21.People of the Philippines vs. Adriano, et.al., GR No. 205228, July 15, 2015.

(Aberratio ictus;
Qualifying Aggravating Circumstance of treachery)

Stray bullets, obviously, kill indiscriminately and often without warning, precluding the unknowing
victim from repelling the attack or defending himself. At the outset, Adriano had no intention to kill
Bulanan, much less, employ any particular means of attack. Logically, Bulanan's death was random
and unintentional and the method used to kill her, as she was killed by a stray a bullet, was, by no
means, deliberate. Nonetheless, Adriano is guilty of the death of Bulanan under Article 4 of the
Revised Penal Code,  pursuant to the doctrine of aberratio ictus, which imposes criminal liability for
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the acts committed in violation of law and for all the natural and logical consequences resulting
therefrom. While it may not have been Adriano's intention to shoot Bulanan, this fact will not
exculpate him. Bulanan' s death caused by the bullet fired by Adriano was the natural and direct
consequence of Adriano's felonious deadly assault against Cabiedes.

As we already held in People v. Herrera citing People v. Hilario, "the fact that accused killed a
person other than their intended victim is of no moment." Evidently, Adriano's original intent was to
kill Cabiedes. However, during the commission of the crime of murder, a stray bullet hit and killed
Bulanan. Adriano is responsible for the consequences of his act of shooting Cabiedes. This is the
import of Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code. As held in People v. Herrera citing People v. Ural:

Criminal liability is incurred by any person committing a felony although the wrongful act be different
from that which is intended. One who commits an intentional felony is responsible for all the
consequences which may naturally or logically result therefrom, whether foreseen or intended or not.
The rationale of the rule is found in the doctrine, he who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the
evil caused.

As regards the crime(s) committed, we reiterate our ruling in People v. Nelmida. In the aforesaid
case, we ruled that accused-appellants should be convicted not of a complex crime but of separate
crimes of two counts of murder and seven counts of attempted murder as the killing and wounding of
the victims were not the result of a single act but of several acts.  The doctrine in Nelmida here is apt
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and applicable.

Finally, we ask, may treachery be appreciated in aberratio ictus?

Although Bulanan's death was by no means deliberate, we shall adhere to the prevailing
jurisprudence pronounced in People v. Flora, where the Court ruled that treachery may be
appreciated in aberratio ictus. In Flora, the accused was convicted of two separate counts of murder:
for the killing of two victims, Emerita, the intended victim, and Ireneo, the victim killed by a stray
bullet. The Court, due to the presence of the aggravating circumstance of treachery, qualified both
killings to murder. The material facts in Flora are similar in the case at bar. Thus, we follow the Flora
doctrine.

22.Jacinto vs. People of the Philippines; GR No. 162540, July 13, 2009. (Impossible crime)
Petitioner is guilty only of an impossible crime as defined and penalized in paragraph 2, Article 4, in
relation to Article 59, both of the Revised Penal Code, because of the factual impossibility of
producing the crime.

The requisites of an impossible crime are: (1) that the act performed would be an offense against
persons or property; (2) that the act was done with evil intent; and (3) that its accomplishment was
inherently impossible, or the means employed was either inadequate or ineffectual.
That the offense cannot be produced because the commission of the offense is inherently
impossible of accomplishment is the focus of this petition. To be impossible under this clause, the
act intended by the offender must be by its nature one impossible of accomplishment. There must be
either (1) legal impossibility, or (2) physical impossibility of accomplishing the intended act in order to
qualify the act as an impossible crime.

Factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his
control prevent the consummation of the intended crime.

Intod v. Court of Appeals is highly instructive and applicable to the present case. In Intod, the
accused, intending to kill a person, peppered the latter’s bedroom with bullets, but since the intended
victim was not home at the time, no harm came to him. The trial court and the CA held Intod guilty of
attempted murder. But upon review by this Court, he was adjudged guilty only of an impossible
crime as defined and penalized in paragraph 2, Article 4, in relation to Article 59, both of the
Revised Penal Code, because of the factual impossibility of producing the crime.

Petitioner's case is closely akin to the above example of factual impossibility given in Intod. In this
case, petitioner performed all the acts to consummate the crime of qualified theft, which is a crime
against property. Petitioner's evil intent cannot be denied, as the mere act of unlawfully taking the
check meant for Mega Foam showed her intent to gain or be unjustly enriched. Were it not for the
fact that the check bounced, she would have received the face value thereof, which was not rightfully
hers. Therefore, it was only due to the extraneous circumstance of the check being unfunded, a fact
unknown to petitioner at the time, that prevented the crime from being produced. The thing
unlawfully taken by petitioner turned out to be absolutely worthless, because the check was
eventually dishonored, and Mega Foam had received the cash to replace the value of said
dishonored check. 1avvp

23.Abrogar and Abrogar vs. Cosmos Bottling Company; GR No. 164749, March 15, 2017. (Proximate
cause)
Proximate cause is "that which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any new cause,
produces an event, and without which the event would not have occurred.

To be considered the proximate cause of the injury, the negligence need not be the event closest in
time to the injury; a cause is still proximate, although farther in time in relation to the injury, if the
happening of it set other foreseeable events into motion resulting ultimately in the damage.

An examination of the records in accordance with the foregoing concepts supports the conclusions
that the negligence of Intergames was the proximate cause of the death of Rommel; and that the
negligence of the jeepney driver was not an efficient intervening cause.

First of all, Intergames' negligence in not conducting the race in a road blocked off from vehicular
traffic, and in not properly coordinating the volunteer personnel manning the marathon route
effectively set the stage for the injury complained of. The submission that Intergames had previously
conducted numerous safe races did not persuasively demonstrate that it had exercised due
diligence because, as the trial court pointedly observed, "[t]hey were only lucky that no accident
occurred during the previous marathon races but still the danger was there." 73

Secondly, injury to the participants arising from an unfortunate vehicular accident on the route was
an event known to and foreseeable by Intergames, which could then have been avoided if only
Intergames had acted with due diligence by undertaking the race on a blocked-off road, and if only
Intergames had enforced and adopted more efficient supervision of the race through its volunteers.
And, thirdly, the negligence of the jeepney driver, albeit an intervening cause, was not efficient
enough to break the chain of connection between the negligence of Intergames and the injurious
consequence suffered by Rommel. An intervening cause, to be considered efficient, must be "one
not produced by a wrongful act or omission, but independent of it, and adequate to bring the
injurious results. Any cause intervening between the first wrongful cause and the final injury which
might reasonably have been foreseen or anticipated by the original wrongdoer is not such an
efficient intervening cause as will relieve the original wrong of its character as the proximate cause
of the final injury

In fine, it was the duty of Intergames to guard Rommel against the foreseen risk, but it failed to do
so.

24. Fantastico and Villanueva vs. Malicse, Jr.; GR No. 190912, January 12, 2015. (Attempted felony;
qualifying aggravating circumstance)

The essential elements of an attempted felony are as follows:

1. The offender commences the commission of the felony directly by overt acts;
2. He does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the
felony;
3. The offender's act be not stopped by his own spontaneous desistance;
4. The non-performance of all acts of execution was due to cause or accident
other than his spontaneous desistance.

The first requisite of an attempted felony consists of two (2) elements, namely:
(1) That there be external acts;
(2) Such external acts have direct connection with the crime intended to be committed.

In this particular case, there was no treachery. There is treachery when the offender
commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the
execution, which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the
offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make. The essence of
treachery is that the attack comes without a warning and in a swift, deliberate, and
unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting victim no
chance to resist or escape. For treachery to be considered, two elements must concur:
(1) the employment of means of execution that gives the persons attacked no
opportunity to defend themselves or retaliate; and (2) the means of execution were
deliberately or consciously adopted. From the facts proven by the prosecution, the
incident was spontaneous, thus, the second element of treachery is wanting. The
incident, which happened at the spur of the moment, negates the possibility that the
petitioners consciously adopted means to execute the crime committed. There is no
treachery where the attack was not preconceived and deliberately adopted but was just
triggered by the sudden infuriation on the part of the accused because of the
provocative act of the victim.

Abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces

between the victim and the aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority of strength
notoriously advantageous for the aggressor selected or taken advantage of by him in
the commission of the crime." "The fact that there were two persons who attacked the
victim does not per se establish that the crime was committed with abuse of superior
strength, there being no proof of the relative strength of the aggressors and the
victim." The evidence must establish that the assailants purposely sought the
advantage, or that they had the deliberate intent to use this advantage. "To take
advantage of superior strength means to purposely use excessive force out of
proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked." The appreciation
of this aggravating circumstance depends on the age, size, and strength of the parties.

25.Cruz vs. People of the Philippines; GR No. 166441, October 8, 2014. (Attempted felony; punishable
only if there is no other consummated felony)
The intent of the offender to lie with the female defines the distinction between attempted rape and
acts of lasciviousness. The felony of attempted rape requires such intent; the felony of acts of
lasciviousness does not. Only the direct overt acts of the offender establish the intent to lie with the
female. However, merely climbing on top of a naked female does not constitute attempted rape
without proof of his erectile penis being in a position to penetrate the female's vagina.