5 SENTENCE SUMMARY; RELEVANT PRINCIPLES
pendens clearly annotated on the subject lot’s title.
1. Prudential Bank vs Panis; GR No. 50008; August 31,
1988
Spouses Magcale secured a loan from Prudential Ban. As
security, respondent spouses executed a real estate
mortgage, their residential building. Spouses defaulted in
their payment, the security was eventually sold in a public
auction.
A valid real estate mortgage can be constituted on the
building erected on the land belonging to another. In the
enumeration of properties under Article 415 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines, this Court ruled that, "it is obvious that the
inclusion of 'building' separate and distinct from the land, in
said provision of law can only mean that a building is by
itself an immovable property."
Thus, while it is true that a mortgage of land necessarily
includes, in the absence of stipulation of the improvements
thereon, buildings, still a building by itself may be
mortgaged apart from the land on which it has been built.
Such a mortgage would be still a real estate mortgage for the
building would still be considered immovable property even if
dealt with separately and apart from the land.
2. Harty vs Municipality of Victoria; GR No. 5013; March
11, 1909
The subject property was formerly owned and donated by a
certain Tañedo for religious purposes. Harty argues that said
property belongs to the Catholic Church while the
Municipality of Victoria claims it as property for public use.
The parcel of land surrounding the parish Church of Victoria
was property for public use. Even assuming that the property
was originally private property, it must be assumed that the
donor waived his right thereto for the benefit of the
townspeople since they have continuously enjoyed the use of
the land as a public plaza. The property thus became
property for public use. As such, it could not have been the
validly donated by the town to the church. The same could
not likewise be acquired by prescription.
3. Flancia vs CA; GR No. 146997; April 26, 2005
Petitioners purchased, by virtue of a contract, from Oakland
corporation, a parcel of land. Sometime after, petitioners
received a notice foreclosing the mortgage. It turns out that
the corporation mortgaged to Genato 2 parcels of land,
including the petitioner’s property, for unpaid loans.
When the subject property was mortgaged to respondent,
Genato, what was in effect between Oakland Corporation and
Spouses Flancia was only a contract to sell, and not a
contract of sale. Thus, Oakland retained absolute ownership
over the subject property. Because Oakland retained all the
rights as owner of the property, it was entitled absolutely to
mortgage it to Genato. Hence, the mortage was valid.
Moreover, Genato’s registered mortgage was superior to
Spouses’ contract to sell.
4. Suarez vs Emboy; GR No. 187994; March 12, 2014
Respondents argue that they have been occupying the
subject lot in the concept of owner for several decades.
Carmencita, on the other hand, was a buyer in bad faith for
having purchased the property despite the notice of lis
In a complaint for unlawful detainer, the following key
jurisdictional facts must be alleged and sufficiently
established: 1) initially, possession of property by the
defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff;
2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by
plaintiff to defendant of the termination of the latter's right of
possession; 3) thereafter, the defendant remained in
possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of the
enjoyment thereof; and 4) within one year from the last
demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff
instituted the complaint for ejectment.
In the case at bar, the first requisite mentioned above is
markedly absent because Carmencita failed to clearly
allege and prove how and when the respondents entered
the subject lot and constructed a house upon it.
5. Gasataya vs Mabasa; GR No. 148147; Feb 16, 2007
Actual or positive fraud proceeds from an intentional
deception practiced by means of misrepresentation of
material facts, which in this case was the conscious
representation by petitioner's father (Sabas Gasataya)
that respondent's obligation to DBP had already been
settled. It is fraud to knowingly omit or conceal a fact, upon
which benefit is obtained, to the prejudice of another.
Consequently, fraud is a ground for reconveyance.
An innocent purchaser for value is one who buys the property
of another without notice that some other person has a right
to or interest in that same property, and who pays a full and
fair price at the time of the purchase or before receiving any
notice of another person's claim. Obviously, petitioner was
not an innocent purchaser for value.
6. Republic vs Carrasco; GR No. 143491; Dec 6, 2006
Carrasco was unable to sufficiently prove his possession of
the land sough to be registered. To begin with, Carrasco
failed to prove that Norberto Mingao, from whom he allegedly
derived his title, was the owner of the subject and and hence
can transmit rights over the same in his favor. Hence, since
Mingao's possession and ownership of the subject land were
not sufficiently proven, Mingao himself cannot validly transmit
his rights over the land in respondent's favor.
In sum, the respondent could not have acquired an
imperfect title to the land in question because he has not
proved possession openly, continuously and adversely
in the concept of an owner since June 12, 1945, the
period of possession required by law. At best, he can only
prove possession since 1990, the date which he admitted to
have taken possession of the subject parcel of land from
Mingao.
7. Spouses Del Campo vs Abesia; GR No. L-49219; April
15, 1988
The trial court, in this case, correctly held that Article 448 of
the Civil Code cannot apply where a co-owner builds, plants
or sows on the land owned in common for then he did not
build, plant or sow upon land that exclusively belongs to
another but of which he is a co-owner. The co-owner is not a
third person under the circumstances, and the situation is
governed by the rules of co-ownership.

However, when, as in this case, the co-ownership is
terminated by the partition and it appears that the house of
defendants overlaps or occupies a portion of 5 square meters
of the land pertaining to plaintiffs which the defendants
obviously built in good faith, then the provisions of Article 448
of the new Civil Code should apply.
8. Office of the City Mayor vs Ebio; GR No. 178411; June
23, 2010
Alluvial deposits along the banks of a creek do not form
part of the public domain as the alluvial property
automatically belongs to the owner of the estate to which
it may have been added. The only restriction provided for by
law is that the owner of the adjoining property must register
the same under the Torrens system; otherwise, the alluvial
property may be subject to acquisition through prescription by
third persons.
That for more than 30 years, neither Guaranteed Homes,
Inc. nor the local government of Parañaque in its
corporate or private capacity sought to register the
accreted portion. Undoubtedly, respondents are deemed to
have acquired ownership over the subject property through
prescription. Respondents can assert such right despite the
fact that they have yet to register their title over the said lot.
9. Heirs of Cabal vs Spouses Cabal; GR No. 153625; July
31, 2006
Marcelino is one of the heirs of Marcelo Cabal, who was
allowed by the latter to build his house on subject lot. When
Marcelo’s heirs extra-judicially settled among themselves the
estate of Marcelo, it was reavealed that Marcelino had
occupied and built his house not on his lot but on respodents’
lot, Spouses Cabal.
Marcelino has been in possession of the disputed lot
since then with the knowledge of his co-heirs, such that
even before his father died in 1954, when the co-ownership
was created, his inheritance or share in the co-ownership
was already particularly designated or physically segregated.
10. Vda De Alberto vs CA; GR No. L-29759; May 18, 1989
As a general rule, the action for partition among co-owners
does not prescribe so long as the co-ownership is expressly
or impliedly recognized. The said rule does not apply in the
case at bar because private respondent (Antonio Alberto,
Jr.) was never recognized as a co-heir either expressly or
impliedly.
Moreover, private respodent’s action for recovery of property
is barred by prescription. The Court found no explanation
for the surprising delay in the filing of the complaint,
allowing more than 10 years to elapse from the death of
Alberto, Sr. The negligence or omission to assert a right
within a reasonbale time, warrants a presumption that the
party entitled to assert it etiher has abandoned it or declined
to assert it.
11. Republic vs Jacob; GR No 146874; July 20, 2006
A government declaration was issued reserving a parcel of
land for development of geothermal energy. A portion of the
subject lot was under an application for registration. The
period of possession and occupancy after such proclamation
could no longer be tracked in favour of the claimant. Further,
private respondent cannot tack her own possession of the
property to that of her parents because there is no evidence
that the parents ever had open, continuous, adverse, and
actual possession of the lot.
12. Benin vs Tuason; GR No. L-26127; June 28, 1974
The purpose of the new publication is to give notice to all
persons concerned regarding the amended application.
Without a new publication the registration court cannot
acquire jurisdiction over the area or parcel of land that is
added to the area covered by the original application,
and the decision of the registration court would be a
nullity insofar as the decision concerns the newly
included land.
The reason is because without a new publication, the law is
infringed with respect to the publicity that is required in
registration proceedings, and third parties who have not had
the opportunity to present their claim might be prejudiced in
their rights because of failure of notice.
But if the amendment consists in the exclusion of a
portion of the area covered by the original application
and the original plan as previously published, a new
publication is not necessary. In the latter case, the
jurisdiction of the court over the remaining area is not
affected by the failure of a new publication.
13. Corporation vs Treyes; GR No. 170916; April 27, 2007
Respondent allegedly harvested several marine products and
ransacked petitioners’ chapel, prompting the latter to file an
independent action for damages during the pendency of the
forcible entry and detainer cases.
The recoverable damages in forcible entry and detainer
cases thus refer to "rents" or "the reasonable compensation
for the use and occupation of the premises" or "fair rental
value of the property" and attorney's fees and costs.
However, in the present case, petitioners claim for
damages have no direct relation to their loss of
possession of the premises.
14. Republic vs CA; GR No. 108926; July 12, 1996
Private respondent, Democrito Plaza acquired the subject
property from the Heirs of Alhambra, took possession, paid
the taxes and declared the Tax Declarations in his name.
However, the President then issued Proclamation No. 679
withdrawing the subject property from sale and reserved the
same for slum improvement and disposition of the NHA in
coordination with the DENR – NCR.
The court ruled that there is clear and convincing evidence
that the appellee has established possession over the land
for 30 years. His bona fide claim of ownership is evidenced
by the tax payment receipts, deed of sale, tax declaration,
improvements made on the land and developing it into a rice
field.
15. Moralidad vs Pernes; GR No. 152809; August 3, 2006
Petitioner initially bought a parcel of land in Davao for her
family to transfer and be safe from NPA rebels but also
wanted the property to be available for her upon her
retirement. However, relations soured between Moralidad
and respondents, Pernes family, prompting her to file an
unlawful detainer suit against the latter.
The written letter by the petitioner to the defendants, it
created the usufruct between the parties. What was
constituted between the parties herein is one of usufruct over
a piece of land, with the petitioner being the owner of the
property upon whom the naked title thereto remained and the
respondents being 2 among other unnamed usufructuaries’
who were simply referred to as petitioner’s kin.
From the pleadings submitted by the parties, it is indubitable
that there were indeed facts and circumstances whereby the
subject usufruct may be deemed terminated or extinguished
by the occurrence of the resolutory conditions provided for in
the title creating the usufruct.
Thus, the Court rules that the continuing animosity between
the petitioner and the Pernes family and the violence and
humiliation she was made to endure, despite her advanced
age and frail condition, are enough factual bases to consider
the usufruct as having been terminated.
16. Hidalgo Enterprises Inc vs Balandan; GR No. L-3422;
June 13, 1952
Petitioner was the owner of an Ice plant, who had in their
premises 2 tanks filled of water, 9 feet deep. The factory was
fenced but Ingress and egress was easily made because the
gates were always open and there was no guard assigned in
the said gate.
One day when Mario (respondent’s son) was playing with his
friend, they saw the tank inside the factory and began playing
and swimming inside it. While bathing, Mario sank to the
bottom of the tank, and fished out later, having died of
‘asphyxia secondary to drowning.’ The lower decided in the
favor of the parents saying that the petitioner is liable for
damages due to the doctrine of attractive nuisance.
A water tank is NOT an instrumentality or appliance
considered as an attractive nuisance. The great majority of
American decisions say no. There are numerous cases in
which the attractive nuisance doctrine has not been held to
be applicable to ponds or reservoirs, pools of water, streams,
canals, dams, ditches, culverts, drains, cesspools or sewer
pools.
17. Gestopa vs CA; GR No. 111904; October 5, 2000
Spouses Danlag own six parcels of land. To four parcels of
land, they executed a donation mortis causa in favor of
respondent Mercedes Danlag-Pilapil, reserving donor's rights
to amend, cancel, or revoke the donation and to sell or
encumber such properties.
Years later, they executed another donation, this time inter
vivos, to six parcels of land in favor of respondents, reserving
their rights to the fruits of the land during their lifetime and for
prohibiting the donee to sell or dispose the properties
donated. Subsequently, the spouses sold 2 parcels to herein
petitioners, spouses Gestopa, and eventually revoking the
donation. Respondent filed a petition to quiet title, stating that
she had already become the owner of the parcels of land.
The document in dispute is a donation mortis causa because
the spouses were aware of the difference between the two
donations, and they needed to execute another deed of
donation inter vivos.
Acceptance is a requirement for donations inter vivos.
Donations mortis causa, being in the form of a will, are
not required to be accepted by the donees during the
donors' lifetime.
18. Cariño vs Abaya; GR No. 46706; June 26, 1940
Gray sisters, Petrona and Dorotea, both died intestate
without either descendants and ascendants and assigned
Miguel Cariño to administer their properties. Thereafter, Jose
Cariño prayed to be appointed as an administrator of the
estate of the Gray sisters. Father Abaya opposed, stating the
document was neither a donation inter vivos nor a will, but a
void donation mortis causa.
Donations which are to become effective upon the death of
the donor partake of the nature of disposals of property by
will and shall be governed by the rules established for
testamentary successions. Accordingly, said donations can
only be made with the formalities of a will. As the document
was not executed in conformity with the provisions of section
618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, conspicuously for lack of
attestation clause and marginal signatures, we are
constrained to hold that the same cannot be accorded any
force and effect.
19. JLT Agro Inc vs Balansag; GR No. 141882; March 11,
2005
Don Julian contracted two marriages. He had two children
with the first wife Antonia and 4 children on the second wife
Milagros. The present controversy involves a parcel of land
which was originally registered in the name of Don Julian and
Antonia. Don Julian married Milagros without partitioning the
properties in his first marriage. To avoid conflict, the parties
entered into a Compromise Agreement which embodied the
partition of all the properties of Don Julian. The above parcel
of land was included to be the share of Milagros and her
children. Milagros took possession of the said property which
was subsequently sold to respondents herein. Respondents,
upon registering the said land discovers that the title to the
above land was on the name of Petitioner herein.
Don Julian after the execution of the Compromise Agreement
executed a Deed of Assignment of Assets with Assumption of
Liabilities to petitioner which transfers the ownership of the
subject land in favor to the petitioner. Don Julian died
intestate.
Manresa defines preterition as the omission of the heir in the
will. In the case at bar, Don Julian did not execute a will since
what he resorted to was a partition inter vivos of his
properties, as evidenced by the court approved Compromise
Agreement. Thus, it is premature if not irrelevant to speak of
preterition prior to the death of Don Julian in the absence of a
will depriving a legal heir of his legitime. Besides, there are
other properties which the heirs from the second marriage
could inherit from Don Julian upon his death.