Setting the Political Agenda

How Media Shape Campaigns

by John Carey

Focus on technique and “inside dope”

leads to “meta-campaigning” in which
issues become tactical moues in a game
of skill between expert political strategists.

The media assign significance to issues, select what events are to be commu-
nicated to the public, and provide a context which gives meaning to what is said
and done. An election campaign exists in the public consciousness largely the
way it exists in mass media presentation of campaign events. This power of the
press invites a fundamental question: if the mass media can form, as well as
inform, public consciousness about political campaigns, what are they depicting
(and making) them to be?
To study the question, I investigated the coverage of the 1974 congressional
elections. Limited to weekday coverage, my sample consisted of all election-
related news on the three national television networks (broadcasts were tape re-
corded); three national magazines (Time, U.S. News and World Report, and
Newsweek); and three national newspapers (Los Angeles Times, New York
Times, and Washington Post) for the four weeks before the elections. The basic
unit of analysis was reference to a topic in an article or story. A list of 149 topics
was required to code all the material in the sample. These were organized into
six topic groups: Domestic Issues, International Issues, Campaign Issues,
Campaign Actions, Physical and Demographic Characteristics of a Candidate,
and Personal Qualities and Political Philosophy of a Candidate.’

’ A reference was noted in relation to a specific topic, though no reference to topic groups as
such was recorded. Topic group references were calculated by adding all references to all topics
included in the topic group. Any article or story may include references to any number of different
topics. However, one or more references to a topic in any single article or story &as considered a
single reference
John Carey is a research associate with Environmental Media Consultants and a Ph.D.
candidate in communications at the University of Pennsylvania.

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 Political AgendalHow Media Shape Campaigns

The analysis of references to topics used two measures of composition. First,

attention, the percentage of articles or stories containing references to a topic,
and the proportion of all references treating a topic group. Second, emphasis,
the percentage of articles or stories containing reference to a topic, or topic
group, in a headline, lead or main point of the story. Since only one topic per
article or story was typically recorded as receiving emphasis, both topic empha-
sis and topic group emphasis could be expressed as the percent of all articles or
stories in the sample for each medium. Measures of attention and emphasis for
topic group are shown in Table 1. Topic attention and emphasis were combined
to form a News Value Index (NVI), using the formula:'
E%
NVI = - + (EW) ( A % )
A%

where E % = percent of articles or stories featuring a

topic in the headline, lead, or as the main point
A% = percent of articles or stories making any reference
to a topic

This research design is based on a topic analysis developed by Gerbner (2, Ch. 11, Sect. D )

51
Journal of Cotrztntrnication. Spring 1976

Table 1: Topic group emphasis and attention

Emphasig Attention

News- Mag- All News- Mag- All

TV papers azines Media TV papers azines Media
% % a/‘ Q/Q Yo % O/Q YQ
Campaign issues 58.9 44.4 55.7 53.0 40.5 34.4 35.6 36.8
Campaign actions 27.4 32.1 17.1 25.5 22.1 17.0 13.8 17.6
Domestic issues 10.2 20.1 14.3 14.9 16.5 26.1 20.8 21.1
Personal qualities/
political philosophy 2.5 3.4 5.7 3.9 11.9 11.2 12.9 12.0
Physical and demographic
characteristics 1.7 1.3 4.2 2.4 7.4 9.3 14.3 10.3
International issues 1.7 1.5 2.9 2.0 1.5 1.9 2.7 2.0

aTopic group emphasis totals slightly over 100 percent because a few items were
double-coded when t w o topics were equally emphasized.
N articles and stories: TV-117; N e w s p a p e r s d l 6 ; Magazines-70
N references t o all topics: TV-731; Newspapers-3661; Magazines-638

As shown in Table 2, campaign issues dominated all media coverage of the

campaign, particularly in headlines and leads. Campaign actions received sig-
nificant emphasis, but newspapers and magazines devoted more attention to
issues, which, as we shall see, were seen more for their tactical value in the
campaign than for broader social significance. Personal qualities and political
philosophy of a candidate received little emphasis and only moderate attention.
Most frequently, it was noted that a candidate was liberal or conservative
in political philosophy (16.6 percent attention for all media); a good cam-
paigner/or not (8.9 percent attention for all media); generally experienced
or not (7.1 percent attention for all media); and dominant or soft spoken (3.8
percent attention for all media). There was little emphasis placed on the
physical and demographic characteristics of a candidate, and only moderate
attention given to qualities like age, business background, or education of a
candidate. Magazines placed a slightly higher news value on physical and
demographic characteristics than newspapers or television.

Among all topics discussed in press coverage

of the election campaign, references to strategic questions about
the campaign itself had the highest news value.

The press was concerned with evaluating how the campaign was going;
what techniques and strategy a candidate was using; where he currently stood
in the polls, and whether he had moved up or down since the last poll.
Treatment of these topics was analogous to the color commentary in a profes-
sional football contest. The general game plan was laid out; strengths and
weaknesses of key supporting elements like the party organization were ana-
lyzed; field conditions like inflation and unemployment were considered; the
present score (i.e., the polls) was matched against scores earlier in the game to
see where the momentum was going; psychological elements like poor crowd

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 Political A g e n d a l H o w Media Shape Campaigns

reaction were suspected of taking a toll on one side; and key plays like Congress-
man Mills’ “tidal basin incident” were brought back again and again in a form
of instant replay.
For example, when NBC news reporters treated the Bayh-Lugar senatorial
race in Indiana, they discussed Lugar’s use of a train to convey a Harry Truman
image and Bayh’s strategy of visiting gun ranges to counter the feeling that he
was against the use of guns. Both campaigns were screened for issues they were
using to gain support, and both candidates were evaluated as potential presi-
dential candidates in 1976. Indeed, the campaign was depicted not as a race for

Table 2: Topics with highest news value index

All media Television Newspapers Magazines

Topic (Topic group) Rank MeanNVI Rank NVI Rank NVI Rank NVI
Evaluative statement about how
campaign is going (campaign issue) 1 426.0 1 322.6 1 191.4 1 764.0
Campaign strategyltechniques
(campaign issue) 2 191.1 2 272.9 4 88.9 2 211.5
Democratic/Republican Party
strength (campaign issue) 3 130.7 5 136.0 5 76.8 3 179.2
President Ford campaigns
(campaign action) 4 123.2 3 227.7 10 19.7 4 122.2
Mills scandal (campaign issue) 5 72.0 4 173.3 16 12.3 12 30.3
Candidate tours/campaigns
(campaign action) 6 56.9 13 31.0 2 121.6 19 18.1
Position in polls (campaign issue) 7 46.4 6 66.7 8 40.6 11 31.9
Disclosure of financial sources
(campaign issue) 8 45.3 8 49.0 6 74.1 24 12.8
Effect of Watergate (campaign issue) 9 44.0 11 33.4 21 10.7 5 87.9
Criticize opponent, generally
(campaign action) 10 42.6 20 10.9 3 105.4 25 11.4
Voter apathy (campaign issuel 11 41.7 7 57.4 17 12.0 8 55.8
The economy, generally
(domestic issue) 12 33.4 15 28.8 25 7.8 6 63.8
Campaign Reform Bill (domestic issue) 13 32.4 14 30.9 23 9.2 7 57.0
Inflation (domestic issue) 14 24.3 11 33.4 13 16.6 16 22.8
Criticize Republicans/Democrats
(campaign action) 15 22.3 9 37.9 20 11.0 19 18.1
Predict election results
(campaign action) 16 20.2 17 14.7 24 7.9 9 38.0
Women i n politics (campaign issue) 17 20.2 16 22.2 51 2.5 10 35.9
Candidate’s age [demographic
characteristic) 18 19.5 19 11.0 12 17.4 13 30.0
Criticize Ford (campaign action) 19 18.4 10 35.5 15 12.7 32 7.1
Media coverage of campaign
(campaign issuel 20 17.4 24 8.5 9 29.7 23 14.1
Liberal-conservative orientation
(personal quality/political
philosophy) 21 16.6 18 14.0 19 11.7 15 24.2
Work background of candidate
(demographic characteristic) 22 12.8 22 9.7 22 10.1 17 18.5
Campaign spending (campaign issue) 23 12.5 31 5.0 11 18.3 21 14.3
Nixon pardon (domestic issue) 24 12.4 25 6.8 31 4.7 14 25.9
TV-radio commercials (campaign issue) 25 11.9 30 5.1 14 16.5 22 14.2

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Journal of Communication, Spring 1976

the Senate, but as a stepping stone towards another campaign, i.e , for Presi-
dent. In the end, Bayh’s “all-American” image was seen as winning the day.
The press attempted to make the public knowledgeable insiders of campaign
activities, asking the questions a campaign manager might ask: what would be
the effect of Watergate on voters; was Ford’s campaigning a help or hindrance
to Republican candidates; who were the targets of TV spots and what effect
were they having? Particularly in the last two weeks of the campaign, the public
was taken backstage to hear the candidate discuss strategy; learn how the TV
spots were produced; see where money was allocated in the campaign; and
evaluate whether a candidate had run a good campaign.

In general, campaign coverage for TV, newspapers, and

magazines in the sample was remarkably similar (both
across media and within each medium.)

A1 viewed the campaign as a strategic contest in which a candidate’s ability

was dentified with how well he played the campaign
~~ - game.
- Differences in
media coverage relate closely to differences in the institutional needs of each.
Magazines provided less coverage of certain timely campaign actions (e.g.,
candidate tours received 31 percent attention on TV, 20.2 percent in news-
papers, and 12.8 percent in magazines), and placed greater value on such
campaign issues as the effect of Watergate (19.6 percent attention on TV, 10.7
percent in newspapers, 31.4 percent in magazines) which were not tied to
immediately breaking stories. Newspapers provided more coverage, generally,
to stories that could produce an interesting “follow-up” the next day. Thus, one
candidate’s attack on his opponent often received good newspaper coverage
because the opponent’s reply could be sought for the next day’s paper. Also,
newspapers were more likely to mention a candidate touring a local area in the
lead or headline (6 percent emphasis in newspapers compared to 1 percent in
magazines or TV), since the mention of a local shopping center or school carries
added interest for local readers. Newspapers placed greater value on media
coverage of the campaign (NVI 8.5 on TV, 29.7 in newspapers, 14.1 in maga-
zines). This had the effect of papers tooting their own horns in some cases (e.g.,
in mentioning that their earlier prediction had come true), but also, at times, it
lead them to look self-reflectively at their own coverage and its potential effect
on voters. (The Los Angeles Tim.es was noteworthy in this regard.)
The television networks tended to provide more coverage of events which
could be shown and which conveyed a national flavor. Thus Ford’s campaign-
ing for Republican candidates in several states had a high news value for the
networks (NVI 227.7 on TV, 19.7 in newspapers, and 12.2 in magazines). This
same news value may explain, in part, the extraordinary coverage the networks
provided of the Wilbur Mills scandal (NVI 173.3 on TV, 12.3 in newspapers,
and 30.3 in magazines). The more titilating and entertaining aspects of the
story were available to all media, but this story allowed the networks to d o what
they can do so well, i.e., show an interview with the Washington D.C. police-
man who stopped the Mills’ car, followed by an interview with an Arkansas
voter, telling her reaction to the incident. The networks also could show a
reporter knocking on the door of Fanny Foxe, the strip teaser who was with

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 Political AgendalHow Media Shape Campaigns

Mills and who jumped into the tidal basin after their car was stopped, only to
have a housekeeper answer and say that she wasn’t home. The story lacked
excitement on TV, but it would have even less value in print.

Media news values aflect not only the selection

of certain events for coverage,
but also the framing of what is reported.

The media frame provides the context for interpreting what the public sees
or hears. For example, if we see on the news a candidate delivering a speech to a
crowd, there are several possible levels of interpretation. If a candidate is talking
about inflation, we can ask ourselves if he or she has a solution, seems con-
cerned, or looks healthy; or if the crowd is responding well, etc. We may apply
more than one level of interpretation. In covering campaign events, the media
often frame what a politician says or does (e.g., by what the announcer says as a
lead into the film clip) and thereby refer the public to one level of inter-
pretation.
In the 1974 election campaign, the media news value of evaluating
campaign strategy was not only a major topic in itself, but also a principal frame
surrounding coverage of other issues. The “strategic frame” suggests, in effect,
that to get at the real meaning of what a candidate said or did, the viewer should
interpret its strategic significance in the campaign. For example, when CBS
profiled the Gary Hart-Peter Dominick race for Senate in Colorado, it prefaced a
film clip of Hart talking about strip mining with a framing statement by the
announcer that many liberals had moved into Colorado and therefore Hart was
appealing to environmental issues. Similarly, the Washington Post placed a
Congressional candidate’s discussion of domestic issues in a tactical frame when
they reported:
A t first he [Stanford Parris, Rep. Va.] tried the classic incumbent politician
tactics of ignoring altogether Harris’ attacks on that [ Parris’] record. He
promised instead to help curb government spending which he blamed for
inflation, and reminded voters of his easy accessibility for their personal
problems .
Curiously, newspaper coverage of local elections most often allowed a
candidate to speak unencumbered by a strategic frame. Perhaps this is because a
reporter doesn’t have the time to find out how several local campaigns are
going, and therefore simply reports what the candidate said.
Another form of framing is the set of qualifying tags or phrases that emerge
during a campaign and become part of the reporters’ repertoire. Often, these
qualifying phrases do not assert anything, but take for granted an effect or value
or truth which “everyone accepts.” For example, a third party candidate was
likely to be qualified as “not a serious contender.” If a candidate was charged
with some wrongdoing, it became his “Watergate.” Even if the charge was
dropped, a story about the candidate might be introduced with a qualifying tag
that he was still trying to overcome the effects of his own small Watergate. A
Republican candidate in 1974 could expect a story about his campaign to be
prefaced, “With Republicans all across the country facing near disaster at the

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Joirrnal of Communication, Spring 1976

polls. . .” We then heard or read what this particular candidate was doing to
ward off the “disaster” that faced him November 5th.a
The issue is not whether media frames are true (many are), or even if they
refer a listener or reader to an unfair context of interpretation (most often they
are fair).

As the media focus more sharply on the tactics and measure

a candidate in terms of his campaign competence, many
politicians respond by engaging in a meta-campaign, i.e., an attempt to
demonstrate competence as campaign organizers and strategists.

The meta-campaign is thus a campaign about the campaign. It is not simply

an attempt to affect media coverage of campaign activity. It is specifically an
attempt to draw upon the media’s concern with evaluating the campaign itself.
If you are a politician and the media are going to analyze campaign com-
mercials, discuss polls, speculate on campaign strategy, etc., let them see your
TV spots, show them your polls, discuss your strategy with them, etc., and in the
process try to affect their assessment. This was evident in several areas of
campaign reporting. First, when a team of specialists was brought in to conduct
polls, plan strategy, produce media, etc., it was often made known to the press,
and they were selectively made available for interviews or discussion. Interviews
with campaign advisers often served the dual function of demonstrating expert
strategic ability and communicating information useful to the campaign, as
when the New York Times reported:
Dave Garth, a top aide of M r . Carey, said that M r . Wilson’s law practice did
not have to be emphasized. He said it was a more credible issue because the
Carey forces had generally remained silent and let the newspapers expose
the fact that M r . Wilson had earned more than $500,000 in outside income
during his 15 years as Lieutenant Governor.
In one breath, Mr. Garth demonstrates competence as a strategist, tells us that
the opponent may have acted injudiciously in office, and attributes what we’ve
just learned from him to the newspapers.
Meta-campaigning by candidates themselves was evident in the degree to
which strategy was openly discussed, and in the sophistication of terms used to
evaluate their campaigns. In 1974, a candidate was not likely to receive cov-
erage if he simply said the campaign was “going well” or “things are turning
around.” But discussion of “halo effects” and “ticket splitters” and “in-
cumbency problems” did meet media news values and often received coverage.
Invariably, the carrot of strategic evaluation was accompanied by a simpler and
less candid message, as when the New York Times reported Governor Wilson
In 1972, the problem of qualifying tags became clear when Edmund Muskie, running in the
Democratic presidential primaries, was tagged by the Florida press as reeling from the effects of a
“crying incident in New Hampshire.” This was a reference to Muskie’s emotional reaction (it’s not
clear whether he cried) to a strong statement about his wife in a New Hampshire newspaper. The
qualifying tag, minus the full details of the incident, accompanied most of the reports on Muskie’s
campaigning in Florida Whereas in New Hampshire there was a clear charge that he might be
emotionally unstable (a charge he could and did respond to), in Florida the question of emotional
instability was merely alluded to and therefore not really answerable (1):

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 Political Agenda/How Media Shape Campaignx

saying, “The halo effect of Representative Hugh L. Carey’s victory in the

Democratic primary is now wearing off and I am moving in the proper direc-
tion.” The apparent advantage of revealing an “insider’s” view of campaign
image-building led Birch Bayh to spoof his own campaign image. The Washing-
ton Post reported him speaking to an Evansville, Indiana press dinner:
“Aw, shucks, it sure is good to be back in Indiana. W e were sitting in front of
the stove the other day. 1 was reading the Constitution. Marvella was sewing
a star on the flag and Evan was studying his Eagle Scout book, when
Martiella looked up at me. ‘Blue Eyes’ she said-she always calls me Blue
Eyes-‘1 yearn for the farm.’ ‘All right, honey,’ 1 said, and we piled into our
pickup truck, the one with the ripe rack up over the seat, and we headed out
there. . . .” It was very inside s t u . served up for a politically sophisticated
audience, this self spoof on Bayh’s hayseed Hoosier style.
Meta-campaign activity was more directly evident in newspaper and maga-
zine coverage, They were more open, generally, in providing the sources for
information (also, they have more space to do so). It’s not clear whether TV
coverage was less influenced by meta-campaigning, or if the research reported
here simply couldn’t measure it.

The findings show quite clearly that mass media news

coverage of the 1974 election campaign treated it as a strategic game
or contest, much like cooerage of sports.

Great emphasis was placed on how the campaign was run, and readers or
viewers were taught to become knowledgeable “insiders,” understanding the
tactical significance of campaign activity. The news value which produced
elaborate coverage of campaign issues and actions also affected treatment of
domestic issues. Using a number of framing mechanisms, the media often
encouraged the public to interpret a candidate’s discussion of environmental or
economic issues as a strategic appeal for votes.
Press coverage across media (TV, newspapers, and magazines) was remark-
ably consistent, thereby supporting and extending Graber’s finding of consistent
campaign coverage by each of twenty newspapers throughout the country,
many of which differed significantly in their editorial positions (3).
Meta-campaigning by candidates, i.e., campaigning about their campaigns,
emerged in our findings. The media’s focus on evaluating campaign activity and
candidate’s response through meta-campaigning, supplies an implicit message
underlying much information about a campaign. The message is: it’s a game,
and good players make good public officials.

REFERENCES
1. Carey. John. “News Values in Press Coverage of a Primary Campaign.” Unpublished manu-
script, Annenberg School, University of Pennsylvania, 1972.
2. Grrbner, George. Moss Communicattons and Popular Conceptions of Education: A Cross-
Cultural Study. U.S. Ofice of Education, 1964.
3. Graber, Doris. “The Press as Opinion Resource during the 1968 Presidential Campaign.” Public
Opinion Quarterly, Summer 1971, pp, 472-478.

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