBOT,”
accused-appellant.
MELO, J.
FACT
The crime of MURDER punishable under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code was charged agains
Patricio Amigo wherein he was charged guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

However, he argued that the court erred in imposing or meting out the penalty of reclusion perpetua
against him despite the fact that Sec. 19 (1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution was already in effect
when the offense was committed.

Furthermore, he contends that under the 1987 Constitution and prior to the promulgation of Republic
Act No. 7659, the death penalty had been abolished and hence, the penalty that should have been
imposed for the crime of murder committed by accused-appellant without the attendance of any
modifying circumstances, should be reclusion temporal in its medium period or 17 years, 4 months
and 1 day, to 20 years of reclusion temporal.

ISSUE
Whether or not as a result of the prohibition against the death penalty, the court meant to require a
corresponding modification in the other periods.

RULING

21
No. The Court ruled that Article III, Section 19(1) does not change the periods of the penalty
prescribed by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code except only insofar as it prohibits the imposition
of the death penalty and reduces it to reclusion perpetua. The range of the medium and minimum
penalties remains unchanged.

The applicable sentence is the medium period of the penalty prescribed by Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code which, conformably to the new doctrine here adopted and announced, is still reclusion
perpetua.

It is a settled rule of legal hermeneutics that if the language under consideration is plain, itis neither
necessary nor permissible to resort to extrinsic aids, like the records of the constitutional convention,
for its interpretation

A reading of Section 19(1) of Article III will readily show that there is really nothing therein which
expressly declares the abolition of the death penalty. The provision merely says that the death penalty
shall not be imposed unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes the Congress hereafter
provides for it and, if already imposed, shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.

The language, while rather awkward, is still plain enough. And itis a settled rule of legal hermeneutics
that if the language under consideration is plain, it is neither necessary nor permissible to resort to
extrinsic aids, like the records of the constitutional convention, for its interpretation.

CASE #8
Lokin Jr. vs. COMELEC
G.R. Nos. 179431-32 June 22, 2010
LUIS K. LOKIN, JR., as the second nominee of CITIZENS BATTLE AGAINST CORRUPTION
(CIBAC), Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and the HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, Respondents.
BERSAMIN, J.:

FACT
CIBAC filed a certificate nomination, substitution and amendment of the list of nominees dated May
7, 2007. The organization was one of the those duly registered under the party-list system of
representation that manifested their intent to participate in the May 14, 2007 synchronized national
and local elections.

CIBAC’s nominees were: (1) Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva; (2) herein petitioner Luis K. Lokin, Jr.;
(3) Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales; (4) Sherwin Tugna; and (5) Emil L. Galang.
However, a certificate of nomination substitution and amendment of the list of nominees was filed by
CIBAC withdrawing the nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang and substituted Armi Jane R.
Borje as one of the nominees. Retaining only (1) Villanueva, (2) Cruz-Gonzales, and (3) Borje.

Following the close of the polls, or on June 20, 2007, Villanueva sent a letter to COMELEC
Chairperson Benjamin Abalos, transmitting therewith the signed petitions of more than 81% of the
CIBAC members, in order to confirm the withdrawal of the nomination of Lokin, Tugna and Galang
and the substitution of Borje.

22
They also filed with the COMELEC en banc sitting as the National Board of Canvassers a motion
seeking the proclamation of Lokin as its second nominee. The motion was opposed by Villanueva and
Cruz-Gonzales. The COMELEC failed to act on the matter, prompting Villanueva to file a petition to
confirm the certificate of nomination, substitution and amendment of the list of nominees of CIBAC
on June 28, 2007.

COMELEC resolved to set the matter through a resolution pertaining to the validity of the withdrawal
of the nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang and the substitution of Borje for proper disposition
and hearing. Cruz-Gonzales was proclaimed as the official second nominee of CIBAC and took her
oath of office as a Party-List Representative.

Lokin filed a petition for mandamus before the supreme court seeking to compel COMELEC to
proclaim his as the official second nominee of CIBAC.

He alleges that Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 No change of names or alteration of the order of
nominees shall be allowed after the same shall have been submitted to the COMELEC except in cases
where the nominee dies, or withdraws in writing his nomination, becomes incapacitated in which case
the name of the substitute nominee shall be placed last in the list. Incumbent sectoral representatives
in the House of Representatives who are nominated in the party-list system shall not be considered
resigned.”

The COMELEC argued that once the proclamation of the winning party-list organization has been
done and its nominee has assumed office, any question relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the candidates to the House of Representatives will be under the jurisdiction of the
HRET. Lokin questions whether in an election protest or in a special civil action for quo warranto in
the HRET, not in a special civil action for certiorari in this Court.

ISSUE
Whether or not Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 is invalid and of no effect

RULING
Yes. Lokin has correctly brought this special civil action for certiorari against the COMELEC to seek
the review of the September 14, 2007 resolution of the COMELEC in accordance with Section 7 of
Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution, notwithstanding the oath and assumption of office by Cruz-
Gonzales.

As Rule 64 states, the mode of review is by a petition for certiorari in accordance with Rule 65 to be
filed in the Supreme Court within a limited period of 30 days. Undoubtedly, the Court has original
and exclusive jurisdiction over Lokin’s petitions for certiorari and for mandamus against the
COMELEC.

YES, the petitions for certiorari and mandamus was GRANTED.

Considering that Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 – to the extent that it allows the party-list
organization to withdraw its nomination already submitted to the COMELEC – was invalid, CIBAC’s
withdrawal of its nomination of Lokin and the others and its substitution of them with new nominees

23
were also invalid and ineffectual. It is clear enough that any substitution of Lokin and the others could
only be for any of the grounds expressly stated in Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941.

Resultantly, the COMELEC’s approval of CIBAC’s petition of withdrawal of the nominations and its
recognition of CIBAC’s substitution, both through its assailed September 14, 2007 resolution, should
be struck down for lack of legal basis. Thereby, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction, having
relied on the invalidly issued Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 to support its action.

Prohibitive or negative words can rarely, if ever, be directory, for there is but one way to obey the
command “thou shall not,” and that is to completely refrain from doing the forbidden act, subject to
certain exceptions stated in the law itself.

The usage of “No” in Section 8—“No change of names or alteration of the order of nominees shall be
allowed after the same shall have been submitted to the COMELEC except in cases where the
nominee dies, or withdraws in writing his nomination, or becomes incapacitated, in which case the
name of the substitute nominee shall be placed last in the list” renders Section 8 a negative law, and is
indicative of the legislative intent to make the statute mandatory.

Prohibitive or negative words can rarely, if ever, be directory, for there is but one way to obey the
command “thou shall not,” and that is to completely refrain from doing the forbidden act, subject to
certain exceptions stated in the law itself, like in this case.

When the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no reason for interpretation or
construction, but only for application. Accordingly, an administrative agency tasked to implement a
statute may not construe it by expanding its meaning where its provisions are clear and unambiguous.

The Court declares Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 invalid and of no effect to the extent that it
authorizes a party-list organization to withdraw its nomination of a nominee once it has submitted the
nomination to the Commission on Elections.

CASE #9
Maglasang vs. People
G.R. No. 90083. October 4, 1990.
KHALYXTO PEREZ MAGLASANG, accused-petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Presiding Judge ERNESTO B. TEMPLADO (San Carlos City Court), Negros
Occidental, respondents.

FACTS
After the dismissal of the petition filed by Atty. Marceliano L. Castellano, as counsel of the petitioner,
he then filed a motion for reconsideration.

However, the motion for reconsideration did not contain the duplicate original or certified true copies
of the assailed orders. Thus, in a Resolution dated October 18,1989, the motion for reconsideration
was denied "with FINALITY."

24
Three months later, or on January 22, 1990 to be exact, the Court received from Atty. Castellano a
copy of a complaint dated December 19,1989, filed with the Office of the President of the Philippines
whereby Khalyxto Perez Maglasang, through his lawyer, Atty. Castellano, as complainant, accused all
the five Justices of the Court's Second Division with "biases and/or ignorance of the law or knowingly
rendering unjust judgments or resolution."

Atty. Castellano was required by the Justices of the Supreme Court to show cause why he should not
be punished for contempt or administratively dealt with for improper conduct.

The reason for such order was due to the strong and intemperate language of the complaint and its
improper filing with the Office of the President.

ISSUE
Whether or not the President of the Philippines as Chief Executive may pass judgment on any of the
Court's acts, as implied by the complaint filed by Atty. Castellano.

RULING

No, there is no other department or agency may pass upon the judgments of the Judiciary Department
or declare them 'unjust," not even the President of the Philippines as Chief Executive may pass
judgment on any of the Court's acts.

The Supreme Court is supreme—no other department or agency may pass upon its judgments or
declare them "unjust", not even the President of the Philippines.

We further note that in filing the "complaint" against the justices of the Court's Second Division, even
the most basic tenet of our government system which is the separation of powers between the
judiciary, the executive, and the legislative branches has been lost on Atty. Castellano.

We, therefore, take this occasion to once again remind all and sundry that "the Supreme Court is
supreme—the third great department of government entrusted exclusively with the judicial
power to adjudicate with finality all justiciable disputes, public and private.

CASE #10
In Re: Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta
Adm. Mat. No. 98-5-01-SC. November 9, 1998
IN RE APPOINTMENTS DATED March 30, 1998 OF HON. MATEO A. VALENZUELA and
HON. PLACIDO B. VALLARTA AS JUDGES OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
BRANCH 62, BAGO CITY AND OF BRANCH 24, CABANATUAN CITY, respectively.
NARVASA, C.J.:

FACTS
The President appoints Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as Judges of the
Regional Trial Court of Branch 62, Bago City and of Branch 24, Cabanatuan City during the
prohibited period provided by the constitution in Art. VII, Sec 15.

25
 He "firmly and respectfully reiterate his request for the Judicial and Bar Council to transmit the final
list of nominees for the lone SupremeCourt vacancy in order to complete the appointments.

However, this is opposed by Chief Justice Narvasa who claims that the election ban provision also
applies to appointments in the judiciary. The constitutional issues being raised in this matter induced
the Court En Bance to decide on the Administrative matter.

ISSUE
1.Whether during the period of the ban on appointments imposed by Section 15, Article VII of the
Constitution, the President is required to fill vacancies in the judiciary.

RULING

Statutory Construction
During the period stated in Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution, two months immediately
before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, the President is neither required to
make appointments to the courts nor allowed to do so.

The Court’s view is that during the period stated in Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution “(t)wo
months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term” the President
is neither required to make appointments to the courts nor allowed to do so; and that Sections 4(1) and
9 of Article VIII simply mean that the President is required to fill vacancies in the courts within the
time frames provided therein unless prohibited by Section 15 of Article VII. It is noteworthy that the
prohibition on appointments comes into effect only once every six years.

Midnight Appointments
Now, it appears that Section 15, Article VII is directed against two types of appointments: (1) those
made for buying votes and (2) those made for partisan considerations.

The first refers to those appointments made within the two months preceding a Presidential election
and are similar to those which are declared election offenses in the Omnibus Election Code.

The second type of appointments prohibited by Section 15, Article VII consists of the so-called
“midnight” appointments. In Aytona v. Castillo, it was held that after the proclamation of Diosdado
Macapagal as duly elected President, President Carlos P. Garcia, who was defeated in his bid for
reelection, became no more than a “caretaker” administrator whose duty was to “prepare for the
orderly transfer of authority to the incoming President.”

CASE #11
De Castro vs. Judicial and Bar Council (JBC)
G.R. No. 191149. March 17, 2010

26
JOHN G. PERALTA, petitioner, vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC), respondent
BERSAMIN, J.:

FACT
Seven days after the presidential election would be the compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno
oas provided in the Constitution in Section 9, Article VIII, that “vacancy shall be filled within ninety
days from the occurrence thereof” from a “list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and
Bar Council for every vacancy.”

On December 22, 2009, Congressman Matias V. Defensor, an ex officio member of the JBC,
addressed a letter to the JBC, requesting that the process for nominations to the office of the Chief
Justice be commenced immediately.

As a result, the JBC opened the position of Chief Justice for application or recommendation,

The announcement was published on January 20, 2010 in the Philippine Daily Inquirer and The
Philippine Star.17 Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC “automatically considered” for the
position of Chief Justice the five most senior of the Associate Justices of the Court, namely: Associate
Justice Antonio T. Carpio; Associate Justice Renato C. Corona; Associate Justice Conchita Carpio
Morales; Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.; and Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B.
Nachura. However, the last two declined their nomination through letters dated January 18, 2010 and
January 25, 2010, respectively.

Others either applied or were nominated. Victor Fernandez, the retired Deputy Ombudsman for
Luzon, applied, but later formally withdrew his name from consideration through his letter dated
February 8, 2010. Candidates who accepted their nominations without conditions were Associate
Justice Renato C. Corona; Associate Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro; Associate Justice Arturo
D. Brion; and Associate Justice Edilberto G. Sandoval (Sandiganbayan). Candidates who accepted
their nominations with conditions were Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio and Associate Justice
Conchita Carpio Morales. Declining their nominations were Atty. Henry Villarica (via telephone
conversation with the Executive Officer of the JBC on February 5, 2010) and Atty. Gregorio M.
Batiller, Jr. (via telephone conversation with the Executive Officer of the JBC on February 8, 2010)

The JBC excluded from consideration former RTC Judge Florentino Floro (for failure to meet the
standards set by the JBC rules); and Special Prosecutor Dennis VillaIgnacio of the Office of the
Ombudsman (due to cases pending in the Office of the Ombudsman). In its meeting of February 8,
2010, the JBC resolved to proceed to the next step of announcing the names of the following
candidates to invite the public to file their sworn complaint, written report, or opposition, if any, not
later than February 22, 2010, to wit: Associate Justice Carpio, Associate Justice Corona, Associate
Justice Carpio Morales, Associate Justice Leonardo-De Castro, Associate Justice Brion, and Associate
Justice Sandoval. The announcement came out in the Philippine Daily Inquirer and The Philippine
Star issues of February 13, 2010.2

ISSUE
Whether or not the JBC have the discretion to withhold the submission of the short list to President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.

27
 RULING
Yes. The intervention of the JBC eliminates the danger that appointments to the Judiciary can be
made for the purpose of buying votes in a coming presidential election, or of satisfying partisan
considerations.

The presidential power of appointment is dealt with in Sections 14, 15 and 16 of the Article. Section
4(1) and Section 9 states that the appointment of Supreme Court Justices can only be made by the
President upon the submission of a list of at least three nominees by the JBC.

Given the background and rationale for the prohibition in Section 15, Article VII, we have no doubt
that the Constitutional Commission confined the prohibition to appointments made in the Executive
Department.

The framers did not need to extend the prohibition to appointments in the Judiciary, because
their establishment of the JBC and their subjecting the nomination and screening of candidates for
judicial positions to the unhurried and deliberate prior process of the JBC ensured that there would no
longer be midnight appointments to the Judiciary.

Indeed, it is axiomatic in statutory construction that the ascertainment of the purpose of the enactment
is a step in the process of ascertaining the intent or meaning of the enactment, because the reason for
the enactment must necessarily shed considerable light on “the law of the statute,” i.e., the intent;
hence, the enactment should be construed with reference to its intended scope and purpose, and the
court should seek to carry out this purpose rather than to defeat it.

CASE #12
Philippine Constitution Association vs. Enriquez
G.R. No. 113105. August 19, 1994
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION, EXEQUIEL B. GARCIA and RAMON A.
GONZALES, petitioners, vs. HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, as Secretary of Budget and
Management; HON. VICENTE T. TAN, as National Treasurer and COMMISSION ON AUDIT,
respondents
QUIASON, J.:

FACT
On the same day that the President signed the General Appropriation Bill of 1994 into law, he
delivered his Presidential Veto Message, specifying the provisions of the bill he vetoed and on which
he imposed certain conditions. No step was taken in either House of Congress to override the vetoes.
ISSUE
Whether or not the conditions imposed by the President in the items of the GAA of 1994 are constitutional.

RULING
Petitioners claim that the conditions imposed by the President violated the independence and fiscal
autonomy of the Supreme Court, the Ombudsman, the COA and the CHR. In the first place, the
conditions questioned by petitioners were placed in the GAB by Congress itself, not by the
President.

28
The Veto Message merely highlighted the Constitutional mandate that additional or indirect
compensation can only be given pursuant to law. In the second place, such statements are mere
reminders that the disbursements of appropriations must be made in accordance with law. Such
statements may, at worse, be treated as superfluities.

A general appropriations bill is a special type of legislation, whose content is limited to specified
sums of money dedicated to a specific purpose or a separate fiscal unit.

The item veto was first introduced by the Organic Act of the Philippines passed by the U.S. Congress
on August 29, 1916. The concept was adopted from some State Constitutions. Cognizant of the
legislative practice of inserting provisions, including conditions, restrictions and limitations, to items
in appropriations bills, the Constitutional Convention added the following sentence to Section 20(2),
Article VI of the 1935 Constitution: “When a provision of an appropriation bill affects one or more
items of the same, the President cannot veto the provision without at the same time vetoing the
particular item or items to which it relates” In short, under the 1935 Constitution, the President was
empowered to veto separately not only items in an appropriations bill but also “provisions.

CASE #13
Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty (LAMP) vs. Secretary of Budget and Management
G.R. No. 164987. April 24, 2012
LAWYERS AGAINST MONOPOLY AND POVERTY (LAMP), represented by its Chairman
and counsel, CEFERINO PADUA, Members, ALBERTO ABELEDA, JR., ELEAZAR
ANGELES, GREGELY FULTON ACOSTA, VICTOR AVECILLA, GALILEO BRION,
ANATALIA BUENAVENTURA, EFREN CARAG, PEDRO CASTILLO, NAPOLEON
CORONADO, ROMEO ECHAUZ, ALFREDO DE GUZMAN, ROGELIO KARAGDAG, JR.,
MARIA LUZ ARZAGA-MENDOZA, LEO LUIS MENDOZA, ANTONIO P. PAREDES,
AQUILINO PIMENTEL III, MARIO REYES, EMMANUEL SANTOS, TERESITA SANTOS,
RUDEGELIO TACORDA, SECRETARY GEN. ROLANDO ARZAGA, Board of Consultants,
JUSTICE ABRAHAM SARMIENTO, SEN. AQUILINO PIMENTEL, JR., and BARTOLOME
FERNANDEZ, JR., petitioners, vs. THE SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT,
THE TREASURER OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, and THE
PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE and the SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES in representation of the Members of the Congress, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:

FACTS
Petitioners are of the opinion that the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) is silent and
prohibits an automatic and direct allocation of lump sums to individual senators, and congressmen for
the funding of projects.

The silence in the law of direct or even indirect participation by members of Congress betrays a
deliberate intent on the part of the Executive and the Congress to scrap and do away with the ‘pork
barrel’ system.”

Furthermore, several flaws in the implementation of the provision were decried by LAMP namely:

1) the DBM illegally made and directly released budgetary allocations out of PDAF in favor of
individual Members of Congress; and

29
2) the latter do not possess the power to propose, select and identify which projects are to be actually
funded by PDAF.

Petitioners contend that the aforementioned flaws of the PDAF contradict with the principle of
separation of powers.

The reason for this perceived contradiction lies in the fact that the Members of Congress in effect
intrude into an executive function by receiving and, thereafter, spending funds for their chosen
projects.

Petitioner Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty (LAMP) filed an action for certiorari assailing the
constitutionality and legality of the implementation of the Priority Development Assistance Fund
(PDAF) as provided for in Republic Act (R.A.) 9206 or the General Appropriations Act for 2004
(GAA of 2004).

ISSUE
Whether or not the implementation of PDAF violates the principle of separation of powers as
provided in our constitution.

RULING
The Court rules in the negative. Absent a clear showing that an offense to the principle of separation
of powers was committed, much less tolerated by both the Legislative and Executive, the Court is
constrained to hold that a lawful and regular government budgeting and appropriation process ensued
during the enactment and all throughout the implementation of the GAA of 2004.

The powers of government are generally divided into three branches: the Legislative, the Executive
and the Judiciary.

Each branch is supreme within its own sphere being independent from one another and it is this
supremacy which enables the courts to determine whether a law is constitutional or unconstitutional.

The powers of government are generally divided into three branches: the Legislative, the Executive
and the Judiciary. Each branch is supreme within its own sphere being independent from one another
and it is this supremacy which enables the courts to determine whether a law is constitutional or
unconstitutional.

The Judiciary is the final arbiter on the question of whether or not a branch of government or any of
its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or so capriciously as to constitute
an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty
to pass judgment on matters of this nature.

Under the Constitution, the power of appropriation is vested in the Legislature, subject to the
requirement that appropriation bills originate exclusively in the House of Representatives with the
option of the Senate to propose or concur with amendments.

30
CASE #14
Belgica vs. Ochoa
G.R. No. 208566. November 19, 2013
GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA et al. vs. HONORABLE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
FACTS
DUMMY NGOS
After six whistle-blowers declared in their sworn affidavits claiming that JLN Corporation (stands for
Janet Lim Napoles) had facilitated the swindling of billions of pesos from the public coffers for
“ghost projects” using no fewer than 20 dummy non-government organizations for an entire decade.

INVESTIGATION COMMENCED
In July 2013, NBI began the investigation after several allegations that the government has been
defrauded of some P10 Billion over the past 10 years by a syndicate using funds from the pork barrel
of lawmakers and various government agencies for scores of ghost projects.”

PETITION TO DECLARE PORK BARREL UNCONSTITUTIONAL

In August 2013, the Commission on Audit released a report revealing substantial irregularities in the
disbursement and utilization of PDAF by the Congressmen during the Arroyo administration.

Contained in the COA Report and the Napoles controversy were several filed petitions seeking that
the Pork Barrel System be declared unconstitutional

ISSUE
Whether or not the PDAF, CDF and Pork Barrel System is unconstitutional since they violate the
Principle of Separation of Powers.

RULING
Yes, the Supreme Court declared the PDAF, and CDF as unconstitutional. However, the Presidential
Pork Barrel is partially constitutional.

The 24.79 Billion funds would be treated as a mere funding source allotted for several purposes of
spending. Consequently, it remains unconstitutional, considering the lack of post-enactment
legislative identification feature.

The President was denied the power to veto items since the system of budgeting did not textualize the
items into the appropriations bill.

From the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of
its members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of
separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional.

31
The legislators have been authorized under the 2013 PDAF Article, to participate in “the various
operational aspects of budgeting,” including “the evaluation of work and financial plans for individual
activities” and the “regulation and release of funds”

The provision under Section 8 of PD 910 provides undue delegation of legislative power to the
President the power to appropriate funds intended by law for energy-related purposes only to other
purposes he may deem fit as well as other public funds under the broad classification of “priority
infrastructure development projects.”

Consequently, this has transgressed the principle of non-delegability. As a final order, DIRECTED all
prosecutorial organs of the government to, within the bounds of reasonable dispatch, investigate and
accordingly prosecute all government officials and/or private individuals for possible criminal
offenses related to the irregular, improper and/or unlawful disbursement/utilization of all funds under
the Pork Barrel System. This Decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY but PROSPECTIVE in
effect.

CASE #15
Remman Enterprises, Inc. and Chamber of Real Estate and Builders’ Association vs.
Professional RegulatoryBoard of Real Estate Service and Professional
G.R. No. 197676. February 4, 2014
REMMAN ENTERPRISES, INC. and CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE AND BUILDERS’
ASSOCIATION, petitioners, vs. PROFESSIONAL REGULATORY BOARD OF REAL
ESTATE SERVICE and PROFESSIONAL REGULATION COMMISSION, respondents.
VILLARAMA, JR., J

FACTS

Under the R.A. No. 9646 also known as "Real Estate Service Act of the Philippines," there were
several provisions such as SEC. 28. Exemptions from the Acts Constituting the Practice of Real
Estate Service SEC. 29 Prohibition Against the Unauthorized Practice of Real Estate Service, and
SEC. 32. Corporate Practice of the Real Estate Service that were questioned due to their
unconstitutionality.

Prior to its enactment, real estate service practitioners were under the control of Department of Trade
and Industry (DTI) through the Bureau of Trade Regulation and Consumer Protection (BTRCP).
Under the new law, it is now transferred to the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) through
the Professional Regulatory Board of Real Estate Service (PRBRES).

Remman Enterprises Inc. (REI) and Chamber of Real Estate and Builders’ Association (CREBA)
filed an appeal in the Regional Trial Court to declare as void and unconstitutional aforementioned
provisions of R.A. No. 9646.

ISSUES
● Whether or not R.A. No. 9646 is unconstitutional for violating the "one title-one subject" rule
under Article VI, Section 26 (1) of the Constitution

● Whether or not Section 28(a) is unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause

32
 RULING
The Court finds the petition to be of no merit.

The one-subject requirement under the Constitution is satisfied if all the parts of the statute are
related, and are germane to the subject matter expressed in the title, or as long as they are not
inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject and title.—The Court has previously ruled that the
one-subject requirement under the Constitution is satisfied if all the parts of the statute are related, and
are germane to the subject matter expressed in the title, or as long as they are not inconsistent with or
foreign to the general subject and title.

It is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals by implication are not favored. In order to
effect a repeal by implication, the later statute must be so irreconcilably inconsistent and repugnant
with the existing law that they cannot be made to reconcile and stand together.—It is a well-settled
rule of statutory construction that repeals by implication are not favored. In order to effect a repeal by
implication, the later statute must be so irreconcilably inconsistent and repugnant with the existing
law that they cannot be made to reconcile and stand together.

The clearest case possible must be made before the inference of implied repeal may be drawn, for
inconsistency is never presumed. There must be a showing of repugnance clear and convincing in
character. The language used in the later statute must be such as to render it irreconcilable with what
had been formerly enacted. An inconsistency that falls short of that standard does not suffice.
Moreover, the failure to add a specific repealing clause indicates that the intent was not to repeal any
existing law, unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exist in the terms of the new and
old laws.

Equal Protection of the Laws; If classification is germane to the purpose of the law, concerns all
members of the class, and applies equally to present and future conditions, the classification does not
violate the equal protection guarantee.— Although the equal protection clause of the Constitution
does not forbid classification, it is imperative that the classification should be based on real and
substantial differences having a reasonable relation to the subject of the particular legislation. If
classification is germane to the purpose of the law, concerns all members of the class, and applies
equally to present and future conditions, the classification does not violate the equal protection
guarantee.

CASE #16
Roos Industrial Construction, Inc. vs. National Labor Relations Commission
G.R. No. 172409. February 4, 2008
ROOS INDUSTRIAL CONSTRUCTION, INC. and OSCAR TOCMO, petitioners, vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and JOSE MARTILLOS, respondents
TINGA, J.
FACTS
Without any employment contract, the respondent worked as a drive-mechanic by the petitioners.
However, on March 16, 2002 he was terminated without due process.

The respondent acquired the status of a regular employee considering that his task was necessary to
the usual trade, and was illegally dismissed as determined by the Labor Arbiter.

33
Petitioners were ordered to pay the respondent backwages, separation pay, salary differential, holiday
pay, service incentive leave pay and 13th-month pay.

A copy of the Labor Arbiter’s decision were received by the petitioners on 17 December 2003.
Furthermore, the petitioners filed a Memorandum of Appeal before the NLRC and paid the appeal fee
on 29 December 2003, which was the last day of the reglementary period for perfecting an appeal.

Petitioners filed a Motion for Extension of Time to Submit/Post Surety Bond instead of posting the
required cash or surety bond within the reglementary period.

Petitioners stated that they could not post and submit the required surety bond as the signatories to the
bond were on leave during the holiday season, and made a commitment to post and submit the surety
bond on or before 6 January 2004.

Due to the NLRC’s inaction, petitioners filed a surety bond equivalent to the award of the Labor
Arbiter. In a Resolution dated July 29, 2004, the Second Division of the NLRC dismissed petitioners’
appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

After the petitioner’s appeal was denied in the Court of Appeals, the elevated the case to the Supreme
Court by way of a special civil action of certiorari.

ISSUES
Whether or not petitioners complied with the NLRC rules in filing the appeal bond.

RULING
No. The petitioners did not comply with the NLRC rules when they filed the appeal bond.

An appeal from the decision of the Labor Arbiter involving a monetary award is only deemed
perfected upon the posting of a cash or surety bond within ten (10) days from such decision; The
appeal bond is not merely procedural but jurisdictional.

The Court reiterates the settled rule that an appeal from the decision of the Labor Arbiter involving a
monetary award is only deemed perfected upon the posting of a cash or surety bond within ten (10)
days from such decision.

Contrary to petitioners’ assertion, the appeal bond is not merely procedural but jurisdictional. Without
said bond, the NLRC does not acquire jurisdiction over the appeal. Indeed, non-compliance with such
legal requirements is fatal and has the effect of rendering the judgment final and executory. It must be
stressed that there is no inherent right to an appeal in a labor case, as it arises solely from the grant of
statute.

It is only in highly meritorious cases that the Court opts not to strictly apply the rules and thus prevent
a grave injustice from being done.—No exceptional circumstances obtain in the case at bar which
would warrant a relaxation of the bond requirement as a condition for perfecting the appeal. It is only
in highly meritorious cases that this Court opts not to strictly apply the rules and thus prevent a grave
injustice from being done and this is not one of those cases.

34
CASE #17
Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 148560 November 19, 2001
JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA,vs. SANDIGANBAYAN(Third Division) and PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
FERNANDO, J.
FACTS
No less than the President himself, Joseph Ejercito Estrada seeks to assail the constitutionality of RA
7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder), as amended by RA 7659.

This is after he was charged with violation of the said law.

According to him the said law must be declared unconstitutional for the following reasons:

(a) it suffers from the vice of vagueness;

(b) it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and,
(c) it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal
Code, all of which are purportedly clear violations of the fundamental rights of the accused to due
process and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

ISSUE
Whether or not RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder), as amended by RA
7659 should be declared unconstitutional.

RULING
No, every intendment of the law must be adjudged by the courts in favor of its constitutionality,
invalidity being a measure of last resort. In construing therefore, the provisions of a statute, courts
must first ascertain whether an interpretation is fairly possible to side step the question of
constitutionality.

The President, however, contends that there exists a failure of the said law to provide for the statutory
definition of the terms “combination” and “series” in the key phrase “a combination or series of overt
or criminal acts” found in Sec.1, par. (d),and Sec. 2, and the word “pattern” in Sec. 4.

According to him, these issues render the Plunder Law unconstitutional for being impermissibly
vague and overbroad and deny him the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him, hence, violative of his fundamental right to due process.

However, it should be noted that a statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general
terms are used therein, or because of the employment of terms without defining them; much less do
we have to define every word we use.

It is a well-settled principle oflegal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted intheir
natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and signification,unless it is evident that the legislature
intended a technical orspecial legal meaning to those words.

35
CASE #18
FIRST METRO INVESTMENT CORPORATION
vs. ESTE DEL SOL MOUNTAIN RESERVE
G.R. No. 141811, November 15, 2001
DE LEON, JR., J.

FACTS

Este del Sol obtained a loan of P 7,285,500.00 from FMIC to finance the construction of Este del Sol
Mountain Reserve.

Annual Interest rate of 16% was agreed upon by the parties as well as the staggered release of the loan
proceeds. Also, a 20% will be imposed on the amount due together with all the penalties, fees,
expenses or charges, plus attorney's fees equivalent to twenty-five (25%)

Several documents that served as security for payment was executed by Este del Sol. Also among
them, a Real Estate Mortgage and individual Continuing Suretyship agreements by co-respondents.

Respondent Este del Sol also executed an Underwriting Agreement and Consultancy Agreement,
where they shall pay petitioner FMIC an annual supervision fee (P200,000.00) and consultancy fee
(P332,500.00) per annum for a period of four (4) consecutive years. The said amounts of fees were
deemed paid by respondent Este del Sol to petitioner FMIC which deducted the same from the first
release of the loan.

After the failure to pay based on the revised Schedule of Amortization as a result petitioner, FMIC
caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage.

The trial court favored FMIC, However, the appellate court reversed the challenged decision of the
trial court.

ISSUE
Whether or not the illegal scheme employed by petitioner FMIC to collect excessively usurious
interest were disguised under the cover of Underwriting and Consultancy Agreements.

RULING

Yes, the Court agrees with the factual findings and conclusion of the appellate court. The stipulated
penalties, liquidated damages and attorney's fees, excessive, iniquitous and unconscionable and
revolting to the conscience as they hardly allow the borrower any chance of survival in case of
default.

The 20% penalty on the amount due and 10% of the proceeds of the foreclosure sale as attorney's fees
would suffice to compensate the appellee, especially so because there is no clear showing that the
appellee hired the services of counsel to effect the foreclosure, it engaged counsel only when it was
seeking the recovery of the alleged deficiency.

Article 1957 of the New Civil Code clearly provides that:

36
Art. 1957. Contracts and stipulations, under any cloak or device whatever, intended to circumvent the
laws against usury shall be void. The borrower may recover in accordance with the laws on usury.

The Court DENIED the instant petition, and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED.

CASE #19
DEL SOCORRO V. VAN WILSEN
G.R. No. 193707 December 10, 2014
Petitioner: ORMA A. DEL SOCORRO, for and in behalf of her minor child RODERIGO
NORJO VAN WILSEM
Respondent: ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM
Ponente: PERALTA, J.

The petitioner ORMA A. DEL SOCORRO in behalf of her minor child filed a complaint affidavit
with the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City against ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM
for violation of Section 5, paragraph E(2) of R.A. No. 9262 for the latter’s unjust refusal to
support his minor child with petitioner

Facts:
Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem contracted
marriage in Holland. Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued
by the appropriate Court of Holland. At that time, their son was only eighteen (18) months old. After
that Del Socorro and her son came home to the Philippines.

Van Wilsem made a promise to provide monthly support to their son. However, since the arrival of
Del Socorro and her son in the Philippines, Van Wilsem never gave support to the son, Roderigo. Not
long thereafter, Van Wilsem came to the Philippines and remarried. Now all the parties, including
their son, Roderigo, are presently living in Cebu City.

Del Socorro sued Van Wilsem for the latter’s unjust refusal to support their minor child.

RTC-Cebu dismissed the case against Van Wilsem on the ground that the facts charged in the
information do not constitute an offense with respect to the accused, he being an alien, and
accordingly, orders this case DISMISSED.

Del Socorro filed her Motion for Reconsideration contending that it is Van Wilsem’s obligation to
support their child under the Family Code, thus, failure to do so makes him liable under “Anti-
Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004.”

Del Socorro contends that the law mentioned above "equally applies to all persons in the Philippines
who are obliged to support their minor children regardless of the obligor’s nationality."

The Motion for Reconsideration was denied. The RTC reiterates its previous ruling and reiterates its
ruling that Van Wilsem, who is a foreign national, is not subject to our national law (The Family
Code) in regard to a parent’s duty and obligation to give support to his child.

The motion for reconsideration was DENIED for lack of merit.

37
After the RTC dismissed the criminal case against Van Wilsem, for violation of Anti-Violence
Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004, the case was elevated to the Supreme Court through
a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the Orders of the lower court.

Van Wilsem contends that there is no sufficient and clear basis presented by Del Socorro that she, as
well as her minor son, are entitled to financial support.

He added that by reason of the of the Divorce Covenant obtained in Holland, he is not obligated to
Del Socorro for any financial support.

Issue:
1. Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child under Philippine law;
and

2. Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his
unjustified failure to support his minor child.

Ruling:
On this point, we agree with Van Wilsem that Del Socorro cannot rely on the Civil Code in
demanding support from respondent, who is a foreign citizen, since Article 15 of the New Civil Code
stresses the principle of nationality.

In other words, insofar as Philippine laws are concerned, specifically the provisions of the Family
Code on support, the same only applies to Filipino citizens.

By analogy, the same principle applies to foreigners such that they are governed by their national law
with respect to family rights and duties.

In the present case, Van Wilsem hastily concludes that being a national of the Netherlands, he is
governed by such laws on the matter.

However, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to
take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved.

In view of respondent’s failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands in his favor, the doctrine
of processual presumption shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign law involved is not
properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law is the same as our local or
domestic or internal law.

Thus, since the law of the Netherlands as regards the obligation to support has not been properly
pleaded and proved in the instant case, it is presumed to be the same with Philippine law, which
enforces the obligation of parents to support their children and penalizing the non-compliance
therewith.

38
In addition, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their
object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or
judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.

Foreign laws should not be applied when its application would work undeniable injustice to the
citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice is the most important function of law; hence, a law,
or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust negates the fundamental principles of Conflict of
Laws.

Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands neither enforce a parent’s obligation to
support his child nor penalize the noncompliance therewith, such obligation is still duly enforceable in
the Philippines because it would be of great injustice to the child to be denied of financial support
when the latter is entitled thereto.

Based on the foregoing legal precepts, we find that Van Wilse may be made liable under SECTION 5
Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. Under the aforesaid special law, the
deprivation or denial of financial support to the child is considered an act of violence against women
and children.

Considering that Van Wilsem is currently living in the Philippines, we find strength in petitioner’s
claim that the Territoriality Principle in criminal law, in relation to Article 14 of the New Civil Code,
applies to the instant case, which provides that: "penal laws and those of public security and safety
shall be obligatory upon all who live and sojourn in Philippine territory, subject to the principle of
public international law and to treaty stipulations."

It is indisputable that the alleged continuing acts of Van Wilsem in refusing to support his child with
petitioner is committed here in the Philippines as all of the parties herein are residents of the Province
of Cebu City. As such, our courts have territorial jurisdiction over the offense charged against
respondent. It is likewise irrefutable that jurisdiction over the respondent was acquired upon his arrest.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders of the Regional Trial Court of the City of Cebu
are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the same court to conduct
further proceedings based on the merits of the case.

CASE #20
Tawang Multi-purpose Cooperative vs, La Trinidad Water District
G.R. No. 166471 March 22, 2011
TAWANG MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE Petitioner, vs. LA TRINIDAD WATER
DISTRICT, Respondent.
CARPIO, J.

FACTS

Tawang Multi-Purpose Cooperative filed with the National Water Resources Board (NWRB) an
application for a certificate of public convenience (CPC) to operate and maintain a waterworks system
in Barangay Tawang on 9 October 2000.

39
However, Tawang Multi-Purpose Cooperative opposed the application and claimed that its franchise
is exclusive under Section 47 of P.D. No. 198 which provides that no franchise shall be granted to
any other person or agency for domestic, industrial or commercial water service within the district or
any portion thereof unless and except to the extent that the board of directors of said district consents
thereto by resolution duly adopted, such resolution, however, shall be subject to review by the
Administration.

Tawang Multi-Purpose Cooperative’s application for a certificate of public convenience was approved
by the National Water Resources Board.

National Water Resources Board is of the opinion that La Trinidad Water District’s franchise cannot
be exclusive since exclusive franchises are unconstitutional and found that Tawang Multi-Purpose
Cooperative is legally and financially qualified to operate and maintain a waterworks system.

On appeal, RTC where it ruled in favor of La Trinidad Water District and cancelled Tawang Multi-
Purpose Cooperative’s certificate of public convenience. It held that no franchise of whatever nature
can preclude the State, through its duly authorized agencies or instrumentalities, from granting
franchise to any person or entity, or to repeal or amend a franchise already granted.

ISSUE
Whether or not Section 47 of P.D. no. 198 is unconstitutional.

RULING
Yes. The court declared Section 47 of Presidential Decree No. 198 UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The
Court ruled that what cannot be legally done directly cannot be done indirectly. Indeed, if acts that
cannot be legally done directly can be done indirectly, then all laws would be illusory.

The constitution clearly states that “franchises for the operation of a public utility cannot be exclusive
in character. The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions expressly and clearly state that, "nor shall such
franchise be exclusive in character."

Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm of the
constitution that law or contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch or
entered into by private persons for private purposes is null and void and without any force and effect.
Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is
deemed written in every statute and contract."

Section 5 of Art. XIV of the 1973 Constitution reads:

"No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall
be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations organized under the
laws of the Philippines at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, nor
shall such franchise, certificate, or authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer period than

40
fifty years. Neither shall any such franchise or right be granted except under the condition that it shall
be subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by the Batasang Pambansa when the public interest so
requires. The State shall encourage equity participation in public utiltities by the general public. The
participation of foreign investors in the governing body of any public utility enterprise shall be limited
to their proportionate share in the capital thereof."

Section 47 of P.D. 198, which vests an "exclusive franchise" upon public utilities, is clearly repugnant
to Article XIV, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution, it is unconstitutional and may not, therefore, be
relied upon by petitioner in support of its opposition against respondent’s application for certificate of
public convenience and the subsequent grant thereof by the National Water Resources Board.

CASE #21
Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) Party-List vs.
Commission on Elections
BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT AND TRANSPARENCY
(BANAT) PARTY-LIST, represented by SALVADOR B. BRITANICO, petitioner, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
CARPIO, J.

FACTS
BANAT Party-List the petitioner, a duly accredited multisectoral organization, filed this petition for
prohibition alleging that RA 9369 have several provisions that are of questionable application and
doubtful validity for failing to comply with the provisions of the Constitution.

Before the Court is a petition for prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction filed by petitioner Barangay Association for
National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) Party List (petitioner) assailing the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9369 (RA 9369)3 and enjoining respondent

ISSUES
1. Whether RA 9369 violates Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution
2. Whether Sections 37 and 38 violate Section 17, Article VI and Paragraph 7, Section 4,
Article VII of the Constitution
3. Whether Section 43 violates Section 2(6), Article IX-C of the Constitution; and
4. Whether Section 34 violates Section 10, Article III of the Constitution.

RULING
The Court’s Ruling The petition has no merit. It is settled that every statute is presumed to be
constitutional. The presumption is that the legislature intended to enact a valid, sensible and just law.
Those who petition the Court to declare a law unconstitutional must show that there is a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful, speculative or argumentative one;
otherwise, the petition must fail. In this case, petitioner failed to justify why RA 9369 and the
assailed provisions should be declared unconstitutional.

It is settled that every statute is presumed to be constitutional. The presumption is that the legislature
intended to enact a valid, sensible and just law. Those who petition the Court to declare a law
unconstitutional must show that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not
merely a doubtful, speculative or argumentative one; otherwise, the petition must fail.

41
1. RA 9369 does not violate Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution
- Although the constitution requires that “every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only
one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof,” the requirement is satisfied if the
title is comprehensive enough to include subjects related to the general purpose which the
statute seeks to achieve.

2. Sections 37 and 38 do not violate Section 17, Article VI and Paragraph 7, Section 4,
Article VII of the Constitution
- In the present case, Congress and the COMELEC en banc do not encroach upon the
jurisdiction of the PET and the SET.

- There is no conflict of jurisdiction since the powers of Congress and the COMELEC en banc,
on one hand, and the PET and the SET, on the other, are exercised on different occasions and
for different purposes.

- The PET is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
the President or Vice President.

- The SET is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
members of the Senate.

- The jurisdiction of the PET and the SET can only be invoked once the winning presidential,
vice presidential or senatorial candidates have been proclaimed.

- On the other hand, under Section 37, Congress and the COMELEC en banc shall determine
only the authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass. Congress and the
COMELEC en banc shall exercise this power before the proclamation of the winning
presidential, vice presidential, and senatorial candidates.

3. Section 43 does not violate Section 2(6), Article IX-C of the Constitution
- The Court does not agree with petitioner and the COMELEC that the Constitution gave the
COMELEC the “exclusive power” to investigate and prosecute cases of violations of election
laws.

- Section 2(6), Article IX-C of the Constitution vests in the COMELEC the power to
“investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including
acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.”

- It is clear that the grant of the “exclusive power” to investigate and prosecute election
offenses to the COMELEC was not by virtue of the Constitution but by BP 881, a legislative
enactment.

4. Section 34 does not violate Section 10, Article III of the Constitution

- There is no violation of the non-impairment clause. First, the non- impairment clause is
limited in application to laws that derogate from prior acts or contracts by enlarging,
abridging or in any manner changing the intention of the parties.

42
 - There is impairment if a subsequent law changes the terms of a contract between the parties,
imposes new conditions, dispenses with those agreed upon or withdraws remedies for the
enforcement of the rights of the parties.

The petition was DISMISSED for lack of merit.

CASE #22
Fernando vs. St. Scholastica’s College
G.R. No.: 161107 March 12, 2013
HON. MA. LOURDES C. FERNANDO, in her capacity as City Mayor of Marikina City,
JOSEPHINE C. EVANGELIST A, in her capacity as Chief, Permit Division, Office of the City
Engineer, and ALFONSO ESPIRITU, in his capacity as City Engineer of Marikina City,
Petitioners, vs. ST. SCHOLASTICA'S COLLEGE and ST. SCHOLASTICA'S ACADEMY-
MARIKINA, INC., Respondents.
MENDOZA, J.

FACTS
Ordinance No. 192, entitled “Regulating the Construction of Fences and Walls in the Municipality of
Marikina.” was issued by the City of Marikina .

The provisions below are the subject of this petition:

1. Section 3(1) Fences on the front yard – shall be no more than one (1) meter in height. Fences
in excess of one (1) meter shall be of an open fence type, at least eighty percent (80%) see-thru.

2. Section 5 – in no case shall walls and fences be built within the five (5) meter parking area
allowance located between the front monument line and the building line of commercial and industrial
establishments and educational and religious institutions.

St. Scholastica’s College (respondent) was ordered by the City Government ordering them to
demolish and replace the fence of their property and to move it back about six (6) meters to provide
parking space for vehicles to park in accordance with the ordinance.

The City refused and insisted that it must be enforceable at once despite the respondent’s request for
an extension. Then the respondent files a prohibition with an application for a writ of preliminary
injunction and temporary restraining order before the Regional Trial Court.

The petition of the respondent granted by the RTC. Furthermore, the petitioner was ordered to
permanently desist from enforcing the ordinance. After the Court of Appeals affirmed RTC’s
decision. Hence, the petitioner elevated the course to the Supreme Court.

ISSUES
Whether or not the enforcement of the City of Marikina of the provisions of Sections 3(1) and 5 of the
Ordinance No. 192 was valid.

RULING

43
No. The legislative intent of Section 5 was to make parking space available for use by the public,
considering that it would no longer be the exclusive use of the respondents as it will be also available
for use by the general public which is in contravention of Section 9 of Article 3 of the 1987
Constitution which provides that private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation. Moreover, the petitioner fails to show an adequate reason that the provisions in Section
3(1) of the ordinance will achieve its ultimate goal which is the prevention of crime to ensure public
safety and security.

The provisions of this section violate the right to privacy of the respondent considering that the
residence of the nuns was also located within the property. This right is inherent in the concept of
liberty, indicated in the Bill of Rights in Sections 1, 2, 3(1), 6, 8 and 17, Article 3 of the Constitution.

The Court declared that these two specific sections are invalid while the other sections that are
incapable of being separated from the invalid ones remain to be valid and enforceable.

CASE #23
White Light Corp. vs. City of Manila
G.R. No. 122846 January 20, 2009
WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION, TITANIUM CORPORATION and STA. MESA TOURIST
& DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioners, vs. CITY OF MANILA, represented by DE
CASTRO, MAYOR ALFREDO S. LIM, Respondent.
Tinga, J.

FACTS
Manila City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim signed into law an Ordinance prohibiting short time admission in
hotels, motels, lodging houses, pension houses and similar establishments in Manila.

Short-time admission refers to the admittance and charging of room rate for less than twelve (12)
hours at any given time or the renting out of rooms more than twice a day or any other term that may
be concocted by owners or managers of said establishments but would mean the same or would bear
the same meaning.

Penalties shall be incurred against establishments found guilty of violation of this ordinance. White
Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium Corporation (TC) and Sta. Mesa Tourist and Development
Corporation (STDC) filed a motion to intervene and to admit attached complaint-in-intervention on
the ground that the Ordinance directly affects their business interests as operators of drive-in-hotels
and motels in Manila.

The three companies are components of the Anito Group of Companies which owns and operates
several hotels and motels in Metro Manila. The City filed an Answer dated January 22, 1993 alleging
that the Ordinance is a legitimate exercise of police power.

The RTC rendered a decision declaring the Ordinance null and void. However, the Court of Appeals
reversed the decision of the RTC and affirmed the constitutionality of the Ordinance.

ISSUES

44
Whether or not the ordinance signed into law by Manila City Mayor Alfredo Lim should be declared
unconstitutional.

RULING
Yes. Ordinance No. 7774 of the City of Manila is hereby declared null and void for being
unconstitutional.

The goal of minimizing the use of the covered establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and
alike do not sanctify any and all means for their achievement. Those means must align with the
Constitution, and our emerging sophisticated analysis of its guarantees to the people.

Those means must align with the Constitution, and our emerging sophisticated analysis of its
guarantees to the people.

The primary constitutional question that confronts us is one of due process, as guaranteed under
Section 1, Article III of the Constitution. Substantive due process completes the protection envisioned
by the due process clause. It inquires whether the government has sufficient justification for depriving
a person of life, liberty, or property.

It must appear that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular
class, require an interference with private rights and the means must be reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive of private rights. It must also be evident
that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can
work.

CASE #24
Ortega vs. People
G.R. No. 151085 August 20, 2008
JOEMAR ORTEGA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
NACHURA, J.

FACTS
Joemar Ortega, 14 years old, was charged with the crime of Rape. by means of force, violence and
intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously had carnal knowledge of and/or
sexual intercourse with a minor, then about 6 years old, against her will.

Joemar Ortega was found guilty by the RTC beyond reasonable doubt as Principal by Direct
Participation of the crime of RAPE and there being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance.

The decision of the RTC was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

However, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9344, or the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006, was
enacted into law on April 28, 2006 and it took effect on May 20, 2006.

The law establishes a comprehensive system to manage children in conflict with the law (CICL) and
children at risk with child-appropriate procedures and comprehensive programs and services. The law
also provides for the immediate dismissal of cases of CICL, specifically Sections 64, 65, 66, 67 and
68 of R.A. No. 9344's Transitory Provisions.

45
 ISSUES
Whether or not the pertinent provisions of R.A. No. 9344 apply to Joemar’s case, considering he was
13 years old when he committed the alleged rape.

RULING
Yes, petitioner Joemar F. Ortega’s cases is covered by R.A. No. 9344, and is hereby referred to the
local social welfare and development officer of the locality for the appropriate intervention program.

Petitioner was only 13 years old at the time of the commission of the alleged rape. Under R.A. No.
9344, when the accused is below 15 years of age, he is exempted from criminal liability.

SECTION 68 of R.A. No. 9344 provides that:

“Persons who have been convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of this Act,
and who were below the age of eighteen (18) years at the time of the commission of the offense for
which they were convicted and are serving sentence, shall likewise benefit from the retroactive
application of this Act.

They shall be entitled to appropriate dispositions provided under this Act and their sentences shall be
adjusted accordingly. They shall be immediately released if they are so qualified under this Act or
other applicable laws.”

CASE #25
Commissioner of Internal Revenue Vs. Philippine Airlines, Inc.
G.R. No. 160528 October 9, 2006
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC.,
respondent.
PANGANIBAN, CJ.:

Respondent Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL) through Atty. Edgardo P. Curbita, filed with the Office of
the then Commissioner of Internal Revenue, a written request for refund of the total amount of 20%
final withholding tax withheld from the respondent by various withholding agent banks.

Relying on Section 13 of Presidential Decree No. 1590, the respondent is given the option to pay
either its corporate income tax or a franchise tax of two percent of its gross revenue and either would
be in lieu of all "other taxes." Respondent believed they are entitled to a refund since they chose to
pay the first option.

The CIR argues that the "in lieu of all other taxes" proviso is a mere incentive that applies only when
PAL actually pays something; that is, either the basic corporate income tax or the franchise tax.

However, PAL was not eligible for exemption from other taxes since the respondent incurs zero tax
liability of under the basic corporate income tax system.

Since the respondent chose to pay its corporate income tax, CTA ruled that the former is not entitled
to the refund.

46
However, CA reversed the Decision of the CTA and held that PAL was bound to pay only the
corporate income tax or the franchise tax, and ruled that respondent is exempt from paying all other
taxes, duties, royalties and other fees of any kind under Section 13 of PD No. 1590.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE
Whether or not the respondent who paid no taxes under any of subsections (A) and (B) of PD No.
1590 could apply the ‘in lieu of all other taxes’ provision of Section 13.

RULING
Yes. The court ruled that, the proviso of PD 1590 namely, "in lieu of all other taxes" intended to give
the respondent the option whether to avail Subsection (a) or (b) as consideration for its franchise.
Choosing any of the aforementioned option excludes the payment of other taxes and dues imposed or
collected by the national or the local government.

PAL has the option to choose the alternative that results in lower taxes. It is not the fact of tax
payment that exempts it, but the exercise of its option.

Applying the Plain Meaning Rule, Section 13 of the franchise of respondent leaves no room for
interpretation. Its franchise exempts it from paying any tax other than the option it chooses: either the
"basic corporate income tax" or the two percent gross revenue tax.

CASE #26
Commissioner of Customs v. Esso Standard Eastern Inc.
G.R. No. L-28329 August 17, 1975
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, petitioner, vs. ESSO STANDARD EASTERN, INC.,
(Formerly: Standard-Vacuum Refining Corp. (Phil.), respondent.
ESGUERRA, J.:

FACT
Esso Standard Eastern, Inc., respondent was assessed to be liable for the special import tax after
importing equipment, machinery, materials, and instruments. Respondent paid the said tax under
protest.

The protest was dismissed, by the Collector of Customs and held that respondent, was subject to the
payment of the special import tax provided in Republic Act No. 1394, as amended by R.A. No. 2352.
And despite respondent’s appeal, the ruling of the Collector of Customs was affirmed by the
Commissioner of Customs.

However, the Court of Tax Appeals reversed the decision of the Commissioner of Customs and
ordered the refund of the amount paid by respondent for the special import tax.

ISSUE
Whether or not the exemption enjoyed by ESSO Standard Eastern, Inc. from customs duties granted
by Republic Act No. 387 should embrace the special import tax imposed by R.A. No. 1394.
RULING

47
Yes, Republic Act No. 387, the Petroleum Act of 1949 provides for the exemption of ESSO Standard
Eastern, Inc. from special import tax.

The purpose of the legislature in enacting the law which is to encourage the exploitation and
development of the petroleum resources of the country is apparent in its title:

AN ACT TO PROMOTE THE EXPLORATION, DEVELOPMENT, EXPLOITATION, AND

UTILIZATION OF THE PETROLEUM RESOURCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; TO ENCOURAGE
THE CONSERVATION OF SUCH PETROLEUM RESOURCES; TO AUTHORIZE THE
SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES TO CREATE AN
ADMINISTRATION UNIT AND A TECHNICAL BOARD IN THE BUREAU OF MINES; TO
APPROPRIATE FUNDS THEREFORE; AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.

The purpose of intensifying exploration for petroleum is embedded in the law, and it is a fact that for
the time being, no taxes, both national and local may be collected from the industry.

On the other hand, the legislature considered the special import tax as a tax distinct from customs
duties which was made apparent in the title of R.A. No. 1394, the Special Import Tax Law which
reads:

AN ACT TO IMPOSE A SPECIAL IMPORT TAX ON ALL GOODS, ARTICLES OR PRODUCTS

IMPORTED OR BROUGHT INTO THE PHILIPPINES, AND TO REPEAL REPUBLIC ACTS
NUMBERED SIX HUNDRED AND ONE, EIGHT HUNDRED AND FOURTEEN, EIGHT
HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-ONE, ELEVEN HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-FIVE. ELEVEN
HUNDRED AND NINETY-SEVEN AND THIRTEEN HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-FIVE.

This implied repeal failed to include R.A. No. 387 among those it chose to bury by the Special Import
Tax Law. The purpose of the legislature which wanted to continue the incentives for the continuing
development of the petroleum industry provides for the continuity of the exemption granted by
Republic Act No. 387.

And so the Court denied the Petition of the Commissioner of Customs to reverse the decision of Court
of Tax Appeals.

CASE #27
Socorro Ramirez v. Court of Appeals and Ester S. Garcia
G.R. No. 93833 September 28, 1995
SOCORRO D. RAMIREZ, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and ESTER
S. GARCIA, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:

FACT
A civil case was filed against Garcia after she allegedly insulted and humiliated Ramirez.

However, private respondent filed a criminal case against petitioner for violation of RA 4200 entitled
“An Act to prohibit and penalize wiretapping and other related violations of private communication,
and other purposes.”

48
Garcia argues that she did not authorize Ramirez to record their conversation via tape recorder and to
communicate in writing the contents thereof.

This was based on a tape recording of the confrontation made by the petitioner.

The petitioner filed a motion to quash and was approved by the trial court on the ground that the facts
do not constitute an offense under RA 4200.

Upon respondent’s petition, the CA assailed the decision of the trial court declaring it null and void.
CA held that the allegations constitute an offense punishable under Section 1 of RA 4200.

ISSUE
Whether or not the petitioner was guilty for the crime under RA 4200, as expressly provided by the
language of the law and the intent of the lawmaking body?

RULING
Yes. The provision in RA 4200 clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not
authorized by all the parties to any private communication to secretly record such communication by
means of a tape recorder.

The statute's intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the
use of the qualifier "any".

The statute itself explicitly mentions the unauthorized "recording" of private communications with the
use of tape-recorders as among the acts punishable.

Legislative intent is determined principally from the language of a statute. Where the language of a
statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express terms, and interpretation
would be resorted to only where a literal interpretation would be either impossible or absurd or would
lead to an injustice.

The Court rule that because RA 4200 as applied to the case at bench is clear and unambiguous and
leaves us with no discretion, the instant petition is hereby DENIED.

CASE #28
Philippine National Bank vs. Tejano
GR No.: 173615 October 16, 2009
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, Petitioner, vs. CAYETANO A. TEJANO, JR., Respondent.
PERALTA, J.:

FACT
There were allegations of irregular and fraudulent transactions of Cayetano Tejano, the then Vice-
President and Manager of PNB with the participation of eight other employees at the time when PNB
was still a GOCC.

49
The offense of grave misconduct consisting of misappropriation of V & G funds by Tejano must
serve as an aggravating circumstance and must serve the penalty of forced resignation with forfeiture
of benefits as found by the PNB Board of Directors.

After being denied by the PNB Board of Directors, respondent appealed to the Civil Service
Commission. However, while the case was pending in the CSC, the PNB had ceased to be a GOCC by
virtue of E.O No. 80, which privatized the bank.

Then the CSC issued a resolution dismissing respondent’s appeal for being filed out of time.

Eventually, the respondent filed a motion for reconsideration. PNB contends that even if the motion
was filed on time, the same must be dismissed because of the privatization of the bank. Consequently,
CSC denied the respondent’s motion on the ground that it no longer has jurisdiction in the case.

The respondent argues that the CSC’s erred in denying his appeal on the basis of the privatization of
the bank even when the incident happened prior to the privatization.

The CA granted the respondent’s petition and the case is remanded to the CSC for further
proceedings.

ISSUE
Whether or not, the PNB becoming a private banking institution by virtue of Executive Order No. 80,
removes the CSC’s jurisdiction on the appeal of the respondent which was already pending before the
CSC prior to the said conversion.

RULING
No. Section 6 of E.O. No. 80 does not invite an interpretation that reads into its clear and plain
language that the said E.O divested the CSC of jurisdiction to finally dispose of respondent’s pending
appeal despite the privatization of PNB.
There is always a presumption that the words employed in a law or statute correctly expresses its
intent and preclude even the courts from giving it a different construction.

While it is true that PNB ceased to be a GOCC, there was no provision in the E.O that stated that the
jurisdiction of the CSC will be divested over pending cases where acts involved were committed
while the bank was still a GOCC.

The Literal Rule provides that where a law is clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be
given its literal meaning and applied without any interpretation or even construction.

For this reason, the petitioner’s interpretation of the E.O lacks merit. There is nothing said in Section
6 of E.O No. 80 that indicates that it authorizes the transfer of jurisdiction from the CSC to another
tribunal over disciplinary and administrative cases already pending with the said Commission prior to
the enactment of the law.

The Court denied the petition to review the decision of the CA and affirmed the remand of the case to
CSC for further proceedings.
CASE #29

50
Domingo vs. Commission on Audit
G.R. No. 112371 October 7, 1998
AIDA DOMINGO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondent
PURISIMA, J.:

FACT
Endorsed to the newly appointed Regional director for DSWD RO5 Aida Domingo’s office were
several government vehicles for the use of personnel of DSWD Region 05.

Despite being provided with government vehicles, officials of DSWD Regional Office were still
collecting transportation allowances as found by the COA Regional Auditor.

Regional Director instructed the employees concerned, including Domingo to cease collecting
transportation allowances.

Domingo asked for reconsideration claiming that on the days she did not use the vehicle, she is
entitled of the commutable transportation. She reimbursed Php 1,600 for the 32 days that she actually
utilized a government vehicle. Auditor denied her petition.

ISSUE
Whether or not a government official is still entitled to transportation allowance despite being
provided with a government vehicle, for the days the official did not actually use the vehicle.

RULING
No. The Court held that Domingo is not entitled to collect commutable transportation allowance as
she is provided with government, regardless of whether or not she utilized the government vehicle.

As provided in Section 28 of Republic Act 6688, otherwise known as the General

Appropriations Act of 1989, states that:

The transportation allowance herein authorized shall not be granted to officials who are assigned a
government vehicle or use government motor transportation, except as may be approved by the
President of the Philippines. Unless otherwise provided by law, no amount appropriated in this Act
shall be used to pay for representation and/or transportation allowances, whether commutable or
reimbursable, which exceed the rates authorized under this Section.

There is no need for an interpretation when the law speaks in clear and categorical language, provided
there is no legislative intent to the contrary. Words and phrases used in a statute should be given their
plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning.

If the legislative intent was that government officials issued an official vehicle could still collect
transportation allowance when they don’t use the said vehicle, the word “use” instead “assign” should
have been employed.

CASE #30
Republic vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 103882 November 25, 1998

51
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS AND REPUBLIC REAL ESTATE CORPORATION, respondents, CULTURAL
CENTER OF THE PHILIPPINES, intervenor.
PURISIMA, J.:
FACT
The reclamation of foreshore lands by chartered cities and municipalities was authorized by Republic
Act No. 1899. Section I of said law provides that:

Sec. 1. Authority is hereby granted to all municipalities and chartered cities to undertake and carry out
at their own expense the reclamation by dredging, filling, or other means, of any foreshore lands
bordering them, and to establish, provide, construct, maintain and repair proper and adequate docking
and harbor facilities as such municipalities and chartered cities may determine in consultation with the
Secretary of Finance and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications.

Invoking the aforementioned provision, Pasay City Council passed Ordinance No. 121, for the
reclamation of Three Hundred (300) hectares of foreshore lands in Pasay City. Consequently, this
empowered the City Mayor to award and enter into reclamation contracts, and prescribing terms and
conditions therefor.

However, the said Ordinance was amended by Ordinance No. 158 which authorized the Republic
Real Estate Corporation ("RREC") to reclaim foreshore lands of Pasay City.

The congress passed the law the including cities of Manila, Iloilo, Cebu, Zamboanga and Davao from
the operation of RA 1899 even the aforementioned cities don’t have offshore based on the literal
meaning of the word “Offshore”.

ISSUE
Whether or not Pasig City can reclaim and invoke the RA 1899 is valid.

RULING
Yes. The term "foreshore lands" includes submerged areas as provided under RA 1899. The
respondent court unduly stretched and broadened the meaning of "foreshore lands", which is beyond
the intention of the law, and is contrary to the legal connotation of "foreshore lands".

The rule is that when the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no reason for
interpretation or construction, but only for application. Hence the Supreme Court interprets the
meaning of the Offshore as “The strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks and that
is alternately wet and dry according to the flow of the tide. (Words and Phrases, "Foreshore")”.

CASE #31
Espiritu v. Cipriano
G.R. No. L-32743 February 15, 1974
Primitivo Espiritu and Leonora A. De Espiritu, petitioners, vs. Ricardo Cipriano and The Court
of First Instance, Rizal, Branch XV, respondents

52
ESGUERRA, J.:

FACT
An oral contract of lease was between the petitioners and respondent was converted from a year to
year arrangement into a month to month basis, and an increase in rent was also imposed. However,
private respondent Cipriano failed to pay the rental since January 1969 at the present monthly rate.

On March 22, 1969, a formal notice to vacate was received by the respondent. In turn, the spondents
invoke the prohibitory provision of Republic Act 6126, entitled, “An Act to Regulate Rentals of
Dwelling Units or of Land on which another’s dwelling is located for one year and penalizing
violations thereof.

“Section 1. No lessor of a dwelling unit or of land on which another's dwelling is located shall, during
the period of one year from March 31, 1970, increase the monthly rental agreed upon between the
lessor and the lessee prior to the approval of this Act when said rental does not exceed three hundred
pesos (P300.00) a month.

Section 6. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

The respondent also contends that the Act should be applied retrospectively since it was approved
only on June 17, 1970.”

ISSUE
Whether or not Republic Act 6126 should be applied retrospectively and free Richard Cipriano from
his obligation to pay the rentals?

RULING
No, R. A. 6126 should not be applied retrospectively, thereby the respondent’s obligation to pay the
rentals should remain.

Article 4 of the Civil Code states that ordains that laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the
contrary is provided and that where the law is clear, our duty is equally plain.

R.A. 6126 is a law being a "temporary measure designed to meet a temporary situation", it had a
limited period of operation as in fact it was so worded in clear and unequivocal language that "No
lessor of a dwelling unit or land ... shall, during the period of one year from March 31, 1970, increase
the monthly rental agreed upon between the lessor and lessee prior to the approval of this Act."

It was only from March, 1970, up to March, 1971 that the prohibition against the increase in rentals
was effective. Outside and beyond that period, the law did not, by the express mandate of the Act
itself, operate.

There was no express provision in the aforementioned law that provides for a retroactive operation. It
is a well-established rule of statutory construction that "Expressium facit cessare tacitum" and,
therefore, no reasonable implication that the Legislature ever intended to give the law in question a

53
retroactive effect may be accorded to the same. As the language of the law is clear and unambiguous,
it must be held to mean what it plainly says.

Therefore, Ricardo Cipriano should be liable for his rental payments and his contention that Section 1
of Article 6126 shall not be applied lacks merit.

CASE #32
Philippine Constitution Association vs. Enriquez
G.R. No. 113105. August 19, 1994
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION, EXEQUIEL B. GARCIA and RAMON A.
GONZALES, petitioners, vs. HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, as Secretary of Budget and
Management; HON. VICENTE T. TAN, as National Treasurer and COMMISSION ON AUDIT,
respondents
QUIASON, J.:
FACT
On the grounds of under Article 36 of the Family Code, petitioner Cynthia Bolos filed a petition for
the declaration of nullity of her marriage to respondent Danilo Bolos .

RTC granted the petition for annulment. The RTC denied due course to the appeal for Danilo’s failure
to file the required motion for reconsideration or new trial, in violation of Section 20 of the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages.

A motion to reconsider the denial of Danilo’s appeal was likewise denied. Danilo filed with the CA a
petition for certiorari. The petition was granted, the RTC orders were reversed and set aside.

It relied on the ruling of this Court in Enrico v. Heirs of Sps. Medinaceli to the effect that the
“coverage [of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC] extends only to those marriages entered into during the
effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988.”

ISSUE
Whether or not the “rule on declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages and annulment of voidable
marriages” is applicable to marriages solemnized before the effectivity of the Family Code.
RULING
No. The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which the Court promulgated on March 15, 2003, is
explicit in its scope. Section 1 of the Rule, in fact, reads:

Section 1. Scope- This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages and annulment of voidable marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines. The Rules
of Court shall apply suppletorily.

The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room for doubt. The coverage extends
only to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on
August 3, 1988. The rule sets a demarcation line between marriages covered by the Family Code and
those solemnized under the Civil Code.

54
A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the law is clear and free from any doubt or
ambiguity, there is no room for construction or interpretation there is only room for application.

The Court finds Itself unable to subscribe to petitioner’s interpretation that the phrase “under the
Family Code” in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the word “petitions” rather than to the word
“marriages.” A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the law is clear and free from any
doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for construction or interpretation.

There is only room for application. As the statute is clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be
given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This is what is known as the
plain-meaning rule or verba legis. It is expressed in the maxim, index animi sermo, or “speech is the
index of intention.” Furthermore, there is the maxim verba legis non est recedendum, or “from the
words of a statute there should be no departure.”

CASE #33
Quijano vs. Development Bank of the Philippines
G.R. No. L-26419 October 16, 1970
GEDEON G. QUIJANO and EUGENIA T. QUIJANO, petitioners, vs. THE DEVELOPMENT
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE EX-OFICIO SHERIFF OF MISAMIS OCCIDENTAL,
respondents
BARREDO, J.

FACT
Petitioners-appellants filed a Petition for mandamus with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction in
order to compel respondent-appellee to accept the former’s back pay certificate payment for their
loan.

Also, such payment was made in order to restrain the ex-officio sheriff from proceeding with the
scheduled foreclosure sale of the real properties mortgaged to the Development Bank of the
Philippines (DBP).

Petitioners filed an application for an urban estate loan with the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation
(RFC), predecessor-in-interest of DBP in amount of P19,500 and was approved on April 30, 1953.
The mortgage contract was executed by the petitioners in favor of DBP on March 23, 1954. The first
release of P4,200 was made on April 29, 1954, and the other releases were made subsequent
thereafter. The petitioner wrote DBP offering to pay in the amount of P14,000 for the outstanding
obligation with the respondent-bank.

The petitioners were advised by DBP, thru its Ozamis Brand advised of the non-acceptance of his
offer on the ground that the loan was not incurred before or subsisting on June 20, 1953 when
Republic Act 897 was approved.

ISSUE
Whether or not the obligation of the petitioners was subsisting at the time of the approval of Republic
Act No. 897.

55
 RULING
Yes, the obligation was subsisting at the time of the approval of R.A. No. 897 since it was availed
only when they executed the mortgage contract in March 23, 1954 and received the installments
thereafter.

On the other hand, however, We cannot see any room for interpretation or construction in the clear
and unambiguous language of the above-quoted provision of law. This Court has steadfastly adhered
to the doctrine that its first and fundamental duty is the application of the law according to its express
terms, interpretation being called for only when such literal application is impossible. No process of
interpretation or construction need be resorted to here a provision of law peremptorily calls for
application. Where a requirement or condition is made in explicit and unambiguous terms, no
discretion is left to the judiciary. It must see to it that its mandate is obeyed. Thus, even before the
amendment of the Back Pay Law, when said law limited the applicability of back pay certificates to
"obligations subsisting at the time of the approval of this Act," this Court has ruled that obligations
contracted after its enactment on June 18, 1948 cannot come within its purview.

CASE #34
Security Bank and Trust Company vs. RTC of Makati
G.R. No. 113926 October 23, 1996
SECURITY BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, petitioner,
vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI, BRANCH 61, MAGTANGGOL EUSEBIO and
LEILA VENTURA, respondents
HERMOSISIMA, JR. J.

FACT
Upon maturity of several promissory notes issued by the respondent in favor of petitioner the
principal balance remaining was still in huge amount.

Respondent Eusebio refused to pay the balance payable, which led to a collection case being filed in
court by petitioner SBTC, wherein a judgment was rendered in favor of the latter. Eusebio is hereby
ordered to pay SBTC the remaining balance plus 12% interest per annum.

On August 6, 1993, a motion for partial reconsideration was filed by petitioner SBTC contending that
they agreed to the interest rate of 23%

The motion was denied and an order was issued to grant the rates of interest beyond 12% per annum;
and holding defendant Leila Ventura solidarily liable with co-defendants Eusebio.

ISSUE
Whether or not the 23% rate of interest per annum agreed upon by petitioner bank and respondents is
allowable as provided in Section 2 of CB Circular No. 905.

RULING
Yes, the imposition of the 23% annual interest rate is allowable. As provided in the records, it was
clear that the agreed rate of interest as stipulated on the three (3) promissory notes is 23% per annum.

The applicable provision of law is the Central Bank Circular No. 905 which took effect on December
22, 1982. Sec. 2. fixes the interest rate at 12% per annum in the absence of express contract. All the
promissory notes were signed in 1983 and, therefore, were already covered by CB Circular No. 905.

56
The parties freely agreed upon the rate of interest and since no question were raised, the stipulations
are in effect, binding. The respondent court a quo is not in the position to change the stipulations in
the contract where it is not illegal.

The court finds no valid reason for the respondent court a quo to impose a 12% rate of interest on the
principal balance owing to petitioner by respondent in the presence of a valid stipulation.

The decision of the respondent court a quo, is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the
rate of interest that should be imposed be 23% per annum.

Basic is the rule of statutory construction that when the law is clear and unambiguous, the court is left
with no alternative but to apply the same according to its clear language.

CASE #35
Go vs. Distinction Properties Development and Construction Inc.
G.R. No. 194024 April 25, 2012
PHILIP L. GO, PACIFICO Q. LIM and ANDREW Q. LIM Petitioners, vs. DISTINCTION
PROPERTIES DEVELOPMENT AND CONSTRUCTION, INC. Respondent.
MENDOZA, J.:

FACT
The petitioners are registered individual owners of condominium units in Phoenix Heights
Condominium. One of the petitioners Pacifico Lim, is one of the incorporators and the then president
of DPDCI, who executed a Master Deed and Declaration of Restrictions (MDDR) of Phoenix Heights
Condominium, which was filed with the Registry of Deeds.

Thereafter, Phoenix Heights Condominium Corporation (PHCC) was formally organized and
incorporated who then approved a settlement offer from DPDCI for the set-off of the latter’s
association dues arrears. The said settlement between the two corporations likewise included the
reversion of the 22 storage spaces into common areas. With the conformity of PHCC, DPDCI’s
application for alteration (conversion of unconstructed 22 storage units and units GF4-A and BAS
from saleable to common areas) was granted by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB).

The petitioners filed a complaint before the HLURB against DPDCI for unsound business practices
and violation of the MDDR. DPDCI denied that such allegations such as the brochure attached to the
complaint was "a mere preparatory draft" and not the official one actually distributed to the public.

Furthermore, the said brochure contained a disclaimer as to the binding effect of the supposed offers
therein. Also, DPDCI questioned the petitioners’ personality to sue as the action was a derivative suit.

Although the HLURB confirmed that the petitioner’s action was not a derivative suit, it stated the it is
one which involved contracts of sale of the respective units between the complainants. However, the
Court of Appeals held that HLURB has no jurisdiction over the case.

ISSUE

57
Whether or not the court of appeals erred in holding that the HLURB has no jurisdiction over the
instant case.

RULING
NO. Once vested by the allegations in the complaint, jurisdiction also remains vested irrespective of
whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. Thus,
it was ruled that the jurisdiction of the HLURB to hear and decide cases is determined by the nature of
the cause of action, the subject matter or property involved and the parties.

The provision below states that the National Housing Authority jurisdiction.

SECTION 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real estate trade and business and in
addition to its powers provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing Authority
shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature:

(a) Unsound real estate business practices;

(b) Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer
against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and

(c) Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of
subdivision lot or condominium unit against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman.

This provision must be read in light of the law’s preamble, which explains the reasons for enactment
of the law or the contextual basis for its interpretation. A statute derives its vitality from the purpose
for which it is enacted, and to construe it in a manner that disregards or defeats such purpose is to
nullify or destroy the law. P.D. No. 957, as amended, aims to protect innocent subdivision lot and
condominium unit buyers against fraudulent real estate practices.

Inasmuch as the HLURB has no jurisdiction over petitioners’ complaint, the Court sustains the
subject decision of the CA that the HLURB decision is null and void ab initio.

CASE #36
Luzon Development Bank vs. Enriquez
G.R. No. 168646. January 12, 2011
LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK, petitioner, vs. ANGELES CATHERINE ENRIQUEZ,
respondent.
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
FACT
DELTA is a domestic corporation owned by Ricardo De Leon who owns Lot 4 of Delta Homes I.
Said Lot 4 is the subject matter of these cases.

In order to develop Delta Homes, De Leon and his spouse obtained a P4 million loan from the BANK.
To secure the loan, the spouses De Leon executed in favor of the BANK a real estate mortgage
(REM) on several of their properties, including Lot 4. Subsequently, this REM was amended by
increasing the amount of the secured loan from P4 million to P8 million.

58
Thereafter, DELTA executed a Contract to Sell with respondent Angeles Catherine Enriquez
(Enriquez) over the house and lot in Lot 4 for the purchase price of P614,950.00. Enriquez made a
downpayment of P114,950.00.

When DELTA defaulted on its loan obligation, the BANK, instead of foreclosing the REM, agreed to
a dation in payment or a dacion en pago.

The Deed of Assignment in Payment of Debt was executed on September 30, 1998 and stated that the
real estate with the building and improvements existing shall be the payment of the total obligation
owing to the Bank.

It appears, however, that the dacion en pago was not annotated on the TCT of Lot 4.

On November 18, 1999, Enriquez filed a complaint against DELTA and the BANK before the Region
IV Office of the HLURB alleging that DELTA violated the terms of its License to Sell by selling the
house and lots for a price exceeding that prescribed in Batas Pambansa (BP) Bilang 220 and failing to
get a clearance for the mortgage from the HLURB.

Enriquez sought a full refund of the P301,063.42 that she had already paid to DELTA, award of
damages, and the imposition of administrative fines on DELTA and the BANK.

According to DELTA, it did not violate the terms of its license because it did not obtain a new
mortgage over the subdivision project. It likewise assailed the award of moral and exemplary damages
to Enriquez on the ground that the latter has no cause of action.

ISSUES
1. Whether or not the Contract to Sell conveys ownership

2. Whether or not the dacion en pago extinguished the loan obligation, such that DELTA has no
more obligations to the BANK.

RULING
1. No, Contract to sell does not transfer ownership Both parties are correct in arguing that the
Contract to Sell executed by DELTA in favor of Enriquez did not transfer ownership over Lot
4 to Enriquez.

In the instant case, there is nothing in the provisions of the contract entered into by DELTA
and Enriquez that would exempt it from the general definition of a contract to sell.

2.) The Dacion en Pago executed by DELTA and the BANK indicates a clear intention by the
parties that the assigned properties would serve as full payment for DELTA’s entire
obligation.

The contractual intention determines whether the property subject of the dation will be considered
as the full equivalent of the debt and will therefore serve as full satisfaction for the debt.

59
Like in all contracts, the intention of the parties to the dation in payment is paramount and
controlling. The contractual intention determines whether the property subject of the dation will be
considered as the full equivalent of the debt and will therefore serve as full satisfaction for the debt.

“The dation in payment extinguishes the obligation to the extent of the value of the thing
delivered, either as agreed upon by the parties or as may be proved, unless the parties by agreement,
express or implied, or by their silence, consider the thing as equivalent to the obligation, in which case
the obligation is totally extinguished.” In the case at bar, the Dacion en Pago executed by DELTA and
the BANK indicates a clear intention by the parties that the assigned properties would serve as full
payment for DELTA’s entire obligation.

Delta Development and Management Services, Inc. is NOT LIABLE TO PAY Luzon Development
Bank the value of the subject lot; and respondent Angeles Catherine Enriquez is ordered to PAY the
balance of the purchase price and the interests accruing thereon, as decreed by the Court of Appeals,
to the Luzon Development Bank, instead of Delta Development and Management Services, Inc.

The Luzon Development Bank is ordered to DELIVER a CLEAN TITLE to Angeles Catherine
Enriquez upon the latter’s full payment of the balance of the purchase price and the accrued interests.

CASE #37
Municipality of Nueva Era, Ilocos Norte v. Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte
G.R. No. 169435 February 27, 2008
MUNICIPALITY OF NUEVA ERA, ILOCOS NORTE, represented by its Municipal Mayor,
CAROLINE ARZADON-GARVIDA, petitioner, vs. MUNICIPALITY OF MARCOS, ILOCOS
NORTE, represented by its Municipal Mayor, SALVADOR PILLOS, and the HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
REYES, R.T., J.:

FACT
Boundaries, settlement of boundary disputes between municipalities are fixed by the law creating a
municipality. Governor General Francis Burton Harrison, acting on a resolution passed by the
provincial government of Ilocos Norte, united several rancherias and created the township of Nueva
Era by virtue of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 66 dated September 30, 1916.

The Municipality of Marcos, on the other hand, was created on June 22, 1963 pursuant to Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 3753 entitled "An Act Creating the Municipality of Marcos in the Province of Ilocos
Norte." Section 1 of R.A. No. 3753 provides:

SECTION 1. The barrios of Capariaan, Biding, Escoda, Culao, Alabaan, Ragas and Agunit in the
Municipality of Dingras, Province of Ilocos Norte, are hereby separated from the said municipality
and constituted into a new and separate municipality to be known as the Municipality of Marcos.

60
Clearly, Marcos shall be derived from the listed barangays of Dingras, namely: Capariaan, Biding,
Escoda, Culao, Alabaan, Ragas and Agunit based on the first paragraph of the said Section 1 of R.A.
No. 3753.

However, the Municipality of Nueva Era or any of its barangays was not mentioned. Hence, if based
only on said paragraph, it is clear that Nueva Era may not be considered as a source of territory of
Marcos. The description of Marcos' boundaries seems problematic since it stated in the second
paragraph, particularly in the phrase: "on the East, by the Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province boundary."

Marcos claimed that the middle portion of Nueva Era, which adjoins its eastern side, formed part of
its territory. On March 29, 2000, the SP of Ilocos Norte ruled in favor of Nueva Era. The disputed
area consisting of 15,400 hectares, more or less, is hereby declared as part and portion of the
territorial jurisdiction of respondent Nueva Era.

On appeal by Marcos, the RTC affirmed the decision of the SP in its decision of March 19, 2001.
Thereafter, Marcos filed a petition for review of the RTC decision before the CA.

ISSUE
Whether or not the Eastern boundary of Marcos extends over and covers the middle portion of Nueva
Era.

RULING
The Court held that the legislative intent is to create Marcos out of the territory of Dingras only. As
provided in R.A. No. 3753, only the barangays of Dingras are enumerated as Marcos' source of
territory, Nueva Era's territory is, therefore, excluded.

The court cannot accept the contention of Marcos that " a portion of Nueva Era formed part of its
territory because, according to it, Nueva Era is between the Marcos and Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province
boundary.

Only Dingras is specifically named by law as source territory of Marcos. Hence, the said description
of boundaries of Marcos is descriptive only of the listed barangays of Dingras as a compact and
contiguous territory.

Considering that the description of the eastern boundary of Marcos under R.A. No. 3753 is
ambiguous, the same must be interpreted in light of the legislative intent. The law must be given a
reasonable interpretation, to preclude absurdity in its application.

CASE #38
Brent School, Inc. vs. Zamora
G.R. No. L-48494 February 5, 1990
BRENT SCHOOL, INC., and REV. GABRIEL DIMACHE, petitioners, vs. RONALDO ZAMORA,
the Presidential Assistant for Legal Affairs, Office of the President, and DOROTEO R. ALEGRE,
respondents.
NARVASA, J.:

61
 FACT
Brent School Inc. entered into a fixed contract for a specific term of 5 years with Doroteo R. Alegre.
In the said contract he will be in the position of athletic director of the said school.

At an annual compensation of P20,000.00, date of execution of the agreement was set on July 17,
1976. However three months before the expiration of the contract, Alegre was given a copy of the
report filed by Brent School with the Department of Labor advising of the termination of his services
effective on July 16, 1976.

It was determined that the ground for the termination was "completion of contract, expiration of the
definite period of employment.".

Alegre accepted the payment for period May 16 to July 17, 1976, and signed a receipt as full payment
of the contract.

However, Alegre later protested and argued that although his contract did stipulate that the same
would terminate on July 17, 1976, he had acquired the status of a regular employee and could not be
removed except for valid cause.

The Regional Director required Alegre to be reinstated as a “permanent employee” to his former
position. According to the Regional Director, the termination is not sanctioned by the PD 422 and
prohibited by Circular no 8 of the Bureau of Private Schools.

The motion for reconsideration filed by Brent School to the Regional Director, Secretary of Labor,
and the Office of the President was dismissed for lack of merit.

ISSUE
Whether or not the provisions of labor code as amended, if applied in this case entitles Alegre to
reinstatement.

RULING
No, Alegre is not entitled to reinstatement and the other relief. The fact is that his contract of
employment with Brent School having lawfully terminated with and by reason of the expiration of the
agreed term of period thereof.

When the employment contract was signed between Brent School and Alegre on July 18, 1971, it was
perfectly legitimate for them to include in it a stipulation fixing the duration thereof Stipulations for a
term were explicitly recognized as valid by this Court,

"Where a contract specifies the period of its duration, it terminates on the expiration of such period."
"A contract of employment for a definite period terminates by its own terms at the end of such
period."

As revised, said article, renumbered 270, 23 now reads:

. . . Regular and Casual Employment.—The provisions of written agreement to the contrary

notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall be deemed

62
to be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary
or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer except where the employment has been
fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been
determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or service to be
employed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season.

An employment shall be deemed to he casual if it is not covered by the preceding paragraph:

provided, that, any employee who has rendered at least one year of service, whether such service is
continuous or broken, shall be considered a regular employee with respect to the activity in which he
is employed and his employment shall continue while such actually exists.

It is a salutary principle in statutory construction that there exists a valid presumption that undesirable
consequences were never intended by a legislative measure, and that a construction of which the
statute is fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid all objecionable mischievous, undefensible,
wrongful, evil and injurious consequences.

We have, here, then a case where the true intent of the law is clear that calls for the application of the
cardinal rule of statutory construction that such intent of spirit must prevail over the letter thereof, for
whatever is within the spirit of a statute is within the statute, since adherence to the letter would result
in absurdity, injustice and contradictions and would defeat the plain and vital purpose of the statute.
CASE #39
Gonzales III vs. Office of the President
G.R. No. 196231 September 4, 2012
EMILIO A. GONZALES III, Petitioner, vs. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE
PHILIPPINES, ACTING THROUGH AND REPRESENTED BY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., SENIOR DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY JOSE AMOR M.
AMORANDO, OFFICER-IN-CHARGE - OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
FOR LEGAL AFFAIRS, ATTY. RONALDO A. GERON, DIR. ROWENA TURINGAN-
SANCHEZ, AND ATTY. CARLITO D. CATAYONG, Respondents.
BRION, J.:

FACT
The Ombudsman investigated PSI Rolando Mendoza and four policemen for an alleged robbery
(extortion), grave threats and physical injuries amounting to grave misconduct against Christian
Kalaw. The case was dismissed by the Manila City Prosecutors Office for lack of probable cause and
for failure of the complainant (Christian Kalaw) to submit evidence and prosecute the case.

However, when Mendoza et al. filed a case against Christian Kalaw regarding the incident, such was
given due course by the City Prosecutors Office.

The Ombudsman without citing any reason directed the PNP-NCR to endorse the case against
Mendoza and the arresting policemen to his office for administrative adjudication.

He also caused the docketing of the case and named Atty. Clarence V. Guinto of the PNP-CIDG-
NCR, who indorsed the case records, as the nominal complainant, in lieu of Christian Kalaw, who in
turn, did not also affirm his complaint-affidavit with the Ombudsman or submit any position paper as
required during the proceedings

63
After serving a preventive suspension, Mendoza was adjudged liable for grave misconduct by Deputy
Ombudsman Gonzales based on the sole and uncorroborated complaint-affidavit of Christian Kalaw,
which was not previously sustained by the City Prosecutor's Office and the PNP Internal Affairs
Service.

Mendoza interposed a timely motion for reconsideration. Despite the pending and unresolved motion
for reconsideration, the judgment of dismissal was enforced, thereby abruptly ending Mendoza’s 30
years of service in the PNP with forfeiture of all his benefits.

As a result, Mendoza sent several hand-written letter-requests to the Ombudsman for immediate
resolution of his motion for reconsideration but was not given attention.

A decision dated March 31, 2011 was rendered by the Office of the President dismissing petitioner
Emilio A. Gonzales III, Deputy Ombudsman for the Military and Other Law Enforcement Offices
(MOLEO)
A petition for Certiorari was filed seeking to declare as unconstitutional Section 8(2) of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, which gives the President the
power to dismiss a Deputy Ombudsman of the Office of the Ombudsman.

ISSUE
Whether or not Deputy Ombudsman Gonzales committed serious and inexcusable negligence and
gross violation of their own rules of procedure by allowing Mendoza's motion for reconsideration to
languish for more than nine (9) months without any justification.

RULING
Yes. The Deputy Ombudsman Gonzales committed serious and inexcusable negligence and gross
violation of their own rules of procedure by allowing Mendoza's motion for reconsideration to
languish for more than nine (9) months without any justification, in violation of the Ombudsman
prescribed rules to resolve motions for reconsideration in administrative disciplinary cases within five
(5) days from submission.

The inaction is gross, considering there is no opposition thereto. The prolonged inaction precipitated
the desperate resort to hostage-taking. The Court finds him guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty and Grave
Misconduct constituting betrayal of public trust, and hereby meted out the penalty of DISMISSAL
from service.

It is a basic canon of statutory construction that in interpreting a statute, care should be taken that
every part thereof be given effect, on the theory that it was enacted as an integrated measure and not
as a hodge-podge of conflicting provisions.

A construction that would render a provision inoperative should be avoided; instead, apparently
inconsistent provisions should be reconciled whenever possible as parts of a coordinated and
harmonious whole. Otherwise stated, the law must not be read in truncated parts.

64
Every part thereof must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the
general intent of the whole enactment. Gonzales III vs. Office of the President of the Philippines, 679
SCRA 614, G.R. No. 196231 September 4, 2012.

CASE #40
Galicto vs. Aquino III
G.R. No. 193978. February 28, 2012
JELBERT B. GALICTO, petitioner, vs. H.E. PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III, in
his capacity as President of the Republic of the Philippines; ATTY. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in
his capacity as Executive Secretary; and FLORENCIO B. ABAD, in his capacity as Secretary of the
Department of Budget and Management, respondents.
BRION, J.:
FACT
Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III is the President of the Republic of the Philippines (Pres. Aquino); he
issued EO 7 and has the duty of implementing it.

The Senate, through the Senate Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises,
conducted an inquiry in aid of legislation on the reported excessive salaries, allowances, and other
benefits of GOCCs and government financial institutions.

Based on its findings that “officials and governing boards of various GOCCs and GFIs have been
granting themselves unwarranted allowances, bonuses, incentives, stock options, and other benefits as
well as other irregular and abusive practices,” the Senate issued Senate Resolution No. 17 “urging the
President to order the immediate suspension of the unusually large and apparently excessive
allowances, bonuses, incentives and other perks of members of the governing boards of GOCCs and
GFIs.”

After the Congress called out this issue, the President issued EO 7 provided for the guiding principles
and framework to establish a fixed compensation and position classification system for GOCCs and
GFIs.

A Task Force was also created to review all remunerations of GOCC and GFI employees and officers,
while GOCCs and GFIs were ordered to submit to the Task Force information regarding their
compensation. Finally, EO 7 ordered (1) a moratorium on the increases in the salaries and other forms
of compensation, except salary adjustments under EO 8011 and EO 900, of all GOCC and GFI
employees for an indefinite period to be set by the President,9 and (2) a suspension of all allowances,
bonuses and incentives of members of the Board of Directors/Trustees until December 31, 2010.

Galicto, the petitioner filed a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Application for Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order, seeking to nullify and enjoin the
implementation of Executive Order No. (EO) 7.

ISSUES
Whether or not E.O. 7 is unconstitutional for having been issued beyond the powers of the President and
for being in breach of existing laws.

RULING

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No, ecause of the transitory nature of EO 7, it has been pointed out that the present case has already
been rendered moot by these supervening events:

(1) the lapse on December 31, 2010 of Section 10 of EO 7 that suspended the allowances and bonuses
of the directors and trustees of GOCCs and GFIs; and

(2) the enactment of R.A. No. 10149 amending the provisions in the charters of GOCCs and GFIs
empowering their board of directors/trustees to determine their own compensation system, in favor of
the grant of authority to the President to perform this act.

With the enactment of the GOCC Governance Act of 2011, the President is now authorized to fix the
compensation framework of GOCCs and GFIs.

The new law amended R.A. No. 7875 and other laws that enabled certain GOCCs and GFIs to fix
their own compensation frameworks; the law now authorizes the President to fix the compensation
and position classification system for all GOCCs and GFIs, as well as other entities covered by the
law. This means that, the President can now reissue an EO containing these same provisions without
any legal constraints.

Statutory Construction: View that provisions of law should be read and understood in their entirety
and all parts thereof should be seen as constituting a coherent whole.—Provisions of law should be
read and understood in their entirety and all parts thereof should be seen as constituting a coherent
whole. In this context, the recognition under Section 9 of Joint Resolution No. 4 of the authority
granted to exempt entities like Philhealth to determine their own compensation and position
classification system seeks to exclude them from the salary adjustments provided in Joint Resolution
No. 4.

Case #41

Wa-acon v. Philippines
G.R. No. 164575  December 6, 2006
ROBERT P. WA-ACON, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent

VELASCO, JR., J.

Case Digest by: Mikko P. Solis

Subject: Statutory Construction
Topic: Presumption of Law/Fact

FACTS
It was the period from July 19, 1979, to September 28, 1981, accused Robert P. Wa-acon, a Special
Collecting Officer at National Food Authority (NFA) was charged with grave abuse of confidence,
misappropriate, misapply, embezzle and convert the received and entrusted rice stocks and empty
sacks to his own personal use and benefit with a total value of P114,303.00.

Petitioner denied the crime and contended the rice delivered to him weighed less than that for which
he signed. Petitioner explained that he could not check the weight of the sacks delivered to him as the
weighing scale in their office had a maximum capacity of only twelve (12) kilograms.

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Petitioner claimed that he informed his superiors of such shortage verbally, but was unheeded. Citing
the presumption under the last paragraph of Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code that "the failure of
the public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds which he is chargeable upon demand by
any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or
property to personal use" and the inability of accused Wa-acon to "rebut the presumption that he had
put the rice stocks and the empty sacks to personal use," the Sandiganbayan found him guilty of
malversation of public funds under the Revised Penal Code
Petitioner filed Motion for Reconsideration and then denied on the ground that accused that no new
substantial issues and cogent reasons raised to justify the reversal of the April 22, 2004 Decision.
Hence this petition

ISSUE
Whether or not the petitioner is liable for the charge against him, namely malversation of funds?

RULING
Yes, the petitioner is guilty under Article 217, as amended by Republic Act 1060, which provides that
it no longer requires proof by the State that the accused actually appropriated, took, or
misappropriated public funds or property. Instead, a presumption, though disputable and rebuttable,
was installed that upon demand by any duly authorized officer, the failure of a public officer to have
duly forthcoming any public funds or property should be prima facie evidence that he had put such
missing funds or properties to personal use. 

Presumption of Law
A "presumption of law" is sanctioned by a statute prescribing that "a certain inference must be made
whenever facts appear which furnish the basis of the interference." 

Presumption of Fact
This is to be set apart from a "presumption of fact" which is a "[conclusion] drawn from particular
circumstances, the connection between them and the sought for fact having received such a sanction
in experience as to have become recognized as justifying the assumption." 

Case #42

Lastrilla vs. Granda

G.R. No. 160257  January 31, 2006
ROBERT LASTRILLA, Petitioner,  vs.  RAFAEL A. GRANDA, Respondent.
PUNO, J.; 

Case Digest by: Mikko P. Solis

Subject: Statutory Construction
Topic: Effects of Presumption on Construction and Interpretation

FACTS
The deceased Granda spouses owned several parcels of land with some improvements thereon in
Tacloban City which were allegedly sold by the Granda spouses, as evidenced by three (3) deeds of
absolute sale, with the following amounts: Php 3.8M, Php 5M, and Php 200K, all dated December 7,
1985, witnessed by the petitioner, Robert Lastrilla, and the deceased spouses' youngest daughter
Silvina and notarized by Atty. Camilo Camenforte. Respondent Rafael Granda is a grandson and legal
heir of the deceased spouses Rafael and Aurora Granda, who died in June 1989 and September 16,
2000, respectively. The Granda spouses had ten children including Jesse Granda, the respondent’s
father, and Silvina Granda, the respondent’s aunt. On February 21, 2001 or more than five months
after Aurora's death, respondent filed the instant complaint for Violation of Articles 171 and 172 of

67
the Revised Penal Code against petitioner, Silvina, Atty. Camenforte, and petitioner’s siblings who
were listed as buyers in two of the deeds of absolute sale, claiming that the signatures of his deceased
grandparents were falsified and antedated. As per verification, the examining officers of the PNP
Crime Laboratory confirmed that the signatures of each of the respondent's grandparents "were not
written by one and the same person. The CA found probable cause against private respondent Robert
Lastrilla, and directed the Office of the Prosecutor of Tacloban City to issue a recommendation for the
filing of three (3) pieces of informations charging Robert Lastrilla of the crime of Falsification of
Public Document under Article 172 (1), in relation to Article 171 (1), (2) and (5) of the Revised Penal
Code. 

ISSUE
Whether or not the petitioners are liable for falsification. 

RULING
Yes. All the elements of falsification are present in this case. Probable cause need not be based on
clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt
and definitely not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt.

The disputable presumption is that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary act
and takes ordinary care of his concerns. This presumption assumes greater significance to the case of
petitioner who, as "the one tasked [by his siblings] to ensure that the signatures on the subject deeds
were all authentic and genuine," is naturally expected to not have voluntarily affixed his signature in
the subject deeds unless he understood the clear significance of his act. 
 
Moreover, there is sufficient evidence to prove that petitioner "was personally and directly responsible
for registering the falsified deeds with the Register of Deeds of Tacloban City" and that "he caused
the cancellation of the Transfer Certificates of Title in the name of Aurora" and "effected the issuance
of the new Transfer Certificates of Title." 
 
In the absence of satisfactory explanation, one found in possession of and who used a forged
document is the forger of said document. If a person had in his possession a falsified document and he
made use of it, taking advantage of it and profiting thereby, the clear presumption is that he is the
material author of the falsification.

Case #43

Samson v. Aguirre
G.R. No. 133076 September 22, 1999
MOISES S. SAMSON, petitioner, vs.
HON. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, in his capacity as the Executive Secretary, COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS, and the DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET, respondents.

QUISUMBING, J.:

Case Digest by: Mikko P. Solis

Subject: Statutory Construction
Topic: - Presumption against Constitutionality

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 FACTS
In this case the law in question is Republic Act No. 8535, creating the City of Novaliches out of 15
barangays of Quezon City. Petitioner asserts that RA No. 8535 failed to conform to the criteria
established by the Local Government Code particularly, Sections 7, 11(a) and 450(a), as to the
requirements of income, population and land area, seat of government  and no adverse effect to being
a city of Quezon City. In addition, he also said the law would amend the Constitution.

However, the respondents argued that petitioner failed to substantiate said allegations with convincing
proof and that petitioner Samson had the burden of proof to overcome the legal presumption that
Congress considered all the legal requirements under the Local Government Code of 1991 in passing
R.A. 8535. Further, respondents stated that the petition itself is devoid of any pertinent document
supporting petitioner's claim that R.A. 8535 is unconstitutional.

ISSUE
Whether or not the petitioner was able to successfully overcome the presumption of validity accorded
in R.A. No. 8535.

RULING
No, the Court ruled that petitioner was not able to successfully overcome the presumption of validity
accorded in R.A. No. 8535. There is a presumption of constitutionality in favor of a statute. One who
attacks a statute must prove its invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt. Every law is presumed to have
passed through regular congressional processes. 
Petitioner   did   not   present   any   proof,   only   allegations,   that   no   certifications   were  
submitted   to the House Committee on Local Government—as such certifications attesting
compliance with the LGC and its IRR is required. Allegations cannot substitute for proof.  The
presumption stands that the law passed by Congress complied with all the requisites.

Case #44

LAMP v. Secretary of Budget

G.R. No. 164987   April 24, 2012
LAWYERS AGAINST MONOPOLY AND POVERTY (LAMP), represented by its Chairman
and counsel, CEFERINO PADUA, Members, ALBERTO ABELEDA, JR., ELEAZAR
ANGELES, GREGELY FULTON ACOSTA, VICTOR AVECILLA, GALILEO BRION,
ANATALIA BUENAVENTURA, EFREN CARAG, PEDRO CASTILLO, NAPOLEON
CORONADO, ROMEO ECHAUZ, ALFREDO DE GUZMAN, ROGELIO KARAGDAG, JR.,
MARIA LUZ ARZAGA-MENDOZA, LEO LUIS MENDOZA, ANTONIO P. PAREDES,
AQUILINO PIMENTEL III, MARIO REYES, EMMANUEL SANTOS, TERESITA SANTOS,
RUDEGELIO TACORDA, SECRETARY GEN. ROLANDO ARZAGA, Board of Consultants,
JUSTICE ABRAHAM SARMIENTO, SEN. AQUILINO PIMENTEL, JR., and BARTOLOME
FERNANDEZ, JR., Petitioners,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, THE TREASURER OF THE
PHILIPPINES, THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, and THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE
and the SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES in representation of the
Members of the Congress, Respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:

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Case Digest by: Mikko P. Solis
Subject: Statutory Construction

FACTS
For consideration of the Court is an original action for certiorari assailing the constitutionality and
legality of the implementation of the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) as provided for
in Republic Act (R.A.) 9206 or the General Appropriations Act for 2004 (GAA of 2004).

Petitioner Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty(LAMP), a group of lawyers who have banded
together with a mission of dismantling all forms of political, economic, or social monopoly in the
country. According to LAMP, the above provision is silent and, therefore, prohibits an automatic or
direct allocation of lump sums to individual senators and congressmen for the funding of projects. It
does not empower individual Members of Congress to propose, select and identify programs and
projects to be funded out of PDAF.

For LAMP, this situation runs afoul against the principle of separation of powers because in receiving
and, thereafter, spending funds for their chosen projects, the Members of Congress in effect intrude
into an executive function. Further, the authority to propose and select projects does not pertain to
legislation. “It is, in fact, a non-legislative function devoid of constitutional sanction,”8 and, therefore,
impermissible and must be considered nothing less than malfeasance.

RESPONDENT’S POSITION: the perceptions of LAMP on the implementation of PDAF must not be
based on mere speculations circulated in the news media preaching the evils of pork barrel.

ISSUES

1) whether or not the mandatory requisites for the exercise of judicial review are met in this case; and
2) whether or not the implementation of PDAF by the Members of Congress is unconstitutional and
illegal.

RULING
A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on
the individual challenging it. In this case, the petitioner contested the implementation of an alleged
unconstitutional statute, as citizens and taxpayers. The petition complains of illegal disbursement of
public funds derived from taxation and this is sufficient reason to say that there indeed exists a
definite, concrete, real or substantial controversy before the Court.

LOCUS STANDI: The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges “such a personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions. Here, the sufficient interest preventing the illegal expenditure of money
raised by taxation required in taxpayers’ suits is established. Thus, in the claim that PDAF funds have
been illegally disbursed and wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law,
LAMP should be allowed to sue.

Lastly, the Court is of the view that the petition poses issues impressed with paramount public
interest. The ramification of issues involving the unconstitutional spending of PDAF deserves the
consideration of the Court, warranting the assumption of jurisdiction over the petition.

II.

The Court rules in the negative.

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In determining whether or not a statute is unconstitutional, the Court does not lose sight of the
presumption of validity accorded to statutory acts of Congress. To justify the nullification of the law
or its implementation, there must be a clear and unequivocal, not a doubtful, breach of the
Constitution. In case of doubt in the sufficiency of proof establishing unconstitutionality, the Court
must sustain legislation because “to invalidate [a law] based on x x x baseless supposition is an
affront to the wisdom not only of the legislature that passed it but also of the executive which
approved it.”

Case #45

Belgica v. Ochoa
G.R. No. 208566    November 19, 2013
RECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA JOSE M. VILLEGAS JR. JOSE L. GONZALEZ
REUBEN M. ABANTE and QUINTIN PAREDES SAN DIEGO, Petitioners, vs. HONORABLE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR. SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT FLORENCIO B. ABAD, NATIONAL TREASURER ROSALIA V. DE
LEON SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by FRANKLIN M. DRILON m his
capacity as SENATE PRESIDENT and HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES represented by
FELICIANO S. BELMONTE, JR. in his capacity as SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE,
Respondents.

Case Digest by: Mikko P. Solis

Subject: Statutory Construction
Topic: Judicial Review

MENDOZA, J.:

Case Digest by: Mikko P. Solis

Subject: Statutory Construction

FACTS
Pork Barrell refers to an appropriation of government spending meant for localized projects and
secured solely or primarily to bring money to a representative's district.  The “Pork Barrel System”
involves two (2) kinds of lump-sum discretionary funds: (a) Congressional Pork Barrel or the
discretionary funds of Members of the Legislature (PDAF); and (b) Presidential Pork Barrel or certain
funds of the President such as the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund.

The Malampaya Funds was a special fund created under PD 910 issued by then President Ferdinand
E. Marcos for the development of indigenous energy resources vital to economic growth while the
Presidential Social Fund is sourced from the share of the government in the aggregate gross earnings
of PAGCOR through which the President provides direct assistance to priority programs and projects
not funded under the regular budget.

In July 2013, NBI began its probe into allegations that “the government has been defrauded of some
P10 Billion over the past 10 years by a syndicate using funds from the pork barrel of lawmakers and
various government agencies for scores of ghost projects.” The investigation was spawned by sworn
affidavits of six whistle-blowers who declared that JLN Corporation (stands for Janet Lim Napoles)
had facilitated the swindling of billions of pesos from the public coffers for “ghost projects” using no
fewer than 20 dummy non-government organizations for an entire decade. In August 2013, the

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Commission on Audit released report revealing substantial irregularities in the disbursement and
utilization of PDAF by the Congressmen during the Arroyo administration.

As for the 'Presidential Pork Barrel', whistle-blowers alleged that "at least P900 Million from royalties
in the operation of the Malampaya gas project off Palawan province intended for agrarian reform
beneficiaries has gone into a dummy NGO
Spurred in large part by the findings contained in the CoA Report and the Napoles controversy,
several petitions were lodged before the Court similarly seeking that the Pork Barrel System be
declared unconstitutional

ISSUES
Whether or not the issues raised in the consolidated petitions involve an actual and justiciable
controversy

RULING
Actual Case or Controversy
The prevailing rule in constitutional litigation is that no question involving the constitutionality or
validity of a law or governmental act may be heard and decided by the Court unless there is
compliance with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry, namely: (a) there must be an actual case or
controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act must have the
standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; (c) the question of constitutionality
must be raised at the earliest opportunity ; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis
mota of the case.Of these requisites, case law states that the first two are the most important and,
therefore, shall be discussed forthwith.

By constitutional fiat, judicial power operates only when there is an actual case or controversy. This is
embodied in Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution which pertinently states that "judicial
power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable." 

Jurisprudence provides that an actual case or controversy is one which "involves a conflict of legal
rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a
hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute. In other words, "there must be a contrariety of legal
rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence." Related to
the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of "ripeness," meaning that the
questions raised for constitutional scrutiny are already ripe for adjudication. "A question is ripe for
adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual
challenging it. It is a prerequisite that something had then been accomplished or performed by either
branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an
immediate or threatened injury to itself as a result of the challenged action." "Withal, courts will
decline to pass upon constitutional issues through advisory opinions, bereft as they are of authority to
resolve hypothetical or moot questions."
Based on these principles, the Court finds that there exists an actual and justiciable controversy in
these cases.

Locus Standi
Petitioners have come before the Court in their respective capacities as citizen-taxpayers and
accordingly, assert that they "dutifully contribute to the coffers of the National Treasury." Clearly, as
taxpayers, they possess the requisite standing to question the validity of the existing "Pork Barrel
System" under which the taxes they pay have been and continue to be utilized. It is undeniable that
petitioners, as taxpayers, are bound to suffer from the unconstitutional usage of public funds, if the
Court so rules. Invariably, taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds

72
are illegally disbursed or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that public
funds are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law, as in these cases.

Moreover, as citizens, petitioners have equally fulfilled the standing requirement given that the issues
they have raised may be classified as matters "of transcendental importance, of overreaching
significance to society, or of paramount public interest." The CoA Chairperson‘s statement during the
Oral Arguments that the present controversy involves "not merely a systems failure" but a "complete
breakdown of controls" amplifies, in addition to the matters above-discussed, the seriousness of the
issues involved herein. Indeed, of greater import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of
public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid
statute. All told, petitioners have sufficient locus standi to file the instant cases.

Case #46

Biraogo v Philippine Truth Commission

G.R. No. 192935 December 7, 2010
REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, REP. RODOLFO B. ALBANO, JR., REP. SIMEON A.
DATUMANONG, and REP. ORLANDO B. FUA, SR. vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR. and DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET
AND MANAGEMENT SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD

MENDOZA, J.:

Case Digest by: Mikko P. Solis 

Subject: Statutory Construction

FACT
Before the May 2010 elections, the then-Senator Benigno Simeon Aquino III declared his staunch
condemnation of graft and corruption with his slogan, "Kung walang corrupt, walang mahirap." The
Filipino people, convinced of his sincerity and of his ability to carry out this noble objective,
catapulted the good senator to the presidency. At the dawn of his administration, the President on July
30, 2010, signed Executive Order No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (Truth
Commission). The Philippine Truth Commission is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of
the President with the primary task to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-
level public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the
previous administration, and thereafter to submit its finding and recommendations to the President,
Congress and the Ombudsman. Barely a month after the issuance of Executive Order No. 1, the
petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from performing its
functions.

ISSUES
Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

RULING
Yes. The clear mandate of the envisioned Truth Commission is to investigate and find out the truth
"concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration" only,
which is the Arroyo administration. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain,
patent and manifest.

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The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of the legislature. Its
inhibitions cover all the departments of the government including the political and executive
departments, and extend to all actions of a state denying equal protection of the laws, through
whatever agency or whatever guise is taken. 

It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without
distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid
classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however,
to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness.

The test has four requisites:

(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; 
(2) It is germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.

For a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must include or embrace all
persons who naturally belong to the class. The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the
members of the class are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed.

The Court said that a revision of the executive issuance so as to include the earlier past
administrations before the Aquino administration would allow it to pass the test of reasonableness and
will be regarded as valid and not affront to the Constitution.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

Case #47

Francisco vs. Toll Regulatory Board

G.R. No. 166910  October 19, 2010
ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR. and JOSE MA. O. HIZON, Petitioners, vs. TOLL
REGULATORY BOARD, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION,
MANILA NORTH TOLLWAYS CORPORATION, BENPRES HOLDINGS CORPORATION,
FIRST PHILIPPINE INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, TOLLWAY
MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, PNCC SKYWAY CORPORATION, CITRA METRO
MANILA TOLLWAYS CORPORATION and HOPEWELL CROWN INFRASTRUCTURE,
INC., Respondents.

VELASCO, JR., J.:

Case Digest by: Mikko P. Solis 

Subject: Statutory Construction
Topic: Judicial Review

FACT

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President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1112, authorizing the establishment of
toll facilities on public improvements. In order to attract the private sector, P.D. 1112 allowed the
collection of toll fees for the use of certain public improvements that would allow a reasonable rate of
return on investments. 

On the same date, P.D. 1113 was issued, granting to the Philippine National Construction Corporation
("PNCC"), then known as the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines
("CDCP"), for a period of thirty years franchise to construct, maintain and operate toll facilities in the
North Luzon and South Luzon Expressways, with the right to collect toll fees.

On December 22, 1983, P.D. 1894 was issued therein further granting PNCC a franchise over the
Metro Manila Expressway ("MMEX"), and the expanded and delineated NLEX and SLEX. PNCC
was granted the "right, privilege and authority to construct, maintain and operate any and all such
extensions, linkages or stretches, together with the toll facilities appurtenant thereto, from any part of
the North Luzon Expressway, South Luzon Expressway and/or Metro Manila Expressway and/or to
divert the original route and change the original end-points of the North Luzon Expressway and/or
South Luzon Expressway.

In the agreement entered by PNCC with private sectors the supplemental Approval Operation
Agreement (STOA) defines the scope of the road project coverage, the terminal date of the
concession, and provisions on initial toll rate and a built-in formula for adjustment of toll rates,
investment recovery clauses and contract termination in the event of the concessionaire’s.

Petitioners Francisco and Hizon, as taxpayers and expressway users, seek to nullify the various
STOAs adverted to above and the corresponding Toll Regulatory (TRB) resolutions. the STOAs and
the toll rate-fixing resolutions violate the Constitution in that they veritably impose on the public the
burden of financing tollways by way of exorbitant fees and thus depriving the public of property
without due process. 

Petitioners also seek to nullify certain provisions of P.D. 1113 and P.D. 1894, which uniformly grant
the President the power to approve the transfer or assignment of usufruct or the rights and privileges
thereunder by the tollway operator to third parties, particularly the transfer effected by PNCC to
MNTC. Wherein the authority to approve is an exercise of legislative power under Article VI, Section
1 of the Constitution.

ISSUES
WON petitioners in the petitions have locus standi? And the existence of actual controversy? 

RULING
Yes, petitioners being taxpayers have locus standi on the issue.  The petitioner as taxpayers establish
that he has a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained thus sustaining,
direct injury as a result if redressed by favorable action. The case as well is in current and contains
actual controversy given the adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse
effect on the individual challenging it. 2. Yes, the president has the authority to approve pertaining to
the TRB resolution. 

The court finds the following Valid and Constitutional, DENYING petition of Petitioners.

1. the Supplemental Toll Operation Agreement dated April 30, 1998 covering the North Luzon
Tollway Project and the TRB Board Resolution No. 2005-4 issued pursuant thereto;

75
2. the Supplemental Toll Operation Agreement dated November 27, 1995 covering the South Metro
Manila Skyway and the TRB Board Resolution No. 2004-53 and previous TRB resolutions issued
pursuant thereto;
3. the Supplemental Toll Operation Agreement covering the South Luzon Tollway Project or South
Luzon Expressway and the TRB Board resolutions issued pursuant to the said agreement, particularly
the TRB Board resolutions allowing the toll rate increases that are supposed to have been
implemented on June 30, 2010;
4. Section 3, paragraph (a) of Presidential Decree No. 1112, otherwise known as the "Toll Operation
Decree," in relation to Section 3, paragraph (d) thereof and Section 8, paragraph (b) of Presidential
Decree No. 1894; and
5. Section 3, paragraph (e) 3 of P.D. No. 1112 and Section 13 of P.D. No. 1894.

Case #48

GUINGONA VS CA
G.R. No. 125532 July 10, 1998

SECRETARY TEOFISTO GUINGONA, JR.; STATE PROSECUTORS JUDE ROMANO,

LEAH ARMAMENTO, MANUEL TORREVILLAS, JOAQUIN ESCOVAR, MENRADO
CORPUS; the NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION; and POTENCIANO
ROQUE, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and RODOLFO PINEDA, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Case Digest by: Mikko P. Solis 

Subject: Statutory Construction
Topic: Judicial Review

FACTS:

In the last quarter of 1995, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) conducted an investigation on
the alleged participation and involvement of national and local government officials in "jueteng" and
other forms of illegal gambling.

In November 1995, one Potenciano Roque, claiming to be an eyewitness to the networking of national
and local politicians and gambling lords, sought admission into the Government's "Witness
Protection, Security and Benefit Program."

Allegedly, he gained first-hand information in his capacity as Chairman of the Task Force Anti-
Gambling (TFAG) during the term of former President Corazon C. Aquino until his resignation.

After a thorough evaluation of his qualifications, convinced of his compliance with the requirements
of Republic Act No. 6981, otherwise known as the "Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Act,"
the Department of Justice admitted Roque to the program.

Roque executed a sworn statement before NBI alleging that during his stint as Chairman, several
gambling lords, including private respondent Rodolfo Pineda, and certain politicians offered him
money and other valuable considerations, which he accepted, upon his agreement to cease conducting
raids on their respective gambling operations.

76
The DOJ Task Force on Illegal Gambling created by petitioner Secretary Teofisto Guingona
conducted a preliminary investigation of the case and subpoenaed all the respondents requiring them
to submit their counter-affidavits.

On February 5, 1996, three (3) Informations for corruption of public officials were filed against
Rodolfo Pineda (private respondent) in the Manila and Pasig City Trial Courts.

In its Decision, Respondent Court addressed mainly the issue of whether the secretary of justice acted
in excess of his jurisdiction 

(a) in admitting Petitioner Roque into the Program and 

(b) in excluding him from the Informations filed against private respondent. Private respondent
contended that Roque's admission was illegal on two grounds: first, his testimony could not be
substantially corroborated in its material points; and second, he appeared to be the most guilty or at
least more guilty than private respondent, insofar as the crimes charged in the Informations were
concerned.

A petition for review on certiorari was filed with a lone issue of whether or not a witness' testimony
requires prior or simultaneous corroboration at the time he is admitted into the witness protection,
security and benefit program.

ISSUE:
Won the issue raised by petitioners do not warrant the exercise of judicial power.

RULING:
The Court finds the petition fundamentally defective. The Constitution provides that judicial power
"includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable."

Judicial review, which is merely an aspect of judicial power, demands the following: 
(1) there must be an actual case calling for the exercise of judicial power; 
(2) the question must be ripe for adjudication; and 
(3) the person challenging must have "standing"; that is, he has personal and substantial interest in the
case, such that he has sustained or will sustain direct injury.

The first requisite is that there must be before a court an actual case calling for the exercise of judicial
power. Courts have no authority to pass upon issues through advisory opinions or to resolve
hypothetical or feigned problems or friendly suits collusively arranged between parties without real
adverse interests. Courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest,
however intellectually challenging. As a condition precedent to the exercise of judicial power, an
actual controversy between litigants must first exist.

An actual case or controversy exists when there is a conflict of legal rights or an assertion of opposite
legal claims, which can be resolved on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence. 

A justiciable controversy is distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute, in that

the former involves a definite and concrete dispute touching on the legal relations of parties having
adverse legal interests. A justiciable controversy admits of specific relief through a decree that is
conclusive in character, whereas an opinion only advises what the law would be upon a hypothetical
state of facts.

In the case at bar, Petitioners filed this suit out of fear that the assailed Decision would frustrate the
purpose of said law, which is to encourage witnesses to come out and testify. But their apprehension

77
is neither justified nor exemplified by this particular case. A mere apprehension does not give rise to a
justiciable controversy.

After finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the government prosecutors, Respondent
Court allowed the admission of Roque into the Program. In fact, Roque had already testified in court
against the private respondent. Thus, the propriety of Roque's admission to the Program is already a
moot and academic issue that clearly does not warrant judicial review.

Petitioners failed not only to present an actual controversy, but also to show a case ripe for
adjudication. Hence, any resolution that this Court might make in this case would constitute an
attempt at abstraction that can only lead to barren legal dialectics and sterile conclusions unrelated to
actualities.

Case #49

Quiño vs. Commission on Elections

G.R. No. 197466. November 13, 2012
JOEL P. QUIÑO, MARY ANTONETTE C. DANGOY,JOSEPHINE T. ABING, JOY ANN P.
CABATINGAN,TESSA P. CANG, WILFREDO T. CALO, HOMER C.CANEN, JOSE L.
CAGANG, ALBERTO CABATINGANand FRANCISCO T. OLIVERIO, petitioners, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and RITCHIE R.WAGAS, respondents.
VILLARAMA, JR., J. :

Case Digest by: Mikko P. Solis

Subject: Statutory Construction
Topic: Moot and Academic Principle

FACTS
Two candidates for the position of Mayor, petitioner Quino and respondent Wagas 

Petitioner Joel P. Quiño and private respondent Ritchie R. Wagas both ran for the position of Mayor
of Compostela. 

Results of the canvassing showed that Quiño won against Wagas. Quiño, along with the rest of the
petitioners who were the winning candidates for members of the Sangguniang Bayan, were
proclaimed by the MBOC on May 11, 2010. 

WAGAS FILED A PETITION TO ANNUL PROCLAMATION

Wagas also filed a petition for annulment of proclamation in the COMELEC alleging certain
irregularities.

He contends that the Certificates of Canvass and Proclamation are without authentic basis, and prayed
that the proclamation of the winning candidates be declared null and void. 

QUINO ANSWERS
Quiño denied the allegations of irregularities in the canvassing of votes. Quiño argued that such
allegations are pure speculation. 

He insisted that the few problems or deficiencies encountered, such as the audit/print logs, did not
affect the integrity of the elections, and hence the proceedings of the MBOC and the proclamation of
the winning candidates were proper and lawful. 

78
He moved for the dismissal of the petition.

COMELEC SUPENDS PROCLAMATION

Commission ORDERS to, as it does hereby, GRANT the “Extremely Urgent Motion to Suspend the
Effect of Proclamation” filed by petitionerWagas, hereby immediately suspending the effect of the
proclamation of the candidates for mayor, vice-mayor and eight councilors.

REQUEST FOR MANUAL RECOUNT DENIED, WAGAS FILES PETITION FOR

CERTIORARI
COMELEC En Banc issued an order denying Wagas’ request for manual recount. The new MBOC
was set to convene on February 27, 2012. 

Wagas, however, filed a petition for certiorari before this Court (G.R. No. 200505) assailing the
denial of his motion for recount and seeking injunctive relief. 

ISSUE
Whether or not Quino’s petition for certiorari has become moot and academic.

RULING
MOOT AND ACADEMIC
Yes, the petition for certiorari becomes moot and academic. Because there no longer exists an actual
controversy between the parties and resolving the merits of this case would no longer serve any useful
purpose. As we held in Ocampo v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal.

PROCLAMATION DONE, PETITION ALREADY MOOT AND ACADEMIC

The Special Board of Canvassers of Compostela, Cebu already proclaimed the petitioners as the
winning candidates for municipal mayor, vice-mayor and councilors. With this development, the
reliefs prayed for in the present petition have become moot and academic. 

MOOT AND ACADEMIC 

It is a rule of universal application, almost, that courts of justice constituted to pass upon substantial
rights will not consider questions in which no actual interests are involved they decline jurisdiction of
moot cases.

There no longer exists an actual controversy between the parties and resolving the merits of this case
would no longer serve any useful purpose.

OCAMPO V. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL RULING

At any rate, the petition has become moot and academic. 

The Twelfth Congress formally adjourned on June 11, 2004. And on May 17, 2004, the City Board of
Canvassers proclaimed Bienvenido Abante the duly elected Congressman of the Sixth District of
Manila pursuant to the May 10, 2004 elections.

ENRILE VS. SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL 

We ruled that a case becomes moot and academic when there is no more actual controversy between
the parties or no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits. 

GANCHO-ON VS. SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT  

79
Thus: It is a rule of universal application, almost, that courts of justice constituted to pass upon
substantial rights will not consider questions in which no actual interests are involved they decline
jurisdiction of moot cases. 

And where the issue has become moot and academic, there is no justiciable controversy, so that a
declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. 

There is no actual substantial relief to which petitioner would be entitled and which would be negated
by the dismissal of the petition.

WHEREFORE, the present petition for certiorari is DISMISSED on the ground of MOOTNESS.  SO
ORDERED.

Case #50

Gancho-on v. Secretary of Labor and Employment

G.R. No. 108033  April 14, 1997
TEOFISTO C. GANCHO-ON, petitioner, vs.
THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT AND LAKAS NG
NAGKAKAISANG MANGGAGAWA-PAFLU, respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.

Case Digest by: Mikko P. Solis

Subject: Statutory Construction
Topic: Actual Controversy / Ripeness Test

FACTS:

On 16 January 1992 respondent Lakas ng Nagkakaisang Manggagawa-PAFLU filed with the

Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) a petition for certification election in a bid to
exclusively represent the truck drivers of Eros Repair Shop. Petitioner Teofisto C. Gancho-on, owner
of the shop, moved for the dismissal of the petition on the ground of absence of employer-employee
relationship. He contended that the members of respondent Union who would constitute the proposed
bargaining unit were not employees of his shop but of individual owners of the trucks used in the
trucking and hauling business managed by his wife, Herminia. As a support of his contention, he
presented certificates of registration indicating the ownership of four (4) vehicles being driven by the
union members. In addition, he submitted copy of the application to operate business filed with the
Mayor's Office together with an application for renewal of the certificate of registration which
described his business as an automotive repair shay. Respondent Union opposed the motion and
asserted that while petitioner may be the registered owner of the shop, his wife was the manager of the
trucking and hauling business under the same name and style as the shop. It offered in evidence the
following documents executed by petitioner's wife herself: 
(a) an affidavit dated 10 February 1992 alleging among others that she was the manager of Eros
Repair Shop which was engaged in the trucking and hauling of sugar cane and that the truck drivers
were paid on commission basis;

80
(b) a letter dated 17 February 1992 addressed to the Assistant Regional Director of the DOLE
informing the latter of the violation by one of the truck drivers of Eros Repair Shop of a memorandum
issued to all truck drivers; and, 
(c) another letter dated 20 February 1992 addressed to the same official seeking advice concerning
eleven (11) of her truck drivers who failed to report for work.

On 13 May 1992, the petition for certification election was given due course with the following
options: respondent union, or no union at all. Petitioner assailed the order for certification election
before respondent Secretary of Labor and Employment, still insisting on the absence of employer-
employee relationship. However, the latter subsequently denied it. Thus, the petitioner elevate this
case before the Supreme Court.

On 11 January 1993 the certification election nevertheless proceeded. Respondent union thereafter
submitted to the Court an original copy of the declaration of the final certification election results
showing that it did not garner a single vote because out of thirty-six (36) drivers, all of the twenty (20)
who cast their votes favored a "no union." This notwithstanding, petitioner argues that it is still
necessary for the Court to resolve the issue of employer-employee relationship not only for the
guidance of the bench and bar in general but also because the matter "hangs like the sword of
Damocles over his head."

ISSUE:

Whether or not the issue of employer-employee relationship still contended by the petitioner is ripe
and is the actual controversy of the case?

RULING:

No. The Court held that the issue of employer-employee relationship still contended by the petitioner
is not ripe and is not the actual controversy of the case. 

Petitioner entirely misses the material points which have rendered the present proceeding moot and
academic. First, subject resolution of respondent Secretary as aforestated decreed that the pre-election
conference preparatory to the certification election be immediately conducted. The certification
election thereafter became a fait accompli. Second, in a sense salutary to petitioner, the defeat
suffered by respondent Union in its bid to be certified as the sole bargaining agent of the truck drivers
made irrelevant the findings of both the Med-Arbiter-Designate and respondent Secretary that an
employer-employee relationship existed. It should be emphasized that the issue of employer-
employee relationship came into being only because petitioner denied its existence in his motion to
dismiss the petition for certification election. Since the certification proceeding before the Med-
Arbiter merely provided the mainspring of this petition the defeat of respondent Union in the election
has stripped this case of its raison d'etre.
It is a rule of universal application, almost, that courts of justice constituted to pass upon substantial
rights will not consider questions in which no actual interests are involved; they decline jurisdiction of
moot cases. And where the issue has become moot and academic, there is no justiciable controversy,
so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical-use or value. There is no actual substantial relief
to which petitioners would be entitled and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for being moot and academic.

81
Case #51

David v. Macapagal-Arroyo
G.R. No. 171396             May 3, 2006
PROF. RANDOLF S. DAVID, LORENZO TAÑADA III, RONALD LLAMAS, H. HARRY L.
ROQUE, JR., JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN, ROGER R. RAYEL, GARY S. MALLARI, ROMEL
REGALADO BAGARES, CHRISTOPHER F.C. BOLASTIG, Petitioners,
vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, AS PRESIDENT AND COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF,
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, HON. AVELINO CRUZ II, SECRETARY
OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, GENERAL GENEROSO SENGA, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED
FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO LOMIBAO, CHIEF,
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, Respondents.

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Case Digest by: Mikko P. Solis

Subject: Statutory Construction
Topic: Actual Controversy Locus Standi

FACTS:

On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the EDSA People Power I,
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, in a move to suppress alleged plans to overthrow the
government, issued Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 (PP 1017), declaring a state of national
emergency. She cited as factual bases for the said issuance the escape of the Magdalo Group and their
audacious threat of the Magdalo DDay; the defections in the military, particularly in the Philippine
Marines; and the reproving statements from the communist leaders.

On the same day, she issued General Order No. 5 (G.O. No. 5) setting the standards which the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP) should follow in the
suppression and prevention of acts of lawless violence. The following were considered as additional
factual bases for the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5: the bombing of telecommunication towers
and cell sites in Bulacan and Bataan; the raid of an army outpost in Benguet resulting in the death of
three soldiers; and the directive of the Communist Party of the Philippines ordering its front
organizations to join5,000 Metro Manila radicals and 25,000 more from the provinces in mass
protests. Immediately, the Office of the President announced the cancellation of all programs and
activities related to the 20th People Power I anniversary celebration. It revoked permits to hold rallies.
Members of the Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) and the National Federation of Labor Unions-Kilusang
Mayo Uno (NAFLU-KMU), who marched from various parts of Metro Manila to converge at the
EDSA Shrine, were violently dispersed by anti-riot police. 

Professor Randolf David, Akbayan party-list president Ronald Llamas, and members of the KMU and
NAFLU-KMU were arrested without a warrant. In the early morning of February 25, 2006, operatives

82
of the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) raided the Daily Tribune offices in Manila
and confiscated news stories, documents, pictures, and mock-ups of the Saturday issue. Policemen
were stationed inside the editorial and business offices, as well as outside the building. A few minutes
after the search and seizure at the Daily Tribune offices, the police surrounded the premises of another
pro-opposition paper, Malaya, and its sister publication, the tabloid Abante. The PNP warned that it
would take over any media organization that would not follow “standards set by the government
during the state of national emergency.”

On March 3, 2006, exactly one week from the declaration of a state of national emergency and after
all the present petitions had been filed, President Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation No. 1021
(PP 1021), declaring that the state of national emergency has ceased to exist and lifting PP1017.
These consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition allege that in issuing PP 1017 and G.O. No.
5, President Arroyo committed grave abuse of discretion. It is contended that respondent officials of
the Government, in their professed efforts to defend and preserve democratic institutions, are actually
trampling upon the very freedom guaranteed and protected by the Constitution. Hence, such issuances
are void for being unconstitutional.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 is unconstitutional?

Whether or not the petitioners have a legal standing in questioning the constitutionality of the
proclamation?
 
RULING:
The Court finds and so holds that PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it constitutes a call by the
President for the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence whenever becomes necessary as
prescribe under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution. However, there were extraneous
provisions giving the President express or implied power.
 

To issue decrees; (" Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Section 1,
Article VI categorically states that "[t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of
the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.")

To direct the AFP to enforce obedience to all laws even those not related to lawless violence as well
as decrees promulgated by the President[The absence of a law defining "acts of terrorism" may result
in abuse and oppression on the part of the police or military]; and

To impose standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press, are ultra
vires and unconstitutional. The Court also rules that under Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution,
the President, in the absence of legislative legislation, cannot take over privately-owned public utility
and private business affected with public interest. Therefore, the PP No. 1017 is only partly
unconstitutional.

This Court adopted the “direct injury” test in our jurisdiction. In People v. Vera, it held that the person
who impugns the validity of a statute must have “a personal and substantial interest in the case such

83
that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result.” Therefore, the court ruled that the
petitioners have a locus standi, for they suffered “direct injury” resulting from “illegal arrest” and
“unlawful search” committed by police operatives pursuant to PP 1017.

Case #52

Velarde v. SJS
G.R. No. 159357 April 28, 2004
Brother MARIANO "MIKE" Z. VELARDE, petitioner, vs. SOCIAL JUSTICE
SOCIETY, respondent.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Case Digest by: Mikko P. Solis

Subject: Statutory Construction
Topic: Locus Standi

Facts
On January 28, 2003, SJS filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief against Velarde and his aforesaid co-
respondents. SJS, a registered political party, sought the interpretation of several constitutional
provisions, specifically on the separation of church and state; and a declaratory judgment on the
constitutionality of the acts of religious leaders endorsing a candidate for an elective office, or urging
or requiring the members of their flock to vote for a specified candidate.

Bro. Mike Velarde and his aforesaid co-respondents filed their Motions to Dismiss. All sought the
dismissal of the Petition on the common grounds that it does not state a cause of action and that there
is no justiciable controversy.

The Court denied the Motions to Dismiss, and the Motions for Reconsideration filed by Bro. Mike
Velarde, Bro. Eddie Villanueva and Executive Minister Eraño Manalo, which raised no new
arguments other than those already considered in the motions to dismiss.

The trial court said that it had jurisdiction over the Petition, because "in praying for a determination as
to whether the actions imputed to the respondents are violative of Article II, Section 6 of the
Fundamental Law, the Petition has raised only a question of law." It then proceeded to a lengthy
discussion of the issue raised in the Petition the separation of church and state principle. Through its
discourse, the court a quo opined at some point that the endorsement of specific candidates in an
election to any public office is a clear violation of the separation clause. 

After its essay on the legal issue, however, the trial court failed to include a dispositive portion in its
assailed Decision. Thus, Velarde and Soriano filed separate Motions for Reconsideration which, as
mentioned earlier, were denied by the lower court.

Issue
Whether or not the respondent have any legal standing to file the Petition for Declaratory Relief?

84
 Ruling

No, legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case,
such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged
act. Interest means a material interest in issue that is affected by the questioned act or instrument, as
distinguished from a mere incidental interest in the question involved.

Parties bringing suits challenging the constitutionality of a law, an act or a statute must show "not
only that the law or act is invalid, but also that they have sustained or are in immediate or imminent
danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that they suffer
thereby in some indefinite way." They must demonstrate that they have been, or are about to be,
denied some right or privilege to which they are lawfully entitled, or that they are about to be
subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of.
First, parties suing as taxpayers must specifically prove that they have sufficient interest in preventing
the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation. A taxpayer’s action may be properly brought only
when there is an exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power. In the present case, there is no
allegation, whether express or implied, that taxpayers’ money is being illegally disbursed.

Second, there was no showing in the Petition for Declaratory Relief that SJS as a political party or its
members as registered voters would be adversely affected by the alleged acts of the respondents
below, if the question at issue was not resolved. There was no allegation that SJS had suffered or
would be deprived of votes due to the acts imputed to the said respondents. Neither did it allege that
any of its members would be denied the right of suffrage or the privilege to be voted for a public
office they are seeking.

Finally, the allegedly keen interest of its "thousands of members who are citizens-taxpayers-registered
voters" is too general and beyond the contemplation of the standards set by our jurisprudence. Not
only is the presumed interest impersonal in character; it is likewise too vague, highly speculative and
uncertain to satisfy the requirement of standing.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review of Brother Mike Velarde is GRANTED. The assailed June
12, 2003 Decision and July 29, 2003 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch 49) are
hereby DECLARED NULL AND VOID and thus SET ASIDE. The SJS Petition for Declaratory
Relief is DISMISSED for failure to state a cause of action.

Case #53
Lozano v. Nograles
G.R. No. 187883     June 16, 2009
ATTY. OLIVER O. LOZANO and ATTY. EVANGELINE J. LOZANO-ENDRIANO, Petitioners,
vs.SPEAKER PROSPERO C. NOGRALES, Representative, Majority, House of
Representatives, Respondent.
G.R. No. 187910    June 16, 2009
LOUIS "BAROK" C. BIRAOGO, Petitioner, vs. SPEAKER PROSPERO C. NOGRALES,
Speaker of the House of Representatives, Congress of the Philippines, Respondent.

85
PUNO, C.J.:

Case Digest by: Mikko P. Solis

Subject: Statutory Construction
Topic: Lis Mota

FACTS:
The two petitions, filed by their respective petitioners in their capacities as concerned citizens and
taxpayers, prayed for the nullification of House Resolution No. 1109 entitled "A Resolution Calling
upon the Members of Congress to Convene for the Purpose of Considering Proposals to Amend or
Revise the Constitution, Upon a Three-fourths Vote of All the Members of Congress." 

Both petitions seek to trigger a justiciable controversy that would warrant a definitive interpretation
by the Court of Section 1, Article XVII, which provides for the procedure for amending or revising
the Constitution.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the case filed by the petitioners contains an actual controversy that would compel the
court to exercise its power of judicial review over the validity of House Resolution No. 1109

Whether or not the petitioners, as taxpayers and concerned citizens, have the locus standi to institute
this case

RULINGS:
No, the Court’s power of review may be awesome, but it is limited to actual cases and controversies
dealing with parties having adversely legal claims, to be exercised after full opportunity of argument
by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented.
The "case-or-controversy" requirement bans this court from deciding "abstract, hypothetical or
contingent questions," lest the court give opinions in the nature of advice concerning legislative or
executive action. An aspect of the "case-or-controversy" requirement is the requisite of "ripeness."  In
our jurisdiction, the issue of ripeness is generally treated in terms of actual injury to the plaintiff.
Hence, a question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse
effect on the individual challenging it.

In the present case, the fitness of petitioners’ case for the exercise of judicial review is grossly
lacking. In the first place, petitioners have not sufficiently proven any adverse injury or hardship from
the act complained of. In the second place, House Resolution No. 1109 only resolved that the House
of Representatives shall convene at a future time for the purpose of proposing amendments or
revisions to the Constitution. No actual convention has yet transpired and no rules of procedure have
yet been adopted. More importantly, no proposal has yet been made, and hence, no usurpation of
power or gross abuse of discretion has yet taken place. In short, House Resolution No. 1109 involves
a quintessential example of an uncertain contingent future event that may not occur as anticipated, or
indeed may not occur at all. The House has not yet performed a positive act that would warrant an
intervention from this Court.

No, Generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when he can demonstrate that (1) he has
personally suffered some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the

86
government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be
redressed by the remedy being sought.

In the cases at bar, petitioners have not shown the elemental injury in fact that would endow them
with the standing to sue. Locus standi requires a personal stake in the outcome of a controversy for
significant reasons. It assures adverseness and sharpens the presentation of issues for the illumination
of the Court in resolving difficult constitutional questions. The lack of petitioners’ personal stake in
this case is no more evident than in Lozano’s three-page petition that is devoid of any legal or
jurisprudential basis.

Neither can the lack of locus standi be cured by the claim of petitioners that they are instituting the
cases at bar as taxpayers and concerned citizens. A taxpayer’s suit requires that the act complained of
directly involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation. It is undisputed that
there has been no allocation or disbursement of public funds in this case as of yet. To be sure,
standing as a citizen has been upheld by this Court in cases where a petitioner is able to craft an issue
of transcendental importance or when paramount public interest is involved. While the Court
recognizes the potential far-reaching implications of the issue at hand, the possible consequence of
House Resolution No. 1109 is yet unrealized and does not infuse petitioners with locus standi under
the "transcendental importance" doctrine.

Case #54

Carbonilla v. BAR
SERGIO I. CARBONILLA, ET. AL vs. BOARD OF AIRLINES REPRESENTATIVES (BAR)
G.R. No. 193247, September 14, 2011
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ET. AL vs. BOARD OF AIRLINES REPRESENTATIVES
(BAR)
G.R. No. 194276, September 14, 2011

Case Digest by: Mikko P. Solis

Subject: Statutory Construction
Topic: Earliest Opportunity

CARPIO, J.:

FACTS:
On 9 February 2006 the Department of Finance approved CAO 1-2005. CAO 7-92 and CAO 1-2005
were promulgated pursuant to Section 3506 in relation to Section 608 of the Tariff and Customs Code
of the Philippines (TCCP). The Bureau of Customs issued Customs Administrative Order No. 1-2005
(CAO 1-2005) amending CAO 7-92.  

Prior to the amendment of CAO 7-92, the BOC created on 23 April 2002 a committee to review the
overtime pay of Customs personnel in Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) and to propose its
adjustment from the exchange rate of ₱25 to US$1 to the then exchange rate of ₱55 to US$1.
Furthermore, for more than two years from the creation of the committee, several meetings were
conducted with the agencies concerned, including respondent Board of Airlines Representatives

87
(BAR), to discuss the proposed rate adjustment that would be embodied in an Amendatory Customs
Administrative Order. However, the Board of Airline Representatives (BAR) alleged that it learned of
the proposed increase in the overtime rates only sometime in 2004 and only through unofficial
reports.

BAR wrote a letter addressed to Edgardo L. De Leon, Chief, Bonded Warehouse Division, BOC-
NAIA, informing the latter of its objection to the proposed increase in the overtime rates. They also
sent a letter to the Department of Finance reiterating its concerns against the issuance of CAO 1-2005.
However, they were not able find a valid ground to disturb the validity of CAO 1-2005, much less to
suspend its implementation or effectivity. They wrote in the letter that the implementation effective 16
March 2005 is legally proper. 

Cruz requested the Office of the President and the Office of the Executive Secretary to review the
decision of Usec. Mendoza. Deputy Executive Secretary Manuel B. Gaite (Deputy Exec. Sec. Gaite)
issued an Order requiring BAR to pay its appeal fee and submit an appeal memorandum within 15
days from notice. BAR paid the appeal fee and submitted its appeal memorandum on 19 January
2007.

The Office of the President denied the appeal of BAR and affirmed the Decision of the Department of
Finance. Still, BAR filed a motion for reconsideration but it was also denied. Then they filed a
petition for review under Rule 45 before the Court of Appeals.

Furthermore, Petitioners Carbonilla, et al. filed an Omnibus Motion to Intervene before the Court of
Appeals on the ground that as customs personnel, they would be directly affected by the outcome of
the case. Petitioners Carbonilla, et al. also adopted the Comment filed by the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG).

The Court of Appeals denied the motion for intervention filed by Carbonilla, et al. They held that the
intervenors’ case was for collection of their unpaid overtime services and their interests could not be
protected or addressed in the resolution of the case. They filed a motion for reconsideration. On the
other hand, without resolving Carbonilla, et al.’s motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals
promulgated the assailed Resolution of the Office of the President and declared Section 3506 of the
TCCP, CAO 7-92 and CAO 1-2005 unenforceable against BAR.

In its 5 August 2010 Resolution, the Court of Appeals, among others, denied Carbonilla, et al.’s
motion for reconsideration. The Office of the President, et al. also filed a motion for reconsideration,
however, the Court of Appeals granted BAR’s motion for reconsideration and denied the Office of the
President, et. al motion for reconsideration. Thus, a petition was filed in the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not CAO 7-92, CAO 1-2005 and Section 3506 of the TCCP is unconstitutional.
RULING:

No, the Court ruled that CAO 7-92, CAO 1-2005 and Section 3506 of the TCCP is constitutional.

88
When an administrative regulation is attacked for being unconstitutional or invalid, a party may raise
its unconstitutionality or invalidity on every occasion that the regulation is being enforced. For the
Court to exercise its power of judicial review, the party assailing the regulation must show that the
question of constitutionality has been raised at the earliest opportunity.

Section 3506 of the TCCP provides that Customs employees may be assigned by a Collector to do
overtime work at rates fixed by the Commissioner of Customs when the service rendered is to be paid
by the importers, shippers or other persons served. The rates to be fixed shall not be less than that
prescribed by law to be paid to employees of private enterprise.

To test whether Section 3506 of the TCCP is enforceable, it must comply the completeness and
sufficient standard tests. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions
when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will have to do
is to enforce it. The second test requires adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to determine the
boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. 

In this case, Section 3506 of the TCCP complied with the requirements. The law is complete in itself
that it leaves nothing more for the BOC to do: it gives authority to the Collector to assign customs
employees to do overtime work; the Commissioner of Customs fixes the rates; and it provides that the
payments shall be made by the importers, shippers or other persons served. Section 3506 also fixed
the standard to be followed by the Commissioner of Customs when it provides that the rates shall not
be less than that prescribed by law to be paid to employees of private enterprise.

Furthermore, employees rendering overtime services are not receiving double compensation for the
overtime pay, travel and meal allowances provided for under CAO 7-92 and CAO 1-2005. Section
3506 provides that the rates shall not be less than that prescribed by law to be paid to employees of
private enterprise. The overtime pay, travel and meal allowances are payment for additional work
rendered after regular office hours and do not constitute double compensation prohibited under
Section 8, Article IX(B) of the 1987 Constitution as they are in fact authorized by law or Section 3506
of the TCCP.
Therefore, the CAO 1-2005 is constitutional and is enforceable. The Court directed Petitioner Bureau
of Customs to implement CAO 1-2005 immediately. However, the petition filed by the carbonilla, et.
al., was denied. 
 

Case #55

Hacienda Luisita v. PARC

G.R. No. 171101               July 5, 2011
HACIENDA LUISITA, INCORPORATED, Petitioner,
LUISITA INDUSTRIAL PARK CORPORATION and RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING
CORPORATION, Petitioners-in-Intervention, vs. PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN REFORM
COUNCIL; SECRETARY NASSER PANGANDAMAN OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
AGRARIAN REFORM; ALYANSA NG MGA MANGGAGAWANG BUKID NG HACIENDA
LUISITA, RENE GALANG, NOEL MALLARI, and JULIO SUNIGA and his SUPERVISORY
GROUP OF THE HACIENDA LUISITA, INC. and WINDSOR ANDAYA, Respondents.

89
Case Digest by: Mikko P. Solis
Subject: Statutory Construction
Topic: Earliest Opportunity
FACTS
In 1957, the Spanish owners of Tabacalera offered to sell Hacienda Luisita as well as their controlling
interest in the sugar mill within the hacienda, the Central Azucarera de Tarlac (CAT), as an indivisible
transaction. The Tarlac Development Corporation (Tadeco), then owned and/or controlled by the Jose
Cojuangco, Sr. Group, agreed to buy and undertook to pay the purchase price for Hacienda Luisita in
pesos, while that for the controlling interest in CAT, in US dollars.Hacienda Luisita de Tarlac
(Hacienda Luisita) was a 6,443-hectare mixed agricultural-industrial-residential expanse straddling
several municipalities of Tarlac and owned by Compañia General de Tabacos de Filipinas
(Tabacalera).

The Philippine government, through the then Central Bank of the Philippines, assisted the buyer
(Tadeco) to obtain a dollar loan from a US bank. Also, the Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS) Board of Trustees extended a PhP 5.911 million loan in favor of Tadeco to pay the peso price
component of the sale.

One of the conditions contained in the approving GSIS Resolution No. 3203, as later amended by
Resolution No. 356, Series of 1958, was that “the lots comprising the Hacienda Luisita shall be
subdivided by [Tadeco] and sold at cost to the tenants, should there be any, and whenever conditions
should exist warranting such action under the provisions of the Land Tenure Act.”

As of March 31, 1958, Tadeco had fully paid the purchase price for Hacienda Luisita and
Tabacalera’s interest in CAT.

In 1980, the martial law administration filed a suit before the RTC against Tadeco, et al. for them to
surrender Hacienda Luisita to the [now] Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) so that the land can
be distributed to farmers at cost. Responding, Tadeco alleged that Hacienda Luisita does not have
tenants, and sugar lands are not covered by existing agrarian reform legislations. The RTC rendered
judgment ordering Tadeco to surrender Hacienda Luisita to the MAR. Tadeco appealed to the Court
of Appeals (CA).

However, in 1988, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) moved to withdraw the government’s
case against Tadeco. The CA dismissed the case, but subject to the condition that Tadeco obtain the
approval of the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) of a stock distribution plan (SDP).

Pursuant thereto, Tadeco organized a spin-off corporation, Hacienda Luisita, Inc. (HLI), as vehicle to
facilitate stock acquisition by the farmworkers. For this purpose, Tadeco assigned and conveyed to
HLI the agricultural land portion (4,915.75 hectares) and other farm-related properties of Hacienda
Luisita in exchange for HLI shares of stock.

To accommodate the assets transfer from Tadeco to HLI, the latter, with the Securities and Exchange
Commission’s (SEC’s) approval, increased its capital stock from PhP 1.5 million to PhP 400 Million
divided into 400 million shares with par value of PhP 1/share. 150 million of the shares were to be
issued only to qualified and registered beneficiaries of the CARP, and the remaining 250 million to
any stockholder of the corporation.

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On May 9, 1989, some 93% of the then farmworker-beneficiaries (FWBs) complement of Hacienda
Luisita signified in a referendum their acceptance of the proposed HLI’s Stock Distribution Option
Plan. The Stock Distribution Option Agreement (SDOA), styled as a Memorandum of Agreement
(MOA), was entered into by Tadeco, HLI, and the 5,848 qualified FWBs and attested to by then DAR
Secretary Philip Juico.

Under the SDOA, included as part of the distribution plan are: (a) production-sharing equivalent to
three percent (3%) of gross sales from the production of the agricultural land payable to the FWBs in
cash dividends or incentive bonus; and (b) distribution of free homelots of not more than 240 square
meters each to family-beneficiaries. The production-sharing, as the SDP indicated, is
payable “irrespective of whether [HLI] makes money or not,” implying that the benefits do not
partake the nature of dividends, as the term is ordinarily understood under corporation law.

Two separate petitions were filed by respondents (naming themselves the Supervisory Group and
AMBALA group) with the DAR to revoke the SDOA, alleging that HLI had failed to give them their
dividends and the one percent (1%) share in gross sales, as well as the thirty-three percent (33%)
share in the proceeds of the sale of the converted 500 hectares of land. They further claimed that their
lives have not improved contrary to the promise and rationale for the adoption of the SDOA. They
prayed for a renegotiation of the SDOA, or, in the alternative, its revocation.

Subsequently, DAR Sec. Pangandaman recommended to the PARC Executive Committee (Excom)
(a) the recall/revocation of PARC Resolution No. 89-12-2 approving HLI’s SDP; and (b) the
acquisition of Hacienda Luisita through the compulsory acquisition scheme.

PARC issued the assailed Resolution No. 2005-32-01 directing that the lands subject of the revoked
SDO plan be placed under the compulsory coverage or mandated land acquisition scheme of the
CARP. 

ISSUE:
Whether or not operative fact doctrine is applicable in the case.

RULING:
YES. The operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case. The Court maintained its stance that the
operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case since, contrary to the suggestion of the minority, the
doctrine is not limited only to invalid or unconstitutional laws but also applies to decisions made by
the President or the administrative agencies that have the force and effect of laws. Prior to the
nullification or recall of said decisions, they may have produced acts and consequences that must be
respected. It is on this score that the operative fact doctrine should be applied to acts and
consequences that resulted from the implementation of the PARC Resolution approving the SDP of
HLI. The majority stressed that the application of the operative fact doctrine by the Court in its July 5,
2011 decision was in fact favorable to the FWBs because not only were they allowed to retain the
benefits and homelots they received under the stock distribution scheme, they were also given the
option to choose for themselves whether they want to remain as stockholders of HLI or not.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. PARC Resolution No. 2005-32-01 dated December
22, 2005 and Resolution No. 2006-34-01 dated May 3, 2006, placing the lands subject of HLI’s SDP
under compulsory coverage on mandated land acquisition scheme of the CARP, are hereby
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the original 6,296 qualified FWBs shall have the option
to remain as stockholders of HLI. DAR shall immediately schedule meetings with the said 6,296

91
FWBs and explain to them the effects, consequences and legal or practical implications of their
choice, after which the FWBs will be asked to manifest, in secret voting, their choices in the ballot,
signing their signatures or placing their thumbmarks, as the case may be, over their printed names.

Case #56

Tropical Homes, Inc. vs. NHA

G.R. No. L-48672
July 31, 1987
Gutierrez, Jr., J.

Case Digest by: Mikko P. Solis

Subject: Statutory Construction
Topic: Lis Mota
 
Tropical Homes, Inc. questioned the constitutionality of PD No. 1344 pursuant to an NHA resolution
that they are assailing for requiring them to refund Arturo Cordova. The Court however, sees the
constitutional question as not the lis mota of the case.
 
FACTS

There was a 10% downpayment upon the execution of the contract, and the balance is payable at a
monthly amortization of P318.16 beginning May 17, 1972 for 20 years. Section 14 of the contract
provided that the contract will be automatically cancelled upon default in payment of any installment
within 90 days from its due date. In 1972, Tropical Homes, Inc. (THI) entered into a contract with
private respondent Arturo  Cordova for the sale of a lot at Better Living Subdivision in Parañaque.
The Contract price was P32,108.00.

In 1973, Cordova was informed that the contract was cancelled due to nonpayment of installments for
a period of seven (7) months. He filed a letter-complaint at the Department of Trade asking for a
refund of the total payments he made amounting to P8,627.86. The case was referred to NHA as they
had jurisdiction over the case pursuant to PD 957.

On February 21, 1978, the NHA issued the resolution including a decision favoring Cordova which
states that the complainant was entitled to the refund of his payments on the first contract totalling
P8,627.86 and was recommended that THI be ordered to refund to Arturo Cordova the amount of
P8,627.86 with 12% interest per annum from 1 October 1976, until fully paid. THI’s Motion for
reconsideration was denied by NHA.

On April 1978, PD No. 1344 was passed which provided the following:
Section 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real estate trade and business and in addition
to its powers provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing Authority shall have
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature: Unsound real estate business
practices, claims involving refund and any other claims filed by sub-division lot or condominium unit
buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and cases involving specific

92
performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lot or
condominium unit against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman.

Section 2. The decision of the National Housing Authority shall become final and executory after the
lapse of fifteen (15) days from the date of its receipt. It is appealable only to the President of the
Philippines and in the event the appeal is filed and the decision is not reversed and/or amended within
a period of thirty (30) days, the decision is deemed affirmed. Proof of the appeal of the decision must
be furnished the National Housing Authority.
 
Tropical Homes, Inc. questioned the constitutionality of PD No. 1344 because a) it deprives them
access to courts of law and b) the manner of appeal provided for therein is violative of due process.
 
ISSUE:
Whether or not the constitutional issue is the lis mota of the case.
 
RULING:
No. The Court does not decide questions of a constitutional nature unless that question is properly
raised and presented in appropriate cases and is necessary to a determination of the case i.e. the issue
of constitutionality must be the very lis mota presented.

In this case, the petitioner has not clearly shown how a ruling upon the constitutionality of P.D. No.
1344 will in any way affect the correctness of the decision rendered against him. The resolution
promulgated by respondent NHA, was issued before the passage of the questioned decree. Moreover,
The writ of execution of NHA did not rely upon P.D. No. 1344.  The issue of constitutionality is
poorly discussed.

Case #57

ABAKADA Guro Party-List v. Purisima

G.R. No. 166715, [August 14, 2008]
ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST (formerly AASJS) * OFFICERS/MEMBERS SAMSON S.
ALCANTARA, ED VINCENT S. ALBANO, ROMEO R. ROBISO, RENE B. GOROSPE and
EDWIN R. SANDOVAL, petitioners, 
vs. HON. CESAR V. PURISIMA, in his capacity as Secretary of Finance, HON. GUILLERMO
L. PARAYNO, JR., in his capacity as Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and
HON. ALBERTO D. LINA, in his Capacity as Commissioner of Bureau of
Customs, respondents.

Case Digest by: Mikko P. Solis

Subject: Statutory Construction
Topic: Earliest Opportunity

FACTS:
Petitioners, invoking their rights as taxpayers, challenges the constitutionality of RA 9335, a tax
reform legislation. RA 9355 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection

93
of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and Bureau of Customs (BOC), encouraging their officials
and employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions
through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and Revenue Performance
Evaluation Board (Board).

Invoking their rights as taxpayers, challenges the constitutionality of RA 9335, a tax reform
legislation, petitioners act on the following grounds:

Establishing a system of rewards and incentives transforms the BIR and BOC officials and employees
into mercenaries and bounty hunters that are driven to attain these rewards. They find that this will
only invite corruption and sacrificing the duty of the officials and employees to serve the people.

Limiting the scope of the system of rewards and incentives only to officials and employees of the BIR
and the BOC violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection as there is no valid classification
as to why such system should not apply to all employees and officials of other government agencies.

The law unduly delegates the power to fix revenue targets to the President as it lacks a sufficient
standard on the matter, making the President free to fix an unrealistic and unattainable targets that
may cause the dismissal of officials and employees; and the creation of a congressional oversight
committee on the ground that it violates the doctrine of separation of powers.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the RA 9335 is unconstitutional.

RULING:
The Court held that the petition was partially granted. A law enacted by Congress enjoys the strong
presumption of constitutionality. To justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal
breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and equivocal one.  To invalidate RA 9335 based on
petitioners' baseless supposition is an affront to the wisdom not only of the legislature that passed it
but also of the executive which approved it. Public service is its own reward. Nevertheless, public
officers may by law be rewarded for exemplary and exceptional performance. A system of incentives
for exceeding the set expectations of a public office is not anathema to the concept of public
accountability. In fact, it recognizes and reinforces dedication to duty, industry, efficiency and loyalty
to public service of deserving government personnel. Administrative regulations enacted by
administrative agencies to implement and interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce have
the force of law and are entitled to respect.  Such rules and regulations partake of the nature of a
statute and are just as binding as if they have been written in the statute itself. As such, they have the
force and effect of law and enjoy the presumption of constitutionality and legality until they are set
aside with finality in an appropriate case by a competent court. Section 12 provides for the creation of
a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee, which violates the principle of separation of powers and
is thus unconstitutional. Under this principle, a provision that requires Congress or its members to
approve the implementing rules of a law after it has already taken effect shall be unconstitutional, as
is a provision that allows Congress or its members to overturn any directive or ruling made by the
members of the executive branch charged with the implementation of the law. Sec. 13 of RA 9335
provides the separability clause which states, “If any provision of this Act is declared invalid by a
competent court, the remainder of this Act or any provision not affected by such declaration of
invalidity shall remain in force and effect. The general rule is that where part of a statute is void as
repugnant to the Constitution, while another part is valid, the valid portion, if separable from the

94
invalid, may stand and be enforced. The presence of a separability clause in a statute creates the
presumption that the legislature intended separability, rather than complete nullity of the statute.  The
separability clause of RA 9335 reveals the intention of the legislature to isolate and detach any invalid
provision from the other provisions so that the latter may continue in force and effect. The valid
portions can stand independently of the invalid section. Without Section 12, the remaining provisions
still constitute a complete, intelligible and valid law which carries out the legislative intent to optimize
the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC by providing for a system of
rewards and sanctions through the Rewards and Incentives Fund and a Revenue Performance
Evaluation Board. Petition is PARTIALY GRANTED. 

Case #58

Tatad v. Secretary of Department of Energy

G.R. No. 124360, G.R. No. 127867 November 5, 1997
FRANCISCO S. TATAD, petitioner, vs. THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
ENERGY AND THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, respondents.
Tatad vs. Secretary of the Department of Energy, 
281 SCRA 330
Puno J:,

Case Digest by: Mikko P. Solis

Subject: Statutory Construction
Topic: Locus Standi

FACTS:

The petitions at bar challenge the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8180 entitled “An Act
Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry and For Other Purposes.” R.A. No. 8180 ends (26) years
of government regulation of the downstream oil industry. Few cases carry a surpassing importance on
the life of every Filipino as these petitions for the upswing and downswing of our economy materially
depend on the oscillation of oil. Tatad vs. Secretary of the Department of Energy, 281 SCRA 330,
G.R. No. 124360, G.R. No. 127867 November 5, 1997

The petition is anchored on three arguments:

First, that the imposition of different tariff rates on imported crude oil and imported refined
petroleum products violates the equal protection clause. Petitioner contends that the 3%-7% tariff
differential unduly favors the three existing oil refineries and discriminates against prospective
investors in the downstream oil industry who do not have their own refineries and will have to source
refined petroleum products from abroad.

Second, that the imposition of different tariff rates does not deregulate the downstream oil industry
but instead controls the oil industry, contrary to the avowed policy of the law. Petitioner avers that the
tariff differential between imported crude oil and imported refined petroleum products bars the entry
of other players in the oil industry because it effectively protects the interest of oil companies with
existing refineries. Thus, it runs counter to the objective of the law "to foster a truly competitive
market."

95
Third, that the inclusion of the tariff provision in section 5(b) of R.A. No. 8180 violates Section 26(1)
Article VI of the Constitution requiring every law to have only one subject which shall be expressed
in its title. Petitioner contends that the imposition of tariff rates in section 5(b) of R.A. No. 8180 is
foreign to the subject of the law which is the deregulation of the downstream oil industry.

ISSUE:

Whether or not R.A. No. 8180 is unconstitutional.

RULING:
Yes, in G.R. No. 124360 where the petitioner is Senator Tatad, it is contended that section 5(b) of
R.A. No. 8180 on tariff differential violates the provision of the Constitution requiring every law to
have only one subject which should be expressed in its title. We do not concur with this contention. As
a policy, this Court has adopted a liberal construction of the one title—one-subject rule. We have
consistently ruled that the title need not mirror, fully index or catalogue all contents and minute details
of a law. A law having a single general subject indicated in the title may contain any number of
provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to
the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method
and means of carrying out the general subject. We hold that section 5(b) providing for tariff
differential is germane to the subject of R.A. No. 8180 which is the deregulation of the downstream
oil industry. The section is supposed to sway prospective investors to put up refineries in our country
and make them rely less on imported petroleum. 

Two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power. “There
are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power, viz:
the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in
all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislative such that when it reaches the delegate the
only thing he will have to do is to enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test, there must be adequate
guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent
the delegation from running riot. Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative
authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a
power essentially legislative.”

Section 15 can hurdle both the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Given the groove of
the Court’s rulings, the attempt of petitioners to strike down section 15 on the ground of undue
delegation of legislative power cannot prosper. Section 15 can hurdle both the completeness test and
the sufficient standard test. It will be noted that Congress expressly provided in R.A. No. 8180 that
full deregulation will start at the end of March 1997, regardless of the occurrence of any event. Full
deregulation at the end of March 1997 is mandatory and the Executive has no discretion to postpone it
for any purported reason. Thus, the law is complete on the question of the final date of full
deregulation.

The courts, as guardians of the constitution, have the inherent authority to determine whether a statute
enacted by the legislature transcends the limit imposed by the fundamental law. Judicial power
includes not only the duty of the courts to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, but also the duty to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality

96
of the government. The courts, as guardians of the Constitution, have the inherent authority to
determine whether a statute enacted by the legislature transcends the limit imposed by the
fundamental law. Where a statute violates the Constitution, it is not only the right but the duty of the
judiciary to declare such act as unconstitutional and void.

Liberal stance on a petitioner’s locus standi where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of
transcendental significance to the people.—The effort of respondents to question the locus standi of
petitioners must also fall on barren ground. In language too lucid to be misunderstood, this Court has
brightlined its liberal stance on a petitioner’s locus standi where the petitioner is able to craft an issue
of transcendental significance to the people. In Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng
Pilipinas, Inc. v. Tan, we stressed: “x x x Objections to taxpayers’ suit for lack of sufficient
personality, standing or interest are, however, in the main procedural matters. Considering the
importance to the public of the cases at bar, and in keeping with the Court’s duty, under the 1987
Constitution, to determine whether or not the other branches of government have kept themselves
within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they have not abused the discretion given to
them, the Court has brushed aside technicalities of procedure and has taken cognizance of these
petitions.”

Case #59

Deutsche Bank v. CIR

G.R. No. 188550 August 19, 2013
DEUTSCHE BANK AG MANILA BRANCH, PETITIONER, vs. COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE, RESPONDENT.

Sereno, CJ.: 

Case Digest by: Mikko P. Solis

Subject: Statutory Construction
Topic: Locus Standi

FACTS:
Deutsche Bank withheld and remitted to respondent the amount of P67,688,553.51, in accordance
with National Internal Revenue Code of 1997. It represented the fifteen percent (15%) branch profit
remittance tax (BPRT) on its regular banking unit net income remitted to Deutsche Bank Germany
(DB Germany) for 2002 and prior taxable years. Believing that petitioner made an overpayment of
BPRT, petitioner filed with the BIR an administrative claim for refund or issuance of its tax credit
certificate in the total amount of P22,562,851.17, the alleged excess BPRT paid on branch profits
remittance to DB Germany.

Petitioner requested from the International Tax Affairs Division (ITAD) a confirmation of its
entitlement to the preferential tax rate of 10%, a tax treaty relief, under the RP-Germany Tax Treaty.
Due to the inaction of the BIR on its administrative claim, petitioner filed a Petition for Review with
the CTA. CTA Second Division denied the petition on the ground that application of tax treaty relief
should be filed first from International Tax Affairs Division (ITAD) of the BIR  prior to the payment
by the former of its BPRT and actual remittance of its branch profits to DB Germany, or prior to the

97
availment of a preferential tax rate of 10% under a tax treaty. The court likewise ruled that the 15-day
rule for tax treaty relief application under RMO No. 1-2000 cannot be relaxed for petitioner. CTA En
Banc affirmed the CTA Second Division’s decision.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner can avail the tax treaty relief in accordance with Article II, Section 2
(1987 Constitution of the Philippines) the adoption of international laws?

RULING:
YES, the petitioner can avail the tax treaty relief. According to Article II, Section 2 of the 1987
Philippine Constitution, “The Philippines adopts the generally-accepted principles of international law
as part of the law of the land.” In the case at bar, the Supreme Court held that, our Constitution
provides for adherence to the general principles of international law as part of the law of the land. The
time-honored international principle of pacta sunt servanda demands the performance in good faith of
treaty obligations on the part of the states that enter into the agreement. Every treaty in force is
binding upon the parties, and obligations under the treaty must be performed by them in good
faith. More importantly, treaties have the force and effect of law in this jurisdiction. A state that has
contracted valid international obligations is bound to make in its legislations those modifications that
may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations undertaken. Thus, laws and issuances
must ensure that the reliefs granted under tax treaties are accorded to the parties entitled thereto. The
BIR must not impose additional requirements that would negate the availment of the reliefs provided
for under international agreements. The obligation to comply with a tax treaty must take precedence
over the objective of RMO No. 1-2000. More so, when the RP-Germany Tax Treaty does not provide
for any pre-requisite for the availment of the benefits under said agreement. Bearing in mind the
rationale of tax treaties, the period of application for the availment of tax treaty relief as required by
RMO No. 1-2000 should not operate to divest entitlement to the relief as it would constitute a
violation of the duty required by good faith in complying with a tax treaty. Logically, noncompliance
with tax treaties has negative implications on international relations.

Case #60

Salvacion v. Central Bank of the Philippines

G.R. No. 94723 August 21, 1997
KAREN E. SALVACION, minor, thru Federico N. Salvacion, Jr., father and Natural Guardian,
and Spouses FEDERICO N. SALVACION, JR., and EVELINA E. SALVACION vs.
CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, CHINA BANKING CORPORATION and GREG
BARTELLI y NORTHCOTT

Case Digest by: Mikko P. Solis

Subject: Statutory Construction

FACTS:
Greg Bartelli, an American tourist, was arrested for committing four counts of rape and serious illegal
detention against Karen Salvacion. Police recovered from him several dollar checks and a dollar
account in the China Banking Corp. He was, however, able to escape from prison. In a civil case filed
against him, the trial court awarded Salvacion moral, exemplary and attorney’s fees amounting to
almost P1,000,000.00.

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Salvacion tried to execute the judgment on the dollar deposit of Bartelli with the China Banking Corp.
but the latter refused arguing that Section 11 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 exempts foreign
currency deposits from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative
body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever. Salvacion therefore filed this action
for declaratory relief in the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:

ISSUE:
Whether or not should Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and Section 8 of Republic Act
No. 6426, as amended by PD 1246, otherwise known as the Foreign Currency Deposit Act be made
applicable to a foreign transient?

RULING:

NO. The provisions of Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246, insofar as it
amends Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6426, are hereby held to be INAPPLICABLE to this case
because of its peculiar circumstances. Respondents are hereby required to comply with the writ of
execution issued in the civil case and to release to petitioners the dollar deposit of Bartelli in such
amount as would satisfy the judgment.
Supreme Court ruled that the questioned law makes futile the favorable judgment and award of
damages that Salvacion and her parents fully deserve. It then proceeded to show that the economic
basis for the enactment of RA No. 6426 is not anymore present; and even if it still exists, the
questioned law still denies those entitled to due process of law for being unreasonable and oppressive.
The intention of the law may be good when enacted. The law failed to anticipate the iniquitous effects
producing outright injustice and inequality such as the case before us.

The SC adopted the comment of the Solicitor General who argued that the Offshore Banking System
and the Foreign Currency Deposit System were designed to draw deposits from foreign lenders and
investors and, subsequently, to give the latter protection. However, the foreign currency deposit made
by a transient or a tourist is not the kind of deposit encouraged by PD Nos. 1034 and 1035 and given
incentives and protection by said laws because such depositor stays only for a few days in the country
and, therefore, will maintain his deposit in the bank only for a short time. Considering that Bartelli is
just a tourist or a transient, he is not entitled to the protection of Section 113 of Central Bank Circular
No. 960 and PD No. 1246 against attachment, garnishment or other court processes.

Further the SC said: “In fine, the application of the law depends on the extent of its justice.
Eventually, if we rule that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 which
exempts from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body,
government agency or any administrative body whatsoever, is applicable to a foreign transient,
injustice would result especially to a citizen aggrieved by a foreign guest like accused Greg Bartelli.
This would negate Article 10 of the New Civil Code which provides that “in case of doubt in the
interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice
to prevail.”

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Case #61

Gamboa v. Teves
G.R. No. 176579    October 9, 2012
HEIRS OF WILSON P. GAMBOA,* Petitioners, vs.
FINANCE SECRETARY MARGARITO B. TEVES, et al.

Case Digest by: Mikko P. Solis

Subject: Statutory Construction

FACTS:
In his petition, Gamboa prays, among others: For the Honorable Court to issue a declaratory relief that
ownership of common or voting shares is the sole basis in determining foreign equity in a public
utility and that any other government rulings, opinions, and regulations inconsistent with this
declaratory relief be declared unconstitutional and a violation of the intent and spirit of the 1987
Constitution; For the Honorable Court to declare null and void all sales of common stocks to
foreigners in excess of 40 percent of the total subscribed common shareholdings; and For the
Honorable Court to direct the Securities and Exchange Commission and Philippine Stock Exchange to
require PLDT to make a public disclosure of all of its foreign shareholdings and their actual and real
beneficial owners. Other relief(s) just and equitable are likewise prayed for. (Emphasis supplied) As
can be gleaned from his prayer, Gamboa clearly asks this Court to compel the SEC to perform its
statutory duty to investigate whether "the required percentage of ownership of the capital stock to be
owned by citizens of the Philippines has been complied with [by PLDT] as required by x x x the
Constitution."51 Such plea clearly negates SEC’s argument that it was not impleaded.

There is no dispute, and respondents do not claim the contrary, that (1) foreigners own 64.27% of the
common shares of PLDT, which class of shares exercises the sole right to vote in the election of
directors, and thus foreigners control PLDT; (2) Filipinos own only 35.73% of PLDT’s common
shares, constituting a minority of the voting stock, and thus Filipinos do not control PLDT; (3)
preferred shares, 99.44% owned by Filipinos, have no voting rights; (4) preferred shares earn only
1/70 of the dividends that common shares earn; 50 (5) preferred shares have twice the par value of
common shares; and (6) preferred shares constitute 77.85% of the authorized capital stock of PLDT
and common shares only 22.15%.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the PLDT violated the 60-40 ownership requirement in favor of Filipino citizens in
Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
 
RULING:
Yes. The last sentence of Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution reads: The participation of
foreign investors in the governing body of any public utility enterprise shall be limited to their
proportionate share in its capital, and all the executive and managing officers of such corporation or
association must be citizens of the Philippines. This a reiteration of the last sentence of Section 5,
Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution, signifying its importance in reserving ownership and control of
public utilities to Filipino citizens. The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions have the same 60 percent
Filipino ownership and control requirement for public utilities like PLOT. Any deviation from this
requirement necessitates an amendment to the Constitution as exemplified by the Parity Amendment.

100
This Court has no power to amend the Constitution for its power and duty is only to faithfully apply
and interpret the Constitution. While they had differing views on the percentage of Filipino ownership
of capital, it is clear that the framers of the Constitution intended public utilities to
be majority Filipino-owned and controlled. To ensure that Filipinos control public utilities, the
framers of the Constitution approved, as additional safeguard, the inclusion of the last sentence of
Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution commanding that "[t]he participation of foreign investors
in the governing body of any public utility enterprise shall be limited to their proportionate share in its
capital, and all the executive and managing officers of such corporation or association must be
citizens of the Philippines. The Constitution expressly declares as State policy the development of an
economy "effectively controlled" by Filipinos. Consistent with such State policy, the Constitution
explicitly reserves the ownership and operation of public utilities to Philippine nationals, who are
defined in the Foreign Investments Act of 1991 as Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at
least 60 percent of whose capital with voting rights belongs to Filipinos. The FIA’s implementing
rules explain that "[f]or stocks to be deemed owned and held by Philippine citizens or Philippine
nationals, mere legal title is not enough to meet the required Filipino equity. Full beneficial ownership
of the stocks, coupled with appropriate voting rights is essential." In effect, the FIA clarifies, reiterates
and confirms the interpretation that the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution refers to shares with voting rights, as well as with full beneficial ownership. This is
precisely because the right to vote in the election of directors, coupled with full beneficial ownership
of stocks, translates to effective control of a corporation. The Court, by treating the petition as one for
mandamus, merely directed the SEC to apply the Court’s definition of the term "capital" in Section
11, Article XII of the Constitution in determining whether PLDT committed any violation of the said
constitutional provision. The dispositive portion of the Court’s ruling is addressed not to PLDT but
solely to the SEC, which is the administrative agency tasked to enforce the 60-40 ownership
requirement in favor of Filipino citizens in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution. To do this the
1935 Constitution, which contained the same 60 percent Filipino ownership and control requirement
as the present 1987 Constitution, had to be amended to give Americans parity rights with Filipinos.
There was bitter opposition to the Parity Amendment  and many Filipinos eagerly awaited its
expiration. In late 1968, PLDT was one of the American-controlled public utilities that became
Filipino-controlled when the controlling American stockholders divested in anticipation of the
expiration of the Parity Amendment on 3 July 1974.  No economic suicide happened when control of
public utilities and mining corporations passed to Filipinos’ hands upon expiration of the Parity
Amendment.

Case #62

Privatization v. SMAD
G.R. No. 200402 June 18, 2014
PRIVATIZATION and MANAGEMENT OFFICE, Petitioner, vs. STRATEGIC ALLIANCE
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and/or PHILIPPINE ESTATE CORPORATION,
Respondents.

Case Digest by: Mikko P. Solis

Subject: Statutory Construction

101
 FACTS:
PMO, then operating as the Asset Privatization Trust (APT), held a public bidding to sell the PNCC
properties in order to generate maximum cash recovery for the government.  The Asset Specific
Bidding Rules (ASBR) governed the bidding process, which had the following pertinent rules: (1) the
indicative price of the PNCC properties shall be announced on the day of the bidding;  (2) the winning
bidder is the one that submits the highest total bid and that complies with all the terms of the ASBR; 
(3) PMO reserves the right to reject any or all bids, including the highest bid; and  (4) the delivery of
financial information regarding the PNCC properties shall not give rise to a warranty with respect to
the said data or information. Strategic Alliance Development Corporation, as a participant in the
bidding process,14 signified its acceptance under these terms On the day of the bidding, the indicative
price was announced at ₱7,000,000,000. None of the bidders met the threshold. Strategic Alliance
Development Corporation, despite giving the highest offer, only gave ₱1,228,888,800 as its bid offer.
Consequently, PMO rejected all the bids.

As a result, Strategic Alliance Development Corporation protested the rejection of its bid and insisted
that a notice of award of the PNCC properties be issued in its favor. PMO refused. Subsequently, the
former filed a Complaint for Declaration of Right to a Notice of Award and/or Damages before the
RTC.  Ruling in the bidder’s favor, the trial court held that the failure to explain the basis of the
indicative price of ₱7 billion constituted a grave abuse of discretion and a violation of the public’s
right to information, warranting the issuance of a notice of award of the PNCC properties to Strategic
Alliance Development Corporation.

On appeal, the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC so PMO questioned the aforesaid ruling before this
Court via a Petition for Review on Certiorari. Meanwhile, PMO’s co-petitioner, PNCC, moved for
reconsideration. In resolving the Motion for Reconsideration filed by PNCC, the CA totally reversed
itself in its Amended Decision. The CA held that PMO and PNCC cannot be compelled to accept the
bidder’s meager offer, which was grossly disadvantageous to the Filipino people. The CA also
considered that PMO had the right under the ASBR to reject any or all bids; and that its exercise of
discretion to reject the bid of Strategic Alliance Development Corporation had not been attended by
unfairness, arbitrariness or grave abuse.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the announcement of the indicative price after the submission of the sealed bids
constituted an act of fraud on the part of PMO and WON the evaluation of the indicative price was
erroneous, and that the public’s right to information was violated by the failure of PMO to explain the
high indicative price thus the need for issuance of a notice of award of the PNCC properties to
Strategic Alliance Development Corporation.

RULING:
The court denied the entreaties of Strategic Alliance Development Corporation (PHES)
The late announcement of the indicative price does not amount to fraud. PMO timely announced the
indicative price on the day of the bidding pursuant to the ASBR. Therefore, absent a clear and
convincing evidence of fraud, and given that PMO followed the protocol, fraud on its part cannot be
presumed.

To justify the acceptance of its bid for the PNCC properties, PHES reiterates that PMO erred in
computing and explaining the indicative price of 7 billion, in violation of the public’s right to due

102
process. However, its allegations are irrelevant considering that the Civil Code and the ASBR
pertinently provide that bids are mere offers, which may be rightfully rejected by PMO. Moreover,
PHES unsuccessfully anchors its claim on a violation of the public’s right to information because the
said right merely gives access to public records, and does not precipitate a positive right to obtain an
award of the PNCC properties. Therefore, the Court denies the prayer for the issuance of a notice of
award to Strategic Alliance Development Corporation.

Case #63

Agbayani v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 183623  June 25, 2012
LETICIA B. AGBAYANI, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE and LOIDA MARCELINA J. GENABE, Respondents

Case Digest by: Mikko P. Solis

Subject: Statutory Construction

FACTS:
Agbayani and Genabe were both employees of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 275 of Las
Piñas City, working as Court Stenographer and Legal Researcher II. On December 29, 2006,
Agbayani filed a criminal complaint for grave oral defamation against Genabe. City Prosecutor of Las
Piñas City found probable cause for grave oral defamation, upon petition for review by Genabe. DOJ
undersecretary Ernesto Pineda found only for slight oral defamation as it was uttered in the heat of
anger. DOJ also moved for dismissal of the complaint for failure to comply with RA 7160, Sec. 408
and 409 (d). Motion for Reconsideration of Agbayani was denied. Petition for review on certiorari
was filed with CA and dismissed.

ISSUE:
WON, DOJ abuse its discretion when it set aside the findings of the City Prosecutor of Las Pinas.

RULINGS:
No, the rules of procedure, in this case DOJ circular No. 70, Section 5 and Section 6 should be viewed
as instruments to facilitate the attainment of justice and are not to be applied with severity and
rigidity. Indeed, there was substantial compliance with said DOJ rules as respondent Genabe actually
mentioned the name of petitioner as private complainant. CA also found there was proper service of
petition as petitioner was able to file his comment. In addition, in Guy vs. Asia United Bank, a motion
for reconsideration from the resolution of the secretary of justice filed four days beyond the non-
extendible period of 10 days under sec. 13 NPS Rules on Appeal in instances where he finds absence
of Prima Facie evidence is not time barred but subject to the approval of the court.

In Villanueva vs. People oral defamation or slander is the speaking of base and defamatory words
which tend to prejudice another in his reputation, office, trade, business or means of livelihood. It is
grave when it is of a serious or insulting nature. The gravity depends upon (1) expression used, (2)
personal relations of the parties involved, (3) special circumstances of the case, the antecedents or
relationships between the offended party and the offender, which may prove the intention of the
offender at the time.

103
In case at bar, Genabe was about to punch her time-card on December 27, 2006 when she was
informed she had been suspended for failing to meet her deadline in a case, which was done by
Agbayani to the presiding judge. This event precipitated the words uttered by Genabe, hence being
under “heat of anger and obfuscation”, clearly a slight oral defamation only.

Case #64

Makati Shangri-La Hotel Resort Inc.

G.R. No. 189998.  August 29, 2012.
MAKATI SHANGRI-LA HOTEL AND RESORT, INC., 
petitioner, vs. ELLEN JOHANNE HARPER, JONATHAN CHRISTOPHER HARPER, and
RIGOBERTO GILLERA, respondents.

Case Digest by: Mikko P. Solis

Subject: Statutory Construction

FACTS:
November 1999, Christian Harper came to Manila on a business trip as the Business Development
Manager for Asia of ALSTOM Power Norway AS, an engineering firm with worldwide operations.
He checked in at the Shangri-La Hotel. He was due to check out on November 6, 1999. In the early
morning of that date, however, he was murdered inside his hotel room by still unidentified
malefactors. It appears that at around 11:00 am of November 6, 1999, a Caucasian male entered the
Alexis Jewelry Store in Glorietta and expressed interest in purchasing a Cartier lady's watch valued at
P320,000.00 with the use of two Mastercard credit cards and an American Express credit card issued
in the name of Harper. But the customer's difficulty in answering the queries phoned in by a credit
card representative sufficiently aroused the suspicion of saleslady Anna Liza Lumba (Lumba), who
asked for the customer's passport upon suggestion of the credit card representative to put the credit
cards on hold. Probably sensing trouble for himself, the customer hurriedly left the store, and left the
three credit cards and the passport behind.   In the meanwhile, Harper's family in Norway must have
called him at his hotel room to inform him about the attempt to use his American Express card. Not
getting any response from the room, his family requested Raymond Alarcon, the Duty Manager of the
Shangri-La Hotel, to check on Harper's room. Alarcon and security personnel went to Room 1428 at
11:27 a.m., and were shocked to discover Harper's lifeless body on the bed. Criminal Investigation
showed that Harper’s passport, credit cards, laptop and an undetermined amount of cash had been
missing from the crime scene; Respondents commenced this suit in the RTC to recover various
damages from petitioner pertinently alleging:  “The murderer succeeded to trespass into the area of
the hotel's private rooms area and into the room of the said deceased on account of the hotel's gross
negligence in providing the most basic security system of its guests, the lack of which owing to the
acts or omissions of its employees was the immediate cause of the tragic death of said deceased.”
RTC ruled in favor of the respondents. CA affirmed. Respondents were granted a total amount of 52,
078, 702.50 as actual and compensatory damages, and 200,00 as attorney’s fees. Petitioners appealed
that there is error in granting this for the lack of negligence on their part.  Petitioner argues that
respondents failed to prove its negligence; that Harper's own negligence in allowing the killers into
his hotel room was the proximate cause of his own death; and that hotels were not insurers of the
safety of their guests.    

104
 ISSUE:
Whether or not the there was negligence on the part of the petitioners and its said negligence was the
proximate cause of the death of Mr. Christian harper.

RULING:
Yes, The Supreme Court ruled that Shangri-la is liable due to its own negligence.  As the action is
predicated on negligence, the relevant law is Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which states that –
"Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to
pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there was no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this chapter." In
determining whether or not there is negligence on the part of the parties in a given situation,
jurisprudence has laid down the following test: Did defendant, in doing the alleged negligent act, use
that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same
situation? If not, the person is guilty of negligence. The law, in effect, adopts the standard supposed to
be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet pater familias of the Roman law. A review of the
testimony of Col. De Guzman reveals that on direct examination he testified that at the time he
assumed his position as Chief Security Officer of defendant-appellant, during the early part of 1999 to
the early part of 2000, he noticed that some of the floors of the hotel were being guarded by a few
guards, for instance, 3 or 4 floors by one guard only on a roving manner. He then made a
recommendation that the ideal-set up for an effective security should be one guard for every floor,
considering that the hotel is L-shaped and the ends of the hallways cannot be seen. He also qualified
that as to his direct testimony on "ideal-set up", he was referring to one guard for every floor if the
hotel is fully booked. At the time he made his recommendation in the early part of 1999, it was
disapproved as the hotel was not doing well and it was not fully booked so the existing security was
adequate enough. He further explained that his advice was observed only in the late November 1999
or the early part of December 1999. It could be inferred from the foregoing declarations of the former
Chief Security Officer of defendant-appellant that the latter was negligent in providing adequate
security due its guests. With confidence, it was repeatedly claimed by defendant-appellant that it is a
five-star hotel. Unfortunately, the record failed to show that at the time of the death of Christian
Harper, it was exercising reasonable care to protect its guests from harm and danger by providing
sufficient security commensurate to it being one of the finest hotels in the country. In so concluding,
WE are reminded of the Supreme Court’s enunciation that the hotel business like the common
carrier’s business is imbued with public interest. Catering to the public, hotelkeepers are bound to
provide not only lodging for hotel guests but also security to their persons and belongings. The twin
duty constitutes the essence of the business. The apparent security lapses of defendant-appellant were
further shown when the male culprit who entered Christian Harper’s room was never checked by any
of the guards when he came inside the hotel. As per interview conducted by the initial investigator,
PO3 Cornelio Valiente to the guards, they admitted that nobody know that said man entered the hotel
and it was only through the monitor that they became aware of his entry. It was even evidenced by the
CCTV that before he walked to the room of the late Christian Harper, said male suspect even looked
at the monitoring camera. Such act of the man showing wariness, added to the fact that his entry to the
hotel was unnoticed, at an unholy hour, should have aroused suspicion on the part of the roving guard
in the said floor, had there been any. Unluckily for Christian Harper, there was none at that time.
Unfortunately, the record failed to show that at the time of the death of Christian Harper, it was
exercising reasonable care to protect its guests from harm and danger by providing sufficient security
commensurate to it being one of the finest hotels in the country. In so concluding, WE are reminded
of the Supreme Court's enunciation that the hotel business like the common carrier's business is

105
imbued with public interest. Catering to the public, hotelkeepers are bound to provide not only
lodging for hotel guests but also security to their persons and belongings. The twin duty constitutes
the essence of the business.

Case #65

Ursua vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No: 112170, April 10, 1996
CESARIO URSUA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:

Case Digest by: Mikko P. Solis

Subject: Statutory Construction

FACTS:
Petitioner Cesario Ursua was a Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer assigned in
Kidapawan, Cotabato. On May 9, 1989 the Provincial Governor of Cotabato requested the Office of
the Ombudsman in Manila to conduct an investigation on a complaint for bribery, dishonesty, abuse
of authority and giving of unwarranted benefits by petitioner and other officials of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources. The complaint was initiated by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
of Cotabato through a resolution advising the Governor to report the involvement of petitioner and
others in the illegal cutting of mahogany trees and hauling of illegally-cut logs in the area. On 1
August 1989, Atty. Francis Palmones, counsel for petitioner, wrote the Office of the Ombudsman in
Davao City requesting that he be furnished copy of the complaint against petitioner. Atty. Palmones
then asked his client Ursua to take his letter-request to the Office of the Ombudsman because his law
firm's messenger, Oscar Perez, had to attend to some personal matters. Before proceeding to the
Office of the Ombudsman petitioner talked to Oscar Perez and told him that he was reluctant to
personally ask for the document since he was one of the respondents before the Ombudsman.
However, Perez advised him not to worry as he could just sign his (Perez) name if ever he would be
required to acknowledge receipt of the complaint. When petitioner arrived at the Office of the
Ombudsman in Davao City, he was instructed by the security officer to register in the visitors'
logbook. Instead of writing down his name petitioner wrote the name "Oscar Perez" after which he
was told to proceed to the Administrative Division for the copy of the complaint he needed. He
handed the letter of Atty. Palmones to the Chief of the Administrative Division, Ms. Loida
Kahulugan, who then gave him a copy of the complaint, receipt of which he acknowledged by writing
the name "Oscar Perez." On December 18, 1990, after the prosecution had completed the presentation
of its evidence, petitioner without leave of court filed a demurrer to evidence alleging that the failure
of the prosecution to prove that his supposed alias was different from his registered name in the local
civil registry was fatal to its cause. Petitioner argued that no document from the local civil registry
was presented to show the registered name of accused which according to him was a condition  sine
qua non for the validity of his conviction.

106
 ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner Ursua violated the Sec. 1 of C.A. No. 142 as amended by R.A. No. 6085
for using an alias name?

RULING:
No, because such act does not constitute an offense within the concept of C.A. No. 142 as amended
under which he is prosecuted. The confusion and fraud in business transactions which the anti-alias
law and its related statutes seek to prevent are not present here as the circumstances are peculiar and
distinct from those contemplated by the legislature in enacting C.A. No. 142 as amended. There exists
a valid presumption that undesirable consequences were never intended by a legislative measure and
that a construction of which the statute is fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid all
objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil and injurious consequences. Moreover, as
C.A. No. 142 is a penal statute, it should be construed strictly against the State and in favor of the
accused. The reason for this principle is the tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals and the
object is to establish a certain rule by conformity to which mankind would be safe, and the discretion
of the court limited. WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of
the Regional Trial Court of Davao City is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and petitioner CESARIO
URSUA is ACQUITTED of the crime charged. The above law was subsequently amended by R.A.
No. 6085, approved on 4 August 1969. As amended, C.A. No. 142 now reads: Sec. 1. Except as a
pseudonym solely for literary, cinema, television, radio or other entertainment purposes and in athletic
events where the use of pseudonym is a normally accepted practice, no person shall use any name
different from the one with which he was registered at birth in the office of the local civil registry or
with which he was baptized for the first time, or in case of all alien, with which he was registered in
the bureau of immigration upon entry; or such substitute name as may have been authorized by a
competent court: Provided, That persons whose births have not been registered in any local civil
registry and who have not been baptized, have one year from the approval of this act within which to
register their names in the civil registry of their residence. The name shall comprise the patronymic
name and one or two surnames. Sec. 2. Any person desiring to use an alias shall apply for authority
therefor in proceedings like those legally provided to obtain judicial authority for a change of name
and no person shall be allowed to secure such judicial authority for more than one alias. The petition
for an alias shall set forth the person's baptismal and family name and the name recorded in the civil
registry, if different, his immigrant's name, if an alien, and his pseudonym, if he has such names other
than his original or real name, specifying the reason or reasons for the desired alias. The judicial
authority for the use of alias, the Christian name and the alien immigrant's name shall be recorded in
the proper local civil registry, and no person shall use any name or names other than his original or
real name unless the same is or are duly recorded in the proper local civil registry.

Case #66

Mecano v. COA
G.R. No. 103982 December 11, 1992
ANTONIO A. MECANO, petitioner,  vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondent.
CAMPOS, JR., J.:

107
Case Digest by: Mikko P. Solis
Subject: Statutory Construction
Topic: Implied Repeal

FACTS:
Petitioner requested reimbursement for his expenses on the ground that he is entitled to the benefits
under Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 (RAC). Commission on Audit (COA)
Chairman, in his 7th Indorsement, denied petitioner’s claim on the ground that Section 699 of the
RAC had been repealed by the  Administrative Code of 1987 (Exec. Order No. 292), solely for the
reason that the same section was not restated nor re-enacted in the latter. Petitioner also anchored his
claim on Department of Justice Opinion No. 73, S. 1991 by Secretary Drilon stating that “the issuance
of the Administrative Code did not operate to repeal or abrogate in its entirety the Revised
Administrative Code. The COA, on the other hand, strongly maintains that the enactment of the
Administrative Code of 1987 operated to revoke or supplant in its entirety the RAC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Administrative Code of 1987 repealed or abrogated Section 699 of the Revised
Administrative Code of 1917.

RULING:
NO. Petition granted. Respondent ordered to give due course on petitioner’s claim for benefits. Repeal
by implication proceeds on the premise that where a statute of later date clearly reveals an intention
on the part of the legislature to abrogate a prior act on the subject, that intention must be given effect.
Hence, before there can be a repeal, there must be a clear showing on the part of the lawmaker that the
intent in enacting the new law was to abrogate the old one. The intention to repeal must be clear and
manifest; otherwise, at least, as a general rule, the later act is to be construed as a continuation of, and
not a substitute for, the first act and will continue so far as the two acts are the same from the time of
the first enactment. It is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals of statutes by
implication are not favored. The presumption is against inconsistency and repugnancy for the
legislature is presumed to know the existing laws on the subject and not to have enacted inconsistent
or conflicting statutes. The two Codes should be read in pari materia.

Case #66

Penera v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 181613     November 25, 2009
ROSALINDA A. PENERA, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EDGAR T.
ANDANAR, Respondents.
CARPIO, J.:

Case Digest by: Mikko P. Solis

Subject: Statutory Construction
Topic: Implied Repeal

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 FACTS:
On 2 April 2007, Andanar filed before the Office of the Regional Election Director (ORED), Caraga
Region (Region XIII), a Petition for Disqualification against Penera, as well as the candidates for
Vice-Mayor and Sangguniang Bayan who belonged to her political party, for unlawfully engaging in
election campaigning and partisan political activity prior to the commencement of the campaign
period. Andanar claimed that on 29 March 2007 – a day before the start of the authorized campaign
period on 30 March 2007 – Penera and her partymates went around the different barangays in Sta.
Monica, announcing their candidacies and requesting the people to vote for them on the day of the
elections. Penera and private respondent Edgar T. Andanar were mayoralty candidates in Sta. Monica,
Surigao del Norte during the 14 May 2007 elections. Penera alone filed an Answer denying the
charges but admitted that a motorcade did take place and that it was simply in accordance with the
usual practice in nearby cities and provinces, where the filing of certificates of candidacy (COCs) was
preceded by a motorcade, which dispersed soon after the completion of such filing. The COMELEC
disqualified Penera but absolved the other candidates from Penera’s party from violation of section 80
and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the new definition of the term “candidate” in Section 15 of RA 8436 as amended by
RA 9369 is in conflict with Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code such that premature
campaigning may no longer be committed

RULING:
In denying Penera’s petition, the Supreme Court, through Associate Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario,
found that Penera and her witnesses admitted that the vehicles, consisting of two jeepneys and ten
motorcycles, were festooned with multi-colored balloons; the motorcade went around three barangays
in Sta. Monica; and Penera and her partymates waved their hands and threw sweet candies to the
crowd. Thus, for violating Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code, proscribing election campaign
or partisan political activity outside the campaign period, Penera was disqualified from holding the
office of Mayor of Sta. Monica. The Court declared that “there is no absolute and irreconcilable
incompatibility between Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, and Section 80 of the
Omnibus Election Code, which defines the prohibited act of premature campaigning. It is possible to
harmonize and reconcile these two provisions and, thus, give effect to both.” The Court held, further,
that: “True, that pursuant to Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, even after the filing of
the COC but before the start of the campaign period, a person is not yet officially considered a
candidate.  Nevertheless, a person, upon the filing of his/her COC, already explicitly declares his/her
intention to run as a candidate in the coming elections. The commission by such a person of any of the
acts enumerated under Section 79(b) of the Omnibus Election Code (i.e., holding rallies or parades,
making speeches, etc.) can, thus, be logically and reasonably construed as for the purpose of
promoting his/her intended candidacy. When the campaign period starts and said person proceeds
with his/her candidacy, his/her intent turning into actuality, we can already consider his/her acts, after
the filing of his/her COC and prior to the campaign period, as the promotion of his/her election as a
candidate, hence, constituting premature campaigning, for which he/she may be disqualified.  Also,
conversely, if said person, for any reason, withdraws his/her COC before the campaign period, then
there is no point to view his/her acts prior to said period as acts for the promotion of his/her election
as a candidate. In the latter case, there can be no premature campaigning as there is no candidate,
whose disqualification may be sought, to begin with. Third, in connection with the preceding
discussion, the line in Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, which provides that “any

109
unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the
campaign period,” does not mean that the acts constituting premature campaigning can only be
committed, for which the offender may be disqualified, during the campaign period.  Contrary to the
pronouncement in the dissent, nowhere in the said proviso was it stated that campaigning before the
start of the campaign period is lawful, such that the offender may freely carry out the same with
impunity. As previously established, a person, after filing his/her COC but prior to his/her becoming a
candidate (thus, prior to the start of the campaign period), can already commit the acts described
under Section 79(b) of the Omnibus Election Code as election campaign or partisan political activity. 
However, only after said person officially becomes a candidate, at the beginning of the campaign
period, can said acts be given effect as premature campaigning under Section 80 of the Omnibus
Election Code. Only after said person officially becomes a candidate, at the start of the campaign
period, can his/her disqualification be sought for acts constituting premature campaigning. 
Obviously, it is only at the start of the campaign period, when the person officially becomes a
candidate, that the undue and iniquitous advantages of his/her prior acts, constituting premature
campaigning, shall accrue to his/her benefit. Compared to the other candidates who are only about to
begin their election campaign, a candidate who had previously engaged in premature campaigning
already enjoys an unfair headstart in promoting his/her candidacy. As can be gleaned from the
foregoing disquisition, harmony in the provisions of Sections 80 and 79 of the Omnibus Election
Code, as well as Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, is not only very possible, but in
fact desirable, necessary and consistent with the legislative intent and policy of the law.

Case #68

LLEDO vs LLEDO
A.M. No. P-95-1167 February 9, 2010
CARMELITA LLEDO, Complainant,  vs 
ATTY. CESAR V. LLEDO, Branch Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Branch 94, Quezon
City, Respondent
NACHURA, J.:

Case Digest by: Mikko P. Solis

Subject: Statutory Construction
Topic: Implied Repeal

 
FACTS:
 On December 21, 1998, Atty. Cesar V. Lledo, former branch clerk of court of the RTC of Quezon
City, Branch 94 was dismissed from service via a court decision on a case where his wife, Carmelita,
had filed an administrative case against him, charging the latter with immorality, abandonment, and
conduct unbecoming a public official because he left his family to live with another woman with
whom he also begot children. He failed to provide support for his family. The Court, in its December
21, 1998 Decision, DISMISSED him from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and
leave credits and with prejudice to reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the government,
including any government-owned or controlled corporation.  On April 3, 2006, Cesar L. Lledo, Jr.,
Cesar's son, wrote a letter to then Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban. He related that his father had
been bedridden after suffering a severe stroke and acute renal failure. He had been abandoned by his
mistress and had been under Cesar Jr.'s care since 2001. The latter appealed to the Court to reconsider

110
its December 21, 1998 Decision, specifically the forfeiture of leave credits, which money would be
used to pay for his father's medical expenses.  Treating the letter as a motion for reconsideration, the
Court, on May 3, 2006, granted the same, specifically on the forfeiture of accrued leave credits. Cesar
Jr. wrote the Court again expressing his gratitude for the Court's consideration of his request for his
father's leave credits. He again asked for judicial clemency in connection with his father's claim for
refund of the latter's personal contributions to GSIS.
In a letter dated April 16, 2009, Jason C. Teng, Regional Manager of the GSIS Quezon City Regional
Office, explained that a request for a refund of retirement premiums is disallowed. He explained that
“if those that were expected to have no future claim (e.g. those with forfeited retirement benefits)
were suddenly allowed to receive claims for payment of benefits, this would have a negative impact
on the financial viability of the GSIS.” In its Comment, the GSIS Board said that Cesar is not entitled
to the refund of his personal contributions of the retirement premiums because "it is the policy of the
GSIS that an employee/member who had been dismissed from the service with forfeiture of
retirement benefits cannot recover the retirement premiums he has paid unless the dismissal provides
otherwise." The GSIS Board pointed out that the Court's Decision did not provide that Cesar is
entitled to a refund of his retirement premiums. Section 9 of Commonwealth Act No. 186 states:
Section 9. Effect of dismissal or separation from service. - Upon dismissal for cause of a member of
the System, the benefits under his membership policy shall be automatically forfeited to the System,
except one-half of the cash or surrender value, which amount shall be paid to such member, or in case
of death, to his beneficiary. Section 11(d) of Commonwealth Act No. 186, as amended states that
“Upon dismissal for cause or on voluntary separation, he shall be entitled only to his own premiums
and voluntary deposits, if any, plus interest of three per centum per annum, compounded monthly.”

ISSUE:
Whether or not commonwealth act no 186 has been impliedly repealed.
 
RULING:
NO.  It is noteworthy that none of the subsequent laws expressly repealed Commonwealth Act No.
186, as amended. In fact, none of the subsequent laws expressly repealed the earlier laws.   As a
general rule, repeals by implication are not favored. When statutes are in pari materia, they should be
construed together. A law cannot be deemed repealed unless it is clearly manifested that the
legislature so intended it. For the latter law to be deemed as having repealed the earlier law, it is
necessary to show that the statutes or statutory provisions deal with the same subject matter and that
the latter be inconsistent with the former. There must be a showing of repugnance, clear and
convincing in character. The language used in the later statute must be such as to render it
irreconcilable with what had been formerly enacted. An inconsistency that falls short of that standard
does not suffice. Finally, it should be remembered that the GSIS laws are in the nature of social
legislation, to be liberally construed in favor of the government employees. To allow forfeiture of
these personal contributions in favor of the GSIS would condone undue enrichment. WHEREFORE,
the foregoing premises considered, the Government Service Insurance System is hereby DIRECTED
to return to Atty. Cesar Lledo his own premiums and voluntary deposits, if any, plus interest of three
per centum per annum, compounded monthly.

Case #69

Executive Secretary v. FMRI

G.R. NO. 199324 January 7, 2013

111
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, SECRETARY OF FINANCE, COMMISSIONER OF
CUSTOMS, DISTRICT COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, Port of Aparri, Cagayan, DISTRICT
COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, Port of San Fernando, La Union, and HEAD OF THE LAND
TRANSFORTATION OFFICE, Petitioners,
vs. FORERUNNER MULTI RESOURCES, INC., Respondent.
Carpio J.:

Case Digest by: Mikko P. Solis

Subject: Statutory Construction
Topic: Implied Repeal

FACTS:
On December 12, 2002, then President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 156
which imposes a partial ban on the importation of used motor vehicles. The ban is part of several
measures EO 156 adopts to "accelerate the sound development of the motor vehicle industry in the
Philippines.” In Executive Secretary v. Southwing Heavy Industries, Inc. and two related petitions,
EO 156 was found to be a valid executive issuance enforceable throughout the Philippine customs
territory, except in the Subic Special Economic and Freeport Zone in Zambales (Subic Freeport) by
virtue of its status as a "separate customs territory" under Republic Act No. 7227. Respondent
Forerunner Multi Resources, Inc sued the government in the Regional Trial Court of Aparri, Cagayan
to declare invalid EO 156. Respondent attacked EO 156 for (1) having been issued by President
Arroyo ultra vires, (2) trenching the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Constitution and
(3) having been superseded by Executive Order No. 418, modifying the tariff rates of imported used
motor vehicles. Respondent sought a preliminary injunctive writ to enjoin, litis pendentia, the
enforcement of EO 156. Trial court granted relief, initially by issuing a Temporary Restraining Order
followed by a writ of preliminary injunction. On petitioners’ motion, the trial court reconsidered its
Order and lifted the injunctive writ. On appeal, CA set aside the trial court’s order and held that RTC
committed grave abuse of discretion in lifting the preliminary injunctive writ it earlier issued.
Moreover, CA held that the implementation of EO 156 would put petitioner in a financial crisis.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Executive Order No. 418 impliedly repealed Executive Order No. 15.

RULING:
No, the Court ruled that Executive Order No. 418 did not impliedly repeal Executive Order No. 156.
This question was already settled in a Resolution dated 22 August 2006 denying reconsideration of
the ruling in Southwing. The respondents in those cases, importers of used motor vehicles via the
Subic Freeport, had espoused the theory presently advanced by respondent. The subsequent issuance
of E.O. No. 418 increasing the import duties on used motor vehicles did not alter the policy of the
executive department to prohibit the importation of said vehicle. There is nothing in the text of E.O.
No. 418 which expressly repeals E.O. No. 156. The Congress, or the Office of the President in this
case, is presumed to know the existing laws, such that whenever it intends to repeal a particular or
specific provision of law, it does so expressly. The failure to add a specific repealing clause indicates
that the intent was not to repeal previous administrative issuances. E.O. No. 156 is very explicit in its
prohibition on the importation of used motor vehicles. On the other hand, E.O. No. 418 merely
modifies the tariff and nomenclature rates of import duty on used motor vehicles. Nothing therein
expressly revokes the importation ban. Petition is thereby granted, and CA’s decision is set aside.

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Case #70

Obiasca v. Basallote
G.R. No. 176707    February 17, 2010
ARLIN B. OBIASCA,  Petitioner, vs. JEANE O. BASALLOTE, Respondent.
CORONA, J.:

Case Digest by: Mikko P. Solis

Subject: Statutory Construction
Topic: Dura Lex Sed Lex

FACTS:
On May 26, 2003, the City Schools Division Superintendent Beloso appointed respondent Basallote
to the position of AO II of DepEd, Tabaco National High School in Albay.  The new City Schools
Division Superintendent Oyardo, through a letter dated June 4, 2003, advised the School Principal
Gonzales to return the papers for the said position and that a school ranking should be submitted for
review.  During the assumption of the respondent to the position on June 19, 2003, she received a
letter form the HRMO informing her that her appointment could not be forwarded to the CSC because
of her failure to submit the position description form (PDF) duly signed by Gonzales. 

Respondent ed for the signature of Gonzales but the latter refuses and because of this, Respondent
informed Oyardo. Instead of helping her, she was advised to return to her former teaching position
(Teacher I) which she then followed. 

Come August 25, 2003, Oyardo appointed Petitioner Obiasca to the same position (AO II) and such
appointment was sent to and properly attested by the CSC. Upon knowledge, respondent filed a
complaint with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon against Oyardo, Gonzales and Diaz.
The office found Oyardo and Gonzales administratively liable for withholding information from
respondent regarding the status of her appointment but Diaz was absolved of any wrongdoing. 
Respondent also filed a protest with the CSC Regional Office V but it was dismissed on the ground
that it should first be submitted to the Grievance Committee of the DepEd for appropriate action.

Respondent elevated the matter to the CSC and in its November 29, 2005 resolution, the CSC granted
the appeal, approved respondent’s appointment and recalled the approval of petitioner’s appointment. 

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari in the CA claiming that the CSC acted without
factual and legal bases in recalling his appointment. In its September 26, 2006 decision, CA denied
the petition and upheld respondent’s appointment. 

The CA found that the respondent was no doubt, qualified for the position. The CA opined that Diaz
unreasonably refused to affix her signature on respondent’s PDF and to submit respondent’s
appointment to the CSC on the ground of non-submission of respondent’s PDF. The CA ruled that the
PDF was not even required to be submitted and forwarded to the CSC. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration but his motion was denied on February 8, 2007. Hence, this petition. 

ISSUE:

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WON the deliberate failure of the appointing authority to submit respondent’s appointment to the
CSC within 30 days from its issuance made her appointment ineffective and incomplete.

RULING:
No. The appointment of the respondent shall be deemed valid and effective rendering the subsequent
appointment of the petitioner void.  Section 9(h) of PD 807 Already Amended by Section 12 Book V
of EO 292. It is important to also note that Section 9(h) of PD 807 cannot be interpreted as requiring
that an appointment must be submitted by the appointing authority to the CSC within 30 days from
issuance, otherwise, the appointment would become ineffective. Such interpretation fails to appreciate
the relevant part of Section 9(h) which states that "an appointment shall take effect immediately upon
issue by the appointing authority if the appointee assumes his duties immediately and shall remain
effective until it is disapproved by the CSC. Section 12, Book V of EO 292 amended Section 9(h) of
PD 807 by deleting the requirement that all appointments subject to CSC approval be submitted to it
within 30 days.  Under the facts in this case, respondent promptly assumed her duties as
Administrative Officer II when her appointment was issued by the appointing authority. Thus, her
appointment took effect immediately and remained effective until disapproved by the CSC.
Respondent’s appointment was never disapproved by the CSC. In fact, the CSC was deprived of the
opportunity to act promptly as it was wrongly prevented from doing so. More importantly, the CSC
subsequently approved respondent’s appointment and recalled that of petitioner, which recall has
already become final and immutable. The law on the matter is clear. There is no requirement in EO
292 that appointments should be submitted to the CSC for attestation within 30 days from the
issuance. It certainly cannot restore what EO 292 itself already and deliberately removed. At the very
least, that requirement cannot be used as basis to unjustly prejudice respondent. The problem is
petitioner’s insistence that the law be applied in a manner that is unjust and unreasonable. Also, in
appointing petitioner, the appointing authority effectively revoked the previous appointment already
accepted by the respondent. It is the CSC, not the appointing authority, which has this power.
Accordingly, petitioner’s subsequent appointment was void. There can be no appointment to a non-
vacant position. The incumbent must first be legally removed, or her appointment validly terminated,
before another can be appointed to succeed her. In sum, the appointment of petitioner was inconsistent
with the law and well-established jurisprudence. It not only disregarded the doctrine of immutability
of final judgments but also unduly concentrated on a narrow portion of the provision of law,
overlooking the greater part of the provision and other related rules and using a legal doctrine rigidly
and out of context. Its effect was to perpetuate an injustice. “When the law is clear, there is no other
recourse but to apply it regardless of its perceived harshness. Dura lex sed lex. Nonetheless, the law
should never be applied or interpreted to oppress one in order to favor another. As a court of law and
of justice, this Court has the duty to adjudicate conflicting claims based not only on the cold provision
of the law but also according to the higher principles of right and justice.”

Case #71

Dabalos v. RTC
G.R. No. 193960    January 7, 2013
KARLO ANGELO DABALOS y SAN DIEGO, Petitioner, vs. REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT,BRANCH 59, ANGELES CITY (PAMPANGA), REPRESENTED BY ITS
PRESIDING JUDGE MA. ANGELICA T. PARAS-QUIAMBAO; THE OFFICE OF THE
CITY PROSECUTOR, ANGELES CITY (PAMPANGA); AND ABC, Respondents.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

114
Case Digest by: Mikko P. Solis
Subject: Statutory Construction
Topic: Ubi Lex Non Distinguit, Nec Nos Distinguere Debemus

FACTS:
Petitioner averred that at the time of the alleged incident on July 13, 2009, he was no longer in dating
relationship with private respondent; hence, RA. NO. 9262 was inapplicable. In her affidavit, private
respondent admitted that her relationship with petitioner had ended prior to the subject incident.
Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 5(a) of RA 9262 before the RTC of Angeles City,
Branch 59. Petitioner filed a motion for judicial determination of probable cause with motion to quash
the information. She narrated that on July 13, 2009, she sought payment of the money she had lent to
petitioner but the latter could not pay. She then inquired from petitioner if he was responsible for
spreading rumors about her which he admitted. Thereupon, private respondent slapped petitioner
causing the latter to inflict on her the physical injuries alleged in the Information. The RTC denied the
petitioner’s motion. It did not consider material the fact that the parties’ dating relationship had ceased
prior to the incident, ratiocinating that since the parties had admitted a prior dating relationship, the
infliction of slight physical injuries constituted an act of violence against women and their children as
defined in Sec. 3(a) of RA 9262.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the offender and the offended woman should be in a dating relationship at the time of
the infliction of the violence?

RULING:
No. The Court is not persuaded. RA 9262 is broad in scope but specifies two limiting qualifications
for any act or series of acts to be considered as a crime of violence against women through physical
harm, namely: 1) it is committed against a woman or her child and the woman is the offender’s wife,
former wife, or with whom he has or had sexual or dating relationship or with whom he has a
common child; and 2) it results in or is likely to result in physical harm or suffering. Notably, while it
is required that the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the offended woman, for
RA 9262 to be applicable, it is not indispensable that the act of violence be a consequence of such
relationship. Nowhere in the law can such limitation be inferred. Hence, applying the rule on statutory
construction that when the law does not distinguish, neither should the courts, then, clearly, the
punishable acts refer to all acts of violence against women with whom the offender has or had a
sexual or dating relationship.  As correctly ruled by the RTC, it is immaterial whether the relationship
had ceased for as long as there is sufficient evidence showing the past or present existence of such
relationship between the offender and the victim when the physical harm was committed. 
Consequently, the Court cannot depart from the parallelism in Ang and give credence to petitioner's
assertion that the act of violence should be due to the sexual or dating relationship.

Case #72

SPOUSES ROMEO LL. PLOPENIO vs DAR and LBP

115
SPOUSES ROMEO LL. PLOPENIO and ROSIELINDA PLOPENIO represented by GAVINO
PLOPENIO, Petitioners, vs. DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM and LAND BANK
OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
G.R. No. 161090 and
EDUARDO PLOPENIO vs DAR and LBP
G.R. No. 161092

SERENO, J.:

Case Digest by: Mikko P. Solis

Subject: Statutory Construction
Topic: Ubi Lex Non Distinguit, Nec Nos Distinguere Debemus

FACTS:
In 2000, the land of their brother Gavino Plopenio, likewise located in Caramoan, Camarines Sur, was
valued by the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) at P51,125.60 per
hectare. On this basis, petitioners offered their entire landholdings to the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) for acquisition and distribution pursuant to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.
Petitioner-spouses own 11.8643 hectares of coconut land in Caramoan, Camarines Sur, while
petitioner Eduardo owns 22.8349 hectares of coconut land in the same locality. On October 26, 2001,
public respondent Land Bank sent a Notice of Valuation and Adjudication valuing the land of
petitioner-spouses at P23,485.00 per hectare and that of petitioner Eduardo at P22,856.62 per hectare.
Dissatisfied with Land Bank’s offer, petitioners rejected the Notice of Valuation and Acquisition and
referred the matter to the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of Camarines Sur for
summary administrative proceedings.
The PARAD affirmed the valuation made by Land Bank in a Decision dated 5 September 2002, a
copy of which petitioners received on 27 September 2002. On 11 October 2002, or 14 days thereafter,
petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration. The PARAD denied their Motion in an Order dated
20 November 2002, which petitioners received on 21 December 2002. Petitioners then filed separate
Petitions before the SAC-RTC on 6 January 2003, or 16 days after their receipt of the PARAD’s
Order. They explained that they were allowed to file their appeal 15 days from the receipt of the Order
of denial of their Motion for Reconsideration. Since the 15th day fell on a Sunday, they reasoned that
they should be allowed to file their appeal until 6 January 2003. In its Answer, Land Bank alleged that
the Decision of the PARAD had already attained finality after the lapse of the 15-day period, counted
from petitioners’ receipt of the PARAD’s Decision. Thus, it argued that the SAC-RTC should no
longer entertain the Petitions. In its assailed Decisions, the SAC-RTC ruled that the Decision of the
PARAD had already attained finality because petitioners failed to file their Petitions on time. The
petitions therefore are hereby ordered dismissed for lack of valid cause of action. From the Decisions
and Orders of the SAC-RTC, petitioners then filed the instant Petitions for Review directly before the
Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners resorted to a wrongful mode of appeal by filing the instant Rule 45
Petitions with the Supreme Court.

RULING:
The consolidated Petitions for Review are DENIED. While the general rule is that appeals raising
pure questions of law from decisions of RTCs are taken to this Court via a Rule 45 petition, decisions

116
of trial courts designated as SACs are only appealable to the Court of Appeals. It is a settled rule that
the right to appeal is a remedy of statutory origin. As such, this right must be exercised only in the
manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law authorizing its exercise.The special
jurisdiction of the SAC-RTC is conferred and regulated by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law,
and appeals therefrom are governed by Section 60 which provides:  Section 60. Appeals. – An appeal
may be taken from the decision of the Special Agrarian Courts by filing a petition for review with the
Court of Appeals within fifteen (15) days from receipt of notice of the decision; otherwise, the
decision shall become final. That law expressly states that appeals from SACs must be taken to the
Court of Appeals without making a distinction between appeals raising questions of fact and those
dealing purely with questions of law. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus. Where the
law does not distinguish, neither should we. Consequently, the Court rules that the only mode of
appeal from decisions of the SAC-RTC is via a Rule 42 petition for review to the Court of Appeals,
without any distinction as to whether the appeal raises questions of fact, questions of law, or mixed
questions of fact and law. Furthermore, even if the appeals were allowed to prosper, the Petitions
before the SAC-RTC were filed out of time. In the event of a denial of the motion for reconsideration,
the 1994 DARAB Rules provide:  SECTION 12. x x x. The filing of a motion for reconsideration
shall suspend the running of the period within which the appeal must be perfected. If a motion for
reconsideration is denied, the movant shall have the right to perfect his appeal during the remainder of
the period for appeal, reckoned from receipt of the resolution of denial. If the decision is reversed on
reconsideration, the aggrieved party shall have fifteen (15) days from receipt of the resolution of
reversal within which to perfect his appeal.  In this case, the petitioners only filed their Petitions on 6
January 2001, or 16 days after they received the Order denying their Motion for Reconsideration.
Clearly, the Petitions before the SAC-RTC were filed out of time.

Case #73

Gutierrez v. House of Representatives

G.R. No. 193459               February 15, 2011
Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez Petitioner, Vs. The House Of Representatives Committee On
Justice, Risa Hontiveros-Baraquel, Danilo D. Lim, Felipe Pestaño, Evelyn Pestaño, Renato M.
Reyes, Jr., Secretary General Of Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (Bayan); Mother Mary John
Mananzan, Co-Chairperson Of Pagbabago; Danilo Ramos, Secretary-General Of Kilusang
Magbubukid Ng Pilipinas (Kmp); Atty. Edre Olalia, Acting Secretary General Of The National
Union Of People's Lawyers (Nupl); Ferdinand R. Gaite, Chairperson, Confederation For Unity,
Recognition And Advancement Of Government Employees (Courage); And James Terry Ridon
Of The League Of Filipino Students (Lfs), Respondents. Feliciano Belmonte, Jr., Respondent-
Intervenor.

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Case Digest by: Mikko P. Solis

Subject: Statutory Construction
Topic: Ubi Lex Non Distinguit, Nec Nos Distinguere Debemus

FACTS:

117
On July 22, 2010, private respondents Risa Hontiveros-Baraquel, Danilo Lim, and spouses Felipe and
Evelyn Pestaño (Baraquel group) filed an impeachment complaint against Ma. Merceditas Gutierrez
(Petitioner) upon the endorsement of Party-List Representatives Arlene Bag-ao and Walden Bello.
Private respondents Renato Reyes, Jr., Mother Mary John Mananzan, Danilo Ramos, Edre Olalia,
Ferdinand Gaite and James Terry Ridon (Reyes group) filed another impeachment complaint against
petitioner with a resolution of endorsement by Party-List Representatives Neri Javier Colmenares,
Teodoro Casiño, Rafael Mariano, Luzviminda Ilagan, Antonio Tinio and Emerenciana de Jesus.
( complaints were merged) Transmitted the report to Atty. Marilyn Barua-Yap, Secretary General of
the House of Representatives, transmitted the impeachment complaint to House Speaker Feliciano
Belmonte, Jr. who, by Memorandum of August 2, 2010, directed the Committee on Rules to include it
in the Order of Business. Rules on Impeachment of the 14th Congress, were adapted in the said 15 th
impeachment proceeding to meet the exigency in such situation, in keeping with the "effective"
implementation of the "purpose" of the impeachment provisions. The provisional adoption of the
previous Congress’ Impeachment Rules is within the power of the House to promulgate its rules on
impeachment to effectively carry out purpose. The Petitioner filed a complaint on the violation of the
Constitution with regards to court proceedings and due process clause. Petitioner anchored its petition
on the grounds that the Rules of Impeachment proceedings were not promulgated in line with the
constitutional requirement of publication.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the promulgation of the Impeachment Rules requires Publication requirement for it to
have it’s effectivity?

RULING:
No, in the case of Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations
which held that the Constitution categorically requires publication of the rules of procedure in
legislative inquiries explains that the Impeachment Rules is intended to merely enable Congress to
effectively carry out the purpose of Section 3(8), Art. XI of Constitution. Wherein the unpublished
rules of legislative inquiries were not considered null and void in its entirety. In such case the word
promulgation must thus be used in the context in which it is generally understood--that is, to make
known.  (Generalia verba sunt generaliter inteligencia.) The formal act of announcing a rule of court
is within the discretion of Congress on how to promulgate Impeachment rules. Hence, the petitioner’s
contention on the Publication requirement needed for the promulgation of Rules of Impeachment does
not hold grounds.

Case #74

People v. Sandiganbayan and Amante

G.R. No. 167304 August 25, 2009
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (third division) and
VICTORIA AMANTE, Respondents.
PERALTA, J.:

Case Digest by: Mikko P. Solis

Subject: Statutory Construction
Topic: Expressio unius ext exlusio alterius

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 FACTS:
Victoria Amante was a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, Province of Cebu at
the time pertinent to this case. She was able to get hold of a cash advance in the amount of ₱71,095.00
under a disbursement voucher in order to defray seminar expenses of the Committee on Health and
Environmental Protection, which she headed. Almost two years since she obtained the said cash
advance, no liquidation was made. Toledo City Auditor Manolo V. Tulibao issued a demand letter to
respondent Amante asking the latter to settle her unliquidated cash advance within seventy-two hours
from receipt. Thereafter, the OMB-Visayas, on September 30, 1999, issued a Resolution
recommending the filing of an Information for Malversation of Public Funds against respondent
Amante. On May 21, 2004, the OSP filed an Information with the Sandiganbayan accusing Victoria
Amante of violating Section 89 of P.D. No. 1445. Amante filed with the said court a MOTION TO
DEFER ARRAIGNMENT AND MOTION FOR REINVESTIGATION stating that the Decision of
the Office of the Ombudsman made an incomplete proceeding in so far that respondent Amante had
already liquidated and/or refunded the unexpected balance of her cash advance. And that the
Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the said criminal case because respondent Amante was then a
local official who was occupying a position of salary grade 26. The OSP contended that the said court
has jurisdiction over respondent Amante since at the time relevant to the case, she was a member of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, therefore, falling under those enumerated under Section
4 of R.A. No. 8249. According to the OSP, the language of the law is too plain and unambiguous that
it did not make any distinction as to the salary grade of city local officials/heads. The Sandiganbayan
dismissed the case against Amante for lack of jurisdiction.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a member of the sangguniang panlungsod under salary grade 26 who was charged
with violation of the auditing code of the philippines falls within the jurisdiction of the
sandiganbayan.

RULING:
Yes. The applicable law in this case is Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of R.A.
No. 7975 which took effect on May 16, 1995, which was again amended on February 5, 1997 by R.A.
No. 8249. The exception contained in R.A. 7975, as well as R.A. 8249, where it expressly provides
that to determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in cases involving violations of R.A. No.
3019, as amended, R.A. No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code is
not applicable in the present case as the offense involved herein is a violation of The Auditing Code
of the Philippines. The last clause of the opening sentence of paragraph (a) of the said two provisions
states: Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. -- The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in all cases
involving:  A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised
Penal Code, where one or more of the principal accused are officials occupying the following
positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the
commission of the offense:    (1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional
director and higher, otherwise classified as grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and Position

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Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:   (a) Provincial governors,
vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan and provincial treasurers, assessors,
engineers, and other city department heads; (b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the
sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads.   (c)
Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher; (d) Philippine army
and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;   (e) PNP chief superintendent
and PNP officers of higher rank;  (f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials
and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor;  (g) Presidents, directors or
trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or
educational institutions or foundations;  (2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as
Grade "27" and up under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;  (3) Members of
the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;  (4) Chairmen and members of
Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; and  (5) All
other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" and higher under the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989.  B. Other offenses or felonies, whether simple or complexed with
other crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this
section in relation to their office.  C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with
Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A. By simple analogy, applying the provisions of the pertinent
law, respondent Amante, being a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod at the time of the alleged
commission of an offense in relation to her office, falls within the original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. In the case at bar, the accused is a Sangguniang Panlungsod member, a position with
salary grade '26'. Her office is included in the enumerated public officials in Section 4(a) (1) (a) to (g)
of P.D. No. 1606 as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975. However, she is charged with violation
of Section 89 of The Auditing Code of the Philippines which is not a case falling under Section 4(a)
but under Section 4(b) of P.D. No. 1606 as amended. Where a statute, by its terms, is expressly
limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to other matters. 
In other words, the express mention of one person, thing, act, or consequence excludes all others.
Expressio unius ext exlusio alterius. Elsewise stated, expressium facit cessare tacitum- what is
expressed puts an end to what is implied. The legislative body would not have made specific
enumerations in the statute, if it had the intention not to restrict its meaning and confine its terms to
those expressly mentioned. 

Case #75

Gatchalian vs. Commission on Elections

Nos. L-32560–61. October 22, 1970
ESMERALDO M. GATCHALIAN, petitioner on his behalf and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,respondent.
MAKASIAR, J.: 

Case Digest by: Mikko P. Solis

Subject: Statutory Construction
Topic: Expressio unius ext exlusio alterius

FACTS:

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The Commission on Elections promulgated on August 13, 1970, Comelec Resolution No. RR-707
holding that “donations of billboards to the Commission by foreigners or companies or corporations
owned and controlled partially or wholly by foreigners are not covered by the provision of Sec. 56 of
the Revised Election Code.” Upon the request of the Advertising Council of the Philippines,
COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. RR-731 to the effect that the ban in Sec. 46 of the Revised
Election Code, as amended, does not cover the projected campaign for funds and other contributions
by the Advertising Council of the Philippines and others similarly situated, during the 120 days
immediately preceding a regular or special election; and “that in line with the ruling in its resolution
numbered RR-707, donations and contributions for the above campaign may be received from
foreigners, companies or corporations owned and/or controlled wholly or partially by foreigners.
Petitioner Esmeraldo M. Gatchalian, a candidate for delegate to the Constitutional Convention for the
first district of Rizal. filed a petition impugning the validity of said Resolutions Nos. RR-707 and 731
as violative of Sec. 56 of the Revised Election Code. COMELEC denied the petition, claiming that
contributions by foreigners to the Comelec Billboards Committee are not made in aid or support of
any particular candidate in a particular district nor would it in any way influence the result of the
election. Sec. 56 of the Revised Election Code, as amended, provides that “No foreigner shall aid any
candidate, directly or indirectly, or to take part in or to influence in any manner any elections.” The
prohibited active intervention of foreigners thereunder may consist of:  (1)  aiding any candidate,
directly or indirectly, in any election;  (2) taking part in any election; and  (3)  influencing in any
manner any election. 

ISSUE:
Whether or not the term “any candidate” in Sec. 56 comprehends “some candidates” or “all
candidates.”

RULING:
It was held that the term “any candidate” should be construed also to mean some or all
candidates. The term “any candidate” should be construed also to mean some or all candidates. It has
been held that the term “any candidate” voted for at any election refers to “candidates"; and that the
term “any person” is not limited to “any person” in the singular, but is applicable as well to two or
more persons. “When the context so indicates, the word may be construed to mean, and indeed it has
been frequently used in its enlarged and plural sense, as meaning “all,” “all or every,” “each,” “each
one of all,” “every,” without limitation; indefinite number or quantity, an indeterminate unit or the
number of units out of many or all, one or more as the case may be, several, some.

Case #76

City of Manila v. Laguio

G.R. No. 118127             April 12, 2005
CITY OF MANILA, HON. ALFREDO S. LIM as the Mayor of the City of Manila, HON.
JOSELITO L. ATIENZA, in his capacity as Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila and Presiding
Officer of the City Council of Manila, HON. ERNESTO A. NIEVA, HON. GONZALO P.
GONZALES, HON. AVELINO S. CAILIAN, HON. ROBERTO C. OCAMPO, HON.
ALBERTO DOMINGO, HON. HONORIO U. LOPEZ, HON. FRANCISCO G. VARONA, JR.,
HON. ROMUALDO S. MARANAN, HON. NESTOR C. PONCE, JR., HON. HUMBERTO B.
BASCO, HON. FLAVIANO F. CONCEPCION, JR., HON. ROMEO G. RIVERA, HON.
MANUEL M. ZARCAL, HON. PEDRO S. DE JESUS, HON. BERNARDITO C. ANG, HON.
MANUEL L. QUIN, HON. JHOSEP Y. LOPEZ, HON. CHIKA G. GO, HON. VICTORIANO

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A. MELENDEZ, HON. ERNESTO V.P. MACEDA, JR., HON. ROLANDO P. NIETO, HON.
DANILO V. ROLEDA, HON. GERINO A. TOLENTINO, JR., HON. MA. PAZ E. HERRERA,
HON. JOEY D. HIZON, HON. FELIXBERTO D. ESPIRITU, HON. KARLO Q. BUTIONG,
HON. ROGELIO P. DELA PAZ, HON. BERNARDO D. RAGAZA, HON. MA. CORAZON R.
CABALLES, HON. CASIMIRO C. SISON, HON. BIENVINIDO M. ABANTE, JR., HON. MA.
LOURDES M. ISIP, HON. ALEXANDER S. RICAFORT, HON. ERNESTO F. RIVERA,
HON. LEONARDO L. ANGAT, and HON. JOCELYN B. DAWIS, in their capacity as
councilors of the City of Manila, Petitioner, vs. HON. PERFECTO A.S. LAGUIO, JR., as
Presiding Judge, RTC, Manila and MALATE TOURIST DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, Respondents.
TINGA, J.:

Case Digest by: Mikko P. Solis

Subject: Statutory Construction
Topic: Expressio unius ext exlusio alterius

FACTS:
Sometime in March 1993, the City of Manila passed a local ordinance which prohibits establishments
from operating business which provide certain forms of amusement, entertainment, services and
facilities where women are used as tools in entertainment and which tend to disturb the community,
annoy the inhabitants, and adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the community. Operating
motels is among the prohibited businesses. Private respondent Malate Tourist Development
Corporation (MTDC), one of the affected corporations being engaged in the motel industry, filed a
Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order against the execution of the
ordinance before the RTC. MTDC contends among other constitutional infirmities, that the ordinance
is unconstitutional because the City Council has no power to prohibit the operation of motels as
Section 458 (a) 4 (iv) of the Local Government Code of 1991 (the Code) grants to the City Council
only the power to regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of hotels, motels, inns,
pension houses, lodging houses and other similar establishments. City of Manila answers that they
had the power to "prohibit certain forms of entertainment in order to protect the social and moral
welfare of the community" as provided for in Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Local Government Code,
which  reads,  thus:
Section 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. (vii) Regulate the establishment,
operation, and maintenance of any entertainment or amusement facilities, including theatrical
performances, circuses, billiard pools, public dancing schools, public dance halls, sauna baths,
massage parlors, and other places for entertainment or amusement; regulate such other events or
activities for amusement or entertainment, particularly those which tend to disturb the community or
annoy the inhabitants, or require the suspension or suppression of the same; or, prohibit certain forms
of amusement or entertainment in order to protect the social and moral welfare of the community.
RTC favored MTDC and declared the ordinance unconstitutional. Thus, this case elevated before the
Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the ordinance is constitutional?

RULING:

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No. The Supreme Court ruled that the ordinance is unconstitutional. The Congress unequivocably
specified the establishments and forms of amusement or entertainment subject to regulation among
which are beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses, and other similar
establishments (Section 458 (a) 4 (iv)), public dancing schools, public dance halls, sauna baths,
massage parlors, and other places for entertainment or amusement (Section 458 (a) 4 (vii)). This
enumeration therefore cannot be included as among "other events or activities for amusement or
entertainment, particularly those which tend to disturb the community or annoy the inhabitants" or
"certain forms of amusement or entertainment" which the City Council may suspend, suppress or
prohibit. The rule is that the City Council has only such powers as are expressly granted to it and
those which are necessarily implied or incidental to the exercise thereof.  By reason of its limited
powers and the nature thereof, said powers are to be construed strictissimi juris and any doubt or
ambiguity arising out of the terms used in granting said powers must be construed against the City
Council. It is a general rule in statutory construction that the express mention of one person, thing, or
consequence is tantamount to an express exclusion of all others. Expressio unius est exclusio alterium.
This maxim is based upon the rules of logic and the natural workings of human mind. It is particularly
applicable in the construction of such statutes as create new rights or remedies, impose penalties or
punishments, or otherwise come under the rule of strict construction. It is well to recall the maxim
reddendo singula singulis which means that words in different parts of a statute must be referred to
their appropriate connection, giving to each in its place, its proper force and effect, and, if possible,
rendering none of them useless or superfluous, even if strict grammatical construction demands
otherwise. Likewise, where words under consideration appear in different sections or are widely
dispersed throughout an act the same principle applies. WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby
DENIED and the decision of the Regional Trial Court declaring the Ordinance void is AFFIRMED. 

Case #77

Amadora v. CA
G.R. No. L-47745 April 15, 1988
JOSE S. AMADORA, LORETA A. AMADORA, JOSE A. AMADORA JR., NORMA A.
YLAYA PANTALEON A. AMADORA, JOSE A. AMADORA III, LUCY A. AMADORA,
ROSALINDA A. AMADORA, PERFECTO A. AMADORA, SERREC A. AMADORA,
VICENTE A. AMADORA and MARIA TISCALINA A. AMADORA, petitioners vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, COLEGIO DE SAN JOSE-RECOLETOS, VICTOR
LLUCH SERGIO P. DLMASO JR., CELESTINO DICON, ANIANO ABELLANA, PABLITO
DAFFON thru his parents and natural guardians, MR. and MRS. NICANOR GUMBAN, and
ROLANDO VALENCIA, thru his guardian, A. FRANCISCO ALONSO, respondents.

Case Digest by: Mikko P. Solis

Subject: Statutory Construction
Topic: Expressio unius ext exlusio alterius

FACTS:
Pablito Daffon, a student of Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos fired a gun while he was at the auditorium
of the school with some of the students. The stray bullet hit Alfredo Amadora which caused
immediately death of Alfredo. The parents of the deceased filed a petition against Daffon before the
RTC. The trial court convicted the accused for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. The parents

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also sued the school for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code because of the school’s
negligence. The RTC ruled in favor of Amadora, wherein, the principal, the dean of boys and the
teacher-in-charge are all civilly liable.  The Institution appealed and claimed that when the incident
happened the school year has already ended. Amadora argued that even though the semester has
already ended, his son was there in school to complete a school requirement in his Physics subject.
The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the school on the basis that under the last paragraph of Article
2180, only schools of arts and trades (vocational schools) are liable not academic schools like Colegio
de San Jose-Recoletos.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos can be held civilly liable for the negligence which
caused to the death of Amadora.

RULING:
No. The Court ruled that all schools may not be held directly liable. Its liability is only subsidiary.
Moreover, for non-academic schools, it would be the principal or head of school who should be
directly liable for the tortuous act of its students. For academic schools, it would be the teacher-in-
charge who would be directly liable for the tortuous act of the students and not the dean or the head of
school. It also ruled that such liability does not cease when the school year ends or when the semester
ends.  Liability applies whenever the student is in the custody of the school authorities as long as he is
under the control and influence of the school and within its premises. Indeed, even if the student
should be doing nothing more than relaxing in the campus in the company of his classmates and
friends enjoying the ambience and atmosphere of the school, he is still within the custody and subject
to the discipline of the school authorities under the provisions of Article 2180. 
However, a teacher can avoid direct liability, and for the school, to avoid subsidiary liability, is to
show proof that he, the teacher, exercised the necessary precautions to prevent the injury complained
of, and the school exercised the diligence of a bonus pater familias.  In this case, the Physics teacher
in charge was not properly named and there was no sufficient evidence presented to make the said
teacher-in-charge liable and the school. Therefore, Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos cannot be held
subsidiarily liable.

Case #78

Miranda v. Abaya
G.R. No. 136351 July 28, 1999
JOEL G. MIRANDA, petitioner, vs. ANTONIO M. ABAYA and the COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, respondents.

MELO, J.:

Case Digest by: Mikko P. Solis

Subject: Statutory Construction
Topic: Expressio unius ext exlusio alterius

 
FACTS:
On March 24, 1998, Jose "Pempe" C. Miranda, then incumbent city mayor of Santiago, Isabela, filed
his certificate of candidacy for the same mayoralty post in view of the synchronized elections of May

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11, 1998. In March 27, 1998, private respondent Antonio M. Abaya filed a Petition to Deny Due
Course to and/or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy. The petition was GRANTED by the Comelec in its
resolution dated May 5, 1998. The Comelec further ruled to DISQUALIFY Jose "Pempe" Miranda.
On May 6, 1998, way beyond the deadline for filing a certificate of candidacy, petitioner Joel G.
Miranda filed his certificate of candidacy for the mayoralty post, supposedly as a substitute for his
father, Jose "Pempe" Miranda. During the May 11, 1998 elections; petitioner and private respondent
vied for the mayoralty seat, with petitioner garnering 22,002 votes, 1,666 more votes than private
respondent who got only 20,336 votes. On May 13, 1998, private respondent filed a Petition to
Declare Null and Void Substitution with Prayer for Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or
Temporary Restraining Order, which was docketed as SPA No. 98-288. He prayed for the
nullification of petitioner's certificate of candidacy for being void ab initio because the certificate of
candidacy of Jose "Pempe" Miranda, whom petitioner was supposed to substitute, had already been
cancelled and denied due course. On December 8, 1998, the Comelec En Banc rendered nullifying the
substitution by petitioner Joel G. Miranda of his father as candidate for the mayoralty post of Santiago
City. Petitioner sought the Court's intercession via a petition for certiorari, with prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the annulment of petitioner's substitution and proclamation is proper and legally
sound.

RULING:
Yes, while there is no dispute as to whether or not a nominee of a registered or accredited political
party may substitute for a candidate of the same party who had been disqualified for any cause, this
does not include those cases where the certificate of candidacy of the person to be substituted had
been denied due course and cancelled under Section 78 of the Code. The court explains the difference
between the "disqualification" of a candidate and the "cancellation" of his certificate of candidacy.
The majority holds that, under Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code, there are only three
instances in which a candidate may be "substituted," and these are "death, withdrawal or
disqualification" of such candidate. Inasmuch as the certificate of candidacy of petitioner's father, Jose
"Pempe" Miranda, was merely "cancelled," he could not be legally substituted by reason of the rule on
statutory construction, expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
While the law enumerated the occasions where a candidate may be validly substituted, there is no
mention of the case where a candidate is excluded not only by disqualification but also by denial and
cancellation of his certificate of candidacy. Under the foregoing rule, there can be no valid
substitution for the latter case, much in the same way that a nuisance candidate whose certificate of
candidacy is denied due course and/or cancelled may not be substituted. If the intent of the lawmakers
were otherwise, they could have so easily and conveniently included those persons whose certificates
of candidacy have been denied due course and/or cancelled. A person without a valid certificate of
candidacy cannot be considereda candidate in much the same way as any person who has not filed any
certificate of candidacy at all cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be a candidate at all.
Under ejusdem generis rule, where a general word or phrase (such as "disqualification for any cause"
in this case) follows an enumeration of particular and specific words of the same class (such as the
words "dies" and "withdraws" in the instant case) or where the latter follow the former, the general
word or phrase is to be construed to include, or to be restricted to persons, things or cases akin to,
resembling, or of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned. A deceased candidate is
required to have duly filed a valid certificate of candidacy, otherwise his political party would not be
allowed to field a substitute candidate in his stead under Section 77 of the Code. In the case of

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withdrawal of candidacy, the withdrawing candidate is required to have duly filed a valid certificate
of candidacy in order to allow his political party to field a substitute candidate in his stead. Most
reasonable it is then, under the foregoing rule, to hold that a valid certificate of candidacy is likewise
an indispensable requisite in the case of a substitution of a disqualified candidate under the provisions
of Section 77 of the Code, just as it is in the two previous instances. Furthermore, interpretatio talis in
ambiguis semper freinda est, ut euiatur inconveniens et absurdum, meaning, where there is ambiguity,
such interpretation as will avoid inconvenience and absurdity shall in all cases be adopted. To include
those disqualified candidates whose certificate of candidacy had likewise been denied due course
and/or cancelled among those who may be substituted under Section 77 of the Omnibus Election
Code, leads to the absurdity where a substitute is allowed to take the place of somebody who had not
been a candidate in the first place. WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the Certificate of
Candidacy filed by respondent for the position of Mayor for the City of Santiago be not given due
course and/or cancelled.

Case #79

National Power Corporation v. Angas

G.R. Nos. 60225-26              
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION vs. ANGAS 
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE ZAIN B. ANGAS,
District Judge of the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Sur, HADJI DALUMA KINIDAR,
EBRA ALI and/or GASNARA ALI (intervenors), MANGORSI CASAN, CASNANGAN
BATUGAN, PUNDAMARUG ATOCAL, PASAYOD PADO, DIMAAMPAO BAUTE,
CASNANGAN BAUTE, DIMAPORO SUBANG, TAMBILAWAN OTE, MANISUN ATOCAL,
MASACAL TOMIARA (In Civil Case No. 2277) and LACSAMAN BATUGAN, and/or
GUIMBA SHIPPING & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, MAGANCONG DIGAYAN,
MOCTARA LAMPACO, LAMPACO PASANDALAN, DIMAPORO SUBANG, HADJI
DALUMA KINIDAR, DIMAAMPAO BAUTE, PANGONOTAN COSNA TAGOL, SALACOP
DIMACALING, HADJI SITTIE SOHRA LINANG BATARA, BERTUDAN PIMPING and/or
CADUROG PIMPING, BUTUAN TAGOL, DISANGCOPAN MARABONG, and HADJI
SALIC SAWA (In Civil Case No. 2248), respondents.

PARAS, J.:

Case Digest by: Mikko P. Solis

Subject: Statutory Construction
Topic: Expressio unius ext exlusio alterius

FACTS:
The petitioner National Power Corporation filed two complaints for eminent domain against private
respondents. The complaint which sought to expropriate certain specified lots situated at Limogao,
Saguiaran, Lanao del Sur was for the purpose of the development of hydro-electric power and
production of electricity.  The lower court declared and confirmed that the lots mentioned in the
complaints have entirely been lawfully condemned and expropriated by the petitioner, and ordered the
latter to pay the private respondents just compensation for their lands expropriated "with legal interest
thereon until fully paid." On May 16, 1980, one of the private respondents (Sittie Sohra Batara) filed

126
an ex-parte motion praying that petitioner be directed to pay her the unpaid balance for the lands
expropriated from her, including legal interest at 6% per annum. It was granted by the lower court and
directed the petitioner to deposit the sums of money as adjudged. Petitioner complied with said order
and deposited the sums of money with interest computed at 6% per annum. On February 10, 1981,
one of the private respondents (Pangonatan Cosna Tagol), filed with the trial court an ex-parte motion
praying for the first time that the legal interest on the just compensation awarded to her by the court
be computed at 12% per annum as allegedly "authorized by Circular No. 416 of the Central Bank
issued pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 116 and in a decision of the Supreme Court that legal
interest allowed in the judgment of the courts, in the absence of express contract, shall be computed at
12% per annum."  The lower court granted the said motion allowing 12% interest per annum.
Subsequently, the other private respondents filed motions also praying that the legal interest on the
just compensation awarded to them be computed at 12% per annum.  Petitioner moved for a
reconsideration of the lower court's last order alleging that the main decision had already become final
and executory with its compliance of depositing the sums of money as just compensation for the lands
condemned, with legal interest at 6% per annum and that Presidential Decree No. 116 is not
applicable to this case because it is Art. 2209 of the Civil Code which applies.

ISSUE:
Whether or not in the computation of the legal rate of interest on just compensation for expropriated
lands, the law applicable is the Central Bank Circular No. 416 which fixed the legal interest rate at
12% per annum.

RULING:
NO. The Central Bank circular applies only to loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits. The
term "judgments" as used in Section 1 of the Usury Law, as well as in Central Bank Circular No. 416,
should be interpreted to mean only judgments involving loan or forbearance of money, goods or
credits, following the principle of ejusdem generis. Under this doctrine, where general terms follow
the designation of particular things or classes of persons or subjects, the general term will be
construed to comprehend those things or persons of the same class or of the same nature as those
specifically enumerated.  Applying the said rule on statutory construction to Central Bank Circular
No. 416, the general term "judgments" can refer only to judgments in cases involving loans or
forbearance of any money, goods or credits. On the other hand, Art. 2209 of the Civil Code applies to
transactions requiring the payment of indemnities as damages, in connection with any delay in the
performance of the obligation arising therefrom other than those covering loan or forbearance of
money, goods or credits. In the case at bar, the transaction involved is clearly not a loan or
forbearance of money, goods or credits but expropriation of certain parcels of land for a public
purpose, the payment of which is without stipulation regarding interest, and the interest adjudged by
the trial court is in the nature of indemnity for damages. The legal interest required to be paid on the
amount of just compensation for the properties expropriated is manifestly in the form of indemnity for
damages for the delay in the payment thereof. Therefore, since the kind of interest involved in the
joint judgment of the lower court sought to be enforced in this case is interest by way of damages, and
not by way of earnings from loans, etc. Art. 2209 of the Civil Code shall apply. Central Bank Circular
No. 416  By virtue of the authority granted to it under Section 1 of Act No. 2655, as amended,
otherwise known as the "Usury Law," the Monetary Board, in its Resolution No. 1622 dated July 29,
1974, has prescribed that the rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods or
credits and the rate allowed in judgments, in the absence of express contract as to such rate of interest,
shall be twelve per cent (12%) per annum. Art. 2209 of the Civil Code  Art. 2209. If the obligation
consists in the payment of a sum of money, and the debtor incurs a delay, the indemnity for damages,

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there being no stipulation to the contrary, shall be the payment of the interest agreed upon, and in the
absence of stipulation, the legal interest, which is six percent per annum. The purpose of the rule
on ejusdem generis is to give effect to both the particular and general words, by treating the particular
words as indicating the class and the general words as including all that is embraced in said class,
although not specifically named by the particular words. This is justified on the ground that if the
lawmaking body intended the general terms to be used in their unrestricted sense, it would have not
made an enumeration of particular subjects but would have used only general terms.

Case #80

Pelizloy Realty Corporation v. Province of Benguet

G.R. No. 183137, 10 Apr 2013. 
PELIZLOY REALTY CORPORATION, represented herein by its President, GREGORY K.
LOY, Petitioner, vs. THE PROVINCE OF BENGUET, Respondent.
G.R. No. 183137

 LEONEN, J.:

Case Digest by: Mikko P. Solis

Subject: Statutory Construction
Topic: Ejusdem Generis

FACTS:
The Provincial Board of the Province of Benguet approved Provincial Tax Ordinance No. 05-107,
otherwise known as the Benguet Revenue Code of 2005 ("Tax Ordinance"). Section 59, Article X of
the Tax Ordinance levied a ten percent (10%) amusement tax on gross receipts from admissions to
"resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs and tourist spots. Pelizloy's assailed that the Tax
Ordinance's imposition of a 10% amusement tax on gross receipts from admission fees for resorts,
swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs, and tourist spots is an ultra vires act on the part of the
Province of Benguet. Pelizloy Realty Corporation ("Pelizloy") owner of Palm Grove Resort, is a
resort designed for recreation and has facilities like swimming pools, a spa and function halls. It is
located at the Municipality of Tuba, Province of Benguet. However, the province of Benguet argued
that provinces can validly impose amusement taxes on resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot
springs, and tourists’ spots. For it is classified as “amusement places.” The validity of the Tax
Ordinance was anchored in Section 140 of the Local Government Code. The Province of Benguet
asserts that the enumeration in the Tax Ordinace is encompassed bu the phrase “other places of
amusement.” Pelizloy, then filed a petition for declaratory relief and injunction before the RTC.
However, it was denied.  They also filed for a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Hence, the
case was elevated and the instant petition in the Supreme Court.
 
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Province of Benguet is authorized to impose amusement taxes on admission fees
to resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs, and tourist spots for being “amusement places”
under Section 140 of the Local Government Code.
 
RULING:

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No, the Court ruled that the Province of Benguet is not authorized to impose amusement taxes on
admission fees to resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs, and tourist spots. Section 140 of
the Local Government Code provides that a province may levy an amusement tax to be collected from
the proprietors, lessees, or operators of theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses, boxing stadia, and
other places of amusement at a rate of not more than thirty percent (30%) of the gross receipts from
admission fees. What is expressly stated in Section 140 is the amusement tax to be collected from the
proprietors, lessees, or operators of theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses, and boxing stadia. The
resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs, and tourist spots are not among those places
expressly mentioned. Thus, the issue of determining where the enumerations of resorts, swimming
pools, bath houses, hot springs, and tourist spots is encompassed in the phrase “other places of
amusement.” Under the principle of ejusdem generis, "where a general word or phrase follows an
enumeration of particular and specific words of the same class or where the latter follow the former,
the general word or phrase is to be construed to include, or to be restricted to persons, things or cases
akin to, resembling, or of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned. Section 131 (c) of
the Local Government Code provides a clear definition of amusement places. It defined amusement
places to include theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses and other places of amusement where one
seeks admission to entertain oneself by seeing or viewing the show or performances. Indeed, theaters,
cinemas, concert halls, circuses, and boxing stadia are bound by a common typifying characteristic in
that they are all venues primarily for the staging of spectacles or the holding of public shows,
exhibitions, performances, and other events meant to be viewed by an audience. Accordingly, ‘other
places of amusement’ must be interpreted in light of the typifying characteristic of being venues
"where one seeks admission to entertain oneself by seeing or viewing the show or performances" or
being venues primarily used to stage spectacles or hold public shows, exhibitions, performances, and
other events meant to be viewed by an audience. In this case, it is clear that resorts, swimming pools,
bath houses, hot springs and tourist spots cannot be considered venues primarily "where one seeks
admission to entertain oneself by seeing or viewing the show or performances". While it is true that
they may be venues where people are visually engaged, they are not primarily venues for their
proprietors or operators to actively display, stage or present shows and/or performances. The ejusdem
generis rule will not apply in this case. Ejusdem generis rule will not apply where the specific things
in the enumeration have no distinguishable common characteristics and they greatly differ from each
other. In this case, the enumeration of the Province of Benguet do not have the common factor for it to
be considered as in the “other places of amusement.” The resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot
springs and tourist spots do not belong to the same category or class as theaters, cinemas, concert
halls, circuses, and boxing stadia. It follows that they cannot be considered as among the ‘other places
of amusement’ contemplated by Section 140 of the LGC and which may properly be subject to
amusement taxes. The petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The second paragraph of
Section 59, Article X of the Benguet Provincial Revenue Code of 2005, that imposes amusement
taxes on admission fees to resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs and tourist spots, is
declared null and void. Province of Benguet is permanently enjoined from enforcing the second
paragraph of Section 59, Article X of the Benguet Provincial Revenue Code of 2005 with respect to
resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs and tourist spots.

Case #81

People v. Bello
G.R. Nos. 166948-59, 29 Aug 2012

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. MEINRADO ENRIQUE A. BELLO,
MANUEL S. SA TUITO, **** MINVILUZ S. CAMINA, JOELITA TRABUCO, ABELIO
JUANEZA, ROSALINDA D. TROPEL, FELIPE Y. VILLAROSA, RAUL APOSAGA,
HERMIE BARBASA and ROSARIO BARBASA-PERLAS, Respondents.

ABAD, J.:

Case Digest by: Mikko P. Solis

Subject: Statutory Construction
Topic: Ejusdem Generis

FACTS:
In 1998 the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee (the Committee) inquired into alleged anomalies at the
AFP-RSBS. After investigation, the Committee found that when acquiring lands, the AFP-RSBS
would execute two sets of deeds of sale: one, an unnotarized bilateral deed of sale that showed a
higher price and the other, a unilateral deed of sale that showed a discounted purchase price. The first
would be kept by the AFP-RSBS Legal Department while the second would be held by the vendors.
The latter would then use these unilateral deeds of sale in securing titles in the name of AFP-RSBS.
This was done, according to the Committee, to enable the AFP-RSBS to draw more money from its
funds and to enable the vendors to pay lesser taxes. The Committee recommended to the Ombudsman
(OMB) the prosecution of General Jose Ramiscal, Jr. (Ret.), former AFP-RSBS president, who signed
the unregistered deeds of sale covering acquisitions of lands in General Santos, Tanauan, Calamba,
and Iloilo for falsification of public documents or violation of Article 172, paragraph 1, in relation to
Article 171, paragraphs 4 to 6 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), and violation of Republic Act (R.A.)
3019,1 Sections 3(e) and 3(g). Acting on the Committee’s recommendation, the OMB filed with
respect to the acquisition of lands in Iloilo City information before the Sandiganbayan in Criminal
Cases 26770-75 and 26826-31 against respondents Meinrado Enrique A. Bello, Manuel S. Satuito,
Rosario Barbasa-Perlas, Hermie Barbasa, Minviluz Camina, Joelita Trabuco, Rosalinda Tropel, Felipe
Villarosa, Abelio Juaneza, and Raul Aposaga for six counts of violation of R.A. 3019, Section 3(e),
and six counts of falsification of public documents under Article 171, RPC. Satuito and Bello filed a
motion to dismiss and a motion to quash the information on the ground that the Sandiganbayan had no
jurisdiction over the case. On February 12, 2004 the Sandiganbayan granted the motions and ordered
the remand of the records to the proper courts, hence, this petition by the People of the Philippines,
represented by the OMB, which challenges such order.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred in holding that it has no jurisdiction over offenses involving
the heads of the legal departments of government-owned and controlled corporations?

RULING:
No. In clarifying the meaning of the term "manager" as used in Section 4(a)(1)(g), the Sandiganbayan
also invoked the doctrine of noscitur a sociis. Under this doctrine, a proper construction may be had
by considering the company of words in which the term or phrase in question is founded or with
which it is associated.6 Given that the word "manager" was in the company of the words "presidents,
directors or trustees," the clear intent, according to the Sandiganbayan, is to limit the meaning of the
term "manager" to officers who have overall control and supervision of government-owned and
controlled corporations. The directors or trustees of government-owned and controlled corporations
do not, for example, exercise overall supervision and control; when they act collectively as a board,

130
the directors or trustees merely lay down policies for the operating officers to implement. Since
"managers" definitely do not have the same responsibilities as directors and trustees or as presidents,
they belong to a distinct class of corporate officers that, under the definition above, has charge of a
corporation’s "divisions or departments." This brings Bello’s position within the definition. In its
February 12, 2004 decision, the Sandiganbayan held that, not being a stock or non-stock corporation,
AFP-RSBS cannot be regarded as a government-owned and controlled corporation. Consequently,
respondent AFP-RSBS legal department officers did not fall under Section 4(a)(1)(g) of R.A. 8249
that defines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. On motion for reconsideration by the prosecution,
however, the Sandiganbayan changed its position and ruled that AFP-RSBS is after all a government-
owned and controlled corporation, having been created by special law to perform a public function.
Still, the Sandiganbayan held that Section 4(a)(1)(g) cannot apply to the accused since Bello, who
held the highest rank among those who allegedly conspired to commit the crime charged, did not hold
any of the government positions enumerated under that section, the pertinent portion of which reads:
Sec. 4. Section 4 of the same decree is hereby further amended to read as follows:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. – The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases
involving: a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the
Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions
in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission
of the offense: (g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled
corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations. (Emphasis ours)
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition, REVERSES the Sandiganbayan decision dated
February 12, 2004 and resolution dated February 2, 2005 in Criminal Cases 26770-75 and 26826-31,
and DIRECTS the Sandiganbayan to REINSTATE these cases, immediately ARRAIGN all the
accused, and resolve accused Raul Aposaga’s motion for reinvestigation.

Case #82

GSIS v. Commission on Audit

G.R. No. 162372, SEPTEMBER 11, 2012
Government Service Insurance System(Gsis), Hermogenes D. Concepcion, .Jr., Winston F.
Garcia, Reynaldo P. Palmiery, Leovigildo P. Arrellano, Elmer T. Bautista, Leonora V. De Jesus,
Fulgencio S. Factoran, Florino O. Ibañez, Aida C. Nocete, Aurora P. Mathay, Enriqueta
Disuanco, Amalio Mallari, Lourdes Patag, Richard M. Martinez, Asuncion C. Sindac, Gloria D.
Caedo, Romeo C. Quilatan, Esperanza Fallorina, Lolita Bacani, Arnulfo Madriaga, Leocadia S.
Fajardo, Benigno Bulaong, Shirley D. Florentino, And Lea M. Mendiola, Petitioners, Vs.
Commission On Audit (Coa), Amorsonia B. Escarda, Ma. Cristina D. Dimagiba, And Reynaldo
P. Ventura, Respondents.

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

Case Digest by: Mikko P. Solis

Subject: Statutory Construction
Topic: Noscitur A Sociis

FACTS:

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Pursuant to the powers granted to it under Section 41() of the said law, the GSIS Board of Trustees
approved a Resolution that adopted the GSIS Employees Loyalty Incentive Plan (ELIP) which was
later renamed to GSIS Retirement/Financial Plan (RFP). On May 30, 1997, RA 8291 or the GSIS Act
was enacted expanding and increasing the coverage and benefits of the GSIS and instituting reforms.
Its objective was to motivate and reward employees for meritorious, faithful and satisfactory service.
To be entitled to the plan, the employee must be qualified to retire with 5 year lump sum under RA
660 or RA 8291 or had previously retired under applicable retirement laws. Dimagiba, the corporate
auditor of GSIS communicated to the President and General Manager of GSIS that the GSIS RFP was
contrary to law. After her request was denied by the president and gen manager, Dimagiba sought the
assistance of COA in determining the legality of the said plan. The COA’s General Counsel issued a
memorandum stating that the GSIS RFP is a supplementary retirement plan, which is prohibited under
the Teves Retirement Law. Since there is no provision in RA 8291 expressly repealing the Teves
Retirement Law, the two laws must be harmonized absent an irreconcilable inconsistency. It also
violates Section 41(n) of RA 8291 which speaks of an early retirement plan or financial assistance.
However, Garcia, the President and Gen. Manager of GSIS, asserted the legality of the plan and stated
that it is in line with the powers granted to its Board of Trustees. Dimagiba did not respond to Garcia,
but she issued Notice of Disallowance on the grounds that GSIS RFP is null and void for
contradicting the prohibition in creating supplemental retirement schemes and violating Section 41 (n)
of RA 8291 which speaks of an early retirement plan or financial assistance.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the GSIS Retirement/ Financial Plan is null and void.

RULING:
Yes. RA 8291 provides for the following: Section 41. Powers and Functions of the GSIS. The GSIS
shall exercise the following powers and functions: (n) to design and adopt an Early Retirement
Incentive Plan (ERIP) and/or financial assistance for the purpose of retirement for its own personnel.
GSIS is granted the power to adopt a retirement plan and/or financial assistance for its employees, but
its must be noted that it is qualified by the words “early”, “incentive”, and “for the purpose of
retirement”. What Section 41(n) contemplates is a situation wherein GSIS, due to circumstances
which calls for termination of some of its employees, must design a plan to encourage, induce, or
motivate these employees, who are not yet qualified for either optional or compulsory retirement
under our laws, to instead voluntarily retire. This means that the retirement plan is actually an
incentive scheme to encourage employees to retire. This is also the interpretation to the phrase
“financial assistance” found in Section 41(n). Under the doctrine of noscitur a sociis, the construction
of a particular word or phrase, which is in itself ambiguous, or is equally susceptible of various
meanings, may be made clear and specific by considering the company of words in which it is found
or with which it is associated. Hence, the financial assistance is also an incentive scheme to induce the
employees to retire early. This is not the case with GSIS RFP. Its objective is to motivate and reward
employees for meritorious, faithful and satisfactory service. It does not pertain to an early retirement
incentive or financial assistance plan, but a mere retirement benefit which is a form of reward for an
employee’s loyalty. Moreover, to avail of this plan, one must be qualified to retire under RA 660 or
RA 8291 o must previously retired under existing retirement laws. This means that GSIS RFP covers
employees who were already eligible to retire or had already retired. this is not included in the scope
of "an early retirement incentive plan or financial assistance for the purpose of retirement. Its purpose
is not to encourage GSIS’s employees to retire before their retirement age, but to augment the
retirement benefits they would receive under our present laws. Thus, the GSIS RFP is a
supplementary retirement plan, which is prohibited by the Teves Retirement Law.

132
Since the Teves Retirement Law was not repealed by RA 8291 because there has been no showing of
any irreconcilable inconsistency between the two laws, the former is still a good law. Hence, GSIS
RFP is null and void for violating the provision against supplementary retirement plans as provided
by the Teves Retirement Law.

Case #83

People v. Delantar
G.R. No. 169143 [Formerly G.R. No. 138328], [February 2, 2007]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs.  SIMPLICIO DELANTAR, appellant. 

TINGA, J.:

Case Digest by: Mikko P. Solis

Subject: Statutory Construction
Topic: Noscitur A Sociis

FACTS:
From 1994 to August 1996, accused Simplicio Delantar, through coercion and influence, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously promote, facilitate and induce [AAA], a female child below
12 years of age, to indulge in sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct for money, profit and other
consideration. AAA was brought by the accused to her first client, an Arab national named Mr.
Hammond at least 11 times to a hotel where he stayed. Delantar would tell AAA that they had to go
to the client so they can pay of their bills, settle something, or they had to ask for money for AAA’s
tuition fees. Once they are left alone, Mr. Hammond would proceed on kissing AAA, her breasts,
embracing her, and inserting his finger inside her vagina. Every single time the trip to the client
ended, AAA would tell Delantar that she doesn’t want to go back as the client was “bastos”. Delantar
would promise that it wouldn’t happen again, but it did. Only then when Mr. Hammond refused to
pay Php 5,000 that they stopped visiting him.  The second client was former Governor Jalosjos. As
with the first client, Jalosjos would tell AAA that they needed the money. The second client, unlike he
first, was successful on having sexual intercourse with AAA (as he was found guilty of two counts of
rape  and 6 counts of acts of lasciviousness in People v. Jalosjos) The RTC found Delantar guily
beyond reasonable doubt when he delivered and pimped AAA to the clients and sentenced him to
Reclusion Perpetua. The CA affirmed and modified the RTC’s ruling; the modification being
sentencing Delantar to pay complainant [AAA] the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P50,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the lower courts erred in sentencing Delantar to the maximum penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua? 

RULING:
The Court held YES.  The penalty prescribed by Section 5 of R.A. No. 7610 is reclusion temporal in
its medium period to reclusion perpetua. However, it was not proven that appellant is the parent or
guardian of AAA. The establishment of either relationship would have justified the imposition of the

133
penalty provided in the law in its maximum.  In the case at bar, the only evidence presented to
establish AAA's alleged relationship to appellant is her birth certificate 76 which mentions appellant
as the father. However, said document does not bear appellant's signature. In fact, appellant, in his
testimony, denied that he is AAA's father. At best, appellant is AAA's de facto guardian. According to
the maxim noscitur a sociis, the correct construction of a word or phrase susceptible of various
meanings may be made clear and specific by considering the company of words in which it is found
or with which it is associated. Section 31 (c), Article XII of R.A. No. 7610 states: (c) The penalty
provided herein shall be imposed in its maximum period when the perpetrator is an ascendant, parent,
guardian, stepparent or collateral relative within the second degree of consanguinity or affinity, or a
manager or owner of an establishment which has no license to operate or its license has expired or has
been revoked. It should be noted that the words with which "guardian" is associated in the provision
all denote a legal relationship. From this description we may safely deduce that the guardian
envisioned by law is a person who has a legal relationship with a ward. This relationship may be
established either by being the ward's biological parent (natural guardian) or by adoption (legal
guardian). Appellant is neither AAA's biological parent nor is he AAA's adoptive father. Clearly,
appellant is not the "guardian" contemplated by law. He is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
sentence of fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as minimum,
to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to
pay a fine in the sum of P20,000.00 to be administered as a cash fund by the Department of Social
Welfare and Development and disbursed for the rehabilitation of AAA,  and P50,000.00 as moral
damages.

Case #84

Chavez v. JBC
G.R. No. 202242, 16 Apr 2013
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioner, vs.
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO and REP. NIEL
C. TUPAS, JR., Respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:

Case Digest by: Mikko P. Solis

Subject: Statutory Construction
Topic: Noscitur A Sociis

FACTS:
The composition of the JBC was substantially altered way back in 1994. Instead of having only seven
(7) members, an eighth (8th) member was added to the JBC as two (2) representatives from Congress
began sitting in the JBC - one from the House of Representatives and one from the Senate, with each
having one-half (1/2) of a vote. Then, curiously, the JBC En Banc, in separate meetings held in 2000
and 2001, decided to allow the representatives from the Senate and the House of Representatives one
full vote each. At present, Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr.
(respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as representatives of the legislature. It is this practice that
the petitioner has questioned in this petition. Respondents argued that the crux of the controversy is
the phrase “a representative of Congress.” It is their theory that the two houses, the Senate and the

134
House of Representatives, are permanent and mandatory components of “Congress,” such that the
absence of either divests the term of its substantive meaning as expressed under the Constitution.
Bicameralism, as the system of choice by the Framers, requires that both houses exercise their
respective powers in the performance of its mandated duty which is to legislate. Thus, when Section
8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution speaks of “a representative from Congress,” it should mean one
representative each from both Houses which comprise the entire Congress. Respondents further argue
that petitioner has no “real interest” in questioning the constitutionality of the JBC’s current
composition. The respondents also question the petitioner's belated filing of the petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the action for declaratory relief is not among those within the original jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court as provided in Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution.

RULING:
Yes, The Constitution as the subject matter, and the validity and construction of Section 8 (1), Article
VIII as the issue raised, the petition should properly be considered as that which would result in the
adjudication of rights sans the execution process because the only relief to be granted is the very
declaration of the rights under the document sought to be construed. It being so, the original
jurisdiction over the petition lies with the appropriate Regional Trial Court (RTC). Notwithstanding
the fact that only questions of law are raised in the petition, an action for declaratory relief is not
among those within the original jurisdiction of this Court as provided in Section 5, Article VIII of the
Constitution.  Under the maxim noscitur a sociis, where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in
itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may be made clear and
specific by considering the company of words in which it is founded or with which it is
associated.―Under the maxim noscitur a sociis, where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in
itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may be made clear and
specific by considering the company of words in which it is founded or with which it is associated.
This is because a word or phrase in a statute is always used in association with other words or phrases,
and its meaning may, thus, be modified or restricted by the latter. The particular words, clauses and
phrases should not be studied as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part of
the statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in order to produce a
harmonious whole. A statute must be so construed as to harmonize and give effect to all its provisions
whenever possible. In short, every meaning to be given to each word or phrase must be ascertained
from the context of the body of the statute since a word or phrase in a statute is always used in
association with other words or phrases and its meaning may be modified or restricted by the latter.

Case #85

Canet v. Mayor Julieta Decena

G.R. No. 155344, 20 Jan 2004
ROLANDO N. CANET, Petitioner, vs.
MAYOR JULIETA A. DECENA, Respondent.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Case Digest by: Mikko P. Solis

Subject: Statutory Construction

135
Topic: Noscitur A Sociis

FACTS:
On July 27, 1998, the Sangguniang Bayan of Bula, Camarines Sur, passed Resolution No. 049 Series
of 1998, authorizing petitioner Rolando N. Canet to establish, operate and maintain a cockpit in Sitio,
Cabaya, San Roque, Bula, Camarines Sur. Canet, relying on Resolution No. 049, Series of 1998, filed
an application for mayor’s permit. Mayor Julieta Decena denied the application since under the Local
Government Code of 1991, the authority to give licenses for such business is vested in the
Sangguniang Bayan. Moreover, Mayor Decena could not issue the permit as well because there was
no ordinance passed by the Sangguniang Bayan to authorize it. On July 26, 1999, Canet filed a
complaint against Decena for mandamus and damages with application for preliminary mandatory
injunction in RTC of Pili, Camarines Sur, Branch XXXI. Decena’s move to dismiss the complaint
was denied. The writ of preliminary mandatory injunction was issued on Feb. 1, 2000. Decena, on the
other hand, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals. On April 3, 2000,
the CA issued a temporary restraining order instructing Canet and the presiding judge to temporarily
cease and desist from enforcing the writ of preliminary injunction issued on Feb. 1, 2000.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Decena, in her capacity as Municipal Mayor, can be compelled to issue the necessary
business permit to petitioner absent a municipal ordinance which would empower her to do so.

RULING:
No, since there was no ordinance allowing the operation of cockpit, it cannot be implemented. It is a
basic precept of statutory construction that the express mention of one person, thing, act, or
consequence excludes all others, as expressed in the maxim expression unius est exlusio alterius and
expressium facit cessare tacitum what is expressed puts an end to what is implied. The writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction issued by respondent Judge are ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE
while the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued by the Court of Appeals on July 10, 2002 is
made permanent.

Case #86

Atienza v. Villaros
G.R. No. 161081, 10 May 2005
RAMON M. ATIENZA, in his capacity as Vice-Governor of the Province of Occidental
Mindoro, petitioner, vs. JOSE T. VILLAROSA, in his capacity as Governor of the Province of
Occidental Mindoro, respondent.

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Case Digest by: Mikko P. Solis

Subject: Statutory Construction
Topic: Doctrine of Necessary Implication

FACTS:

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On June 25, 2002, Occidental Mindoro Governor Jose VILLAROSA issued a memorandum
concerning the authority to sign purchase orders of supplies, materials, equipment, and repairs needed
by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. The memo stated that all such purchase orders must be signed by
the Governor, citing as basis DILG Opinion 148, s. 1993. Occidental Mindoro Vice Governor Ramon
ATIENZA responded on the bases of the DILG Opinion 96, s. 1995, as affirmed by COA Opinions of
Jun. 28, Apr. 11, and Feb. 9, 1994. He also cited LGC 466 and 468 as bases for the separation of the
legislative and executive powers at the provincial level. On July 1, 2002, Villarosa responded by
issuing a memorandum terminating the casual and job order employees recommended or hired by
Atienza. These employees included 28 plus clerks, 30 utility workers, and an x-ray technician.
Villarosa claims that the employees were redundant and that they bloated the bureaucrac. On July 3,
2002, Villarosa issued another memorandum regarding the “Enforcibility of previous memoranda
Issued on June 20, 26 and July 1, 2002 to be adhered to for strict compliance. July 9, 2002 – Atienza
raised his objections to the 2 memoranda, invoking the separation of powers at a provincial level,
where the legislature is headed by the Vice Governor and the executive is headed by the Governor.
Atienza thus filed a petition for prohibition before the CA, assailing the 2 memoranda as having been
issued with grave abuse of discretion. The petitioner claimed that the memoranda excluded him from
the use and enjoyment of his office in violation of the pertinent provision of the LGC. He prayed that
Villarosa be enjoined from implementing the 2 memoranda. The CA dismissed the petition for
prohibition. Atienza and Villarosa’s terms have ceased on June 30, 2004. Atienza did not seek re-
election, while Villarosa lost his re-election bid, so the case has become moot. 

ISSUES:
Whether or not the vice-governor is authorized to approve purchase orders issued in connection with
the procurement of supplies, materials, equipment, including fuel, repairs and maintenance of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan.

Whether or not the Governor has the authority to terminate or cancel the appointments of casual/job
order employees of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan and the Office of the Vice-Governor.

RULING:
Yes, the vice-governor is authorized to approve purchase orders. The doctrine of necessary
implication states that what is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as that which is expressed.
Every statute is understood by implication to contain all such provisions as may be necessary to
effectuate its purpose or to make effective rights, powers, privileges or jurisdiction.  In this case, the
authority granted to the Vice-Governor to sign all warrants draw on on the provincial treasury for all
expenditures appropriated for the operation of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan as well as to approve
disbursement vouchers which includes the authority to approve purchase orders covering the same
applying the doctrine of necessary implication.  Hence, the Vice-Governor shall be the presiding
officer of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan and can sign all warrants drawn on the provincial treasury
for all expenditures appropriated for the operation of the sangguniang panlalawigan.

No, the Governor has no authority to terminate or cancel the appointments. According to Rep. Act
No. 716, Sec. 465 (b), for efficient, effective and economical governance the purpose of which is the
general welfare of the province and its inhabitants, the provincial governor shall appoint all officials
and employees whose salaries and wages are wholly or mainly paid out of provincial funds and whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for in this Code, as well as those he may be authorized by
law to appoint. In here, the Vice-Governor, as stated in Sec. 466 of the Local Government Code

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where subject to civil service law, rules and regulations, appoint all officials and employees of the
sangguniang panlalawigan, except those whose manner of appointment is specifically provided in this
Code. Thus, while the Governor has the authority to appoint officials and employees whose salaries
are paid out of the provincial funds, this does not extend to the officials and employees of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan because such authority is lodged with the Vice-Governor. In the same
manner, the authority to appoint casual and job order employees of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan belongs to the Vice-Governor.

Case #87

Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Dando

G.R. No. 177456, 4 Sep 2009
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Petitioner, vs. DOMINGO R. DANDO, Respondent.

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Case Digest by: Mikko P. Solis

Subject: Statutory Construction
Topic: "shall," "must," or "ought"

FACTS:
The Complaint alleged that on or about 12 August 1994, Dando availed of a loan in the amount of
₱750,000.00 from Far East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC), under a Privilege Cheque Credit Line
Agreement. The instant Petition stemmed from a Complaint for Sum of Money and Damages filed on
13 March 2003 by BPI against Dando before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 03-281. The
parties agreed that Dando would pay FEBTC the principal amount of the loan, in lump sum, at the end
of 90 days; and interest thereon every 30 days, the periods reckoned from the time of availment of the
loan. Dando defaulted in the payment of the principal amount of the loan, as well as the interest and
penalties thereon. Despite repeated demands, Dando refused and/or failed to pay his just and valid
obligation. In 2000, BPI and FEBTC merged, with the former as the surviving entity, thus, absorbing
the rights and obligations of the latter. After Dando filed with the RTC his Answer with
Counterclaim, BPI filed its Motion to Set Case for Pre-Trial. Acting on the said Motion, the RTC,
through Acting Presiding Judge Oscar B. Pimentel (Judge Pimentel), issued an Order on 11 June 2003
setting Civil Case No. 03-281 for pre-trial conference on 18 August 2003. Judge Pimentel
subsequently issued, on 16 June 2003, a Notice of Pre-Trial Conference, which directed the parties to
submit their respective pre-trial briefs at least three days before the scheduled date of pre-trial. Dando
submitted his Pre-trial Brief to the RTC on 11 August 2003. BPI, on the other hand, filed its Pre-trial
Brief with the RTC, and furnished Dando with a copy thereof, only on 18 August 2003, the very day
of the scheduled Pre-Trial Conference. When the parties appeared before the RTC on 18 August 2003
for the scheduled Pre-Trial Conference, Dando orally moved for the dismissal of Civil Case No. 03-
281, citing Sections 5 and 6, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court. The RTC, through an Order issued on the
same day, required Dando to file a written motion within five days from the receipt of the said Order
and BPI to file its comment and/or opposition thereto. On 25 August 2003, Dando filed with the RTC
his written Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No. 03-281, for violation of the mandatory rule on filing of
pre-trial briefs. BPI filed an Opposition to Dando’s Motion, arguing that its filing with the RTC of the
Pre-Trial Brief on 18 August 2003 should be considered as compliance with the rules of procedure

138
given that the Pre-Trial Conference did not proceed as scheduled on said date. In an Order dated 10
October 2003, the RTC granted Dando’s Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No. 03-281.

BPI filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the 10 October 2003 Order of the RTC, praying for the
liberal interpretation of the rules. Expectedly, Dando filed his Comment/Opposition thereto. On 13
January 2004, the RTC, now presided by Judge Cesar O. Untalan (Judge Untalan), issued an Order
resolving the Motion for Reconsideration of BPI as follows: The Court finds merit in plaintiff’s
motion.

ISSUE:
Whether or not that RTC Judge Untalan committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, in issuing its Order dated 13 January 2004.

RULING:
No. Relevant herein are the following provisions of the Rules of Court on pre-trial: Rule 18 PRE-
TRIAL SEC. 6. Pre-trial brief. – The parties shall file with the court and serve on the adverse party, in
such manner as shall ensure their receipt thereof at least three (3) days before the date of the pre-trial,
their respective pre-trial briefs which shall contain, among others: Failure to file the pre-trial brief
shall have the same effect as failure to appear at the pre-trial. SEC. 5. Effect of failure to appear. –
The failure of the plaintiff to appear when so required pursuant to the next preceding section shall be
cause for dismissal of the action. The dismissal shall be with prejudice, unless otherwise ordered by
the court. A similar failure on the part of the defendant shall be cause to allow the plaintiff to present
his evidence ex parte and the court to render judgment on the basis thereof. (Emphases ours.) It is a
basic legal construction that where words of command such as "shall," "must," or "ought" are
employed, they are generally and ordinarily regarded as mandatory. Thus, where, as in Rule 18,
Sections 5 and 6 of the Rules of Court, the word "shall" is used, a mandatory duty is imposed, which
the courts ought to enforce. The Court is fully aware that procedural rules are not to be belittled or
simply disregarded for these prescribed procedures insure an orderly and speedy administration of
justice. However, it is equally true that litigation is not merely a game of technicalities. Law and
jurisprudence grant to courts the prerogative to relax compliance with procedural rules of even the
most mandatory character, mindful of the duty to reconcile both the need to put an end to litigation
speedily and the parties’ right to an opportunity to be heard. This is not to say that adherence to the
Rules could be dispensed with. However, exigencies and situations might occasionally demand
flexibility in their application. In not a few instances, the Court relaxed the rigid application of the
rules of procedure to afford the parties the opportunity to fully ventilate their cases on the merit. This
is in line with the time-honored principle that cases should be decided only after giving all parties the
chance to argue their causes and defenses. Technicality and procedural imperfection should, thus, not
serve as basis of decisions. In that way, the ends of justice would be better served. For, indeed, the
general objective of procedure is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of
contending parties, bearing always in mind that procedure is not to hinder but to promote the
administration of justice. Accordingly, the ends of justice and fairness would be best served if the
parties to Civil Case No. 03-281 are given the full opportunity to thresh out the real issues and litigate
their claims in a full-blown trial. Besides, Dando would not be prejudiced should the RTC proceed
with the hearing of Civil Case No. 03-281, as he is not stripped of any affirmative defenses nor
deprived of due process of law.

Case #88

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Diokno v. Rehabilitation Finance Corporation
G.R. No. L-4712, 11 Jul 1952. 
RAMON DIOKNO, plaintiff-appellant, vs. REHABILITATION FINANCE
CORPORATION, defendant-appellee.

LABRADOR, J.:

Case Digest by: Mikko P. Solis

Subject: Statutory Construction
Topic: "shall," "must," or "ought"

FACTS:
Plaintiff, Ramon Diokno, is the holder of a back-pay certificate of indebtedness issued by the
Treasurer of the Philippines under the provisions of Republic Act No. 304. When this action was
brought, he had an outstanding loan with the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation amounting to
P50,000, of which P47,355.28 was still unpaid.  In this action he seeks to compel the defendant
corporation to accept payment of the balance of his indebtedness with his back pay certificate.   The
defendant resists the suit on the ground that plaintiff's demand is not only not authorized by Section 2
of Republic Act No. 304 but contrary to the provisions thereof, and furthermore because plaintiff's
loan was obtained on January 27, 1950, much after the passage of Republic Act No. 304, and because
the law permits only "acceptance or discount of backpay certificates," not the repayment of loans. The
court a quo held that Section 2 of Republic Act No. 304 is permissive merely, and that even if it were
mandatory, plaintiff's case cannot fall thereunder because he is not acquiring property for a home or
constructing a residential house, but compelling the acceptance of his backpay certificate to pay a debt
he contracted after the enactment of Republic Act No. 304.  It, therefore, dismissed the complaint
with costs.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Diokno can use his back pay certificate to pay for his loan?

RULING:
No. While it is true that its ordinary signification the word "shall" is imperative, the rule is not
absolute. In common or ordinary parlance, and in its ordinary signification, the term "shall" is a word
of command, and one which has always or which must be given compulsory meaning; as denoting
obligation. It has a preemptory meaning, and it is generally imperative or mandatory.  However, it
may be construed as "many", when so required by the context or by the intention of the statute. In the
ordinary signification, "shall" is imperative, and not permissive, though it may have the latter meaning
when required by the context. The word "shall" is generally regarded as imperative, but in some
context it is given a permissive meaning, the intended meaning being determined by what is intended
by the statute. In the provision subject controversy, it is to be noted that the verb-phrase "shall accept
or discount" has two modifiers, namely, "subject to availability of loanable funds" and "at not more
than  two per centum per annum for ten years."  As to the second modifier, the interest to be charged,
there seems to be no question that the verb phrase is mandatory, because not only does the law use "at
not more" but the legislative purpose and intent, to conserve the value of the backpay certificate for
the benefit of the holders, for whose benefit the same have been issued, can be carried out by fixing a
maximum limit for discounts. But as to when the discounting or acceptance shall be made, the context

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and the sense demand a contrary interpretation. The phrase "subject" means "being under the
contingency of" (Webster's Int. Dict.) a condition. If the acceptance or discount of the certificates to
be "subject" to the condition of the availability of a loanable funds, it is evident that the Legislature
intended that the acceptance shall be allowed on the condition that there are "available loanable
funds." In other words, acceptance or discount is to be permitted only if there are loanable funds.
Thus, Diokno cannot use his backpay certificate to pay for his loan to RFC.

Case #89

Gachon v. Devera, Jr.

G.R. No. 116695, 20 Jun 1997
VICTORIA G. GACHON and ALEX GUEVARA, petitioners, vs.
HON. NORBERTO C. DEVERA, JR., Presiding Judge, Branch XXIV, RTC, Iloilo City; HON.
JOSE R. ASTORGA, Presiding Judge, Branch I, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Iloilo City;
and SUSANA GUEVARA, represented by her attorney-in-fact, ROSALIE
GUEVARA, respondents.

PANGANIBAN J.:

Case Digest by: Mikko P. Solis

Subject: Statutory Construction
Topic: "shall," "must," or "ought"

FACTS:
Summons were served on and received by petitioners on August 25, 1993, directing them to file an
answer within the reglementary period of 10 days. Patricio Guevara was abroad at that time; hence,
the MTCC did not acquire jurisdiction over him. A complaint for forcible entry was filed by private
respondent Susana Guevara against Patricio Guevara and petitioners Victoria Gachon and Alex
Guevara before the Municipal Trial Court for Cities of Iloilo CityOn September 4, 1993, petitioners
filed with the MTCC an urgent motion for extension of time to file an answer. On September 7, 1993,
the MTCC denied the motion on the ground that it was a prohibited pleading under the rule on
summary procedure. On September 8, 1993, or more than 10 days from their receipt of the summons,
petitioner submitted an urgent motion praying for the admission of their answer, which was attached
thereto. Two days later, petitioners filed another motion pleading for the admission of an amended
answer. On September 23, 1993, the MTCC denied the motions and considered the case submitted for
resolution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 6, of the rule on summary procedure, Mandatory or directory statutes, such
that an answer filed beyond the time stated be accepted.

RULING:
Section 6, of the rule on summary procedure is a mandatory Statute, thus answers must be filed within
the reglementary period. It is clear that the use of the word “shall” in the rule on summary procedure
underscores the mandatory character of the challenge provisions. Giving the provisions a directory

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application would subvert the nature of the rule on summary procedure and defeat its objective and
expediting the adjudication of suits. WHEREFORE, the petition is denied, and the assailed decision is
affirmed in toto. Double costs against petitioners.

Case #90

Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 117188, 7 Aug 1997
LOYOLA GRAND VILLAS HOMEOWNERS (SOUTH) ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner, vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HOME INSURANCE AND GUARANTY CORPORATION,
EMDEN ENCARNACION and HORATIO AYCARDO, respondents.

ROMERO, J.:

Case Digest by: Mikko P. Solis

Subject: Statutory Construction
Topic: "shall," "must," or "ought"

FACTS:
Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners Association (LGVHA) was organized on February 8, 1983. They
are the sole homeowners' association in Loyola Grand Villas, a duly registered subdivision in Quezon
City and Marikina City that was owned and developed by Solid Homes, Inc. It was registered with the
Home Financing Corporation, the predecessor of herein respondent HIGC, as the sole homeowners'
organization in the said subdivision under Certificate of Registration No. 04-197. For unknown
reasons, however, LGVHAI did not file its corporate by-laws.  Sometime in 1988, the officers of the
LGVHAI tried to register its by-laws. They failed to do so. To the officers' consternation, they
discovered that there were two other organizations within the subdivision — the North Association
and the South Association. According to private respondents, a non-resident and Soliven himself (the
developer), respectively headed these associations. They also discovered that these associations had
five (5) registered homeowners each who were also the incorporators, directors and officers thereof.
None of the members of the LGVHAI was listed as member of the North Association while three (3)
members of LGVHAI were listed as members of the South Association. In July, 1989, when Soliven
inquired about the status of LGVHAI, Atty. Joaquin A. Bautista, the head of the legal department of
the HIGC, informed him that LGVHAI had been automatically dissolved for two reasons. First, it did
not submit its by-laws within the period required by the Corporation Code and, second, there was
non-user of corporate charter because HIGC had not received any report on the association's
activities. Apparently, this information resulted in the registration of the South Association with the
HIGC. These developments prompted the officers of the LGVHAI to lodge a complaint with the
HIGC. They questioned the revocation of LGVHAI's certificate of registration without due notice and
hearing and concomitantly prayed for the cancellation of the certificates of registration of the North
and South Associations by reason of the earlier issuance of a certificate of registration in favor of
LGVHAI. On January 26, 1993, after due notice and hearing, private respondents obtained a
favorable ruling from HIGC Hearing Officer who disposed of HIGC Case No. RRM-5-89 as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered recognizing the Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners
Association, Inc., as the duly registered and existing homeowners association for Loyola Grand Villas

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homeowners. South Association appealed to the Appeals Board of the HIGC, but this was dismissed
for lack of merit.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the LGVHAI's failure to file its by-laws within the period prescribed by Section 46 of
the Corporation Code had the effect of automatically dissolving the said corporation.

RULING:
Taken as a whole and under the principle that the best interpreter of a statute is the statute itself
(optima statuli interpretatix est ipsum statutum), Section 46 aforequoted reveals the legislative intent
to attach a directory, and not mandatory, meaning for the word "must" in the first sentence thereof.
Note should be taken of the second paragraph of the law which allows the filing of the by-laws even
prior to incorporation. This provision in the same section of the Code rules out mandatory compliance
with the requirement of filing the by-laws "within one (1) month after receipt of official notice of the
issuance of its certificate of incorporation by the Securities and Exchange Commission." It necessarily
follows that failure to file the by-laws within that period does not imply the "demise" of the
corporation. By-laws may be necessary for the "government" of the corporation but these are
subordinate to the articles of incorporation as well as to the Corporation Code and related
statutes.There are in fact cases where by-laws are unnecessary to corporate existence or to the valid
exercise of corporate powers, thus: In the absence of charter or statutory provisions to the contrary,
by-laws are not necessary either to the existence of a corporation or to the valid exercise of the powers
conferred upon it, certainly in all cases where the charter sufficiently provides for the government of
the body; and even where the governing statute in express terms confers upon the corporation the
power to adopt by-laws, the failure to exercise the power will be ascribed to mere nonaction which
will not render void any acts of the corporation which would otherwise be valid.  (Emphasis
supplied.) As correctly postulated by the petitioner, interpretation of this provision of law begins with
the determination of the meaning and import of the word "must" in this section Ordinarily, the word
"must" connotes an imperative act or operates to impose a duty which may be enforced.  It is
synonymous with "ought" which connotes compulsion or mandatoriness.  However, the word "must"
in a statute, like "shall," is not always imperative. It may be consistent with an exercise of discretion.
In this jurisdiction, the tendency has been to interpret "shall" as the context or a reasonable
construction of the statute in which it is used demands or requires. This is equally true as regards the
word "must." Thus, if the languages of a statute considered as a whole and with due regard to its
nature and object reveals that the legislature intended to use the words "shall" and "must" to be
directory, they should be given that meaning.

Case #90

Hacienda Luisita, Inc. v. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council

G.R. No. 171101, July 5, 2011
HACIENDA LUISITA, INCORPORATED, Petitioner,
LUISITA INDUSTRIAL PARK CORPORATION and RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING
CORPORATION, Petitioners-in-Intervention, vs.
PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN REFORM COUNCIL; SECRETARY NASSER
PANGANDAMAN OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM; ALYANSA NG
MGA MANGGAGAWANG BUKID NG HACIENDA LUISITA, RENE GALANG, NOEL

143
MALLARI, and JULIO SUNIGA1 and his SUPERVISORY GROUP OF THE HACIENDA
LUISITA, INC. and WINDSOR ANDAYA, Respondents.

VELASCO, JR., J.:

Case Digest by: Mikko P. Solis

Subject: Statutory Construction
Topic: Operative Fact Doctrine

FACTS:
Hacienda Luisita de Tarlac (Hacienda Luisita) was a 6,443-hectare mixed agricultural-industrial-
residential expanse straddling several municipalities of Tarlac and owned by Compañia General de
Tabacos de Filipinas (Tabacalera). In 1957, the Spanish owners of Tabacalera offered to sell Hacienda
Luisita as well as their controlling interest in the sugar mill within the hacienda, the Central Azucarera
de Tarlac (CAT), as an indivisible transaction. The Tarlac Development Corporation (Tadeco), then
owned and/or controlled by the Jose Cojuangco, Sr. Group, agreed to buy and undertook to pay the
purchase price for Hacienda Luisita in pesos, while that for the controlling interest in CAT, in US
dollars.
The Philippine government, through the then Central Bank of the Philippines, assisted the buyer
(Tadeco) to obtain a dollar loan from a US bank. Also, the Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS) Board of Trustees extended a PhP 5.911 million loan in favor of Tadeco to pay the peso price
component of the sale. One of the conditions contained in the approving GSIS Resolution No. 3203,
as later amended by Resolution No. 356, Series of 1958, was that “the lots comprising the Hacienda
Luisita shall be subdivided by [Tadeco] and sold at cost to the tenants, should there be any, and
whenever conditions should exist warranting such action under the provisions of the Land Tenure
Act.” As of March 31, 1958, Tadeco had fully paid the purchase price for Hacienda Luisita and
Tabacalera’s interest in CAT. In 1980, the martial law administration filed a suit before the RTC
against Tadeco, et al. for them to surrender Hacienda Luisita to the [now] Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) so that the land can be distributed to farmers at cost. Responding, Tadeco alleged that
Hacienda Luisita does not have tenants, and sugar lands are not covered by existing agrarian reform
legislations. The RTC rendered judgment ordering Tadeco to surrender Hacienda Luisita to the MAR.
Tadeco appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). However, in 1988, the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) moved to withdraw the government’s case against Tadeco. The CA dismissed the case, but
subject to the condition that Tadeco obtain the approval of the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council
(PARC) of a stock distribution plan (SDP). Pursuant thereto, Tadeco organized a spin-off corporation,
Hacienda Luisita, Inc. (HLI), as vehicle to facilitate stock acquisition by the farmworkers. For this
purpose, Tadeco assigned and conveyed to HLI the agricultural land portion (4,915.75 hectares) and
other farm-related properties of Hacienda Luisita in exchange for HLI shares of stock. To
accommodate the assets transfer from Tadeco to HLI, the latter, with the Securities and Exchange
Commission’s (SEC’s) approval, increased its capital stock from PhP 1.5 million to PhP 400 Million
divided into 400 million shares with par value of PhP 1/share. 150 million of the shares were to be
issued only to qualified and registered beneficiaries of the CARP, and the remaining 250 million to
any stockholder of the corporation. On May 9, 1989, some 93% of the then farmworker-beneficiaries
(FWBs) complement of Hacienda Luisita signified in a referendum their acceptance of the proposed
HLI’s Stock Distribution Option Plan. The Stock Distribution Option Agreement (SDOA), styled as a
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), was entered into by Tadeco, HLI, and the 5,848 qualified FWBs
and attested to by then DAR Secretary Philip Juico. Under the SDOA, included as part of the
distribution plan are: (a) production-sharing equivalent to three percent (3%) of gross sales from the

144
production of the agricultural land payable to the FWBs in cash dividends or incentive bonus; and (b)
distribution of free homelots of not more than 240 square meters each to family-beneficiaries. The
production-sharing, as the SDP indicated, is payable “irrespective of whether [HLI] makes money or
not,” implying that the benefits do not partake the nature of dividends, as the term is ordinarily
understood under corporation law. In a follow-up referendum the DAR conducted, 5,117 FWBs opted
to receive shares in HLI. 132 chose actual land distribution. The PARC, by Resolution No. 89-12-2,
approved the SDP of Tadeco/HLI. In 1995, HLI applied for the conversion of 500 hectares of land of
the hacienda from agricultural to industrial use, pursuant to Sec. 65 of Republic Act No. 6657. The
DAR approved the application per DAR Conversion Order No. 030601074-764-(95), subject to
payment of 3% of the gross selling price to the FWBs and to HLI’s continued compliance with its
undertakings under the SDP, among other conditions. In 1996, HLI, in exchange for subscription of
12 million shares of stocks of Centennary Holdings, Inc., ceded 300 hectares of the converted area to
the latter. Consequently, TCT No. 292091 was issued in the name of Centennary. Centennary is
wholly-owned by HLI. HLI transferred the remaining 200 hectares covered by TCT No. 287909 to
Luisita Realty Corporation (LRC) in two separate transactions, both uniformly involving 100 hectares
for PhP 250 million each. Subsequently, Centennary sold the entire 300 hectares to Luisita Industrial
Park Corporation (LIPCO) for PhP 750 million. The latter acquired it for the purpose of developing an
industrial complex. The land was subdivided by LIPCO into two titles, covering 180 and four
hectares. Later, LIPCO transferred the land to the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) by
way of dacion en pago in payment of LIPCO’s PhP 431,695,732.10 loan obligations. Apart from the
500 hectares, another 80.51 hectares were later detached from the area coverage of Hacienda Luisita
which had been acquired by the government as part of the Subic-Clark-Tarlac Expressway (SCTEX)
complex. Hence, 4,335.75 hectares remained of the original 4,915 hectares Tadeco ceded to HLI.Two
separate petitions were filed by respondents (naming themselves the Supervisory Group and
AMBALA group) with the DAR to revoke the SDOA, alleging that HLI had failed to give them their
dividends and the one percent (1%) share in gross sales, as well as the thirty-three percent (33%)
share in the proceeds of the sale of the converted 500 hectares of land. They further claimed that their
lives have not improved contrary to the promise and rationale for the adoption of the SDOA. They
prayed for a renegotiation of the SDOA, or, in the alternative, its revocation. Subsequently, DAR Sec.
Pangandaman recommended to the PARC Executive Committee (Excom) (a) the recall/revocation of
PARC Resolution No. 89-12-2 approving HLI’s SDP; and (b) the acquisition of Hacienda Luisita
through the compulsory acquisition scheme.
PARC issued the assailed Resolution No. 2005-32-01 directing that the lands subject of the revoked
SDO plan be placed under the compulsory coverage or mandated land acquisition scheme of the
CARP.

ISSUES:
Whether or not public respondents PARC and Secretary Pangandaman have jurisdiction, power and/or
authority to nullify, recall, revoke or rescind the SDOA.

Whether or not Section 31 of RA 6657 is unconstitutional.

Whether or not Operative Fact Doctrine is applicable in the case.

RULING:

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(1) YES. Under Sec. 31 of RA 6657, as implemented by DAO 10, the authority to approve the plan
for stock distribution of the corporate landowner belongs to PARC. However, contrary to petitioner
HLI’s posture, PARC also has the power to revoke the SDP which it previously approved. It may be,
as urged, that RA 6657 or other executive issuances on agrarian reform do not explicitly vest the
PARC with the power to revoke/recall an approved SDP. Such power or authority, however, is
deemed possessed by PARC under the principle of necessary implication, a basic postulate that what
is implied in a statute is as much a part of it as that which is expressed.

We have explained that "every statute is understood, by implication, to contain all such provisions as
may be necessary to effectuate its object and purpose, or to make effective rights, powers, privileges
or jurisdiction which it grants, including all such collateral and subsidiary consequences as may be
fairly and logically inferred from its terms." Further, "every statutory grant of power, right or
privilege is deemed to include all incidental power, right or privilege.

Following the doctrine of necessary implication, it may be stated that the conferment of express
power to approve a plan for stock distribution of the agricultural land of corporate owners necessarily
includes the power to revoke or recall the approval of the plan.

As public respondents aptly observe, to deny PARC such revocatory power would reduce it into a
toothless agency of CARP, because the very same agency tasked to ensure compliance by the
corporate landowner with the approved SDP would be without authority to impose sanctions for non-
compliance with it.98 With the view We take of the case, only PARC can effect such revocation.

(2) NO. SECTION 31 OF RA 6657 IS CONSTITUTIONAL.

Farmworkers Agrarian Reform Movement (FARM) asks for the invalidation of Sec. 31 of RA 6657,
insofar as it affords the corporation, as a mode of CARP compliance, to resort to stock distribution, an
arrangement which, to FARM, impairs the fundamental right of farmers and farmworkers under Sec.
4, Art. XIII of the Constitution.106

To a more specific, but direct point, FARM argues that Sec. 31 of RA 6657 permits stock transfer in
lieu of outright agricultural land transfer; in fine, there is stock certificate ownership of the farmers or
farmworkers instead of them owning the land, as envisaged in the Constitution. For FARM, this
modality of distribution is an anomaly to be annulled for being inconsistent with the basic concept of
agrarian reform ingrained in Sec. 4, Art. XIII of the Constitution.107

Reacting, HLI insists that agrarian reform is not only about transfer of land ownership to farmers and
other qualified beneficiaries. It draws attention in this regard to Sec. 3(a) of RA 6657 on the concept
and scope of the term "agrarian reform." The constitutionality of a law, HLI added, cannot, as here, be
attacked collaterally.

Not all the requisites for judicial review are present.

When the Court is called upon to exercise its power of judicial review over, and pass upon the
constitutionality of, acts of the executive or legislative departments, it does so only when the
following essential requirements are first met, to wit:

(1) there is an actual case or controversy;

146
(2) that the constitutional question is raised at the earliest possible opportunity
(3) the action is brought by a proper party or one with locus standi; and
(4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

It took the Farmworkers Agrarian Reform Movement (FARM) some eighteen (18) years from
November 21, 1989 before it challenged the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657. The question of
constitutionality will not be passed upon by the Court unless it is properly raised and presented in an
appropriate case at the first opportunity. FARM is, therefore, remiss in belatedly questioning the
constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657. The second requirement that the constitutional question
should be raised at the earliest possible opportunity is clearly wanting.

The last but the most important requisite that the constitutional issue must be the very lis mota of the
case does not likewise obtain. The lis mota aspect is not present, the constitutional issue tendered not
being critical to the resolution of the case. The unyielding rule has been to avoid, whenever plausible,
an issue assailing the constitutionality of a statute or governmental act. If some other grounds exist by
which judgment can be made without touching the constitutionality of a law, such recourse is
favored.111 Garcia v. Executive Secretary explains why: Lis Mota — the fourth requirement to
satisfy before this Court will undertake judicial review — means that the Court will not pass upon a
question of unconstitutionality, although properly presented, if the case can be disposed of on some
other ground, such as the application of the statute or the general law. The petitioner must be able to
show that the case cannot be legally resolved unless the constitutional question raised is determined.
This requirement is based on the rule that every law has in its favor the presumption of
constitutionality; to justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution, and not one that is doubtful, speculative, or argumentative. Constitutional issue has been
rendered moot and academic (stock distribution scheme under Sec. 31 of RA 6657 is no longer an
available option under existing law)

Sec. 5 of RA 9700, amending Sec. 7 of RA 6657, has all but superseded Sec. 31 of RA 6657 vis-a-vis
the stock distribution component of said Sec. 31. In its pertinent part, Sec. 5 of RA 9700 provides:
“[T]hat after June 30, 2009, the modes of acquisition shall be limited to voluntary offer to sell and
compulsory acquisition.” Thus, for all intents and purposes, the stock distribution scheme under Sec.
31 of RA 6657 is no longer an available option under existing law. The question of whether or not it is
unconstitutional should be a moot issue.

The Court, in some cases, has proceeded to resolve constitutional issues otherwise already moot and
academic provided the following requisites are present: (i) there is a grave violation of the
Constitution (ii) the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is
involved (iii) when the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to
guide the bench, the bar, and the public
(iv) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. Sec. 31 of RA 6657 is constitutional as it
simply implements Sec. 4 of Art. XIII of the Constitution that land can be owned collectively by
farmers. Sec. 4, Article XIII of the Constitution reads, in part: “The State shall, by law, undertake an
agrarian reform program founded on the right of the farmers and regular farmworkers, who are
landless, to OWN directly or COLLECTIVELY THE LANDS THEY TILL or, in the case of other
farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof....”

The Constitution allows two (2) modes of land distribution—direct and indirect ownership. Direct
transfer to individual farmers is the most commonly used method by DAR and widely accepted.

147
Indirect transfer through collective ownership of the agricultural land is the alternative to direct
ownership of agricultural land by individual farmers. The aforequoted Sec. 4 expressly authorizes
collective ownership by farmers. No language can be found in the 1987 Constitution that disqualifies
or prohibits corporations or cooperatives of farmers from being the legal entity through which
collective ownership can be exercised. By using the word “collectively,” the Constitution allows for
indirect ownership of land and not just outright agricultural land transfer. This is in recognition of the
fact that land reform may become successful even if it is done through the medium of juridical entities
composed of farmers. Collective ownership is permitted in two (2) provisions of RA 6657. Its Sec. 29
allows workers’ cooperatives or associations to collectively own the land, while the second paragraph
of Sec. 31 allows corporations or associations to own agricultural land with the farmers becoming
stockholders or members. Sec. 31 of RA 6657 is constitutional as it simply implements Sec. 4 of Art.
XIII of the Constitution that land can be owned COLLECTIVELY by farmers. The wisdom of
Congress in allowing a stock distribution plan through a corporation as an alternative mode of
implementing agrarian reform is not for judicial determination. Established jurisprudence tells us that
it is not within the province of the Court to inquire into the wisdom of the law, for, indeed, We are
bound by words of the statute. Sec. 4, Art. XIII of the Constitution is not self-executory.

Likewise, Sec. 4, Art. XIII of the Constitution makes mention of a commitment on the part of the
State to pursue, by law, an agrarian reform program...but subject to such priorities as Congress may
prescribe. This necessarily implies that the above constitutional provision is not self-executory and
that legislation is needed to implement the urgently needed program of agrarian reform. And RA 6657
has been enacted precisely pursuant to and as a mechanism to carry out the constitutional directives.
DAR and PARC must ensure that the farmers should always own majority of the common shares
entitled to elect the members of the board of directors to ensure that the farmers retain control over the
agricultural land

FARM contends that the farmers in the stock distribution scheme under Sec. 31 of RA 6657 do not
own the agricultural land but are merely given stock certificates. Thus, the farmers lose control over
the land to the board of directors and executive officials of the corporation who actually manage the
land. They conclude that such arrangement runs counter to the mandate of the Constitution that any
agrarian reform must preserve the control over the land in the hands of the tiller. While it is true that
the farmer is issued stock certificates and does not directly own the land, still, the Corporation Code is
clear that the FWB becomes a stockholder who acquires an equitable interest in the assets of the
corporation, which include the agricultural lands. It was explained that the “equitable interest of the
shareholder in the property of the corporation is represented by the term stock, and the extent of his
interest is described by the term shares. The expression shares of stock when qualified by words
indicating number and ownership expresses the extent of the owner’s interest in the corporate
property. A share of stock typifies an aliquot part of the corporation’s property, or the right to share in
its proceeds to that extent when distributed according to law and equity and that its holder is not the
owner of any part of the capital of the corporation. The FWBs will ultimately own the agricultural
lands owned by the corporation when the corporation is eventually dissolved and liquidated.

There is nothing unconstitutional in the formula prescribed by RA 6657. The policy on agrarian
reform is that control over the agricultural land must always be in the hands of the farmers. Then it
falls on the shoulders of DAR and PARC to see to it the farmers should always own majority of the
common shares entitled to elect the members of the board of directors to ensure that the farmers will
have a clear majority in the board. Before the SDP is approved, strict scrutiny of the proposed SDP
must always be undertaken by the DAR and PARC, such that the value of the agricultural land

148
contributed to the corporation must always be more than 50% of the total assets of the corporation to
ensure that the majority of the members of the board of directors are composed of the farmers. The
PARC composed of the President of the Philippines and cabinet secretaries must see to it that control
over the board of directors rests with the farmers by rejecting the inclusion of non-agricultural assets
which will yield the majority in the board of directors to non-farmers. Any deviation, however, by
PARC or DAR from the correct application of the formula prescribed by the second paragraph of Sec.
31 of RA 6675 does not make said provision constitutionally infirm. Rather, it is the application of
said provision that can be challenged. Ergo, Sec. 31 of RA 6657 does not trench on the constitutional
policy of ensuring control by the farmers. (3) YES. The operative fact doctrine is applicable in this
case. The Court maintained its stance that the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case since,
contrary to the suggestion of the minority, the doctrine is not limited only to invalid or
unconstitutional laws but also applies to decisions made by the President or the administrative
agencies that have the force and effect of laws. Prior to the nullification or recall of said decisions,
they may have produced acts and consequences that must be respected. It is on this score that the
operative fact doctrine should be applied to acts and consequences that resulted from the
implementation of the PARC Resolution approving the SDP of HLI. The majority stressed that the
application of the operative fact doctrine by the Court in its July 5, 2011 decision was in fact
favorable to the FWBs because not only were they allowed to retain the benefits and homelots they
received under the stock distribution scheme, they were also given the option to choose for
themselves whether they want to remain as stockholders of HLI or not. WHEREFORE, the instant
petition is DENIED. PARC Resolution No. 2005-32-01 dated December 22, 2005 and Resolution No.
2006-34-01 dated May 3, 2006, placing the lands subject of HLI’s SDP under compulsory coverage
on mandated land acquisition scheme of the CARP, are hereby AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that the original 6,296 qualified FWBs shall have the option to remain as
stockholders of HLI. DAR shall immediately schedule meetings with the said 6,296 FWBs and
explain to them the effects, consequences and legal or practical implications of their choice, after
which the FWBs will be asked to manifest, in secret voting, their choices in the ballot, signing their
signatures or placing their thumbmarks, as the case may be, over their printed names.

Case #92

Radaza v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 177135, 15 Oct 2008
ARTURO O. RADAZA, JULITO H. CUIZON, FERNANDO T. TAGA-AN, JR., and
ROGELIO D. VELOSO, Petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
SPECIAL NINETEENTH (19th) DIVISION, OMBUDSMAN MERCEDITAS GUTIERREZ,
DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN VIRGINIA PALANCA - SANTIAGO, DEPARTMENT OF
INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT (DILG), NORMA R. PATALINGJUG and
CRISOLOGO SAAVEDRA, Respondents.

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Case Digest by: Mikko P. Solis

Subject: Statutory Construction
Topic: Period

FACTS:

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On 9 to 15 January 2007, the Philippines successfully played host to the 12th Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Summit, which was held in the province of Cebu. Several cause-
oriented groups wrote a letter dated 9 January 2007 to Honorable Virginia Palanca-Santiago, the
Director of the Public Assistance and Corruption Prevention Office (PACPO) of the Office of the
Ombudsman for the Visayas, urging the latter to investigate some allegedly anomalous transactions
involving the preparations for the ASEAN Summit. In particular, the letter pointed out to the
overpriced procurement of decorative lamp posts and streetlights, which were installed along the
ceremonial routes in the cities of Cebu, Mandaue, and Lapu-Lapu. Said letter was docketed as CPL-
V-07-0033. Crisologo Saavedra, the Project Manager of the joint venture company Pelican/Cebesos
that previously offered to sell and install decorative street lights in Cebu City, likewise submitted
supplemental evidence to PACPO Director Palanca-Santiago to prove that the decorative lamp posts
and streetlights actually installed were indeed severely overpriced. On 29 March 2007, Ombudsman
Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez issued an Order10 in Administrative Case No. OMB-V-A-07-0122-C.
WHEREFORE, as warranted by aforesaid insight on the circumstances of the case, above-named
respondents [including petitioners herein] are hereby placed under PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION for
a period of six (6) months, pending investigation.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in issuing the order for their preventive suspension since there was no strong evidence of
guilt to warrant the issuance of the said order.

RULING:
No, the Court notes that the Office of the Ombudsman has since rendered a Decision dated 31 January
2008 in Administrative Case No. OMB-V-A-07-0122-C, wherein petitioners Cuizon, Taga-an, Jr., and
Veloso, among other public officials, were found guilty of Grave Misconduct and were, thus,
sentenced to the penalty of dismissal from service. Resultantly, the order of preventive suspension
against petitioners has become inconsequential by then. Under Section 24 of Republic Act No.
6770,41 the preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the Office of the
Ombudsman but not more than six months, without pay, except when the delay in the disposition of
the case by the Office of the Ombudsman is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent,
in which case, the period of such delay shall not be counted in computing the period of suspension
herein provided. In the case at bar, both resolutory conditions for the preventive suspension have
taken place: first, the six-month period without pay had already expired on 1 October 2007; and
second, the Office of the Ombudsman had terminated Administrative Case No. OMB-V-A-07-0122-C
by the promulgation of its Decision therein on 31 January 2008. In ascertaining the last day of the
period of suspension, one (1) month is to be treated as equivalent to thirty (30) days, such that six (6)
months is equal to one hundred eighty (180) days. Thus, a preventive suspension for a period of six
(6) months, which begins on 4 April 2007, shall end on 1 October 2007. This is in line with the
provisions of Article 13 of the New Civil Code, which provides: Art. 13. When the law speaks of
years, months, days or nights, it shall be understood that years are of three hundred sixty-five days
each; months, of thirty days; days of twenty four hours; and nights from sunset to sunrise. If months
are designated by their name, they shall be computed by the number of days which they respectively
have. In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last day included.

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Case #93

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner, vs.

THE COURT OF APPEALS and EPIFANIO DE LA CRUZ, respondents.
G.R. No. 98382 May 17, 1993

MELO, J.:

Case Digest by: Mikko P. Solis

Subject: Statutory Construction
Topic: Period

FACTS:
Two lots, located at Bunlo, Bocaue, Bulacan, the second a residential-commercial building were
mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank. The lots were under the common names of (Epifanio dela
Cruz), his brother (Delfin) and his sister (Maria). The lots were mortgaged to guarantee the following
promissory notes: (1) a promissory note for Pl2,000.00, dated September 2, 1958, and payable within
69 days (date of maturity — Nov. l0, 1958); (2) a promissory note for P4,000.00, dated September 22,
1958, and payable within 49 days (date of maturity — Nov. 10, 1958); (3) a promissory note for
P4,000.00, dated June 30, 1.9581 and payable within 120 days (date of maturity — Nov. 10, 1958) See
also Annex C of the complaint itself). This date of June 30, 1958 is disputed by the Epifanio who
claims that the correct date is June 30, 1961, which is the date actually mentioned in the promissory
note.

The 3rd mentioned promissory note states that the maturity date is Nov. 10, 1958. Now then, how
could the loan have been contracted on June 30, 1961? It will be observed that in the bank records, the
third mentioned promissory note was really executed on June 30, 1958. The Court is inclined to
believe that the date "June 30, 1961" was a mere clerical error and hat the true and correct date is June
1958.

Even assuming this, the fact still remains that the first two promissory notes had been guaranteed by
the mortgage of the two lots, and therefore, it was legal and proper to foreclose on the lots for failure
to pay said two promissory notes. PNB presented under Act no 3135 a foreclosure petition of the
mortgaged lots. The lots were sold or auctioned off with PNB as the highest bidder. The final Deed of
Sale was registered in the Bulacan Registry of Property on March 19, 1963. Inasmuch as the plaintiff
did not volunteer to buy back from the PNB the two lots, the PNB sold on June 4, 1970 the same to
spouses Conrado de Vera and Marina de Vera in a "Deed of Conditional Sale". Respondent brought a
complaint for the reconveyance of the lands, which the petitioner allegedly unlawfully foreclosed. The
petitioner defended that all were all valid. CFI ruled the dissmisal of of the complaint. Unsatisfied,
respondent appeal that the lower court erred in holding that there was a valid complaince in regard to
the publication sec 3 of Act 3135Respondent court reversed the judgement appealed from by
declaring void, inter alia, the acution sale of the foreclosed pieces of realty, the finald deed of sale,
and the consolidation of ownership.

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 ISSUE:

WON The required publication of the Notices of Sale on the foreclosed properties under sec 3 of Act
3135 was complied.

RULING:
No, The first date falls on Friday while the second and third dates are on Friday and Saturday,
respectively. Sec 3 of Act 3135 requires the notice of auction sale shalle be “published once a week
for at least three consecutive weeks”. Evidently, petitioner bank failed to comply with this legal
requirement. The SC held that: The rule is that statutory provisions governing publication of notice of
mortgage foreclosure sales must be strictly complied with, and that even slight deviations therefrom
will invalidate the notice and render the sale at least voidable (Jalandoni vs. Ledesma, 64 Phil. l058.
G.R. No. 42589, August 1937 and October 29, 1937). It has been held that failure to advertise a
mortgage foreclosure sale in compliance with statutory requirements constitutes a jurisdictional defect
invalidating the sale and that a substantial error or omission in a notice of sale will render the notice
insufticient and vitiate the sale (59 C.J.S. 1314). In view of the admission of defendant-appellee in its
pleading showing that there was no compliance of the notice prescribed in Section 3 of Act No. 3135,
as amended by Act 4118, with respect to the notice of sale of the foreclosed real properties in this
case, we have no choice but to declare the auction sale as absolutely void in view of the fact that the
highest bidder and purchaser in said auction sale was defendant-appellee bank. Consequently, the
Certificate of Sale, the Final Deed of Sale and Affidavit of Consolidation are likewise of no legal
effect Art 13 of the New Civil Code is completely silent as to the definition of “week”. It is
interpreted as a period of time consisting of seven consecutive days. Further clarifies that where the
word is used simply as a measure of duration of time and without reference to the calendar, it means a
period of seven consecutive days without regard to the day of the week on which it begins
(1 Tolentino, supra at p. 467 citing Derby). WHEREFORE, the petitions for certiorari and
intervention are hereby dismissed and the decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 17, 1991 is
hereby affirmed in toto.

Case #94

Borromeo v. Mariano,
G.R. No. L-16808, 3 Jan 1921
ANDRES BORROMEO, plaintiff vs. FERMIN MARIANO, defendant.

MALCOLM, J.:

Case Digest by: Mikko P. Solis

Subject: Statutory Construction
Topic: Period

FACTS:
Andres Borromeo was appointed, commissioned and took office as a Judge of the Twenty-fourth
(24th) Judicial District, effective July 1, 1914. However, on February, 25, 1920, he was appointed
Judge of the Twenty-first (21st) Judicial District, while Fermin Mariano was appointed Judge of the

152
Twenty-fourth (24th) Judicial District. After the appointments were made, Judge Borromeo
consistently refused to accept appointment to the Twenty-first (21 st) Judicial District.
 
ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Borromeo may validly refuse to accept the Appointment as Judge of the
Twenty-first (21st) Judicial District

RULING:
YES. The cardinal rule of statutory construction requires the court to give effect to the general
legislative intent if that can be discovered within the four corners of the Act. When the object
intended to be accomplished by the statute is once clearly ascertained, general words may be
restrained to it and those of narrower import may be expanded to embrace it, to effectuate the intent. 

Along with this fundamental principle is another, equally well-established, that such a construction is,
if possible, to be adopted, as will give effect to all provisions of the statute. (2 Lewis Sutherland,
Statutory Construction, pp. 662, et seq.; In re Allen [1903], 2 Phil., 630; Code of Civil Procedure, sec.
287.)

The concluding portion of section 155 of the Administrative Code, although not beginning with the
usual introductory word, "provided," is nevertheless, in the nature of a proviso, and should be
construed as such. The office of a proviso is to limit the application of the law. It is contrary to the
nature of a proviso to enlarge the operation of the law. It should not be construed so as to repeal or
destroy the main provisions of the statute.

Returning again to the principle of statutory construction that a proviso should not be given a meaning
which would tend to render abortive the main portions of the law, it should further be recalled that
judges of first instance are removable only through a fixed procedure. 

The effect to be given to the word "appoint" is corroborated by the principles of the law of public
officers. Appointment and qualification to office are separate and distinct things. Appointment is the
sole act of those vested with the power to make it. Acceptance is the sole act of the appointee. Persons
may be chosen for office at pleasure; there is no power in these Islands which can compel a man to
accept the office. (22 R. C. L., 423.) If, therefore, anyone could refuse appointment as a judge of first
instance to a particular district, when once appointment to this district is accepted, he has exactly the
same right to refuse an appointment to another district.

For the reasons given, we are of opinion that the reasonable force of the language used in the proviso
to section 155 of the Administrative Code taken in connection with the whole of the Judiciary Law,
and the accepted canons of interpretation, and the principles of the law of public officers, leave room
for no other construction than that a Judge of First Instance may be made a judge of another district
only with his consent.

It is our holding that the plaintiff Andres Borromeo is lawfully entitled to the possession of the office
of Judge of the Court of First Instance of the Twenty-Fourth Judicial District. It is our judgment that
the defendant Fermin Mariano shall be ousted from the office of Judge of the Twenty fourth Judicial
District, and the plaintiff placed in possession of the same. The motion for reconsideration filed by the

153
Attorney-General is denied. No costs shall be allowed. Let this be entered as the order of the court. So
ordered.

Case #95

People v. Mediado
G.R. No. 169871, February 02, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, VS.
JOSE N. MEDIADO, accused-appellant.

BERSAMIN, J.:

Case Digest by: Mikko P. Solis

Subject: Statutory Construction
Topic: Proviso

FACTS:
On March 20, 1997, Jimmy was having a conversation with Rodolfo Mediado at the dancing hall
located in Balatan, Camarines Sur. At that moment, his wife Lilia, witnessed accused Jose emerge
from behind Jimmy and hacked him twice on the head with a bolo and continued hacking him
although he had fallen to the ground. Accused fled from the scene but was eventually caught by
former-kagawad Clorado and brought him to the PNP station.  Lilia believed that Jose assaulted
Jimmy for fear that he would report to the police authorities that he attacked one Vicente Parañal
during the town fiesta two days earlier. Jose confessed killing Jimmy but claimed that he did so only
to defend himself and his father from Jimmy who hit them with a stone.  Accused then raised the
justifying circumstance of self-defense. Both RTC and the CA rejected Jose’s claim of self-defense
and defense of a relative and found that treachery was employed by Jose when he attacked Jimmy
from behind. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the proviso of self defense or defense of relatives is present in the case at bar.

RULING:
No, the proviso of self-defense or defense of relatives is not present in the instant case. The RTC and
the CA correctly rejected Jose’s claim of self-defense and defense of a relative because he did not
substantiate it with clear and convincing proof.  The requisites for the justifying circumstance of self-
defense are as follows: (1) unlawful aggression, (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel it and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. It
should be noted that unlawful aggression is the condition sine qua non for the justifying
circumstances of self-defense and defense of a relative.

154
In the instant case, Jose did not support his claim that Jimmy had committed aggression by punching
Rodolfo and by throwing stones at him and his father.  In fact, he and his father were not able to
identify any weapon used by Jimmy aside from the stone that he supposedly picked up from the
ground. Plainly, he did not establish with clear and convincing proof that Jimmy had assaulted him or
his father as to pose to either of them an imminent threat of great harm before he mounted his own
attack on Jimmy. Moreover, the nature, number and gravity of Jimmy’s wounds spoke not of defense
on the part of Jose but of a criminal intent to kill Jimmy. They indicated beyond doubt the treacherous
manner of the assault, that is, that Jose thereby ensured that the killing would be without risk and
would deny Jimmy any opportunity to defend himself.

Case #96

Office of the Ombudsman v. Apolonio

G.R. No. 165483. September 12, 2006
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, petitioner, vs.
NELLIE R. APOLONIO, respondent. 

BRION, J.:

Case Digest by: Mikko P. Solis

Subject: Statutory Construction
Topic: Proviso

FACTS:
The respondent, Executive Officer of the NBDB National Book Development Board approved the
cash advance for the purchase of gift cheques, that was not authorized by the NBDB’s governing
board. The Ombudsman found the respondent guilty of grave misconduct and dishonesty, and ordered
her removal. The CA annulled and set aside the decision of the Ombudsman.  The respondent cited
section 13, article 11 of the constitution and the deliberations of the constitutional commission,
arguing that the Constitution only grants the Ombudsman “RECOMMENDATORY POWERS” for
the removal of a public official. Furthermore, respondent claims the RA 6770 (Ombudsman Act of
1999) which grants the Ombudsman actual powers to directly impose the penalty of removal, is
unconstitutional.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Ombudsman has the power to directly impose the penalty of removal from office
against public officials.

RULING:
The Court ruled in the affirmative and rejected the respondent’s interpretation. What is more, the
Court cited the ruling in the case of Ledesma v. CA where the same interpretation was first rejected
on the basis of a “PROVISO” vis-a-vis constitutional deliberations.

LEDESMA RULING:

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The Court in the Ledesma case held that:

Section 15 of RA 6770 provides for the powers, functions and duties of the Ombudsman. The Court
draws attention to subparagraph 3:

Section 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. — The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following
powers, functions and duties:

(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public officer or employee at fault
or who neglect to perform an act or discharge a duty required by law, and recommend his removal,
suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith; or enforce its
disciplinary authority as provided in Section 21 of this Act: provided, that the refusal by any officer
without just cause to comply with an order of the Ombudsman to remove, suspend, demote, fine,
censure, or prosecute an officer or employee who is at fault or who neglects to perform an act or
discharge a duty required by law shall be a ground for disciplinary action against said officer;

PROVISO:
The Court notes that the proviso above qualifies the “ORDER” for the removal, suspension,
demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of an officer or employee similar to the questioned issuances
in the instant case.
                           
The refusal without just cause of any officer to comply with such an order of the Ombudsman to
penalize an erring officer or employee is a ground for disciplinary action is a strong indication that the
Ombudsman’s “RECOMMENDATION” is not merely advisory in nature but is actually mandatory
within the bounds of law.

CONGRESS MAY EMPOWER THE OMBUDSMAN WITH PROSECUTORIAL FUNCTIONS

RA 6770 is proof that the legislature vested in the Ombudsman with prosecutorial functions, and with
broad powers to enable him to implement his own actions.

LEDESMA RULING IS CLEAR OF THE OMBUDSMAN’S RIGHT

The conclusion in the Ledesma case is clear, that the Ombudsman has been statutorily granted the
right to impose administrative penalties on erring public officials.

THE WORD “RECOMMENDATORY” POWER 

The word “recommendatory” power in the text of Section 15 paragraph 3 of RA 6770 does not
deprive the Congress of its plenary legislative power to vest the Ombudsman powers beyond those
stated.

Case #97

Tuna Processing, Inc. v. Philippine Kingford, Inc.

G.R. No. 185582, 29 Feb 2012.
TUNA PROCESSING, INC., Petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE KINGFORD, INC., Respondent.

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PEREZ, J.:

Case Digest by: Mikko P. Solis

Subject: Statutory Construction
Topic: Intrinsic Aids

FACTS:
On January 14, 2003, Kanemitsu Yamaoka, referred to as the “licensor” and a co-patentee of various
patents and 5 Philippine tuna processors referred to as the “sponsors”” licensees”, which includes the
respondent Kingford, entered into a MOA. The MOA provides that the Licensor wishes to form an
alliance with Sponsors to enforce his 3 patents (US, Philippine & Indonesian), granting licenses, and
collecting royalties. Parties wish to be licensed under the patents in order to practice the processes
claimed in those patents, enforce the said patents and collect royalties in conjunction with the
Licensor. Tuna Processors, Inc. was established in California in order to implement the objectives of
the said agreement. It shall open and maintain bank accounts in the US. It shall be owned by the
Sponsors and Licensor with their corresponding shares. 

Due to a series of events, the licensees withdrew from petitioner TPI and correspondingly reneged on
their obligations. Petitioner submitted the dispute for arbitration (Breach of MOA by not paying past
due assessments, failing to cooperate with Claimant TPI in fulfilling objectives of the MOA and
violation of “The Lanham Act”) before the International Centre for Dispute Resolution in the State of
California, US and won the case against respondent.  To enforce the award, petitioner filed a Petition
for Confirmation, Recognition, and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Award before the RTC of
Makati. Respondent Kingford filed a Motion to Dismiss. After the court denied it for lack of merit,
respondent sought for inhibition of Judge Almeda and moved for the reconsideration of the order
denying the motion. Judge Almeda inhibited himself. The case was again re-raffled to Branch 61
where Judge Ruiz granted the respondent's motion and dismissed the petition on the ground that the
petitioner lacked legal capacity to sue in the Philippines. Petitioner now seeks to nullify the order of
the trial court dismissing its Petition. 

ISSUE:
Whether or not a foreign arbitral award can be enforced even if the corporation is not licensed to do
business in the Philippines. 

RULING:
YES. The foreign arbitral award can be enforced.  Applying the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of
2004 in this case where the Act, as its title - An Act to Institutionalize the Use of an Alternative
Dispute Resolution System in the Philippines and to Establish the Office for Alternative Dispute
Resolution, and for Other Purposes - would suggest, is a law especially enacted "to actively promote
party autonomy in the resolution of disputes or the freedom of the party to make their own
arrangements to resolve their disputes." It specifically provides exclusive grounds available to the
party opposing an application for recognition and enforcement of the arbitral award. (Title forms part
of a statute and may be used to construe it) Also, SEC. 45. Rejection of a Foreign Arbitral Award. - A
party to a foreign arbitration proceeding may oppose an application for recognition and enforcement
of the arbitral award in accordance with the procedural rules to be promulgated by the Supreme Court
only on those grounds enumerated under Article V of the New York Convention. Any other ground
raised shall be disregarded by the regional trial court. Not one of these exclusive grounds touched on
the capacity to sue of the party seeking the recognition and enforcement of the award. Also, Rule 13.1

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of the Special Rules of Court on Alternative Dispute Resolution provides that "any party to a foreign
arbitration may petition the court to recognize and enforce a foreign arbitral award.” All considered,
petitioner TPI, although a foreign corporation not licensed to do business in the Philippines, is not, for
that reason alone, precluded from filing the Petition for Confirmation, Recognition, and Enforcement
of Foreign Arbitral Award before a Philippine court.

Case #98

Go v. Distinction Properties
G.R. No. 194024, April 25, 2012
PHILIP L. GO, PACIFICO Q. LIM and ANDREW Q. LIM Petitioners, vs.
DISTINCTION PROPERTIES DEVELOPMENT AND CONSTRUCTION, INC. Respondent.

Case Digest by: Mikko P. Solis

Subject: Statutory Construction
Topic: Intrinsic Aids

FACTS:
Philip L. Go, Pacifico Q. Lim and Andrew Q. Lim (petitioners) are registered individual owners of
condominium units in Phoenix Heights Condominium located at H. Javier/Canley Road, Bo. Bagong
Ilog, Pasig City, Metro Manila. In August 2008, petitioners, as condominium unit-owners, filed a
complaint before the HLURB against DPDCI(Distinction Properties Development and Construction,
Inc.) for unsound business practices and violation of the MDDR. The case was docketed as REM-
080508-13906. They alleged that DPDCI committed misrepresentation in their circulated flyers and
brochures as to the facilities or amenities that would be available in the condominium and failed to
perform its obligation to comply with the MDDR. In defense, DPDCI denied that it had breached its
promises and representations to the public concerning the facilities in the condominium. It alleged that
the brochure attached to the complaint was “a mere preparatory draft” and not the official one actually
distributed to the public, and that the said brochure contained a disclaimer as to the binding effect of
the supposed offers therein. Also, DPDCI questioned the petitioners’ personality to sue as the action
was a derivative suit. After due hearing, the HLURB rendered its decision in favor of petitioners. The
CA ruled that the HLURB(Housing and land use regulatory board) had no jurisdiction over the
complaint filed by petitioners as the controversy did not fall within the scope of the administrative
agency’s authority under P.D. No. 957. The HLURB not only relied heavily on the brochures which,
according to the CA, did not set out an enforceable obligation on the part of DPDCI, but also
erroneously cited Section 13 of the MDDR to support its finding of contractual violation.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the HLURB has jurisdiction over the complaint filed by petitioners.
 

RULING:
The petition fails. In this case, the complaint filed by petitioners alleged causes of action that
apparently are not cognizable by the HLURB considering the nature of the action and the reliefs
sought. A perusal of the complaint discloses that petitioners are actually seeking to nullify and
invalidate the duly constituted acts of PHCC – the April 29, 2005 Agreement entered into by PHCC
with DPDCI and its Board Resolution28 which authorized the acceptance of the proposed

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offsetting/settlement of DPDCI’s indebtedness and approval of the conversion of certain units from
saleable to common areas. All these were approved by the HLURB. Generally, the extent to which an
administrative agency may exercise its powers depends largely, if not wholly, on the provisions of the
statute creating or empowering such agency.  With respect to the HLURB, to determine if said agency
has jurisdiction over petitioners’ cause of action, an examination of the laws defining the HLURB’s
jurisdiction and authority becomes imperative. P.D. No. 957, specifically Section 3, granted the
National Housing Authority (NHA) the “exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade and
business.” Then came P.D. No. 1344 expanding the jurisdiction of the NHA (now HLURB), as
follows:
“SECTION 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real estate trade and business and in
addition to its powers provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing Authority
shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature:
(a) Unsound real estate business practices; 
(b) Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer
against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and
(c) Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of
subdivision lot or condominium unit against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman.”
 
This provision must be read in light of the law’s preamble, which explains the reasons for enactment
of the law or the contextual basis for its interpretation. Statute derives its vitality from the purpose for
which it is enacted, and to construe it in a manner that disregards or defeats such purpose is to nullify
or destroy the law. P.D. No. 957, as amended, aims to protect innocent subdivision lot and
condominium unit buyers against fraudulent real estate practices. The HLURB is given a wide latitude
in characterizing or categorizing acts which may constitute unsound business practice or breach of
contractual obligations in the real estate trade.  This grant of expansive jurisdiction to the HLURB
does not mean, however, that all cases involving subdivision lots or condominium units automatically
fall under its jurisdiction.

Case #99

People v. Sandiganbayan, supra.

G.R. No. 169004, September 15, 2010
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION) and ROLANDO PLAZA

PERALTA, J.:

Case Digest by: Mikko P. Solis

Subject: Statutory Construction
Topic: Intrinsic Aids

FACTS:
On or about December 19, 1995, and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto at Toledo City,
Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused ROLANDO PLAZA, a high-ranking public officer, being a member of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Toledo City, and committing the offense, in relation to office, having obtained cash

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advances from the City Government of Toledo in the total amount of THIRTY THREE THOUSAND
PESOS (₱33,000.00), Philippine Currency, which he received by reason of his office, for which he is
duly bound to liquidate the same within the period required by law, with deliberate intent and intent to
gain, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally fail to liquidate said cash advances of
₱33,000.00, Philippine Currency, despite demands to the damage and prejudice of the government in
the aforesaid amount. Thereafter, respondent Plaza filed a Motion to Dismiss dated April 7, 2005 with
the Sandiganbayan, to which the latter issued an Order dated April 12, 2005 directing petitioner to
submit its comment. Petitioner filed its Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss on April 19, 2005.
Eventually, the Sandiganbayan promulgated its Resolution on July 20, 2005 dismissing the case for
lack of jurisdiction, without prejudice to its filing before the proper court. Thus, the present petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod
whose salary grade is below 27 and charged with violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines

RULING:
This Court has already resolved the above issue in the affirmative. People v. Sandiganbayan and
Amante is a case with uncanny similarities to the present one. In fact, the respondent in the earlier
case, Victoria Amante and herein respondent Plaza were both members of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Toledo City, Cebu at the time pertinent to this case. The only difference is that,
respondent Amante failed to liquidate the amount of Seventy-One Thousand Ninety-Five Pesos
(₱71,095.00) while respondent Plaza failed to liquidate the amount of Thirty-Three Thousand Pesos
(₱33,000.00).

In ruling that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod
whose salary grade is below 27 and charged with violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines,
this Court cited the case of Serana v. Sandiganbayan, et al. as a background on the conferment of
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, thus:

The Sandiganbayan was created by P.D. No. 1486, promulgated by then President Ferdinand E.
Marcos on June 11, 1978. It was promulgated to attain the highest norms of official conduct required
of public officers and employees, based on the concept that public officers and employees shall serve
with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency and shall remain at all times
accountable to the people.

The jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be determined at the time of the institution of the
action, not at the time of the commission of the offense. The exception contained in R. A. 7975, as
well as R. A. 8249, where it expressly provides that to determine the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan in cases involving violations of R. A. No. 3019, as amended, R. A. No. 1379, and
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code is not applicable in the present case as the
offense involved herein is a violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines. The last clause of the
opening sentence of paragraph (a) of the said two provisions states:

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases
involving:

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A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, other known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised
Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the
government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the
offense: x x x.

Like in the earlier case, the present case definitely falls under Section 4 (b) where other offenses and
felonies committed by public officials or employees in relation to their office are involved where the
said provision, contains no exception. Therefore, what applies in the present case is the general rule
that jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be determined at the time of the institution of the
action, not at the time of the commission of the offense. The present case having been instituted on
March 25, 2004, the provisions of R.A. 8249 shall govern. 

Again, the earlier case interpreted the above provisions, thus:

The above law is clear as to the composition of the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Under
Section 4 (a), the following offenses are specifically enumerated: violations of R.A. No. 3019, as
amended, R.A. No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. In order for
the Sandiganbayan to acquire jurisdiction over the said offenses, the latter must be committed by,
among others, officials of the executive branch occupying positions of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989. However, the law is not devoid of exceptions. Those that are classified as Grade 26 and below
may still fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan provided that they hold the positions thus
enumerated by the same law. Particularly and exclusively enumerated are provincial governors, vice-
govenors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers,
and other provincial department heads; city mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang
panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads; officials of the
diplomatic service occupying the position as consul and higher; Philippine army and air force
colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank; PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of
higher rank; City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the
Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor; and presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of
government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or
foundations. In connection therewith, Section 4 (b) of the same law provides that other offenses or
felonies committed by public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) in relation to their
office also fall under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

Clearly, as decided in the earlier case and by simple application of the pertinent provisions of the law,
respondent Plaza, a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod during the alleged commission of an
offense in relation to his office, necessarily falls within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

Case #100

In the matter of the Estate of Emil H. Johnson, Ebba Ingeborg Johnson

G.R. No. 12767, 16 Nov 1918.
In the matter of the estate of EMIL H. JOHNSON. EBBA INGEBORG JOHNSON, applicant-
appellant, Hartigan & Welch for applicant and appellant.
Hartford Beaumont for Victor Johnson and others as appellees.

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Chas. E. Tenney for Alejandra Ibañez de Johnson, personally and as guardian, and for Simeona
Ibañez, appellees.

STREET, J.:

Case Digest by: Mikko P. Solis

Subject: Statutory Construction
Topic: Intrinsic Aids

FACTS:
Emil H. Johnson (Johnson - testator), a native of Sweden and a naturalized citizen of the State of
Illinois, United States, died in the city of Manila. Johnson left a will by which he disposed of his
estate (The will was written in an holographic instrument, written in the testator's own handwriting).
Prior to his death Johnson was married to Rosalie Ackeson (Rosalie) they had a daughter named
EBBA INGEBORG JOHNSON (Ebba). Johnson later embarked for the Philippine Islands as a soldier
in the Army of the United States and continued to live in the Philippine Island even after his military
discharge. As a result Rosalie filed for a decree of divorced from him in Cook County Illinois.

While Johnson was in the Philippines he had marital relations with Alejandra Ibañez, by whom he had
three children: Mercedes, Encarnacion and Victor. Johnson also had two other children: Eleonor and
Alberto to a certain Simeona Ibanez. Johnson’s will were to be disposed as follow: 100 shares of the
corporate stock in the Johnson-Pickett Rope Company to be given to his brother Victor; to his father
and mother in Sweden, the sum of P20,000; to his daughter Ebba Ingeborg, the sum of P5,000; to his
wife, Alejandra Ibañez, the sum of P75 per month, if she remains single; to Simeona Ibañez, spinster,
P65 per month, if she remains single. The rest of the property is left to the testator's five children —
Mercedes, Encarnacion, Victor, Eleonor and Alberto.

The Court of First Instance of the city of Manila granted the probate of this will, on the ground that
Johnson was at the time of his death a citizen of the State of Illinois, United States of America; that
the will was duly executed in accordance with the laws of that State; and hence could properly be
probated here pursuant to section 636 of the Code of Civil Procedure. (Excerpt on the provision: “Will
made here by alien. — A will made within the Philippine Islands by a citizen or subject of another
state or country, which is executed in accordance with the law of the state or country of which he is a
citizen or subject, and which might be proved and allowed by the law of his own state or country, may
be proved, allowed, and recorded in the Philippine Islands, and shall have the same effect as if
executed according to the laws of these Islands.”) Ebba, filed a petition to annul the decree of probate
of will to put the estate to intestate administration making her the sole legitimate heir of his father in
accordance to Philippine proceedings. Ebba’s petition were grounded on the following: (1) Emil H.
Johnson was a resident of the city of Manila and not a resident of the State of Illinois at the time the
will in question was executed; (2) The will is invalid and inadequate to pass real and personal
property in the State of Illinois; (3) The order admitting the will to probate was made without notice
to the petitioner; and (4) The order in question was beyond the jurisdiction of the court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the order of probate can be set aside on the ground that the testator was not a resident
of the State of Illinois but a resident of Manila?

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 RULING:
No, section 636 of the Code of Civil Procedure stated that a will made within the Philippine Islands
by a citizen or subject of another state or country, which is executed in accordance with the law of the
state or country of which he is a citizen or subject, and which might be proved and allowed by the law
of his own state or country, may be proved, allowed, and recorded in the Philippine Islands, and shall
have the same effect as if executed according to the laws of these Islands. As in the case, the court
found that the testator (Johnson) was a citizen of State of Illinois therefore the intrinsic validity of the
provisions of this will must be determined by the law of Illinois to which he is a citizen. The court
ruled that the legal and testamentary successions, with regard to the order of succession, as well as to
the amount of the successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be regulated
by the laws of the nation of the person whose succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of
the property and the country where it may be situated. Therefore, the probate of the will of the testator
is valid and should not be set aside.

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