LEGAL AND

JUDICIAL ETHICS
2018 GOLDEN NOTES
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
MANILA
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 ACADEMIC YEAR 2018-2019
CIVIL LAW STUDENT COUNCIL
NIKKI MEI Q. KO
PATRICIA S. HIDALGO
MARLO S. NEPOMUCENO
LYODYCHIE Q. CAMARO
GENHIS B. ALUNDAY
JOSHUA B. UROLAZA
KRIZELLE R. RUIZ
JHAYPEE D. GUEVARRA
BAR OPERATIONS
CLARA LOUISSE J. YUMANG
NIÑO JOSEPH B. PIO RODA
JERREMIAH KRIZIAH B. BATALLER
CHRISTINE JOYCE P. ANDRES
KRIZA NIÑA B. MALALUAN
MARYLOU RENZI OLOTEO
ELOUISA ANN DC. CARREON
CIARI T. MENDOZA
NICOLE MARIE A. CORTES
ELISHA ELAINE D. BAYOT
JOSEPHINE ANG
PATRICIA MAE D. GUILLERMO
RAFAEL JEROME M. MENDOZA
MARSHAN DEINN S. GUALBERTO
NICOLE C. MABANAG
KIER JOHN V. UY
MICHAEL EARVIN R. SABADO
MON FRANCIS A. TOLENTINO
JUSTIN SANTIAGO L. BELTRAN
GLENN MATTHEW C. MANLAPID
JAMES ROSS L. TAN
VAN ANGELO K. RESPICIO
JOCHRIS DANIEL Z. GUADES
CLARICE ANGELINE V. QUESTIN
JANN PATRICIA M. TORRES
ATTY. AL CONRAD B. ESPALDON
ADVISER
PRESIDENT
INTERNAL VICE PRESIDENT
EXTERNAL VICE PRESIDENT
SECRETARY
TREASURER
AUDITOR
PUBLIC RELALTIONS OFFICER
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VICE-CHAIRPERSON
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ASST. SECRETARY
ASST. SECRETARY
HEAD, PUBLIC RELATIONS COMMITTEE
ASST. HEAD PUBLIC RELATIONS COMMITTEE
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ASST. HEAD, FINANCE COMMITTEE
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SENIOR MEMBERS
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 ACADEMICS COMMITTEE
EDREA JEAN V. RAMIREZ SECRETARY GENERAL
MARIELLA MARASIGAN ASST. SECRETARY GENERAL
ARIANNA LAINE T. SARMIENTO EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
MARIA ANGELICA J. HADLOC EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
GENA MYRTLE P. TERRE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
MAICA A. PRUDENTE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
JED NATHANIEL M. GONZALEZ LAYOUT ARTIST
LAURISSE MARIE T. PERIANES LAYOUT ARTIST
CIARI T. MENDOZA COVER DESIGN ARTIST

LEGAL & JUDICIAL ETHICS COMMITTEE

ANNA FRANCHESCA DIZON

LEGAL & JUDICIAL ETHICS COMMITTEE HEAD

MEMBERS

ZANDRA JANE DEL ROSARIO

LAURA MANGANTULAO
NIKKI AMANTE

ATTY. AL CONRAD B. ESPALDON

ADVISER
 FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS

ACADEMIC OFFICIALS
ATTY. NILO T. DIVINA REV. FR. ISIDRO C. ABAÑO, O.P.
DEAN REGENT

ATTY. ARTHUR B. CAPILI

FACULTY SECRETARY

ATTY. ELGIN MICHAEL C. PEREZ

LEGAL COUNSEL
UST CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTO CONCEPCION LEGAL AID CLINIC

JUDGE PHILIP A. AGUINALDO

SWDB COORDINATOR

LENY G. GADANIA, R.G.C.

GUIDANCE COUNSELOR
 OUR DEEPEST APPRECIATION TO OUR
MENTORS AND INSPIRATION

JUDGE OSCAR PIMENTEL

JUDGE PHILIP A. AGUINALDO

JUSTICE AMY L. JAVIER

JUSTICE MYRA G. FERNANDEZ

ATTY. ELGIN MICHAEL C. PEREZ

ATTY. ARNOLD E. CACHO

JUDGE NOLI C. DIAZ

JUDGE GEORGINA D. HIDALGO

DEAN JOSE I. DELA RAMA, JR.

For being our guideposts in understanding the intricate sphere of Legal and Judicial
Ethics.

-Academics Committee 2018

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REVIEW MATERIAL SHALL BE
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Table of Contents
Practice of Law (Rule 138) ......................................................................................................................................................................1
Concept ........................................................................................................................................................................................................1
Definition of the practice of law. ......................................................................................................................................................1
Practice of law is a privilege, not a right. ......................................................................................................................................4
Law as a profession, not a business or trade. .............................................................................................................................4
Qualifications for Admission to the Bar ........................................................................................................................................5
Appearance of Non-Lawyers..............................................................................................................................................................7
Law student practice rule (Rule 138-A) .......................................................................................................................................7
Non-lawyers in courts...........................................................................................................................................................................8
Non-lawyers in administrative tribunals .....................................................................................................................................9
Proceedings where lawyers are prohibited from appearing as counsels. .................................................................. 10
Sanctions for Practice or appearance without authority ................................................................................................... 10
Lawyers without authority ..............................................................................................................................................................11
Persons who are not lawyers .........................................................................................................................................................11
Public officials and the practice of law ....................................................................................................................................... 14
Prohibition or disqualification of former government attorneys. ................................................................................. 15
Public officials who cannot practice law or can practice law with restrictions. ...................................................... 15
Lawyers who are authorized to represent government ..................................................................................................... 17
Lawyer's Oath ........................................................................................................................................................................................17

Code of Professional Responsibility ............................................................................................................................................... 19

To society (Canons 1-6) ....................................................................................................................................................................21
Respect for law and legal processes ............................................................................................................................................ 21
Efficient and convenient legal services ...................................................................................................................................... 29
True, honest, fair, dignified and objective information on legal services ................................................................... 32
Participation in the improvement and reforms in the legal system.............................................................................. 35
Participation in legal education program ................................................................................................................................. 35
To the legal profession ......................................................................................................................................................................38
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (Rule 139-A) ...................................................................................................................... 38
Membership and dues........................................................................................................................................................................41
Upholding the dignity and integrity of the profession ........................................................................................................ 42
Courtesy, fairness, and candor towards professional colleagues ................................................................................... 45
No assistance in unauthorized practice of law. ...................................................................................................................... 49
To the courts ..........................................................................................................................................................................................51
Candor, fairness and good faith towards the courts ............................................................................................................ 51
Respect for courts and judicial officers ...................................................................................................................................... 53
Assistance in the speedy and efficient administration of justice .................................................................................... 58
Reliance on merits of his cause and avoidance of any impropriety which tends to influence or gives the
appearance of influence upon the courts .................................................................................................................................. 62
To the clients ..........................................................................................................................................................................................64
Availability of service without discrimination ........................................................................................................................ 65
Services regardless of a person's status .................................................................................................................................... 67
Services as counsel de officio..........................................................................................................................................................67
Valid grounds for refusal to serve ................................................................................................................................................68
Candor, fairness and loyalty to clients........................................................................................................................................ 69
Confidentiality rule .............................................................................................................................................................................70
Privileged communications .............................................................................................................................................................70
Conflict of interest ...............................................................................................................................................................................72
 Candid and honest advise to clients .............................................................................................................................................72
Compliance with laws ........................................................................................................................................................................78
Concurrent practice of another profession...............................................................................................................................79
Client's moneys and properties .....................................................................................................................................................79
Fiduciary relationship ........................................................................................................................................................................80
Co-mingling of funds ...........................................................................................................................................................................82
Delivery of funds...................................................................................................................................................................................82
Borrowing or lending .........................................................................................................................................................................83
Fidelity to client's cause ....................................................................................................................................................................84
Competence and diligence................................................................................................................................................................85
Adequate preparation ........................................................................................................................................................................87
Negligence ...............................................................................................................................................................................................87
Collaborating counsel .........................................................................................................................................................................87
Duty to apprise client .........................................................................................................................................................................89
Representation with zeal within legal bounds ........................................................................................................................90
Use of fair and honest means ..........................................................................................................................................................91
Client's fraud ..........................................................................................................................................................................................92
Procedure in handling cases............................................................................................................................................................93
Attorney's Fees ......................................................................................................................................................................................94
Acceptance fees .....................................................................................................................................................................................98
Contingency fee arrangements.......................................................................................................................................................98
Attorney's Liens .................................................................................................................................................................................101
Fees and controversies with clients (Quantum Meruit) ................................................................................................... 103
Concepts of attorney's fees ...........................................................................................................................................................105
Preservation of client's confidences .........................................................................................................................................106
Prohibited disclosures and use ...................................................................................................................................................106
Disclosure, when allowed ..............................................................................................................................................................108
Withdrawal of Services ...................................................................................................................................................................109

Suspension, disbarment and discipline of lawyers (Rule 139-B, Rules of Court) ............................................. 113
Nature and characteristics of disciplinary actions against lawyers ........................................................................... 113
Sui Generis ............................................................................................................................................................................................115
Prescription .........................................................................................................................................................................................116
Grounds .................................................................................................................................................................................................117
Proceedings..........................................................................................................................................................................................119
Discipline of Filipino Lawyers practicing abroad ............................................................................................................... 123

Readmission to the Bar ........................................................................................................................................................................127

Lawyers who have been suspended .........................................................................................................................................127
Lawyers who have been disbarred............................................................................................................................................ 128
Lawyers who have been repatriated ........................................................................................................................................129

Mandatory Continuing Legal Education .....................................................................................................................................132

Purpose ..................................................................................................................................................................................................132
Requirements ......................................................................................................................................................................................132
Non-Compliance ................................................................................................................................................................................132
Exemptions ..........................................................................................................................................................................................133
Sanctions ...............................................................................................................................................................................................133
Bar Matter 2012, Rule on Mandatory Legal Aid Service .................................................................................................. 134

Notarial Practice (A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC) .....................................................................................................................................136

Qualifications on notary public ...................................................................................................................................................136
 Term of office of notary public .................................................................................................................................................... 140
Powers and Limitations ................................................................................................................................................................. 140
Notarial Register ............................................................................................................................................................................... 146
Jurisdiction of notary public and place of notarization ................................................................................................... 148
Revocation of commission ............................................................................................................................................................ 148
Competent evidence of identity .................................................................................................................................................. 149
Sanctions ............................................................................................................................................................................................... 149

Judicial Ethics ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 150

Discipline of members of the Judiciary ................................................................................................................................... 188
Lower court judges and justices of the Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan and Court of Tax Appeals (Rule
140) ......................................................................................................................................................................................................... 191
Grounds ................................................................................................................................................................................................. 192
Sanctions imposed by the Supreme Court on erring members of the Judiciary ................................................... 197
Disqualification of Justices and Judges (Rule 137) ............................................................................................................ 200
Compulsory.......................................................................................................................................................................................... 200
Voluntary .............................................................................................................................................................................................. 200

Legal Fees..................................................................................................................................................................................................... 206

Manner of Payment .......................................................................................................................................................................... 206
Fees in Lien .......................................................................................................................................................................................... 206
Persons authorized to collect Legal Fees ............................................................................................................................... 206

Legal Fees..................................................................................................................................................................................................... 208

Recovery of Costs .............................................................................................................................................................................. 208
Prevailing Party ................................................................................................................................................................................. 208
Dismissed Appeal or Action ......................................................................................................................................................... 208
Frivolous Appeal ............................................................................................................................................................................... 208
False Allegations................................................................................................................................................................................ 208
Non-Appearance of Witness......................................................................................................................................................... 208

Legal Forms ................................................................................................................................................................................................ 209

Quitclaims in Labor Cases ............................................................................................................................................................. 209
Simple Contracts - Lease, Sale of Realty or Personal property ..................................................................................... 209
Promissory Note ................................................................................................................................................................................ 213
Verification and Certificate of Non-forum Shopping......................................................................................................... 214
Notice of Hearing and Explanation (All levels) .................................................................................................................... 214
Affidavits - Loss, Change of Name .............................................................................................................................................. 215
 PRACTICE OF LAW

LEGAL ETHICS NOTE: A lawyer who is a detention prisoner is not

Legal Ethics
It is a branch of moral science which treats of the
duties which an attorney owes to the court, to his
client, to his colleagues in the profession and to
the public as embodied in the Constitution, Rules
of Court, the Code of Professional Responsibility,
Canons of Professional Ethics, jurisprudence,
moral, law and special laws (Justice George
Malcolm).
Sources of ethical standards for the Judiciary
allowed to practice his profession as a necessary
consequence of his status as a detention prisoner.
All prisoners whether under preventive detention
or serving final sentence cannot practice their
profession nor engage in any business or
occupation, or hold office, elective or appointive,
while in detention. This is a necessary
consequence of arrest and detention (People v.
Maceda, G.R. Nos. 89591-96, January 24, 2000).
Essential criteria in determining whether a
person is engaged in the practice of law
[CAHA]

1. Primary 1. Compensation – implies that one must have

a. Bar presented himself to be in active practice and
i. Code of Professional Responsibility that his professional services are available to
ii. Constitution the public for compensation, as a source of
iii. Rules of Court livelihood or in consideration of his said
b. Bench services;
i. New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary 2. Application of law, legal principle, practice or
ii. Rules of Court procedure which calls for legal knowledge,
c. Other personnel – Code of Conduct for training and experience;
Court Personnel
3. Habituality – implies customary or habitually
2. Secondary holding oneself out to the public as a lawyer.
a. Decisions/Resolutions of the Supreme Practice of law is more than an isolated
Court appearance for it consists in frequent or
b. Supreme Court Circulars customary action; and
c. Order/Resolution of other courts
d. IBP Issuances 4. Attorney-Client relationship - engaging in the
e. Treatises and Publications practice of law presupposes the existence of a
lawyer-client relationship. Practice of law
PRACTICE OF LAW includes work as a litigator, in-house counsel,
giving of legal advice, teaching of law, and
Concept even foreign assignment which requires the
knowledge and application of the laws.
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of
court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training, and experience Q: Ronnie, a paralegal in a law firm, helped
(Cayetano v. Monsod, G.R. No. 100113, September Beth in a property dispute in which she was
3, 1991). involved by giving her legal advice and
preparing a complaint that she eventually
The following acts constitute practice of law: filed in court under her own signature. When
the lawyer for the defendant learned of it, he
a. Giving of advice or rendering any kind of told Ronnie to desist from practicing law. But
service that involves legal knowledge; he disputed this, claiming that he had not
b. Appearance in court and conduct of cases practiced law since he did not receive
in court; compensation from Beth for his help. Is
c. Preparation of pleadings and other Ronnie correct? (2011 Bar)
papers incident to actions as well as
drawing of deeds and instruments of A: NO. The receipt of compensation is not the sole
conveyance; and determinant of legal practice. Giving of advice or
d. Notarial acts. rendering any kind of service that involves legal

1 UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS

FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
 Legal Ethics
knowledge is also considered as practice of law.
As such, Ronnie should desist from giving legal
advice since the same is considered a practice of
law for which he is not qualified.
Q: Medado passed the bar exams in 1979 and
took the Attorney’s Oath at PICC. He was
scheduled to sign in the Roll of Attorneys but
on his scheduled date, he failed to do so
allegedly because he had misplaced the Notice
to Sign the Roll of Attorneys given by the
Office of the Bar Confidant when he went
home to his province for a vacation. Several
years later, Medado found the Notice and
realized that what he signed at the PICC was
merely an attendance record. In 2012,
Medado filed the instant Petition, praying that
he be allowed to sign in the Roll of Attorneys.
a. Should his petition be allowed?
b. Did he engage in unauthorized
practice of law?
A:
a. YES. At the outset, not allowing Medado to sign
the Roll of Attorneys would be akin to imposing
upon him the ultimate penalty of disbarment
which is reserved for the most serious ethical
transgressions of members of the Bar. Medado
demonstrated good faith and good moral
character when he finally filed the instant
Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys. It was not
a third party who called the Court’s attention to
petitioner’s omission; rather, it was Medado
himself who acknowledged his own lapse, albeit
after the passage of more than 30 years.
b. YES, he did engage in unuauthorized practice of
law. Medado may have at first operated under an
honest mistake of fact when he thought that what
he had signed at the PICC entrance before the
oath-taking was already the Roll of Attorneys.
However, the moment he realized that what he
had signed was merely an attendance record, he
could no longer claim an honest mistake of fact as
a valid justification. In spite of this knowledge, he
chose to continue practicing law without taking
the necessary steps to complete all the
requirements for admission to the Bar, he
willfully engaged in the unauthorized practice of
law (In Re: Petition to sign in the Roll of Attorneys
Michael Medado, B.M. No. 2540, September 24,
2013).
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
2018 GOLDEN NOTES
2
Q: Evelyn works as a court stenographer at
the Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City. One
day, Evelyn offered to extrajudicially settle
the estate of the mother of her friend, Leticia.
Evelyn was paid for her services. Leticia later
on learned that Evelyn had no authority to
settle her deceased mother's estate as she was
not even a lawyer but an ordinary court
employee. Consequently, Leticia filed an
administrative case against Evelyn.
Does the preparation of an extrajudicial
settlement of estate constitute practice of
law?
A: YES.The preparation of an extrajudicial
settlement of the estate constitutes “practice of
law” as defined in the case of Cayetano v. Monsod.
Not being a lawyer, Evelyn had no authority to
prepare and finalize an extrajudicial settlement of
estate. Worse, she received money from Leticia
for her services. In preparing and finalizing the
extrajudicial settlement of estate and receiving
compensation for the same even when she is not
a lawyer, Evelyn is guilty of simple misconduct
(Arienda v. Monilla, Court Stenographer, RTC, A.M.
No. P-11-2980, June 10, 2013).
Persons excluded in the term “Practicing
Lawyer”
1. Government employees and incumbent
elective officials are not allowed to practice;
2. Lawyers who by law are not allowed to
appear in court;
3. Supervising lawyers of students enrolled in
law student practice in duly accredited legal
clinics of law schools and lawyers of Non-
Government Organizations (NGOs) and
People’s Organizations (POs) who by the
nature of their work already render free legal
aid to indigent and pauper litigants; and
4. Lawyers not covered under subparagraphs
(i) to (iii) of Sec. 4, B.M. 2012 including those
who are employees in the private sector but
do not appear for and in behalf of parties in
courts of law and quasi-judicial agencies.
Q: Atty. Ladaga, a clerk of court, appeared as
counsel for and in behalf of his cousin in a
criminal case for falsification of public
documents before the MeTC of Quezon City.
The appearance of Atty. Ladaga in said case
was without the previous permission of the
Court. Did Atty. Ladaga violate the Code of
 PRACTICE OF LAW
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees by engaging in 4. Attorney of record vs. Attorney ad hoc
private practice?
ATTORNEY OF ATTORNEY AD HOC
A: YES. "Private practice" of a profession, which is RECORD
prohibited, does not pertain to an isolated court Attorney of record is An attorney ad hoc is a
appearance; rather, it contemplates a succession an attorney whose person appointed by
of acts of the same nature habitually or name is entered in the the court to defend an
customarily holding one's self to the public as a records of an action or absentee defendant in
lawyer. It is true that he filed leave applications suit as the lawyer of a the suit in which the
corresponding to the dates he appeared in court designated party appointment was
but he failed to obtain a prior permission from thereto. made.
the head of the Department (OCA v. Atty. Ladaga,
A.M. No. P-99-1287, January 26, 2001). 4. Counsel de oficio

DEFINITIONS An attorney appointed by the court to defend an

indigent defendant in a criminal action.
1. Bar vs. Bench
5. Counsel de parte
BAR BENCH
Refers to the whole Refers to the whole A private counsel of a party secured by him,
body of attorneys and body of judges and without intervention from the government.
counselors. justices.
Collectively, the 6. Amicus Curiae
members of the legal
profession. An experienced and impartial attorney invited by
the court to appear and help in the disposition of
2. Bar Admission the issues submitted to it. Amicus curiae appear
in court not to represent any particular party but
It is the act by which one is licensed to practice only to assist the court (plural: Amici Curiae).
before courts of a particular state or jurisdiction
after satisfying the following requirements: 7. Amicus Curiae par excellence

a. Bar examinations; A bar association which appears in court as

b. Period of residency; and amicus curiae or a friend of the court; it acts
c. Admission on grounds of reciprocity merely as a consultant to guide the court in
after period of years as member of the doubtful questions or issues pending before it.
bar (Pineda, 2009).
8. Practicing Lawyer vs.Trial lawyer (2006
Bar)
3. Attorney-at-law vs. Attorney-in-fact
PRACTICING LAWYER TRIAL LAWYER
ATTORNEY-AT-LAW ATTORNEY-IN-FACT One engaged in the One who personally
Class of persons who Simply an agent whose practice of law, which is handles cases in court,
are licensed officers of authority is strictly not limited to the administrative
the court empowered limited by the conduct of cases in agencies or boards and
to appear, prosecute instrument appointing court, but includes legal engages in actual trial
and defend, and upon him. His authority is advice and counseling, work, either for the
whom peculiar duties, provided in a special and the preparation of prosecution or for the
responsibilities and power of attorney, or instruments and defense of cases of
liabilities are general power of contracts by which legal clients.
developed by law as a attorney, or letter of rights are secured.
consequence. attorney. He is not
necessarily a lawyer. 9. Lead counsel vs. In-house counsel vs. Of
counsel

3 UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS

FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
 Legal Ethics
LEAD IN-HOUSE / OF COUNSEL 12. Pro Se
COUNSEL HOUSE
COUNSEL A party to a lawsuit, who represents himself, is
A lawyer on One who acts An appearing in the case "pro se."
either side of a as attorney for experienced
litigated action a business lawyer, usually NOTE: When there is prohibition to practice law,
who is charged though carried a retired it refers to all other cases except where such
with the as an employee member of the person would appear in court to defend himself
principal of that judiciary, (Pro Se).
management business and employed by
and direction not as an law firms as 13. Advocate
of a party’s independent consultants.
case, as lawyer. It is a lawyer who pleads on behalf of someone
distinguished else. He pleads the cause of another before a
from his tribunal or judicial court (Pineda, 2009).
juniors or
subordinates. 14. Barrister

He is a person entitled to practice law as an

10. Public Prosecutor vs. Private Prosecutor
PUBLIC PRIVATE
PROSECUTOR PROSECUTOR
He is a quasi-judicial A private prosecutor is
officer who represents a lawyer engaged by a
the state in criminal litigant to intervene in
proceedings. the prosecution of a
criminal action when
the offended party is
entitled to indemnity
and has not waived
expressly, reserved or
instituted the civil
action for damages. He
is under the direction
and control of the
public prosecutor (Sec.
5 Rule 110 RRC as
amended, May 1, 2002).
11. Assumpsit (2006 Bar)
Literally means “he has undertaken.” It is an
action for the recovery of damages by reason of
the breach or non-performance of a simple
contract, either express or implied, whether made
orally or in writing. Assumpsit is the word always
used in pleadings by the plaintiff to set forth the
defendant’s undertaking or promise.
advocate or counsel in superior courts (Pineda,
2009).
Q: The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
may intervene in a case involving a matter of
public law or professional concern as: (2014
Bar)
A: Amicus Curiae par excellence
PRIVILEGE
Nature of the practice of law
The practice of law is not a natural, property or
constitutional right but a mere privilege. It is not a
right granted to anyone who demands it but a
privilege to be extended or withheld in the
exercise of sound judicial discretion. It is a
privilege accorded only to those who measure up
to certain rigid standards of mental and moral
fitness.
NOTE: It becomes a property right if there is a
contract for Attorney’s Fees.
PROFESSION, NOT BUSINESS
Law is a profession and not a trade

NOTE: Claims in action of assumpsit are
ordinarily divided into (a) common or indebitatus
assumpsit, brought usually on an implied
promise, and (b) special assumpsit, founded on an
express promise.
The legal profession is not a business. It is not a
money-making trade similar to that of a
businessman employing a strategy for the
purpose of monetary gain. It is a sacred
profession imbued with public interest whose

UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS

2018 GOLDEN NOTES
4
 PRACTICE OF LAW
primary objective is public service, as it is an
essential part in the administration of justice and
a profession in pursuit of which pecuniary
reward is considered merely incidental.
QUALIFICATIONS
The Supreme Court has the power to promulgate
rules concerning the protection and enforcement
of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, the admission to the
practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal
assistance to the underprivileged (Sec. 5(5), Art.
VIII, 1987 Constitution).
Legislative Branch is not allowed to regulate
the practice of law
The 1987 Constitution no longer provides for the
power of the legislature to repeal, alter and
supplement the Rules promulgated by the
Supreme Court regulating the practice of law.
Who may practice law
Any person heretofore duly admitted as a
member of the bar, or hereafter admitted as such
in accordance with the provisions of the rule, and
who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to
practice law (Sec. 1,Rule 138, Rules of Court).
Requirements for admission to the Bar
Under Sections 2, 5 and 6 of Rule 138, the
applicant must be [C21-GRENAPOS]:
1. Citizen of the Philippines;
2. At least 21 years of age;
3. Of Good moral character;
4. a Resident of the Philippines;
5. Must produce before the SC satisfactory
Evidence of good moral character;
6. No charges against him, involving moral
turpitude, have been filed or are pending in
any court in the Philippines (Sec. 2, Rule
138, RRC)
7. Must have complied with the Academic
requirements:
Pre-Law – Pursued and satisfactorily
completed in an authorized and recognized
university or college, requiring for
admission thereto the completion of a four-
year high school course, the course of study
prescribed therein for a bachelor’s degree in
arts or sciences. (Sec. 6, Rule 138, RRC).
5 UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
NOTE: Pursuant to the power of the Legal
Education Board (LEB) to prescribe the
minimum standards for law admission
under Section 7(e) of Republic Act No. 7662,
titled the “Legal Education Reform Act of
1993,” the LEB, under LEB Memorandum
Order No. 7 Series of 2016, required the
PhiLSAT as a prerequisite for admission to
the basic law courses leading to either a
Bachelor of Laws or Juris Doctor degree
beginning school year 2017 - 2018.
Law proper - satisfactorily completed the
following courses in a law school or
university duly recognized by the
government:
a. civil law;
b. commercial law;
c. remedial law;
d. criminal law;
e. public and private international law;
f. political law;
g. labor and social legislation;
h. medical jurisprudence;
i. taxation; and
j. legal ethics (Sec. 5, Rule 138, RRC)
8. Must Pass the bar examinations;
9. Take the lawyer’s Oath; and
10. Sign the Roll of Attorneys.
Admission to Philippine Bar
Passing the Bar examination is not sufficient for
admission of a person to the Philippine Bar. He
still has to take the oath of office and sign the Roll
of Attorney’s as prerequisites to admission.
The 5 Strike Rule in taking the Bar
Under the 5-strike rule, a bar candidate shall be
disqualified after failing thrice; provided that the
candidate may take a fourth or fifth examination
if he successfully completes a one-year refresher
course for each examination.
On September 3, 2013, the SC
resolved to LIFT the five-strike rule on bar
repeaters, provided that the candidates have
enrolled in and passed in regular fourth year
review classes as well as attended a pre-bar
review course every time they take the Bar
Examinations after failing for the third time,
under a curriculum prepared by the Legal
Education Board (LEB), and in law schools
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
 Legal Ethics
accredited by it for that purpose. This rule shall
take effect beginning with the 2014 Bar
Examinations.
Requirements for a Filipino citizen who
graduated from a foreign law school to be
admitted to the Bar
He may be admitted to the bar only upon
submission to the Supreme Court certifications
showing:
a. Completion of all courses leading to the
degree of Bachelor of Laws or its
equivalent degree;
b. Recognition or accreditation of the law
school by the proper authority;
c. Completion of all fourth year subjects in
the Bachelor of Laws academic program in
a law school duly recognized by the
Philippine Government; and
d. Present proof of completing a separate
bachelor’s degree.
A Filipino citizen who completed and obtained his
or her degree in Bachelor of Laws or its
equivalent in a foreign law school must also
present proof of completion of a
separate bachelor’s degree (Bar Matter No. 1153,
Re: Letter of Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza Proposing
Reforms in the Bar Examinations through
Amendments to Rule 138 of the Rules of Court,
March 9, 2010).
Q: Ching was born on April 1964 to a Filipino
mother and Chinese father. Because of
questions concerning his citizenship, he was
only conditionally allowed to take the bar
examinations. Upon passing the bar, he was
required to present further proof of
citizenship and was not allowed to take the
Oath. Can he elect Philippine citizenship, 14
years after reaching the age of majority
(required under the 1935 Constitution)?
A: NO. Ching is not qualified to be a lawyer for
having elected Philippine citizenship 14 years
after reaching the age of majority. Ching offered
no reason why he delayed the election of
Philippine citizenship. The procedure is not a
tedious process. All that is required is to execute
an affidavit and file the same in the nearest
registry (In Re: Application for Admission to the
Philippine Bar of Vicente Ching, B.M. 914, October
1, 1999).
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
2018 GOLDEN NOTES
6
Q: Atty. Melendrez filed a petition to
disqualify Meling from taking the bar exams
and to impose disciplinary penalty as a
member of the Shari'a Bar. He alleged that in
his application to take the bar, Meling failed to
disclose the fact that he has 3 pending
criminal cases. Also, Meling has been using the
title “Attorney" in his communications as
secretary to the Mayor. Should Meling be
disqualified from being admitted to the Bar?
A: YES. Meling's deliberate silence and non-
revelation of his pending criminal cases
constitute concealment. The disclosure
requirement is imposed to determine whether
there is satisfactory evidence of good moral
character of the applicant. By concealing the
existence of such cases, the applicant flunks the
test of fitness even if the cases are ultimately
proven unwarranted or insufficient to impugn or
affect the good moral character of the applicant.
Further, it was highly improper for Meling, as
member of the Shari'a Bar, to use the title
"Attorney". Only members of the Philippine Bar,
who have obtained the necessary degree in the
study of law and successfully passed the bar
exams, been admitted to the IBP and remain
members in good standing are authorized to
practice law and thus use the title (In Re:
Disqualification of Bar Examinee Haron S. Meling,
B.M. No. 1154, June 8, 2004).
Q: Argosino passed the bar examinations held
in 1993. The Court, however, deferred his
oath-taking due to his previous conviction for
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide.
The criminal case, which resulted in
Argosino’s conviction, arose from the death of
a neophyte during fraternity initiation rites.
Various certifications showed that he is a
devout Catholic with a genuine concern for
civic duties and public service. Also, it has
been proven that Mr. Argosino has exerted all
efforts to atone for the death of Raul. Should
Argosino be allowed to take his lawyer's oath?
A: YES. The practice of law is a privilege granted
only to those who possess the strict intellectual
and moral qualifications required of lawyers who
are instruments in the effective and efficient
administration of justice. The SC recognizes that
Mr. Argosino is not inherently of bad moral fiber
given the various certifications that he is a devout
Catholic with a genuine concern for civic duties
and public service and that it has been proved
 PRACTICE OF LAW
that he has exerted all efforts to atone for the
death of Raul and the court gave him the benefit
of the doubt, taking judicial notice of the general
tendency of youth to be rash, temerarious and
uncalculating (Re: Petition of Al Argosino to Take
the Lawyer’s Oath, B.M. No. 712, March 19, 1997).
CONTINUING REQUIREMENTS FOR
MEMBERSHIP IN THE BAR
1. Good moral character
Good moral character is a continuing
requirement
The nature of the office of an attorney requires
that a lawyer shall be a person of good moral
character. Since this qualification is a condition
precedent to a license to enter upon the practice
of law, the maintenance thereof is equally
essential during the continuance of the practice
and the exercise of the privilege (Grande v. Atty.
De Silva, A.C. No. 4838, July 29, 2003).
The requirement of good moral character has
four general purposes, namely:
1. To protect the public;
2. To protect the public image of lawyers;
3. To protect prospective clients; and
4. To protect errant lawyers from themselves.
Each purpose is as important as the other
(Garrido v. Attys. Garrido and Valencia, A.C.
No. 6593, February 4, 2010).
2. Citizenship – The practice of law is a privilege
denied to foreigners. The requirement of Filipino
citizenship and of residence in the Philippinesis
not harsh nor unreasonable but is based on wise
and sound principles of public policy, which takes
into account the close connection of the practice
of law with the administration of justice and the
other branches of the government. (Agpalo, Legal
and Judicial Ethics, 2009).
Reacquisition of the privilege to practice law
in the Philippines under R.A. No. 9225 or the
Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of
2003
How is Citizenship retained under this Act?
Any provision of law to the contrary
notwithstanding, natural-born citizens by reason
of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign
7 UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
country are hereby deemed to have re-acquired
Philippine citizenship upon taking the following
oath of allegiance to the Republic:
"I _____________________, solemny swear (or affirm)
that I will support and defend the Constitution of
the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws
and legal orders promulgated by the duly
constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I
hereby declare that I recognize and accept the
supreme authority of the Philippines and will
maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and
that I imposed this obligation upon myself
voluntarily without mental reservation or
purpose of evasion." (Sec. 3, RA 9225).
Derivative Citizenship
The unmarried child, whether legitimate,
illegitimate or adopted, below eighteen (18)
years of age, of those who re-acquire Philippine
citizenship are deemed citizens of the Philippines
APPEARANCE OF NON-LAWYERS
Appearance of non-lawyers
GR: Only those who are licensed to practice law
can appear and handle cases in court.
XPNs:
1. Law student practice;
2. Non-lawyers in court can appear for a party
in MTC; and
NOTE: Section 34, Rule 138 of the Revised
Rules of Court expressly allows pro se
practice or the right of a non-member of the
bar to engage in limited practice of law
(Antiquiera, 1992).
3. Non-lawyers can represent parties in
administrative tribunals such as NLRC,
DARAB, and Cadastral Courts.
LAW STUDENT PRACTICE
Law student practice Rule
A law student who has successfully completed his
third year of the regular four-year prescribed law
curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized law
school's clinical legal education program
approved by the Supreme Court, may appear
without compensation in any civil, criminal or
administrative case before any trial court,
tribunal, board or officer, to represent indigent
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
 Legal Ethics
clients accepted by the legal clinic of the law
school (Sec. 1, Rule 138-A).
The appearance of the law student authorized by
this rule, shall be under the direct supervision
and control of a member of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines duly accredited by the law school.
Any and all pleadings, motions, briefs,
memoranda or other papers to be filed, must be
signed by the supervising attorney for and in
behalf of the legal clinic (Sec. 2, Rule 138-A).
NOTE: The law student shall comply with the
standards of professional conduct governing
members of the Bar. Failure of an attorney to
provide adequate supervision of student practice
may be a ground for disciplinary action (Circular
No.19, dated December 19, 1986).
Q: Alex filed before the MeTC a formal Entry of
Appearance as private prosecutor in a
criminal case for Grave Threats where his
father was the complainant. Describing
himself as a third year law student, he
justified his appearance as private prosecutor
on the basis of Section 34 of Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court. However, the MeTC denied his
request on the ground that Circular No. 19
governing limited law student practice in
conjunction with Rule 138-A should take
precedence over the ruling of the Court that a
non-lawyer may appear before the inferior
courts as an agent or friend of a party litigant.
Was the denial of the court proper?
A: NO. In a Resolution dated June 10, 1997 in Bar
Matter No. 730, the Court En Banc clarified: “The
rule, however, is different if the law student
appears before an inferior court, where the issues
and procedure are relatively simple. In inferior
courts, a law student may appear in his personal
capacity without the supervision of a lawyer.” As
provided for in Section 34, Rule 138, “a law
student may appear before an inferior court as an
agent or friend of a party without the supervision
of a member of the bar.”
Petitioner expressly anchored his appearance on
Section 34 of Rule 138. The court must have been
confused by the fact that petitioner referred to
himself as a law student in his entry of
appearance. Rule 138-A should not have been
used by the courts a quo in denying permission to
act as private prosecutor against petitioner for
the simple reason that Rule 138-A is not the basis
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
2018 GOLDEN NOTES
8
for petitioner’s appearance (Cruz v. Mina, et al,
G.R. No. 154207, April 27, 2007).
Q: Ferdinand Cruz sought permission to enter
his appearance for and on his behalf before
the RTC as the plaintiff in a Civil Case for
Abatement of Nuisance. Cruz, a fourth year
law student, anchors his claim on Section 34
of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court that a non-
lawyer may appear before any court and
conduct his litigation personally. Judge
Mijares denied the motion with finality. In the
same Order, the trial court held that for the
failure of Cruz to submit the promised
document and jurisprudence and for his
failure to satisfy the requirements or
conditions under Rule 138-A of the Rules of
Court, his appearance was denied. Did the
court act with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
when it denied the appearance of Cruz as
party litigant?
A: YES. The law recognizes the right of an
individual to represent himself in any case to
which he is a party. The Rules state that a party
may conduct his litigation personally or with the
aid of an attorney, and that his appearance must
either be personal or by a duly authorized
member of the Bar. The individual litigant may
personally do everything in the course of
proceedings from commencement to the
termination of the litigation. Cruz as plaintiff, at
his own instance, can personally conduct the
litigation of his case. He would then be acting not
as a counsel or lawyer, but as a party exercising
his right to represent himself.
The trial court must have been misled by the fact
that Cruz is a law student and must, therefore, be
subject to the conditions of the Law Student
Practice Rule. It erred in applying Rule 138-A,
when the basis of Cruz's claim is Section 34 of
Rule 138. The former rule provides for conditions
when a law student may appear in courts, while
the latter rule allows the appearance of a non-
lawyer as a party representing himself (Cruz v.
Mijares, et al., G.R. No. 154464, September 11,
2008).
NON LAWYERS IN COURT
Non-lawyers in court
The following are the instances where non-
 PRACTICE OF LAW
lawyers may appear in court:
1. In Cases before the MTC: A party to the
litigation, may conduct his own case or
litigation in person, with the aid of an agent
or friend appointed by him for that purpose
(Sec. 34, Rule 138, RRC);
2. Before any other court, a party may conduct
his litigation personally but if he gets
someone to aid him, that someone must be
authorized member of the Bar (Sec. 34, Rule
138, RRC);
NOTE: A non-lawyer conducting his own
litigation is bound by the same rules in
conducting the trial case. He cannot after
judgment, claim that he was not properly
represented.
3. Criminal case before the MTCin a locality
where a duly licensed member of the Bar is
not available, the judge may appoint a non-
lawyer who is a:
a. Resident of the province; and
b. Of good repute for probity and ability to
aid the accused in his defense (Sec. 7,Rule
116, RRC); and
4. Any official or other personappointed or
designated to appear for the Government of
the Philippines in accordance with law (Sec.
33, Rule 138, RRC).
NOTE: Such person shall have all the rights of
a duly authorized member of the Bar to
appear in any case in which said government
has a direct or indirect interest (Sec. 33, Rule
138, RRC).
Party’s Right to Self-Representation
A party’s representation on his own behalf is not
considered to be a practice of law as "one does not
practice law by acting for himself, any more than
he practices medicine by rendering first aid to
himself” (Maderada v. Mediodea, A.M. No. MTJ-02-
1459, October 14, 2003).
Therefore, a person can conduct the litigation of
the cases personally. He is not engaged in the
practice of law if he represents himself in cases in
which he is a party. By conducting the litigation of
his own cases, he acts not as a counsel or lawyer
but as a party exercising his right to represent
himself. Certainly, he does not become a counsel
9 UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
or lawyer by exercising such right (Santos v. Judge
Lacurom, A.M. No. RTJ-04-1823, August 28, 2006).
Party-Litigant representing himself/herself
In civil cases, an individual litigant has the right to
conduct his litigation personally.
In criminal cases, in grave and less grave
offenses, an accused who is a layman must
always appear by counsel; he cannot conduct his
own defense without violating his right to due
process of law. In light offenses a party-litigant
can represent himself/herself.
NOTE: Where an accused was not duly
represented by a member of the Bar during trial,
the judgment should be set aside, and the case
remanded to the trial court for a new trial (People
v. Santocildes, Jr., G.R. No. 109149, December 21,
1999).
With regard to a juridical person, it must always
appear in court through a duly licensed member
of the bar, except before MTC where it may be
represented by its agent or officer who need not
be a lawyer.
Limitations on the appearance of non-lawyers
1. He should confine his work to non-adversary
contentions;
2. He should not undertake purely legal work,
such as the examination or cross-
examination of witnesses, or the presentation
of evidence; and
3. His services should not be habitually
rendered. He should not charge or collect
attorney’s fees (PAFLU v. Binalbagan Isabela
Sugar Co., G.R. No. L-23959, November 29,
1971).
NON-LAWYERS IN ADMINISTRATIVE
TRIBUNAL
1. Under the Labor Code, non-lawyers may
appear before the NLRC or any Labor Arbiter,
if:
a. They represent themselves; or
b. They represent their organization or
members thereof (Art. 222, PD 442, as
amended) (2002 Bar); or
c. If they are duly accredited members of
any legal aid office duly recognized by
the Department of Justice, or the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines in
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
 Legal Ethics
cases referred to by the latter.
NOTE: He is not, however, entitled
to attorney’s fees under Article 222 of the
Labor Code for not being a lawyer (Five J. Taxi
v. NLRC, G.R. No. 111474, August 22, 1994).
2. Under the Cadastral Act, a non-lawyer can
represent a claimant before the Cadastral
Court (Sec. 9, Act No. 2259).
Q: Eric, a labor federation president,
represented Luisa, a dismissed WXT
employee, before the NLRC. Atty. John
represented Luisa's two co-complainants. In
due course, the NLRC reinstated the three
complainants with backwages and awarded
25% of the backwages as attorney’s fees, 15%
for Atty. John and 10% for Eric, a non-lawyer.
When WXT appealed to the Court of Appeals,
Atty. John questioned Eric’s continued
appearance before that court on Luisa’s
behalf, he not being a lawyer. Is Eric's
appearance before the Court of Appeals valid?
(2011 Bar)
A: NO. The practice of law is only reserved for
those qualified for the same. Eric’s appearance in
court on behalf of another is not sanctioned by
the rules. A non-lawyer may only be allowed to
appear in court if he is representing himself not
that of another (Sec. 34, Rule 138, RRC).
Q: Kanlaon Construction and Reluya, et al.
cases were assigned before two labor arbiters.
Without written authority to represent
Kanlaon Construction, the engineers who
were co-defendants of Kanalaon, admitted the
complaints against them. Consequently, the
labor arbiters adjudicated the case in favor of
Reluya et al. Can the engineers represent their
co-defendant in the labor cases?
A: NO, the appearance of the engineers on behalf
of Kanlaon Construction required written proof of
authorization. It was incumbent upon the arbiters
to ascertain his authority especially since both
engineers were named co-respondents in the
cases before the arbiters. Absent this authority,
whatever statements and declarations the
engineers made before the arbiters could not
bind Kanlaon.
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
2018 GOLDEN NOTES
10
Nevertheless, even assuming that the engineers
were authorized to appear as representatives of
Kanlaon, they could bind the latter only in
procedural matters before the arbiters and the
Commission. Kanlaon's liability arose from
engineer’s alleged promise to pay. A promise to
pay amounts to an offer to compromise and
requires a special power of attorney or the
express consent of Kanlaon. The authority to
compromise cannot be lightly presumed and
should be duly established by evidence (Kanlaon
Construction v. NLRC, G.R. No. 126625, September
18, 1997).
PROCEEDINGS WHERE LAWYERS ARE
PROHIBITED FROM APPEARING
1. Proceedings before the Small Claims Court -
No attorney shall appear in behalf of or
represent a party at the hearing, unless the
attorney is the plaintiff or defendant (Sec. 17,
Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases).
NOTE: If the court determines that a party
cannot properly present his/her claim or
defense and needs assistance, the court may,
in its discretion, allow another individual
who is not an attorney to assist that party
upon the latter’s consent. (Sec. 17, Rule of
Procedure for Small Claims Cases)
2. Proceedings before the Katarungang
Pambarangay - During the pre-trial
conference under the Rules of Court, lawyers
are prohibited from appearing for the parties.
Parties must appear in person only except
minors or incompetents who may be assisted
by their next of kin who are not lawyers (P.D.
No. 1508, Formerly Sec. 9; Local Government
Code of 1991, R.A. 7160, Sec. 415).
SANCTIONS FOR PRACTICE OR
APPEARANCE WITHOUT AUTHORITY
Remedies against practice of law without
authority[ICE-DA]
1. Petition for Injunction;
2. Contempt of court;
3. Criminal complaint for Estafa against a
person who falsely represented himself to be
an attorney to the damage of a party;
4. Disqualification and complaints for
disbarment; or
5. Administrative complaint against the erring
lawyer or government official.
 PRACTICE OF LAW
Q: In one civil case, AMC filed a third-party
complaint against MBC. The trial court set the
case for pre-trial but the same was cancelled.
During the subsequent pre-trial, the counsels
for the parties were asked to produce their
respective authorizations to appear at said
hearing. Atty. X, counsel for MBC,manifested
that her authority to appear for MBC was
submitted at the first pre-trial hearing way
back in 2004. The counsel was given the
chance to go over the records to look for the
Secretary’s Certificate allegedly submitted but
she failed to show any written authority. As a
result, the trial court declared MBC in default.
Was there any grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the trial court?
A:NO. MBC failed to substantiate its sole excuse
for its counsel’s apparent lack of authority to be
its representative during the pre-trial conference.
To be sure, if indeed there was such an authority
previously executed by MBC in favor of its
counsel as early as the pre-trial conferences that
MBC alleges to have taken place. This fact would
have been easily proven by MBC. It, however,
failed to produce this document before the court
a quo, the appellate court and this Court. As fairly
observed by AMC, the SPA later submitted by
MBC’s counsel is dated December 5, 2006 or
"after" the pre-trial conference on November 20,
2006. Prescinding from the foregoing
disquisitions, we agree with the court a quo that
respondent's counsel did not have the proper
authority. (Absolute Management Corporation v.
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, G.R.
190277, July 23, 2014)
NOTE: In any case, an unauthorized appearance
of an attorney may be ratified by the client either
expressly or impliedly. Ratification retroacts to
the date of the lawyer’s first appearance and
validates the action taken by him (Sps. Agbulos v.
Gutierrez, G.R. No. 176530, June 16, 2009).
Q: In a 2011 decision, Atty. Gumba was
suspended from the practice of Law for six
months effective immediately. Subsequently,
Judge Armea of MTC Naga wrote a letter
inquiring from the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) whether Atty. Gumba
could continue representing her clients and
appear in courts. She also asked the OCA if the
decision relating to Atty. Gumba’s suspension
which was downloaded from the internet,
constitutes sufficient notice to disqualify her
11
to appear in courts for the period of her
suspension. Judge Armea’s inquiry arose
because Atty. Gumba represented a party in a
case pending in her court. Respondent denied
that she was suspended to practice law since
she had not yet received a copy of the Court’s
resolution on that matter. She insisted that
service of any pleading or judgment cannot be
made through the internet. Is Atty. Gumba
administratively liable for engaging in the
practice of law during the period of her
suspension?
A: YES.While, indeed, service of a judgment or
resolution must be done only personally or by
registered mail, and that mere showing of a
downloaded copy of the October 5, 2011
Resolution to Atty. Gumba is not a valid service,
the fact, however, that Atty. Gumba was duly
informed of her suspension remains unrebutted.
In this case, the Court notified her of her
suspension. However, she continued to engage in
the practice of law by filing pleadings and
appearing as counsel in courts during the period
of her suspension. When the Court orders the
suspension of a lawyer from the practice of law,
the lawyer must desist from performing all
functions which require the application of legal
knowledge within the period of his or her
suspension. In fine, it will amount to
unauthorized practice and a violation of a lawful
order of the Court if a suspended lawyer engages
in the practice of law during the pendency of his
or her suspension (Tan v. Atty. Gumba, A.C. No.
9000, Jan 10, 2018).
PERSONS NOT LAWYERS
Remedies against unauthorized practice of
law by persons who are not lawyers [ICE]
1. Petition for Injunction;
2. Contempt of court; or
3. Criminal complaint for Estafa against a
person who falsely represented himself to be
an attorney to the damage of a party.
Sanctions for persons who are not lawyers
They shall be punished with contempt of court,
severe censure and three (3) months
imprisonment because of the highly fraudulent
and improper conduct tending directly to impede,
obstruct, degrade, and make a mockery of the
administration of justice (Manangan v. CFI, G.R.
No. 82760, August 30, 1990; Lapena, 2009).
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
 Legal Ethics
A person who has been refused admission to the
bar by order of the Supreme Court but
nonetheless attempts to practice law is guilty of
indirect contempt. (2014 Bar)
NOTE: A disbarred lawyer still appearing in court
is guilty of indirect contempt (Lemoine v. Atty.
Balon, Jr., A.C. No. 5829, October 28, 2003).
CONTEMPT OF COURT
Power of Contempt vs. Power to Disbar
The power to punish for contempt and the power
to disbar are separate and distinct, and that the
exercise of one does not exclude the exercise of
the other. (People v. Godoy, G.R. Nos. 115908-09,
March 29, 1995)
Kinds of Contempt
1. Direct– Consists of misbehavior in the
presence of or so near a court or judge as to
interrupt or obstruct the proceedings before
the court or the administration of justice; it is
punished summarily.
NOTE: An imputation in a pleading of gross
ignorance against a court or its judge,
especially in the absence of any evidence, is a
serious allegation, and constitutes direct
contempt of court. Derogatory, offensive or
malicious statements contained in pleadings
or written submissions presented to the
same court or judge in which the proceedings
are pending are treated as direct contempt
because they are equivalent to a misbehavior
committed in the presence of or so near a
court or judge as to interrupt the
administration of justice. This is true, even if
the derogatory, offensive or malicious
statements are not read in open court.
(Habawel and Medina v. Court of Tax Appeals,
G.R. No. 174459, September 7, 2011)
2. Indirect– One committed away from the
court involving disobedience of or resistance
to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment or
command of the court, or tending to belittle,
degrade, obstruct, interrupt or embarrass the
court. It is not summary in nature.
3. Civil– It is the failure to do something
ordered to be done by a court or a judge for
the benefit of the opposing party therein. It is
remedial in nature.
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
2018 GOLDEN NOTES
12
4. Criminal – Conduct directed against the
authority and dignity of a court or of a judge,
as in unlawfully assailing or discrediting the
authority or dignity of a court or of a judge,
or in doing a duly forbidden act. Intent is
necessary.
NOTE: Where the punishment imposed,
whether against a party to a suit or a
stranger, is wholly or primarily to protect or
vindicate the dignity and power, either by
fine payable to the government or by
imprisonment, or both, it is deemed a
judgment in criminal case.
Where the punishment is by fine directed to
be paid to a party in the nature of damages
for the wrong inflicted, or by imprisonment
as coercive measure to enforce the
performance of some act for the benefit of the
party or in aid of the final judgment or decree
rendered in his behalf, the contempt
judgment will, if made before final decree, be
treated as in the nature of an interlocutory
order.
Two-fold aspect of Contempt Power (1998
Bar)
1. The proper punishment of the guilty party for
his disrespect to the court or its order; and
2. To compel his performance of some act or
duty required of him by the court which he
refuses to perform.
NOTE: The question of whether the contempt
committed is civil or criminal, does not affect the
jurisdiction or the power of a court to punish the
same (Halili v. CIR, G.R. No. L-24864, April 30,
1985).
A practicing lawyer and officer of the court facing
contempt proceedings cannot just be allowed to
voluntarily retire from the practice of law which
would negate the inherent power of the court to
punish him for contempt (Montecillo v. Gica, 60
SCRA 234).
Q: Dela Cruz misrepresented himself as a
lawyer in the application for habeas corpus of
Gamido. What punishment should the court
impose on Dela Cruz?
 PRACTICE OF LAW
A: The Court declared him guilty of indirect
contempt for maliciously and falsely portraying
himself as a member of the bar, appearing in
court and filing pleadings (In the Matter of the
Application for Habeas Corpus of Maximino
Gamido; Gamido v. New Bilibid Prison, G.R. No.
146783, July 29, 2002).
Q:At the start of the preliminary conference
before the Supreme Court, Atty. Jesus Falcis
failed to rise and manifest his presence when
appearances for petitioners were called. He
also failed to rise during the initial round of
questioning by the Justices. When responding
to them, he failed to address them in keeping
with customary courtesies. Throughout the
proceedings, he acted as though he was
unprepared and without knowledge of the
decorum typical to appearing in court. Is Atty.
Falcis guilty of direct contempt of court?
A: YES. Atty. Falcis acted in a contumacious
manner during the preliminary conference. A
person guilty of misbehaving in court and
showing disrespect towards courts may be
punished for direct contempt. As an officer of the
court, he is duty bound to maintain towards this
Court a respectful attitude essential to the proper
administration of justice. He is charged with
knowledge of the proper manner by which
lawyers are to conduct themselves during judicial
proceedings. His Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility exhort him to
maintain the requisite decency and to afford
dignity to this Court. (Jesus Falcis III vs. Civil
Registrar General, G.R. No. 217910, July 3, 2018).
Q: A judge cited complainant, a driver at the
Engineering Department of the Makati City
Hall, in contempt for using the former’s
parking space, and refused to accept the
driver’s apology. Is the judge administratively
liable for grave abuse of authority in citing the
driver for contempt of court?
A: YES. The Court does not see how the improper
parking by the driver could even in the remotest
manner disrupt the speedy administration of
justice. At most, it would cause the Judge
inconvenience or annoyance, but still, this does
not fall under any of the acts for which a person
could be cited for contempt. Neither does it
appear from the records, nor from the evidence
presented, that the complainant intended any
13
disrespect toward respondent Judge (Nunez v.
Ibay, A.M. No. RTJ-06-1984, June 30, 2009).
Q: Balajadia filed a criminal case against Tan.
In paragraph 5 of the complaint-affidavit,
Balajadia appeared to have asserted that he is
a "practicing lawyer”. However, certifications
issued by the Office of the Bar Confidant and
the IBP showed that he has never been
admitted to the Philippine Bar. Hence, Tan
filed a case against him claiming that he is
liable for indirect contempt for
misrepresenting himself as a lawyer. In
defense, Balajadia claimed that the allegation
that he is a practicing lawyer was an honest
mistake. He stated that the secretary of Atty.
Aquino prepared the subject complaint-
affidavit copying in verbatim paragraph 5 of
Atty. Aquino’s complaint-affidavit. It was
inadvertently alleged that he was a “practicing
lawyer in Baguio City” which statement
referred to the person of Atty. Aquino and his
law office address. Is Balajadia liable for
indirect contempt?
A: NO. Balajadia never intended to represent
himself as a lawyer to the public. It was a clear
inadvertence on the part of the secretary of Atty.
Aquino. The allegation that he is a practicing
lawyer cannot, by itself, establish intent as to
make him liable for indirect contempt (Tan v.
Balajadia, G.R. No. 169517, March 14, 2006).
Q: C and D are law partners using the firm
name C and D – Attorneys-at-Law. In an
administrative case filed against C, the
Supreme Court found that C was not entitled
to admission to the practice of law in the
Philippines and ordered his name stricken-off
from the Roll of Attorneys. As a result, C and D
changed their firm name to Law Office of D –
Attorney-at-Law, C - Counsellor, with C
handling purely counselling and office work
while D is the law practitioner. Are C and D
liable for contempt of court? Explain your
answer. (2014 Bar)
A: YES, C and D are liable for indirect contempt.
Indirect contempt is committed away from the
court involving disobedience of or resistance to a
lawful order or judgment of the court. SC found C
not entitled to admission to the practice of law.
Although they changed the firm name, C
continued to practice law and D permitted it.
Practice of law includes counselling or giving of
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
 Legal Ethics
advice or rendering any kind of service that
involves legal knowledge.
Q: The court ordered Atty. Z to testify as a
witness for his client in the very case he is
handling but he refused on the ground that it
would violate the rule on privileged
communication. Atty. Z is guilty of? (2014 Bar)
A: Distinction should be made. If Atty. Z refuses to
testify on formal matters, like mailing,
authentication or custody of documents, he can
be cited for direct contempt (under Section 1,
Rule 71 of the Rules of Court) for refusal to be a
witness. However, if the matter to be testified is
substantial, he cannot be guilty of contempt or
any violation of his duty to the court, based on
Rule 12.08, Code of Professional Responsibility.
PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND THE
PRACTICE OF LAW
Public Officials
Includes elective or appointive officials and
employees, permanent or temporary, whether in
the career or non-career service, including
military and police personnel, whether or not
they receive compensation, regardless of amount
(Sec. 3 (b), R.A. No. 6713, Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees).
Prohibited acts or omissions of public officers
1. Accepting or having any member of his family
accept employment in a private enterprise
which has pending official business with him
during the pendency thereof or within one
year after termination. (Sec. 3[d], RA 3019);
2. Own, control, manage or accept employment
as officer, employee, consultant, counsel,
broker, agent, trustee or nominee in any
private enterprise regulated, supervised or
licensed by their office unless expressly
allowed by law (Sec. 7[b], RA 6713);
3. A lawyer shall not, after leaving a
government service, accept engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in
which he had intervened. while in said
service (Rule 6.03, CPR); and
4. A lawyer should not accept employment as
an advocate in any matter upon the merits
which he has previously acted in a judicial
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
2018 GOLDEN NOTES
14
capacity (Canon 36, CPE).
NOTE: These prohibitions shall continue to apply
for a period of 1 year after resignation, or
separation from public office. The 1-year
prohibition shall also apply in connection with
any matter before the office he used to be with.
Misconduct in the discharge of official duties
as government official
GR: It is NOT disciplinable
XPN: He may be disciplined if misconduct is of
such a character as to affect his qualification as a
lawyer to show moral delinquency (Gonzales-
Austria v. Abaya, 176 SCRA 634).
Q: After the SC suspended Atty. Baliga from
the practice of law, the Commission on Human
Rights suspended him from his position as
Director/Attorney VI of the CHR Region II.
According to the CHR, Atty. Baliga's
suspension from the practice of law
"prevented him from assuming his post as
Regional Director for want of eligibility in the
meantime that his authority to practice law is
suspended."
Atty. Baliga argued that he cannot be
suspended for acts not connected with his
functions as CHR Regional Director. According
to Atty. Baliga, his suspension from the
practice of law did not include his suspension
from public office. Is Atty. Baluga correct?
A: NO. Work in government that requires the use
of legal knowledge is considered practice of law.
The Commission on Human Rights is an
independent office created under the
Constitution with power to investigate "all forms
of human rights violations involving civil and
political rights. It is divided into regional offices
with each office having primary responsibility to
investigate human rights violations in its
territorial jurisdiction.Each regional office is
headed by the Regional Director who is given the
position of Attorney VI.
The exercise of the powers and functions of a
Commission on Human Rights Regional Director
constitutes practice of law. Thus, the Regional
Director must be an attorney - a member of the
bar in good standing and authorized to practice
law. When the Regional Director loses this
 PRACTICE OF LAW
authority, such as when he or she is disbarred or
suspended from the practice of law, the Regional
Director loses a necessary qualification to the
position he or she is holding. The disbarred or
suspended lawyer must desist from holding the
position of Regional Director.(Lingan vs. Atty.
Calubaquib, A.C. No. 5377, June 30, 2014).
PROHIBITION OR DISQUALIFICATION OF
FORMER GOVERNMENT ATTORNEYS
Prohibition or disqualification of former
government attorneys
A lawyer shall not, after leaving government
service, accept engagement or employment in
connection with any matter in which he had
intervened while in said service (Canon 6, Rule
6.03, CPR).
REASON: The evil sought to be avoided by this
provision is the possibility of a lawyer who just
retired, resigned or separated from the
government of using his influence for his own
private benefit (Antiquiera, 1992).
NOTE: Violation of restriction is tantamount to
representing conflicting interests (Pineda, 2009).
PUBLIC OFFICIALS WHO CANNOT PRACTICE
LAW OR WITH RESTRICTIONS
GR: The appointment or election of an attorney to
a government office disqualifies him from
engaging in the private practice of law.
REASON:A public office is a public trust, and a
public officer or employee is obliged not only to
perform his duties with the highest degree of
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency but
also with exclusive fidelity.
This disqualification is intended to:
a. Preserve public trust in a public office;
b. Avoid conflict of interests or a possibility
thereof; and
c. Assure the people of impartiality in the
performance of public functions and thereby
promote the public welfare.
Public officials not allowed to engage in law
practice (Absolute Prohibition) [JOPPC2OMS]:
1. Judges and other officials and employees of
15
the Supreme Court (Sec. 35, Rule 148, RRC);
2. Officials and employees of the OSG (Ibid.);
3. Government Prosecutors (People v.
Villanueva, G.R. No. L-19450, May 27, 1965);
4. President, Vice-President, Members of the
Cabinet, their deputies and assistants (Sec.
13, Art VII, 1987 Constitution);
5. Members of the Constitutional Commission
(Sec. 2, Art IX-A, 1987 Constitution);
6. Civil Service Officers or employees whose
duties and responsibilities require that their
entire time be at the disposal of the
government (Ramos v. Rada, A.M. No. 202, July
22, 1975);
7. Ombudsman and his deputies (Sec. 8 [second
par.], Art. IX, 1987 Constitution);
8. All governors, city and municipal Mayors
(Sec. 90, R.A. No. 7160); and
9. Those prohibited by Special laws.
Restrictions on the Practice of Law on Certain
individuals (Relative Prohibition)
1. No Senator or member of the House of
Representatives may personally “appear” as
counsel before any court of justice or before
the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and
other administration bodies (Sec. 14, Art. VI,
1987 Constitution).
NOTE: What is prohibited is to “personally
appear” in court and other bodies. The word
“appearance” includes not only arguing a
case before any such body but also filing a
pleading on behalf of a client as “by simply
filing a formal motion, plea, or answer.”
2. Under the Local Government Code (Sec. 91,
RA 7160), Sanggunian members may practice
their professions provided that if they are
members of the Bar, they shall NOT:
a. Appear as counsel before any court in
any civil case wherein a local
government unit or any office, agency, or
instrumentality of the government is the
adverse party;
b. Appear as counsel in any criminal case
wherein an officer or employee of the
national or local government is accused
of an offense committed in relation to his
office;
c. Collect any fee for their appearance in
administrative proceedings involving the
local government unit of which he is an
official; or
d. Use property and personnel of the
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
 Legal Ethics
government except when the Sanggunian
member concerned is defending the
interest of the government.
3. Under Sec. 1, R.A. 910, as amended, a retired
justice or judge receiving pension from the
government, cannot act as counsel:
a. In any civil case in which the
Government, or any of its subdivision or
agencies is the adverse party; or
b. In a criminal case wherein an officer or
employee of the Government is accused
of an offense in relation to his office; nor
c. Collect any fees for his appearance in any
administrative proceedings to maintain
an interest adverse to the government,
provincial or municipal, or to any of its
legally constituted officers (Sec. 1, R.A.
910).
4. Civil service officers and employees without
permit from their respective department
heads (Noriega v. Sison, A.M. No. 2266,
October 27, 1983).
5. A former government attorney cannot, after
leaving government service, accept
engagement or employment in connection
with any matter in which he had intervened
while in the said service (Rule 6.03, CPR).
Q: Atty. Sagucio was the former Personnel
Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat
Industries Inc. until his appointment as
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of
Tuguegarao. Taggat Industries was
sequestered by the PCGG and ceased its
operations. As Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor, he was assigned to conduct the
preliminary investigation over a criminal case
filed against Taggat Industries. He
recommended the filing of 651 Informations
for violation of the Labor Code. He was then
charged for violating Rule 15.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and for defying
the prohibition against private practice of law
while working as government prosecutor. Is
Atty. Sagucio guilty of engaging in private
practice of law while working as an Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor?
A: YES. “Private practice of law” contemplates a
succession of acts of the same nature habitually
or customarily holding one’s self to the public as a
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
2018 GOLDEN NOTES
16
lawyer. Atty. Sagucio admitted that he rendered
his legal services to complainant while working
as a government prosecutor. Even the receipts he
signed stated that the payments by Taggat were
for "Retainer’s fee.” Thus, Atty. Sagucio clearly
violated the prohibition in RA 6713.
Atty. Sagucio’s violation of RA 6713 also
constitutes a violation of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1,
which mandates that “[a] lawyer shall not engage
in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.” His admission that he received from
Taggat fees for legal services while serving as a
government prosecutor is an unlawful conduct,
which constitutes a violation of Rule 1.01 (Lim-
Santiago v. Sagucio, A.C. No. 6705, March 31,
2006).
NOTE: Violations of R.A. 6713 – the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials
and Employees – are not subject to disciplinary
action under the Code of Professional
Responsibility unless the violations also
constitute infractions of specific provisions of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
Q: Atty. Eliseo represented Allan in a
collection suit against the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office (PCSO). After his election
as Sangguniang Bayan member, the court
rendered a decision in PCSO’s favor. Still, Atty.
Eliseo appeared for Allan in the latter’s
appeal, prompting the PCSO to question his
right to do so. In response, Atty. Eliseo
claimed that the local government code
authorizes him to practice law as long it does
not conflict with his duties. Is Atty. Eliseo
correct? (2011 Bar)
A: NO. He cannot appear against a government
instrumentality in a civil case.
Q: Atty. Dude is the COMELEC Officer in a very
distant municipality. He is the only lawyer in
that area. When election period is over, he has
much spare time. Many people go to him for
counseling, legal advice, preparation of
documents of Sale, Mortgage and the like. He
does not charge a fee in money, but he
receives gifts which are offered. Is there
impropriety? (2012 Bar)
A: YES, giving legal advice and preparing legal
documents, even if free, constitutes private
 PRACTICE OF LAW
practice of law, which is prohibited of
government employees.
NOTE: While certain local elective officials (like
governors, mayors, provincial board members
and councilors) are expressly subjected to a total
or partial proscription to practice their
profession or engage in any occupation, no such
interdiction is made on punong barangay and the
members of the Sangguniang Barangay. Expressio
unius est exclusio alterius. Since they are excluded
from any prohibition, the presumption is that
they are allowed to practice their profession.
However, he should procure prior permission or
authorization from the head of his Department, as
required by the Civil Service Regulations (Catu v.
Rellosa, A.C. No. 5738, February 19, 2008).
Practice of law by the clerk of court
GR: The practice of law by a clerk of court is not
allowed,except isolated practice.
XPNs:
1. Written permission which must be
approved by the Supreme Court; and
2. Approved leave of absence with justifiable
reasons.
LAWYERS AUTHORIZED TO REPRESENT THE
GOVERNMENT
1. Office of the Solicitor General - for the
National Government, and any person appointed
to appear for the government of the Philippines
in accordance with law (Sec. 33, Rule 138, RRC).
Duties of the Solicitor General
The Solicitor General, in his discretion, may
pursue any of the following actions:
1. Prosecute;
2. Not to prosecute;
3. To abandon a prosecution already started; or
4. To take a position adverse to the People of
the Philippines in a criminal case or to that of
a government agency or official, when he
believes that justice will be served by taking a
different stand.
Duty of the Solicitor General to represent one
party whereby two government agencies are
in conflict
17
It is incumbent upon the Solicitor General to
present to the court that which would legally
uphold the best interest of the government. The
other government agency adversely affected, if it
still believes in the merits of its case, may appear
on its own behalf through its legal officer or
representative.
2. Legal Officer - for LGUs, they are represented
by a legal officerwhich provides legal assistance
or support to the mayor or governor and
represents the LGU in all civil actions and special
proceedings wherein it or any of its officials are
involved in an official capacity (Sec. 481, LGC).
NOTE: As a general rule, a municipality cannot
engage the services of a private lawyer. Only the
Provincial Prosecutor, the Provincial Attorney or
the Municipal Attorney could validly represent a
municipality in all cases/complaints and legal
problems invoving it. The reason being that only
accountable public officers may act for and in
behalf of public entities and that public funds
should not be expended to hire private lawyers.
(DILG Opinion No. 59, series of 2007).
3. Office of the Government Corporate Counsel
(OGCC) - Under the Administrative Code of 1987,
it is the OGCC which shall act as the principal law
office of all GOCCs. In Phividec Industrial
Authority v. Capitol Steel Corporation, the SC listed
three (3) indispensable conditions before a GOCC
can hire a private lawyer: (1) private counsel can
only be hired in exceptional cases; (2) the GOCC
must first secure the written conformity and
acquiescence of the Solicitor General or the
Government Corporate Counsel, as the case may
be; and (3) the written concurrence of the COA
must also be secured.
LAWYER’S OATH
I, _____(name)______________, of ____(permanent
address)_____________, do solemnly swear that I will
maintain allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines,
I will support the Constitution and obey the laws
as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted
authorities therein;
I will dono falsehood, nor consent to the doing of
any in court;
I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue
any groundless, false or unlawful suit, or give aid
nor consent to the same;
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
 Legal Ethics
I will delay no man for money or malice, and will
conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best
of my knowledge and discretion, with all good
fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients;
and I impose upon myself these voluntary
obligations without any mental reservation or
purpose of evasion.
So help me God.
Importance of the lawyer’s oath
By taking the lawyer’s oath, a lawyer becomes the
guardian of truth and the rule of law and an
indispensable instrument in the fair and impartial
administration of justice. Good moral character
includes, at least, common honesty. Deception
and other fraudulent acts are not merely
unacceptable practices that are disgraceful and
dishonorable; they reveal a basic moral flaw
(Olbes v. Deciembre, A.C. No. 5365, April 27, 2005).
The lawyer’s oath is not a mere ceremony or
formality for practicing law to be forgotten
afterwards nor is it mere words, drift and hollow,
it is a sacred trust that every lawyer must uphold
and keep inviolable at all times.
Q: An administrative complaint was filed
against Atty. Contawi for having violated his
oath as a lawyer, causing him damage and
prejudice. He had mortgaged and sold the
property of his client without the latter's
knowledge or consent, facilitated by the use of
a falsified Special Power of Attorney. Did Atty.
Contawi violate his lawyer's oath?
DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES
OF A LAWYER
Four-fold duty of a lawyer
1. To the Public/Society– He must not
undertake any action which violates his
responsibility to the society as a whole, he
must be an example in the community for his
uprightness as a member of the society. The
lawyer must be ready to render legal aid,
foster legal reforms, be a guardian of due
process, and aware of his special role in the
solution of special problems and be always
ready to lend assistance in the study and
solution of social problems (Canon 1-6, CPR).
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
2018 GOLDEN NOTES
18
A: YES. Atty. Contawi disposed of complainant's
property without the latter’s knowledge or
consent, and partook of the proceeds of the sale
for his own benefit. The established acts
exhibited his unfitness and plain inability to
discharge the bounden duties of a member of the
legal profession. He failed to prove himself
worthy of the privilege to practice law and to live
up to the exacting standards demanded of the
members of the bar. It bears to stress that the
practice of law is a privilege given to lawyers who
meet the high standards of legal proficiency and
morality. Any violation of these standards
exposes the lawyer to administrative liability
(Brennisen v. Atty. Contawi, A.C. No. 7481, April 24,
2012).
Q: Can a lawyer be held administratively
liable for submitting pleadings, evidence, or
exhibits before the courts which do not exist?
A: YES. This conduct is deceitful which impairs
the justice system in the country. A lawyer who
took oath before the Supreme Court, must not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct and must not delay court
proceedings just to prolong the justice deserve by
the oppressed. Further, he shall not do any
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
Court, nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to
be misled by any artifice and he shall not
knowingly assert as a fact that which has not
been proved (Magsaysay Maritime Corporation
Princess Cruisee Lines, LTD. etc. v. Mazaredo, G.R.
No. 201359, Sept. 23, 2015).
2. To the Bar/Legal Profession– A lawyer
observes candor, fairness, courtesy and
truthfulness in his conduct towards other
lawyers, avoid encroachment in the business
of other lawyers and uphold the honor of the
profession. (Canon 7-9, CPR)
3. To the Courts – A lawyer must maintain
towards the court a respectful attitude,
defend against unjust criticisms, uphold the
court’s authority and dignity, obey court
orders, processes, and assists in the
administration of justice (Canon 10-13, CPR).
4. To the Clients– The lawyer owes entire
devotion to the interest of his client, warm
and zeal in the maintenance of the defense of
 DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF A LAWYER
his rights and exertion of utmost learning
ability to the end that nothing be taken or
withheld from his client except in accordance
with law. He owes a duty of competent and
zealous representation to the client,
and should preserve his client’s secrets,
preserve his funds and property and avoid
conflicts of interest (Canon 14- 22, CPR).
NOTE: The first and most important duty of a
lawyer is his duty to the COURT. The lawyer is an
officer of the court who sets the judicial
machinery with the main mission of assisting the
court in the administration of justice. His public
duties take precedence over his private duties.
Duties of attorneys under the Rules of Court
(2006 Bar)
The following are the duties of an attorney under
the Rules of Court: [ADA-RECORD]
1. To maintain Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines, to support the Constitution and
obey the laws of the Philippines;
2. Not to encourage either the commencement
or the continuance of an action or
proceeding, or Delay any man’s cause, from
any corrupt motive or interest;
3. To counsel or maintain such Actions or
proceedings only as appear to him to be just,
and such defenses only as he believes to be
honestly debatable under the law;
4. To observe and maintain the Respect due to
the courts of justice and judicial officers;
5. To Employ, for the purpose of maintaining
the causes confided to him, such means only
as are consistent with truth and honor, and
never seek to mislead the judge or any
judicial officer by an artifice or false
statement of fact or law;
6. To maintain inviolate the Confidence and at
every peril to himself, to preserve the secrets
in connection with his client and to accept no
compensation in connection with his client’s
business except from him or with his
knowledge and approval;
7. To abstain from all Offensive personality and
to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor
and reputation of a party or witness unless
required by the justice of the cause with
which he is charged;
8. Never to Reject, for any consideration, the
cause of the defenseless or oppressed; and
9. In the Defense of a person accused of a crime,
by all fair and honorable means, regardless of
his personal opinion as to the guilt of the
19
accused, to present every defense that the
law permits to the end that no person may be
deprived of life, liberty, but by due process of
law. (Sec. 20, Rule 138, RRC)
Privileges of a lawyer [PSP-IS-12]
1. To Practice law during good behavior before
any judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative
agency;
2. First one to Sit in judgment on every case, to
set the judicial machinery in motion;
3. Enjoys the Presumption of regularity in the
discharge of his duty;
4. He is Immune, in the performance of his
obligations to his client, from liability to third
persons, insofar as he does not materially
depart from his character as a quasi-judicial
officer;
5. His Statements, if relevant, pertinent or
material to the subject of judicial inquiry are
absolutely privileged regardless of their
defamatory tenor and of the presence of
malice;
6. 1st grade civil service eligibility for any
position in the classified service in the
government the duties of which require
knowledge of law; and
7. 2nd grade civil service eligibility for any
other governmental position, which does not
prescribe proficiency in law as a qualification.
THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY
CHAPTER 1
LAWYER AND SOCIETY
(Canons 1-6)
2. Uphold the Constitution and obey the laws of
the land and legal processes
3. Make legal services available in an efficient
and convenient manner
4. Use of true, honest, fair, dignified and
objective information in making known legal
services
5. Participate in the improvement of the legal
system
6. Keep abreast of legal development and
participate in continuing legal education
program and assist in disseminating
information regarding the law and
jurisprudence
7. Applicability of the CPR to lawyers in the
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
 Legal Ethics
government service
CHAPTER 2
THE LAWYER AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION
(Canons 7-9)
8. At all times uphold integrity and dignity of
the profession and support the activities of
the IBP
9. Conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and
candor toward his colleagues and avoid
harassing tactics against opposing counsel
10. Not to directly or indirectly assist in the
unauthorized practice of law
CHAPTER 3
THE LAWYER AND THE COURTS
(Canons 10-13)
11. Owes candor, fairness and good faith to the
court
12. Observe and maintain the respect due to the
courts and judicial officers and should insist
on similar conduct by others
13. Duty to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice
14. Rely upon the merits of his cause, refrain
from any impropriety which tends to
influence courts, or give the appearance of
influencing the courts
CHAPTER 4
THE LAWYER AND THE CLIENT
(Canons 14-22)
15. Not to refuse his services to the needy
16. Observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his
dealings and transactions with clients
17. Hold in trust all the moneys and property of
his client that may come to his possession
18. Owes fidelity to client’s cause and be mindful
of the trust and confidence reposed in him
19. Serve client with competence and diligence
20. Represent client with zeal within the bounds
of law
21. Charge only fair and reasonable fees
22. Preserve the confidence and secrets of client
even after the attorney-client relation is
terminated
23. Withdraw services only for good cause and
upon notice
Applicability of the Canons (2014 Bar)
Although the Code of Professional Responsibility
refers to lawyers, members of the bench are
lawyers who are required to comment on the
complaints filed against them and show cause
why they should not be suspended, disbarred or
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
2018 GOLDEN NOTES
20
otherwise disciplinary sanctioned as a member of
the bar as provided for in A. M. 02-9-02 SC (Re:
Automatic conversion of some administrative
cases against Justices (except Supreme Court
Justices who can only be the subject if
impeachment), Judges and Court Officials who are
lawyers as disciplinary proceedings against them
both in such officials and as members of the
Philippine Bar).
Q: Atty. Doblar represents Eva in a contract
suit against Olga. He is also defending Marla in
a substantially identical contract suit filed by
Emma. In behalf of Eva, Atty. Doblar claims
that the statute of limitations runs from the
time of the breach of the contract. In the
action against Marla, Atty. Doblar now argues
the reverse position – i.e., that the statute of
limitation does not run until one year after
discovery of the breach.
Both cases are assigned to Judge Elrey.
Although not the sole issue in the two cases,
the statute of limitations issue is critical in
both.
Is there an ethical/professional responsibility
problem in this situation? If a problem exists,
what are its implications or potential
consequences? (2013 Bar)
A: YES. There is an ethical/professional
responsibility problem that results from the
actuation of Atty. Doblar in arguing the reverse
positions.
The signatures of Atty. Doblar on the pleadings
for Eva and for Marla constitute a certificate by
him that he has read the pleadings; that to the
best of his knowledge, information, and belief,
there is good ground to support them; and that
the pleadings were not interposed for delay
(Rules of Court, Rule 7, Sec. 3, par. 2). Atty. Doblar
could not claim he has complied with the
foregoing requirement because he could not take
a stand for Eva that is contrary to that taken for
Marla. His theory for Eva clearly contradicts his
theory for Marla. He has violated his professional
responsibility mandated under the Rules of Court.
In counseling on the contradictory positions, Atty.
Doblar has likewise counselled or abetted
activities aimed at defiance of the law or at
lessening confidence in the legal system (Code of
Professional Responsibility, Canon 1, Rule 1.02)
 DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF A LAWYER
because conflicting opinions may result arising
from an interpretation of the same law.
Atty. Doblar could not seek refuge under the
umbrella that what he has done was in protection
of his clients. This is so because a lawyer’s duty is
not to his client but to the administration of
justice. To that end, his client’s success is wholly
subordinate. His conduct ought to and must
always be scrupulously observant of the law and
ethics.
Any means not honorable, fair, and honest, which
is resorted to by the lawyer, even in the pursuit of
his devotion to his client’s cause, is condemnable
and unethical (Pineda, Legal and Judicial Ethics,
211 [1999], citing Maglasang vs. People, G.R. No.
90083, October 4, 1990).
DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF A
LAWYER TO SOCIETY
RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES
CANON 1
A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey
the laws of the land and promote respect for
law and legal processes.
Two-fold duty under Canon 1
1. Obey the laws and the legal processes; and
2. Inspire others to maintain respect and
obedience thereto.
NOTE: The portion of Canon 1, which calls for
lawyers to “promote respect for law and for legal
processes”, is a call to uphold the ‘Rule of Law
(Funa, 2009).
Concept of “Rule of Law”
“The supremacy of the law” provides that
decisions should be made by the application of
known legal principles or laws without the
intervention of discretion in their application.
(Black’s Law Dictionary)
NOTE: A lawyer’s oath to uphold the cause of
justice is superior to his duty to his client; its
primacy is indisputable (Cobb-Perez v. Lantin, G.R.
No. L-22320, July 29, 1968).
Q: Atty. Tansingco was a notary public who
prepared and notarized an Occupancy
21
Agreement at the request of Mr. Stier, the
owner and long-time resident of a real
property located in Cubao. Since Mr. Stier is a
U.S. Citizen and thereby disqualified to own
real property in his name, he agreed that the
property be transferred in the name of Mr.
Donton, a Filipino. Donton averred that Atty.
Tansingco’s act of preparing the Occupancy
Agreement, despite knowledge that Stier is a
foreign national, constitutes serious
misconduct and is a deliberate violation of the
Code. Is Atty. Tansingco guilty of serious
misconduct?
A: YES. Atty. Tansingco is liable for violation of
Canon 1 and Rule 1.02 of the Code. A lawyer
should not render any service or give advice to
any client, which will involve defiance of the laws
which he is bound to uphold and obey. Atty.
Tansingco had sworn to uphold the Constitution.
Thus, he violated his oath and the Code when he
prepared and notarized the Occupancy
Agreement to evade the law against foreign
ownership of lands. Atty. Tansingco used his
knowledge of the law to achieve an unlawful end.
Such an act amounts to malpractice in his office,
for which he may be suspended (Donton v. Atty.
Tansingco, A.C. No. 6057, June 27, 2006).
Q: Prosecutor Coronel entered his appearance
on behalf of the State before a Family Court in
a case for declaration of nullity of marriage,
but he failed to appear in all the subsequent
proceedings. When required by the
Department of Justice to explain, he argued
that the parties in the case were ably
represented by their respective counsels and
that his time would be better employed in
more substantial prosecutorial functions,
such as investigations, inquests and
appearances in court hearings. Is
Atty. Coronel’s explanation tenable? (2006
Bar)
A: NO. Atty. Coronel’s explanation is not tenable.
The role of the State’s lawyer in nullification of
marriage cases is that of protector of the
institution of marriage (Art 48, FC). “The task of
protecting marriage as an inviolable social
institution requires vigilant and zealous
participation and not mere pro forma
compliance” (Malcampo-Sin v. Sin, G.R. No.
137590, March 26, 2001). This role could not be
left to the private counsels who have been
engaged to protect the private interest of the
parties.
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
 Legal Ethics
RULE 1.01, CANON 1
A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral and deceitful conduct.
Definitions:
1. Deceitful Conduct
An act that has the proclivity for fraudulent and
deceptive misrepresentation, artifice or device
that is used upon another who is ignorant of the
fact, to the prejudice and damage of the party
imposed upon (CPR Annotated, PhilJA).
2. Unlawful Conduct
It is the transgression of any provision of law,
which need not be a penal law. The presence of
evil intent on the part of the lawyer is not
essential in order to bring his act or omission
within the terms of this Rule.
3. Immoral Conduct
Conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless,
and which shows a moral indifference to the
opinion of the good and respectable members of
the community. To warrant disciplinary action,
the act must not only be merely immoral but
grossly immoral.
Grossly immoral conductis one that is so corrupt
and false as to constitute a criminal act or so
unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible
to a high degree. It is willful, flagrant, or
shameless act, which shows a moral indifference
to the opinion of respectable members of the
community (Figueroa v. Barranco, SBC Case No.
519, July 31, 1997).
4. Dishonesty
The concealment or distortion of truth in a matter
relevant to one’s office or connected with the
performance of his duties. (Japson v. CSC, G.R. No.
189479, April 12, 2011).
Instances of Gross Immorality and the
resulting consequences
1. Abandonment of wife and cohabiting with
another woman. DISBARRED (Obusan v.
Obusan, Jr., A.C. No. 1392, April 2, 1984);
2. A lawyer who had carnal knowledge with a
woman through a promise of marriage which
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
2018 GOLDEN NOTES
22
he did not fulfill. DISBARRED (In re:
Disbarment of Armando Puno, A.C. No. 389,
February 28, 1967);
3. Seduction of a woman who is the niece of a
married woman with whom respondent
lawyer had an adulterous relation.
DISBARRED (Royong v. Oblena, A.C. No. 376,
April 30, 1963);
4. Lawyer arranging marriage of his son to a
woman with whom the lawyer had illicit
relations. DISBARRED (Mortel v. Aspiras, A.M.
No. 145, December 28, 1956);
5. Lawyer inveigling a woman into believing
that they have been married civilly to satisfy
his carnal desires. DISBARRED (Terre v.
Terre, A.M. No. 2349, July 3, 1992);
6. Lawyer taking advantage of his position as
chairman of the college of medicine and
asked a lady student to go with him to Manila
where he had carnal knowledge of her under
threat that if she refused, she would flunk in
all her subjects. DISBARRED (Delos Reyes v.
Aznar, A.M. No. 1334, November 28, 1989);
7. Bigamy perpetrated by the lawyer.
DISQUALIFIED FROM ADMISSION TO THE
BAR (Royong vs. Oblena, A.C. No. 376, April 30,
1963);
8. Concubinage coupled with failure to support
illegitimate children. SUSPENDED
INDEFINITELY (Laguitan v. Tinio, A.M. No.
3049, December 4, 1989);
9. Maintaining adulterous relationship with a
married woman. SUSPENDED INDEFINITELY
(Cordova v. Cordova, A.M. No. 3249, November
29, 1989);
10. A retired judge who penned a decision 7
months after he retired, antedating the
decision and forcing his former court staff to
include it in the expediente of the case.
DISBARRED (Radjaie v. Alovera, A.C. No. 4748,
August 4, 2000);
11. Forging a Special Power of Attorney.
SUSPENDED FOR 3 YEARS (Rural Bank of
Silay, Inc. v. Pilla, A.C. No. 3637, January 24,
2001);
12. Attempting to engage in an opium deal
SUSPENDED FOR 1 YEAR (Piatt v. Abordo, 58
Phil. 350, September 1, 1933); or
13. Facilitating the travel of a person to the U.S.
using spurious travel documents.
DISBARRED (Sebastian v. Calis, A.C. No. 5118,
September 9, 1999).
Acts NOT constituting gross immorality
1. Stealing a kiss from a client (Advincula v.
 DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF A LAWYER
Macabata, A.C. No. 7204, March 7, 2007);
2. Live-in relationship involving two
unmarried persons; or
3. Failure to pay a loan.
GR: A lawyer may not be disciplined for
failure to pay a loan. The proper remedy is
the filing of an action for collection of a sum
of money in regular courts. (Toledo v. Abalos,
A.C. No. 5141, September 29, 1999)
XPN: A deliberate failure to pay just debts
and the issuance of worthless checks. (Lao v.
Medel, A.C. No. 5916, July 1, 2003)
Q: Judge A has an illicit relationship with B, his
Branch Clerk of Court. C, the wife of Judge A,
discovered the illicit affair and consulted a
lawyer to vindicate her violated marital
rights. If you were that lawyer, what would
you advice C, and if she agrees and asks you to
proceed to take action, what is the legal
procedure that you should follow? (2014 Bar)
A: File a case of immorality against Judge A and
the clerk of court for violation or Rule 1.01, CPR;
impropriety under Canon 4 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct against Judge A; and invoke the
automatic conversion of the administrative case
against Judge A and the clerk of court as members
of the bar under A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC, with the
Office of the Court Administrator. Complaint for
disbarment against Judge A and the clerk of court
may also be filed. (This is without prejudice to the
filing of criminal and civil cases).
Q: In a case for disbarment against Atty. Ivan
M. Solidum, Jr., the IBP-CBD found that he
committed the following acts: (1) signing
drawn checks against the account of his son as
if they were from his own account; (2)
misrepresenting to Navarro the identity of the
lot he mortgaged to her; (3) misrepresenting
to Presbitero the true value of the 263-
square-meter lot he mortgaged to her; (4)
conspiring with Yulo to obtain the loans from
complainants; (5) agreeing or promising to
pay 10% interest on his loans although he
knew that it was exorbitant; and (6) failing to
pay his loans because the checks he issued
were dishonored as the accounts were
already closed. Is Atty. Solidum guilty of
violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility?
23
A: YES. It is clear that Atty. Solidum violated Rule
1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
We have ruled that conduct, as used in the Rule, is
not confined to the performance of a lawyer’s
professional duties. A lawyer may be disciplined
for misconduct committed either in his
professional or private capacity. The test is
whether his conduct shows him to be wanting in
moral character, honesty, probity, and good
demeanor, or whether it renders him unworthy
to continue as an officer of the court.
Atty. Solidum is guilty of engaging in dishonest
and deceitful conduct, both in his professional
capacity with respect to his client, Presbitero, and
in his private capacity with respect to
complainant Navarro. Both Presbitero and
Navarro allowed Atty. Solidum to draft the terms
of the loan agreements. He drafted the MOAs
knowing that the interest rates were exorbitant.
Later, using his knowledge of the law, he assailed
the validity of the same MOAs he prepared. He
issued checks that were drawn from his son’s
account whose name was similar to his without
informing complainants. Further, there is nothing
in the records that will show that he paid or
undertook to pay the loans he obtained from
complainants (Navarro vs Solidum, Jr., A.C. No.
9872, January 28, 2014).
Q: Atty. XX rented a house of his cousin, JJ, on a
month-to-month basis. He left for a 6-month
study in Japan without paying his rentals and
electric bills while he was away despite JJ's
repeated demands. Upon his return to the
Philippines, Atty. XX still failed to settle his
rental arrearages and electric bills, drawing JJ
to file an administrative complaint against
Atty. XX. Atty. XX contended that his non-
payment of rentals and bills to his cousin is a
personal matter which has no bearing on his
profession as a lawyer and, therefore, he did
not violate the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Is Atty. X's contention in
order? Explain. (2010 Bar)
A: NO. In a case involving the same facts, the
Supreme Court held that having incurred just
debts, a lawyer has the moral duty and legal
responsibility to settle them when they become
due. “Verily lawyers must at all times faithfully
perform their duties to society, to the bar, to the
court and to their clients. As part of their duties,
they must promptly pay their financial
obligations” (Wilson Cham v. Atty. Eva Pata-Moya,
556 SCRA 1).
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
 Legal Ethics
NOTE: Just debts include unpaid rentals, electric
bills, claims adjudicated by a court of law, and
claims the existence and justness which are
admitted by the debtor (Cham v. Paita-Moya, A.C.
No.7494, June 27, 2008).
Q: Carmelite has unpaid obligations to NHFMC
which is secured by a mortgage. To process
the redemption of the mortgaged property,
Carmelita’s children, Verlita and Raymond
called Atty. Ramon and expressed their
intention to redeem the property by paying
the redemption price of 350,000. Atty. Ramon
informed them that the redemption was
under process, and that the certificate of
redemption would be issued in two to three
weeks’ time. Verlita and Raymond later found
out that Atty. Ramon had not deposited the
redemption price and had not filed the letter
of intent for redeeming the property. Atty.
Ramon promised to return the money but
failed to do so. Should Atty. Ramon be held
administratively liable?
A: YES. Atty. Ramon is guilty of dishonesty and
deceit. Atty. Ramon certainly transgressed the
Lawyer's Oath by receiving money from Verlita
and Raymond after having made them believe
that she could assist them in ensuring the
redemption in their mother's behalf. She further
misled them about her ability to realize the
redemption by falsely informing them about
having started the redemption process. She took
advantage of Verlita and Raymond who had
reposed their full trust and confidence in her
ability to perform the task by virtue of her being a
lawyer.As a lawyer, Atty. Ramon was proscribed
from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct in her dealings with others,
especially clients whom she should serve with
competence and diligence. Her duty required her
to maintain fealty to them, binding her not to
neglect the legal matter entrusted to her. Thus,
her neglect in connection therewith rendered her
liable (Mercullo v. Atty. Ramon, AC. No. 11078, Jul
19, 2016).
Morality vs. Immoral Conduct
MORALITY IMMORAL CONDUCT
Morality as Immoral conduct has
understood in law is been defined as that
a human standard conduct which is willful,
based on natural flagrant, or shameless
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
2018 GOLDEN NOTES
24
moral law which is and which shows a
embodied in man’s moral indifference to the
conscience and opinion of the good and
which guides him to respectable members of
do good and avoid the community. (Arciga
evil. v. Maniwang, A.M. No.
1608, August 14, 1981)
Q: Rose Bansig filed a complaint for
disbarment against Atty. Celera. Celera was
legally married to Bansig’s sister, Rosemarie
Bunagan. However, notwithstanding the
marriage with Bunagan, Atty. Celera
contracted another marriage with a certain
Ma. Cielo Paz Torres Alba, as evidenced by a
certified copy of the certificate of marriage.
Despite numerous efforts of Rose and the
court, Atty. Celera, in his defense, repetitively
stated that he had no knowledge of the
complaint since he has yet to receive a copy of
it. Is the contention of Atty. Celera tenable?
A: NO. He exhibited a deplorable lack of that
degree of morality required of him as a member
of the Bar. He made a mockery of marriage, a
sacred institution demanding respect and dignity.
Also, we take notice of Atty. Celera’s defiant
stance against the Court as demonstrated by his
repetitive disregard of its Resolution. Even
assuming that indeed the copies of the complaint
had not reached him, he cannot, however, feign
ignorance that there is a complaint against him
that is pending before this Court which he could
have easily obtained a copy had he wanted to. His
acts were deliberate, maneuvering the liberality
of the Court in order to delay the disposition of
the case and to evade the consequences of his
actions. His cavalier attitude in repeatedly
ignoring the orders of the Supreme Court
constitutes utter disrespect to the judicial
institution. Respondent’s conduct indicates a high
degree of irresponsibility (Bunagan-Bansig v.
Celera, A.C. No. 5581, January 14, 2014).
Q: Maria Victoria Ventura filed an
administrative complaint against Atty. Danilo
Samson for allegedly raping her when she was
merely 13 years old. Atty. Samson admitted
that they had a sexual relationship but
countered that such was done with mutual
agreement and in consideration of money. Did
Atty. Samson’s act constitute “grossly immoral
conduct” that would warrant his disbarment?
 DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF A LAWYER
A: YES. Atty. Samson’s act of engaging in sex with
a young lass, the daughter of his former
employee, constitutes gross immoral conduct that
warrants sanction. He not only admitted he had
sexual intercourse with complainant but also
showed no remorse whatsoever when he
asserted that he did nothing wrong because she
allegedly agreed and he even gave her money.
Indeed, his act of having carnal knowledge of a
woman other than his wife manifests his
disrespect for the laws on the sanctity of
marriage and his own marital vow of fidelity.
Moreover, the fact that he procured the act by
enticing a very young woman with money
showed his utmost moral depravity and low
regard for the dignity of the human person and
the ethics of his profession. He has violated the
trust and confidence reposed on him by
complainant, then a 13-year-old minor, who for a
time was under his care. Whether the sexual
encounter between him and complainant was or
was not with the latter’s consent is of no moment.
Such conduct is a transgression of the standards
of morality required of the legal profession and
should be disciplined accordingly (Ventura v.
Samson, A.C. No. 9608, November 27, 2012).
Q: An administrative complaint for
disbarment was filed against Atty. Iris for
allegedly carrying an immoral relationship
with Carlos, husband of complainant Leslie.
Atty. Iris contended that her relationship with
Carlos was licit because they were married.
And when she discovered Carlos’ true civil
status, she cut off all her ties with him. Is Atty.
Iris guilty of committing gross immoral
conduct warranting her disbarment?
A: NO. Her relationship with Carlos, clothed as it
was with what Atty. Iris believed was a valid
marriage, cannot be considered immoral.
Immorality connotes conduct that shows
indifference to the moral norms of the community.
Moreover for such conduct to warrant
disciplinary action, the same must be “grossly
immoral”, that is it must be so corrupt and false
as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled
as to be reprehensible to a high degree. Atty. Iris’
act of immediately distancing herself from Carlos
upon discovering his true civil status belies that
alleged moral indifference and proves that she
had no intention of flaunting the law and the high
moral standard of the legal profession (Ui v. Atty.
Bonifacio, A.C. No. 3319, June 8, 2000).
25
---
Q: Patricia and Simeon were teen sweethearts.
It was after their child was born that Simeon
first promised he would marry her after he
passes the bar examinations. Their
relationship continued and Simeon allegedly
made more than twenty or thirty promises of
marriage. Patricia learned that Simeon
married another woman. Meanwhile, Simeon
successfully passed the 1970 bar
examinations after four attempts. Before he
could take his oath, Patricia filed a petition to
disqualify Simeon to take the Lawyer’s Oath
on the ground of gross immoral conduct.
Did the act of Simeon in engaging in
premarital relations with Patricia and making
promises to marry her constitute gross
immoral conduct?
A: NO, the SC ruled that the facts do not
constitute gross immoral conduct warranting a
permanent exclusion of Simeon from the legal
profession. His engaging in premarital sexual
relations with complainant and promises to
marry suggests a doubtful moral character on his
part but the same does not constitute grossly
immoral conduct. To justify suspension or
disbarment the act complained of must not only
be immoral, but grossly immoral. A grossly
immoral act is one that is so corrupt and false as
to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or
disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high
degree (Figueroa v. Barranco, Jr., SBC Case No.
519, July 31, 1997).
Moral turpitude
An act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the
duties which one person owes to another or to
society in general which is contrary to the usually
accepted and customary rule of right and duty
which a person should follow. The question as to
whether an offense involves moral turpitude is
for the Supreme Court to decide.
Examples of acts involving moral turpitude
and the resulting consequences
1. Conviction of Estafa and/or BP 22.
DISBARRED (In the Matter of Disbarment
Proceedings v. Narciso N. Jaramillo, En Banc
A.C. No. 229, April 30, 1957);
2. Conviction of bribery/ attempted bribery.
DISBARRED (In Re: Dalmacio De los Angeles,
A.C. No. L-350, August 7, 1959; 7 C.J.S., p. 736; 5
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
 Legal Ethics
Am. Jur. p. 428);
3. Conviction of murder. DISBARRED (In Re:
Disbarment Proceedings Against Atty.
Diosdado Q. Gutierrez, A.C. No. L- 363, July 31,
1962);
4. Conviction of illegal marriage before
admission to the bar. DISQUALIFIED FROM
BEING ADMITTED TO THE BAR (Villasanta v.
Peralta, 101 Phil.313, April 30, 1957);
5. Conviction of falsification of public document.
REMOVED FROM HIS OFFICE/NAME ERASED
FROM ROLL OF ATTORNEYS (De Jesus-Paras
v. Vailoces, A.C. No. 439, April 12, 1961);
6. Conviction of Estafa through falsification of
public document. DISBARRED (Villanueva v.
Sta. Ana, CBD Case No. 251, July 11, 1995);
7. Conviction of Abduction. SUSPENDED FROM
OFFICE FOR 1 YEAR (In Re Basa, 41 Phil. 275,
December 7, 1920);
8. Conviction of Concubinage. SUSPENDED
FROM OFFICE FOR 1 YEAR (In re Isada, 60
Phil. 915, November 16, 1934); or
9. Conviction of Smuggling. DISBARRED (In re
Rovero, A.C. No. 126, October 24, 1952)
NOTE: Psychological incapacity of a lawyer does
not necessarily make him an unfit member of the
Bar (Paras v. Paras, 529 SCRA 893)
Q: Atty. Simeon persuaded Armando, Benigno
and Ciriaco to invest in business venture that
later went bankrupt. Armando, Benigno and
Ciriaco charged Atty. Simeon with estafa.
Simultaneously, they filed an administrative
complaint against the lawyer with the
Supreme Court. If Simeon is convicted of
estafa, will he be disbarred? Explain. (2009
Bar)
A: YES. One of the grounds for disbarment under
Sec. 27, Rule 138, is conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude. Estafa is a crime
involving moral turpitude.
Q: If Atty. Simeon is acquitted of the estafa
charge, will the disbarment complaint be
dismissed? Explain. (2009 Bar)
A: Not necessarily. If the acquittal is based on
the ground that no crime was committed, or that
Simeon is innocent, the administrative case may
be dismissed. But if the acquittal is based merely
on reasonable doubt, the disbarment proceeding
may still continue. The purpose of a disbarment
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
2018 GOLDEN NOTES
26
proceeding is to determine whether a lawyer still
deserves to remain a member of the bar. For such
determination, conduct which merely avoids the
penalty of the law is not sufficient.
RULE 1.02, CANON 1
A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities
aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening
confidence in the legal system. (1994, 1998
Bar)
Examples of activities aimed at defiance of the
law or at lessening confidence in the legal
system
1. Advising his clients to execute another Deed
of Sale antedated to evade payment of capital
gains taxes (Chua vs. Mesina, A.C. No. 4904,
August 12, 2004);
2. Lawyer who engages in prohibited
campaigning, use of government resources
and solicitation of votes, in campaigning for
national positions in the IBP (Re: 1989
Elections of IBP, B.M. No. 491, October 6,
1989); or
3. Repeatedly disobeying orders of SEC to
appear in its hearings and repeatedly failing
to substantiate his excuse for failing to
appear (Batac et. al. v. Cruz, Jr., A.C. No. 5809,
February 23, 2004).
Q: Chu retained Atty. Guico as counsel to
handle labor disputes involving his company.
In one case, Atty. Guico asked Chu to prepare a
substantial amount of money to be given to
the NLRC Commissioner handling the appeal
to insure a favorable decision. Chu was able to
raise P300,000 for the purpose. Atty. Guico
again advised Chu to raise
anotherP300,000.00 to encourage the NLRC
Commissioner to issue the decision. But Chu
could only produce P280,000.00. The NLRC’s
decision was adverse to Chu. Was the advice
given by Atty. Guico proper?
A: NO. Every lawyer should not render any
service or give advice to any client that would
involve defiance of the very laws that he was
bound to uphold and obey,for he or she was
always bound as an attorney to be law abiding,
and thus to uphold the integrity and dignity of the
Legal Profession.Verily, he or she must act and
comport himself or herself in such a manner that
would promote public confidence in the integrity
 DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF A LAWYER
of the Legal Profession. Atty. Guico violated the common right. (Funa, 2009) A lawyer owes to
law against bribery and corruption. He society and to the court the duty not to stir up
compounded his violation by actually using said litigation.
illegality as his means of obtaining a huge sum
from the client that he soon appropriated for his Barratry vs. Ambulance chasing (1993 Bar)
own personal interest. His acts constituted gross
dishonesty and deceit, and were a flagrant breach BARRATRY AMBULANCE CHASING
of his ethical commitments under the Lawyer’s An offense of frequently An act of chasing
Oath not to delay any man for money or malice; exciting and stirring up victims of accidents for
and under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional quarrels and suits, the purpose of talking
Responsibility. His deviant conduct eroded the either at law or to the said victims (or
faith of the people in him as an individual lawyer otherwise; lawyer’s act relatives) and offering
as well as in the Legal Profession as a whole. In of fomenting suits his legal services for the
doing so, he ceased to be a servant of the law (Chu among individuals and filing of a case against
v. Guico, Jr., A.C. No. 10573, January 13, 2015). offering his legal the person(s) who
services to one of them. caused the accident(s).
Q: Atty. Asilo, a lawyer and a notary public, Barratry is not a crime It has spawned a
notarized a document already prepared by under the Philippine number of recognized
spouses Roger and Luisa when they laws. However, it is evils such as [FSMD]:
approached him. It is stated in the document proscribed by the rules
that Roger and Luisa formally agreed to live of legal ethics. 1. Fomenting of
separately from each other and either one can litigation with
have a live-in partner with full consent of the resulting burdens
other. What is the liability of Atty. Asilo, if on the courts and
any? (1998 Bar) the public;
2. Subordination of
A: Atty. Asilo may be held administratively liable perjury;
for violating Rule 1.02 of the CPR - a lawyer shall 3. Mulcting of
not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of innocent persons
the law or at lessening confidence in the legal by judgments, upon
system. An agreement between two spouses to manufactured
live separately from each other and either one causes of action;
could have a live-in partner with full consent of and
the other, is contrary to law and morals. The 4. Defrauding of
ratification by a notary public who is a lawyer of injured persons
such illegal or immoral contract or document having proper
constitutes malpractice or gross misconduct in causes of action but
office. He should at least refrain from its ignorant of legal
consummation (In Re: Santiago, A.C. No. 923, June rights and court
21, 1940; Panganiban v. Borromeo, 58 Phil. 367; In procedures by
Re: Bucana, A.C. No. 1637, July 6, 1976). means of contracts
which retain
RULE 1.03, CANON 1 exorbitant
A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or percentages of
interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or recovery and illegal
delay any man’s cause. charges for court
costs and expenses
The rule is aimed against the practice of barratry, and by settlement
stirring up litigation and ambulance chasing. made for quick
returns of fees and
Crime of maintenance against just rights
of the injured
Maintenance is the intermeddling of an persons.
uninterested party to encourage a lawsuit. It is a (Hightower v.
taking in hand, a bearing up or upholding of Detroit Edison Co.
quarrels or sides, to the disturbance of the 247 NW 97, 1993)

27 UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS

FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
 Legal Ethics
Impropriety of voluntary giving of advice
It is improper to voluntarily give legal advice
when the lawyer, in giving such, is motivated by a
desire to obtain personal benefit, secure personal
publicity, or cause legal action to be taken merely
to harass or injure another.
Q: Atty. Melissa witnessed the car accident
that resulted in injury to Manny, a friend of
hers. While visiting him at the hospital, she
advised him about what action he needed to
take regarding the accident. Is Atty. Melissa
subject to disciplinary action if she eventually
handles the case for him? (2011 Bar)
A: NO. It is unprofessional for a lawyer to
volunteer advice to bring a lawsuit, except in rare
cases where ties of blood, relationship or trust
make it his duty to do so. (Canon 28, CPE) In the
case at hand, since Atty. Melissa is a friend of the
injured person, she may not be admonished for
extending some legal advice to a friend in need.
Q: Atty. X advised complainant that to stop the
ejectment suit against him, Atty. X would file a
complaint with the Baguio CFI. Complainant
gave Atty. X P5,863.00 for fees and
miscellaneous fees. However, the complaint
was not filed. By way of defenses, the lawyer
presented complainant’s affidavit of
desistance; claimed that upon perusal of the
records of the ejectment case, he found that
complainant had already filed a Third-Party
complaint, thereby making the proposed suit
unnecessary. Is he liable for misconduct?
A: YES, the lawyer is liable for misconduct. It is
clear from the facts that the lawyer had
deceitfully defrauded the complainant. By
receiving the amount of P 5,863.00 from the
complainant in order to represent him, the
lawyer violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the CPR.
He should have filed the complaint before the CFI
of Baguio. He clearly acted in a deceitful conduct
by misrepresenting to file a complaint in order to
affect the ejectment suit. Also, the lawyer
encouraged the suit which is groundless and
unfounded in order to gain a financial interest
(Munar v. Flores, A.C. No. 2112, May 30, 1983).
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
2018 GOLDEN NOTES
28
RULE 1.04, CANON 1
A lawyer shall encourage his clients to avoid,
end or settle a controversy if it will admit of a
fair settlement.
It is the duty of the lawyer to temper his client’s
propensity to litigate and resist his client’s whims
and caprices for the lawyer also owes duty to the
court. A lawyer should be a mediator for concord
and a conciliator for compromise rather than an
initiator of controversy and a predator of conflict.
The rule requires that lawyers encourage
settlement only when the same is fair. It should
be noted that the duty and the right of the lawyer
is limited to encouraging the client to settle.
Ultimately, however, the final decision to settle a
claim rests upon the client.
Q: Jon de Ysasi III was employed by his father
in their farm. During the entire period of his
illness, his father took care of his medical
expenses and he continued to receive
compensation. However, without due notice,
his father ceased to pay his salary. He made
oral and written demands through Atty.
Sumbingco for an explanation for the sudden
withholding, as well as for the remittance of
his salary. Both demands were not acted
upon. He filed a case in court. Can the lawyers
employed by the parties be admonished for
not trying to reconcile the parties before the
filing of the suit?
A: YES. The conduct of the respective counsel of
the parties, as revealed by the records, sorely
disappoints the Court and invites reproof. Both
counsels may well be reminded that their ethical
duty as lawyers to represent their clients with
zeal goes beyond merely presenting their clients'
respective causes in court. It is just as much their
responsibility, if not more importantly, to exert
all reasonable efforts to smooth over legal
conflicts, preferably out of court and especially in
consideration of the direct and immediate
consanguineous ties between their clients. Once
again, the useful function of a lawyer is not only
to conduct litigation but to avoid it whenever
possible by advising settlement or withholding
suit. He is often called upon less for dramatic
forensic exploits than for wise counsel in every
phase of life. He should be a mediator for concord
and a conciliator for compromise, rather than a
virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation
(De Ysasi III v. NLRC, G.R. No. 104599, March 11,
1994).
 DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF A LAWYER
EFFICIENT AND CONVENIENT
LEGAL SERVICES
CANON 2
A lawyer shall make his legal services
available in an efficient and convenient
manner compatible with the independence,
integrity and effectiveness of the
NOTE: It is the lawyer’s prime duty to see to it
that justice is accorded to all without
discrimination.
RULE 2.01, CANON 2
A lawyer shall not reject, except for valid
reasons, the cause of the defenseless or the
oppressed.
Definitions
1. Defenseless
Those who are not in a position to defend
themselves due to poverty, weakness, ignorance
or other similar reasons.
professional partnerships in the private
practice of law in providing quality legal
assistance to indigent litigants through a
system of tax incentives;
3. Provide relief to the Public Attorney’s Office
(PAO) and other associations accredited by
the Supreme Court from the numerous cases
it handles;
4. Provide indigent litigants the opportunity to
acquire the services of distinguished law
firms and legal practitioners of the country
for free; and
5. Ensure that the right of every individual to
counsel, as mandated in the Constitution, is
protected and observed.
Services available
Public Attorney's Office (PAO), Department of
Justice (DOJ) and other legal aid clinics accredited
by the Supreme Court shall refer pauper litigants
to identified lawyers and professional
partnerships. PAO, DOJ or the accredited legal aid
clinics shall issue a certification that services
were rendered by the lawyer or the professional
partnership under this act. The certification shall
include the cost of the actual services given.

2. Oppressed Incentives to lawyers giving free service

Those who are the victims of the cruelty, unlawful
exaction, domination or excessive use of
authority.
A lawyer so appointed as counsel for an indigent
prisoner, as the Canons of Professional Ethics
demands, should always “exert his best efforts” in
the indigent’s behalf (People v. Estebia, G.R. No. L-
26868, December 27, 1972).
NOTE: The inability to pay for legal services is
not a valid reason to refuse acceptance of a case.
This is because the profession is a branch of the
administration of justice and not a mere money-
getting trade (CPR Annotated, PhilJA).
A lawyer or professional partnerships rendering
actual free legal services shall be entitled to an
allowable deduction from the gross income, the
amount that could have been collected for the
actual free legal services rendered or up to ten
percent (10%) of the gross income derived from
the actual performance of the legal profession,
whichever is lower: Provided, That the actual free
legal services herein contemplated shall be
exclusive of the minimum sixty (60)-hour
mandatory legal aid services rendered to indigent
litigants as required under the Rule on
Mandatory Legal Aid Services for Practicing
Lawyers, under BAR Matter No. 2012, issued by
the Supreme Court (Sec. 5, RA 9999).

AN ACT PROVIDING A MECHANISM FOR FREE Salient Features of RA 9999

LEGAL ASSISTANCE AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES (RA No. 9999) 1. The law will allow indigent litigants to
FEBRUARY 23, 2010 acquire the services of renowned lawyers
and law firms for free;
Purposes of RA No. 9999 (Free Legal 2. In exchange for the services rendered by the
Assistance Act of 2010) lawyer or the law firm, they will be given tax
incentives equivalent to the cost of the
1. Encourage lawyers and professional services rendered to the indigent litigant;
partnerships to provide free legal assistance; 3. It will help relieve the Public Attorney’s
2. Solicit the assistance of lawyers and Office (PAO) of its numerous caseloads

29 UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS

FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
 Legal Ethics
involving indigent litigants who shall be
referred to lawyers or law firms in private
practice; and
4. It should entice renowned and distinguished
firms and lawyers in the practice as their
services shall still be compensated
commensurately through the tax incentives.
RULE 2.02, CANON 2
In such cases, even if the lawyer does not accept
a case, he shall not refuse to render legal
advice to the person concerned if only to the
extent necessary to safeguard the latter’s
rights.
Rendering of Legal Advice includes preliminary
steps that should be taken, at least, until the
person concerned has obtained the services of a
proper counsel’s representation. Even though no
attorney-client relationship is created between
the parties, the lawyer, by providing interim
advice, preserves the dignity of the profession by
inspiring public faith in the profession (CPR
Annotated, PhilJA).
Q: Wanda finally became pregnant in the 10th
year of her marriage to Horacio. As her
pregnancy progressed, she started having
difficulty breathing and was easily fatigued.
The doctors diagnosed that she has a heart
congestion problem due to a valve defect, and
that her chances of carrying a baby to full
term are slim. Wanda is scared and
contemplates the possibility of abortion. She
thus sought legal advice from Diana, a lawyer-
friend and fellow church member, who has
been informally advising her on legal matters.
What is Diana’s best ethical response? (2013
Bar)
A: Advise Wanda on the purely legal side of her
problem and assure her that abortion is allowed
by law if the pregnancy endangers the life of the
mother (Code of Professional Responsibility,
Canon 2, Rule 2.01-2.02).
Q: The rendition of free legal services is a
lawyer’s: (2014 Bar)
A: Moral duty is above social obligation and legal
mandate. The lawyer voluntarily imposes upon
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
2018 GOLDEN NOTES
30
himself higher duties and more noble obligations
enshrined in the Lawyer's Oath which goes
beyond commitment to social obligation and legal
mandates.
RULE 2.03, CANON 2
A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any
act designated primarily to solicit legal
business. (1997 Bar)
Rationale behind the rule that legal
profession is not considered as a business
(2006 Bar)
It is not a business because it is a:
1. Duty of public service, of which the
emolument is a byproduct, and in which one
may attain the highest eminence without
making much money;
2. Relation, as an “officer of the court”, to the
administration of justice involving thorough
sincerity, integrity and reliability;
3. Duty of public service;
4. Relation to clients with the highest degree of
fiduciary; and
5. Relation, to the colleagues at the bar,
characterized by candor, fairness, and
unwillingness to resort to current business
methods of advertising and encroachment on
their practice, or dealing directly with their
clients.
Advertisements
GR: Advertisement by lawyers is NOT allowed.
The most worthy and effective advertisement
possible is the establishment of a well-merited
reputation for professional capacity and fidelity
to trust.
XPNs: [LEPO-LABAN-PD]
1. Reputable Law lists, in a manner consistent
with the standards of conduct imposed by the
canons, of brief biographical and informative
data;
2. Advertisements or simple announcement of
the Existence of a lawyer or his law firm
posted anywhere where it is proper such as
his place of business or residence except
courtrooms and government buildings;
3. Ordinary, simple Professional Card. It may
contain only a statement of his name, the
name of the law firm which he is connected
with, address, telephone number and the
 DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF A LAWYER
special branch of law practiced;
4. A simple announcement of the Opening of a
law firm or of changes in the partnership,
associates, firm name or office address, being
for the convenience of the profession;
5. Advertisements or announcement in any
Legal publication, including books, journals,
and legal magazines and in telephone
directories (Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc., B.M. No.
553, June 17, 1993);
6. Writing legal Articles;
7. Engaging in Business and other occupations
except when such could be deemed
improper, be seen as indirect solicitation or
would be the equivalent of a law practice;
8. Activity of an association for the purpose of
legal representation;
9. Notice to other local lawyers and publishing
in a legal journal of one’s availability to act as
an associate for them;
10. Seeking a Public office, which can only be
held by a lawyer or, in a dignified manner, a
position as a full time corporate counsel; and
11. Listing in a phone Directory, but not under a
designation of a special branch of law (Atty.
Khan Jr. v. Atty. Simbillo, A.C. No. 5299, August
19, 2003).
NOTE: For solicitation to be proper, it must be
compatible with the dignity of the legal
profession. If made in a modest and decorous
manner, it would bring no injury to the lawyer or
to the bar (Pineda, 2009).
Rationale for the Prohibition of
Advertisements
1. The profession is primarily for public service;
2. Commercializes the profession;
3. Involves self-praise and puffing;
4. Damages public confidence; and
5. May increase lawsuits and result in needless
litigation.
Examples of indirect solicitation
1. Writing and selling for publication articles of
general nature on legal subjects; and
2. Writing unsolicited articles on a legal subject.
NOTE: If engaged in another profession or
occupation concurrently with the practice of law,
the lawyer shall make clear to his client whether
he is acting as a lawyer or in another capacity.
Q: Atty. Tabalingcos was charged with
unlawfully soliciting clients and advertising
31
legal services through various business
entities. He allegedly set up two financial
consultancy firms, Jesi and Jane Management,
Inc. and Christmel Business Link, Inc., and
used them as fronts to advertise his legal
services and solicit cases. However, he
contended that his law firm had an agreement
with Jesi and Jane Management, Inc., whereby
the firm would handle the legal aspect of the
corporate rehabilitation case; and that the
latter would attend to the financial aspect of
the case’ such as the preparation of the
rehabilitation plans to be presented in court.
Is Atty. Tabalingcos guilty of unlawful
solicitation?
A: YES. he violated Rule 2.03of the Code, which
prohibits lawyers from soliciting cases for the
purpose of profit.
A lawyer is not prohibited from engaging in
business or other lawful occupation. Impropriety
arises, though, when the business is of such a
nature or is conducted in such a manner as to be
inconsistent with the lawyer’s duties as a
member of the bar. This arises when the business
is one that can readily lend itself to the
procurement of professional employment for the
lawyer; or that can be used as a cloak for indirect
solicitation on the lawyer’s behalf; or is of a
nature that, if handled by a lawyer, would be
regarded as the practice of law. It is clear from
the documentary evidence submitted by
complainant that Jesi & Jane Management, Inc.,
which purports to be a financial and legal
consultant, was indeed a vehicle used by Atty.
Tabalingcos as a means to procure professional
employment; specifically for corporate
rehabilitation cases (Villatuya v. Tabalingcos, A.C.
No. 6622, July 10, 2012).
Q: Atty. David agreed to give ½ of his
professional fees to an intermediary or
commission agent and he also bound himself
not to deal directly with the clients. Can he be
subject to disciplinary action?
A: YES. The agreement is void because it was
tantamount to malpractice which is the practice
of soliciting cases of law for the purpose of gain
either personally or through paid agents or
brokers. Malpractice ordinarily refers to any
malfeasance or dereliction of duty committed by
a lawyer. The meaning of malpractice is in
consonance with the notion that the practice of
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
 Legal Ethics
law is a profession not a business. The lawyer
may not seek or obtain employment by himself or
through others, to do so would be unprofessional
(Tan Tek Beng v. David, A. C. No. 1261, December
29, 1983).
NOTE: A general professional partnership with a
non-lawyer is void. In the formation of
partnership for the practice of law, no person
should be admitted or held out as a practitioner
or member who is not a member of the legal
profession duly authorized to practice, and
amenable to professional discipline (Canon 33,
CPE).
Q: Atty. Dulcinea writes a regular column in a
newspaper of general circulation and articles
on unforgettable legal stories in a leading
magazine. Her by-line always includes the
name of her firm where she is a named
partner. Would you consider this as improper
advertising?
A: YES. Atty. Dulcinea’s by-line including the firm
name where she belongs is improper because it is
an indirect way of solicitation or is an
advertisement of the law firm.
Q: A paid advertisement appeared in the July
5, 2000 issue of Philippine Daily Inquirer,
which reads: "ANNULMENT' OF MARRIAGE
Specialist 532-4333/521-2667." Similar
advertisements were published in the August
2 and 6, 2000 issues of the Manila Bulletin and
August 5, 2000 issue of The Philippine Star.
Does the appearance of such in a newspaper,
amount to advertising and solicitation of legal
services prohibited by the Code of
Professional Responsibility and the Rules of
Court?
A: YES. It has been repeatedly stressed that the
practice of law is not a business. It is a profession
in which duty to public service, not money, is the
primary consideration. Lawyering is not
primarily meant to be a money-making venture,
and law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily
yields profits. The gaining of a livelihood should
be a secondary consideration. The duty to public
service and to the administration of justice
should be the primary consideration of lawyers,
who must subordinate their personal interests or
what they owe to themselves (Atty. Khan Jr. v.
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
2018 GOLDEN NOTES
32
Atty. Simbillo, A.C. No. 5299, August 19, 2003).
NOTE: The rule against solicitation applies to a
lawyer who offers monetary reward to those who
can serve as witness/es in the case, which he is
handling (CPR Annotated, PhilJA).
RULE 2.04, CANON 2
A lawyer shall not charge rates lower than
those customarily prescribed unless the
circumstances so warrant (1997, 2005 Bar)
GR: A lawyer shall not charge rates lower than
those customarily prescribed.
XPN: When clients are relatives, co-lawyers, or
are indigents.
What the rule prohibits is a competition in the
matter of charging professional fees for the
purpose of attracting clients in favor of the
lawyer who offers lower rates. The rule does not
prohibit a lawyer from charging a reduced fee or
none at all to an indigent (Comments of the IBP
Committee).
TRUE, HONEST, FAIR, DIGNIFIED AND
OBJECTIVE INFORMATION ON LEGAL
SERVICES
CANON 3
A lawyer in making known his legal services
shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and
objective information or statement of facts
Brazen commercialization of legal services is
not allowed
The practice of law is not a trade like the sale of
commodities to the general public where "the
usual exaggerations in trade, when the proper
party had the opportunity to know the facts, are
not in themselves fraudulent.” (Art. 1340, NCC)
Q: Atty. E has a daily 10-minute radio program
billed as a “Court of Common Troubles.” The
program is advertised by the radio station as
a public service feature for those who seek
but cannot afford to pay for legal advice. Its
sponsors include a food processing company
and a detergent manufacturing firm which
share with the radio station the monthly
 DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF A LAWYER
remuneration of Atty. E. Is
there any impropriety in Atty. E’s role under
the above arrangement? (1997 Bar)
A: YES. Giving advice on legal matters through
the medium of a newspaper column or radio
station or television broadcast is improper. It
would involve indirect advertising and violation
of the confidential relation between the lawyer
and the client (Agpalo, 2002).
Q: Atty. Nelson recently passed the Bar and
wanted to specialize in marine labor law. He
gave out calling cards with his name, address
and telephone number in front, and the
following words at the back: "We provide
legal assistance to overseas seamen who are
repatriated due to accident, illness, injury, or
death. We also offer FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE."
Does this constitute ethical misconduct?
(2012 Bar)
A: YES, the calling card contains advertisement in
violation of Canon 3 of CPR. The phrase “We also
offer financial assistance” was clearly used to
entice clients who already had representation to
change counsels with a promise of loans to
finance their legal actions. Money was dangled to
lure clients away from their original lawyers,
thereby taking advantage of their financial
distress and emotional vulnerability. This crass
commercialism degraded the integrity of the bar
and deserves no place in the legal profession.
(Linsangan v. Atty. Tolentino, A.C. No. 6672,
September 4, 2009)
Q: As a new lawyer, Attorney Novato started
with a practice limited to small claims cases,
legal counseling, and notarization of
documents. He put up a solo practice law
office and was assisted by his wife who served
as his secretary/helper. He used a makeshift
hut in a vacant lot near the local courts and a
local transport regulatory agency. With this
strategic location, he enjoyed heavy
patronage assisting walk-in clients in the
preparation and filing of pleadings and in the
preparation and notarization of contracts and
documents. He had the foresight of investing
in a good heavy duty copier machine that
reproduces quality documents, and charges a
reasonable fee for this service. He put up a
shingle that reads: "Atty. Novato, Specialist in
Small Claims, Fastest in Notarization; the Best
and Cheapest in Copier Services."
33
Is Attorney Novato’s manner of carrying out
his professional practice in keeping with
appropriate ethical and professional practice?
(2013 Bar)
A: NO. Attorney Novato’s manner of carrying out
his professional practice is not in keeping with
appropriate ethical and professional practice. He
has degraded the law profession which may
result to loss of respect to lawyers as a whole.
The use of a makeshift hut standing alone would
create the impression that the lawyer does not
have a permanent address which is required to be
stated in all pleadings he signs as well as required
to be shown in documents he notarizes.
His shingle shows that he has considered the law
profession as a business. He should have separate
shingle for his copier services business.
When he included in his shingle the phrases
“Specialist in Small Claims” and “Fastest in
Notarization” he has transgressed the rule that a
lawyer in making known his legal services shall
use only dignified information or statement of
facts (Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon
3). So also the norm that a lawyer shall not use or
permit the use of any misleading, undignified,
self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim
regarding his qualifications or legal services
(Ibid., Canon 3, Rule 3.01).
RULE 3.01, CANON 3
A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any
false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive,
undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement
or claim regarding his qualifications or legal
services. (1997 Bar)
Any false, exaggerating or untrue claims about his
qualification are clearly unethical. Example of this
is when a lawyer makes representation to a
prospective client that he has never lost a single
case in his entire career. Certainly, this is
impossible for the best lawyers in the country
have experienced losing cases (Antiquiera, 1992).
Self-laudation is prohibited
Certain self-laudatory information such as
election to a public office, scholastic honors and
achievements, and legal authorships may be
disseminated. What is prohibited is that which
“creates an unjustified expectation about results
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
 Legal Ethics
the lawyer can achieve (Funa, 2009).
Examples of Advertisements considered as
deceptive
1. Misstatements of fact;
2. Suggestions that the ingenuity or prior
record of a lawyer rather than the justice of
the claim are the principal factors likely to
determine the result;
3. Inclusion of information irrelevant in
selecting a lawyer; and
4. Representations concerning the quality of
service, which cannot be measured or
verified (CPR Annotated, PhilJA).
RULE 3.02, CANON 3
In the choice of a firm name, no false,
misleading or assumed name shall be used. The
continued use of the name of a deceased
partner is permissible provided that the firm
indicates in all its communications that said
partner is deceased. (1994, 1996, 2001 Bar)
A lawyer is not authorized to use a name other
than the name inscribed in the Roll of Attorneys
in his practice of law (Pangan v. Atty. Ramos, A.M.
No. 1053, September 7, 1979).
Rationale behind the rule that the name of
deceased partner may still be used
All the partners have, by their joint and several
efforts over a period of years contributed to the
goodwill attached to the firm name. In the case of
a firm having widespread connections, this
goodwill is disturbed by a change in firm name
every time a partner dies, and that reflects a loss
in some degree of the goodwill to the building up
of which the surviving partners have contributed
their time, skill and labor through a period of
years (CPR Annotated, PhilJA).
NOTE: No name not belonging to any of the
partners or associates may be used in the firm
name for any purpose.
Continued use of the name of a deceased partner
is permissible provided that the firm indicates in
all its communications that said partner is
deceased. The use of a cross after the name of the
deceased partner is sufficient indication. It is
advisable though that the year of the death be
also indicated.
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
2018 GOLDEN NOTES
34
The use of the firm name of a foreign law firm is
unethical (Pineda, 2009).
RULE 3.03, CANON 3
Where a partner accepts public office, he shall
withdraw from the firm and his name shall be
dropped from the firm name unless the law
allows him to practice law concurrently.
Name of a partner in law firm should be dropped
if appointed as judge since he is no longer
allowed to practice law (Pineda, 2009).
The rationale of this rule is to prevent the law
firm or partners from making use of the name of
the public official to attract business and to avoid
suspicion of undue influence.
Q: Samonte alleges that when she went to
Branch 220, RTC QC to inquire about the
reason for the issuance of the TRO, Atty.
Rolando Gatdula (Clerk of Court) blamed her
lawyer for writing the wrong address in the
complaint for ejectmen. He told her that if she
wanted the execution to proceed, she should
change her lawyer and retain the law office of
Atty. Gatdula, at the same time giving his
calling card with the name "Baligod, Gatdula,
Tacardon, Dimailig and Celera" with office at
Rm. 220 Mariwasa Bldg., 717 Aurora Blvd.,
Cubao, Quezon City, otherwise she will not be
able to eject the defendant. Samonte told Atty.
Gatdula that she could not decide because she
was only representing her sister. To her
consternation, the RTC Branch 220 issued an
order granting the preliminary injunction as
threatened by Atty. Gatdula despite the fact
that the MTC, Branch 37 had issued an Order
directing the execution of the Decision in a
prior civil case.
Samonte filed an administrative case for
misconduct. Did Atty. Gatdula violate the Code
of Conduct and Ethical Standards for the
Public Officials and Employees?
A: YES. The card clearly gives the impression that
he is connected with the said law firm. The
inclusion/retention of his name in the
professional card constitutes an act of solicitation
which violates Section 7 sub-par. (b) (2) of R.A.
6713, otherwise known as "Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for the Public Officials and
Employees" which declares it unlawful for a
 DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF A LAWYER
public official or employee to, among others: (2)
Engage in the private practice of their profession
unless authorized by the Constitution or law,
provided that such practice will not conflict or
tend to conflict with official functions (Samonte v.
Gatdula, A.M. No. 99-1292, February 26, 1999).
RULE 3.04, CANON 3
A lawyer shall not pay or give anything of value
to representatives of the mass media in
anticipation of, or in return for, publicity to
attract legal business.
The reason for this rule is to prevent some
lawyers from gaining an unfair advantage over
others through the use of gimmickry, press
agentry or other artificial means.
Q: Fiscal Salva conducted the investigation of
a case concerning the killing of Monroy, in the
session hall of the Municipal Court of Pasay
City to accommodate the public and members
of the press. He also told the press that “if you
want to ask questions, I am allowing you to do
so and the questions will be reproduced as
my own”. Is the act of Fiscal Salva unethical?
A: YES. Fiscal Salva should be publicly censured
for the uncalled for and wide publicity and
sensationalism that he had given to and allowed
in connection with his investigation, whatever be
his motive, which is considered and found to be
contempt of court (Cruz v Salva, G.R. No. L-12871,
July 25, 1959).
PARTICIPATION IN THE IMPROVEMENT AND
REFORMS IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM
CANON 4
A lawyer shall participate in the development
of the legal system by initiating or supporting
efforts in law reform and in the improvement
of the administration of justice.
By reason of education and experience, lawyers
are especially qualified to recognize deficiencies
in the legal system and to initiate corrective
measures therein. Thus, they should participate
in proposing and supporting legislation and
programs to improve the system, without regard
to the general interests or desires of clients or
former clients (Ethical Consideration 8-1, 1978,
Model Code of Professional Responsibility,
35
American Bar Association).
Examples:
1. Presenting position papers or resolutions for
the introduction of pertinent bills in
Congress; or
2. Petitions with the SC for the amendment of
the Rules of Court.
Endorsement by a lawyer
A lawyer may, with propriety, endorse a
candidate and seek endorsement from other
lawyers. A lawyer should not use or attempt to
use the power or prestige of the judicial office to
secure such endorsement. On the other hand, the
lawyer whose endorsement is sought should have
the courage and moral stamina to refuse the
request for endorsement if he believes the
candidate lacks the essential qualifications for the
office or believes the opposing candidate is better
qualified (ABA Opinion 189 (1938); Funa, 2009).
PARTICIPATION IN THE LEGAL
EDUCATION PROGRAM
CANON 5
A lawyer shall keep abreast of legal
developments, participate in continuing legal
education programs, support efforts to
achieve high standards in law schools as well
as in the practical training of law students
and assist in disseminating information
regarding the law and jurisprudence.
This duty carries with it the obligation to be well
informed of the existing laws, and to keep abreast
with legal developments, recent enactment and
jurisprudence. It is imperative that they be
conversant with the basic legal principles. Unless
they faithfully comply with such duty, they may
not be able to discharge competently and
diligently their obligations as members of the Bar.
Worse, they may become susceptible to
committing mistakes (Dulalia Jr. v. Cruz, A.C. No.
6854, April 25, 2007, citing Santiago v. Rafanan,
A.C. No. 6252, October 5, 2004).
The latest circular of the Supreme Court provides
for the mandatory attendance of all lawyers in the
so-called “Mandatory Continuing Legal Education
Program” of the IBP. For law practitioners, they
have to comply with the 36 hours of mandatory
legal education as a pre-condition to the non-
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
 Legal Ethics
revocation of license to practice law (Antiquiera,
1992).
Three-fold obligation of a lawyer under this
canon
1. He owes it to himself to continue improving
his knowledge of the laws;
2. He owes it to his profession to take an active
interest in the maintenance of high standards
of legal education; and
3. He owes it to the lay public to make the law a
part of their social consciousness (Pineda,
2009).
LAWYERS IN THE GOVERNMENT AND
DISCHARGE OF OFFICIAL TASKS
CANON 6
These canons shall apply to lawyers in
government service in the discharge of their
official tasks.
Lawyers employed in the government should be
more sensitive in the performance of their
professional obligations as their conduct is
subject to constant scrutiny of the public.
Q: Provincial Prosecutor Bonifacio refused to
represent the Municipality of San Vicente in a
case for collection of taxes. He explained that
he cannot handle the case with sincerity and
industry because he does not believe in the
position taken by the municipality. Can
Prosecutor Bonifacio be sanctioned
administratively? (2006 Bar)
A: NO. A lawyer may refuse a case which he
believes to be unmeritorious, because it is “his
duty to counsel or maintain such actions or
proceedings only as appear to him to be just and
such defenses only as he believes to be honestly
debatable under the law (Sec. 20(c), Rule 138).
The Canons of Code of Professional Responsibility
are applicable to government lawyers in the
performance of their official tasks (Canon 6, CPR).
RULE 6.01, CANON 6
The primary duty of a lawyer engaged in public
prosecution is not to convict but to see to it that
justice is done. The suppression of facts or the
concealment of witnesses capable of
establishing the innocence of the accused is
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
2018 GOLDEN NOTES
36
highly reprehensible and is cause for
disciplinary action.
Q: From the viewpoint of legal ethics, why
should it be mandatory that the public
prosecutor be present at the trial of a criminal
case despite the presence of a private
prosecutor? (2001 Bar)
A: The public prosecutor must be present at the
trial of the criminal case despite the presence of a
private prosecutor in order to see to it that the
interest of the State is well-guarded and
protected, should the private prosecutor be found
lacking in competence in prosecuting the case.
Moreover, the primary duty of a public
prosecutor is not to convict but to see to it that
justice is done (Rule 6.01, CPR). A private
prosecutor would be naturally interested only in
the conviction of the accused.
Instance where a private prosecutor may
appear in behalf of the State even without the
presence or supervision of a public
prosecutor
All criminal actions either commenced by
complaint or by information shall be prosecuted
under the direction and control of a public
prosecutor. In case of heavy work schedule of the
public prosecutor or in the event of lack of public
prosecutors, the private prosecutor may be
authorized in writing by the Chief of the
Prosecution Office or the Regional State
Prosecutor to prosecute the case subject to the
approval of the court. Once so authorized to
prosecute the criminal action, the private
prosecutor shall continue to prosecute the case
up to end of the trial even in the absence of a
public prosecutor, unless the authority is revoked
or otherwise withdrawn (Sec. 5, Rule 110, RRC as
amended by A.M. No. 02-2-07-SC effective May 1,
2002).
RULE 6.02, CANON 6
A lawyer in the government service shall not
use his public position to promote or advance
his private interests, nor allow the latter to
interfere with his public duties.
Restriction on lawyers who are also public
officials and employees during their
incumbency [PERU]
 DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF A LAWYER
They must NOT:
1. Engage in the Private practice of their
profession unless authorized by the
Constitution or law, provided that such
practice will not conflict or tend to conflict
with their official functions;
2. Own, control, manage or accept Employment
as officer, employee, consultant, counsel,
broker, agent, trustee or nominee in any
private enterprise regulated, supervised or
licensed by their office unless expressly
allowed by law;
3. Recommend any person to any position in a
private enterprise which has a regular or
pending official transaction with their office;
and
4. Use or divulge confidential or classified
information officially known to them by
reason of their office and not available to the
public.
Rule 6.01 vs. Rule 6.02
Unlike Rule 6.01, 6.02 is not limited to public
prosecutors, or public lawyers engaged
principally in criminal prosecution cases. The
restriction applies particularly to lawyers in
government service, who are allowed by law to
engage in private law practice, and those who,
though prohibited from engaging in the practice
of law, have friends, former associates and
relatives who are in the active practice of law
(CPR Annotated, PhilJA).
RULE 6.03, CANON 6
A lawyer shall not, after leaving government
service, accept engagement or employment in
connection with any matter in which he had
intervened while in said service. (1992, 1993,
2001 Bar)
The restriction provided under the rule covers
engagement or employment which means that he
cannot accept any work or employment from
anyone that will involve or relate to the matter in
which he intervened as a public official, except on
behalf of the body or authority which he served
during his public employment (CPR Annotated,
PhilJA).
NOTE: Sec. 7(b) of R.A. 6713 prohibits former
public official or employee for a period of 1 year
after retirement or separation from office to
practice his profession in connection with any
matter before the office he used to be with.
37
Q: Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza filed a
petition with the CFI praying for the
assistance and supervision of the court in the
GenBank’s liquidation. Mendoza gave advice
on the procedure to liquidate the GenBank.
Subsequently, President Aquino established
the PCGG to recover the alleged ill-gotten
wealth of former President Marcos, his family
and cronies. The PCGG filed with the
Sandiganbayan a complaint for reversion,
reconveyance, restitution, accounting and
damages against Tan, et al. and issued several
writs of sequestration on properties they
allegedly acquired. Tan, et al. were
represented by former SolGen Mendoza, who
has then resumed his private practice of law.
The PCGG filed motions to disqualify Mendoza
as counsel for Tan, et al., alleging that then
SolGen and counsel to Central Bank, “actively
intervened” in the liquidation of GenBank,
which was subsequently acquired by Tan, et
al. Is Rule 6.03 of the CPR applicable to
Mendoza?
A: NO. The advice given by Mendoza on the
procedure to liquidate the GenBank is not the
“matter” contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the CPR.
ABA Formal Opinion No. 342 is clear in stressing
that the “drafting, enforcing or interpreting
government or agency procedures, regulations or
laws, or briefing abstract principles of law” are
acts which do not fall within the scope of the
term “matter”. However, this concern does not
cast shadow in the case at bar. The act of
Mendoza in informing the Central Bank on the
procedure on how to liquidate the GenBank is a
different from the subject matter of the civil case
about the sequestration of the shares of Tan et al.
in Allied Bank. Consequently, the danger that
confidential official information might be
divulged is still nil, if not inexistent. Their
interests coincide instead of colliding (PCGG v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 151809-12, April 12,
2005).
Adverse-interest Conflict vs. Congruent-
interest Conflict
ADVERSE-INTEREST CONGRUENT-INTEREST
CONFLICTS REPRESENTATION
CONFLICTS
Exist where the matter The disqualification does
in which the former not really involve a
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
 Legal Ethics
government lawyer conflict at all, because it Integration of the Bar
represents a client in prohibits the lawyer from
private practice is representing a private The Integration of the Philippine Bar means the
substantially related practice client even if the official unification of the entire lawyer
to the matter that the interests of the former population, and this requires membership and
lawyer dealt with government client and financial support of every attorney as condition
while employed by the the new client are sine qua non to the practice of law and the
government and the entirely parallel. retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys of
interests of the the Supreme Court (Pineda, 1999).
government and the
interests of the Fundamental purposes of the IBP
current and former
are adverse. 1. To elevate the standards of the legal
profession;
2. Improve the administration of justice; and
NOTE: “Congruent-interest representation 3. Enable the Bar to discharge its public
conflict,” unlike the “adverse-interest conflict,” is responsibility more effectively (Sec. 2, Rule
unique to former government lawyers. 139-A, RRC).

NOTE: The Philippines is divided into 9 Regions

DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF A LAWYER
TO THE LEGAL PROFESSION
CANON 7
A lawyer shall at all times uphold the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession
and support the activities of the integrated
bar
Integrated Bar of the Philippines
It is an official national body composed of all
persons whose names now appear or may
hereafter be included in the Roll of Attorneys of
the Supreme Court (Sec. 1, Rule 139-A, RRC).
Statutory Basis
R.A. 6397 (An Act Providing for the Integration
of the Philippine Bar, and Appropriating Funds
Therefor). The Supreme Court may adopt rules of
court to effect the Integration of the Philippine
Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit in
order to raise the standards of the legal
profession, improve the administration of justice
and enable the bar to discharge its public
responsibility more effectively.
NOTE: The Integrated Bar is a state-organized
bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as
distinguished from bar associations organized by
lawyers themselves, where membership is
voluntary. It is a national organization of lawyers
created on 16 January 1973 under Rule 139-A of
the Rules of Court, and constituted on 4 May 1973
into a body corporate by PD No. 181.
of the Integrated Bar, with a Chapter organized in
every province. Each Chapter shall have its own
local government as provided for by uniform
rules to be prescribed by the Board of Governors
and approved by the SC (Secs. 3 and 4, Rule 139-A,
RRC).
Constitutionality of the IBP integration
The practice of law is not a vested right but a
privilege clothed with public interest. Hence, it is
fair and just that the exercise of that privilege be
regulated to assure compliance with the lawyer's
public responsibilities. Given existing bar
conditions, the most efficient means of doing so is
by integrating the Bar through a rule of court that
requires all lawyers to pay annual dues to the
Integrated Bar (In the Matter of the Integration of
the Bar of the Philippines, 49 SCRA 22, January 9,
1973).
Structure of the IBP Board
Nine Governors shall be elected by the House of
Delegates from the nine Regions on the
representation basis of one Governor from each
Region. Each Governor shall be chosen from a list
of nominees submitted by the Delegates from the
Region, provided that not more than one nominee
shall come from any Chapter. The President and
the Executive Vice President, if chosen by the
Governors from outside of themselves as
provided in Section 7 of this Rule, shall ipso facto
become members of the Board (Sec. 6, Rule 139-A,
RRC).

UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS

2018 GOLDEN NOTES
38
 DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF A LAWYER
Term of members of the IBP Board
The Governors shall hold office for a term of two
years from July 1 immediately following their
election to June 30 of their second year in office
and until their successors shall have been duly
chosen and qualified (Sec. 38, Art. VI, IBP By-
Laws).
Principle of Rotation
Pursuant to the principle of rotation, the
governorship of a region shall rotate once in as
many terms as the number of chapters there are
in the region, to give every chapter a chance to
represent the region in the Board of Governors.
Thus, in a region composed of 5 chapters, each
chapter is entitled to the governorship once in
every 5 terms, or once every ten (10) years, since
a term is two (2) years (Atty. Magsino et al. v. Atty.
Vinluan, A.M. No. 09-5-2-SC, December 14, 2010).
NOTE: The principle on rotation shall be strictly
implemented so that all prior elections for
governor in the region shall be reckoned with or
considered in determining who should be the
governor to be selected from the different
chapters to represent the region in the Board of
Governors (Bar Matter No. 586 dated May 16,
1991).
Kinds of rotation
1. Rotation by pre-ordained sequence - effected
by the observance of the sequence of the
service of the chapters in the first cycle,
which is very predictable.
2. Rotation by exclusion - effected by the
exclusion of a chapter who had previously
served until all chapters have taken their
turns to serve. It is not predictable as each
chapter will have the chance to vie for the
right to serve, but will have no right to a re-
election as it is debarred from serving again
until the full cycle is completed (In The
Matter of the Brewing Controversies in the
Elections of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, A.M. No. 09-5-2-SC, December 04,
2012).
NOTE: In one case, the Supreme Court held that
rotation by exclusion shall be adopted since the
elections would be more genuine as the
opportunity to serve as Governor at any time is
once again open to all chapters, unless, of course,
a chapter has already served in the new cycle.
39
While predictability is not altogether avoided, as
in the case where only one chapter remains in the
cycle, still, as previously noted by the Court “the
rotation rule should be applied in harmony with,
and not in derogation of, the sovereign will of the
electorate as expressed through the ballot.” (In
The Matter of the Brewing Controversies in the
Elections of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
A.M. No. 09-5-2-SC, December 04, 2012).
Transferring to another IBP Chapter is not a
ground for disqualification to run as IBP
Governor
Transferring to another IBP Chapter is not a
ground for disqualification for the post of IBP
Governor as the same is allowed under Section 19
of the IBP By-Laws with the qualification only
that the transfer be made not less than three
months immediately preceding any chapter
election (Velez v. De Vera, A.C. No. 6697, July 25,
2006).
Board meetings
The Board shall meet regularly once every three
months, on such date and at such time and place
as it shall designate. A majority of all the
members of the Board shall constitute a quorum
to do business. Special meetings may be called by
the President or by five members of the Board
(Sec. 6, Rule 139-A, RRC).
IBP officers
The Integrated Bar shall have a/an:
1. President;
2. Executive Vice President who shall be chosen
by the Governors immediately after the
latter’s election; either from among
themselves or from other members of the
Integrated Bar, by the vote of at least five
Governors. Each of the regional members of
the Board shall be ex officio Vice President
for the Region which he represents;
3. Secretary;
4. Treasurer; and
5. Such other officers and employees as may be
required by the Board of Governors, to be
appointed by the President with the consent
of the Board, and to hold office at the
pleasure of the Board or for such term as it
may fix. Said officers and employees need not
be members of the Integrated Bar (Sec. 7,
Rule 139-A, RRC).
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
 Legal Ethics
NOTE: No lawyer holding an elective, judicial,
quasi-judicial or prosecutory office in the
Government or any political subdivision or
instrumentality thereof shall be eligible for
election or appointment to any position in the
Integrated Bar or any Chapter thereof. A Delegate,
Governor, officer or employee of the Integrated
Bar, or an officer or employee of any Chapter
thereof shall be considered ipso facto resigned
from his position as of the moment he files his
certificate of candidacy for any elective public
office or accepts appointment to any judicial,
quasi-judicial, or prosecutory office in the
Government or any political subdivision or
instrumentality thereof (Sec. 13, Rule 139-A, RRC).
Term of officers
The President and the Executive Vice President
shall hold office for a term of two years from July
1 following their election until June 30 of their
second year in office and until their successors
shall have been duly chosen and qualified. In the
event the President is absent or unable to act, his
functions and duties shall be performed by the
Executive Vice President, and in the event of the
death, resignation, or removal of the President,
the Executive Vice President shall serve as Acting
President for the unexpired portion of the term.
In the event of the death, resignation, removal or
disability of both the President and the Executive
Vice President, the Board of Governors shall elect
an Acting President to hold office for the
unexpired portion of the term or during the
period of disability. Unless otherwise provided in
these By-Laws, all other officers and employees
appointed by the President with the consent of
the Board shall hold office at the pleasure of the
Board or for such term as the Board may fix (Sec.
49, Article VII, IBP By-Laws).
Qualifications of a Regional IBP Governor
1. He is a member in good standing in the IBP;
2. He is included in the voters list of his chapter
or he is not disqualified by the Integration
Rule, by the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar, or
by the By-Laws of the Chapter to which he
belongs;
3. He does not belong to a chapter from which a
regional governor has already been elected,
unless the election is the start of a new
season or cycle; and
4. He is not in the government service (In Re:
Petition to disqualify Atty. De Vera, A.C. No.
6052, December 11, 2003).
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
2018 GOLDEN NOTES
40
NOTE: Moral fitness is not an explicit
qualification in the IBP by-laws.
Vacancy occurring in the IBP presidency
1. In the event the President is absent or unable
to act, his duties shall be performed by the
Executive Vice President.
2. In the event of the death, resignation, or
removal of the President, the Executive Vice
President shall serve as Acting President
during the remainder of the term of the office
thus vacated.
3. In the event of the death, resignation,
removal or disability of both the President
and the Executive Vice President, the Board
of Governors shall elect an Acting President
to hold office until the next succeeding
election or during the period of disability
(Sec. 8, Rule 139-A, RRC).
NOTE: Serves only the unexpired term.
Prohibited acts and practices relative to the
elections of IBP officers
1. Distribution, except on election day, of
election campaign materials;
2. Distribution, on election day, of election
campaign materials other than a statement of
the bio data of the candidate on not more
than one page of a legal size sheet of paper;
or causing the distribution of such statement
to be done by persons other than those
authorized by the officer presiding at the
elections;
3. Campaigning for or against any candidate,
while holding an elective, judicial, quasi-
judicial or prosecutory office in the
Government or any political subdivision,
agency or instrumentality thereof;
4. Formation of tickets, single slates, or
combinations of candidates as well as the
advertising thereof; and
5. For the purpose of inducing or influencing a
member to withhold his vote, or to vote for or
against a candidate:
a. Payment of the dues or other
indebtedness of any member;
b. Giving of food, drink, entertainment,
transportation or any article of value, or
any similar consideration to any person;
c. Making a promise or causing an
expenditure to be made, offered or
 DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF A LAWYER
promise to any person (Sec. 4, IBP By-
Laws; In the Matter of the Inquiry into the
1989 Elections of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, A.M. No. 491, October 6,
1989).
Q: In the election of national officers of the
IBP, the SC received reports of electioneering
and extravagance that characterized the
campaign of the 3 candidates for President of
the IBP. It is alleged that they used
government planes, gave free
accommodations to voters to expensive hotels
and there has been intervention of public
officials to influence the voting. Is there a
violation of the IBP by-laws? Is there sufficient
ground for the SC to suspend the oath taking
of the officials?
A: YES. The candidates for the national positions
in the IBP conducted their campaign preparatory
to the election on June 3, 1989 in violation of
Section 14 of the IBP by-laws and the Rules of
Court, that the IBP shall be strictly non-political.
Also the ethics of the legal profession imposed on
all lawyers has been violated corollary to their
obligation to obey and uphold the constitution
and the laws, the duty to promote respect for law
and legal processes and to abstain activities
aimed at the defiance of the law or at lessening
confidence in the legal system (In Re: IBP
Elections, B.M. 491, October 6, 1989).
MEMBERSHIP AND DUES
Q: The Integrated Bar of the Philippines
adopted a resolution recommending to the
Court the removal of the name Marcial A.
Edillon, a duly licensed practicing attorney,
from its Roll of Attorneys for stubborn refusal
to pay his membership dues to the IBP since
its constitution, notwithstanding due notice. Is
Edillon correct in his objection that the Court
is without power to compel him to become a
member of the IBP, hence, Sec. 1 of Rule 139-A
of the Rules of Court is unconstitutional for it
infringes on his constitutional right of
freedom to associate (and not to associate)?
A: NO. To compel a member of the Integrated Bar
is not violative of his constitutional freedom to
associate. Integration does not make a lawyer a
member of any group of which he is not already a
member. He became a member of the Bar when
he passed the Bar Examinations. All that
integration actually does is to provide an official
41
national organization for the well-defined but
unorganized group of which every lawyer is
already a member.
Assuming that the questioned provision does in a
sense compel a lawyer to be a member of the
Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an
exercise of the police power of the State.(In the
Matter of IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of
Atty. Edillon, A.C. No. 1928, December 19, 1980)
NOTE: A lawyer does not automatically become a
member of the IBP chapter where he resides or
works after becoming a full-fledged member of
the Bar. He has the discretion to choose the IBP
Chapter he wants to join. (Garcia v. De Vera, A.C.
6052, December 11, 2003)
Unless he otherwise registers his preference for a
particular Chapter, a lawyer shall be considered a
member of the Chapter of the province, city,
political subdivision or area where his office is or,
in the absence thereof, his residence is located. In
no case shall any lawyer be a member of more
than one Chapter (Sec. 4, Rule 139-A, RRC).
Procedure for voluntary termination of
membership
A member may terminate his membership by
filing a written notice to that effect with the
Secretary of the Integrated Bar, who shall
immediately bring the matter to the attention of
the Supreme Court. Forthwith he shall cease to be
a member and his name shall be stricken by the
Court from the Roll of Attorneys (Sec.11, Rule
139-A, RRC).
NOTE: Re-instatement may be made by the Court
in accordance with rules and regulations
prescribed by the Board of Governors and
approved by the Court (Sec. 11, Rule 139-A, RRC).
Membership dues
Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay
such annual dues as the Board of Governors shall
determine with the approval of the Supreme
Court. A fixed sum equivalent to ten percent
(10%) of the collections from each Chapter shall
be set aside as a Welfare Fund for disabled
members of the Chapter and the compulsory
heirs of deceased members thereof (Sec. 9, Rule
139-A, RRC).
NOTE: Membership dues are not prohibited by
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
 Legal Ethics
the Constitution. The fee is imposed as a
regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for
carrying out the purposes and objectives of the
integration (In the Matter of IBP Membership dues
delinquency of Atty. Marcial Edillon, A.M. No. 1928,
August 3, 1978).
Effect of non-payment of dues
Default in the payment of annual dues for six
months shall warrant suspension of membership
in the Integrated Bar, and default in such
payment for one year shall be a ground for the
removal of the name of the delinquent member
from the Roll of Attorneys (Sec. 10, Rule 139-A,
RRC) subject to the requirement of due process.
(Funa, 2009)
Q: Atty. Llamas, for a number of years, has not
indicated the proper PTR and IBP O.R. Nos.
and data in his pleadings. He only indicated
“IBP Rizal 259060” but he has been using this
for at least 3 years. Atty. Llamas averred that
he is only engaged in a “limited” practice of
law and under R.A. 7432, as a senior citizen,
he is exempt from payment of income taxes,
including the payment of membership dues. Is
Atty. Llamas correct?
A: NO. Rule 139-A requires that every member of
the Integrated Bar shall pay annual dues and
default thereof shall warrant the appropriate
penalties. It does not matter whether or not
Atty. Llamas is only engaged in “limited” practice
of law. Moreover, the exemption invoked by Atty.
Llamas does not include exemption from
payment of membership or association dues
(Santos Jr. v. Atty. Llamas, A.C. No. 4749, January
20, 2000).
NOTE: R.A. 7432 providing 20% discount to
Senior Citizens DOES NOT apply to IBP Dues.
Q: Atty. Arevalo sought exemption from
payment of IBP dues for the alleged unpaid
accountability for the years 1977-2005. He
alleged that after being admitted to the
Philippine Bar in 1961, he became part of the
Philippine Civil Service then migrated to, and
worked in the USA from December 1986 until
his retirement in 2003. He maintained that he
cannot be assessed IBP dues for the years that
he was working in the Philippine Civil Service
since the Civil Service law prohibits the
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
2018 GOLDEN NOTES
42
practice of one’s profession while in
government service, and neither can he be
assessed for the years when he was working
in the USA. Is Atty. Arevalo entitled to
exemption from payment of his dues during
the time that he was inactive in the practice of
law?
A: NO. The Integration of the Philippine Bar
means the official unification of the entire lawyer
population. This requires membership and
financial support of every attorney as condition
sine qua non to the practice of law and the
retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys of
the Supreme Court.
Payment of dues is a necessary consequence of
membership in the IBP, of which no one is
exempt. This means that the compulsory nature
of payment of dues subsists for as long as one’s
membership in the IBP remains regardless of the
lack of practice of, or the type of practice, the
member is engaged in. There is nothing in the law
or rules which allow exemption from payment of
membership dues (even if the lawyer is staying
abroad). At most, as correctly observed by the
IBP, he could have informed the Secretary of the
Integrated Bar of his intention to stay abroad
before he left. In such case, his membership in the
IBP could have been terminated and his
obligation to pay dues could have been
discontinued (Letter of Atty. Arevalo, Jr.
Requesting Exemption from Payment of Dues, B.M.
No. 1370, May 9, 2005).
No retirement in the IBP
There is no such thing as retirement in the IBP as
understood in labor law. A lawyer, however, may
terminate his bar membership after filing the
required verified notice of termination with the
Secretary of the Integrated Bar (In Re: Atty. Jose
Principe, Bar Matter No. 543, September 20, 1990).
UPHOLDING THE DIGNITY AND INTEGRITY OF
THE PROFESSION
Q: Dongga-as engaged the law firm of Atty.
Cruz-Angeles to handle the annulment of his
marriage with his wife, Mutya. In connection
therewith, Atty. Cruz-Angeles was paid the
aggregate sum of P350,000 representing legal
fees. Dongga-as constantly followed-up his
case. However, despite the passage of more
than five (5) months from the engagement,
 DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF A LAWYER
Atty. Cruz-Angeles could not present any
petition and instead, offered excuses for the
delay. They even failed to file the appropriate
pleading before the proper court and could
not even show a finished draft of such
pleading. Moreover, Atty. Cruz-Angeles
misrepresented that the delay in the filing of
petition was due to the fact that they were still
looking for a “friendly” court, judge, and
prosecutor. Is Atty. Cruz-Angeles guilty of any
ethical misconduct?
A: YES. Once a lawyer takes up the cause of his
client, he is duty-bound toserve the latter with
competence, and to attend to such client's cause
with diligence, care, anddevotion whether he
accepts it for a fee or for free. He owes fidelity to
such cause and must alwaysbe mindful of the
trust and confidence reposed upon him.
Therefore, a lawyer's neglect of a legalmatter
entrusted to him by his client constitutes
inexcusable negligence for which he must be
heldadministratively liable," as in this case.
Furthermore, Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler
misrepresented to complainant that the delay in
the filing of his petition for annulment was due to
the fact that they were still looking for a
"friendly" court, judge, and public prosecutor
who will not be too much of a hindrance in
achieving success in the annulment case. As
members of the Bar, respondents should not
perform acts that would tend to undermine
and/or denigrate the integrity of the courts, such
as insinuating that they can find a "friendly" court
and judge that will ensure a favorable ruling in
complainant's annulment case. It is their sworn
duty as lawyers and officers of the court to
uphold the dignity and authority ofthe courts.
Respect for the courts guarantees the stability of
the judicial institution. Without thisguarantee, the
institution would be resting on very shaky
foundations. In this case, respondents
compromised the integrity not only of the
judiciary, but also of the national prosecutorial
service, by insinuating that they can influence a
court, judge, and prosecutor to cooperate with
them to ensure the annulment of complainant's
marriage(Dongga-as v. Atty. Cruz-Angeles et. al.,
A.C. No. 11113, August 9, 2016).
RULE 7.01, CANON 7
A lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly
making a false statement or suppressing a
material fact in connection with his
application for admission to the bar.
43
The concealment of an attorney in his application
to take the bar exams of the fact that he had been
charged with or indicted for an alleged crime, is
ground for revocation of his license to practice
law (In re: Victorino Lanuevo, A.M. No. 1162,
August 29, 1975).
Honest mistake as excuse in making false
statement
An honest mistake in making false statement may
be a valid excuse but the burden of proof lies on
the one who alleges it.
On the other hand, to be liable for suppressing a
fact or information in the application, the
suppression must be:
1. Deliberately or knowingly made; and
2. The fact or information suppressed must be
material (CPR Annotated, PhilJA).
Discovery of False statements or Supression of
Material Fact in the application for admission
to the Bar
1. Before the candidate could take the bar
examinations- he will be denied permission to
take the examinations.
2. After the candidate had passed the
examinations but before having been taken his
oath- he will not be allowed to take his oath
as a lawyer.
3. After the candidate had taken his oath as a
lawyer- his name will be stricken from the
Roll of Attorneys.
Effect of concealment of a crime which does
not involve moral turpitude
Concealment will be taken against him. It is the
fact of concealment and not the commission of
the crime itself that makes him morally unfit to
become a lawyer. When he made concealment he
perpetrated perjury (In re: Victorino Lanuevo,
A.M. No. 1162, August 29, 1975).
RULE 7.02, CANON 7
A lawyer shall not support the application for
admission to the bar of any person known by
him to be unqualified in respect to character,
education or other relevant attribute.
The rationale behind the rule goes beyond the
personal responsibility to be upright and honest.
It further extends to the lawyer’s responsibility to
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
 Legal Ethics
uphold the integrity and dignity of the profession,
by not blindly issuing certifications in support of
applications for admission to the bar of persons
known to him or her to have questionable
character, inadequate education or other relevant
attributes not consistent with any or all of the
requirements for admission (CPR Annotated,
PhilJA).
RULE 7.03, CANON 7
A lawyer shall not engage in a conduct that
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor shall he, whether in public or private
life, behave in a scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession (2004 Bar)
Q: Atty. Perenia got married in 2005. Then he
met another woman, Helen. They fell in love
and started living together. Atty. Perenia
would even bring Helen along to social
functions and introduce her as his second
wife. Rule on the conduct of Atty. Perenia.
A: YES, it violates Rule 7.03 of CPR. The fact that
he shamelessly flaunts his mistress constitutes an
act which embarrasses and discredits the law
profession since it is his duty and obligation to
uphold the dignity and integrity of the profession.
The actuation of Atty. Perenia is contrary to good
morals.
While it has been held in disbarment cases that
the mere fact of sexual relations between two
unmarried adults is not sufficient to warrant
administrative sanction for such illicit behavior, it
is not so with respect to betrayals of the marital
vow of fidelity. Even if not all forms of extra-
marital relations are punishable under penal law,
sexual relations outside marriage is considered
disgraceful and immoral as it manifests
deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage
and the marital vows protected by the
Constitution and affirmed by our laws (Vitug v.
Roncal, A.C. No. 6313, September 7, 2006).
Q: Atty. Kuripot was one of Town Bank’s
valued clients. In recognition of his loyalty to
the bank, he was issued a gold credit card
with a credit limit of P250,000.00. After two
months, Atty. Kuripot exceeded his credit
limit, and refused to pay the monthly charges
as they fell due. Aside from a collection suit,
Town Bank also filed a disbarment case
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
2018 GOLDEN NOTES
44
against Atty. Kuripot. In his comment on the
disbarment case, Atty. Kuripot insisted that he
did not violate the Code of Professional
Responsibility since his obligation to the bank
was personal in nature and had no relation to
his being a lawyer. Is Atty. Kuripot correct?
Explain your answer. (2005 Bar)
A: NO. Atty. Kuripot is not correct. Section 7.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility provides
that “a lawyer shall not engage in conduct that
adversely affects his fitness to practice law, nor
shall he, whether in public or private life, behave
in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the
legal profession.”
Q: Should Atty. Kuripot should be held
administratively liable for his refusal to settle
his credit card bill. (2005 Bar)
A: He may NOT be held administratively liable.
The Supreme Court has held that it does not take
original jurisdiction of complaints for collection
of debts. The creditor’s course of action is civil,
not administrative in nature and proper reliefs
may be obtained from the regular courts (Litigio
v. Dicon, A.M. No. MTJ-93-806, July 13, 1995).
Q: Atty. Capito was supposed to represent
Milagros in a claim for support against her
husband but no legal action was taken. He
then borrowed 4,000 from Milagros. He was
also permitted to stay in the house of Milagros
for 2 weeks but he prolonged his stay to a
month and even reneged on his promise to
pay. Atty. Capito continued to borrow money
from her and the debt grew to P16,000. When
Milagros finally met him to collect the debt,
Atty. Capito, in the presence of several others,
told her “Eh kung sabihin ko na sugar mommy
kita”. Rule on the conduct of Atty. Capito.
A: The respondent is guilty of gross discourtesy
amounting to conduct unbecoming of a court
employee. By such violation, respondent failed to
live up to his oath of office as member of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and violated
Rule 7.03 and Rule 8.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. He should not use
abusive, offensive, scandalous, menacing and
improper language. Their every act or word
should be marked by prudence, restraint,
courtesy and dignity (Re: Complaints of Mrs.
Milagros Lee & Samantha Lee against Atty. Gil
 DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF A LAWYER
Luisito R. Capito, A.M. No. 2008-19-SC, August 18,
2010).
Q: Ricafort filed a complaint for disbarment
against Atty. Medina. Ricafort alleged that his
tricycle sideswiped Atty. Medina’s car along
Sarvida Street in Surigao City. Atty. Medina
then alighted from his car and confronted
Ricafort. The latter allegedly snapped at him,
saying: “Do you not know me?" and proceeded
to slap him, and then left. Should Atty. Medina
be held administratively liable?
A: YES. Good character is a continuing
qualification for lawyers. The Court has the
power to impose disciplinary sanctions to
lawyers who commit acts of misconduct in either
a public or private capacity if the acts show them
unworthy to remain officers of the court. Canon 7,
Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that “A lawyer shall not
engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his
fitness to practice law, nor shall he whether in
public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.”By itself, the act of humiliating
another in public by slapping him or her on the
face hints of a character that disregards the
human dignity of another. Atty. Medina’s question
to Ricafort confirms such character and his
potential to abuse the profession as a tool for
bullying, harassment, and discrimination. His act
discredits the legal profession by perpetuating a
stereotype that is unreflective of the nobility of
the profession (Ricafort v. Medina, A.C. No. 5179,
May 31, 2016).
COURTESY, FAIRNESS AND CANDOR
TOWARDS PROFESSIONAL COLLEAGUES
CANON 8
A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy,
fairness and candor towards his professional
colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics
against opposing counsel.
The lawyer’s arguments, whether written or oral,
should be gracious to both the court and
opposing counsel and be of such words as may be
properly addressed by one gentleman to another
(National Security Co. v. Jarvis, 278 U.S. 610).
A lawyer’s language should be forceful but
dignified, emphatic but respectful as befitting an
45
advocate and in keeping with the dignity of the
legal profession (In Re: Climaco, A.C. No. 134-J,
January 21, 1974).
Q: Atty. Ferrer filed a reply with opposition to
motion to dismiss that contained abusive,
offensive, and improper language which
insinuated that Atty. Barandon presented a
falsified document in court. He also filed a
fabricated charge against Atty. Barandon in
another case for alleged falsification of public
document. Furthermore, at the courtroom
of MTC Daet before the start of hearing,
Atty. Ferrer, evidently drunk, threatened
Atty. Barandon. Is he guilty of violation of the
Code of Professional Responsibility?
A: YES. Canon 8 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility commands all lawyers to conduct
themselves with courtesy, fairness and candor
towards their fellow lawyers and avoid harassing
tactics against opposing counsel.
Atty. Ferrer’s actions do not measure up to this
Canon. Moreover, Atty. Ferrer could have aired
his charge of falsification in a proper forum and
without using offensive and abusive language
against a fellow lawyer. The Court has constantly
reminded lawyers to use dignified language in
their pleadings despite the adversarial nature of
our legal system (Barandon v. Ferrer, Sr., A.C.5768,
March 26, 2010).
Q: Atty. Y, in his motion for reconsideration of
the Decision rendered by the NLRC, alleged
that there was connivance of the NLRC
Commissioners with Atty. X for monetary
considerations in arriving at the questioned
decision. He insulted the Commissioner for
their ineptness in appreciating the fact as
borne by the evidence presented. Atty. X files
an administrative complaint against Atty. Y
for using abusive language. Atty. Y posits that
as a lawyer for the down-trodden laborers, he
is entitled to express his righteous anger
against the Commissioners for having cheated
them; that his allegations in the motion for
reconsideration are absolutely privileged; and
that proscription against the use of abusive
language does not cover pleadings filed with
the NLRC, as it is not a court, nor are any of its
Commissioners Justices or Judges. Is Atty. Y
administratively liable under the Code of
Professional Responsibility? Explain. (2010
Bar)
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
 Legal Ethics
A: YES. Atty. Y has clearly violated Canons 8 and
11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
is administratively liable. A lawyer shall not in his
professional dealings, use language which is
abusive, offensive or otherwise improper (Rule
8.01, Code of Professional Responsibility). In the
case of Johnny Ng v. Atty. Alar (507 SCRA 465), it
was held that the argument that the NLRC is not a
court, is unavailing. The lawyer remains a
member of the Bar, an “oath-bound servant of the
law, whose first duty is not to his client but to the
administration of justice and whose conduct
ought to be and must be scrupulously observant
of the law and ethics.”
The argument that labor practitioners are
entitled to some latitude of righteous anger is
unavailing. It does not deter the Court from
exercising its supervisory authority over lawyers
who misbehave or fail to live up to that standard
expected of them as members of the Bar.
Instances of Lack of Candor (honesty)
1. Misquoting the contents of paper, testimony
of a witness, the language or the argument of
opposing counsel; or the language of the
decision or a textbook;
2. With knowledge of its invalidity, to cite as
authority a decision that has been overruled
or a statute that has been repealed, or in the
argument to assert as a fact that which has
not been proved, or in those jurisdictions
where the side has the opening and closing
arguments to mislead his opponent by
concealing or withholding positions in his
opening argument upon which his side then
intends to rely;
3. Offering evidence which he knows the court
should reject; or
4. Introducing into an argument, addressed to
the court, remarks or statements intended to
influence the bystanders (Pineda, 2009).
RULE 8.01, CANON 8
A lawyer shall not, in his professional
dealings, use language which is abusive,
offensive or otherwise improper.
Instances of disrespectful language
1. Categorizes the SC decision as false,
erroneous and illegal (Suo v. Cloribel, A.M. No.
01-1-15-RTC, July 10, 2003);
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
2018 GOLDEN NOTES
46
2. Description of judges attitude as “unjust,
hostile, vindictive and dangerous.” (Cornejo v.
Judge Tan, G.R. No. L-2217, March 23, 1950);
3. Stating that “justice is blind and also deaf and
dumb.” (In Re: Almacen, G.R. No. L-27654,
February 18, 1970);
4. Attributing to the SC acts of dismissing judges
“without rhyme and reason” and disbarring
lawyers “without due process.” (Zaldivar v.
Gonzales, G.R. Nos. 79690-707, February 1,
1989);
5. Calling an adverse counsel as “bobo” or using
the word “ay que bobo” in reference to the
manner of offering evidence (Castillo v.
Padilla Jr., A.M. No. 2339, February 1984); and
6. Any other analogous cases.
NOTE: Although the Canon that the Rule
implements pertains to a lawyer’s dealings with
his fellow lawyers, the Rule is generally worded
to apply to anyone in the wider context of a
lawyer’s professional dealings, including his or
her clients and witnesses (CPR Annotated, PhilJA).
Q: A complaint was filed against Atty. Zaide for
use of intemperate, offensive and abusive
language. Atty. Zaide referred to the
complainant as a “notorious extortionist” and
to his opposing counsel as someone suffering
from "serious mental incompetence" in one of
his pleadings. Did the act of Atty. Zaide violate
the Code of Professional Responsibility?
A: YES. More specifically, Canon 8.01 of the CPR.
The act shows Atty. Zaide's lack of restraint in the
use and choice of his words - a conduct
unbecoming of an officer of the court. While a
lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor
and courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the
use of offensive and abusive language. Language
abounds with countless possibilities for one to be
emphatic but respectful, convincing but not
derogatory, and illuminating but not offensive
(Gimeno v. Zaide, A.C. No. 10303, April 22, 2015).
Q: In pleadings and motions filed by Tiongco,
he described Atty. Deguma as a love crazed
Apache, a horned spinster, man-hungry virago
and female bull of an Amazon who would stop
at nothing to injure defendant if only to please
and attract her client. Tiongco claims that
Atty. Deguma, as a lawyer in the PAO, is using
the PAO as a marriage bureau for her benefit.
 DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF A LAWYER
Is the language employed by Tiongco
improper and unethical?
A: YES. The Code of Professional Responsibility
provides in Canon 8 that a lawyer shall conduct
himself with courtesy, fairness, and candor
toward his professional colleagues, and shall
avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
Rule 8.01 provides that a lawyer shall not in his
professional dealings, use language which is
abusive, offensive or otherwise improper while
Rule 11.03 provides that a lawyer shall abstain
from scandalous, offensive or menacing language
before the courts. Thus, Tiongco is warned
accordingly (Tiongco Yared v. Ilarde, G.R. No.
114732, August 1, 2000).
NOTE: Lack of want of intention is no excuse for
the disrespectful language employed. Counsel
cannot escape responsibility by claiming that his
words did not mean what any reader must have
understood them as meaning (Rheem of the
Philippines v. Ferrer, G.R. No. L-22979, January 27,
1967).
Q: In 2009, Atty. Guevarra wrote a series of
posts on his Facebook account, referring to
Belo as a quack doctor, that she bribes
lawyers in the Department of Justice, and that
plastic surgery procedures were done by
doctors without license and training, alleging
such practice nearly killed his client Norcio.
Guevarra also threatened Belo that she will be
convicted for criminal negligence and estafa
for Norcio’s operation. Belo asserted that the
said posts, written in vulgar and obscene
language, were designed to inspire public
hatred, destroy her reputation, and to close
BMGI and all its clinics, as well as to extort the
amount of P200 Million from her as evident
from his demand letter. Atty. Guevarra,
however, claimed that the complaint was filed
in violation of his constitutionally-guaranteed
right to privacy and that he wrote the posts in
the exercise of his freedom of speech. Should
Atty. Guevarra be sanctioned for his acts?
A: YES.Before one can have an expectation of
privacy in his or her online social networking
activity - in this case, Facebook - it is first
necessary that said user manifests the intention
to keep certain posts private, through the
employment of measures to prevent access
thereto or to limit its visibility. Also, the
constitutional right of freedom of expression may
47
not be availed of to broadcast lies or half-truths,
insult others, destroy their name or reputation or
bring them into disrepute. A punctilious scrutiny
of the Facebook remarks complained of disclosed
that they were ostensibly made with malice
tending to insult and tarnish the reputation of
complainant and BMGI. By posting the subject
remarks on Facebook directed at complainant
and BMGI, respondent disregarded the fact that,
as a lawyer, he is bound to observe proper
decorum at all times, be it in his public or private
life. He overlooked the fact that he must behave in
a manner befitting of an officer of the court, that
is, respectful, firm, and decent. Instead, he acted
inappropriately and rudely; he used words
unbecoming of an officer of the law, and
conducted himself in an aggressive way by
hurling insults and maligning complainant's and
BMGI's reputation (Belo-Henares v. Atty.
Guevarra, A.C. No. 11394, December 1, 2016).
RULE 8.02, CANON 8
A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly,
encroach upon the professional employment
of another lawyer; however, it is the right of
any lawyer, without fear or favor, to give
proper advice and assistance to those
seeking relief against unfaithful or
neglectful counsel (1995, 1997, 2001, 2005,
2006 Bar)
A person without a retained lawyer is a legitimate
prospective client for any lawyer whom he
approaches for legal services. But, as soon as he
had retained one and had not dismissed the
retained counsel, efforts on the part of another
lawyer to take him as client constitutes an act of
encroaching upon the employment of another
lawyer.
A lawyer should not in any way communicate
upon the subject of controversy with a party
represented by counsel much less should he
undertake to negotiate or compromise the matter
with him, but should deal with his counsel.
Any act which is aimed to ease out a previous
lawyer with the intention to grab the case is
highly unethical and should be avoided
(Antiquiera, 1992).
Exceptions
1. A lawyer may properly interview any witness
or prospective witness or prospective
witness for the opposing side in any civil or
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
 Legal Ethics
criminal action without the consent of
opposing counsel or party; and
2. Any person who seeks relief against an
unfaithful or neglectful lawyer may approach
another lawyer for proper advice and
assistance. Any advice or assistance extended
after proper verification is not encroaching
upon the business of another lawyer for such
act is justified under the circumstances.
Q: Myrna, in a case for custody of children
against her husband, sought advice from Atty.
Mendoza whom she met at a party. She
informed Atty. Mendoza that her lawyer, Atty.
Khan, has been charging her exorbitant
appearance fees when all he does is move for
postponements which have unduly delayed
the proceedings; and that recently, she
learned that Atty. Khan approached her
husband asking for a huge amount in
exchange for the withdrawal of her Motion for
Issuance of Hold Departure Order so that he
and his children can leave for abroad. Is it
ethical for Atty. Mendoza to advise Myrna to
terminate the services of Atty. Khan and hire
him instead for a reasonable attorney’s fees?
(2006 Bar)
A: Such advice would be unethical. A lawyer shall
conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and
candor towards his professional colleagues.
(Canon 8, CPR) Specifically, he should not directly
or indirectly encroach upon the professional
employment of another lawyer (Canon 8, CPR).
Q: What should Atty. Mendoza do about the
information relayed to him by Myrna that
Atty. Khan approached her husband with an
indecent proposal? (2006 Bar)
A: He can advise her to terminate the services of
Atty. Khan and/or file an administrative case
against Atty. Khan. It is the right of any lawyer,
without fear or favor, to give proper advice and
assistance to those seeking relief against
unfaithful or neglectful counsel (Rule 8.02, CPR).
Q: You are the counsel of K in his action for
specific performance against DEV, Inc., a
subdivision developer which is represented
by Atty. L. Your client believes that the
president of DEV Inc., would be willing to
consider an amicable settlement and your
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
2018 GOLDEN NOTES
48
client urges you to discuss the matter with
DEV Inc., without the presence of Atty. L whom
he consider to be an impediment to an early
compromise. Would it be alright for you to
negotiate the terms of the compromise as so
suggested above by your client? (1997 Bar)
A: NO. Rule 8.02, Canon 8 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility provides that “a
lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach
upon the professional employment of another
lawyer.” Canon 9 of the Code of Professional
Ethics is more particular. “A lawyer should not in
any way communicate upon the subject of the
controversy with a party represented by counsel,
much less should he undertake to negotiate or
compromise the matter with him but should deal
only with his counsel.”
Q: Atty. Manuel is counsel for the defendant in
a civil case pending before the RTC. After
receiving the plaintiff's Pre-Trial Brief
containing the list of witnesses, Atty. Manuel
interviewed some of the witnesses for the
plaintiff without the consent of plaintiff's
counsel. Did Atty. Manuel violate any ethical
standard for lawyers? Explain. (2009 Bar)
A: NO. Canon 39 of the Canons of Professional
Ethics provides that “a lawyer may interview any
witness or prospective witness from the opposing
side in any civil or criminal action without the
consent of opposing counsel or party.” This is
because a witness is supposed to be a neutral
person whose role is to tell the truth when called
upon to testify.
Q: Will your answer be the same if it was the
plaintiff who was interviewed by Atty. Manuel
without the consent of plaintiff's counsel?
Explain. (2009 Bar)
A: NO. Canon 9 of the Canons of Professional
Ethics provides that “a lawyer should not in any
way communicate upon a subject of controversy
with a party represented by counsel, much less
should he undertake to negotiate or compromise
the matter with him, but should deal only with his
counsel.” If he communicates with the adverse
party directly, he will be encroaching into the
employment of the adverse party's lawyer.
 DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF A LAWYER
NO ASSISTANCE IN UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE
OF LAW
CANON 9
A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly,
Unauthorized Practice of Law
assist in the unauthorized practice of law.
Unauthorized practice of law is committed when
a person, not a lawyer, performs acts which are
exclusive to members of the bar. (Pineda, 2009)
REASON: To protect the public, the court, the
client and the bar from the incompetence or
dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law
and not subject to the disciplinary control of the
court.
There is no violation of this canon if a lawyer
employs a paralegal graduate to assist him in the
practice of law since the job of a paralegal is
limited to drafting of documents, case
management, etc (Antiquiera, 1992).
Q: Will a lawyer violate the Code of
Professional Responsibility if he forms a
partnership with professionals of other
disciplines like doctors, engineers, architects
or accountants? (2014 Bar)
A:YES, the Code of Professional Responsibility
prohibits unauthorized practice of law so that
lawyers cannot directly or indirectly assist said
practice, or delegate its practice to one who is not
qualified to do so. In partnership, the act of a
partner is the act of the partnership; hence, a
non-lawyer cannot perform an act that has a legal
effect and in the name of the partnership.
Q: Sanchez alleged that the complaint against
him and the supporting affidavits were
subscribed and sworn to before Tupas, the
Clerk of Court, who is not a member of the IBP
and therefore engaged in unauthorized
practice of law. Is Tupas as Clerk of Court
authorized to administer oath?
A: YES. The term "clerk of courts" in Section 41 of
the Administrative Code as amended is used as a
general term. The intention of the law is to
authorize all clerks of court regardless of whether
they are clerks of the MTCs, to administer oaths
on matter involving official business. As Clerk of
Court of MCTC, Tupas has the authority to
administer oath of affidavits of parties and
49
witnesses which are to be filed in court (Sanchez
v. Tupas, A.M. OCA IPI No. 03- 1687-P, March 1,
2004).
Q: The Supreme Court suspended indefinitely
Atty. Fernandez from the practice of law for
gross immorality. He asked the MCTC Judge of
his town if he can be appointed counsel de
officio for Tony, a childhood friend who is
accused of theft. The judge refused because
Atty. Fernandez's name appears in the SC's list
of suspended lawyers. Atty. Fernandez then
inquired if he can appear as a friend for Tony
to defend him. xxx Supposing Tony is a
defendant in a civil case for collection of sum
of money before the same court, can Atty.
Fernandez appear for him to conduct his
litigation? (2006 Bar)
A: Even if Tony is a defendant in a civil case, Atty.
Fernandez cannot be allowed to appear for him to
conduct his litigation; otherwise, the judge will be
violating Canon 9 of the CPR which provides that
a “lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in
the unauthorized practice of law.”
RULE 9.01, CANON 9
A lawyer shall not delegate to any
unqualified person the performance of any
task which by law may only be performed by
a member of the bar in good standing.
The qualifications to be a lawyer are personal and
the Bar is an exclusive group of professionals who
possess the requisite qualifications and for whom
defined functions are reserved. To delegate the
functions would violate the rationale behind
reserving defined functions exclusively for those
who are admitted to the bar.
Although the authority of a lawyer to represent a
client cannot be delegated to an unqualified
person, it does not follow however that the
retained lawyer is automatically authorized to
make such delegation to a qualified person
because a client-lawyer relationship is personal
(CPR Annotated, PhilJA).
Q: Lorenzo is a lawyer but was suspended
from the practice of law due to some unethical
acts. He worked for a law firm owned by one
of his friends. Since he has so many cases to
handle, Atty. Berenguer assigned a case to
Lorenzo, believing he can handle an easy case.
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
 Legal Ethics
Did Atty. Berenguer violate any rule?
A: YES, because he delegated the handling of a
case to a person suspended from the practice of
law. Under Rule 9.01 of CPR – A lawyer shall not
delegate to any unqualified person the
performance of any task which by law may only
be performed by a member of the bar in good
standing.
Q: Atty. Monica Santos-Cruz registered the
firm name "Santos-Cruz Law Office" with the
DTI as a single proprietorship. In her
stationery, she printed the names of her
husband and a friend who are both non-
lawyers as her senior partners in light of their
investments in the firm. She allowed her
husband to give out calling cards bearing his
name as senior partner of the firm and to
appear in courts to move for postponements,
Did Atty. Santos-Cruz violate the CPR? (2010
Bar)
A: YES, she violated Rule 9.01, Canon 9 of the
CPR. By allowing her husband to appear in courts
to move for the postponements of the cases of the
firm, she delegated her duty to appear, which a
member of the bar can only perform, to an
unqualified person.
The lawyer’s duty to prevent, or at the very least
not to assist in, the unauthorized practice of law
is founded on public interest and policy. Public
policy requires that the practice of law be limited
to those individuals found duly qualified in
education and character. The permissive right
conferred on the lawyer is an individual and
limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails
to maintain proper standards of moral and
professional conduct (Cambaliza v. Cristal-
Tenorio, A.C. No. 6290, July 14, 2004).
RULE 9.02, CANON 9
A lawyer shall not divide or stipulate to
divide a fee for legal services with persons
not licensed to practice law.
The interest promoted by the prohibition is that
the independence of the professional judgment of
a lawyer, which the client is paying for, could be
at risk if a non-lawyer has direct rights to share in
the legal fees resulting from the exercise of such
professional judgment. (CPR Annotated, PhilJA)
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
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50
Exceptions to Rule 9.02
1. Where there is a pre-existing agreement with
a partner or associate that, upon the latter’s
death, money shall be paid over a reasonable
period of time to his estate to persons
specified in the agreement (Rule 9.02, second
par., Canon 9, CPR); or
NOTE: This exception is in the nature of a
bequest. It is still in substance, payment to the
deceased lawyer. His estate and/or assignee
could not claim entitlement to the money in
their own right but only by representation
(CPR Annotated, PhilJA).
2. Where a lawyer undertakes to complete
unfinished legal business of a deceased
lawyer (Rule 9.02, third par., Canon 9, CPR); or
NOTE: The estate or the heir cannot be made
a member of the partnership with the
surviving partners. The legal fees in this case,
no longer represent past compensation.
3. Where a lawyer or law firm includes a non-
lawyer employee in a retirement plan, even if
the plan is based in whole or in part, on a
profit sharing agreement (Rule 9.02, fourth
par., Canon 9, CPR).
NOTE: This is not a division of legal fees but a
pension representing deferred wages for the
employees’ past services.
This exception is an implicit recognition of
the incontestable fact that lawyers need to,
and in fact, depend on non-lawyers for the
administrative support functions necessary
to allow lawyers to discharge their legal
functions more efficiently (CPR Annotated,
PhilJA).
Q: Engr. Rufino referred a case for partition of
the estate of the late Benjamin Yap to Atty.
Pefianco. It was agreed in writing that Rufino
would receive ten percent of the attorney’s
fees to be received by Atty. Pefianco. However,
when the fees were already paid, Pefianco
refused to pay, stating in a letter that the
spouses will be the one to shoulder his
commission. Rufino filed a disbarment case
against Pefianco. Should Atty. Pefianco be
disciplined?
 DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF A LAWYER
A: YES, it is clear that Atty. Pefianco violated Rule
9.02, Canon 9. By stipulating that Rufino will be
entitled to a commission from his attorney’s fees,
Atty. Pefianco entered into an agreement to
divide the fee with a person not licensed to
practice law.
Q: You had just taken your oath as lawyer. The
secretary to the president of a big university
offered to get you as the official notary public
of the school. She explained that a lot of
students lose their identification cards and
are required to secure an affidavit of loss
before they can be issued a new one. She
claimed that this would be very lucrative for
you, as more than 30 students lose their
identification cards every month. However,
the secretary wants you to give her one-half of
your earning therefrom. Will you agree to the
arrangement? Explain. (2005 Bar)
A: NO, I will not agree. Rule 9.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility provides that “a
lawyer shall not divide or stipulate to divide a fee
for legal service with persons not licensed to
practice law”. The secretary is not licensed to
practice law and is not entitled to a share of the
fees for notarizing affidavits, which is a legal
service.
DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF A LAWYER
TO THE COURTS
CANDOR, FAIRNESS & GOOD FAITH TO THE
COURTS
CANON 10
A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good
faith to the court
The burden cast on the judiciary would be
intolerable if it could not take at face value what
is asserted by counsel.
As officers of the court, lawyers have the primary
obligation towards the administration of justice.
To mislead the court is contumacious and clearly
a ground for disciplinary action (Antiquiera, CPR).
Requirements of candor
1. A lawyer shall not suppress material and vital
facts which bear on the merit or lack of merit
of a complaint or petition;
51
2. A lawyer shall volunteer to the court any
development of the case which has rendered
the issue raised moot and academic;
3. Disclosure to the court of any decision
adverse to his position of which opposing
counsel is apparently ignorant and which
court should consider in deciding a case; and
4. He shall not represent himself as a lawyer for
a client, appear in court and present
pleadings in the latter’s behalf only to claim
later that he was not authorized to do so.
Q: Atty. Florido demanded from his wife that
the custody of their children be surrendered
to him. He showed her a photocopy of an
alleged Resolution issued by the CA
supposedly granting his motion for temporary
child custody. His wife refused. Atty. Florido
filed a verified petition for the issuance of a
writ of habeas corpus asserting his right to
custody of the children on the basis of the
alleged CA Resolution. His wife, however,
obtained a certification from the CA stating
that no such resolution had been issued. May
Atty. Florido be held administratively liable
for his reliance on and attempt to enforce a
spurious Resolution of the CA?
A: YES. Atty. Florido’s actions erode the public
perception of the legal profession. Candor and
fairness are demanded of every lawyer. The
burden cast on the judiciary would be intolerable
if it could not take at face value what is asserted
by counsel. The time that will have to be devoted
just to the task of verification of allegations
submitted could easily be imagined (Hueysuwan-
Florido v. Atty. Florido, A.C. No. 5624, January 20,
2004).
RULE 10.01, CANON 10
A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor
consent to the doing of any in court; nor
shall he mislead, or allow the court to be
misled by any artifice.
A lawyer must be a disciple of truth. He should
bear in mind that as an officer of the court his
high vocation is to correctly inform the court
upon the law and the facts of the case and to aid it
in doing justice and arriving at a correct
conclusion.
The courts on the other hand are entitled to
expect only complete honesty from lawyers
appearing and pleading before them. While a
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
 Legal Ethics
lawyer has the solemn duty to defend his client’s
cause, his conduct must never be at the expense
of truth (Young v. Batuegas, A.C. No. 5379, May 9,
2003).
NOTE: A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his
client but not at the expense of truth and the
administration of justice (Garcia v. Francisco,
Adm. Case no. 3923, March 30, 1993).
Presenting false evidence is not justifiable.Itis a
clear violation of Canon 10 and Rule 10.01 of the
CPR.Aside from violations of the CPR, the lawyer
is also guilty of a crime under Art. 184, Revised
Penal Code, which states:
"Any person who shall knowingly offer in
evidence a false witness or testimony in any
judicial or official proceeding, shall be punished
as guilty of false testimony and shall suffer the
respective penalties provided in this section.”
Examples of falsehood
1. Lawyers falsely stating in a deed of sale that
property is free from all liens and
encumbrances when it is not so (Sevilla v.
Zoleta, A.C. No. 31, March 28, 1955);
2. Lawyers making it appear that a person,
long dead, executed a deed of sale in his
favor (Monterey v. Arayata, Per. Rec. Nos
3527, 3408, August 23, 1935);
3. Lawyer encashing a check payable to a
deceased cousin by signing the latter’s name
on the check (In re: Samaniego, A.C. No. 74,
November 20, 1959);
4. Lawyer falsified a power of attorney and
used it in collecting the money due to the
principal and appropriated the money for
his own benefit (In re: Rusina, A.C. No. 270,
May 29, 1959);
5. Lawyer alleging in one pleading that his
clients were merely lessees of the property
involved, and alleged in a later pleading that
the same clients were the owners of the
same property where there are false
allegations in the pleadings (Chavez v. Viola,
G.R. No. 2152, April 19, 1991);
6. Lawyer uttering falsehood in a Motion to
Dismiss. (Martin v. Moreno, A.C. No. 1432,
May 21, 1984);
7. Lawyer denying having received the notice
to file brief which is belied by the return
card (Ragasajo v. IAC, G.R. No. L-69129,
August 31, 1987);
8. Lawyer presenting falsified documents in
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
2018 GOLDEN NOTES
52
court which he knows to be false (Berenguer
v. Carranza, A.C. No. 716, January 30, 1969);
9. Lawyer filing false charges or groundless
suits (Retuya v. Gorduiz, A.C. No. 1388, March
28, 1980); and
10. Making untruthful and false statements
before the court (Molina v. Magat, A.C. No.
1900, June 13, 2012).
Q: Dr. Maligaya, a doctor and retired colonel of
the Air Force filed an action for damages
against several military officers for whom
Atty. Doronilla stood as a counsel. During the
hearing, Atty. Doronilla alleged that he and Dr.
Maligaya had an agreement that if the
opposing party withdraws the case against
him, Dr. Maligaya will also withdraw all the
cases. However, Dr. Maligaya swore that he
never entered into any such agreement. Atty.
Doronilla then admitted that there was no
such agreement. He pointed out that his main
concern was to settle the case amicably. Dr.
Maligaya filed a case against Atty. Doronilla
charging him with unethical conduct for
having uttered falsehood in court. Is Atty.
Doronilla guilty as charged?
A: YES. Atty. Doronilla violated Canon 10 and
Rule 10.01 of the CPR. Not only that, he also
violated the lawyer’s oath to do no falsehood, nor
consent to the doing of any in court, of which
Canon 10 and Rule 10.01 are but restatements.
His act infringed on every lawyer’s duty to “never
seek to mislead the judge or any officer by an
artifice or false statement of fact or law”.
(Maligaya v. Doronilla, A.C. No. 6198, September
15, 2006)
Q: De Jesus (complainant) alleged that Atty.
Sanchez-Malit (respondent) drafted and
notarized a Real Estate Mortgage of a public
market stall that falsely named the former as
its absolute and registered owner despite the
latter being the consultant of the local
government unit, and was therefore aware
that the market stall was government-
owned.Prior thereto, Atty. Sanchez-Malit also
notarized two contracts that caused De Jesus
legal and financial problems. One contract
was a lease agreement that was notarized
without the signature of the lessees. The other
contract was a sale agreement which Atty.
Sanchez-Malit also drafted and notarized, but
did not advise De Jesus that the property was
 DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF A LAWYER
still covered by the period within which it
could not be alienated.Did Atty. Sanchez-Malit
violate Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility?
A: YES. In this case, respondent fully knew that
complainant was not the owner of the mortgaged
market stall. That complainant comprehended
the provisions of the real estate mortgage
contract does not make respondent any less
guilty. If at all, it only heightens the latter’s
liability for tolerating a wrongful act. A notary
public should not notarize a document unless the
persons who signed it are the very same ones
who executed it and who personally appeared
before the said notary public to attest to the
contents and truth of what are stated therein.
Thus, in acknowledging that the parties
personally came and appeared before her,
respondent also violated Rule 10.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility and her oath as a
lawyer that she shall do no falsehood (De Jesus v.
Sanchez-Malit, A.C. No. 6470, July 08, 2014).
RULE 10.02, CANON 10
A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or
misrepresent the contents of the paper, the
language or the argument of opposing
counsel, or the text of a decision or authority,
or knowingly cite as law a provision already
rendered inoperative by repeal or
amendment, or assert as a fact that which has
not been proved.
If not faithfully and exactly quoted, the decisions
and rulings of the court may lose their proper and
correct meaning, to the detriment of other courts,
lawyers and the public who may thereby be
misled.
RULE 10.03, CANON 10
A lawyer shall observe the rules of
procedure and shall not misuse them to
defeat the ends of justice.
Filing multiple actions constitutes an abuse of the
Court’s processes. Those who filed multiple or
repetitive actions subject themselves to
disciplinary action for incompetence or willful
violation of their duties as attorneys to act with
all good fidelity to the courts, and to maintain
only such actions that appear to be just and
consistent with truth and honor (Pablo R. Olivares
etc. v. Atty. Arsenio Villalon Jr., A.C. No. 6323, April
13, 2007).
53
Instances when lawyers can be disciplined
based on the pleadings they filed
When a counsel deliberately:
1. Files an unsigned pleading in violation of
the rules;
2. Alleges scandalous matters therein; or
3. Fails to promptly report to the court a
change of his address (Sec. 3, Rule 7, RRC).
NOTE: A lawyer should not abuse his right of
recourse to the courts for the purpose of arguing
a cause that had been repeatedly rebuffed.
Neither should he use his knowledge of law as an
instrument to harass a party nor to misuse
judicial processes, as the same constitutes serious
transgression of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. For while he owes fidelity to the
cause of his client, it should not be at the expense
of truth and the administration of justice (Garcia
v. Francisco, A.C. No. 3923, March 30, 1993).
---
RULE 10.04, CANON 10
A lawyer shall, when filing a pleading,
furnish the opposing party with a copy
thereof, together with all the documents
annexed thereto. Unless a motion is ex
parte, he should set it for hearing, with
sufficient notice to the other party.
RESPECT FOR COURTS AND JUDICIAL
OFFICERS
CANON 11
A lawyer shall observe and maintain the
respect due to the courts and to judicial
officers and should insist on similar conduct
by others.
Disrespect toward the court would necessarily
undermine the confidence of the people in the
honesty and integrity of the members of the
court, and consequently, to lower or degrade the
administration of justice by the court.
All lawyers are expected to recognize the
authority of the Supreme Court and obey its
lawful processes and orders. Despite errors
which one may impute on the orders of the Court,
these must be respected, especially by the bar or
the lawyers who are themselves officers of the
courts (Yap-Paras v. Atty. Paras, A.C. No. 4947,
June 7, 2007).
In case of conflict between his duty to the court
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
 Legal Ethics
and his duty to the society and his client, the
other must yield since it is his duty to the court
that should take precedence.
NOTE: The fact that a person is a lawyer does not
deprive him of the right, as enjoyed by every
citizen, to comment on and criticize the
actuations of a judge but it is the cardinal
condition of all criticisms that it shall be bona fide,
and shall not spill over the walls of decency and
propriety (Zaldivar v. Gonzales, G.R. Nos. 79690-
707, February 1, 1989).
What a lawyer can ordinarily say against a
concluded litigation and the manner the judge
handed down the decision therein may not
generally be said to a pending action. The court,
in a pending litigation, must be shielded from
embarrassment and influence in performing the
important duty of deciding it. On the other hand,
once litigation is concluded, the judge who
decided on it is subject to the same criticism as
any other public official because then his ruling
becomes public property and is thrown open to
public consumption.
Q: Atty. Paguia asserts that the inhibition of
the members of the SC from hearing the
petition is called for under the Code of Judicial
Conduct prohibiting justices or judges from
participating in any partisan political activity.
According to him, the justices violated the said
rule by attending the 'EDSA 2 Rally' and by
authorizing the assumption of Vice- President
Macapagal-Arroyo to the Presidency. The
subsequent decision of the Court in Estrada v.
Arroyo (G.R. Nos. 146710-15, March 2, 2001
and G.R. Nos. 146710-15, April 3, 2001) is a
patent mockery of justice and due process. He
went on to state that the act of the public
officer, if lawful, is the act of the public office.
But the act of the public officer, if unlawful, is
not the act of the public office. Consequently,
the act of the justices, if lawful, is the act of the
Supreme Court. But the act of the justices, if
unlawful, is not the act of the Supreme Court.
Further, he asserted that the decision in
Estrada v. Arroyo being patently unlawful in
view of the Code of Judicial Conduct, is not the
act of the SC but is merely the wrong of those
individual Justices who falsely spoke and
acted in the name of the SC. Are Atty. Paguia’s
comments within the bounds of “fair and well-
founded criticisms” regarding decisions of the
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
2018 GOLDEN NOTES
54
SC?
A: NO. Criticism or comment made in good faith
on the correctness or wrongness, soundness or
unsoundness, of a decision of the Court would be
welcome for, if well-founded, and such reaction
can enlighten the court and contribute to the
correction of an error if committed (In re: Sotto,
82 Phil. 595). Attorney Paguia has not limited his
discussions to the merits of his client's case
within the judicial forum; indeed, he has repeated
his assault on the Court in both broadcast and
print media.
The Supreme Court does not claim infallibility; it
will not denounce criticism made by anyone
against the Court for, if well-founded, can truly
have constructive effects in the task of the Court,
but it will not countenance any wrongdoing nor
allow the erosion of our people’s faith in the
judicial system, let alone, by those who have been
privileged by it to practice law in the Philippines.
Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility mandates that the lawyer should
observe and maintain the respect due to the
courts and judicial officers and, indeed, should
insist on similar conduct by others. In liberally
imputing sinister and devious motives and
questioning the impartiality, integrity, and
authority of the members of the Court, Atty.
Paguia has only succeeded in seeking to impede,
obstruct and pervert the dispensation of justice
(Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 159486-88,
November 25, 2003).
Q: Members of the faculty of the UP College of
Law published a statement on the allegations
of plagiarism and misrepresentation relative
to the Court’s decision in Vinuya v. Executive
Secretary. The authors directly accused the
Court of perpetrating extraordinary injustice
by dismissing the petition of the comfort
women in said case. The insult to the
members of the Court was aggravated by
imputations of deliberately delaying the
resolution of the case, its dismissal on the
basis of “polluted sources,” the Court’s alleged
indifference to the cause of petitioners, as
well as the supposed alarming lack of concern
of the members of the Court for even the most
basic values of decency and respect. Was the
criticism proper?
A: NO. While most agree that the right to criticize
the judiciary is critical to maintaining a free and
 DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF A LAWYER
democratic society, there is also a general
consensus that healthy criticism only goes so far.
Many types of criticism leveled at the judiciary
cross the line to become harmful and
irresponsible attacks. These potentially
devastating attacks and unjust criticism can
threaten the independence of the judiciary. The
court must “insist on being permitted to proceed
to the disposition of its business in an orderly
manner, free from outside interference
obstructive of its functions and tending to
embarrass the administration of justice.”
This runs contrary to their obligation as law
professors and officers of the Court to be the first
to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court,
to which they owe fidelity according to the oath
they have taken as attorneys, and not to promote
distrust in the administration of justice. Their
actions likewise constitute violations of Canons
10, 11, and 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility (Re: Letter
of the UP Law Faculty entitled “Restoring Integrity:
A Statement by the Faculty of the University of the
Philippines College of Law on the Allegations of
Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in the Supreme
Court”, A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC, October 19, 2010).
Q: The Court En Banc issued a Resolution
directing respondent Atty. De Vera to explain
why he should not be cited for indirect
contempt of court for uttering allegedly
contemptuous statements in relation to the
then pending case involving the
constitutionality of the Plunder Law. Atty. De
Vera admitted the report in the November 6,
2002 issue of the Philippine Daily Inquirer
where he “suggested that the Court must take
steps to dispel once and for all these ugly
rumors and reports” that “the Court would
vote in favor of or against the validity of the
Plunder Law to protect the credibility of the
Court”. Is the statement of Atty. De Vera
disrespectful to the courts?
A: YES. Indeed, freedom of speech includes the
right to know and discuss judicial proceedings,
but such right does not cover statements aimed at
undermining the Court’s integrity and authority,
and interfering with the administration of justice.
Freedom of speech is not absolute, and must
occasionally be balanced with the requirements
of equally important public interests, such as the
maintenance of the integrity of the courts and
orderly functioning of the administration of
justice.
55
Thus, the making of contemptuous statements
directed against the Court is not an exercise of
free speech; rather, it is an abuse of such right.
Unwarranted attacks on the dignity of the courts
cannot be disguised as free speech, for the
exercise of said right cannot be used to impair the
independence and efficiency of courts or public
respect therefore and confidence therein (In Re:
Published Alleged Threats by Atty. Leonard de
Vera, A.M. No. 01-12-03-SC, July 29, 2002).
Q: Jimmy and his siblings filed a case for
disciplinary action against Atty. Cefra for
notarizing a falsified Deed of Absolute Sale
over a parcel of land, where their signatures
were forged. The Supreme Court required him
to comment on the administrative complaint.
However, Atty. Cefra did not comply with the
Court’s order. His continued refusal to file his
Comment caused the court to order his arrest
and commitment. Is Atty. Cefra guilty of
violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility in ignoring the court’s order
directing him to comment on the complaint
against him?
A: YES. The act of disobeying a court order
constitutes violation of Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which requires a
lawyer to “observe and maintain the respect due
to the courts[.]” He contumaciously delayed
compliance with this court’s order to file a
Comment. Atty. Cefra did not comply with this
order until he was arrested by the National
Bureau of Investigation. Atty. Cefra only filed his
Comment, more than seven years after the
Court’s order. Atty. Cefra’s actions show utter
disrespect for legal processes (Anudon v. Cefra,
A.C. No. 5482, February 10, 2015).
RULE 11.01, CANON 11
A lawyer shall appear in court properly
attired.
As an officer of the court and in order to maintain
the dignity and respectability of the legal
profession, a lawyer who appears in court must
be properly attired. Consequently, the court can
hold a lawyer in contempt of court if he does not
appear in proper attire. Any deviation from the
commonly accepted norm of dressing in court
(barong or tie, not both) is enough to warrant a
citing for contempt.
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
 Legal Ethics
The traditional attires for male lawyers in the
Philippines are the long-sleeve Barong Tagalog or
coat and tie. Female lawyers appear in semi-
formal attires. Judges also appear in the same
attire in addition to black robes.
Q:Atty. Jesus Falcis appeared in a preliminary
conference before the Supreme Court wearing
a casual jacket, cropped jeans, and loafers
without socks. Did Atty. Falcis commit any
ethical impropriety?
A: YES. Atty. Falcis is reminded of the
requirement under Canon 11 of the CPR for
lawyers to “observe and maintain the respect due
to the Courts and to judicial officers and to insist
on similar conduct by others.” This duty
encompasses appearances before courts in
proper attire. This Court does not insist on
sartorial pomposity. It does not prescribe
immutable minutiae for physical appearance.
Still, professional courtesy demands that persons,
especially lawyers, having business before courts,
act with discretion and manifest this discretion in
their choice of apparel. (Jesus Falcis III vs. Civil
Registrar General, G.R. No. 217910, July 3, 2018).
RULE 11.02, CANON 11
A lawyer shall punctually appear at court
hearings.
Punctuality is demanded by the respect which a
lawyer owes to the court, the opposing counsel
and to all the parties to the case (Funa, 2009).
RULE 11.03, CANON 11
A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous,
offensive, or menacing language or
behavior before the Courts.
Q: After the parties had filed their respective
briefs with the CA and before the latter's
resolution submitting the case for decision
was released, respondent lawyers, Atty.
Depasucat, and others filed a pleading
"Manifestation of Usurpation of Authority of
the Hon. Court of Appeals from a Self-
Confessed Briber of Judges", which stated that
plaintiff-appellant Uy had, in fact, confessed to
bribing judges. Consequently, Uy filed a
verified complaint against respondent
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
2018 GOLDEN NOTES
56
lawyers for gross misconduct. Should they be
disciplined for having authored and filed the
“Manifestation of Usurpation of Authority of
the Hon. Court of Appeals from a Self-
Confessed Briber of Judges”?
A: YES. The lawyers went overboard by stating in
the Manifestation that complainant "had in fact
confessed to bribery and telling one of the judges,
after the judges allegedly refused to give in to
their demands, by using illegally taped
conversations-both actual and/or by telephone".
It belied their good intention and exceeded the
bounds of propriety, hence, not arguably
protected; it is the surfacing of a feeling of
contempt towards a litigant; it offends the court
before which it is made. A lawyer shall abstain
from scandalous, offensive or menacing language
or behavior before the courts. It must be
remembered that the language vehicle does not
run short of expressions which are emphatic but
respectful, convincing but not derogatory,
illuminating but not offensive. It has been said
that a lawyer's language should be dignified in
keeping with the dignity of the legal profession. It
is the duty of Atty. Depasucat et al. as members of
the Bar to abstain from all offensive personality
and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or
reputation of a party or witness, unless required
by the justice of the cause with which he is
charged (Uy v. Depasucat, A.C. No. 5332, July 29,
2003).
NOTE: The language of a lawyer, both oral and
written, must be respectful and restrained in
keeping with the dignity of the legal profession
and with his behavioral attitude toward his
brethren in the profession. The use of abusive
language by counsel against the opposing counsel
constitutes at the same time disrespect to the
dignity of the court justice. Moreover, the use of
impassioned language in pleadings, more often
than not, creates more heat than light.
(Buenaseda v. Flavier, G.R. No. 106719, September
21, 1993)
The duty to observe and maintain respect is not a
one-way duty from a lawyer to a judge. A judge
should also be courteous to counsel, especially
those who are young and inexperienced and to all
those appearing or concerned in the
administration of justice.
Q: An administrative case for disbarment was
filed against MDS, a Lady Senator, for uttering
 DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF A LAWYER
offensive remarks in her privilege speech
delivered in the Senate floor. She was quoted
as saying that she wanted “to spit on the face
of Chief Justice and his cohorts in the Supreme
Court,” and calling the Court a “Supreme Court
of idiots.” She alleged that it was considered
as part of her parliamentary immunity as such
was done during the session. Is she correct?
A: YES. Her statements, being part of her
privilege speech as a member of Congress, were
covered by the constitutional provision on
parliamentary immunity. Her privilege speech is
not actionable criminally or in a disciplinary
proceeding under the Rules of Court. However, as
a member of the Bar, the Court wishes to express
its deep concern about the language Senator MDS
used in her speech and its effect on the
administration of justice. To the Court, the lady
senator has undoubtedly crossed the limits of
decency and good professional conduct.
No lawyer who has taken an oath to maintain the
respect due to the courts should be allowed to
erode the people’s faith in the judiciary. In this
case, the lady senator clearly violated Canon 8,
Rule 8.01 and Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (Pobre v. Senator
Santiago, A.C. No. 7399, August 25, 2009).
RULE 11.04, CANON 11
A lawyer shall not attribute to a judge
motives not supported by the record or have
no materiality to the case.
Every citizen has the right to comment upon and
criticize the actuations of public officers. This
right is not dismissed by the fact that the criticism
is aimed at a judicial authority, or that it is
articulated by a lawyer.
Such right is especially recognized where the
criticism concerns a concluded litigation, because
the Court’s actuations are thrown open to public
consumption. Courts thus treat with forbearance
and restraint a lawyer who vigorously assails
their actuations for courageous and fearless
advocates are the strands that weave durability
into the tapestry of justice.
Post litigation utterances or publications made by
lawyers, critical of the courts and their judicial
actuations, whether amounting to a crime or not,
which transcend the permissible bounds of fair
comment and legitimate criticism and thereby
tend to bring them into dispute or to subvert
57
public confidence in their integrity and in the
orderly administration of justice,constitute grave
professional misconduct which may be visited
with disbarment or other lesser appropriate
disciplinary sanctions by the SC in the exercise of
the prerogatives inherent in it as the duly
constituted guardian of the morals and ethics of
the legal fraternity (In Re: Almacen, G.R. No. L-
27654, February 18, 1970).
Q: Atty. Romeo Roxas was charged with
indirect contempt. In a letter addressed to
Associate Justice Chico-Nazario, he wrote that
Justice Nazario decided the cases in favor of
Zuzuarregui, ordering Attys. Roxas and Pastor
to pay the former on considerations other
than the pure merits of the case and called the
SC a “dispenser of injustice." He ended
his letter by mocking her when he said “sleep
well if you still can” and that “her earthly life
will be judged by the Supreme Dispenser of
Justice where only the merits of your Honor’s
life will be relevant and material and where
technicalities can shield no one from his
or her wrongdoings."
In the written explanation of Atty. Roxas, he
extended apologies to Justice Nazario. He said
he was merely exercising his rights to express
a legitimate grievance or articulate fair
criticisms of the court’s ruling. Moreover,
according to him, instead of resorting to
public criticisms, he chose to ventilate his
criticisms in a very discreet and private
manner by writing a personal letter. Should
Atty. Roxas be punished for the contents of his
letter?
A: YES. Atty. Roxas’ letter contains defamatory
statements that impaired public confidence in the
integrity of the Judiciary. The making of
contemptuous statements directed against the
court is not an exercise of free speech; rather, it is
an abuse of such right.
A letter furnished to all the members of the SC,
even if a copy was not disseminated to the media,
does not enjoy the mantle of right to privacy.
Letters addressed to the individual justices in
connection with the performance of their judicial
functions become part of the judicial record and
are matter of concern for the entire court.
Atty. Roxas is guilty of indirect contempt of court
for an improper conduct tending, directly and
indirectly, to impede, obstruct or degrade the
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
 Legal Ethics
administration of justice; and with his
contemptuous and defamatory statements, Atty.
Roxas likewise violated Canon 11 of the CPR
particularly Rules 11.03 and 11.04 (Roxas v.
Zuzuarregui, et al., G.R. No. 152072, July 12, 2007).
Q: When is public comment and criticism of a
court decision permissible and when would it
be improper? (1997 Bar)
A: A lawyer, like every citizen, enjoys the right to
comment on and criticize the decision of a court.
As an officer of the court, a lawyer is expected not
only to exercise that right but also to consider it
his duty to expose the shortcomings and
indiscretions of courts and judges. But such right
is subject to the limitations that it shall be bona
fide. It is proper to criticize the courts and judges,
but it is improper to subject them to abuse and
slander, degrade them or destroy public
confidence in them. Moreover, a lawyer shall not
attribute to a judge motives not supported by the
record or have no materiality in the case (Rule
11.04, CPR).
NOTE: A lawyer should be reminded of his
primary duty to assist the court in the
administration of justice. The relations between
counsel and judge should be based on mutual
respect and on a deep appreciation by one of the
duties of the other. It is upon their cordial
relationship and mutual cooperation that the
hope of our people for speedy and efficient justice
rests (Abiera v. Maceda, A.C. No. RTJ-91-660, June
30, 1994).
If the court official or employee or a lawyer is to
be disciplined, the evidence against him should be
substantial, competent and derived from direct
knowledge, not on mere allegations, conjectures,
suppositions or on the basis of hearsay (Cervantes
v. Atty. Sabio, A.C. No. 7828, August 11, 2008).
RULE 11.05, CANON 11
A lawyer shall submit grievances against a
Judge to the proper authorities only.
Proper venue/forum for the filing of the
following cases
NATURE OF THE WHERE TO FILE
CASE
If administrative in It shall be filed with
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
2018 GOLDEN NOTES
58
nature the Office of the Court
Administrator of the
Supreme Court.
If criminal and not It shall be filed with
purely administrative the Office of the
Ombudsman, also with
the Office of the City
Prosecutor (OCP).
If it involves a JusticeIt must be coursed
of the Supreme Court through the House of
based on impeachable Representative and the
offenses Senate in accordance
with the rules on
impeachment.
Source:(CPR Annotated, PhilJA)
NOTE: An administrative complaint is not an
appropriate remedy where judicial recourse is
still available, such as a motion for
reconsideration, an appeal, or a petition for
certiorari, unless the assailed order or decision is
tainted with fraud, malice, or dishonesty
(Santiago III v. Justice Enriquez, Jr., A.M. No. CA-09-
47-J, February 13, 2009).
ASSISTANCE IN THE SPEEDY AND EFFICIENT
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
CANON 12
A lawyer shall exert every effort and
consider it his duty to assist in the speedy
and efficient administration of justice.
A lawyer is bound by his oath to serve his client
with utmost zeal and dedication and shall
conduct himself according to the best of his
knowledge and discretion (Antiquiera, CPR).
The filing of another action concerning the same
subject matter, in violation of the doctrine of res
judicata, runs contrary to this Canon (Lim v.
Montano, A.C. No. 5653, February 27, 2006).
Q: Jardin engaged the services of Atty. Villar
Jr. to represent him in a collection case.
Despite several extensions of time given by
the trial court, Atty. Villar Jr. failed to file his
formal offer of exhibits and did not give an
explanation of his inaction. The case was
dismissed and this prompted Jardin to file a
complaint for disbarment against Atty. Villar,
Jr. Was Atty. Villar, Jr. remiss in his duties as
 DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF A LAWYER
counsel when he failed to file his formal offer
of exhibits?
A: YES. The record clearly shows that Atty. Villar
Jr. has been languid in the performance of his
duties as counsel for the complainant. He was
given by the Trial Court several extensions of
time. Evidently, Atty. Villar Jr. has fallen short of
the competence and diligence required of every
member of the Bar. He committed a serious
transgression when he failed to exert his utmost
learning and ability and to give entire devotion to
his client's cause. His client had relied on him to
file the formal offer of exhibits among other
things. But he failed him. Resulting as it did in the
dismissal of the case, his failure constitutes
inexcusable fault (Jardin v. Atty. Villar, Jr., A.C. No.
5474, August 28, 2003).
Q: Judgment was rendered against Eternal
Gardens ordering it to reconvey the cemetery
to the rightful owners. Despite the final
decision of the SC, Eternal Gardens was able to
prevent the execution for 17 years, rendering
the judgment ineffectual. They filed several
petitions and motions for reconsideration
with the trial court and the CA despite the fact
that it would never prosper as the trial court’s
decision had long become final before the said
petitions were filed. Did the lawyers violate
Canon 12 of the CPR?
A: YES. While lawyers owe their entire devotion
to the interest of the client and zeal in the defense
of their client’s right, they are also officers of the
court, bound to exert every effort to assist in the
speedy and efficient administration of
justice.They should not misuse the rules of
procedure to defeat the ends of justice or unduly
delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment
or misuse court processes. The facts and the law
should advise them that a case such as this should
not be permitted to be filed to merely clutter the
already congested judicial dockets. They do not
advance the cause of law or their clients by
commencing litigations that for sheer lack of
merit do not deserve the attention of the courts
(Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corporation v. CA,
G.R. No. 123698, August 5, 1998).
Q: Felipe filed an administrative case against
Atty. Macapagal for dishonesty. The Court
required Atty. Macapagal to submit his
Comment thereon. Atty. Macapagal then
requested for an extension of time to submit
59
his comment because of his numerous
professional commitments. The Court granted
his request but despite the lapse of the
extended period he failed to file his comment.
Moreover, he failed to appear during the
scheduled hearings nor submit his position
paper. Should Atty. Macapagal be held
administratively liable?
A: YES. Canon 12 of CPR provides that a lawyer
shall exert every effort and consider his duty to
assist in the speedy and efficient administration
of Justice. Atty. Macapagal’s unjustified disregard
of the lawful orders of this Court and the IBP is
not only irresponsible, but also constitutes utter
disrespect for the judiciary and his fellow
lawyers. His conduct is unbecoming of a lawyer,
for lawyers are particularly called upon to obey
court orders and processes and are expected to
stand foremost in complying with court directives
being themselves officers of the court. As an
officer of the court, Atty. Macapagal is expected to
know that a resolution of this Court is not a mere
request but an order which should be complied
with promptly and completely (Felipe v. Atty.
Macapagal, A.C. 4549, Dec 2, 2013.
RULE 12.01, CANON 12
A lawyer shall not appear for trial unless he
has adequately prepared himself on the law
and the facts of his case, the evidence he will
adduce and the order of its profference. He
should also be ready with the original
documents for comparison with the copies.
A newly hired counsel who appears in a case in
the midstream is presumed and obliged to
acquaint himself with all the antecedent
processes and proceedings that have transpired
in the record prior to his takeover (Villasis v. CA,
G.R. Nos. L- 36874-76, September 30, 1974).
RULE 12.02, CANON 12
A lawyer shall not file multiple actions
arising from the same cause.(1991, 1997,
1998, 2002 Bar)
Forum Shopping
The mere filing of several cases based on the
same incident does not necessarily constitute
forum shopping. The question is whether the
several actions filed involve the same
transactions, essential facts and circumstances. If
they involve essentially different facts,
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
 Legal Ethics
circumstances and causes of action, there is no
forum shopping (Paredes v. Sandiganbayan, G.R.
No. 108251, January 31, 1996).
The essence of forum shopping is the filing of
multiple suits involving the same parties for the
same cause of action, either simultaneously or
successively, for the purpose of obtaining a
favorable judgment (Foronda v. Atty. Guerrero,
A.C. No. 5469, August 10, 2004).
It is an act of malpractice for it trifles with the
courts, abuses their processes, degrades the
administration of justice and adds to the already
congested court dockets. What is critical is the
vexation brought upon the courts and the
litigants by a party who asks different courts to
rule on the same or related causes and grant the
same or substantially the same relief and in the
process creates the possibility of conflicting
decisions being rendered by different forums
upon the same issues, regardless of whether the
court, in which one of the suits was brought, has
no jurisdiction over the action (Top Rate
Construction and General Services v. Paxton Devt.
Corp., G.R. No. 151081, September 11, 2003).
NOTE: If same evidence supports both actions,
there is also forum shopping.
Possible consequences of forum shopping
1. Summary dismissal without prejudice unless
there is a willful or deliberate forum-
shopping. (Sec. 5, Rule 7, RRC)
2. Penalty for direct contempt of court on the
party and his lawyer in case of willful and
deliberate forum-shopping. (Sec. 5, Rule 7,
RRC)
3. Criminal action for a false certification of non-
forum shopping and indirect contempt.
4. Disciplinary proceedings for the lawyer
concerned. (Sec. 5, Rule 7, RRC)
RULE 12.03, CANON 12
A lawyer shall not, after obtaining
extensions of time to file pleadings,
memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse
without submitting the same or offering an
explanation for his failure to do so.(2003
Bar)
The court censures the practice of counsels who
secure repeated extensions of time to file their
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
2018 GOLDEN NOTES
60
pleadings and thereafter simply let the period
lapse without submitting the pleading or even an
explanation or manifestation of their failure to do
so (Achacoso v. CA, G.R. No. L-35867, June 28,
1973).
Asking for extension of time must be in good
faith. Otherwise, it is an obstruction of justice and
the lawyer is subject to discipline (CPR Annotated,
PhilJA).
The same rule applies more forcefully to motion
for continuance. Postponement is not a matter of
right but of sound judicial discretion (Edrial v.
Quilat- Quilat, G.R. No. 133625, September 6,
2000).
RULE 12.04, CANON 12
A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case,
impede the execution of a judgment or misuse
court processes.
It is understandable for a party to make full use of
every conceivable legal defense the law allows it.
However, of such attempts to evade liability to
which a party should respond, it must ever be
kept in mind that procedural rules are intended as
an aid to justice, not as means for its frustration.
Once a judgment becomes final and executory,
the prevailing party should not be denied the
fruits of his victory by some subterfuge devised
by the losing party. Unjustified delay in the
enforcement of a judgment sets at naught the role
of the courts in disposing justiciable
controversies with finality (Aguilar v. Manila
Banking Corporation, G.R. No. 157911, September
19, 2006).
Lawyers should not resort to nor abet the resort
of their clients, to a series of actions and petitions
for the purpose of thwarting the execution of a
judgment that has long become final and executor
(Cobb-Perez v. Lantin, G.R. No. L-22320, May 22,
1968).
The writs of amparo and habeas data are
extraordinary remedies which cannot be used as
tools to stall the execution of a final and
executory decision in a property dispute (Castillo
v. Cruz, G.R. No. 182165, November 25, 2009).
RULE 12.05, CANON 12
A lawyer shall refrain from talking to his
witness during a break or recess in the trial,
while the witness is still under examination.
 DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF A LAWYER
The rule is designed to uphold and maintain fair
play with the other party and to prevent the
examining lawyer from being tempted to coach
his own witness to suit his purpose.
Guidelines in interviewing witnesses(2001,
2005 Bar Questions)
1. A lawyer may interview a witness in advance
of the trial to guide him in the management of
the litigation;
2. A lawyer may also interview a “prospective
witness” for the opposing side in any civil and
criminal action without the consent of
opposing counsel or party;
3. A lawyer must properly obtain statements
from witnesses whose names were furnished
by the opposing counsel or interview the
employees of the opposing party even though
they are under subpoena to appear as
witnesses for the opposite side;
4. If after trial resulting in defendant’s
conviction, his counsel has been advised that
a prosecution witness has committed perjury,
it is not only proper but it is the lawyer’s duty
to endeavor honorable means to obtain such
witness’ reaction, even without advising the
public prosecutor of his purpose and even
though the case is pending appeal; and
5. An adverse party, though he may be used as a
witness, is not however a witness within the
meaning of the rule permitting a lawyer to
interview the witness of the opposing
counsel.
Q: May an attorney talk to his witnesses
before and during the trial? (2014 Bar)
A: An attorney can talk with his witnesses before
the trial but it is unethical to do so if the client is
already on the witness stand during the trial.
NOTE: Although the law does not forbid an
attorney to be a witness and at the same time an
attorney in a case, the courts prefer that counsel
should not testify as a witness unless it is
necessary and that they should withdraw from
the active management of the case (PNB v. Uy
Teng Piao, G.R. No. L- 35252, October 21, 1932).
RULE 12.06, CANON 12
A lawyer shall not knowingly assist a
witness to misrepresent himself or to
impersonate another.
61
Sanctions to a lawyer who instructs a witness
to perpetuate misrepresentation
Art. 184, Revised Penal Code provides: The
lawyer who presented a witness knowing him to
be a false witness is criminally liable for “Offering
False Testimony in Evidence.”
NOTE: The lawyer who is guilty of the above is
both criminally and administratively liable.
Criminal liability of witness who commits
misrepresentation
The witness who commits the misrepresentation
is criminally liable for “False Testimony” either
under Art. 181, 182 or 183, Revised Penal Code,
depending upon the nature of the case.
RULE 12.07, CANON 12
A lawyer shall not abuse, browbeat or
harass a witness nor needlessly
inconvenience him.
Q: Nolito Boras was convicted of statutory
rape. The victim, a minor, testified and the
manner of examination was excessive. The
lawyer of Boras was asking questions like,
“Did you have any opportunity at the time you
were raped to hold the penis of Nolito Boras?”,
“At the time, when you were raped by Nolito
Boras, is his penis hard or soft?”, and “Did you
see your uncle Cerilo after the accused stop
pushing and pulling his penis to your vagina or
while he was still in the process of pushing and
pulling his penis to your vagina?” Did the
lawyer of Nolito Boras violate Rule 12.07?
A: YES. It must be stressed that in dealing with
rape cases of children, especially those below 12
years of age, due care must be observed by the
trial court in handling the victim. By subjecting
her into explaining whether she was forced or
intimidated is excessive. It is because proof of
force and intimidation is unnecessary in statutory
rape. Considering that there is a medical report
substantiating the allegations made by the victim,
the manner of examination of the victim must be
tempered. Especially in this case since the child is
only six years old who remains uncorrupted
(People v. Boras, G.R. No. 127495, December 22,
2000).
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
 Legal Ethics
RULE 12.08, CANON 12
A lawyer shall avoid testifying in behalf of
his client, except:
a. On formal matters, such as the mailing,
authentication or custody of an instrument,
and the like; or
b. On substantial matters, in cases where his
testimony is essential to the ends of justice,
in which event he must, during his
testimony, entrust the trial of the case to
another counsel.
The function of a witness is to tell the facts as he
recalls them in answer to questions. The function
of an advocate is that of a partisan. It is difficult to
distinguish between the zeal of an advocate and
the fairness and impartiality of a disinterested
witness.
Matters to which a lawyer CANNOT testify
on[TARCC]
1. When, as an attorney, he is to Testify on the
theory of the case;
2. When such would Adversely affect any lawful
interest of the client with respect to which
confidence has been reposed on him;
3. Having accepted a Retainer, he cannot be a
witness against his client;
4. He cannot serve Conflicting interests; and
5. When he is to violate the Confidence of his
client.
CANON 13
A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his
cause and refrain from any impropriety
which tends to influence, or gives the
appearance of influencing the court
It is unethical for a lawyer to give an appearance
as if he is capable of influencing judges and court
personnel. Giving of gifts to the judges are
discouraged as it tend to give an appearance of
influencing the conduct of judicial function or
breeding familiarity with judges (Antiquiera,
1992).
It is reprehensible for a lawyer to wrongfully use
the name of the law office for the purpose of
“giving more weight and credit to the pleading.”
Motions and pleadings filed in courts are acted
upon in accordance with their merits or lack of it,
and not on the reputation of the law firm or the
lawyer filing the same (Rodica v. Atty. Lazaro, et
al. A.C. No. 9259, August 23, 2012).
RULE 13.01, CANON 13
A lawyer shall not extend extraordinary
attention or hospitality to, nor seek
opportunity for cultivating familiarity with
judges.
The rule is designed to protect the good name
and reputation of the judge and the lawyer.

Matters to which a lawyer CAN testify
on[FETAD]
1. On Formal matters, such as the mailing,
authentication or custody of instrument and
the like;
2. Acting as an Expert on his fee;
3. On substantial matters in cases where his
Testimony is essential to the ends of justice,
in which event he must, during his testimony,
entrust the trial of the case to another
counsel;
4. Acting as an Arbitrator; and
5. Deposition.
RELIANCE ON MERITS OF CASE AND
AVOIDANCE FROM ANY IMPROPRIETY WHICH
TENDS TO INFLUENCE OR GIVES THE
APPEARANCE OF INFLUENCE UPON THE
COURTS
Lawyers should not seek for opportunity to
cultivate familiarity with judges. A lawyer who
resorts to such practices of seeking familiarity
with judges dishonors his profession and a judge
who consents to them is unworthy of his high
office.
It is improper for a litigant or counsel to see a
judge in chambers and talk to him about a matter
related to the case pending in the court of said
judge (Austria v. Masaquel, G.R. No. 22536, August
31, 1967).
Q: Atty. J requested Judge K to be a principal
sponsor for the wedding of his son. Atty. J met
Judge K a month before during the IBP-
sponsored reception to welcome Judge K into
the community, and having learned that Judge
K takes his breakfast at a coffee shop near his
(Judge K's) boarding house, Atty. J made it a
point to be at the coffee shop at about the time

UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS

2018 GOLDEN NOTES
62
 DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF A LAWYER
that Judge K takes his breakfast. Comment on
Atty. J's acts. Do they violate the Code of
Professional Responsibility? (2000 Bar)
A: YES. His actions violate the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Canon 13 of the said
Code provides that a lawyer shall rely upon the
merits of his cause and refrain from any
impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the
appearance of influencing the court. Rule 13.01 of
the same Code provides that a lawyer shall not
extend extraordinary attention or hospitality to,
nor seek opportunity for, cultivating familiarity
with judges. Atty. J obviously sought opportunity
for cultivating familiarity with Judge K by being at
the coffee shop where the latter takes his
breakfast, and is extending extraordinary
attention to the judge by inviting him to be a
principal sponsor at the wedding of his son.
RULE 13.02, CANON 13
A lawyer shall not make public statements
in the media regarding a pending case
tending to arouse public opinion for or
against a party.
Prejudicial Publicity
There must be an allegation and proof that the
judges have been unduly influenced, not simply
that they might be, by barrage of publicity (CPR
Annotated, PhilJA).
NOTE: The restriction does not prohibit
issuances of statements by public officials
charged with the duty of prosecuting or
defending actions in court.
In a concluded litigation, a lawyer enjoys a wider
latitude of comment on or criticize the decision of
a judge of his actuation. Thus, it has been held
that a newspaper publication tending to impede,
obstruct, embarrass or influence the courts in
administering justice in a pending case
constitutes criminal contempt, but the rule is
otherwise after the litigation is ended (In re:
Loazano, 54 Phil. 801, July 24, 1930).
Q: Dumbledore, a noted professor of
commercial law, wrote an article on the
subject of letters of credit, which was
published in the IBP Journal. Assume that he
devoted a significant portion of the article to a
commentary on how the Supreme Court
should decide a pending case involving the
63
application of the law on letters of credit. May
he be sanctioned by the Supreme Court?
Explain. (2008 Bar)
A: YES. Professor Dumbledore may be sanctioned
by the Supreme Court. Rule 13.02 of the CPR
provides that “a lawyer shall not make public
statements in the media regarding a pending case
tending to arouse public opinion for or against a
party.” The Court in a pending litigation must be
shielded from embarrassment or influence in its
duty of deciding the case.
Q: Assume Dumbledore did not include any
commentary on the case. Assume further after
the Supreme Court decision on the case had
attained finality, he wrote another IBP Journal
article, dissecting the decision and explaining
why the Supreme Court erred in all its
conclusions. May he be sanctioned by the
Supreme Court? Explain. (2008 Bar)
A: He may not be sanctioned by the Supreme
Court. Once a case is concluded, the judge who
decided it is subject to the same criticism as any
other public official because his decision becomes
public property and is thrown open to public
consumption. The lawyer enjoys a wide latitude
in commenting or criticizing the judge’s decision,
provided that such comment or criticism shall be
bona fide and not spill over the bounds of decency
and propriety.
RULE 13.03, CANON 13
A lawyer shall not brook or invite
interference by another branch or agency of
the government in the normal course of
judicial proceedings.
The reason for this rule is that such action will be
contrary to the principle of separation of powers.
All lawyers must uphold, respect and support the
independence of the judiciary. This independence
from interference is made to apply against all
branches and agencies of the government (Funa,
2009).
NOTE: In the case of De Bumanlag v. Bumanlag,
the Supreme Court reprimanded Atty. Bumanlag
for gross ignorance of law and of the Constitution
in having asked the President to set aside by
decree the Court’s decision which suspended him
for two years from the practice of law.
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
 Legal Ethics
DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF A
LAWYER TO THE CLIENTS
Characteristics of attorney-client relationship
1. Strictly personal – Prohibits the delegation
of work without the client’s consent
2. Highly confidential
a. Communication made in the course of
lawyers professional employment; and
b. Communication intended to be
confidential.
3. Fiduciary
a. Hold in trust all moneys and properties
of his client that may come into his
possession;
b. When a lawyer enforces a charging lien
against his client, the relationship is
terminated; and
c. An attorney cannot represent adverse
interest unless the parties consent to the
representation after full disclosure of
facts.
Absence of a written contract will not
preclude finding of an attorney-client
relationship
The absence of a written contract will not
preclude a finding that there is a professional
relationship. Documentary formalism is not an
essential element in the employment of an
attorney; the contract may be express orimplied.
It is sufficient to establish the professional
relation, that the advice and assistance of an
attorney is sought and received in any matter
pertinent to his profession. An acceptance of the
relation is implied on the part of the attorney
from his acting on behalf of his client in
pursuance of a request from the latter (Hirach
Bros. and Co. v. R. E. Kennington Co., 88 A. L. R., 1.
cited in Hilado v. David, G.R. No. L-961, September
21, 1949).
NOTE: If a person, in respect to his business
affairs or any troubles of any kind, consults with
his attorney in his professional capacity with the
view to obtaining professional advice or
assistance and the attorney voluntarily permits
or acquiesce in such consultation, as when he
listens to his client’s preliminary statement of his
case or gives advice thereon, then the
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
2018 GOLDEN NOTES
64
professional employment is regarded as
established just as effective as when he draws his
client’s pleading or advocates his client’s cause in
court (Dee v. CA, G.R. No. 77439, August 24, 1989).
Formation of the lawyer-client relationship
The lawyer-client relationship is formed through
the following:
1. Oral– When the counsel is employed without
a written agreement, but the conditions and
amount of attorney’s fees are agreed upon.
2. Express– When the terms and conditions
including the amount of fees are explicitly
stated in a written document, which may be a
private or public document. Written contract
of attorney’s fees is the law between the
lawyer and the client.
3. Implied– When there is no agreement,
whether oral or written, but the client
allowed the lawyer to render legal services
not intended to be gratuitous without
objection and client is benefited by reason
thereof.
Rules protecting the attorney-client
relationship
1. Best effort must be exerted by the attorney to
protect his client’s interest;
2. The attorney must promptly account for any
fund or property entrusted by or received for
his client;
3. An attorney cannot purchase his client’s
property or interest in litigation;
4. The privacy of communications shall at all
times upheld; and
5. An attorney cannot represent a party whose
interest is adverse to that of his client even
after the termination of the relation.
Three principal types of professional activity
of a lawyer [LAP]
1. Legal advice and instructions to clients to
inform them of their rights and obligations;
2. Appearance for clients before public
tribunals which possess power and authority
to determine rights of life, liberty, and
property according to law, in order to assist
in proper interpretation and enforcement of
law; and
3. Preparation for clients of documents
requiring knowledge of legal principles not
possessed by ordinary layman (CPR
 DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF A LAWYER
Annotated, PhilJA).
Q: Uy engaged the services of Atty. Gonzales to
prepare and file a petition for the issuance of
a new certificate of title. Uy confided with him
the circumstances surrounding the lost title
and discussed the fees and costs. When the
petition was about to be filed, Atty. Gonzales
went to Uy’s office and demanded a certain
amount from him other than what they had
previously agreed upon. Uy found out later
that instead of filing the petition for the
issuance of a new certificate of title, Atty.
Gonzales filed a letter- complaint against him
with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
for “falsification of public documents.” The
letter-complaint contained facts and
circumstances pertaining to the transfer
certificate of title that was the subject matter
of the petition which Atty. Gonzales was
supposed to have filed. Should Atty. Gonzales
be suspended for violating the lawyer-client
relationship when he filed a complaint for
“falsification of public documents” against his
client using facts connected with the latter’s
petition?
A: NO. Evidently, the facts alleged in the
complaint for “estafa through falsification of
public documents” filed by Atty. Gonzales against
Uy were obtained by Atty. Gonzales due to his
personal dealings with Uy. Whatever facts alleged
by Atty. Gonzales against Uy were not obtained by
Atty. Gonzales in his professional capacity but as
a redemptioner of a property originally owned by
his deceased son and therefore, when Atty.
Gonzales filed the complaint for estafa against Uy,
which necessarily involved alleging facts that
would constitute estafa, Atty. Gonzales was not, in
any way, violating Canon 21. Clearly, there was no
attorney-client relationship between Atty.
Gonzales and Uy. The preparation and the
proposed filing of the petition was only incidental
to their personal transaction (Uy v. Atty. Gonzales,
A.C. No. 5280, March 30, 2004).
Q: Atty. Marie consulted Atty. Hernandez
whether she can successfully prosecute her
case for declaration of nullity of marriage that
she intends to file against her husband. Atty.
Hernandez advised her in writing that the
case will not prosper for the reasons stated
therein.
65
Is Atty. Hernandez's subsequent acquiescence
to be Noel's counsel ethical? (2006 Bar)
A: NO. Atty. Hernandez's acquiescence to be
Noel's counsel will not be ethical. It will
constitute a conflict of interests. When Atty. Marie
consulted Atty. Hernandez' for advice on whether
she can successfully prosecute her case for
declaration of nullity of her marriage to Noel, and
he advised her that it will not prosper, a lawyer-
client relationship was created between them,
although his advice was unfavorable to her. From
that moment, Atty. Hernandez is barred from
accepting employment from the adverse party
concerning the same matter about which she had
consulted him (Hilado v. David, 84 Phil. 569,
1949).
Q: In the course of a drinking spree with Atty.
Holgado, who has always been his counsel in
business deals, Simon bragged about his
recent sexual adventures with socialites
known for their expensive tastes. When Atty.
Holgado asked Simon how he manages to
finance his escapades, the latter answered
that he has been using the bank deposits of
rich clients of Banco Filipino where he works
as manager.
Is Simon's revelation to Atty. Holgado covered
by the attorney-client privilege? (2006 Bar)
A: NO. Simon's revelation to Atty. Holgado is not
covered by the lawyer-client privilege. In the first
place, it was not made on account of a lawyer-
client relationship, that is, it was not made for the
purpose of seeking legal advice. In the second
place, it was not made in confidence (Mercado v.
Vitriolo, 459 SCRA 1). In the third place, the
attorney-client privileged does not cover
information concerning a crime or fraud being
committed or proposed to be committed.
AVAILABILITY OF SERVICE WITHOUT
DISCRIMINATION
CANON 14
A lawyer shall not refuse his services to the
needy
The poor and indigent should not be further
disadvantaged by lack of access to the Philippine
legal system.
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
 Legal Ethics
Lawyer’s right to decline employment
GR: A lawyer is not obliged to act as legal counsel
for any person who may wish to become his
client. He has the right to decline employment.
XPNs:
1. A lawyer shall not refuse his services to the
needy (Canon 14);
2. He shall not decline to represent a person
solely on account of the latter’s race, sex,
creed or status in life or because of his own
opinion regarding the guilt of said person
(Rule 14.01);
3. He shall not decline, except for serious and
efficient cause like:
a. If he is not in a position to carryout
effectively or competently; and
b. If he labors under a conflict of interest
between him and the prospective client
(Rule 14.03).
Legal aid cases
Legal aid cases are those actions, disputes and
controversies that are criminal, civil and
administrative in nature in whatever stage,
wherein an indigent and pauper litigants need
legal representation (Sec. 4(c), B.M. No. 2012).
Rationale for establishing legal aid services
Legal aid is not a matter of charity. It is a means
for the correction of social imbalances that may
and often do lead to injustice, for which reason it
is a public responsibility of the Bar. The spirit of
public service should, therefore, underlie all legal
aid offices. The same should be so administered
as to give maximum possible assistance to the
indigent and deserving members of the
community in all cases, matters and situations in
which legal aid may be necessary to forestall an
injustice (Public Service, Sec. 1, Art. 1 of the IBP
Guidelines on Legal Aid).
Q: Are there instances where a lawyer has the
duty to decline employment? (1993 Bar)
A: A lawyer should decline no matter how
attractive the fee offered may be if its acceptance
will involve: [RACCAA]
1. A violation of any of the Rules of the legal
profession;
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
2018 GOLDEN NOTES
66
2. Advocacy in any manner in which he had
intervened while in the government service;
3. Nullification of a Contract which he prepared;
4. Employment with a Collection agency which
solicits business to collect claims;
5. Employment, the nature of which might
easily be used as a means of Advertising his
professional services of his skill; or
6. Any matter in which he knows or has reason
to believe that he or his partner will be an
essential witness for the prospective client.
Reasons why a lawyer may not accept a
“losing case”
1. The attorney’s signature in every pleading
constitutes a certificate by him that there is
good cause to support it and that it is not
interposed for delay, and willful violation of
such rule shall subject him to disciplinary
action;
2. It is the attorney’s duty to “counsel or
maintain such actions or proceedings only as
appears to him to be just and only such
defenses as he believes to be honestly
debatable under the law”;
3. A lawyer is not to encourage either the
commencement or the continuance of an
action or proceeding, or delay any man’s
cause, for any corrupt motive or interest; and
4. A lawyer must decline to conduct a civil cause
or to make a defense when convinced that it
is intended merely to harass or injure the
opposite party or to work oppression or
wrong.
Q: Is there an instance when a lawyer may
accept losing case? (1996, 2001, 2002, 2005
Bar)
a. In criminal case?
b. In civil case?
A:
a. A lawyer may accept a “losing” criminal case
since an accused is presumed to be innocent
until his guilt is proven beyond reasonable
doubt. Furthermore, CPR provides that a
lawyer shall not decline to represent a person
because of his opinion regarding the guilt of
said person. Otherwise, innocent persons
might be denied proper defense. (CPR, Rule
14.01)
b. A lawyer may also accept a losing civil case,
 DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF A LAWYER
provided that, in so doing, he must not
engage in dilatory tactics and must advise his
client about the prospects and advantage of
settling the case through a compromise to the
extent of representing indigents, defenseless
and the oppressed.
SERVICES REGARDLESS OF PERSON’S STATUS
RULE 14.01, CANON 14
A lawyer shall not decline to represent a
person solely on account of the latter’s race,
sex, creed or status of life, or because of his
own opinion regarding the guilt of said
person.
Q: Atty. DD’s services were engaged by Mr. BB
as defense counsel in a lawsuit. In the course
of the proceedings, Atty. DD discovered that
Mr. BB was an agnostic and a homosexual. By
reason thereof, Atty. DD filed a motion to
withdraw as counsel without Mr. BB’s express
consent. Is Atty. DD’s motion legally tenable?
Reason briefly. (2004 Bar)
A: NO. Atty. DD’s motion is not legally tenable. He
has no valid cause to terminate his services. His
client, Mr. BB, being an agnostic and homosexual,
should not be deprived of his counsel’s
representation solely for that reason.
Q: A is accused of robbery in a complaint filed
by B. A sought free legal assistance from the
Public Attorney’s Office (PAO) and Atty. C was
assigned to handle his case. After reviewing
the facts as stated in the complaint and as
narrated by A, Atty. C is convinced that A is
guilty. May Atty. C refuse to handle the
defense of A and ask to be relieved? Explain
fully. (2014 Bar)
A: NO. Rule 14.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall not
decline to represent a person solely on account of
his own opinion regarding the guilt of the said
person. It is not the duty of the lawyer to
determine whether the accused is guilty or not,
but the judge’s. Besides, in a criminal case, the
accused is presumed innocent, and he is entitled
to an acquittal unless his guilt is proven beyond
reasonable doubt. The role of the lawyer is to see
to it that his constitutional right to due process is
observed.
67
SERVICES AS COUNSEL DE OFFICIO
RULE 14.02, CANON 14
A lawyer shall not decline, except for serious
and sufficient cause, an appointment as
counsel de oficio or as amicus curiae, or a
request from the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines or any of its chapters for
rendition of free legal aid.
A court may assign an attorney to render
professional aid free of charge to any party in
case, if upon investigation it appears that the
party is destitute and unable to employ an
attorney and that the services of counsel are
necessary to secure the ends of justice and to
protect the rights of the party. It shall be the duty
of the attorney so assigned to render the required
service, unless he is excused therefrom by the
court for sufficient cause shown (Sec. 31, Rule
138, RRC).
Counsel de oficio
1. Members of the bar in good standing;
2. Any person, resident of the province and of
good repute for probity and ability, in
localities without lawyers
Considerations in appointing a counsel de
oficio
1. Gravity of offense
2. Difficulty of questions that may arise; and
3. Experience and ability of appointee
Q: A criminal complaint was filed against
Bermas for rape. The Prosecutor issued a
certification that the accused has waived his
right to preliminary investigation. On
arraignment, the accused was brought before
the trial court without counsel. The Court
assigned a different counsel de officio to the
case for four times. Each counsel failed to
appear before the court. Despite the said
events, the lower court convicted the accused
of death penalty for the violation of the crime
of rape. The defense counsel claimed that the
accused was deprived of due process, is he
correct?
A: YES. The right to counsel must be more than
just the presence of a lawyer in the courtroom or
the mere propounding of standard questions and
objections. The right to counsel means that the
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
 Legal Ethics
accused is amply accorded legal assistance
extended by a counsel who commits himself to
the cause for the defense and acts accordingly.
The right assumes an active involvement by the
lawyer in the proceedings, particularly at the trial
of the case, his bearing constantly in mind of the
basic rights of the accused, his being well-versed
on the case, and his knowing the fundamental
procedures, essential laws and existing
jurisprudence.
It is never enough that accused be simply
informed of his right to counsel; he should also be
asked whether he wants to avail himself of one
and should be told that he can hire a counsel of
his own choice if he so desires or that one can be
provided to him at his request.
A counsel de officio must take the case not as a
burden but as an opportunity to assist in the
proper dispensation of justice. No lawyer is to be
excused from this responsibility except only for
the most compelling and cogent reasons.
Obviously, in the instant case, the aforenamed
defense lawyers did not protect, much less
uphold, the fundamental rights of the accused.
Instead, they haphazardly performed their
function as counsel de officio to the detriment and
prejudice of the accused Sevilleno, however guilty
he might have been found to be after trial (People
v. Bermas, G.R. No. 120420, April 21, 1999).
VALID GROUNDS FOR REFUSAL TO SERVE
RULE 14.03, CANON 14
A lawyer may not refuse to accept
representation of an indigent client unless:
a. He is in no position to carry out the work
effectively or competently;
b. He labors under a conflict of interest
between him and the prospective client or
between a present client and a prospective
client.
Grounds of refusal of appointment to be a
Counsel de Oficio
1. Too many de officio cases assigned to the
lawyer (People v. Daeng, G.R. No. L-34091,
January 30, 1973);
2. Conflict of interest (Rule 14.03, CPR);
3. Lawyer is not in a position to carry out the
work effectively or competently (supra);
4. Lawyer is prohibited from practicing law by
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
2018 GOLDEN NOTES
68
reason of his public office which prohibits
appearances in court;
5. Lawyer is preoccupied with too many cases
which will spell prejudice to the new clients;
6. Health reasons; and
7. Extensive travel abroad.
NOTE: A lawyer may refuse to handle cases due
to these valid reasons. However, Rule 2.02
requires him to give advice on preliminary steps
if he is asked until the client secures the services
of counsel. He shall refrain from giving this
preliminary advice if there is conflict of interest
between a present client and a prospective one
for extending such legal advice will create and
establish an attorney-client relationship between
them and may involve a violation of the rule
prohibiting a lawyer from representing
conflicting interest.
Q: Judge Climaco issued an order denying
Atty. Ledesma’s motion to withdraw as
counsel de oficio. One of the grounds for such a
motion was his allegation that with his
appointment as Election Registrar by the
COMELEC, he was not in a position to devote
full time to the defense of the two accused.
The denial by the Judge of such plea,
notwithstanding the conformity of the
defendants, was due to “its principal effect of
delaying the case." Is the denial of Judge
Climaco correct?
A: YES. The reluctance of Ledesma to comply
with his responsibilities as counsel de oficio is not
an adequate ground for the motion of withdrawal.
Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened
with a condition. For some lawyers especially the
neophytes in the profession being appointed as a
lawyer is an irksome chore. Law is a profession
dedicated to the ideal of service and not a mere
trade. Thus is made manifest the indispensable role
of a member of the Bar in the defense of an
accused. Such a consideration could have sufficed
for Ledesma not being allowed to withdraw as
counsel de oficio. For he did betray by his moves
his lack of enthusiasm for the task entrusted to
him, to put matters mildly. He did point though to
his responsibility as an election registrar.
Assuming his good faith, no such excuse could be
availed now. There is not likely at present, and in
the immediate future, an exorbitant demand on his
time (Ledesma v. Climaco, G.R. No. L-23815, June
28, 1974).
 DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF A LAWYER
Q: May a lawyer decline a request for free
legal aid to an indigent accused made by a
chapter of the IBP? Explain. (2002 Bar)
A: NO. Rule 14.02 of the
CPR provides that “a lawyer shall not decline,
except for serious and sufficient cause, an
appointment as counsel de officio or as amicus
curiae or a request from the IBP or any of its
chapter for rendition of free legal aid.” He
may, decline such appointment only for “serious
and sufficient cause”.
Q: Will your answer be different if the legal
aid is requested in a civil case? (2002 Bar)
A: The answer will not be exactly the same,
because in a civil case, the lawyer can also decline
if he believes the action or defense to be
unmeritorious. He is ethically bound to maintain
only actions and proceedings which appear to
him to be just and only such defenses which he
believes to be honestly debatable under the law.
RULE 14.04, CANON 14
A lawyer who accepts the cause of a person
unable to pay his professional fees shall
observe the same standard of conduct
governing his relations with paying clients.
(2008 Bar Question)
Q: Atty. Mariano Dajoyag, Jr. is Ernesto Ramos’
counsel. He failed to perfect their appeal
before the SC. He filed the petition for
certiorari within the 20-day period of
extension that he sought in his 2nd motion for
extension. He learned that the period of
extension granted in his 1st motion for
extension was inextendible only after the
expiration of the 2 periods of extension that
he prayed for. A complaint for negligence and
malpractice was filed against him, to which he
pleaded good faith and excusable neglect of
duty. Is Atty. Dajoyag Jr. guilty of neglect of
duty?
A: YES. Motions for extension are not granted as a
matter of right but in the sound discretion of the
court, and lawyers should never presume that
their motions for extension or postponement will
be granted or that they will be granted the length
of time they prayed for.
Further, regardless of the agreement Atty.
69
Dajoyag, Jr. had with Ramos with respect to the
payment of his fees, Atty. Dajoyag, Jr. owed it to
Ramos to do his utmost to ensure that every
remedy allowed by law is availed of. Rule 14.04 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins
every lawyer to devote his full attention,
diligence, skills, and competence to every case
that he accepts. Pressure and large volume of
legal work do not excuse Atty. Dajoyag, Jr. for
filing the petition for certiorari out of time
(Ramos v. Dajoyag, Jr., A.C. No. 5174, February 28,
2002).
NOTE: The fact that his services are rendered
without remuneration should not occasion a
diminution in his zeal (Ledesma v. Climaco, G.R.
No. L-23815, June 28, 1974).
CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY TO
CLIENTS
CANON 15
A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and
loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with
his clients
A lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his
client. He owes his client full devotion to his
interest, warm zeal in the maintenance and
defense of his rights.
It demands of an attorney an undivided
allegiance, a conspicuous and high degree of good
faith, disinterestedness, candor, fairness, loyalty,
fidelity and absolute integrity in all his dealings
and transactions with his clients and an utter
renunciation of every personal advantage
conflicting in any way, directly or indirectly, with
the interest of his client (Oparel Sr. v. Abaria, A.C.
No. 959, July 30, 1971).
If they find that their client’s cause is defenseless,
then it is their bounden duty to advise the latter
to acquiesce and submit rather than to traverse
the incontrovertible (Rollon v. Atty. Naraval, A.C.
No. 6424, March 4, 2005).
Q: Baens engaged the services of Atty. Sempio
to file a case for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage against his wife. Despite receipt of
P250,000 for legal expenses, Atty. Sempio
failed to file the petition, and it was Baens’
wife who filed the same. Atty. Sempio filed an
Answer only after the 15-day period stated in
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
 Legal Ethics
the Summons. Atty. Sempio also failed to
make an objection on the petition on the
ground of improper venue as neither Baens
nor his wife were and are residents of
Dasmariñas, Cavite. He never bothered to
check the status of the case and thus failed to
discover and attend all the hearings set for the
case. As a result, the civil case was decided
without Baens being able to present his
evidence. Did Atty. Sempio violate the Code of
Professional Responsibility?
A: YES. In the first place, securing a copy of such
notices, orders and case records was within his
control and is a task that a lawyer undertakes.
The preparation and the filing of the answer is a
matter of procedure that fully fell within the
exclusive control and responsibility of the lawyer.
It was incumbent upon him to execute all acts and
procedures necessary and incidental to the
advancement of his client’s cause of action.
Records further disclose that he omitted to
update himself of the progress of his client’s case
with the trial court, and neither did he resort to
available legal remedies that might have
protected his client’s interest. Although a lawyer
has complete discretion on what legal strategy to
employ in a case entrusted to him, he must
present every remedy or defense within the
authority of law to support his client’s interest.
When a lawyer agrees to take up a client’s cause,
he covenants that he will exercise due diligence in
protecting the latter’s rights.
Evidently, the acts of the Atty. Sempio plainly
demonstrated his lack of candor, fairness, and
loyalty to his client as embodied in Canon 15 of
the Code. A lawyer who performs his duty with
diligence and candor not only protects the
interest of his client; he also serves the ends of
justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain
the respect of the community to the legal
profession (Baens v. Sempio, A.C. No. 10378, June
9, 2014).
Q: Campos engaged the services of Atty.
Estebal to assist each of them in securing
tourist visas to the United States. Despite
receipt of payment, Atty. Estebal failed to
secure for them the US tourist visa nor
returned the amount they paid, thus they filed
an administrative case against the lawyer. Did
Atty. Estebal violate Canons 15, 16 and 20?
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70
A: YES. Respondent violated Canons 15 because
he was not candid enough to tell the
complainants their chances of getting their visa.
Instead, the respondent made the complainants
believe that they will have a good chance of
getting the visa, yet, nothing happened. He also
violated Canon 16 (Rule 16.01) because he did
not account for the money he received from the
complainants. The amount due to the
complainants was not clear. Lastly, it appears that
the attorney’s fees that he collected from the
complainants are excessive and unreasonable.
Considering the degree of work and number of
hours spent, the amount he collected from the
complainants is not commensurate to the degree
of services rendered. Obviously, respondent took
advantage of the weakness of the complainants in
their desire to go US (Campos Jr. v. Estebal, A.C.
No. 10443, Aug. 8, 2016).
CONFIDENTIALITY RULE
Confidentiality
It means the relation between lawyer and client
or guardian and ward, or between spouses, with
regard to the trust that is placed in the one by the
other (Black’s Law Dictionary 7th Edition 1990,
2004).
A lawyer shall preserve the confidences and
secrets of his client even after the attorney-client
relation is terminated (Canon 21, CPR).
It is one of the duties of a lawyer, as provided for
in the Rules of Court, to maintain inviolate the
confidence, and at every peril to himself, to
preserve the secrets of his client (Sec. 20(e), Rule
138, RRC).
PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS
Privileged communication
A privileged communication is one that refers to
information transmitted by voluntary act of
disclosure between attorney and client in
confidence and by means of which, in so far as the
client is aware, discloses the information to no
third person other than one reasonably necessary
for the transmission of the information or the
accomplishment of the purpose for which it was
given.
 DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF A LAWYER
RULE 15.02, CANON 15
A lawyer shall be bound by the rule on
privilege communication in respect of
matters disclosed to him by a prospective
client. (2008 Bar)
Two-fold purpose of the rule
1. To encourage a client to make a full
disclosure of the facts of the case to his
counsel without fear, and
2. To allow the lawyer freedom to obtain full
information from his client (Pineda, 2009).
Disclosure of a prospective client
The foregoing disqualification rule applies to
prospective clients of a lawyer. Matters disclosed
by a prospective client to a lawyer are protected
by the rule on privileged communication even if
the prospective client does not thereafter retain
the lawyer or the latter declines the employment.
It covers crimes and offenses already committed
by the client.
The reason for this is to make the prospective
client free to discuss whatever he wishes with the
lawyer without fear that what he tells the lawyer
will be divulged or used against him, and for the
lawyer to be equally free to obtain information
from the prospective client (CPR Annotated,
PhilJA).
Requisites of privileged communication
1. There is attorney-client relationship or a kind
of consultancy requirement with a
prospective client;
2. The communication was made by the client
to the lawyer in the course of the lawyer’s
professional employment; and
3. The communication must be intended to be
confidential.
NOTE: The party who avers that the
communication is privileged has the burden of
proof to establish the existence of the privilege
unless from the face of the document itself, it
clearly appears that it is privileged. The mere
allegation that the matter is privileged is not
sufficient (People v. Sleeper, G.R. No. 22783,
December 3, 1924; Lapena Jr., 2009).
Client identity
Client identity is privileged where a strong
probability exists that revealing the client’s name
71
would implicate that client in the very activity for
which he sought the lawyer’s advice (Regala v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 105938, September 20,
1996).
Characteristics of privileged communication
1. Attorney-client privilege where legal advice
is professionally sought from an attorney.
2. The client must intend the above
communication to be confidential.
3. Attorney-client privilege embraces all forms
of communication and action.
4. As a general rule, attorney-client privilege
also extends to the attorney’s secretary,
stenographer, clerk or agent with reference
to any fact acquired in such capacity.
5. The above duty is perpetual and
communication is absolutely privileged from
disclosure.
6. Persons entitled to claim privileges
Coverage of the attorney-client privilege
1. Lawyer;
2. Client; and
3. Third persons who by reason of their work
have acquired information about the case
being handled such as:
a. Attorney’s secretary, stenographer and
clerk;
b. Interpreter, messengers and agents
transmitting communication; and
c. An accountant, scientist, physician,
engineer who has been hired for effective
consultation. (Sec. 24(b), Rule 130, RRC)
Duration of privileged communication
The privilege continues to exist even after the
termination of the attorney-client relationship.
NOTE: The privilege character of the
communication ceases only when waived by the
client himself or after his death, by his heir or
legal representative (Lapena, Jr. 2009).
Instances when communication is not
privileged
A communication made by a client to a lawyer is
not privileged in the following instances:
1. After pleading has been filed because such
becomes part of public records.
2. When communication was intended by the
client to be sent to a third person through his
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
 Legal Ethics
counsel.
3. When the communication sought by client is
intended to aid future crime or perpetration
of fraud.
4. When communication between attorney and
client is heard by a third party.
5. When there is consent or waiver of the client.
6. When the law requires disclosure.
7. When disclosure is made to protect the
lawyer’s rights.
NOTE: Even if the communication is unprivileged,
the rule of ethics prohibits lawyers from
voluntarily revealing or using to his benefit or to
that of a third person, to the disadvantage of the
client, the said communication unless the client
consents thereto (Sec. 3, Rule 138-A, RRC).
Q: Atty. Vitriolo represented Rose Mercado in
an annulment case filed by her husband.
Thereafter, a criminal action against her was
filed by the former for falsification of public
document. According to Atty. Vitriolo, she
indicated in the Certificates of Live Birth of
her children that she is married to a certain
Ferdinand Fernandez, and that their marriage
was solemnized on April 11, 1979, when in
truth, she is legally married to Ruben Mercado
and their marriage took place on April 11,
1978. Mercado claims that the criminal
complaint disclosed confidential facts and
information relating to the civil case for
annulment handled by Vitriolo as her counsel.
Did Atty. Julito Vitriolo violate the rule on
privileged communication between attorney
and client?
A: NO. The evidence on record fails to
substantiate Mercado’s allegations. She did not
even specify the alleged communication in
confidence disclosed by Atty. Vitriolo. All of
Mercado’s claims were couched in general terms
and lacked specificity. Without any testimony
from Mercado as to the specific confidential
information allegedly divulged by Atty. Vitriolo
without her consent, it is difficult, if not
impossible to determine if there was any
violation of the rule on privileged
communication. It is not enough to merely assert
the attorney-client privilege. The burden of
proving that the privilege applies is placed upon
the party asserting the privilege (Mercado v.
Vitrilio, A.C. No. 5108, May 26, 2005).
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72
Q: Atty. Serafin Roto is the Corporate
Secretary of a construction corporation that
has secured a multi-million infrastructure
project from the government. In the course of
his duties as corporate secretary, he learned
from the company president that the
corporation had resorted to bribery to secure
the project and had falsified records to cut
implementing costs after the award of the
project. The government filed a civil action to
annul the infrastructure contract and has
subpoenaed Atty. Roto to testify against the
company president and the corporation
regarding the bribery. Atty. Roto moved to
quash the subpoena, asserting that lawyer-
client privilege prevents him from testifying
against the president and the corporation.
Resolve the motion to quash. (2013 Bar)
A: The motion to quash should be granted. While
it is true that being a corporate secretary does not
necessarily constitute a lawyer-client relation,
Atty. Roto may nevertheless be considered in the
practice of law if part of his duties as a corporate
secretary is to give legal advice to or prepare
legal documents for the corporation. Thus, it is
his duty as an attorney “to maintain inviolate the
confidence, and at every peril to himself, to
preserve the secrets of his client (Rule 138, Sec.
20, par.(e), Rules of Court).
CONFLICT OF INTEREST
(1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1997, 1999, 2000,
2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2008
Bar)
RULE 15.01, CANON 15
A lawyer, in conferring with a prospective
client, shall ascertain as soon as practicable
whether the matter would involve a conflict
with another client or his own interest, and
if so, shall forthwith inform the prospective
client.
RULE 15.02, CANON 15
A lawyer shall be bound by the rule on
privileged communication in respect of
matters disclosed to him by a prospective
client.
Purpose of “conflict search”
By conducting a conflict search, the lawyer will be
able to determine, in the first instance, if he is
barred from accepting the representation
 DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF A LAWYER
through conflicts with his present clients or the
lawyer’s own interest (CPR Annotated, PhilJA).
Three tests to determine existence of conflict
of interest
1. Conflicting Duties - When, on behalf of one
client, it is the attorney’s duty to contest for
that which his duty to another client requires
him to oppose or when possibility of such
situation will develop.
2. Invitation of Suspicion - Whether the
acceptance of the new relation will prevent a
lawyer from the full discharge of his duty of
undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or
will invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or
double-dealing in the performance thereof.
3. Use of Prior Knowledge Obtained -
Whether a lawyer will be called upon in his
new relation to use against the first client any
knowledge acquired in the previous
employment.
Types of conflict of interest
1. Concurrent or multiple representations –
Generally occurs when a lawyer represents
clients whose objectives are adverse to each
other, no matter how slight or remote such
adverse interest may be.
The tests for concurrent or multiple
representations are:
a. Whether a lawyer is duty-bound to fight
for an issue or claim in behalf of one
client and, at the same time, to oppose
that claim for the other client;
b. Whether the acceptance of a new relation
would prevent the full discharge of the
lawyer’s duty of undivided fidelity or
loyalty to the client;
c. Whether the acceptance of new relation
would invite suspicion of unfaithfulness
or double-dealing in the performance of
the lawyer’s duty of undivided fidelity
and loyalty; and
d. Whether, in the acceptance of a new
relation, the lawyer would be called upon
to use against a client confidential
information acquired through their
connection.
2. Sequential or successive representation–
Involves representation by a law firm of a
present client who may have an interest
adverse to a prior or former client of the firm
73
(CPR Annotated, PhilJA).
NOTE: What is material in determining whether
there is a conflict of interest in the representation
is probability, not certainty of conflict (see
discussion on disqualification or limitation of
public officials in practicing law, congruent-
interest representation conflict and adverse-
interest conflict).
There is no conflict of interest in a situation
where a lawyer represents his present client
against his former client, so long as no
confidential information acquired during the
previous employment was used against the
former client by the lawyer. The prohibition does
not cover a situation where the subject matter of
the present engagement is totally unrelated to the
previous engagement of the attorney. Moreover, a
mere allegation of the professional misconduct
would not suffice to establish the charge, because
accusation is not synonymous with guilt (Seares,
Jr. v. Atty. Gonzales-Alzate, Admin. Case. No. 9058,
November 14, 2012).
Illustration: Existence of conflict of Interest
1. A v. B
A and B are present clients.
2. C v. D; E v. D
C is the present client and D is not a present
client in the same case but is a present client
in another case.
3. F v. G; H v. G
F is the present client and G was a former
client and the cases are related.
4. I v. J; K v. J
I is the present client and J was a former
client in a case that is unrelated.
5. L, M, N v. O, P, Q
L, M, N are present clients but L and M joins
O, P, Q. (People v. Davis)
Other instances of conflict of interest
1. A corporate lawyer cannot join a labor union
of employees in that corporation;
2. A lawyer of an insurance corporation who
investigated an accident cannot represent the
complainant/injured person;
3. As a receiver of a corporation, he cannot
represent the creditor;
4. As a representative of the obligor, he cannot
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
 Legal Ethics
represent the obligee; and
5. As a lawyer representing a party in a
compromise agreement, he cannot,
subsequently, be a lawyer representing
another client who seeks to nullify the
agreement.
Being a counsel-of-record of the other party is
not a requisite to be guilty of representing
conflicting interests
To be guilty of representing conflicting interests,
a counsel-of-record of one party need not also be
counsel-of-record of the adverse party. He does
not have to publicly hold himself as the counsel of
the adverse party, nor make his efforts to advance
the adverse party's conflicting interests of record
--- although these circumstances are the most
obvious and satisfactory proof of the charge. It is
enough that the counsel of one party had a hand
in the preparation of the pleading of the other
party, claiming adverse and conflicting interests
with that of his original client. To require that he
also be counsel-of-record of the adverse party
would punish only the most obvious form of
deceit and reward, with impunity, the highest
form of disloyalty (Artueza v. Atty. Maderazo, A.C.
No. 4354, April 22, 2002).
Q: Mr. X engaged the services of Atty. Y
regarding his brother’s indebtedness to
Caesar’s Palace, a casino in Las Vegas. His
services were reportedly contracted for
P100,000. It was found that the debt was
actually incurred by Ramon Sy, with Mr. X's
brother merely signing for the chits. Atty. Y
was able to free Mr. X's brother from his
indebtedness. Having thus settled the account
of Mr. X's brother, Atty. Y sent several demand
letters to Mr. X demanding the balance of
P50,000.00 as attorney's fees. Mr. X refused to
pay and claimed, that at the time Atty. Y was
rendering services to Mr. X, he was actually
working "in the interest" and "to the
advantage" of Caesar's Palace of which he was
an agent and a consultant. This being the case,
Atty. Y is not justified in claiming that he
rendered legal services to Mr. X in view of the
conflicting interests involved. Did Atty. Y
violate the conflict of interest rule?
A: NO. Generally, an attorney is prohibited from
representing parties with contending positions.
However, at a certain stage of the controversy
before it reaches the court, a lawyer may
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
2018 GOLDEN NOTES
74
represent conflicting interests with the consent of
the parties. A common representation may work
to the advantage of said parties since a mutual
lawyer, with honest motivations and impartially
cognizant of the parties' disparate positions, may
well be better situated to work out an acceptable
settlement of their differences, being free of
partisan inclinations and acting with the
cooperation and confidence of said parties. A
lawyer is entitled to have and receive the just and
reasonable compensation for services rendered
at the special instance and request of his client
and as long as he is honestly and in good faith
trying to serve and represent the interests of his
client, the latter is bound to pay his just fees (Dee
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 77439, August 24,
1989).
Rule when the lawyer of the corporation and
the board of directors of such corporation is
the same
The interest of the corporate client is paramount
and should not be influenced by any interest of
the individual corporate officials. A lawyer
engaged as counsel for a corporation cannot
represent members of the same corporation's
Board of Directors in a derivative suit brought
against them. To do so would be tantamount to
representing conflicting interests which is
prohibited by the Code of Professional
Responsibility (Hornilla v. Atty. Salunat, A.C. No.
5804, July 1, 2003).
Q: Six months ago, Atty. Z was consulted by A,
about a four-door apartment in Manila left by
her deceased parents. A complained that her
two siblings, B and C, who were occupying two
units of the apartment, were collecting the
rentals from the other two units and refusing
to give her any part thereof. Atty. Z advised A
to first seek the intervention of her relatives
and told her that if this failed, he would take
legal action as A asked him to do. B asks Atty.
Z to defend him in a suit brought by A against
him (B) and C through another counsel.
Should Atty. Z accept the case?
A: NO. When A consulted him about her
complaint against B and C, a lawyer-client
relationship was created between A and Atty. Z.
Atty. Z cannot subsequently represent B against A
in a matter he was consulted about. This
constitutes conflict of interest. It does not matter
 DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF A LAWYER
if Atty. Z is not handling the case for A.
Q: Should Atty. Z tell B that A consulted him
earlier about the same case? Why? (2002 Bar)
A: YES. Rule 21.07 of the CPR provides that "a
lawyer shall not reveal that he has been consulted
about a particular case except to avoid possible
conflict of interest.” In this case, he has to reveal
to B that he had been consulted by A on the case
that B if offering to retain his services, in order to
avoid a possible conflict of interest.
RULE 15.03, CANON 15
A lawyer shall not represent conflicting
interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the
facts.
GR: An attorney cannot represent diverse
interests. It is highly improper to represent both
sides of an issue. The proscription against
representation of conflicting interest finds
application where the conflicting interest arise
with respect to the same general matter and is
applicable however slight such adverse interest
may be. It applies although the attorney’s
intention and motives were honest and he acted
in good faith.
XPN: Representation of conflicting interest may
be allowed where the parties consent to the
representation after full disclosure of facts
(Nakpil v. Valdez, A.C. No. 2040, March 4, 1998).
NOTE: A lawyer may at a certain stage of the
controversy and before it reaches the court
represent conflicting interests with the express
written consent of all parties concerned given
after disclosure of the facts. The disclosure should
include an explanation of the effects of the dual
representation, such as the possible revelation or
use of confidential information.
An attorney owes loyalty to his client not only in
the case in which he has represented him but also
after relation of attorney and client has
terminated.
Instances when lawyers cannot represent
conflicting interest even if the consent of both
clients were secured
Where the conflict is:
75
1. Between the attorney’s interest and that of a
client; or
2. Between a private client’s interests and that
of the government or any of its
instrumentalities.
Effects of representing adverse interests [DJ-
FAC]
1. Disqualification as counsel of new client on
petition of former client;
2. Where such is unknown to, and becomes
prejudicial to the interests of the new client, a
Judgment against such may, on that ground,
be set aside;
3. The attorney’s right to Fees may be defeated
if found to be related to such conflict and
such was objected to by the former client, or
if there was a concealment and prejudice by
reason of the attorney’s previous
professional relationship with the opposite
party;
4. A lawyer can be held Administratively liable
through disciplinary action and may be held
Criminally liable for betrayal of trust.
Q: Daging received a Retainer Proposal from
Davis & Sabling Law Office. Thereafter, in an
ejectment case filed by Daging against Pinlac
and Balageo, he was shocked to find out that
Atty. Davis appeared as counsel for Balageo.
Hence, the filing of this administrative
complaint. Atty. Davis maintained that he
never obtained any knowledge or information
regarding the business of Daging who used to
consult only Atty. Sabling. He admitted though
having represented Balageo in the ejectment
case but denied that he took advantage of the
Retainer Agreement between Daging and
Davis and Sabling Law Office. Is Atty. Davis
guilty of representing conflicting of interests
to both of his firm’s clients?
A: YES. Clearly, Atty. Davis violated Rule 15.03 of
Canon 15 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility". A lawyer may not, without being
guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel
for a person whose interest conflicts with that of
his present or former client." The prohibition
against representing conflicting interests is
absolute and the rule applies even if the lawyer
has acted in good faith and with no intention to
represent conflicting interests. Atty. Davis’
argument that he never took advantage of any
information acquired by his law firm in the
course of its professional dealings with the
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
 Legal Ethics
complainant, even assuming it to be true, is of no
moment. Undeniably aware of the fact that
complainant is a client of his law firm, respondent
should have immediately informed both the
complainant and Balageo that he, as well as the
other members of his law firm, cannot represent
any of them in their legal tussle; otherwise, they
would be representing conflicting interests and
violate the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Indeed, respondent could have simply advised
both complainant and Balageo to instead engage
the services of another lawyer (Daging v. Davis,
A.C. No. 9395, Nov 12, 2014).
Q: Huey Company and Dewey Corporation are
both retainer clients of Atty. Anama. He is the
corporate secretary of Huey Company. He
represents Dewey Corporation in three
pending litigation cases. Dewey Corporation
wants to file a civil case against Huey
Company and has requested Atty. Anama to
handle the case. What are the options
available to Atty. Anama? Explain your
answer.
A: The options available to Atty. Anama are:
1. To decline the case because to do so will
constitute representing conflicting
interests. It is unethical for a lawyer to
represent a client in a case against
another client in the same case.
2. To accept to file the case against Huey
Company, after full disclosure to both
retained clients and upon their express
and written consent. The written consent
may free him from the charge of
representing conflicting interests,
because written consent amounts to a
release by the clients of the lawyer’s
obligation not to represent conflicting
interests.
Q: If you were Atty. Anama, which option
would you take? Explain.
A: If I were Atty. Anama, I will choose the first
option and inhibit myself in the case as both
entities are my clients. The conflict of interests
between the contending clients may reach such a
point that, notwithstanding their consent to the
common representation, the lawyer may be
suspected of disloyalty by one client. His
continuing to act in a double capacity strikes
deeply in the foundation of the attorney-client
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76
relationship.
Q: Hocorma Foundation filed a complaint for
disbarment against Atty. Funk who used to
work as corporate secretary, counsel, chief
executive officer, and trustee of the
foundation. He also served as its counsel in
several criminal and civil cases. Complainant
alleged that Atty. Funk filed an action for
quieting of title and damages against Hocorma
on behalf of Mabalacat Institute using
information he acquired while with the
foundation. As a defense, Atty. Funk
contended that he was hired by Don Santos to
serve as director and legal counsel. He
emphasized that, in all these, the attorney-
client relationship was always between Santos
and him. He was more of Santos’ personal
lawyer than the lawyer of Hocorma
Foundation. Did Atty. Funk betray the trust
and confidence of a former client?
A: YES. An attorney owes his client undivided
allegiance. An attorney may not, without being
guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel
for a person whose interest conflicts with that of
his present or former client. This rule is so
absolute that good faith and honest intention on
the erring lawyer’s part does not make it
inoperative. The reason for this is that a lawyer
acquires knowledge of his former client’s doings,
whether documented or not, that he would
ordinarily not have acquired were it not for the
trust and confidence that his client placed on him
in the light of their relationship. It would simply
be impossible for the lawyer to identify and erase
such entrusted knowledge with faultless
precision or lock the same into an iron box when
suing the former client on behalf of a new one
(Santos Ventura Hocorma Foundation, Inc.,
represented by Gabriel H. Abad v. Atty. Richard V.
Funk. A.C. No. 9094, August 15, 2012).
Q: R is a retained counsel of ABC Bank-Ermita
Branch. One day, his Balikbayan compadre B,
consulted him about his unclaimed deposits
with the said branch of ABC Bank, which the
bank had refused to give to him claiming that
the account had become dormant. R agreed to
file a case against the bank with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. B lost the case,
but upon the advice of R, he no longer
appealed the decision. B later discovered that
R was the retained counsel of ABC Bank-
Ermita Branch. Does B have any remedy?
 DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF A LAWYER
Discuss the legal and ethical implications of
the problem. (2014 Bar)
A: Atty. R clearly violated the rule against
representing conflicting interests (Rule 15.03,
Code of Professional Responsibility). B may file
an action to set aside the judgment on the theory
that if a lawyer is disqualified from appearing as
counsel for a party on account of conflict of
interests, he is presumed to have improperly and
prejudicially advised and represented the party
in the conduct of the litigation from beginning to
end. He may also file an action for damages
against Atty. R, aside from an administrative
complaint due to his misconduct. He was
prejudiced by the adverse decision against him,
which he no longer appealed upon the advice of
Atty. R.
Q: Mabini Colleges, Inc. (complainant), had a
Board of Trustees which was divided into two
opposing factions (Adeva Group and Lukban
Group). The Adeva Group issued an
unnumbered Board Resolution which
authorized its members to apply for a loan
with the Rural Bank of Paracale (RBP) in favor
of the complainant. The Lukban Group
opposed this.However, Atty. Pajarillo
(respondent), acting as complainant’s
corporate secretary, sent a letter to RBP to
assure the RBP of complainant's financial
capacity to pay the loan.RBP eventually
granted the loan application which was
secured by a Real Estate Mortgage over the
properties of the complainant. 3 years after,
RBP moved to foreclose the Real Estate
Mortgage. Complainant filed a complaint for
Annulment of Mortgage with a Prayer for
Preliminary Injunction against RBP.
Respondent entered his appearance as
counsel for RBP.Is Atty. Pajarillo guilty of
representing conflicting interests when he
entered his appearance as counsel for RBP?
A: YES. Indeed, respondent represented
conflicting interests in violation of Canon 15, Rule
15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which provides that "[a] lawyer shall not
represent conflicting interests except by written
consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of the facts."Clearly, complainant was
respondent's former client. And respondent
appeared as counsel of RBP in a case filed by his
former client against RBP. This makes respondent
guilty of representing conflicting interests since
respondent failed to show any written consent of
77
all concerned (particularly the complainant)
given after a full disclosure of the facts
representing conflicting interests (Mabini
Colleges, Inc. v. Atty. Pajarillo, A.C. No. 10687, July
22, 2015).
RULE 15.04, CANON 15
A lawyer may, with the written consent of
all concerned, act as mediator, conciliator
or arbitrator in setting the disputes.
RULE 15.05, CANON 15
A lawyer when advising his client, shall give
a candid and honest opinion on the merits
and probable results of the client’s case,
neither overstating nor understating the
prospects of the case.
Q: Consorcia Rollon engaged the services of
Atty. Naraval in a case for collection of sum of
money filed against her. After going over the
documents she brought with her, Atty.
Naraval agreed to be her lawyer and she was
required to pay P8,000.00 for the filing and
partial service fee. Atty. Naraval did not
inform her that the said civil suit has been
decided against her and which judgment has
long become final and executory.
Atty. Naraval was not able to act on the case.
Because of this, Rollon wanted to withdraw
the amount she has paid and to retrieve the
documents pertaining to said case.
Unfortunately, despite several follow-ups,
Atty. Naraval always said that he cannot
return the documents because they were in
their house, and that he could not give her
back the P8,000.00 because he has no money.
Did Atty. Naraval fail to fulfill his
undertakings?
A: YES. Despite his full knowledge of the finality
based on the documents furnished to him, Atty.
Naraval withheld such vital information and did
not properly apprise Rollon. He should have
given her a candid and honest opinion on the
merits and the status of the case but he withheld
such vital information. He did not inform her
about the finality of the adverse judgment.
Instead, he demanded P8,000 as “filing and
service fee” and thereby gave her hope that her
case would be acted upon.
Rule 15.05 of the Code of Professional
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
 Legal Ethics
Responsibility requires that lawyers give their
candid and best opinion to their clients on the
merit or lack of merit of the case, neither
overstating nor understating their evaluation
thereof. Knowing whether a case would have
some prospect of success is not only a function,
but also an obligation on the part of lawyers. If
they find that their client's cause is defenseless,
then it is their bounden duty to advise the latter
to acquiesce and submit, rather than to traverse
the incontrovertible (Rollon v. Naraval, A.C. No.
6424, March 4, 2005).
RULE 15.06, CANON 15
A lawyer shall not state or imply that he is
able to influence any public official, tribunal
or legislative body.
Influence-peddling
It is improper for a lawyer to show in any way
that he has connections and can influence any
tribunal or public official, judges, prosecutors,
congressmen and others, especially so if the
purpose is to enhance his legal standing and to
entrench the confidence of the client that his case
or cases are assured of victory.
Q: In a case for inhibition filed against Judge
Paas, it was found that her husband, Atty.
Renerio Paas, was using his wife's office as his
office address in his law practice. Judge Paas
admitted that Atty. Paas did use her office as
his return address for notices and orders in 2
criminal cases, lodged at the Pasay City RTC,
but only to ensure and facilitate delivery of
those notices, but after the cases were
terminated, all notices were sent to his office
address in Escolta. Was Atty. Paas’ act of using
his wife’s office as his office address
unprofessional and dishonorable?
A: YES. By allowing Atty. Paas to use the address
of her court in pleadings before other courts,
Judge Paas had indeed allowed her husband to
ride on her prestige for the purpose of advancing
his private interest.
Atty. Paas is guilty of simple misconduct because
of using a fraudulent, misleading, and deceptive
address that had no purpose other than to try to
impress either the court in which his cases are
lodged, or his client, that he has close ties to a
member of the judiciary, in violation of the Code
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
2018 GOLDEN NOTES
78
of Professional Responsibility.
The need for relying on the merits of a lawyer's
case, instead of banking on his relationship with a
member of the bench which tends to influence or
gives the appearance of influencing the court,
cannot be overemphasized. It is unprofessional
and dishonorable, to say the least, to misuse a
public office to enhance a lawyer's prestige.
Public confidence in law and lawyers may be
eroded by such reprehensible and improper
conduct (Paas v. Almarvez, A.M. No. P-03-1690,
April 4, 2003).
COMPLIANCE WITH LAWS
RULE 15.07, CANON 15
A lawyer shall impress upon his client
compliance with the laws and the principles
of fairness.
Q: Maria Cielo Suzuki entered into contracts of
sale and real estate mortgage with several
persons. The sale and mortgage transactions
were facilitated by Atty. Erwin Tiamson,
counsel of the sellers. Suzuki paid P80,000 as
her share in the expenses for registration. He
retained in his possession the subject deeds of
absolute sale and mortgage as well as the
owner's copy of the title. However, he never
registered the said documents and did not
cause the transfer of the title over the subject
property in the name of Suzuki. Atty. Tiamson
said that he did not register the deed of sale to
protect the interest of his client and even if
the same has been registered, he cannot give
him the owner's duplicate copy until purchase
price for the subject property has been fully
paid and the real estate mortgage cancelled. Is
Atty. Tiamson justified in not registering the
transaction?
A: NO. Rule 15.07 obliges lawyers to impress
upon their clients compliance with the laws and
the principle of fairness. To permit lawyers to
resort to unscrupulous practices for the
protection of the supposed rights of their clients
is to defeat one of the purposes of the State, the
administration of justice. While lawyers owe their
entire devotion to the interest of their clients and
zeal in the defense of their client's right, they
should not forget that they are, first and foremost,
officers of the court, bound to exert every effort
to assist in the speedy and efficient
 DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF A LAWYER
administration of justice. The client's interest is
amply protected by the real estate mortgage
executed by complainant. Thus, Atty. Tiamson
failed to live up to this expectation (Suzuki v.
Tiamson, A.C. No. 6542, September 30, 2005).
Q: Areola alleged that during Prisoners’ Week,
Atty. Mendoza, visited the Antipolo City Jail
and called all detainees with pending cases
before the RTC where she was assigned, to
attend her speech/lecture. Areola claimed
that Atty. Mendoza stated the following during
her speech:
“Kayong mga detenidong mga babae na no
bail ang kaso sa drugs, iyak-iyakan lang ninyo
si Judge Martin at palalayain na kayo.
Malambot ang puso noon.” Did Atty. Mendoza
commit any unethical act?
A: YES.Atty. Mendoza made it appear that the
judge is easily moved if a party resorts to
dramatic antics such as begging and crying in
order for their cases to be dismissed.
Atty. Mendoza made irresponsible advices to her
clients in violation of Rule 1.02 and Rule 15.07 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. It is the
mandate of Rule 1.02 that "a lawyer shall not
counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the
law or at lessening confidence in the legal
system." Rule 15.07 states that "a lawyer shall
impress upon his client compliance with the laws
and the principles of fairness."
Atty. Mendoza’s improper advice only lessens the
confidence of the public in our legal system.
Judges must be free to judge, without pressure or
influence from external forces or
factors according to the merits of a case. Atty.
Mendoza’s careless remark is uncalled for.
(Areola vs. Atty. Mendoza, A.C. No. 10135, January
15, 2014).
CONCURRENT PRACTICE OF
ANOTHER PROFESSION
RULE 15.08, CANON 15
A lawyer who is engaged in another
profession or occupation concurrently with
the practice of law shall make clear to his
client whether he is acting as a lawyer or in
another capacity.
This rule is intended to avoid confusion; it is for
79
the benefit of both the client and the lawyer
(Funa, 2009).
The lawyer should inform the client when he is
acting as a lawyer and when he is not, because
certain ethical considerations governing the
client-lawyer relationship may be operative in
one case and not in the other (Report of the IBP
Committee).
A party’s engagement of his counsel in another
capacity concurrent with the practice of law is not
prohibited, so long as the roles being assumed by
such counsel is made clear to the client (New
Sampaguita Builder Construction, Inc. v. Philippine
National Bank, G.R. No. 148753, July 30, 2004).
CLIENT’S MONEYS AND PROPERTIES
CANON 16
A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and
properties of his client that may come into his
possession
Money collected by the lawyer on a judgment
favorable to his client constitutes trust funds and
should be immediately paid over to the client.
While Section 37, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court
grants the lawyer a lien upon the funds,
documents and papers of his client, which have
lawfully come into his possession, such that he
may retain the same until his lawful fees and
disbursements have been paid, and apply such
funds to the satisfaction thereof, the lawyer still
has the responsibility to promptly account to his
client for such moneys received. Failure to do so
constitutes professional misconduct.
The lawyer’s failure to turn over such funds,
moneys, or properties to the client despite the
latter’s demands give rise to the presumption that
the lawyer had converted the money for his
personal use and benefit. This failure also renders
the lawyer vulnerable to judicial contempt under
Section 25, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court (CPR
Annotated, PhilJA).
Q: An adverse judgment was rendered in a
civil case against Luis de Guzman. His counsel
was Atty. Emmanuel Basa and he wanted to
challenge the decision through a petition for
certiorari. It was agreed that Luis will pay
P15,000 for said legal service. Atty. Basa
collected a down payment of P5,000. He did
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
 Legal Ethics
not seasonably file with the CA the required
appellant’s brief resulting in the dismissal of
the appeal. Despite several extensions to file
the appellant’s brief, Atty. Basa failed to do so.
Instead, he filed two more motions for
extension. When he filed the appellant’s brief,
it was late, being beyond the last extension
granted by the appellate court. Was Atty.
Emmanuel Basa negligent in the performance
of his professional duty to Luis de Guzman?
A: YES, he is guilty of gross misconduct. Where a
client gives money to his lawyer for a specific
purpose, such as to file an action or appeal an
adverse judgment, the lawyer should, upon
failure to take such step and spend the money for
it, immediately return the money to his client. His
unjustified withholding of Luis’ money is a gross
violation of the general morality and professional
ethics (De Guzman v. Atty. Emmanuel Basa, A.C.
No. 5554, June 29, 2004).
Prohibition of a Lawyer acquiring client’s
property
Pursuant to Canon 16 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Furthermore, Article 1491 of the Civil Code states
that:
“The following persons
cannot acquire or purchase, even at
public or judicial auction, either in
person or through the mediation of
another:
xxx
(5) lawyers, with respect to the
property and rights which may be the
object of any litigation in which they
take part by virtue of their profession.”
(see NCC)
NOTE: This prohibition is entirely independent of
fraud and such need not be alleged or proven. Art.
1491 (5) of the NCC applies only if the sale or
assignment of the property takes place during the
pendency of the litigation involving the client’s
property. (Ramos v. Ngaseo, A.C. No. 6210,
December 9, 2004)
Q: In an action to prevent the condominium
developer from building beyond ten (10)
floors, Judge Cerdo rendered judgment in
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
2018 GOLDEN NOTES
80
favor of the defendant developer. The
judgment became final after the plaintiffs
failed to appeal on time. Judge Cerdo and Atty.
Cocodrilo, counsel for the developer,
thereafter separately purchased a
condominium unit each from the developer.
Did Judge Cerdo and Atty. Cocodrilo commit
any act of impropriety or violate any law for
which they should be held liable or
sanctioned? (2013 Bar)
A: NO. The prohibition imposed by the Civil Code,
Art. 1491 (3), prohibiting judges and attorneys,
and that contained in the Canons of Professional
Ethics, Canon 10, with regard to purchase of any
interest in the subject matter of litigation both
refer only to instances where the property is still
the subject of the litigation.
The prohibition does not apply to instances, such
as in the problem, where the conveyance takes
place after the judgment because the property
can no longer be said to be the “subject of
litigation” (Director of Lands v. Abba, 88 SCRA
513).
FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP
RULE 16.01, CANON 1
A lawyer shall account for all money or
property collected or received for or from
the client.
A lawyer must be scrupulously careful in
handling money entrusted to him in his
professional capacity, because of the high degree
of fidelity and good faith expected on his part
(Medina v. Bautista, A.C. No. 190, September 26,
1964).
Lawyer’s inexcusable act of withholding the
property of client and imposing unwarranted fees
in exchange for release of documents deserve the
imposition of disciplinary action (Miranda v.
Carpio, A.C. No. 6281, September 26, 2011).
Q: X sought assistance to the President of the
IBP to enable him to talk to Atty. U who had
allegedly been avoiding him for more than a
year. Atty. U failed to turn–over to his client
the amount given to him by X as settlement
for a civil case. Is Atty. U guilty for violating
Canon 16 of the Code of Professional
 DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF A LAWYER
Responsibility?
A: YES. The Code of Professional Responsibility
mandates every lawyer to hold in trust all money
and properties of his client that may come into
his possession. A lawyer’s failure to return upon
demand the funds or property held by him on
behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption
that he has appropriated the same for his own
use to the prejudice of, and in violation of the
trust reposed in him by, his client. The relation
between attorney and client is highly fiduciary in
nature. Being such, it requires utmost good faith,
loyalty, fidelity and disinterestedness on the part
of the attorney. Its fiduciary nature is intended
for the protection of the client (Espiritu v. Ulep,
A.C. No. 5808, May 4, 2005).
Q: Atty. Sanicas represented Viray in a labor
case filed against Sps. Lopez. The Labor
Arbiter decided in favor of Viray and awarded
him a total of Php189, 491. 60. A writ of
execution was issued and implemented for
the collection of the award. However, upon
the execution of the writ, Viray discovered
that Atty. Sanicas had already received Php95,
000 from Sps. Lopez by misrepresenting that
he was authorized to receive the same. Viray
then demanded the remittance of the amount.
Due to Atty. Sanicas’ refusal, Viray instituted
an administrative case against him. In his
defense, Atty. Sanicas claimed that he has a
lien over the award as his Atty.’s fees. Will the
case prosper?
A: YES, it will prosper. The Code of Professional
Responsibility demands the utmost degree of
fidelity and good faith in dealing with the moneys
entrusted to lawyers because of their fiduciary
relationship." Specifically, Rule 16.01 of the Code
imposes upon the lawyer the duty to "account for
all money or property collected or received for or
from the client." Rule 16.03 thereof, on the other
hand, mandates that "a lawyer shall deliver the
funds xx x of his client when due or upon
demand." The fact that a lawyer has a lien for his
attorney's fees on the money in his hands
collected for his client does not relieve him from
the obligation to make a prompt accounting."
Moreover, a lawyer has no right "to unilaterally
appropriate his client's money for himself by the
mere fact alone that the client owes him
attorney's fees (Viray v. Sanicas, A.C. No. 7337,
Sept 29, 2014).
81
Fiduciary duty
The principle that an attorney derives no undue
advantage that may operate to the prejudice or
cause an occasion for loss of a client refers to
fiduciary duty. The relationship between the
lawyer and the client is one of mutual trust and
confidence of the highest degree.
Instances when civil liability of lawyers arises
1. Client is prejudiced by lawyer's negligence or
misconduct;
2. Breach of fiduciary obligation;
3. Civil liability to third persons;
4. Libelous words in pleadings;
5. violation of communication privilege;
6. Liability for costs of suit (Treble Costs) –
when lawyer is made liable for insisting on
client's patently unmeritorious case or
interposing appeal merely to delay litigation
Remedy of the client
Recover property from lawyer, together with its
fruits, subject to client’s returning to his lawyer
the purchase price thereof and the legal interests
thereon.
Exemption from liability
A lawyer is exempted from liability for slander,
libel or for words otherwise defamatory,
published in the course of judicial proceedings,
provided the statements are connected with,
relevant, pertinent and material to the cause in
hand or subject of inquiry.
NOTE: Test of relevancy – The matter to which the
privilege does not extend must be palpably
wanting in relation to the subject of controversy,
that no reasonable man can doubt its relevancy or
propriety.
Criminal liability of lawyers
A lawyer may be held criminally liable if he
commits any of the following:
1. Causes prejudice to the client thru malicious
breach of professional duty or thru
inexcusable negligence or ignorance;
2. Reveals client’s secrets learned in lawyer’s
professional capacity thru malicious breach
of professional duty or inexcusable
negligence or ignorance;
3. A lawyer who has undertaken the defense of
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
 Legal Ethics
a client or has received confidential
information from said client in a case may be
criminally liable for undertaking defense of
opposing party in same cause without
consent of first client (Art. 209, RPC);
4. A lawyer who shall knowingly introduce in
evidence in any judicial proceeding or to the
damage of another or who, with intent to
cause such damage, shall use any false
document may be held criminally liable
therefore (Art. 172, RPC); and
5. A lawyer who appropriates his client’s funds
may be held liable for estafa.
NOTE: When a lawyer collects or receives money
from his client for a particular purpose, he should
promptly account to the client how the money
was spent. His failure either to render an
accounting or to return the money (if the
intended purpose of the money does not
materialize) constitutes a blatant disregard of
Rule 16.01 of the CPR (Belleza v. Malaca, A.C. No.
7815, July 23, 2009).
Costs of Suit
GR: Losing client and not the lawyer is liable for
costs of suit in favor of prevailing party, the
lawyer not being a party-litigant.
XPN: Where the lawyer insisted on client’s
patently unmeritorious case or interposed an
appeal to delay litigation or thwart prompt
satisfaction of prevailing party’s just and valid
claim, the court may adjudge lawyer to pay treble
costs of suit.
CO-MINGLING OF FUNDS
RULE 16.02, CANON 16
A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client
separate and apart from his own and those
of others kept by him.
Failure of the lawyer to account all the funds and
property of his client which may come into his
possession would amount to misappropriation
which may subject him to disbarment on the
ground of grave misconduct or a criminal
prosecution for estafa under Art. 315, par. 1(b) of
the RPC.
Q: BPI filed two complaints for replevin and
damages against Esphar Medical Center Inc.
and its President Cesar Espiritu. Espiritu
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
2018 GOLDEN NOTES
82
engaged the services of Atty. Juan Cabredo IV.
While these cases were pending, the latter
advised Esphar to remit money and update
payments to the bank through the trial court.
Accordingly, Esphar's representative
delivered a total of P51,161.00 to Atty.
Cabredo's office. However, the management of
Esphar found out that he did not deliver said
money to the court or to the bank. Did Atty.
Caredo commit a breach of trust?
A: YES. His act amounted to deceit in violation of
his oath. The relationship between a lawyer and a
client is highly fiduciary; it requires a high degree
of fidelity and good faith. Hence, in dealing with
trust property, a lawyer should be very
scrupulous. Money or other trust property of the
client coming into the possession of the lawyer
should be reported by the latter and account any
circumstances, and should not be commingled
with his own or be used by him (Espiritu v.
Cabredo IV, A.C. No. 5831, January 13, 2003).
DELIVERY OF FUNDS
RULE 16.03, CANON 16
A lawyer shall deliver the funds and
property of his client when due or upon
demand. However, he shall have a lien over
the funds and may apply so much thereof as
may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees
and disbursements, giving notice promptly
thereafter to his client. He shall also have a
lien to the same extent on all judgments and
executions he has secured for his client as
provided for in the Rules of Court.
Counsel cannot unilaterally retain client’s
property for his attorney’s lien
A counsel has no right to retain or appropriate
unilaterally as lawyer’s lien any amount
belonging to his client which may come into his
possession (Cabigao v. Rodrigo, 57 Phil. 20).
NOTE: While this rule provides that the lawyer
has the right to retain the funds of his client as
may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and
disbursements known as attorney’s lien
and his lien to the same extent on all judgments
and executions he has secured for his client called
charging lien, he is still duty bound to render an
accounting of his client’s funds and property
which may come into his possession in the course
of his professional employment In the application
 DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF A LAWYER
of attorney’s lien, a lawyer shall give notice to his
client otherwise, the same might be construed as
misappropriation which may subject him to
disciplinary action (Antiquiera, 2007).
Q: Fernandez engaged the services of Atty.
Cabrera II to handle the cases of her
associates in Baguio City. After taking hold of
the records of the cases that Fernandez
entrusted to him and after getting initially
paid for the services he would render, Atty.
Cabrera II suddenly disappeared and could no
longer be located in his given address or in
the addresses that Fernandez gathered. Did
Atty. Cabrera II violate the Code of
Professional Responsibility when he accepted
the records and money of the complainant
and thereafter failed to render his services?
A: YES. Acceptance of money from a client
establishes an attorney-client relationship and
gives rise to the duty of fidelity to the client's
cause. The Canons of Professional Responsibility
require that once an attorney agrees to handle a
case, he should undertake the task with zeal, care,
and utmost devotion.
Atty. Cabrera's action projects his appalling
indifference to his client's cause and a brazen
disregard of his duties as a lawyer. Not only did
he fail to render service of any kind, he also
absconded with the records of the cases with
which he was entrusted. Then to top it all, he kept
the money complainant paid to him. Such conduct
is unbecoming of a member of the bar, for a
lawyer's professional and personal conduct must
at all times be kept beyond reproach and above
suspicion. (Fernandez v. Atty. Cabrera II, A.C. No.
5623, December 11, 2003).
Q: Campos engaged the services of Atty.
Estebal in securing tourist visas to US. Campos
paid a total of Php345,000; however, Atty.
Estebal failed to apply or secure for him the
U.S. tourist visa that he promised. Thus, he
demanded for the return of his money. For
failure to return his money, Campos instituted
an administrative case against Atty. Estebal.
Will the case prosper?
A: YES, it will prosper. There is hardly any doubt
that Atty. Estebal’s act of receiving such
substantial sums from complainants without in
the least intending to honor his word to secure
the U.S. tourist visas that he promised to get for
83
them constitutes a breach of his professional
responsibility. Rule 16.03 provides that A lawyer
shall deliver the funds and property of his client
when due or upon demand. By mismanaging the
fund of his client and failure to return the money
intended for securing US visas, Atty. Estebal failed
to observe honesty and good faith in his dealings
with them (Campos, Jr., Atty. Estebal, A.C. No.
10443, Aug. 8, 2016).
Q: Soliman engaged the services of Atty.
Amboy in connection with a partition case. No
case was filed as the other co-owners were
amenable to the partition. Instead, Atty.
Amboy just facilitated the issuance of the
titles to the said property. Atty. Amboy then
told Soliman that someone from the Register
of Deeds can help expedite the issuance of the
titles for a fee of P50,000.00 which Soliman
deposited to Atty. Amboy’s bank account as
payment for the latter’s contact. However,
Atty. Amboy failed to deliver the respective
certificates of title. Soliman claimed that Atty.
Amboy thereafter refused to release the
pertinent documents she gave to her for the
processing of the titles to the property or give
back the P50,000.00 that was already paid to
her. Did Atty. Amboy violate the Code of
Professional Responsibility?
A: YES, Atty. Amboy violated the Code. Upon
inquiry, the supposed contact denied having
received any amount from Atty. Amboy. In not
returning the money to Soliman after a demand
therefor was made following her failure to
procure the issuance of the certificates of title,
Atty. Amboy violated Canon 16, particularly Rule
16.03 thereof, which requires that a lawyer shall
deliver the funds and property of his client upon
demand. A lawyer’s failure to return upon demand
the funds held by him on behalf of his client gives
rise to the presumption that he has appropriated
the same for his own use in violation of the trust
reposed in him by his client (Soliman v. Amboy, A.C.
No. 10568 January 13, 2015).
BORROWING OR LENDING
RULE 16.04, CANON 16
A lawyer shall not borrow money from his
client unless the client's interest are fully
protected by the nature of the case or by
independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer
lend money to a client except, when in the
interest of justice, he has to advance
necessary expenses in a legal matter he is
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
 Legal Ethics
handling for the client.
A lawyer who takes advantage of his client’s
financial plight to acquire the latter’s properties
for his own benefit is of the confidence of the
public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the
legal profession (Hernandez, Jr. v. Go A.C. No. 1526,
January 31, 2005).
Prohibition from BORROWING money from
client
GR: A lawyer is not allowed to borrow money
from his client.
XPN: The client’s interests are fully protected by
the nature of the case or by independent advice.
Prohibition of LENDING money to client
GR: A lawyer is not allowed to lend money to his
client.
XPN: When in the interest of justice, he has to
advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he
is handling for the client (Rule 16.04, CPR).
NOTE: The prohibition from lending is intended
to assure the lawyer’s independent professional
judgment, for if the lawyer acquires a financial
interest in the outcome of the case, the free
exercise of his judgment may be adversely
affected.
Q: Atty. Lozada was the retained counsel and
legal adviser of Frias. Atty. Lozada persuaded
Frias to sell her house, the former acting as
broker since she was in need of money. The
prospective buyer paid 3 million where Atty.
Lozada took 1 million as her commission
without Frias’ consent. The buyer backed out
from the sale and filed a case against Frias for
the return of the purchase price. Frias claimed
that her failure to return the money was
because of Atty. Lozada’s refusal to give
back the 1 million she took as commission. A
case was filed by Frias against Atty. Lozada
but despite the favorable decision, Atty.
Lozada refused to return the money.
Atty. Lozada claimed that since she did not
have enough money, Frias requested her to
sell or mortgage the property and offered her
a loan, commission and attorney’s fees on the
basis of the selling price. Did Atty. Lozada
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84
commit a violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility in asking for a loan from her
client?
A: YES. Her act of borrowing money from a client
was a violation of Canon 16.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
A lawyer’s act of asking a client for a loan, as what
respondent did, is very unethical. It comes within
those acts considered as abuse of client’s
confidence. The canon presumes that the client is
disadvantaged by the lawyer’s ability to use all
the legal maneuverings to renege on her
obligation (Frias v. Lozada, A.C. NO. 6656,
December 13, 2005),
NOTE: The principle behind Rule 16.04 is to
prevent the lawyer from taking advantage of his
influence over the client or to avoid acquiring a
financial interest in the outcome of the case.
FIDELITY TO CLIENT’S CAUSE
CANON 17
A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his
client and he shall be mindful of the trust
and confidence reposed in him.
Q: Matias Lagramada residing with his uncle,
Apolonio Lagramada, was invited by the latter
to accompany him to the police station,
supposedly to pick up a refrigerator they were
to repair. Upon their arrival there, Matias was
immediately taken in and locked behind bars.
Two sets of information were filed against
him only 10 months after the first day of his
incarceration. With the assistance of counsel,
Matias pleaded not guilty when arraigned,
without raising the invalidity of the arrest.
Was the case properly handled?
A: NO. Lawyers owe fidelity to the cause of their
clients and must be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in them. Matias’ counsel, in
the spirit of safeguarding his client’s rights,
should have taken the necessary steps to correct
the situation. However, he allowed his client to
enter a plea during the latter’s arraignment
without raising the invalidity of arrest. Thus, the
former effectively waived his client’s right to
question its validity. Defense counsels are
expected to spare no effort to save the accused
from unrighteous incarcerations.
 DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF A LAWYER
Matias’ counsel should have not only
perfunctorily represented his client during the
pendency of the case, but should have kept in
mind his duty to render effective legal assistance
and true service by protecting the latter’s rights
at all times (People v. Lagramada, G.R. Nos.
146357 & 148170, August 29, 2002).
Q: Complainants engaged the services of Atty.
Guaren for the titling of a residential lot they
acquired in Bonbon, Nueva Caseres. They
alleged that Atty. Guaren took all the
pertinent documents relative to the titling of
their lot; that they always reminded Atty.
Guaren about the case and each time he would
say that the titling was in progress; that they
became bothered by the slow progress of the
case so they demanded the return of the
money they paid. Despite the acceptance of
P7,000, Atty. Guaren failed to perform his
obligation and allowing 5 years to elapse
without any progress in the titling of
complainants’ lot. Did Atty. Guaren violate the
Code of Professional Responsibility?
A:YES. The Supreme Court reiterated that the
practice of law is not a business. It is a profession
in which duty to public service, not money, is the
primary consideration. Lawyering is not
primarily meant to be a money-making venture,
and law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily
yields profits. The gaining of a livelihood should
be a secondary consideration. The duty to public
service and to the administration of justice
should be the primary consideration of lawyers,
who must subordinate their personal interests or
what they owe to themselves. Atty. Guaren
breached his duty to serve his client with
competence and diligence when he neglected a
legal matter entrusted to him. Thus, Atty. Guaren
violated Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and was suspended
from the practice of law for six months (Brunet v.
Guaren, A.C. No. 10164, March 10, 2014).
COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE
CANON 18
A lawyer shall serve his client with
competence and diligence.
Diligence is the attention and care required of a
person in a given situation and is the opposite of
negligence. It is axiomatic in the practice of law
85
that the price of success is eternal diligence to the
cause of the client (Edquibal v. Ferrer, A.C. No.
5687, February 3, 2005).
Degree of diligence required in the profession
The legal profession demands of a lawyer that
degree of vigilance and attention of a good father
of a family (Lapena, 2009) or ordinary pater
familias (Pineda, 2009). He is not required to
exercise extraordinary diligence (Edquibal v.
Ferrer, Jr., A.C. No. 5687, February 3, 2005).
Q: In a criminal case for rape with homicide,
the accused pleaded guilty. However, the
three PAO lawyers assigned as counsel de
oficio did not advise their client of the
consequences of pleading guilty; one PAO
lawyer left the courtroom during trial and
thus was not able to cross-examine the
prosecution witnesses. The other postponed
the presentation of evidence for the defense,
and when he appeared, he said he would rely
solely on the plea of guilty, in the belief that it
would lower the penalty to reclusion perpetua.
Should the three PAO lawyers be disciplined?
A: YES. All three (3) of them displayed manifest
disinterest on the plight of their client. They
lacked vigor and dedication to their work. Canon
18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
requires every lawyer to serve his client with
utmost dedication, competence and diligence. He
must not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him,
and his negligence in this regard renders him
administratively liable. Obviously, in the instant
case, the defense lawyers did not protect, much
less uphold, the fundamental rights of the
accused. Instead, they haphazardly performed
their function as counsel de officio to the
detriment and prejudice of the accused Sevilleno,
however guilty he might have been found to be
after trial (People v. Sevilleno, G.R. No. 129058,
March 29, 1999).
Q: Sanchez charged Atty. Aguilos with
misconduct for the latter’s refusal to return
the amount she had paid for his professional
services. She avers that Atty. Aguilos
demanded the full payment of his fee before
working on the case; that the lawyer
contemplated to file a petition for legal
separation instead of petition for annulment,
of which the latter is the main consideration
for his professional employment yet Atty.
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
 Legal Ethics
Aguilos further asked for a higher acceptance
fee for the latter. Sanchez subsequently
withdrew the case and demanded the refund
of the amounts paid less the amounts
corresponded to the services he already
performed but Atty. Aguilos refused. Is Atty.
Aguilos liable for misconduct?
A: YES. Aguilos was liable for misconduct, and he
should be ordered to return the entire amount
received from the client. As the foregoing findings
reveal, he did not know the distinction between
the grounds for legal separation and for
annulment of marriage. Such knowledge would
have been basic and expected of him as a lawyer
accepting a professional engagement for either
causes of action. The case unquestionably
contemplated by the parties and for which his
services was engaged, was no other than an
action for annulment of the complainant's
marriage with her husband with the intention of
marrying her British fiancee. They did not
contemplate legal separation at all, for legal
separation would still render her incapacitated to
re-marry. That the respondent was insisting in
his answer that he had prepared a petition for
legal separation, and that she had to pay more as
attorney's fees if she desired to have the action
for annulment was, therefore, beyond
comprehension other than to serve as a hallow
afterthought to justify his claim for services
rendered. Aguilos failed to live up to the
standards imposed on him as an attorney. He
thus transgressed Canon 18, and Rules 18.01,
18.02 and 18.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.(Sanchez v. Aguilos, A.C. No. 10543,
March 16, 2016)
Q: Ferrer was accused of raping his 11-year-
old stepdaughter. Ferrer’s counsel of record
was PAO's Atty. Macabanding. During the pre-
trial, both of them failed to appear. Ferrer was
considered by the court as having jumped
bail. Trial in absentia followed where Ferrer
was assisted by another PAO lawyer, Atty.
Alonto. Atty. Macabanding did not appear in
all the subsequent hearings of the case. He did
not inform the court of his whereabouts.
Ferrer was found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged and imposed upon
him the death penalty. Did Atty. Macabanding
live up to the demands expected from a
counsel de oficio?
A: NO. Canon 18 of the CPR requires every lawyer
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
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86
to serve his client with utmost dedication,
competence and diligence. He must not neglect a
legal matter entrusted to him. For all intents,
purposes and appearances, Atty. Macabanding
abandoned his client, an accused who stands to
face the death penalty. Ferrer was not properly
and effectively accorded the right to counsel.
While he faced the daunting task of defending an
accused that had jumped bail, this unfortunate
development is not a justification to excuse him
from giving his heart and soul to the latter's
defense. The exercise of their duties as counsel de
oficio meant rendering full meaning and reality to
the constitutional precepts protecting the rights
of the accused (People v. Ferrer, G.R. No. 148821,
July 18, 2003).
Instances of Lawyer’s lack of Diligence and
their resulting consequences
1. Lawyer failed to file his client’s position
paper which caused the client to be
default in an ejectment case. The
complainant’s appeal was also denied
since the lawyer failed to file an appeal
memorandum. The lawyer was
DISBARRED (Enriquez v. Atty. Lavadia,
A.C. No. 5686, June 16, 2015).
2. Lawyer failed to file his client’s position
paper and he did not inform the
complainant that his case was dismissed
by the court. The lawyer was suspended
from practice of law for three
years(Olvida v. Atty. Gonzales, A.C. No.
5732, June 16, 2015)
3. The lawyer’s services were availed in
order to file a petition for adoption of a
minor child but he failed to perform
anything related to the case despite the
lapse of one year. The lawyer was
SUSPENDED for a period of three years
(Sps. Lopez, Atty. Limos, A.C. No. 7618,
February 2, 2016).
4. Lawyer failed to file a motion for
reconsideration on behalf of his client
and further neglected to regularly update
his clients on the status of the case. The
lawyer was SUSPENDED for two years
(Ramiscal v. Atty. Orro, A.C. No. 10945,
February 23, 2016).
 DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF A LAWYER
COLLABORATING COUNSEL
Rule 18.01, Canon 18
A lawyer shall not undertake a legal service
which he knows or should know that he is
not qualified to render. However, he may
render such service if, with the consent of
his client, he can obtain as collaborating
counsel a lawyer who is competent on the
matter.
The lawyer’s acceptance, whether for a fee or not,
is an implied representation that he possesses the
requisite degree of academic learning, skill and
ability to handle the case.
He is therefore directed not to take legal services,
which he knows or should know he is not
qualified or competent to render except if his
client consents, the lawyer can take as
collaborating counsel another lawyer who is
competent on the matter.
Q: When is professional incompetence a
ground for disbarment under the Rules of
Court? Explain. (2010 Bar)
A: Professional incompetence of a lawyer may be
a special ground for disbarment if his
incompetence is so total, gross and serious that
he cannot be entrusted with the duty to protect
the rights of his clients. “A lawyer shall not
undertake a legal service where he knows or
should know that he is not qualified to render”
(Rule 18.01, CPR). If he does so, it constitutes
malpractice or gross misconduct in office which
are grounds for suspension or disbarment under
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
Collaborating Counsel
One who is subsequently engaged to assist a
lawyer already handling a particular case for a
client (Pineda, 2009).
NOTE: The handling lawyer cannot just take
another counsel without the consent of the client.
The new lawyer on the other hand cannot just
enter his appearance as collaborating counsel
without the conformity of the first counsel.
ADEQUATE PREPARATION
87
RULE 18.02, CANON 18
A lawyer shall not handle any legal matter
without adequate preparation.
A lawyer should prepare his pleadings with great
care and circumspection. He should refrain from
using abrasive and offensive language, for it
merely weakens rather than strengthens the
force of legal reasoning and detracts from its
persuasiveness. In preparing a complaint for
damages, counsel for plaintiff should allege and
state the specific amounts claimed not only in the
body of the complaint but also in the prayer, so
that the proper docket fees can be assessed and
paid (Fernandez v. Atty. Novero, A.C. No. 5394,
December 2, 2002).
The counsel must constantly keep in mind that
his actions or omissions, even malfeasance and
nonfeasance would be binding to his client.
Verily, a lawyer owes to the client the exercise of
utmost prudence and responsibility in
representation (Fernandez v. Atty. Novero, A.C. No.
5394, December 2, 2002).
NEGLIGENCE
RULE 18.03, CANON 18
A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him
liable.(1998, 2002 Bar Questions)
A lawyer is enjoined not to neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable. It is
the duty of the lawyer to serve his client with
competence and diligence and he should exert his
best efforts to protect within the bounds of the
law, the interest of his client (Vda. De Enriquez v.
San Jose, 516 SCRA 486).
Diligence required
Prone to err like any other human being, he is not
answerable for every error or mistake, and will
be protected as long as he acts honestly and in
good faith to the best of skill and knowledge. An
attorney is not expected to know all the laws. He
is not liable for disbarment for an honest mistake
or error. He is not an insurer of the result in a
case where he is engaged in as counsel. Only
ordinary care and diligence are required of him
(Pineda, 2009).
NOTE: What amounts to carelessness or
negligence in a lawyer’s discharge of his duty to
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
 Legal Ethics
client is incapable of exact formulation. It will
depend upon the circumstances of the case.
Instances of negligence by attorneys
1. Failure to appeal to CA despite instructions by
the client to do so constitutes inexcusable
negligence on the part of the counsel (Abiero v.
Juanino, A.C. No. 5302, February 18, 2005).
2. Even if a lawyer was "honestly and sincerely"
protecting the interests of his client, the former
still had no right to waive the appeal without the
latter's knowledge and consent (Abay v. Atty.
Montesino, A.C. No. 5718, December 4, 2003).
Q: Are the mistakes or negligence of a lawyer
binding upon the client? (1998, 2000, 2002
Bar)
GR: Client is bound by attorney’s conduct,
negligence and mistake in handling a case or in
the management of litigation and in procedural
technique, and he cannot complain that the result
might have been different had his lawyer
proceeded differently.
XPNs: [LIPIG]
1. Lack of acquaintance with technical aspect of
procedure;
2. When adherence thereto results in
outright deprivation of client’s liberty or
property or where Interest of justice so
requires;
3. Where error by counsel is Purely technical
which does not substantially affect client’s
cause;
4. Ignorance, incompetence, or inexperience of
lawyer is so great and error so serious that
client, who has a good cause, is prejudiced
and denied a day in court; and
5. Gross negligence of lawyer.
NOTE: If by reason of the lawyer’s negligence,
actual loss has been caused to his client, the latter
has a cause of action against him for damages.
However, for the lawyer to be held liable, his
failure to exercise reasonable care, skill and
diligence must be proximate cause of the loss.
Q: Atty. Macalalad was introduced to Atty.
Solidon by a mutual acquaintance. Solidon
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asked Atty. Macalalad to handle the judicial
titling of a parcel of land located in Samar and
owned by Atty. Solidon’s relatives. For a
consideration of P80,000.00, Atty. Macalalad
accepted the task to be completed within a
period of eight months. Atty. Macalalad
received P50,000.00 as initial payment; the
remaining balance of P30,000.00 was to be
paid when Atty. Solidon received the
certificate of title to the property. Atty.
Macalalad has not filed any petition for
registration over the property sought to be
titled up to the present time. Is he guilty of
violating the CPR?
A: YES. Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. The mere failure of
the lawyer to perform the obligations due to the
client is considered per se a violation. A lawyer so
engaged to represent a client bears the
responsibility of protecting the latter’s interest
with utmost diligence. Accordingly, competence,
not only in the knowledge of law, but also in the
management of the cases by giving these cases
appropriate attention and due preparation, is
expected from a lawyer. Atty. Macalalad failed to
act as he committed when he failed to file the
required petition (Solidon v. Macalalad, A.C. No.
8158, February 24, 2010).
Q: Malangas engaged the services of Atty.
Zaide to file a civil case for damages against
Alfeche and NEMA. Atty. Zaide received an
acceptance fee of 20, 000 and filing fee of
50,000. The case was dismissed because of
failure to prosecute as Atty. Zaide did not
attend the hearings conducted by the RTC.
Consequently, an administrative case was
filed against Atty. Zaide. Will the case
prosper?
A: Yes, it will prosper. Rule 18.03 provides that a
lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted
to him and his negligence in connection therewith
shall render him liable. By his failure to appear at
the hearings in connection therewith, Atty. Zaide
unduly delayed the case as the trial court had to
postpone the hearings thereon, and this, in turn,
naturally arrested the progress of the case insofar
as NEMA was concerned (Datu Ismael Malangas,
Atty. Zaide, A.C. No. 10675, May 31, 2016).
Q:Spouses Santander filed a civil suit for
damages against Congressional Village
 DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF A LAWYER
Homeowner’s Association and Ely Mabanag.
Atty. Jimenez was the counsel of record and
handling lawyer for the association. The RTC
rendered a decision in favor of the Sps.
Santander. The CA dismissed the appeal on
the ground that the original period to file the
appellant’s brief had expired 95 days before
the first motion for extension of time to file
said brief was filed. Some members of the
association filed a Complaint for Disbarment
against Atty. Jimenez. In his defense, Atty.
Jimenez alleged that the members have no
personality to file the disbarment complaint
as they were not his clients. Is Atty. Jimenez
liable for violating Rule 18.03 and Canon 18 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility?
A: YES, Atty. Jimenez is liable. His failure to file
the appellant’s brief within the period provided
by law violates Canon 18 of the CPR. Atty. Jimenez
had filed with the CA an Urgent Motion for
Extension stating that a previous motion had
been filed but “due to the health condition of the
undersigned counsel…he was not able to finish
said Appellant’s Brief within the fifteen day
period earlier requested by him.” It is clear that
Atty. Jimenez was indeed in charge of the case. A
lawyer representing a client bears the
responsibility of protecting the client’s interest
with utmost diligence (Figueras v. Jimenez, A.C.
No. 9116, March 12, 2014).
Q: The Warriner Spouses secured the services
of Atty. Dublin to file a complaint for damages
against E.B. Villarosa& Partner Co. Ltd. before
the RTC. However, Atty. Dublin allowed the
time to lapse for the filing of the Formal Offer
of Documentary Evidence. An administrative
case was filed against Atty. Dublin, with him
reasoning out that the claims of his clients
were fabricated. Is he guilty of mishandling
the case of the spouses?
A: YES. Atty. Dublinis liable for mishandling the
case. He failed to serve his clients with
competence and diligence when he failed to
submit the necessary documents on time and
even failed to oppose the motion to dismiss of
E.B. Villarosa& Partner Co. Ltd. The issue on
whether or not his client’s claims are fabricated
are of no matter to his case, because he is allowed
to withdraw as counsel when the client insists
that a lawyer pursue immoral or illegal conduct.
Finally, as an officer of the court, he is proscribed
from disobeying and disrespecting court orders
89
and processes (Spouses Warriner v. Atty. Dublin,
A.C. No. 5239, Nov. 18, 2013).
DUTY TO APPRISE CLIENT
RULE 18.04, CANON 18
A lawyer shall keep the client informed of
the status of his case and shall respond
within a reasonable time to the client’s
request for information.
A lawyer should notify his client of the adverse
decision while within the period to appeal to
enable the client to decide whether to seek an
appellate review. He should communicate with
him concerning the withdrawal of appeal with all
its adverse consequences. The client is entitled to
the fullest disclosure of the mode or manner by
which his interest is defended or why certain
steps are taken or omitted.
Q: Spouses Garcia engaged the services of
Atty. Rolando Bala to appeal to the CA the
adverse decision of the Department of
Agrarian Relations Adjudication Board
(DARAB). Instead, he erroneously filed a
Notice of Appeal. During one instance when
the spouses had called on him to ask for a
copy of the supposed appeal, Atty. Bala
uttered unsavory words against them.
Because of his error, the prescribed period for
filing the petition lapsed, to the prejudice of
his clients. Did Atty. Bala violate any ethical
rules?
A: YES. Rule 18.04 states that a "lawyer shall
keep the client informed of the status of his case
and shall respond within a reasonable time to the
client's request for information." Accordingly, the
spouses had the right to be updated on the
developments and status of the case for which
they had engaged the services of Atty. Bala. But
he apparently denied them that right. Having
become aware of the wrong remedy he had
erroneously taken, he purposely evaded his
clients, refused to update them on the appeal, and
misled them as to his whereabouts. Moreover, he
uttered invectives at them when they visited him
for an update on the case. (Spouses Garcia v. Bala,
A.C. No. 5039, November 25, 2005)
Q: Sps. Ramiscals engaged the legal services of
Atty. Edgar S. Orro to handle a case in which
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
 Legal Ethics
they were the defendants seeking the
declaration of the nullity of title to a parcel of
land. Upon receiving the P10,000.00
acceptance fee from them, Orro handled the
trial of the case until RTC decided it in their
favor. When the case reached CA, Orro
requested from the spouses an additional
amount of P30,000.00 for the preparation and
submission of their appellees’ brief. Later on,
the CA reversed the decision of the RTC. Orro
did not inform the Ramiscals of the adverse
decision of the CA which they only learned
about from their neighbors. They endeavored
to communicate with Orro but their efforts
were initially in vain. When they finally
reached him, he asked an additional
P7,000.00 from them as his fee in filing a
motion for reconsideration in their behalf,
albeit telling them that such motion would
already be belated. They later discovered that
he did not file the motion for reconsideration;
hence, the decision attained finality,
eventually resulting in the loss of their
property. Did Atty. Orro competently and
diligently discharge his duties as a lawyer?
A: NO.Every lawyer, upon becoming a member of
the Philippine Bar, solemnly takes the Lawyer’s
Oath, by which he vows, among others, that: "I
will delay no man for money or malice, and will
conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best
of my knowledge and discretion, with all good
fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients." If he
should violate the vow, he contravenes the Code
of Professional Responsibility, particularly its
Canon 17, and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of Canon 18.
As an essential part of their highly fiduciary
relationship, the client is entitled to the periodic
and full updates from the lawyer on the
developments of the case. Updating the clients
could have prevented their substantial prejudice
by enabling them to engage another competent
lawyer to handle their case. As it happened, his
neglect in that respect lost for them whatever
legal remedies were then available. His various
omissions manifested his utter lack of
professionalism towards them. (Ramiscal v. Orro,
A.C. No. 10945, February 23, 2016)
NOTE: The lawyer is obliged to respond within a
reasonable time to a client's request for
information. A client is entitled to the fullest
disclosure of the mode or manner by which that
client's interest is defended or why certain steps
are taken or omitted. A lawyer who repeatedly
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90
fails to answer the inquiries or communications
of a client violates the rules of professional
courtesy and neglects the client's interests
(Villariasa-Reisenbeck v. Abarrientos, A.C. No.
6238, November 4, 2004).
Doctrine of imputed knowledge
The knowledge acquired by an attorney during
the time that he is acting within the scope of his
authority is imputed to the client. It is based on
the assumption that an attorney, who has notice
of matter affecting his client, has communicated
the same to his principal in the course of
professional dealings.
NOTE: The doctrine applies regardless of
whether or not the lawyer actually communicated
to the client what he learned in his professional
capacity, the attorney and his client being one
judicial person.
Notice to counsel is notice to client, but not
vice versa if the latter appeared by attorney
GR: The law requires that service of any notice
upon a party who has appeared by attorney shall
be made upon his attorney. Notice sent to a party
who has appeared by counsel is not notice in law,
it being immaterial that the client actually
received the notice or volunteered to get a copy
thereof.
XPNs:
1. Strict application might foster dangerous
collusion to the detriment of justice;
2. Service of notice upon party instead of upon
his attorney is ordered by the court;
3. Notice of pre-trial is required to be served
upon parties and their respective lawyers;
and
4. In appeal from the lower court to the RTC,
upon docketing of appeal.
REPRESENTATION WITH ZEAL
WITHIN LEGAL BOUNDS
CANON 19
A lawyer shall represent his client with zeal
within the bounds of the law
When a lawyer accepts a case, whether for a fee or
not, his acceptance is an implied representation
that he: [CASE]
 DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF A LAWYER
1. will exercise reasonable and ordinary Care
and diligence in the pursuit or defense of the
case;
2. will possess the requisite degree of Academic
learning, skill and ability in the practice of his
profession;
3. will take steps as will adequately Safeguard
his client’s interests; and
4. will Exert his best judgment in the
prosecution or defense of the litigation
entrusted to him (Islas v. Platon, G.R. No. L-
23183, December 29, 1924).
Authority to appear in court is presumed
GR: A lawyer is presumed to be properly
authorized to represent any cause in which he
appears.
XPN: On motion of either party and on reasonable
grounds, the presiding judge may require an
attorney to prove the authority under which he
appears (Sec. 21, Rule 138, RRC).
Voluntary appearance of lawyer without
authority
An attorney may not appear for a person until he
is in fact employed by, or retained for such
person. An attorney willfully appearing in court
for a person without being employed, unless by
leave of court, may be punished for contempt as
an officer of the court, who has misbehaved in his
official transactions (Sec. 26, Rule 138).
Effects of unauthorized appearance
1. The party represented is not bound by
attorney’s appearance in the case neither by
the judgment rendered therein;
2. Court does not acquire jurisdiction over the
person of the party represented;
3. The adverse party who has been forced to
litigate as a defendant by the unauthorized
action on the part of the attorney for the
plaintiff may, on that ground, move for the
dismissal of the complaint; and
4. If unauthorized appearance is willful,
attorney may be cited for contempt as an
officer of the court who has misbehaved in
his official transactions, and he may be
disciplined for professional misconduct.
Ratification of unauthorized appearance
1. Express– Categorized assertion by client that
91
he has authorized a lawyer or that he
confirms his authorization to represent him
in the case.
2. Implied– Where party with knowledge of
fact that a lawyer has been representing him
in a case, accepts benefits of representation
or fails to promptly repudiate the assumed
authority.
Requisites of implied ratification by silence
1. The party represented by the attorney is of
age or competent or if he suffers from any
disability, he has a duly appointed guardian
or legal representative;
2. The party or his guardian, as the case may be,
is aware of the attorney’s representation; and
3. He fails to promptly repudiate assumed
authority.
Extent of lawyer’s authority in litigation
A lawyer has authority to bind the client in all
matters of ordinary judicial procedure. The cause
of action, the claim or demand sued upon and the
subject matter of the litigation are within the
exclusive control of the client. A client may waive,
surrender, dismiss, or compromise any of his
rights involved in litigation in favor of the other
party even without or against the consent of his
attorney.
Q: May a lawyer be held liable for damages by
his clients for the lawyer’s failure to file the
necessary pleadings to prosecute the client’s
case and as a result of which the client
suffered damages? (2014 Bar)
A: YES, a lawyer may be held liable for damages
by his client for failure to represent his client
with zeal (Canon 19, CPR) and for not serving his
client with competence and diligence (Canon 18,
CPR).
USE OF FAIR AND HONEST MEANS
RULE 19.01, CANON 9
A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest
means to attain the lawful objectives of his
client and shall not present, participate in
presenting or threaten to present,
participate in presenting or threaten to
present unfounded criminal charges to
obtain an improper advantage in any case
or proceeding(1997 Bar)
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
 Legal Ethics
Rule 19.01 of the CPR obligates a lawyer, in
defending his client, to employ only such means
as are consistent with truth and honor. He should
not prosecute patently frivolous and meritless
appeals or institute clearly groundless actions.
The act of a lawyer in preventing the execution of
the judgment against his clients shows that he
actually committed what the above rule expressly
prohibits (Que v. Revilla, A.C. No. 7054, December
4, 2009).
Under this rule, a lawyer should not file or
threaten to file any unfounded or baseless
criminal case or cases against the adversaries of
his client designed to secure a leverage to compel
the adversaries to yield or withdraw their own
cases against the lawyer’s client.
CLIENT’S FRAUD
RULE 19.02, CANON 19
A lawyer who has received information that
his client has, in the course of the
representation, perpetrated a fraud upon a
person or tribunal, shall promptly call upon
the client to rectify the same, and failing
which he shall terminate the relationship
with such client in accordance with the
Rules of Court (2001 Bar)
The lawyer’s duty to his client does not mean
freedom to set up false or fraudulent claims
especially with respect to provisions of law or
administrative rules and that while lawyers are
bound to exert utmost legal skill in prosecuting
their client’s cause or defending it, their duty, first
and foremost, is to the administration of justice
(CPR Annotated, PhilJA).
NOTE: It is an unethical tactic for a lawyer to
offer monetary rewards to anyone who could give
him information against a party so that he could
have leverage against all actions involving such
party (CPR Annotated, PhilJA).
Q: Atty. Bravo represents Carlos Negar (an
insurance agent for Dormir Insurance Co.) in a
suit filed by insurance claimant Andy Limot
who also sued Dormir Insurance. Limot
testified during the trial that he had mailed
the notice of the loss to the insurance agent,
but admitted that he lost the registry receipt
so that he did not have any documentary
evidence of the fact of mailing and of its
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
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92
timeliness. Dormir Insurance denied liability
contending that the timely notice had not
been given either to the company or its agent.
A few days after Negar testified, he admitted
to Atty. Bravo that he had lied when he denied
receipt of Limot's notice; he did receive the
notice by mail but immediately shredded it to
defeat Limot's claim.
If your were Atty. Bravo, what would you do in
light of your client's disclosure that he
perjured himself when he testified? (2013
Bar)
A: I shall promptly call upon Carlos Negar, my
client, to rectify his perjured testimony by
recanting the same before the court. Should he
refuse or fail to do so I shall then terminate my
relationship with him (Canon, 19, Rule 19.02)
stating that with his having committed perjury he
persuaded an illegal conduct in connection with
the case (Ibid., Canon 22, Rule 22.01).
Q: In a prosecution for a murder against a
ranking army officer, the latter engaged the
services of RS, a well-known trial lawyer, to
whom the officer in one of their conferences
disclosed a plan to eliminate or salvage—i.e.,
kill or otherwise cause to disappear—the only
witness, a fellow military officer, through a
contrived traffic or highway vehicular
accident.
a. What are the legal and moral obligations
of Atty. RS to his client and to the
authorities, under the given
circumstances?
b. Should the planned accident take place,
and the witness to the prosecution be
killed, as a result, is Atty. RS under any
obligation to disclose to the authorities
the plan that his client had mentioned to
him, as above mentioned?
A:
a. Atty. RS has the obligation to disclose such
facts to authorities. The announced intention
of a client to commit a crime is not included
within the confidences which his attorney is
bound to respect. The attorney cannot reveal
to anybody the facts stated by the client as
regards the case proceedings. However this is
not an absolute rule. The privilege is limited
or has reference only to communications
 DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF A LAWYER
which are within the ambit of lawful
employment and does not extend to those
transmitted in contemplation of future
crimes or fraud.
b. YES, Atty. RS has the obligation to disclose
such information to the authorities. As
provided for by Rule 19.02 of Canon 19, a
lawyer shall not allow his client to perpetrate
fraud. He shall promptly advise the client to
rectify the same, and if the client refuses to
heed the lawyer's advice for rectification, the
lawyer must withdraw from the case (People
v. Sandiganbayan, 275 SCRA 505).
Q: If the lawyer is counsel de parte for the
accused and he learns later after accepting the
case and while trial is ongoing that his client
was indeed the perpetrator of the crime, may
the lawyer withdraw his appearance from the
case? Why or Why not? (2014 Bar)
A: He may withdraw his appearance but in
accordance with procedure in Section 26, Rule
138 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, Rule 19.02 of
the CPR provides that “a lawyer who has received
information that his client has, in the course of
the representation, perpetuated a fraud upon a
person or tribunal, shall promptly call upon the
client to rectify the same, and failing which, he
shall terminate the relationship with such client
in accordance with the Rules of Court.”
PROCEDURE IN HANDLING THE CASE
RULE 19.03, CANON 19
A lawyer shall not allow his client to dictate
the procedure in handling the case.
Who has control over the case
1. As to matters of procedure - it is the client
who yields to the lawyer and not the lawyer
yielding to the client. (Lapena 2009)
NOTE: The basis of this rule is that the
lawyer is better trained and skilled in law.
2. As to subject matter - the client is in control.
NOTE: Cause of action, claim or demand, and
subject of litigation are within client’s
control. Proceedings to enforce the remedy
are within the exclusive control of the
attorney.
93
Authority of counsel to compromise
GR: The attorney has no authority to
compromise his client’s case. This is so because
the client, even if represented by counsel, retains
exclusive control over the subject matter of the
litigation. The client can, of course, authorize his
lawyer to compromise his case, and the
settlement made by the lawyer will bind his
client.
XPNs:
1. When the lawyer is confronted with an
emergency where prompt and urgent action
is necessary to protect the interest of his
client and there is no opportunity for
consultation with the latter.
2. Settlement of monetary obligation to client is
full payment in cash.
Duty of the lawyer in gathering information
regarding the case
The lawyer cannot entirely depend on the
information his client gave or the time his client
wished to give. The lawyer should take more
control over handling the case. Where the client is
based overseas, the lawyer should with more
reason, have moved to secure all the legal means
available to him either to continue representing
his client effectively or to make the necessary
manifestation in court, with the client’s
conformity, that he was withdrawing as counsel
of record (CPR Annotated, PhilJA).
Appearance
It is the coming into court as a party either as a
plaintiff or as a defendant and asking relief
therefrom.
Kinds of appearance
1. General appearance – When a party comes
to court either as plaintiff or defendant and
seeks general reliefs from the court for
satisfaction of his claims or counterclaims
respectively.
2. Special appearance– When a defendant
appears in court solely for the purpose of
objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over
his person.
NOTE: By virtue of Sec. 20, Rule 14 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, there is no more
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
 Legal Ethics
distinction between general appearance and
special appearance, in the sense that a defendant
may file a motion to dismiss not only on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction over his person but
also on some other grounds without waiving the
jurisdiction of the court over his person.
Entry of appearance v. Appearance of counsel
Entry of appearance is the written manifestation
submitted by the counsel of record to inform the
court that he will act as the counsel of a party
made before the date of the hearing while
appearance of counsel is the verbal manifestation
of the counsel in order for the court to recognize
his presence during the hearing of the case (Sec.
21, Rule 138, Rules of Court).
ATTORNEY’S FEES
(1990, 1991, 1992, 1994, 1995, 1997, 1998,
2005, 2006, 2007 Bar)
CANON 20
A lawyer shall charge only fair and
reasonable fees
GR: Only lawyers are entitled to attorney’s fees.
The same cannot be shared with a non-lawyer. It
is unethical.
XPNs: A lawyer may divide a fee for legal
services with another under the following
instances: [CPR]
1. A lawyer undertakes to Complete the
unfinished legal business of a deceased
lawyer;
2. There is a Pre-existing agreement with a
partner or associate that, upon the latter’s
death, money shall be paid over a reasonable
period of time to his estate or to persons
specified in the agreement;
3. A lawyer or law firm includes non-lawyer
employees in Retirement plan, even if the
plan is based, in whole or in part, on a profit-
sharing agreement. (Rule 9.02, CPR)
NOTE: Entitlement to lawyer’s fees is presumed
(Funa, 2009).
Unless otherwise expressly stipulated, rendition
of professional services by a lawyer is for a fee or
compensation and is not gratuitous (Research and
Services Realty, Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 124074, January
27, 1997).
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
2018 GOLDEN NOTES
94
RULE 20.01, CANON 20
A lawyer shall be guided by the following
factors in determining his fees:
a. The time spent and the extent of the
service rendered or required;
b. The novelty and difficulty of the
questions involved;
c. The importance of the subject matter;
d. The skill demanded;
e. The probability of losing other
employment as a result of acceptance
of the proffered case;
f. The customary charges for similar
services and the schedule of fees of the
IBP chapter to which he belongs;
g. The amount involved in the
controversy and the benefits resulting
to the client from the service;
h. The contingency or certainty of
compensation;
i. The character of the employment,
whether occasional or established;
and
j. The professional standing of the
lawyer.
NOTE: Generally, the amount of attorney’s
fees due is that stipulated in the retainer
agreement which is conclusive as to the amount
of lawyer’s compensation (Funa, 2009) unless the
stipulated amount in the written contract is found
by the court to be unconscionable or
unreasonable. (Sec. 24, Rule 138, RRC)
In the absence thereof, the amount of attorney’s
fees is fixed on the basis of quantum meruit.
(Sesbreno v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 117438, June
8, 1995; Funa, 2009)
Kinds of payment
1. Fixed or absolute feethat which is payable
regardless of the result of the case.
a. A fixed fee payable per appearance
b. A fixed fee computed upon the number of
hours spent
c. A fixed fee based on piece work
d. Combination of any of the above
2. Contingent fee–a fee that is conditioned on
the securing of a favorable judgment and
recovery of money or property and the
amount of which may be on a percentage
basis.
 DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF A LAWYER
Requisites for the accrual of attorney’s fees
1. Existence of attorney-client relationship; and
2. Rendition by the lawyer of services to the
client.
NOTE: A pauper, while exempted from payment
of legal fees is not exempted from payment of
attorney’s fees. (Cristobal v. Employees’
Compensation Commission, G.R. No. L-49280,
February 26, 1981)
Factors in determining the attorney’s fees
(1994 Bar)
In determining what is fair and reasonable, a
lawyer shall be guided by the following factors:
[STIP-SNACCC]
1. Skill demanded;
2. Time spent and the extent of the services
rendered or required;
3. Importance of the subject matter;
4. Probability of losing other employment as a
result of acceptance of the proffered case;
5. Professional Standing of the lawyer;
6. Novelty and difficulty of the questions
involved;
7. Amount involved in the controversy and the
benefits resulting to the client from the
services;
8. Customary Charges for similar services and
the schedule of fees of the IBP chapter to
which he belongs;
9. Contingency or certainty of compensation;
and
10. Character of the employment, whether
occasional or established. (Rule 20.01)
NOTE: Imposition of interest in the payment of
attorney’s fees is not justified. (Funa, 2009)
Contracts for attorney’s services in this
jurisdiction stands upon an entirely different
footing from other contract for the payment of
compensation for any other services. (Mambulao
Lumber Co. v. Philippine National Bank, G.R. No. L-
22973, January 30, 1968)
No court shall be bound by the opinion of
attorneys as expert witnesses as to the proper
compensation, and may disregard such testimony
and base its conclusion on its professional
knowledge. A written contract for services shall
control the amount to be paid therefor, unless
found by the court to be unconscionable or
95
unreasonable. (Sec. 24, Rule 138, RRC)
Factors to consider in determining the
amount of attorney’s fees in the absence of
any fee arrangement [TINS]
1. Time spent and the services rendered or
required – A lawyer is justified in fixing
higher fees when the case is so complicated
and requires more time and effort in fixing it.
2. Importance of subject matter – The more
important the subject matter or the bigger
the value of the interest of the property in
litigation, the higher is the attorney’s fees.
3. Novelty and difficulty of questions involved –
When the questions in a case are novel and
difficult, greater effort, deeper study and
research are bound to burn the lawyer’s
time and stamina considering that there are
no local precedents to rely upon.
4. Skill demanded of a lawyer – The totality of
the lawyer’s experience provides him skill
and competence admired in lawyers.
Different types of fee arrangements
1. Retainer’s fee where the lawyer is paid for
services for an agreed amount for the case.
2. The lawyer agrees to be paid per court
appearance.
3. Contingent fee where the lawyer is paid for
his services depending on the success of the
case. This applies usually in civil suits for
money or property where the lawyer’s fee is
taken from the award granted by the court.
4. Attorney de officio. The attorney is appointed
by the court to defend the indigent litigant in
a criminal case. The client is not bound to pay
the attorney for his services although he may
be paid a nominal fee taken from a public
fund appropriated for the purpose.
5. Legal aid. The attorney renders legal services
for those who could not afford to engage the
services of paid counsel.
6. Quantum meruit basis. If there is no specific
contract between the lawyer and the client,
the lawyer is paid on quantum meruit basis,
that is, what the lawyer deserves for his
services.
NOTE: When the claim for entitlement to
attorney's fees is contingent, but no written
agreement has been executed bearing the
supposed contingent fees, the only way to
determine the same is to apply the principle of
quantum meruit. The recovery of attorney's fees
on the basis of quantum meruit is a device that
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
 Legal Ethics
prevents an unscrupulous client from running
away with the fruits of the legal services of
counsel without paying for it and it also avoids
unjust enrichment on the part of the attorney
himself. (National Power Corporation v. Heirs of
Sangkay, G.R. No. 165828, August 24, 2011)
Q: Spouses de Guzman engaged the legal
services of Atty. Rosario, Jr. as defense counsel
in a complaint filed against them. As
represented by Atty. Rosario, Spouses de
Guzman won their case at all levels, from RTC
to the Supreme Court. Atty. Rosario filed a
Motion to Determine Attorney's Fees. He
alleged that he had a verbal agreement with
the Spouses and that he would get 25% of the
market value of the subject land if the
complaint filed against them would be
dismissed. Despite the fact that he had
successfully represented them, the spouses
refused his written demand for payment of
the contracted attorney’s fees. Is Atty. Rosario
entitled to recover his attorney’s fees?
A:YES. In the case at bench, the attorney’s fees
being claimed by the petitioner refers to the
compensation for professional services rendered,
and not as indemnity for damages. The award of
P10,000, made in its extraordinary concept as
indemnity for damages, forms part of the
judgment recoverable against the losing party
and is to be paid directly to Spouses de Guzman
and not to Atty. Rosario. Thus, to grant
petitioner’s motion to determine attorney’s fees
would not result in a double award of attorney’s
fees. The amount of attorney’s fees must be based
in quantum meruit. Atty. Rosario served as
defense counsel for Spouses de Guzman for
almost seventeen (17) years. Given the
considerable amount of the time spent, the
diligent effort exerted by Rosario, and the quality
of work shown by him in ensuring the successful
defense of his clients, he clearly deserves to be
awarded reasonable attorney’s fees for services
rendered. Justice and equity dictate that
petitioner be paid his professional fee based on
quantum meruit. (Rosario v. de Guzman, G.R. No.
191247, July 10, 2013)
Q: Concept Placement retained the services of
Atty. Funk. Under their retainer contract, Atty.
Funk is to render various legal services except
litigation, quasi-judicial and administrative
proceedings and similar actions for which
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
2018 GOLDEN NOTES
96
there will be separate billings. Thereafter,
Atty. Funk represented Concept Placement in
the case filed against it for illegal dismissal.
While the labor case was still pending,
Concept Placement terminated the services of
Atty. Funk. Nevertheless, Atty. Funk continued
handling the case. Atty. Funk then advised
Concept Placement of the POEA’s favorable
decision and requested the payment of his
attorney’s fees. Concept Placement refused. Is
Atty. Funk entitled to attorney’s fees for
assisting Concept Placement as counsel in the
labor case even if the services of Atty. Funk
were already terminated?
A: YES. The expiration of the retainer contract
between the parties during the pendency of the
labor case does not extinguish the respondent’s
right for attorney’s fees. The Court found that
while the petitioner and the respondent did not
execute a written agreement on the fees in the
labor case aside from the Retainer Agreement,
the petitioner did categorically and unequivocally
admit in its Compulsory Counterclaim that it has
engaged the services of the respondent as its
counsel for a fee of P60, 000, etc. (Concept
Placement Resources Inc. v. Atty. Funk, G.R. No.
137680, February 6, 2004)
Retainer
1. This is the act of the client by which he
employs a lawyer to manage for him a cause
to which he is a party, or otherwise to advise
him as counsel;
2. It also refers to a fee which the client pays his
attorney whom he retains. (Pineda, 2009)
Retaining fee
A retaining fee is a preliminary fee given to an
attorney or counsel to insure and secure his
future services, and induce him to act for the
client. (Pineda, 2009)
Kinds of Retainer Agreements on Attorney’s
Fees
1. General retainer or retaining fee– It is the
fee paid to a lawyer to secure his future
services as general counsel for any ordinary
legal problem that may arise in the ordinary
business of the client and referred to him for
legal action. The client pays fixed retainer
fees, which could be monthly or otherwise.
The fees are paid whether or not there are
 DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF A LAWYER
cases referred to the lawyer;
2. Special retainer – It is a fee for a specific or
particular case or service rendered by the
lawyer for a client. (Pineda, 2009)
Q: Atty. M is a partner in the law firm OMP &
Associates. C, a former classmate of Atty. M
engaged the legal services of Atty. M to handle
his appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA) from
an adverse decision of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) in his annulment case. After the
notice to file brief was issued by the CA, Atty.
M met an accident which incapacitated him
from further engaging law practice. May Atty.
P, his partner in the law firm, file the required
appeal brief for C? Explain your answer. (2014
Bar)
A: It depends on whether or not C knew Atty. M
to be a partner of the OMP & Associates law firm
when he hired him. Generally, the retainer of a
member of a law firm is equivalent to the retainer
of the firm itself. Thus, if the said member dealt
with dies or is incapacitated to render service, the
law firm is bound to provide a substitute. Hence,
Atty. P may file the required brief for C.
On the other hand, if Atty. M was retained alone,
without the knowledge that he belonged to a law
firm, P may not file the required brief for C
without the consent of the latter. There is no
statement in the problem that C knew M to be a
member of the law firm OMP & Associates at the
time that C engaged his services.
Q: Atty. Francisco’s retainer agreement with
RXU said that his attorney's fees in its case
against CRP “shall be 15% of the amounts
collected.” Atty. Francisco asked the trial
court to issue a temporary restraining order
against CRP but this was denied, prompting
him to file a petition for certiorari with the
Court of Appeals to question the order of
denial. At this point, RXU terminated Atty.
Francisco’s services. When the parties later
settled their dispute amicably, CRP paid RXU
P100 million. Because of this, Atty. Francisco
came around and claimed a 15% share in the
amount. What should be his attorney’s fees?
(2011 Bar)
A: A reasonable amount that the court shall fix
upon proof of quantum meruit which means “as
much as he deserves”.
97
Instances when the measure of quantum
meruit may beresorted to(2007 Bar)
1. There is no express contract for payment of
attorney’s fees agreed upon between the
lawyer and the client;
2. Although there is a formal contract for
attorney’s fees, the stipulated fees are found
unconscionable or unreasonable by the court;
3. The contract for attorney’s fees is void due to
purely formal matters or defects of execution;
4. The counsel, for justifiable cause, was not able
to finish the case to its conclusion;
5. Lawyer and client disregard the contract for
attorney’s fees; and
6. The client dismissed his counsel before the
termination of the case.
Q: A client refuses to pay Atty. A his contracted
attorney's fees on the ground that counsel did
not wish to intervene in the process of
effecting a fair settlement of the case. Decide.
(2001 Bar)
A: Rule 1.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that "a lawyer shall
encourage his clients to avoid, end or settle a
controversy if it will admit of a fair settlement". If
a lawyer should refuse to intervene in a
settlement proceeding, his entitlement to his
attorney's fees may be affected. However, if he
has already rendered some valuable services to
the client, he must be paid his attorney's fees on
the basis of quantum meruit, even if it is assumed
that he is dismissed.
Instances when counsel cannot recover the
full amount despite written contract for
attorneys’ fees (2006 Bar)
1. When the services called for were not
performed as when the lawyer withdrew
before the case was finished, he will be
allowed only reasonable fees;
2. When there is a justified dismissal of the
attorney, the contract will be nullified and
payment will be on the basis of quantum
meruit only. A contrary stipulation will be
invalid;
3. When the stipulated attorney’s fees are
unconscionable, when it is disproportionate
as compared to the value of services
rendered and is revolting to human
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
 Legal Ethics
conscience;
4. When the stipulated attorney’s fees are in
excess of what is expressly provided by law;
5. When the lawyer is guilty of fraud or bad
faith toward his client in the matter of his
employment;
6. When the counsel’s services are worthless
because of his negligence;
7. When contract is contrary to law, morals or
public policy; and
8. Serving adverse interest unless the lawyer
proves that it was with the consent of both
parties.
Rationale behind the rule that the court may
reduce unconscionable attorney’s fees
1. A lawyer is primarily an officer of the court
hence fees should be subject to judicial
control;
2. Sound public policy demands that courts
disregard stipulations for attorney’s fees
when they appear to be a source of
speculative profit at the expense of the
debtor or mortgagor. (Borcena v. IAC, et. al.,
G.R. No. 70099, January 7, 1987)
NOTE: A trial judge may not order the reduction
of the attorney’s fees on the ground that the
attorney is “below average standard of a lawyer.”
The opinion of the judge as to the capacity of a
lawyer is not a basis of the right to a lawyer’s
fees. (Fernandez v. Hon. Bello, G.R. No. L-14277,
April 30, 1960)
ACCEPTANCE FEES
Q: B hired Atty. Z to file a replevin case against
C for an agreed acceptance fee of P30,000.00
which was evidence by a written contract.
After the complaint was filed by Atty. Z, B
terminated his services and hired a new
lawyer for the same amount of attorney’s fees.
How much attorney’s fees is Atty. Z entitled
to? (2014 Bar)
A: Atty. Z is entitled to the entire amount of the
attorney’s fees agreed upon because his services
were terminated by the client without just cause.
(Sec. 26, Rule 138, Rules of Court)
Q: Rose engaged the services of Atty. Jack as
counsel for five cases. In the Retainer
Agreement, Rose agreed to pay Atty. Jack the
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amount of 200,000 as Acceptance Fee for the
five cases plus an additional 1,500
Appearance Fee per hearing and in the event
that damages are recovered, she would pay
Atty. Jack 10% as success fee. Rose issued two
checks amounting to 51,716.54 in favor of
Atty. Jack however despite receipt of said
amounts he failed to file a case in one of the
five cases referred to him; one case was
dismissed due to untimely appeal; and
another case was dismissed but he failed to
inform Rose about it before she left for
abroad. Dissatisfied with the outcome of her
cases she demanded from Atty. Jack the return
of all the records she had entrusted to him
however he returned only two of the five
cases. She filed a complaint charging him with
violation of Canon 16 and 16.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Was there a
violation of the said Canon by the respondent?
A: NONE. From the records of the case, it was
found that four of the cases referred by Rose
were filed but were dismissed or terminated for
causes not attributable to Atty. Jack; and that
there was no probable cause to maintain the suit.
No fault or negligence can be attributed to Atty.
Jack. Rose still owes payment of acceptance fee
because she only paid 51, 716.54.
An acceptance fee is not a contingent fee, but is an
absolute fee arrangement which entitles a lawyer
to get paid for his efforts regardless of the
outcome of the litigation. Dissatisfaction from the
outcome of the cases would not render void the
retainer agreement for Atty. Jack appears to have
represented the interest of Rose. (Yu v. Bondal,
A.C. No. 5534, January 17, 2005)
NOTE: The expiration of the retainer contract
between the parties during the pendency of the
labor case does not extinguish the respondent’s
right to attorney’s fees. (Uy v. Gonzales, A.C. No.
5280, March 30, 2004)
CONTINGENCY FEE ARRANGEMENTS
Contingency fee contract
One which stipulates that the lawyer will be paid
for his legal services only if the suit or litigation
ends favorably to the client. (Taganas v. NLRC,
G.R. No. 118746, September 7, 1995)
 DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF A LAWYER
It is like a contract subject to a suspensive
condition wherein the obligation to pay the
counsel is based upon the outcome of the case.
Contingent fees are sanctioned by the CPE and by
the CPR subject to certain limitations. (Licudan v.
CA, G.R. No. 91958, January 24, 1991)
NOTE: If a lawyer employed on contingent basis
dies or becomes disabled before the final
adjudication or settlement of the case has been
obtained, he or his estate will be allowed to
recover the reasonable value of the services
rendered. The recovery will be allowed only after
the successful termination of the litigation in
the client’s favor. (Morton v. Forsee, Ann. Cas. 1914
D. 197; Lapena, 2009, Pineda, 2009)
Rationale for contingent fee contracts
Contracts of this nature (contingent fee contract)
are permitted because they redound to the
benefit of the poor client and the lawyer
especially in cases where the client has
meritorious cause of action, but no means with
which to pay for the legal services unless he can,
with the sanction of law, make a contract for a
contingent fee to be paid out of the proceeds of
the litigation. (Francisco, 1949)
Limitation of the stipulation regarding
contingent fee contract
It must be reasonable based on the circumstance
of the case. Contingent fee contracts are under
the supervision and close scrutiny of the court in
order that clients may be protected from just
charges. Its validity depends on the measure of
reasonableness of the stipulated fees under the
circumstances of the case. Stipulated attorney’s
fees must not be unconscionable wherein the
amount is by far so disproportionate compared to
the value of the services rendered as to amount to
fraud perpetrated to the client. (Sesbreno v. CA,
G.R. No. 117438, June 8, 1995)
Q: The stipulation between the lawyer and
counsel is as follows, “the attorney’s fees of
the Atty. X will be ½ of whatever the client
might recover from his share in the property
subject of the litigation.” Is the stipulation
valid?
A: YES. The stipulation made is one of a
contingent fee which is allowed by the CPE and
the CPR. It does not violate the prohibition of
99
acquisition of property subject of the litigation by
the lawyer provided for in the Civil Code since the
prohibition applies only to a sale or assignment to
the lawyer by his client during the pendency of
the litigation. The transfer actually takes effect
after the finality of the judgment and not during
the pendency of the case. As such it is valid
stipulation between the lawyer and client.
Acceptance of an initial fee before or during
the progress of the litigation detract from the
contingent nature of the fees
The acceptance of an initial fee before or during
the progress of the litigation does not detract
from the contingent nature of the fees, as long as
the bulk thereof is made dependent upon the
successful outcome of the action. (Francisco v.
Matias, G.R. No. L-16349, January 31, 1964)
Q: Chester asked Laarni to handle his claim to
a sizeable parcel of land in Quezon City
against a well-known property developer on a
contingent fee basis. Laarni asked for 15% of
the land that may be recovered or 15% of
whatever monetary settlement that may be
received from the property developer as her
only fee contingent upon securing a favorable
final judgment or compromise settlement.
Chester signed the contingent fee agreement.
Assuming that the property developer settled
the case after the case was decided by the
Regional Trial Court in favor of Chester for P1
Billion. Chester refused to pay Laarni P150
Million on the ground that it is excessive. Is
the refusal justified? Explain. (2008 Bar)
A: The refusal of Chester to pay is unjustified. A
contingent fee is impliedly sanctioned by Rule
20.01(f) of the CPR. A much higher compensation
is allowed as contingent fees in consideration of
the risk that the lawyer will get nothing if the suit
fails. In several cases, the Court has indicated that
a contingent fee of 30% of the money or property
that may be recovered is reasonable. Moreover,
although the developer settled the case, it was
after the case was decided by the RTC in favor of
Chester, which shows that Atty. Laarni has
already rendered service to the client.
Q: Assuming that there was no settlement and
the case eventually reached the Supreme
Court which promulgated a decision in favor
of Chester. (This time) Chester refused to
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
 Legal Ethics
convey to Laarni 15% of the litigated land as
stipulated on the ground that the agreement
violates Article 1491 of the Civil Code, which
prohibits lawyers from acquiring by purchase
properties and rights, which are the object of
litigation in which they take part by reason of
their profession. Is the refusal justified?
Explain. (2008 Bar)
A: Chester’s refusal is not justified. A contingent
fee arrangement is not covered by Art.1491 of the
Civil Code, because the transfer or assignment of
the property in litigation takes effect only upon
finality of a favorable judgment. (Director of
Lands v. Ababa, G.R. No. L-26096, February 27,
1979); (Macariola v. Asuncion, A.C. No. 133-J, May
31, 1982)
Q: Evangelina Masmud’s husband, the late
Alexander, filed a complaint against his
employer for non-payment of permanent
disability benefits, medical expenses, sickness
allowance, moral and exemplary damages,
and attorney’s fees. He engaged the services
of Atty. Go, as his counsel and agreed to pay
attorney’s fees on a contingent basis, as
follows: 20% of total monetary claims as
settled or paid and an additional 10% in case
of appeal. The Labor Arbiter granted the
monetary claims of Alexander. Eventually,
after several appeals, the decision being
favorable to Evangelina (substituted her
deceased husband), the decision became final
and executory. Upon motion of Atty. Go, the
surety company delivered to the NLRC
Cashier, the check amounting to
P3,454,079.20. Thereafter, Atty. Go moved for
the release of the said amount to Evangelina.
Out of the said amount, Evangelina paid Atty.
Go the sum of P680,000.00. Dissatisfied, Atty.
Go filed a motion to record and enforce the
attorney’s lien alleging that Evangelina
reneged on their contingent fee agreement.
Evangelina manifested that Atty. Go’s claim
for attorney’s fees of 40% of the total
monetary award was null and void based on
Article 111 of the Labor Code. Is her
contention correct?
A: NO. Art. 111. Attorney's fees. (a) In cases of
unlawful withholding of wages, the culpable party
may be assessed attorney's fees equivalent to ten
percent of the amount of the wages recovered.
Contrary to Evangelina’s proposition, Article 111
of the Labor Code deals with the extraordinary
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concept of attorney’s fees. It regulates the amount
recoverable as attorney's fees in the nature of
damages sustained by and awarded to the
prevailing party. It may not be used as the
standard in fixing the amount payable to the
lawyer by his client for the legal services he
rendered.
In this regard, Section 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court should be observed in determining Atty.
Go’s compensation. The said Rule provides:
Sec. 24. Compensation of attorneys; agreement as
to fees. An attorney shall be entitled to have and
recover from his client no more than a reasonable
compensation for his services, with a view to the
importance of the subject matter of the
controversy, the extent of the services rendered,
and the professional standing of the attorney. No
court shall be bound by the opinion of attorneys as
expert witnesses as to the proper compensation,
but may disregard such testimony and base its
conclusion on its own professional knowledge. A
written contract for services shall control the
amount to be paid therefor unless found by the
court to be unconscionable or unreasonable.
The retainer contract between Atty. Go and
Evangelina provides for a contingent fee. The
contract shall control in the determination of the
amount to be paid, unless found by the court to
be unconscionable or unreasonable. The criteria
found in the Code of Professional Responsibility
are also to be considered in assessing the proper
amount of compensation that a lawyer should
receive. (Canon 20, Rule 20.01, CPR; Evangelina
Masmud v. NLRC, et. al., G.R. No. 183385, February
13, 2009)
Champertous contract
Is one where the lawyer stipulates with his client
in the prosecution of the case that he will bear all
the expenses for the recovery of things or
property being claimed by the client, and the
latter agrees to pay the former a portion of the
thing or property recovered as compensation.
A champertous contract is considered VOID
It is void due to public policy, because it would
make him acquire a stake in the outcome of the
litigation which might lead him to place his own
interest above that of the client (Bautista v.
Gonzales, A.M. No. 1625, February 12, 1990).
 DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF A LAWYER
Contingent vs. Champertous contract
CONTINGENT CHAMPERTOUS
CONTRACT CONTRACT
Payable in cash – Payable in kind - a
dependent on the portion of the thing or
success of the property recovered as
litigation compensation
Lawyers do not Lawyers undertake to
undertake to pay all pay all expenses of
expenses of litigation litigation
Valid Void
Q: Complainants engaged the legal services of
Atty. Bañez, Jr. in connection with the
recovery of their properties from Fevidal.
Complainants signed a contract of legal
services, where it was agreed that they would
not pay acceptance and appearance fees to
Atty. Bañez, Jr., but that the docket fees would
instead be shared by the parties. Under the
contract, complainants would pay respondent
50% of whatever would be recovered of the
properties. Did Atty. Bañez, Jr violate any
canon of the Code of Professional
Responsibility?
A: YES. He violated Canon 16.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which states that
lawyers shall not lend money to a client, except
when in the interest of justice, they have to
advance necessary expenses in a legal matter
they are handling for the client. He violated such
canon because the contract for legal services he
has executed with complainants is in the nature
of a champertous contract – an agreement
whereby an attorney undertakes to pay the
expenses of the proceedings to enforce the
client’s rights in exchange for some bargain to
have a part of the thing in dispute. (Conchita
Baltazar et. al. v. Atty. Bañez, Jr., A.C. No. 9091,
December 11, 2013)
Q: The contract of attorney's fees entered into
by Atty. Quintos and his client, Susan,
stipulates that if a judgment is rendered in
favor of the latter, Atty. Quintos gets 60% of
the property recovered as contingent fee. In
turn, he will assume payment of all expenses
of the litigation. May Atty. Quintos and Susan
increase the amount of the contingent fee to
80%? (2006 Bar)
101
A: NO. Atty. Quintos and Susan cannot agree to
increase the amount of the contingent fee to 80%
because the agreement is champertous. Even if
there is no champertous provision present, the
contingent fee of 80% of the PROPERTY
recovered could still be considered as
unconscionable, because it is so disproportionate
as to indicate that an unjust advantage had been
taken of the client, and is revolting to human
conscience. Contracts for attorney's fees are
always subject to control by the courts.
Q: A inherited parcel of land situated in
Batasan Hills which is occupied by informal
settlers. He wanted to eject the occupants, but
he has no financial means to pursue the
ejectment case. He contracted the services of
Atty. B, who agreed to defray all the expenses
of the suit on the condition that he will be paid
one-half of the property to be recovered as his
compensation. What is this kind of attorney’s
fees? Can Atty. B enforce this contract against
A?
What are the respective remedies relative to
the collection of attorney’s fees, if any, of A
and Atty. B against each other? (2014 Bar)
A: This is a champertous contract and not a
contingent contract. In the problem, Atty. B
defrays all the expenses for litigation and gets
50% of the property to be recovered as his
compensation. This has the characteristics of a
champertous contract. Hence, void for being
contrary to public policy. The legal profession
exists to serve the ends of justice and is not to be
conducted as a business enterprise. Since the
contract is void, Atty. B cannot enforce it against
A but A has a cause of action against Atty. B for
unethical conduct.
ATTORNEY’S LIENS
Attorney’s retaining lien
A retaining lien is the right of an attorney to
retain the funds, documents and papers of his
client who have lawfully come into his possession
and may retain the same until his lawful fees and
disbursements have been paid, and may apply
such funds to the satisfaction thereof.
NOTE: A lawyer is not entitled to unilaterally
appropriate his client’s money for himself by the
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
 Legal Ethics
mere fact alone that the client owes him his client which have lawfully come into his
attorney’s fees. (Rayos v. Hernandez, G.R. No. possession until his lawful fees and
169079, February 12, 2007) disbursements have been paid and to apply
such funds to the satisfaction thereof.
Requisites in order for an attorney to be able 2. Charging Lien - right which the attorney has
to exercise his retaining lien [ALU] upon all judgments for the payment of
money, and executions issued in pursuance of
1. Attorney-client relationship; said judgments, which he has secured in
2. Lawful possession by the lawyer of the litigation of his client.
client’s funds, documents and papers in his
professional capacity; and Under this rule, this lien, whether retaining
3. Unsatisfied claim for attorney’s fees or or charging, takes legal effect only from and
disbursements. after, but not before, notice of said lien has
been entered in the record and served on the
Attorney’s charging lien adverse party (Elena De Caiña, et al. v. Hon.
Victoriano, et al., G.R. No. L-12905, February
A charging lien is the right of a lawyer to the same 26, 1959).
extent upon all judgments for the payment of
money, and executions issued in pursuance of RETAINING CHARGING
such judgments which he has secured in a LIEN LIEN
litigation of his client, from and after the time As to Nature Passive lien. It Active lien. It
when he shall have caused a statement of his cannot be can be
claim of such lien to be entered upon the records actively enforced by
of the court rendering such judgment, or issuing enforced. It is a execution. It is
such execution, and shall have caused written general lien. a special lien.
notice thereof to be delivered to his client and to As to Basis Lawful Securing of a
the adverse party; and he shall have the same possession of favorable
right and power over such judgments and papers, money
executions as his client would have to enforce his documents, judgment for
lien and secure the payment of his fees and property client.
disbursements. (Sec. 37, Rule 138, RRC) belonging to
the client.
Requisites in order for an attorney to be able
to exercise his charging lien As to Coverage Covers papers, Covers all
documents, judgments for
1. Existence of attorney-client relationship; and properties the payment of
2. The attorney has rendered services; in the lawful money and
3. Favorable money judgment secured by the possession of execution
counsel for his client; the attorney by issued in
4. The attorney has a claim for attorney’s fees reason of his pursuance of
or advances; and professional such judgment.
5. A statement of the claim has been duly employment.
recorded in the case with notice thereof
served upon the client and the adverse party. As to Effect As soon as the As soon as the
attorney gets claim for
NOTE: A charging lien, to be enforceable as a possession of attorney’s fees
security for the payment of attorney’s fees, papers, had been
requires as a condition sine qua non a judgment documents, or entered into
for money and execution in pursuance of such property. the records of
judgment secured in the main action by the the case.
attorney in favor of his client.
As to May be Generally,
Retaining Lien vs.Charging Lien Applicability exercised exercised only
before when the
1. Retaining Lien - right of the attorney to judgment or attorney had
retain the funds, documents, and papers of execution or already

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 DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF A LAWYER
regardless secured a failed to pay in full the stipulated attorney’s
thereof. favorable fees of Atty. D. How can Atty. D collect his fees
judgment for from M? Discuss fully. (2014 Bar)
his client.
A: D can exercise the remedy of retaining lien
As to When When client over the documents and other pieces of evidence
Extinguishme possession loses action as which have lawfully come to his possession,
nt lawfully ends lien may only under Sec. 37, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of
as when be enforced Court. The payment of attorney's fee is based on
lawyer against the services rendered and not dependent on the
voluntarily judgment success or failure of the case.
parts with awarded in
funds, favor of client,
documents, proceeds FEES AND CONTROVERSIES WITH CLIENTS
and papers of thereof/execut
client or offers ed thereon. RULE 20.02, CANON 20
them as A lawyer shall, in cases of referral, with the
evidence. consent of the client, be entitled to a division
of fees in proportion to the work performed
and responsibility assumed.
Q: Upon being replaced by Justice C, Atty. B,
the former counsel of the parents of the NOTE: This is not in the nature of a broker’s
victims of the OZONE Disco tragedy, was commission.
directed to forward all the documents in his
possession to Justice C. Atty. B refused, Lawyer-referral system
demanding full compensation pursuant to
their written contract. Sensing that a Under this system, if another counsel is referred
favorable judgment was forthcoming, Atty. B to the client, and the latter agrees to take him as
filed a motion in court relative to his collaborating counsel, and there is no express
attorney’s fees, furnishing his former clients agreement on the payment of attorney’s fees, the
with copies thereof. Is Atty. B legally and said counsel will receive attorney’s fees in
ethically correct in refusing to turn over the proportion to the work performed and
documents and in filing the motion? Explain. responsibility assumed. The lawyers and the
(1996 Bar) client may agree upon the proportion but in case
of disagreement, the court may fix the
A: YES. He is entitled to a retaining lien which proportional division of fees. (Lapena, 2009)
gives him the right to retain the funds, documents
and papers of his client which have lawfully come
to his possession until his lawful fees and RULE 20.03, CANON 20
disbursement have been paid (Sec. 37, Rule 138, A lawyer shall not, without the full
RRC; Rule 16.03, CPR). He is also legally and knowledge and consent of the client, accept
ethically correct in filing a motion in court any fee, reward, costs, commission, interest,
relative to his fees. He is entitled to a charging rebate or forwarding allowance or other
lien upon all judgments for the paying of money, compensation whatsoever related to his
and executions issued in pursuance of such professional employment from anyone
judgments, which he has secured in a litigation of other than the client. (1997, 2003 Bar)
his client, from and after the time when the
records of the court rendering such judgment or It is intended to secure the fidelity of the lawyer
issuing such execution. to his client’s cause and to prevent a situation in
which the receipt by him of a rebate or
commission from another with the client’s
Q: M engaged the services of Atty. D to business may interfere with the full discharge of
prosecute his annulment of marriage case in his duty to his client (Report of the IBP
the Regional Trial Court. After a long-drawn Committee).
trial, Atty. D was able to secure a favorable
judgment from the court. Unfortunately, M has GR: Fees shall be received from the client only.

103 UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS

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XPN: A lawyer may receive compensation from a
person other than his client when the latter has
full knowledge and approval thereof [Sec. 20 (e),
Rule 138].
Q: Atty. X, lawyer of a labor union of rank and
file employees succeeded in the negotiation of
a collective bargaining agreement for the rank
and file employees by virtue of which salary
increase was received by the rank and file
employees. At the same time the employer
granted salary increase to supervisory
employees who were not members of the
union. Atty. X now seeks to collect from the
non-supervisory employees’ attorney’s fees
for this increase in salaries. Is he entitled to
such fees?
A: NO. Atty. X is not entitled to collect attorney’s
fees from the non-union supervisory employees.
A lawyer who rendered services to a party, who
did not employ him nor authorize his
employment, cannot recover compensation even
if his services have redounded to the benefit of
such party. Otherwise, anyone might impose
obligations upon another without the latter’s
knowledge or consent, and even against his
protest as what happened in the present case. In
labor cases such as this one, where the company
grants the same salary increase to non-union
supervisory employees similar to the rank and
file employees who were the clients of the lawyer,
it is not because of the special efforts of the
latter’s lawyer that the non-union supervisory
employees benefited but because of the
company’s policy of non-discrimination. The
lawyer is not entitled to claim attorney’s fees
from the supervisors for the benefits they
received (Orosco v. Hernaez, G.R. No. L-541&9,
December 2, 1901).
RULE 20.04, CANON 20
A lawyer shall avoid controversies with
clients concerning his compensation and
shall resort to judicial action only to prevent
imposition, injustice or fraud. (1998 Bar)
GR: A lawyer should avoid the filing of any case
against a client for the enforcement of attorney’s
fees.
NOTE: The legal profession is not a money-
making trade but a form of public service.
Lawyers should avoid giving the impression that
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they are mercenary (Perez v. Scottish Union and
National Insurance Co., C.A. No. 8977, March 22,
1946). It might even turn out to be unproductive
for him for potential clients are likely to avoid a
lawyer with a reputation of suing his clients.
XPNs:
1. To prevent imposition
2. To prevent injustice
3. To prevent fraud (Rule 20.04, CPR)
NOTE: A client may enter into a compromise
agreement without the intervention of the
lawyer, but the terms of the agreement should
not deprive the counsel of his compensation for
the professional services he had rendered. If so,
the compromise shall be subjected to said fees. If
the client and the adverse party who assented to
the compromise are found to have intentionally
deprived the lawyer of his fees, the terms of the
compromise, insofar as they prejudice the lawyer,
will be set aside, making both parties accountable
to pay the lawyer’s fees. But in all cases, it is the
client who is bound to pay his lawyer for his legal
representation (Atty. Gubat v. NPC, G.R. No.
167415, February 26, 2010).
Ways on how lawyers claim attorney's fees
1. Same action in which the services of a lawyer
had been rendered; or
2. In a separate action.
With respect to the first situation, the remedy for
recovering attorney’s fees as an incident of the
main action may be availed of only when
something is due to the client. Attorney’s fees
cannot be determined until after the main
litigation has been decided and the subject of the
recovery is at the disposition of the court. The
issue over attorney’s fees only arises when
something has been recovered from which the fee
is to be paid.
While a claim for attorney’s fees may be filed
before the judgment is rendered, the
determination as to the propriety of the fees or as
to the amount thereof will have to be held in
abeyance until the main case from which the
lawyer’s claim for attorney’s fees may arise has
become final. Otherwise, the determination to be
made by the courts will be premature. Of course,
a petition for attorney’s fees may be filed before
the judgment in favor of the client is satisfied or
the proceeds thereof delivered to the client
(Rosario, Jr. vs. De Guzman et. al., G.R. No. 191247,
 DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF A LAWYER
July 10, 2013).
Instances when an independent civil action to
recover attorney’s fees is necessary
1. Main action is dismissed or nothing is
awarded;
2. Court has decided that it has no jurisdiction
over the action or has already lost it;
3. Person liable for attorney’s fees is not a party
to the main action;
4. Court reserved to the lawyer the right to file a
separate civil suit for recovery of attorney’s
fees;
5. Services for which the lawyer seeks payment
are not connected with the subject litigation;
6. Judgment debtor has fully paid all of the
judgment proceeds to the judgment creditor
and the lawyer has not taken any legal step to
have his fees paid directly to him from the
judgment proceeds; and
7. Failure to exercise charging Lien.
Effects of the nullity of contract on the right to
attorney’s fees
If the nullification is due to:
1. Illegality of its object - the lawyer is
precluded from recovering; or
2. Formal defect (or because the court has
found the amount to be unconscionable) -
the lawyer may recover for any services
rendered based on quantum meruit.
Kinds of lawyer according to services
rendered and the compensation they are
entitled to
1. Counsel de parte– He is entitled to the
reasonable attorney’s fees agreed upon, or in
the absence thereof, on quantum meruit
basis.
2. Counsel de officio– The counsel may not
demand from the accused attorney’s fees
even if he wins the case. He may, however,
collect from the government funds, if
available based on the amount fixed by the
court.
3. Amicus Curiae– not entitled to attorney’s
fees.
CONCEPTS OF ATTORNEY’S FEES
Two concepts of attorney’s fees
1. Ordinary attorney's fee– The reasonable
105
compensation paid to a lawyer by his client
for the legal services he has rendered to the
latter (Pineda, 2009).
NOTE: The basis for this compensation is the
fact of his employment by and his agreement
with the client.
2. Extraordinary attorney's fee– An
indemnity for damages ordered by the court
to be paid by the losing party in litigation.
NOTE: The basis for this is any of the cases
provided for by law where such award can be
made, such as those authorized in Article
2208 of the Civil Code, and is payable to the
client, NOT to the lawyer unless they have
agreed that the award shall pertain to the
lawyer as additional compensation or as part
thereof.
ORDINARY CONCEPT OF ATTORNEY’S FEES
Q: Aurora Pineda filed an action for
declaration of nullity of marriage against
Vinson Pineda, who was represented by Attys.
Clodualdo de Jesus, Carlos Ambrosio and
Emmanuel Mariano. The marriage was
subsequently declared null and void.
Throughout the proceedings counsels and
their relatives and friends availed of free
products and treatments from Vinson’s
dermatology clinic. This notwithstanding,
they billed him additional legal fees
amounting to P16.5 million which he,
however, refused to pay. Instead, he issued
them several checks totaling P1.12 million as
full payments as settlement. Still not satisfied,
the three lawyers filed in the same court a
motion for payment of lawyers' fees for P50
million, which is equivalent to 10% of the
value of the properties awarded to Pineda in
the case. Is their claim justified?
A: NO. Clearly, what they were demanding was
additional payment for legal services rendered in
the same case. Demanding P50 million on top of
the generous sums and perks already given to
them was an act of unconscionable greed. They
could not charge Pineda a fee based on
percentage, absent an express agreement to that
effect. The payments to them in cash, checks, free
products and services from Pineda’s business
more than sufficed for the work they did. The full
payment for settlement should have discharged
Vinson's obligation to them.
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
 Legal Ethics
As lawyers, they should be reminded that they
are members of an honorable profession, the
primary vision of which is justice. It is the
lawyer’s despicable behavior in the case at bar
which gives lawyering a bad name in the minds of
some people. The vernacular has a word for it:
nagsasamantala. The practice of law is a decent
profession and not a money-making trade.
Compensation should be but a mere incident
(Pineda v. de Jesus, G.R. No. 155224, Aug. 23, 2006).
EXTRAORDINARY CONCEPT OF ATTORNEY’S
FEES
Rules on extraordinary concept of attorney’s
fees
GR: Attorney’s fees as damages are not
recoverable. An adverse decision does not ipso
facto justify their award in favor of the winning
party.
XPNs: Attorney’s fees in the concept of
damagesmay be awarded in any of the following
circumstances:
1. When there is an agreement;
2. When exemplary damages are awarded;
3. When defendant’s action or omission
compelled plaintiff to litigate;
4. In criminal cases of malicious prosecution
a. Plaintiff was acquitted; and
b. The person who charged him knowingly
made the false statement of facts or that
the filing was prompted by sinister
design to vex him;
5. When the action is clearly unfounded;
6. When defendant acted in gross and evident
bad faith;
7. In actions for support;
8. In cases of recovery of wages;
9. In actions for indemnity under workmen’s
compensation and employee’s liability laws;
10. In a separate civil action arising from a crime;
11. When at least double costs are awarded
(costs of suit does not include attorney’s
fees);
12. When the court deems it just and equitable;
and
13. When a special law so authorizes. (Art. 2208,
NCC)
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
2018 GOLDEN NOTES
106
Rationale why that the Court shall state the
reason for the award of attorney’s fees in in its
decision
The award of attorney’s fees being an exception
rather than the general rule, it is necessary for the
court to make findings of facts and law that would
bring the case within the exception and justify the
grant of such award. (Agustin v. CA, G.R. No.
84751, June 6, 1990.
NOTE: Attorney’s fees must be specifically prayed
for and proven and justified in the decision itself
(Trans-Asia Shipping Lines, Inc. v. CA, G.R. No.
118126, March 4, 1996).
PRESERVATION OF CLIENT’S CONFIDENCES
CANON 21
A lawyer shall preserve the confidence and
secrets of his client even after the attorney-
client relation is terminated.
The protection given to the client is perpetual and
does not cease with the termination of the
litigation nor is affected by the party ceasing to
employ the attorney and employ another or any
other change of relation between them. It even
survives the death of the client.
PROHIBITED DISCLOSURES AND USE
RULE 21.01, CANON 21
A lawyer shall not reveal the confidences or
secrets of his client except:
a. When authorized by the client after
acquainting him of the consequences of the
disclosure;
b. When required by law;
c. When necessary to collect his fees or to
defend himself, his employees or associates or
by judicial action.
GR: A lawyer shall not reveal the confidences and
secrets of his client.
NOTE: An attorney cannot, without the consent of
his client, be examined as to any communication
made by the client to him, or his advice given
thereon in the course of, or with a view to,
professional employment, nor can an attorney’s
secretary, stenographer, or clerk be examined,
without the consent of the client and his
 DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF A LAWYER
employer, concerning any fact the knowledge of
which has been acquired in such capacity [Sec.
24(b), Rule 130, RRC].
XPNs:
1. When authorized by his client after
acquainting him of the consequences of the
disclosure;
NOTE: The only instance where the waiver of
the client alone is insufficient is when the
person to be examined with reference to any
privileged communication is the attorney’s
secretary, stenographer or clerk, in respect to
which, the consent of the attorney is likewise
necessary.
2. When required by law; or
3. When necessary to collect his fees or to
defend himself, his employees or associates
by judicial action.
NOTE: Payment of retainer fee is not essential
before an attorney can be required to safeguard a
prospective client’s secret acquired by the
attorney during the course of the consultation
with the prospective client, even if the attorney
did not accept the employment.
Instances when a lawyer may testify as a
witness in a case which he is handling for a
client
1. On formal matters, such as the mailing,
authentication or custody of an instrument
and the like;
2. Acting as an expert on his fee;
3. Acting as an arbitrator;
4. Depositions; and
5. On substantial matters in cases where his
testimony is essential to the ends of justice, in
which event he must, during his testimony,
entrust the trial of the case to another
counsel.
RULE 21.02, CANON 21
A lawyer shall not, to the disadvantage of
his client, use information acquired in the
course of employment, nor shall he use the
same to his own advantage or that of a third
person, unless the client with full knowledge
of the circumstances consents thereto.
RULE 21.05, CANON 21
A lawyer shall adopt such measures as may
be required to prevent those whose services
107
are utilized by him, from disclosing or using
confidences or secrets of the client.
RULE 21.06, CANON 21
A lawyer shall avoid indiscreet conversation
about a client’s affairs even with members of
his family.
RULE 21.07, CANON 21
A lawyer shall not reveal that he has been
consulted about a particular case except to
avoid possible conflict of interest.
Q: Bun Siong Yao is a majority stockholder of
Solar Farms & Livelihood Corporation and
Solar Textile Finishing Corporation. Atty.
Leonardo Aurelio is also a stockholder and
the retained counsel of both the corporation
and Bun Siong Yao. The latter purchased
several parcels of land using his personal
funds but were registered in the name of the
corporations upon the advice of Atty. Aurelio.
After a disagreement between Atty. Aurelio
and Bun Siong Yao’s wife, the former
demanded the return of his investment in the
corporations but when Yao refused to pay, he
filed 8 charges for estafa and falsification of
commercial documents against Yao, his wife
and the other officers of the corporation. Yao
alleged that the series of suits is a form of
harassment and constitutes an abuse of the
confidential information which Atty. Aurelio
obtained by virtue of his employment as
counsel. Atty.. Did Atty. Aurelio abuse the
confidential information he obtained by
virtue of his employment as counsel?
A: YES. The long-established rule is that an
attorney is not permitted to disclose
communications made to him in his professional
character by a client, unless the latter consents.
Atty. Aurelio took advantage of his being a lawyer
in order to get back at Yao. In doing so, he has
inevitably utilized information he has obtained
from his dealings with Yao and Yao's companies
for his own end.
Lawyers cannot be allowed to exploit their
profession for the purpose of exacting vengeance
or as a tool for instigating hostility against any
person most especially against a client or former
client (Bun Siong Yao v. Aurelio, A.C. No. 7023,
March 30, 2006).
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
 Legal Ethics

Acts punished under Art. 209 of the Revised Professional employment of a law firm is
Penal Code (betrayal of trust by attorney) equivalent to retainer of members thereof. In a
law firm, partners or associates usually consult
1. By causing damage to his client, either: a) by one another involving their cases and some work
any malicious breach of professional duty, or as a team. Consequently, it cannot be avoided that
b) by inexcusable negligence or ignorance; some information about the case received from
the client may be disclosed to the partners or
2. By revealing any of the secrets of his clients
associates.
learned by him in his professional capacity;
or
3. By having undertaken the defense of a client Q: In need of legal services, Niko secured an
or having received confidential information appointment to meet with Atty. Henry of
from said client in a case, shall undertake the HENRY & MEYER LAW OFFICES. During the
defense of the opposing party in the same meeting, Niko divulged highly private
information to Atty. Henry, believing that the
case, without the consent of his first client.
lawyer would keep the confidentiality of the
information. Subsequently, Niko was shocked
when he learned that Atty. Henry had shared
RULE 21.03, CANON 21
the confidential information with his law
A lawyer shall not, without the written
partner, Atty. Meyer, and their common
consent of his client, give information from
friend, private practitioner Atty. Canonigo.
his files to an outside agency seeking such
When confronted, Atty. Henry replied that
information for auditing, statistical,
Niko never signed any confidentiality
bookkeeping, accounting, data processing,
agreement, and that he shared the
or any other similar purposes.
information with the two lawyers to secure
affirmance of his legal opinion on
Niko’s problem. Did Atty. Henry violate any
Q: Certain government officers, armed with a
rule of ethics? Explain fully. (2008 Bar)
search warrant duly issued, seized among
other things, a filing cabinet belonging to Atty.
A: Atty. Henry violated Canon 21 of the CPR by
X. In seeking the return of the cabinet, Atty. X
sharing information obtained from his client Niko
claimed that the cabinet contained documents
with Atty. Canonigo. Canon 20 provides that “a
and articles belonging to his clients but the
lawyer shall preserve the confidences or secrets
government refused to return the cabinet.
of his client even after the attorney-client
Atty. X petitioned the court which issued the
relationship is terminated.” The fact that Atty.
warrant, praying that the agents be prohibited
Canonigo is a friend from whom he intended to
from opening the cabinet. Should Atty. X’s
secure legal opinion on Niko’s problem, does not
petition be given due course?
justify such disclosure. He cannot obtain a
collaborating counsel without the consent of the
A: YES. The lower court cannot order the opening
client (Rule 18.01, CPR).
of said cabinet. To do so is in violation of his
rights as an attorney. It would be tantamount to
On the other hand, Atty. Henry did not violate
compelling him to disclose his client’s secrets
Canon 21 in sharing information with his partner
(Lapena, 2009).
Atty. Meyer. Rule 21.04 of the CPR specifically
provides that “a lawyer may disclose the affairs of
a client of the firm to partners or associates
NOTE: Confidential information obtains even
thereof unless prohibited by the client.” Atty.
against government agencies and
Henry was not prohibited from disclosing the
instrumentalities (Funa, 2009).
affairs of Niko with the members of his law firm.
The employment of a member of a firm is
DISCLOSURE, WHEN ALLOWED
generally considered as employment of the firm
itself (Hilado v. David, G.R. No. L-961, September
RULE 21.04, CANON 21
21, 1949).
A lawyer may disclose the affairs of a client of
the firm to partners or associates thereof
unless prohibited by the client.

UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS

2018 GOLDEN NOTES
108
 DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF A LAWYER
Privileged communication rule with regard to
the identity of his client
GR: A lawyer may not invoke privileged
communication to refuse revealing a client’s
identity.
XPNs:
1. When there is a strong possibility that
revealing the client’s name would implicate
the client in the very activity for which he
sought the lawyer’s advice;
2. When disclosure would open the client to
civil liability; or
3. When the government’s lawyers have no case
against an attorney’s client and revealing the
client’s name would furnish the only link that
would come from the chain of testimony
necessary to convict him.
Reasons why a lawyer may not invoke
privileged communication to refuse
revealing a client’s identity
1. Due process considerations require that the
opposing party should know their adversary;
2. The privilege pertains to the subject matter
of the relationship;
3. The privilege begins to exist only after
attorney-client relationship has been
established hence, it does not attach until
there is a client; and
4. The court has a right to know that the client
whose privileged information is sought to be
protected is flesh and blood.
Q: Atty. X was hired by Mr. D to draft the
demand letters and complaint-affidavit
charging Mr. A of estafa. However, Atty. X later
on represented Mr. A in the similar case.
Consequently, Atty. X was charged with
violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility for representing conflicting
interests. Atty. Y Contends that his lawyer-
client relationship with Mr. D ended when he
and his group entered into the compromise
settlement. Is his contention correct?
A: NO. Atty. X’s contention is not correct. The
lawyer-client relationship did not terminate as of
the date of the compromise agreement, for the
fact remained that he still needed to oversee the
implementation of the settlement as well as to
proceed with the criminal cases until they were
dismissed or otherwise concluded by the trial
court. It is also relevant to indicate that the
109
execution of a compromise settlement in the
criminal cases did not ipso facto cause the
termination of the cases not only because the
approval of the compromise by the trial court was
still required, but also because the
compromise would have applied only to the civil
aspect, and excluded the criminal aspect pursuant
to Article 2034 of the Civil Code (Samson v. Era,
A.C. No. 6664, July 16, 2013).
WITHDRAWAL OF SERVICES
CANON 22
A lawyer shall withdraw his services only for
good cause and upon notice appropriate in
the circumstances.
Right to withdraw
GR: A lawyer lacks the unqualified right to
withdraw once he has taken a case. By his
acceptance, he has impliedly stipulated that he
will prosecute the case to its conclusion. This is
especially true when such withdrawal will work
injustice to a client or frustrate the ends of justice.
XPNs: The right of a lawyer to retire from the
case before its final adjudication, which arises
only from:
1. The client’s written consent; or
2. By permission of the court after due notice
and hearing.
Instances when a lawyer may withdraw his
services without the consent of his client (Rule
22.01, Canon 22)
a. When the client pursue an Illegal or immoral
course of conduct in connection with the matter
he is handling;
b. When the client insists that the lawyer pursue
conduct in Violation of these canons and rules;
c. When his Inability to work with co-counsel will
not promote the best interest of the client;
d. When the Mental or physical condition of the
lawyer renders it difficult for him to carry out the
employment effectively;
e. When the client deliberately Fails to pay the
fees for the services or fails to comply with the
retainer agreement;
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
 Legal Ethics
f. When the lawyer is Elected or appointed to a
public office; and
g. Other similar cases. (Rule 22.01, CPR)
i. When there is conflict of interest.
Hot Potato Rule
GR: A lawyer may not unreasonably withdraw
from representing a client.
XPN: Withdrawal may be allowed if there is a
conflict of interests arising from circumstances
beyond the control of the lawyer or the law firm.
(Black’s Law Dictionary, 9th edition)
NOTE: In cases a-e (above), the lawyer must file a
written motion with an express consent of his
client and the court shall determine whether he
ought to be allowed to retire.
He may also retire at any time from an action or
special proceeding without the consent of his
client, should the court, on notice to the client and
attorney, and on hearing, determine that he ought
to be allowed to retire. (Sec. 26, Rule 138, RRC)
Procedure to follow when withdrawal is
without client’s consent
1. File a petition for withdrawal in court.
2. Serve a copy of this petition upon his client
and the adverse party at least 3 days before
the date set for hearing.
NOTE: He should present his petition well in
advance of the trial of the action to enable the
client to secure the services of another lawyer.
If the application is filed under circumstances
that do not afford a substitute counsel sufficient
time to prepare for trial or that it will
work prejudice to the client’s cause, the court
may deny his application and require him to
conduct the trial.
A lawyer should not presume that the court will
grant his petition for withdrawal. Until his
withdrawal shall have been proved, the lawyer
remains counsel of record who is expected by his
client as well as by the court to do what the
interests of his client require.
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
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Q: Can a client discharge the services of his
lawyer without a cause? (1994, 1997, 1998
Bar)
A: YES. A client has the right to discharge his
attorney at any time with or without a cause or
even against his consent.
1. With just cause – lawyer is not necessarily
deprived of his right to be paid for his
services. He may only be deprived of such
right if the cause for his dismissal constitutes
in itself a sufficient legal obstacle for
recovery.
2. Without just cause
a. No express written agreement as to fees
- reasonable value of his services up to
the date of his dismissal (quantum
meruit).
b. There is written agreement and the fee
stipulated is absolute and reasonable –
full payment of compensation.
c. The fee stipulated is contingent.
d. If dismissed before the conclusion of the
action - reasonable value of his
services (quantum meruit)
e. If contingency occurs or client prevents
its occurrence – full amount.
NOTE: A lawyer should question his discharge
otherwise he will only be allowed to recover on
quantum meruit basis.
Limitations on client’s right to discharge the
services of his lawyer
1. When made with justifiable cause, it shall
negate the attorney’s right to full payment of
compensation.
2. The attorney may, in the discretion of the
court, intervene in the case to protect his
right to fees.
3. A client may not be permitted to abuse his
right to discharge his counsel as an excuse to
secure repeated extensions of time to file a
pleading or to indefinitely avoid a trial.
Conditions for substitution of counsel
1. Written application
2. Written consent of the client
3. Written consent of the attorney to be
substituted, or in the absence thereof, proof
of service of notice of said motion to the
attorney to be substituted in the manner
prescribed by the rules.
 DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF A LAWYER
Heavy workload as excuse for withdrawal as
counsel
Standing alone, heavy workload is not sufficient
reason for the withdrawal of a counsel. When a
lawyer accepts to handle a case, whether for a fee
or gratis et amore, he undertakes to give his
utmost attention, skill and competence to it
regardless of its significance. Failure to fulfill his
duties will subject him to grave administrative
liability as a member of the Bar (Ceniza v. Atty.
Rubia, A.C. No. 6166, October 2, 2009).
Q: On the eve of the initial hearing for the
reception of evidence for the defense, the
defendant and his counsel had a conference
where the client directed the lawyer to
present as principal defense witnesses 2
persons whose testimonies were personally
known to the lawyer to have been perjured.
The lawyer informed his client that he refused
to go along with the unwarranted course of
action proposed by the defendant. But the
client insisted on the directive, or else he
would not pay the agreed attorney’s fees.
When the case was called for hearing the next
morning the lawyer forthwith moved in open
court that he be relieved as counsel for the
defendant. Both the defendant and the
plaintiff’s counsel objected to the motion.
Under the given facts, is the defense lawyer
legally justified in seeking withdrawal from
the case? Why or why not? Reason briefly.
(2004 Bar)
A: YES, he is justified. Under Rule 22.01 of the
CPR, a lawyer may withdraw his services “if the
client insists that the lawyer pursue conduct
violative of these canons and rules”. The
insistence of the client that the lawyer present
witnesses whom he personally knows to have
been perjured, will expose him to criminal and
civil liability and violate his duty of candor,
fairness and good faith to the court.
Q: Was the motion for relief as counsel made
by the defense lawyer in full accord with the
procedural requirements for a lawyer’s
withdrawal from a court case? Explain briefly.
(2004 Bar)
A: NO, his actuation is not in accord with the
procedural requirements for the lawyer’s
withdrawal from a court case. Whether or not a
111
lawyer has a valid cause to withdraw from a case,
he cannot just do so and leave the client in the
cold unprotected. He must serve a copy of his
petition upon the client and the adverse party. He
should, moreover, present his petition well in
advance of the trial of the action to enable the
client to secure the services of another lawyer.
NOTE: In one case, respondent lawyer admitted
that he deliberately failed to timely file a formal
offer of exhibits because he believes that the
exhibits were fabricated and was hoping that the
same would be refused admission by the RTC. If
respondent truly believes that the exhibits to be
presented in evidence by his clients were
fabricated, then he has the option to withdraw
from the case. Canon 22 allows a lawyer to
withdraw his services for good cause such as
when the client pursues an illegal or immoral
course of conduct with the matter he is handling
or when the client insists that the lawyer pursue
conduct violative of these canons and rules. (Sps.
Warriner v. Atty. Dublin, A.C. No. 5239, November
18, 2013)
Q: Atty. X filed a notice of withdrawal of
appearance as counsel for the accused Y after
the prosecution rested its case. The reason for
the withdrawal of Atty. X was the failure of
accused Y to affix his conformity to the
demand of Atty. X for increase in attorney's
fees. Is the ground for withdrawal justified?
Explain. (2000 Bar)
A: The ground for the withdrawal is not justified.
Rule 22.01 (e) of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that a lawyer may
withdraw his services when the client
deliberately fails to pay the fees for his services or
fails to comply with the retainer agreement. In
this case, the client has not failed to pay the
lawyer's fees or to comply with the retainer
agreement. He has only refused to agree with the
lawyer's demand for an increase in his fees. It is
his right to refuse as that is part of his freedom of
contract.
RULE 22.02, CANON 22
A lawyer who withdraws or is discharged
shall, subject to a retaining lien,
immediately turn over all papers and
property to which the client is entitled, and
shall cooperate with his successor in the
orderly transfer of the matter, including all
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
 Legal Ethics
information necessary for the proper
handling of the matter.

Duties of a discharged lawyer or one who

withdraws

1. Immediately turn-over all papers and

property to which the client is entitled; and
2. To cooperate with his successor in the orderly
transfer of the case.

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 SUSPENSION, DISBARMENT AND DISCIPLINE OF LAWYERS
SUSPENSION, DISBARMENT AND DISCIPLINE
OF LAWYERS (RULE 139-B, RULES OF COURT)
NATURE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF
DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST LAWYERS
Rationale of disciplining errant lawyers
The practice of law is considered a privilege
bestowed by the State on those who show that
they possess and continue to possess the legal
qualifications for the profession. Lawyers may,
this, be disciplined for any conduct that is
wanting of the above standards whether in their
professional or in their private capacity. (Engr.
Tombokon v. Atty. Pefianco, Adm. Case No. 6116,
August 1, 2012)
Nature of the power to discipline
The power to discipline a lawyer is JUDICIAL in
nature and can be exercised only by the courts. It
cannot be defeated by the legislative or executive
departments.
The power to disbar and to reinstate is an
inherently judicial function (Andres v. Cabrera,
SBC- 585, February 29, 1984).
NOTE: The power to disbar must be exercised
with great caution, and only in a clear case of
misconduct that seriously affects the standing
and character of the lawyer as an officer of the
Court and as a member of the bar. Thus, where a
lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension,
could accomplish the end desired, disbarment
should never be decreed (Ventura v. Samson, A.C.
No. 9608, November 27, 2012).
Forms of disciplinary measures by the
Supreme Court (WARCS-DIP)
1. Warning- an act of putting one on his guard
against an impending danger, evil, consequence
or penalty.
2. Admonition- a gentle or friendly reproof mild
rebuke, warning, reminder or counselling on a
fault, error or oversight; an expression of
authoritative advice;
3. Reprimand- a public and formal censure or
severe reproof, administered to a person at fault
by his superior officer or the body to which he
belongs;
113
4. Censure- official reprimand;
5. Suspension- temporary withholding of a
lawyer’s right to practice his profession as a
lawyer for a certain period or for an indefinite
period of time.
a. Definite
b. Indefinite – qualified disbarment;
lawyer determines for himself how long
or how short his suspension shall last by
proving to court that he is once again fit
to resume practice of law.
NOTE: Indefinite suspension is not cruel.
Indefinite suspension puts in his hands the key
for the restoratiton of his rights and privileges as
a lawyer. (Dumagdag v. Lumaya, A.C. No. 2614,
June 29, 2000)
6. Disbarment – It is the act of the Supreme Court
of withdrawing from an attorney the right to
practice law. The name of the lawyer is stricken
out from the Roll of Attorneys;
7. Interim Suspension- It is the temporary
suspension of a lawyer from the practice of law
pending imposition of clinical discipline;
Includes:
a. Suspension upon conviction of a
“serious crime”
b. Suspension when the lawyer’s
continuing conduct is or is likely
to watch cause of immediate and
serious injury to a client or
public
8. Probation it is a sanction that allows a lawyer
to practice law under specified conditions.
Powers of the Court of Appeals and the
Regional Trial Courts in Relation to the
Discipline of Lawyers [SWARP]
They are also empowered to:
1. Suspend an attorney from practice for any of
the causes named in Sec 27, Rule 138 until
further action of the Supreme Court in the
case (Sec. 16, Rule 139-B);
2. Warn;
3. Admonish;
4. Reprimand; and
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
 Legal Ethics
5. Probation (IBP Guidelines)
NOTE: The CA and RTC cannot disbar a lawyer.
Q: Atty. D was required by Judge H of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila to show
cause why he should not be punished for
contempt of court for shouting invectives at
the opposing counsel and harassing his
witness.
Assuming that there was sufficient cause or
ground, may Judge H suspend Atty. D from the
practice of law? If Judge H finds that the
actuations of Atty. D are grossly unethical and
unbecoming of a member of the bar, may
Judge H disbar Atty. D instead? (2014 Bar)
A: Under Section 28, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court, a Regional Trial Court may suspend a
lawyer from the practice of law for any of the
causes provided in Section 27, until further action
from the Supreme Court. But it may not disbar
him, for only the Supreme Court can disbar a
lawyer pursuant to its constitutional power to
admit persons to the practice of law.
Other sanctions and remedies
1. Restitution;
2. Assessment of costs;
3. Limitation upon practice;
4. Appointment of a receiver;
5. Requirement that a lawyer take the bar
examination or professional responsibility
examination;
6. Requirement that a lawyer attend continuing
education courses; and
7. Other requirements that the highest court or
disciplinary board deems consistent with the
purposes of the sanctions.
Factors to be considered in imposing Lawyer’s
sanctions
1. The duty violated;
2. The lawyer’s mental state;
3. The actual and potential injury caused by the
lawyer’s misconduct; and
4. The existence of aggravating and mitigating
factors. (Guidelines for imposing Lawyer’s
sanctions, Sec. 3.0)
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
2018 GOLDEN NOTES
114
NOTE: After misconduct has been established,
aggravating and mitigating circumstances may be
considered in deciding what sanction to impose.
Aggravating factors which may be considered
in increasing the degree of discipline to be
imposed:
1. Prior disciplinary offenses;
2. Dishonest or selfish motives;
3. A pattern of misconduct;
4. Multiple offenses;
5. Bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary
proceeding by intentionally failing to comply
with rules or orders of the disciplinary
agency;
6. Submission of false evidence, false
statements, or other deceptive practices
during the disciplinary process;
7. Refusal to acknowledge wrongful nature of
conduct;
8. Vulnerability of victim;
9. Substantial experience in the practice of law;
and
10. Indifference to making restitution (IBP
Guidelines 9.22).
Mitigating which may be considered in
decreasing the degree of discipline to be
imposed:
1. Good faith in the acquisition of a property of
the client subject of litigation (In Re: Ruste,
A.M. No. 632, June 27, 1940);
2. Inexperience of the lawyer (Munoz v. People,
G.R. No. L-33672, September 28, 1973);
3. Age (Santos v. Tan, A.C. No. 2697, April 19,
1991);
4. Apology (Munoz v. People, G.R. No. L- 33672,
September 28, 1973);
5. Lack of Intention to slight or offend the Court
(Rheem of the Philippines, Inc. v. Ferrer, G.R.
No. L-22979, January 27, 1967);
6. Absence of prior disciplinary record;
7. Absence of dishonest or selfish motive;
8. Personal or emotional problems;
9. Timely good faith effort to make restitution
or to rectify consequences of misconduct;
10. Full and free disclosure to disciplinary board
or cooperative attitude toward the
proceedings;
11. Character or reputation;
12. Physical or mental disability or impairment;
13. Delay in disciplinary proceedings;
 SUSPENSION, DISBARMENT AND DISCIPLINE OF LAWYERS
14. Interim rehabilitation;
15. Imposition of other penalties or sanctions;
16. Remorse;
17. Remoteness of prior offenses (IBP Guidelines
9.32).
Factors which should not be considered as
aggravating or mitigating:
1. Forced or compelled restitution
2. Agreeing to the client’s demand for certain
improper behavior or result
3. Withdrawal of complaint against the lawyer
4. Resignation prior to completion of disciplinary
proceedings
5. Complainant’s recommendation as to sanction;
6. Failure of injured client to complain
SUI GENERIS
Sui generis in nature (2002 Bar)
Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a
class of their own (sui generis). They are distinct
from and may proceed independently of civil and
criminal cases (In re Almacen, G.R. No. L-27654,
February 18, 1970; Funa, 2009). It is:
a. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they
are investigations by the Court into the
conduct of one of its officers.
b. Not a civil action because there is neither
plaintiff nor respondent, and involves no
private interest. The complainant is not a
party and has no interest in the outcome
except as all citizens have in the proper
administration of justice. There is no redress
for private grievance.
c. Not a criminal prosecution because it is not
meant as a punishment depriving him of
source of livelihood but rather to ensure that
those who exercise the function should be
competent, honorable and reliable so that the
public may repose confidence in them.
Main objectives of disbarment and suspension
1. Compel the attorney to deal fairly and
honestly with his clients;
2. Remove from the profession a person whose
misconduct has proved him unfit to be
entrusted with the duties and responsibilities
belonging to the office of an attorney;
3. Punish the lawyer;
4. Set an example or a warning for the other
members of the bar;
115
5. Safeguard the administration of justice from
incompetent and dishonest lawyers;
6. Protect the public.
NOTE: The purpose and the nature of disbarment
proceedings make the number of defenses
available in civil and criminal actions inapplicable
in disciplinary proceedings.
Q: Is the defense of Atty. R in a disbarment
complaint for immorality filed by his
paramour P that P is in pari delicto material or
a ground for exoneration? Explain. (2010 Bar)
A: The defense of in pari delicto is immaterial in
an administrative case which is sui generis. The
administrative case is about the lawyer's conduct,
not the woman's. (Mortel v. Aspiras, 100 Phil. 586,
1956)
Q: Arabella filed a complaint for disbarment
against her estranged husband, Atty. P, on the
ground of immorality and use of illegal drugs.
After Arabella presented evidence and rested
her case before the Investigating
Commissioner of the IBP Committee on Bar
Discipline, she filed an Affidavit of Desistance
and motion to dismiss the complaint, she and
her husband having reconciled for the sake of
their children. You are the Investigating
Commissioner of the IBP. Bearing in mind that
the family is a social institution which the
State is duty-bound to preserve, what will be
your action on Arabella's motion to dismiss
the complaint? (2010 Bar)
A: I would still deny the motion to dismiss. The
general rule is that “no investigation shall be
interrupted or terminated by reason of the
desistance, settlement, compromise, restitution,
withdrawal of the charges or failure of the
complainant to prosecute the same unless the
Supreme Court motu proprio or upon
recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors
determines that there is no compelling reason to
continue with the proceedings. An administrative
investigation of a lawyer is sui generis, neither a
civil nor criminal proceeding. An affidavit of
desistance has no place in it.
Q: Atty. Hyde, a bachelor, practices law in the
Philippines. On long weekends, he dates
beautiful actresses in Hong Kong. Kristine, a
neighbor in the Philippines, filed with the
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
 Legal Ethics
Supreme Court an administrative complaint
against the lawyer because of sex videos
uploaded through the internet showing Atty.
Hyde's sordid dalliance with the actresses in
Hong Kong. In his answer, Atty. Hyde (a.)
questions the legal personality and interest of
Kristine to institute the complaint and (b.)
insists that he is a bachelor and the sex videos
relate to his private life which is outside
public scrutiny and have nothing to do with
the law practice. Rule on the validity of Atty.
Hyde's defenses. (2009 Bar)
A:
a. The legal personality and interest of Kristine
to initiate the complaint for disbarment is
immaterial. A disbarment proceeding is sui
generis, neither civil nor a criminal
proceeding. Its sole purpose is to determine
whether or not a lawyer is still deserving to
be a member of the bar. In a real sense,
Kristine is not a plaintiff; hence, interest on
her part is not required.
b. Atty. Hyde's second defense is untenable. His
duty not to engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral and deceitful conduct under Rule
1.01 of the CPR, as well as his duty not to
engage in scandalous conduct to the discredit
of the legal profession under Rule 7.03, is
applicable to his private as well as to his
professional life.
Q: Atty. Cortes executed a Special Power of
Attorney (SPA) authorizing a certain Inis to
sell two parcels of land registered in the
names of Loyola, Lacdan, Veloso, and Inis. The
SPA was alleged to be forged because Loyola
and Lacdan were already dead at the time of
its execution. Moreover, Atty. Cortes notarized
in Quezon City 12 falsified Deeds of Donation
which was executed in Carmona, Cavite.
Consequently, an administrative case as well
as a criminal case of Estafa was instituted
against Atty. Cortes. As a defense, Atty. Cortes
asserted that all the criminal complaints
against him had been dismissed; hence, he
should be exonerated of all the charges
against him. Will the administrative case
prosper?
A: YES, it will prosper. Administrative cases
against lawyers are sui generis, or a class of their
own. Disbarment cases are aimed at purging the
legal profession of individuals who obdurately
scorn and despise the exalted standards of the
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
2018 GOLDEN NOTES
116
noble profession of law. In this case, the Court
found that Atty. Cortes acted with deceit when he
used the falsified documents to effect the transfer
of properties. Also, his act of bringing the Deeds
of Donation that were executed in Carmona,
Cavite, to his law office in Quezon City, and
notarizing them there, not only violated Section
240 of the Revised Administrative Code but "also
partook of malpractice of law and falsification
(Sta. Ana etc. v. Atty. Cortes, A.C. 6980, August 30,
2017).
QUANTUM OF EVIDENCE REQUIRED
The Supreme Court has consistently held that a
clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify
the imposition of administrative penalty
considering the serious consequence of
disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar
(Rose Bunagan-Bansig v. Atty. Rogelio Celera, A.C.
No. 5581, January 14, 2014; Atty. Clodualdo De
Jesus v. Atty. Risos-Vidal, A.C. No. 7961, March 19,
2014).
PRESCRIPTION
NO prescriptive period for the filing of a
administrative complaint against an erring
lawyer
Rule VII, Section 1 of the Rules of Procedure of
the CBD-IBP, which provides for a prescriptive
period for the filing of administrative complaints
against lawyers, should be struck down as void
and of no legal effect for being ultra vires (Heirs of
Falame v. Atty. Baguio, A.C. No. 6876, March 7,
2008).
Q: Atty. Gutierrez phoned Yuhico and asked
for a cash loan claiming that he needed money
to pay for the medical expenses of his mother
who was seriously ill, and promised to pay the
loan very soon. Consequently, he again asked
for a loan to pay for his wife’s
hospitalization and again promised to pay
“within a short time” but failed to do so.
Later, he again attempted to borrow money
for his daughter’s licensure examination
in the US Medical Board and assured Yuhico
that he will pay his debts on or before a
certain date but Yuhico refused to lend him
the money, instead, he demanded payment of
his debts. Atty. Gutierrez failed to pay which
led to the filing of a complaint before the IBP-
 SUSPENSION, DISBARMENT AND DISCIPLINE OF LAWYERS
CBD for non-payment of just debts. It turned
out that Atty. Gutierrez was previously
disbarred in the case of Huyssen v. Atty.
Gutierrez for gross misconduct in view of his
failure to pay his debts and his issuance of
worthless checks. May Atty. Gutierrez be
disbarred for the second time?
A: NO. The SC held that while the IBP
recommended to disbar Atty. Gutierrez for the
second time, we do not have double or multiple
disbarment in our laws or jurisprudence and
neither do we have a law mandating a minimum
5-year requirement for readmission, as cited by
the IBP. Thus, while Gutierrez’s infraction calls
for the penalty of disbarment, they cannot disbar
him anew (Yuhico v. Atty. Gutierrez, A.C. No. 8391,
November 23, 2010).
GROUNDS
Specific grounds for suspension or
disbarment of a lawyer
1. Deceit;
2. Malpractice;
3. Grossly immoral conduct;
4. Conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude;
5. Violation of oath of office;
6. Willful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court;
7. Corrupt or willful appearance as an attorney
for a party to a case without authority to do
so (Sec. 27, Rule 138, RRC);
8. Non-payment of IBP membership dues
(Santos, Jr. v. Atty. Llamas, Adm. Case No.
4749, January 20, 2000).
The statutory enumeration is not to be takenas a
limitation on the general power of SC to suspend
or disbar a lawyer (In Re: Puno, A.C. No. 389,
February 28, 1967). HENCE, the grounds
enumerated are NOT exclusive.
NOTE: Lending money by a justice of Supreme
Court is not a ground for disbarment and helping
a person apply for sale application on a lot is not
an offense and not also a ground for disbarment
(Olazo v. Justice Tinga (Ret.), A.M. No. 10-5-7-SC,
December 7, 2010).
Lawyer’s misconduct committed prior and
after admission to the bar and its effects
1. PRIOR to admission to the bar- acts of
117
misconduct prior to admission include those
that indicate that at the time the lawyer took
his oath, he did not possess the required
qualifications for membership in the bar.
Consequently, the cancellation of his license
is justified.
2. AFTER admission to the bar - those which
cause loss of moral character on his part or
involve violation of his duties to the court, his
client, to the legal profession and to the
public.
NOTE: Disbarment is merited when the action is
not the lawyer’s first ethical infraction of the
same nature (Que v. Revilla, A.C. No. 7054,
December 4, 2009).
Malpractice
It refers to any malfeasance or dereliction of duty
committed by a lawyer (Tan Tek Beng v. David,
Adm. Case No. 1261, December 29 1983; Lapena,Jr.,
2009).
Legal Malpractice
It consists of failure of an attorney to use such
skill, prudence and diligence as a lawyer of
ordinary skill and capacity commonly possess
and exercise in the performance of tasks which
they undertake, and when such failure
proximately causes damage, it gives rise to an
action in tort (Tan Tek Beng v. David, A.C. No.
1261, December 29, 1983).
Gross Misconduct
It is any inexcusable, shameful or flagrant
unlawful conduct on the part of the person
concerned in the administration of justice which
is prejudicial to the rights of the parties or to the
right determination of a cause, a conduct that is
generally motivated by a premeditated, obstinate
or intentional purpose (Yumol Jr. v. Ferrer, Sr., A.C.
No. 6585, April 21, 2005).
NOTE: The issuance of worthless checks
constitutes gross misconduct as its effect
transcends the private interests of the parties
directly involved in the transaction and touches
the interests of the community at large. As a
lawyer, respondent is deemed to know the law,
especially B. P. Blg. 22. By issuing checks in
violation of the provisions of this law, respondent
is guilty of serious misconduct(PACG v. Atty.
Carandang, A.C. No. 5700, January 30, 2006).
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
 Legal Ethics
Grossly immoral conduct
Immoral conduct has been defined as that
conduct which is wilful, flagrant, or shameless,
and wwhich shows a moral indifference to the
opinion of the good and respectable members of
the community. (Arciga v. Maniwang, A.M. No.
1608, August 14, 1981)
An act of personal immorality on the part of a
lawyer in his private relation with opposite sex
may puthis character in doubt. But to justify
suspension or disbarment, the act must not only
be immoral, it must be grossly immoral. (Abaigar
v. Paz, A.M. No. 997, September 10, 1979)
Immoral conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as
to constitute a criminal act, or so unprinciples as
to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when
committed under such scandalous or revolting
circumstances as to shock the community’s sense
of decency. (Dr. Perez v. Atty. Catindig and Atty.
Baydo, A.C. No. 5816, March 10, 2015)
NOTE: Mere intimacy between a lawyer and a
woman with no impediment to marry each other,
and who voluntarily cohabited and had two
children, is neither so corrupt to constitute a
criminal act nor so unprincipled as to warrant
disbarment or disciplinary action against the man
as a member of the bar (Arciga v. Maniwang, A.C.
No. 1608, August 14, 1981).
Moral turpitude
It is defined as “everything that is done contrary
to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals; an
act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the
private and social duties which a man owes his
fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to
the accepted and customary rule of right and duty
between man and woman, or conduct contrary to
justice, honesty modesty, or good morals (Soriano
v. Dizon, A. C. No. 6792, January 25, 2006).
All crimes of which fraud or deceit is an element
or those inherently contrary to rules of right
conduct, honesty, or morality in civilized
community.
Other statutory grounds for suspension and
disbarment of members of the bar
1. Acquisition of interest in the subject matter
of the litigation, either through purchase or
assignment (Art. 1491, NCC);
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
2018 GOLDEN NOTES
118
2. Breach of professional duty, inexcusable
negligence, or ignorance, or for the revelation
of the client’s secrets (Art. 208, RPC);
3. Representing conflicting interests (Art. 209,
RPC).
Any errant behavior on the part of a lawyer, be it
in his public or private activities, which tends to
show him deficient in moral character, honesty,
probity or good demeanor, is sufficient to
warrant his suspension or disbarment (Tiong vs.
Atty. Florendo, A.C. No. 4428, December 12, 2011).
Other grounds for discipline
1. Non-professional misconduct
GR: A lawyer may not be suspended or
disbarred for misconduct in his non-
professional or private capacity.
XPN: Where such is so gross as to show him
to be morally unfit for office or unworthy of
privilege, the court may be justified in
suspending or removing him from the Roll of
Attorneys. (2005 Bar Question)
2. Promoting to violate or violating penal laws
3. Misconduct in discharge of official duties – A
lawyer who holds a government office may
not be disciplined as a member of the bar for
misconduct in the discharge of his duties as
government official.
However, if the misconduct is in violation of
the CPR or of his oath as a lawyer or is of
such a character as to affect his qualifications
as a lawyer, he may be subject to disciplinary
action such as disbarment (Collantes v.
Renomeron, A.C. No. 3056, August 16, 1991).
NOTE: This rule does not apply to
impeachable officials like SC justices,
members of constitutional commissions and
Ombudsman because they can only be
removed by impeachment.
4. Commission of fraud or falsehood; and
5. Misconduct as notary public
NOTE: By applying for having himself
commissioned as notary public, a lawyer
assumes duties in a dual capacity, the non-
performance of which may be a ground for
discipline as a member of the bar.
 SUSPENSION, DISBARMENT AND DISCIPLINE OF LAWYERS
Q: Jose secured the services of Atty. Lada to
pursue a case for partition of property. After
accepting the engagement, Atty. Lada filed the
corresponding complaint eventually
dismissed by the RTC for lack of cause of
action and insufficiency of evidence. Atty.
Lada allegedly asked for the amount of
P10,000.00 for the payment of appeal fees and
other costs. Upon payment, notice of appeal
was filed but was also dismissed for being
filed out of time. Atty. Lada however, did not
disclose such fact and, instead, showed to Jose
an Order purportedly issued by the RTC
directing the submission of the results of a
DNA testing to prove his filiation. When Jose
found out that the Order was spurious, he
filed a disbarment case against Atty. Lada.
Will the case prosper?
A: YES. Atty. Lada already knew of the dismissal
of complainant’s partition case before the RTC.
Moreover, Atty. Lada was inexcusably negligent
in filing complainant’s appeal only on September
12, 2007, or way beyond the reglementary period
therefor, thus resulting in its outright dismissal.
Clearly, Atty. Lada failed to exercise such skill,
care, and diligence as men of the legal profession
commonly possess and exercise in such matters
of professional employment. Worse, Atty. Lada
attempted to conceal the dismissal of
complainant’s appeal by fabricating the Order
which purportedly required a DNA testing to
make it appear that complainant’s appeal had
been given due course, when in truth, the same
had long been denied. In so doing, he engaged in
an unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful conduct that
caused undue prejudice and unnecessary
expenses on the part of complainant. For gross
misconduct, Atty. Lada should be disbarred (Tan
v. Diamante, A.C. No. 7766, August 5, 2014).
PROCEEDINGS
Initiation of disbarment
Any interested person or the court motu proprio
may initiate disciplinary proceedings. There can
be no doubt as to the right of a citizen to bring to
the attention of the proper authority acts and
doings of public officers which citizens feel are
incompatible with the duties of the office and
from which conduct the citizen or the public
might or does suffer undesirable consequences.
(2000 Bar Question)
119
NOTE: A disbarment proceeding may proceed
regardless of interest or lack of interest of the
complainant (Rayos-Ombac v. Rayos, A.C. No. 2884,
January 28, 1998). However, if the complainant
refuses to testify and the charges cannot then be
substantiated, the court will have no alternative
but to dismiss the case.
Characteristics of disbarment proceedings
1. Sui Generis
2. The defense of “double jeopardy” cannot be
availed of in a disbarment proceeding;
3. It can be initiated motu proprio by the SC or
IBP. It can be initiated without a complaint;
4. It is imprescriptible;
5. Conducted confidentially;
6. It can proceed regardless of the interest or
the lack thereof on the part of the
complainant; and
7. It in itself constitutes due process of law.
8. Whatever has been decided in a disbarment
case cannot be a source of right that may be
enforced in another action;
9. In pari delicto rule not applicable;
10. No prejudicial question in disbarment
proceedings;
11. Penalty in a disbarment case cannot be in the
alternative; and
12. Monetary claims cannot be granted except
restitution and return of monies and
properties of the client given in the course of
the lawyer-client relationship.
NOTE: The confidentiality of the proceedings is a
privilege which may be waived by the lawyer in
whom and for the protection of whose personal
and professional reputation it is vested, as by
presenting the testimony in a disbarment case or
using it as impeaching evidence in a civil suit
(Villalon v. IAC, G.R. No. L-73751, September 24,
1986).
Offices authorized to investigate disbarment
proceedings
1. Supreme Court (Sec. 13, Rule 139-B, RRC)
2. IBP through its Commission on Bar Discipline
or authorized investigator (Sec. 2, Rule 139-B,
RRC)
3. Office of the Bar Confidant (Sec. 13, Rule 139-
B, RRC as amended by B.M. No. 1645)
Purposes of disbarment
Disbarment is not meant as a punishment to
deprive an attorney of a means of livelihood but
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
 Legal Ethics
rather intended to:
1. To protect the public
2. To protect and preserve the legal profession
3. To compel the lawyer to comply with his
duties and obligations under the CPR.
Quantum of proof
The burden of proof is upon the complainant and
the SC will exercise its disciplinary power only if
the complainant establishes his case by the
required quantum of proof which is clear,
convincing and satisfactory evidence or
clearly preponderant evidence(Aquino v.
Mangaoang, A.C. No. 4934, March 17, 2004).
Q: Atty. Sesbreño was found guilty of murder
and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua by the Cebu City RTC. On
appeal, however, the Supreme Court
downgraded the crime to homicide. On July
27, 2001, Sesbreño was released from
confinement following his acceptance of the
conditions of his parole. The order of
commutation provides that his original
sentence is commuted to an indeterminate
prison term of from 7 years and 6 months to
10 years imprisonment and to pay an
indemnity of P50,000.00. Dr. Garcia filed a
disbarment case against Sesbreño alleging
that he is practicing law despite his previous
conviction for homicide and continuing to
engage in the practice of law despite his
conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude. Sesbreño argued that the executive
clemency granted to him restored his full civil
and political rights. Decide.
A: There was no mention that the executive
clemency was absolute and unconditional and
restored Sesbreño to his full civil and political
rights. The executive clemency merely
“commuted to an indeterminate prison term of 7
years and 6 months to 10 years imprisonment”,
the penalty imposed on Sesbreño. Commutation
is a mere reduction of penalty and it only partially
extinguished criminal liability. The penalty for
Sesbreño’s crime was never wiped out. For
unauthorized practice of law, Sesbreño is
disbarred (Garcia v. Atty. Sesbreño, A.C. No. 7973
and A.C. No. 10457, February 3, 2015).
Q: After passing the Philippine Bar in 1986,
Richards practiced law until 1996 when he
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
2018 GOLDEN NOTES
120
migrated to Australia where he subsequently
became an Australian citizen in 2000. As he
kept himself abreast of the legal
developments, petitioner learned about the
citizenship retention and re-acquisition act of
2003 (RA 9225), pursuant to which he
reacquired his Philippine citizenship in 2006.
He took his oath of allegiance as a Filipino
citizen at the Philippine embassy in Canberra,
Australia. Jaded by the laid back life in the
outback, he returned to the Philippines in
December of 2008. After the holidays, he
established his own law office and resumed
his practice of law. Months later a concerned
woman who had secured copies of Atty.
Richard's naturalization papers with the
consular authentication, filed with the SC an
anonymous complaint against him for illegal
practice of law. May the Supreme Court Act
upon the complaint filed by an anonymous
person?
A: YES. The Supreme Court may act upon the
complaint filed by an anonymous complainant,
because the basis of the complaint consists of
documents with consular authentications which
can be verified being public records. There is no
need to identify the complainant when the
evidence is documented and verifiable (In re:
Echiverri 67 SCRA 467, 1975). Besides, the
Supreme Court or the IBP may initiate
disbarment proceedings motu proprio.
PROCEDURE FOR DISBARMENT
BAR MATTER NO. 1645 (OCTOBER 13, 2015)
AMENDMENT OF SEC. 1, RULE 139-B OF THE
ROC (AMENDMENT OF B.M 1960)
Proceedings for disbarment, suspension or
discipline of attorneys may be taken by the:
1. Supreme Court motu proprio; or
2. Upon the feeling of a verified complaint of
any person before the Supreme Court or the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
NOTE: The complaint shall state clearly and
concisely the facts complained of and shall be
supported by affidavits of persons having
personal knowledge of the facts therein
alleged and/or by such documents as may
substantiate said facts.
By virtue of B.M. No. 1645, the IBP has no
power to dismiss complaint against lawyers.
 SUSPENSION, DISBARMENT AND DISCIPLINE OF LAWYERS
It may only recommend the dismissal of such
complaints as the power to dismiss
complaints against lawyers is solely reserved
to the Supreme Court.
DISBARMENT PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE IBP
The IBP shall forward to the Supreme Court for
appropriate disposition all complaints for
disbarment, suspension and discipline filed
against incumbent Justices of the Court of
Appeals, Sandiganbayan, Court of Tax Appeals
and judges of lower courts, or against lawyers in
the government service whether or not they are
charged singly or jointly with other respondents,
and whether or not such complaint deals with
acts unrelated to the discharge of their official
functions.
If the complaint is filed before the IBP, six (6)
copies of the verified complaint shall be filed with
the Secretary of the IBP or the Secretary of any of
its chapter who shall forthwith transmit the same
to the IBP Board of Governors for assignment to
an investigator.
PROCEDURAL STEPS FOR
DISBARMENT IN THE IBP
1. The Board of Governors shall appoint from
among the IBP members an investigator or
when special circumstances so warrant, a
panel of 3 investigators to investigate the
complaint;
2. If the complaint is meritorious, the
respondent shall be served with a copy
requiring him to answer within 15 days from
service.
3. The respondent shall file a verified answer
containing the original and five (5) legible
copies; after receipt of the answer or lapse of
the period to do so, the Supreme Court, may,
motu proprio or upon recommendation, the
IBP Board of Governors suspend an attorney
from practice, for any of the causes under
Rule 138, Sec. 27, during the pendency of the
investigation
4. After joinder of the issues or failure to
answer, the respondent shall be given full
opportunity to defend himself. But if the
respondent fails to appear to defend himself
in spite of notice, the investigator may
proceed ex parte. The investigation shall be
terminated within 3 months from
commencement unless extended for good
cause by the Board of Governors upon prior
121
application.
5. The investigator shall make a report to the
Board of Governors within 30 days from
termination of the investigation which report
shall contain his findings and
recommendations together with the
evidence.
6. The Board of Governors shall have the power
to review the decision of the investigator. Its
decision shall be promulgated within a
period not exceeding 30 days from the next
meeting of the Board following the
submission of the report of the investigator.
7. If the decision is a finding of guilt of the
charges, the IBP Board of Governors shall
issue a resolution setting forth its findings
and recommendations which shall be
transmitted to the Supreme Court for final
action together with the record.
RESOLUTION OF THE COURT EN BANC
DATED JUNE 17, 2008 B.M. NO. 1755
(RE: RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE
COMMISSION
ON BAR DISCIPLINE)
Propriety of a motion for reconsideration
1. A party can no longer file a motion for
reconsideration of any order or resolution of
the Investigating Commissioner, such motion
being a prohibited pleading.
2. Regarding the issue of whether a motion for
reconsideration of a decision or resolution of
the Board of Governors (BOG) can be
entertained, an aggrieved party can file said
motion with the BOG within fifteen (15) days
from notice of receipt thereof by said party.
3. In case a decision is rendered by the BOG that
exonerates the respondent or imposes a
sanction less than suspension or disbarment,
the aggrieved party can file a motion for
reconsideration within the 15-day period
from notice. If the motion is denied, said
party can file a petition for a review under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with the
Supreme Court within fifteen (15) days from
notice of the resolution resolving the motion.
If no motion for reconsideration is filed, the
decision shall become final and executory
and a copy of said decision shall be furnished
to the Supreme Court.
4. If the imposable penalty is suspension from
the practice of law or disbarment, the BOG
shall issue a resolution setting forth its
findings and recommendations. The
aggrieved party can file a motion for
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
 Legal Ethics
reconsideration of said resolution with the
BOG within fifteen (15) days from notice. The
BOG shall first resolve the incident and shall
thereafter elevate the assailed resolution
with the entire case records to the Supreme
Court for final action. If the 15-day period
lapses without any motion for
reconsideration having been filed, then the
BOG shall likewise transmit to this Court the
resolution with the entire case records for
appropriate action.
NOTE: Lawyers must update their records with
the IBP by informing the IBP National Office or
their respective chapters of any change in office
or residential address and other contact details.
In case such change is not duly updated, service
of notice on the office or residential address
appearing in the records of the IBP National
Office shall constitute sufficient notice to a lawyer
for purposes of administrative proceedings
against him (Keld Stemmerik v. Atty. Leonuel Mas,
A.C. No. 8010, June 16, 2009).
DISBARMENT PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE
SUPREME COURT
1. In proceedings initiated by the Supreme
Court or in other proceeding when the
interest of justice so requires, the Supreme
Court may refer the case for investigation to
the Office of the Bar Confidant, or to any
officer of the Supreme Court or judge of a
lower court, in which case the investigation
shall proceed in the same manner provided
in sections 6-11 hereof, save that the review
off the report of investigation shall be
conducted directly by the Supreme Court.
The complaint may also be referred to the
IBP for investigation, report, and
recommendation. (Sec. 13, Rule 139-b, RRC, as
amended by B.M. No. 1685)
Q: Atty. Narag’s wife filed a petition for
disbarment because he courted one of his
students, maintained the said student as a
mistress and had children with her. On the
other hand, Atty. Narag claimed that his wife
was a possessive, jealous woman who abused
him and filed the complaint against him out of
spite. Atty. Narag, however, failed to refute the
testimony given against him as his actions
were of public knowledge. Is Atty. Narag’s
disbarment appropriate?
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
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A: YES, Atty. Narag failed to prove his innocence
because he failed to refute the testimony given
against him and it was proved that his actions
were of public knowledge and brought disrepute
and suffering to his wife and children. Good moral
character is a continuing qualification required of
every member of the bar. Thus, when a lawyer
fails to meet the exacting standard of moral
integrity, the Supreme Court may withdraw his or
her privilege to practice law. When a lawyer is
found guilty of gross immoral conduct, he may be
suspended or disbarred. As a lawyer, one must
not only refrain from adulterous relationships but
must not behave in a way that scandalizes the
public by creating a belief that he is flouting those
moral standards (Narag v. Atty. Narag, A.C. No.
3405, June 29, 1998).
Effect of lawyer’s death in an administrative
proceeding against him
1. Renders the action moot and academic, but
2. The Court may still resolve the case on its
merit in order to clear publicly the name of
the lawyer
CONFIDENTIALITY OF DISBARMENT
PROCEEDINGS
Three-fold purpose of confidentiality of
disbarment proceedings
1. To enable the court to make its investigation
free from extraneous influence or
interference;
2. To protect the personal and professional
reputation of attorneys from baseless
charges of disgruntled, vindictive and
irresponsible persons or clients by
prohibiting publication of such charges
pending their final resolution (Albano v.
Coloma, A.C. No. 528, October 11, 1967);
3. To deter the press from publishing charges or
proceedings based thereon for even a
verbatim reproduction of the complaint
against an attorney in the newspaper may be
actionable.
NOTE: The confidentiality of the proceedings is a
privilege which may be waived by the lawyer in
whom and for the protection of whose personal
and professional reputation it is vested, as by
presenting the testimony in a disbarment case or
using it as impeaching evidence in a civil suit.
 SUSPENSION, DISBARMENT AND DISCIPLINE OF LAWYERS
(Villalon v. IAC, G.R. No. L-73751, September 24,
1986)
Q: Atty. Fortun is the counsel for Ampatuan,
Jr., the principal accused in the murder cases
in the Maguindanao Massacare. Atty.
Quinsayas, et al. filed a disbarment complaint
against Atty. Fortun on the ground that he
used and abused the different legal remedies
available and allowed under the rules; and
muddled the issues and diverted the attention
away from the main subject matter of the
cases. Atty. Fortun alleged that Atty.
Quinsayas, et al. actively disseminated the
details to the media of the disbarment
complaint against him in violation of Rule
139-B of the Rules of Court on the confidential
nature of disbarment proceedings Is Atty.
Fortun correct?
A: NO. As a general rule, disbarment proceedings
are confidential in nature until their final
resolution and the final decision of this Court. In
this case, however, the filing of a disbarment
complaint against Atty. Fortun is a matter of
public concern considering that it arose from the
Maguindanao Massacre case. The interest of the
public is not on Atty. Fortun but primarily on his
involvement and participation as defense counsel
in the Maguindanao Massacre case.
The Maguindanao Massacre is a very high-profile
case. It is understandable that any matter related
to the Maguindanao Massacre is considered a
matter of public interest and that the
personalities involved, including Atty. Fortun, are
considered as public figure. Thus, media has the
right to report the filing of the disbarment case as
legitimate news. It would have been different if
the disbarment case against petitioner was about
a private matter as the media would then be
bound to respect the confidentiality provision of
disbarment proceedings under Section 18, Rule
139-B of the Rules of Court (Fortun v. Quinsayas,
G.R. No. 194578, February 13, 2013).
DISCIPLINE OF FILIPINO LAWYERS
PRACTICING ABROAD
Judgment of suspension of a Filipino lawyer in
a foreign court
The judgment of suspension against a Filipino
lawyer in a foreign jurisdiction does not
automatically result in his suspension or
123
disbarment in the Philippines as the acts giving
rise to his suspension are not grounds for
disbarment and suspension in this jurisdiction.
Judgment of suspension against a Filipino lawyer
may transmute into a similar judgment of
suspension in the Philippines only if the basis of
the foreign court's action includes any of the
grounds for disbarment or suspension in this
jurisdiction. (Velez v. De Vera, A.C. No. 6697, July
25, 2006).
NOTE: The judgment, resolution or order of the
foreign court or disciplinary agency shall be
prima facie evidence of the ground for
disbarment or suspension (SC Resolution date 21
February 1992 amending Sec. 27, Rule 138, RRC).
Q: Atty. Forma is a member of the Philippine
Bar. He went to New York City, took the New
York State Bar, and passed the same. He then
practiced in New York City. One of his
American clients filed a case for disbarment
against him for pocketing the money which
was entrusted to him as payment for the filing
fee and other incidental expenses of his
damage suit. Atty Forma came back to the
Philippines and practiced as a lawyer.
Will his disbarment in New York be used
against him for purposes of disbarment
proceedings here in the Philippines? (2014
Bar Question)
A: Atty. Forma may be disbarred in the
Philippines if the ground for his disbarment in
New York is also a ground for disbarment in this
country. But he is still entitled to due process of
law, and the foreign court’s judgment against him
only constitutes prima facie evidence of unethical
conduct as a lawyer. He is entitled to be given an
opportunity to defend himself in an investigation
to be conducted in accordance with Rule 139 of
the Revised Rules of Court (In Re: Suspension from
the Practice of Law in the Territory of Guam of
Atty. Leon Maquera, B.M. 793, July 30, 2004; Velez
v. De Vera, A.C. No. 6697, July 25, 2006).
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
 Legal Ethics
PROCEDURE FOR DISBARMENT OR DISCIPLINE OF ATTONEYS BY THE
SUPREME COURT MOTU PROPRIO (Rule 139-B, RRC, as amended by B.M. no. 1645)

Supreme Court shall refer the case to an investigator, who may

either be:
1. Office of the Bar Confidant
2. Any officer of the SC, or
3. Any judge of a lower court

Notify Respondent

RESPONDENT’S VERIFIED ANSWER (Must be filed within

15 days from service)

INVESTIGATION
(TERMINATE WITHIN 3 MONTHS)

REPORT TO SUPREME COURT (to be submitted not later than

30 days from investigation’s termination)

REPORT MUST CONTAIN THE INVESTIGATOR’S:

1. Findings of fact
2. Recommendations

UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS

2018 GOLDEN NOTES
124
 SUSPENSION, DISBARMENT AND DISCIPLINE OF LAWYERS
PROCEDURE FOR DISBARMENT OR DISCIPLINE OF ATTORNEYS BY THE IBP (Rule 139-B, RRC)

IBP Motu Proprio (Committee on Bar VERIFIED COMPLAINT TO THE IBP BY ANY
Discipline through National Grievance PERSON
Investigator) Complaint must be:
1. In writing;
2. State facts complained of; and
3. Supported by affidavits / documents

Shall appoint an investigator / panel of 3

investigators and notify respondent

IF NOT MERITORIOUS: IF MERITORIOUS, RESPONDENT TO

Recommend the dismissal of the FILE VERIFIED ANSWER
complaint to the Board of (Must be filed within 15 days from
Governors service)

DISMISSAL BY BOARD OF GOVERNORS – INVESTIGATION (terminate within 3 months)

(should be promulgated within a period
not exceeding 30 days from the next
meeting of the board following the
submittal of the investigator’s report)
1. Investigator may issue subpoenas and
administer oaths,
2. Provide respondent with opportunity to be
heard,
3. May proceed with investigation ex parte should
respondent fail to appear.

REPORT TO BOARD OF GOVERNORS (Submitted not later than 30 days from termination
of investigation) containing: (a) Findings of facts; and (b)Recommendations

The Board of Governors shall recommend to the Supreme Court either: (a) the dismissal of the
complaint; or (b) the imposition of disciplinary action against the respondent.

NOTE: The resolution shall be issued within a period not exceeding thirty (30) days from the
next meeting of the Board following the submission of the investigator’s report.

SUPREME COURT FOR

JUDGMENT

125 UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS

FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
 Legal Ethics
EFFECT OF DESISTANCE OR WITHDRAWAL OF
COMPLAINT OR NON-APPEARANCE IN
DISBARMENT PROCEEDINGS

The desistance or the withdrawal of the

complainant of the charges against a
judge/lawyer does not deprive the court of the
authority to proceed to determine the matter. Nor
does it necessarily result in the dismissal of the
complaint except when, as a consequence of the
withdrawal or desistance no evidence is adduced
to prove the charges.

The affidavit of withdrawal of the disbarment

case executed by a complainant does not, in any
way, exonerate the respondent-lawyer. A case of
suspension or disbarment may proceed
regardless of interest or lack of interest of the
complainant. The complainant in a disbarment
case is not a direct party to the case, but a witness
who brought the matter to the attention of the
Court (Quiachon v. Atty. Ramos, A.C. No. 9317, June
4, 2014).

DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR

APPLICABLE TO JUDGES AND LAWYERS

The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable

in cases of dismissal of judges or disbarment
of lawyers (1996, 2003 Bar Questions)

This principle or doctrine applies to both judges

and lawyers. Judges had been dismissed from the
service without need of a formal investigation
because based on the records, the gross
misconduct or inefficiency of judges clearly
appears (Uy v. Mercado, A.M. No. R-368-MTJ,
September 30, 1987).

The same principle applies to lawyers. Thus,

where on the basis of the lawyer’s comment or
answer to show a show-cause order of SC, it
appears that the lawyer has so conducted himself
in a manner which exhibits his blatant disrespect
to the court, or his want of good moral character
or his violation of the attorney’s oath, the lawyer
may be suspended or disbarred without need of
trial-type proceeding. What counts is that the
lawyer has been given the opportunity to air his
side (Prudential Bank v. Castro, A.M. No. 2756,
June 5, 1986).

UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS

2018 GOLDEN NOTES
126
 READMISSION TO THE BAR
READMISSION TO THE BAR
Reinstatement and its requirements
Reinstatement is the restoration of the privilege
to practice law after a lawyer has been disbarred.
The applicant must satisfy the Court that he is a
person of good moral character – a fit and proper
person to practice law.
NOTE: The power of the Supreme Court to
reinstate is based on its constitutional
prerogative to promulgate rules on the admission
of applicants to the practice of law (Sec. 5[5], Art.
VIII, 1987 Constitution).
LAWYERS WHO HAVE BEEN SUSPENDED
Lifting of suspension is not automatic upon
the end of the period stated in the Court’s
decision
The lifting of a lawyer’s suspension is not
automatic upon the end of the period stated in
the Court’s decision, and an order from the Court
lifting the suspension at the end of the period is
necessary in order to enable [him] to resume the
practice of his profession (J.K. Mercado and Sons
Agricultural Enterprises, Inc. et al. v. Atty. de Vera,
et al. and Atty. de Vera v. Atty. Encanto, et al.).
Thus, according to the OBC, a suspended lawyer
must first present proof(s) of his compliance by
submitting certifications from the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines and from the Executive Judge
that he has indeed desisted from the practice of
law during the period of suspension. Thereafter,
the Court, after evaluation, and upon a favorable
recommendation from the OBC, will issue a
resolution lifting the order of suspension and
thus allow him to resume the practice of law
(Maniago v. Atty. De Dios, A.C. No. 7472, March 30,
2010).
Guidelines to be observed in lifting an order
of suspension of a lawyer
The following guidelines were issued by the
Supreme Court, the same to be observed in the
matter of the lifting of an order suspending a
lawyer from the practice of law:
1. After a finding that respondent lawyer must
be suspended from the practice of law, the
127
Court shall render a decision imposing the
penalty;
2. Unless the Court explicitly states that the
decision is immediately executory upon
receipt thereof, respondent has 15 days
within which to file a motion for
reconsideration thereof. The denial of said
motion shall render the decision final and
executory;
3. Upon the expiration of the period of
suspension, respondent shall file a Sworn
Statement with the Court, through the Office
of the Bar Confidant, stating therein that he
or she has desisted from the practice of law
and has not appeared in any court during the
period of his or her suspension;
4. Copies of the Sworn Statement shall be
furnished to the Local Chapter of the IBP and
to the Executive Judge of the courts where
respondent has pending cases handled by
him or her, and/or where he or she has
appeared as counsel;
5. The Sworn Statement shall be considered as
proof of respondent’s compliance with the
order of suspension;
6. Any finding or report contrary to the
statements made by the lawyer under oath
shall be a ground for the imposition of a more
severe punishment, or disbarment, as may be
warranted.
Q: Raul Gonzales was found guilty of both
contempt of court in facie curiae and gross
misconduct as an officer of court and member
of the bar. For this, he was suspended
indefinitely. After more than 4 years from his
suspension, Gonzales filed an ex-parte motion
to lift his suspension from the practice of law,
alleging that he gave free legal aid services by
paying lawyers to do the same as he could not
personally represent said clients; pursued
civic work for the poor; brought honor to the
country by delivering a paper in Switzerland;
that he has a long record in the service of
human rights and the rule of law; his
suspension of 51 months has been the longest
so far; states his profound regrets for the
inconvenience which he has caused to the
Court; sincerely reiterates his respect to the
institution as he reiterates his oath to conduct
himself as a lawyer. May his suspension be
lifted?
A: YES. Gonzales’ contrition, so noticeably absent
in his earlier pleadings, has washed clean the
offense of his disrespect. His remorse has soften
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
 Legal Ethics
his arrogance and made up for his misconduct.
Gonzales’ suspension has given him ample time
and opportunity to amend his erring ways,
rehabilitate himself, and thus, prove himself
worthy once again to enjoy the privileges of
membership of the Bar. His motion was granted
(Zaldivar v. Gonzales, G.R. Nos. 79690- 707, April 7,
1993).
LAWYERS WHO HAVE BEEN DISBARRED
Effect of reinstatement: Wipes out the
restrictions and disabilities resulting from a
previous disbarment (Cui v. Cui, G.R. No. L-18727,
August 31, 1964).
Prior to actual reinstatement, the lawyer will be
required to take anew the lawyer’s oath and sign
once again the roll of attorneys after paying the
requisite fees (Funa, 2009).
Requirements for judicial clemency for
disbarred lawyers and judges (RTAPO)
1. There must be proof of remorse and
reformation.
2. Sufficient time must have elapsed from the
imposition of the penalty to ensure a period
of reform.
3. The age of the person asking for clemency
must show that he still has productive years
ahead of him that can be put to good use by
giving him a chance to redeem himself.
4. There must be a showing of promise (such as
intellectual aptitude, learning or legal
acumen or contribution to the legal
scholarship and the development of the legal
system), as well as potential for public
service.
5. There must be other relevant factors and
circumstances that may justify clemency.
Q: Atty. Narag was disbarred on the ground of
gross immorality for having amorous
relationship with Gina and abandoning his
wife and children to live with his paramour.
Fifteen years had passed since his disbarment
and he is now pleading to be reinstated to the
bar. He claimed that he was extremely
remorseful and that his wife and children had
already forgiven him. As a proof thereof, he
presented an affidavit of his son, Dominador,
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
2018 GOLDEN NOTES
128
Jr. attesting to the truth of his claim. Should
Atty. Dominador be reinstated?
A: No, he should not be reinstated. The Court, in
deciding whether the respondent should indeed
be readmitted to the practice of law, must be
convinced that he had indeed been reformed; that
he had already rid himself of any grossly immoral
act which would make him inept for the practice
of law. However, it appears that the respondent,
while still legally married to Julieta, is still living
with his paramour - the woman for whose sake
he abandoned his family. Moreover, it is noted
that only his son, Dominador, Jr., signed the
affidavit which was supposed to evidence the
forgiveness bestowed upon the respondent. Thus,
with regard to Julieta and the six other children of
the respondent, the claim that they had likewise
forgiven the respondent is hearsay (Narag v. Atty.
Narag, A.C. No. 3405, Mar 18, 2014).
SUPREME COURT’S GUIDELINES IN
REINSTATEMENT
1. The applicant’s character and
standing prior to the disbarment;
2. The nature and character of the charge for
which he was disbarred;
3. His conduct subsequent to the disbarment,
and the time that has elapsed between the
disbarment and the application for
reinstatement (Prudential Bank v. Benjamin
Grecia, A.C. No. 2756, December 18, 1990);
4. His efficient government service (In re:
Adriatico, G.R. No. L-2532, November 17,
1910);
5. Applicant’s appreciation of the
significance of his dereliction and his
assurance that he now possesses the
requisite probity and integrity; and
6. Favorable endorsement of the IBP and pleas
of his loved ones (Yap Tan v. Sabandal, B.M.
No. 144, February 24, 1989).
NOTE: Whether or not the applicant shall be
reinstated rests on the discretion of the court
(Prudential Bank v. Benjamin Grecia, A.C. No. 2756,
December 18, 1990).
The court may require applicant for
reinstatement to enroll in and pass the required
fourth year review classes in a recognized law
school (Cui v. Cui, In Re: Resian, A.C. No. 270,
March 20, 1974).
 READMISSION TO THE BAR
EFFECT OF EXECUTIVE PARDON GRANTED BY
THE PRESIDENT
If during the pendency of disbarment proceeding
the respondent was granted executive pardon,
the dismissal of the case on that sole basis will
depend on whether the executive pardon is
absolute or conditional.
1. Absolute or unconditional pardon - the
disbarment case will be dismissed.
2. Conditional pardon - the disbarment case will
not be dismissed on the basis thereof.
NOTE: To be reinstated, there is still a need for
the filing of an appropriate petition with the
Supreme Court (In re: Rovero, A.M. No. 126,
December 29, 1980).
Q: X filed proceedings for disbarment against
his lawyer, Atty. C, following the latter’s
conviction for estafa for misappropriating
funds belonging to his client (X). While the
proceedings for disbarment was pending, the
President granted absolute pardon in favor of
Atty. C. Atty. C, then, moved for the dismissal
of the disbarment case. Should the motion be
granted?
A: An absolute pardon by the President is one
that operates to wipe out the conviction as well as
the offense itself. The grant thereof to a lawyer is
a bar to a proceeding for disbarment against him,
if such proceeding is based solely on the fact of
such conviction (In re: Parcasio, A.C. No. 100,
February. 18, 1976).
But where the proceeding to disbar is founded on
the professional misconduct involved in the
transaction which culminated in his conviction,
the effect of the pardon is only to relieve him of
the penal consequences of his act and does not
operate as a bar to the disbarment proceeding,
inasmuch as the criminal acts may nevertheless
constitute proof that the attorney does not
possess good moral character (In re: Lontok, 43
Phil. 293, April 7, 1922).
NOTE: In the light of recent court
pronouncements that a lawyer may be disciplined
even for non-professional misconduct, one may
argue that a lawyer convicted of a crime involving
moral turpitude, and subsequently receives
absolute pardon, may still be proceeded against
under the Code of Professional Responsibility
129
even if the acts of which he was found guilty did
not involve professional misconduct (A
modification of In Re Lontok, supra). The ground
for the petition for disciplinary action under the
Code must, however, not be founded alone on the
conviction but must be based on the acts
committed by the lawyer which rendered him
morally unfit to be a member of the bar (Aguirre,
2006).
Q: X, a member of the Bar, was charged with
and found guilty of estafa, for which he was
sentenced to suffer imprisonment and to
indemnify the offended party for the amount
involved. Not having taken an appeal from the
judgment of conviction, upon finality thereof
he was taken into custody to serve sentence. A
month after he was incarcerated, he was
granted pardon by the Chief Executive on
condition that he would not commit another
offense during the unserved portion of his
prison sentence. Soon after X’s release from
custody after being pardoned, the offended
party in the criminal case filed a Complaint for
Disbarment against X in the Supreme Court. X
set up the defense that having been pardoned
thus he may not be disbarred from the
practice of law anymore. Is X’s contention
tenable? (1999 Bar)
A: X’s contention is not tenable. He was granted
only a conditional pardon. Such conditional
pardon merely relieved him of the penal
consequences of his act but did not operate as a
bar to his disbarment. Such pardon does not
reach the offense itself. Hence, it does not
constitute a bar to his disbarment (In Re
Gutierrez, A.C. No. L-363, July 31, 1962; In re
Avancena, A.C. No. 407, August 15, 1967).
Furthermore, the acts of X leading to his
conviction may be used to show that he does not
possess the necessary requirement of good moral
character for continued membership in the Bar
(In re Valloces, A.C. No. 439, September 30, 1982).
LAWYERS WHO HAVE BEEN REPATRIATED
Q: Dacanay practiced law until he migrated to
Canada to seek medical attention for his
ailments. He subsequently applied for
Canadian citizenship to avail of Canada’s free
medical aid program. His application was
approved and he became a Canadian citizen.
Dacanay later on reacquired his Philippine
citizenship by virtue of R.A. 9225. Did
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
 Legal Ethics
Dacanay lose his membership in the
Philippine bar when he gave up his Philippine
citizenship? Can he automatically practice law
upon reacquiring Filipino citizenship?
A: The Constitution provides that the practice of
all professions in the Philippines shall be limited
to Filipino citizens save in cases prescribed by
law. Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement
for admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates
membership in the Philippine bar and,
consequently, the privilege to engage in the
practice of law. In other words, the loss of Filipino
citizenship ipso jure terminates the privilege to
practice law in the Philippines. The practice of
law is a privilege denied to foreigners.
The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost
by reason of naturalization as a citizen of another
country but subsequently reacquired pursuant to
R.A. 9225. This is because “all Philippine citizens
who become citizens of another country shall be
deemed not to have lost their Philippine
citizenship under the conditions of R.A. 9225.”
Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a
citizen of another country is deemed never to
have lost his Philippine citizenship if he
reacquires it in accordance with R.A. 9225.
Although he is also deemed never to have
terminated his membership in the Philippine bar,
no automatic right to resume law practice
accrues.
Before a lawyer who reacquires Filipino
citizenship pursuant to R.A. 9225 can resume his
law practice, he must first secure from the SC the
authority to do so, conditioned on:
1. The updating and payment in full of the
annual membership dues in the IBP;
2. The payment of professional tax;
3. The completion of at least 36 credit hours of
mandatory continuing legal education, this is
especially significant to refresh the
applicant/petitioner’s knowledge of
Philippine laws and update him of legal
developments; and
4. The retaking of the lawyer’s oath which will
not only remind him of his duties and
responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer
of the Court, but also renew his pledge to
maintain allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines (Petition for Leave to Resume
Practice of Law of Benjamin Dacanay, B.M. No.
1678, December 17, 2007).
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
2018 GOLDEN NOTES
130
Q: Atty. Repatriar, a law school classmate,
approached you on your 25th Class Reunion,
with questions on how he can resume the
practice of law in the Philippines. He left the
country in 1977 after two (2) years of initial
law practice, and migrated to the United
States where he was admitted to the practice
of law in the State of New York. He asks that
you give him a formal legal opinion on his
query.
Outline briefly the steps and the supporting
legal reasons you would state in your legal
opinion on what Atty. Repatriar should do to
resume his Philippine practice. (2013 Bar)
A: Atty. Repatriar must prepare a sworn petition
to re-acquire the privilege to practice law in the
Philippines. He should manifest in his petition his
desire to resume his law practice in the
Philippines, and he is not disqualified to practice
law. The “right to resume the practice of law” is
not automatic. R.A. No. 9225 provides that a
person who intends to practice his profession in
the Philippines must apply with the proper
authority for a license or permit to engage in such
practice. It cannot be overstressed that the
practice of law is a privilege burdened with
conditions. It is so delicately affected with public
interest that it is both the power and duty of the
state (through the Supreme Court) to control and
regulate it in order to protect and promote the
public welfare.
Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness,
maintenance of the highest degree of morality,
faithful observance of the legal profession,
compliance with the mandatory continuing legal
education requirement, and payment of
membership fees to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) are the conditions required for
membership in good standing in the bar and for
enjoying the privilege to practice law. Any breach
by a lawyer of any of these conditions makes him
unworthy of the trust and confidence which the
courts and clients repose in him for the continued
exercise of his professional privilege (In re:
petition to re-acquire the privilege to practice law
in the Philippines, Epifanio B. Muneses, B.M. No.
2112, July 24, 2011).
He should file the petition with the Supreme
Court, through the Bar Confidant, accompanied
by the original or certified copies of the following
documents:
 READMISSION TO THE BAR

1. Showing that he is still a Filipino citizen. “The

Court reiterates that Filipino citizenship is a
requirement for admission to the bar and is,
in fact, a continuing requirement for the
practice of law.” (Ibid.) Having retained
Philippine citizenship could be evidenced by
the Philippine passport, the U.S. Green Card
showing Philippine citizenship and U.S.
residency, or other authentic documents
which the Supreme Court may require.

On the other hand, if Atty. Repatriar has lost

his Philippine citizenship, he must submit the
following:

(a) Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine

Citizenship;
(b) Order (for Re-Acquisition of Philippine
Citizenship);
(c) Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines;
(d) Identification Certificate (IC) issued by
the Bureau of Immigration.

The loss of Filipino citizenship means

termination of Atty. Repatriar’s membership
in the bar; ipso jure the privilege to engage in
the practice of law. “Under R.A. No. 9225,
natural-borncitizens who have lost their
Philippinecitizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country
are deemed to have re-acquired their
Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of
allegiance to the Republic.Thus, a Filipino
lawyer who becomes a citizen of another
country and later re-acquires his Philippine
citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 remains to be
a member of the Philippine bar.” (Ibid.)

2. Certification from the IBP indicating updated

payments of annual membership dues;
3. Proof of payment of professional tax; and
4. Certificate of compliance issued by the MCLE
Office. (Ibid.)
5. A certificate of good moral character attested
to by at least three (3) members of the bar;
and
6. A certification from the State Bar of New York
that Atty. Repatriar does not have any
previous or pending disciplinary action filed
against him before that body.

131 UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS

FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
 Legal Ethics
MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION
(MCLE)
Purpose of MCLE
MCLE ensures that members of the IBP are kept
abreast with law and jurisprudence throughout
their career, maintain the ethics of the profession
and enhance the standards of the practice of law.
Committee on Mandatory Continuing Legal
Education
1. Composition:
a. Retired Justice of the SC – to act as
Chairman, who is nominated by the SC
b. IBP National President – acts as the Vice-
Chairman
c. 3 other members – nominated by the
Philippine Judicial Academy, UP Law
Center and Association of Law
Professors, respectively
2. Members are of proven probity and integrity
3. Compensation as may be determined by the
SC
4. The initial terms of each of the 3 members
shall be 5, 4, and 3 years respectively
REQUIREMENTS
Requirements of completion of MCLE
Members of the IBP, unless exempted under Rule 7,
shall complete every 3 years at least 36 hours of
continuing legal education activities. The 36
hours shall be divided as follows:
1. 6 hours – legal ethics
2. 4 hours – trial and pretrial skills
3. 5 hours – alternative dispute resolution
4. 9 hours – updates on substantive and
procedural laws and jurisprudence
5. 4 hours – legal writing and oral advocacy
6. 2 hours – international law and international
conventions
7. Remaining 6 hours – such other subjects as
may be prescribed by the Committee on
MCLE
MCLE for a newly admitted member of the bar
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
2018 GOLDEN NOTES
132
Starts on the first day of the month of his
admission (Bar Matter No. 850, Sec. 3, Rule 3).
Classes of credits
1. Participatory credit – Attending approved
education activities like seminars,
conventions, symposia, and the like; speaking
or lecturing, or assigned as panelist, reactor,
or commentator, etc. in approved education
activities; teaching in law school or lecturing
in bar review classes.
2. Non-participatory – Preparing, as author or
co-author, written materials (article, book or
book review) which contribute to the legal
education of the author member, which were
not prepared in the ordinary course of his
practice or employment; editing a law book,
law journal or legal newsletter.
NON-COMPLIANCE OF THE MCLE
1. Failure to complete education requirement
within the compliance period;
2. Failure to provide attestation of compliance
or exemption;
3. Failure to provide satisfactory evidence of
compliance (including evidence of exempt
status) within the prescribed period;
4. Failure to satisfy the education requirement
and furnish evidence of such compliance
within 60 days from receipt of non-
compliance notice;
5. Failure to pay non-compliance fee within the
prescribed period; or
6. Any other act or omission analogous to any of
the foregoing or intended to circumvent or
evade compliance with the MCLE
requirements.
NOTE: Members failing to comply will receive a
Non-Compliance Notice stating the specific
deficiency and will be given 60 days from date of
notification to file a response.
Q: In order to comply with the MCLE
requirements, Atty. Ausente enrolled in a
seminar given by an MCLE provider.
Whenever he has court or other professional
commitments, he would send his messenger
or a member of his legal staff to register his
attendance at the MCLE sessions so he could
be credited with the required qualifying
attendance. He would also ask them to secure
the printed handouts and the lecturers’ CDs,
 MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION
all of which he studied in his free time. Was
the action of Atty. Ausente proper? (2013 Bar
Question)
A: NO. Atty. Ausente should be sanctioned
because he circumvented or evaded full
compliance with the MCLE
requirements.(Mandatory Continuing Legal
Education, Rule 12, Section I(e))
EXEMPTIONS
Persons exempted from the MCLE
1. The President, Vice-President and the
Secretaries and Undersecretaries of
Executive Departments;
2. Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives;
3. The Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the
Supreme Court, incumbent and retired
members of the judiciary, incumbent
members of Judicial and Bar Council,
incumbent members of the MCLE Committee,
incumbent court lawyers who have availed of
the Philippine Judicial Academy programs of
continuing judicial education (Amendment to
Bar Matter 850, Resolution of the Court En
Banc, July 13, 2004);
4. The Chief State Counsel, Chief State
Prosecutor and Assistant Secretaries of the
Dept. of Justice;
5. The Solicitor General and the Assistant
Solicitor General;
6. The Government Corporate Counsel, Deputy
and Assistant Government Corporate
Counsel;
7. The Chairman and Members of the
Constitutional Commissions;
8. The Ombudsman, the Overall Deputy
Ombudsman, the Deputy Ombudsmen and
the Special Prosecutor of the Office of the
Ombudsman;
9. Heads of government agencies exercising
quasi-judicial functions;
10. Incumbent deans, bar reviewers and
professors of law who have teaching
experience for at least 10 years in accredited
law schools;
11. The Chancellor, Vice-Chancellor and
members of the Corps of Professional and
Professorial Lecturers of the Philippine
Judicial Academy; and
12. Governors and Mayors because they are
prohibited from practicing their profession
Other parties exempted:
133
1. Those who are not in law practice, private or
public;
2. Those who have retired from law practice
with the approval of the IBP Board of
Governors.
Request for exemption under special
circumstance
If there is a good cause for exemption from or
modification of requirement, member may file a
verified request setting forth good cause for
exemption (such as physical disability, illness,
post-graduate study abroad, proven expertise in
law, etc.) from compliance with or modification of
any of the requirements, including an extension
of time for compliance, in accordance with
procedure to be established by the Committee on
MCLE.
NOTE: Applications for exemption from or
modification of the MCLE requirement shall be
under oath and supported by documents.
Q: Atty. Mike started teaching Agrarian
Reform and Taxation in June 2001 at the Arts
and Sciences Department of the Far Eastern
University. In 2005, he moved to San
Sebastian Institute of Law where he taught
Political Law. Is Atty. Mike exempt from
complying with the MCLE for the 4th
compliance period in April 2013? (2011 Bar)
A: NO, since he has yet to complete the required
teaching experience to be exempt.
SANCTIONS
Consequences of non-compliance
A member who fails to comply with the
requirements after the 60-day period shall be
listed as delinquent member by the IBP Board of
Governors upon recommendation of the
Committee on MCLE.
NOTE: The listing as a delinquent member is an
administrative in nature but it shall be made with
notice and hearing by the Committee on MCLE.
B.M. No. 1922, which took effect on January 1,
2009, requires practicing members of the bar to
indicate in all pleadings filed before the courts or
quasi-judicial bodies, the number and date of
issue of their MCLE Certificate of Compliance or
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
 Legal Ethics
Certificate of Exemption, as may be applicable, for
the immediately preceding compliance period.
Failure to disclose the required information
would cause the dismissal of the case and the
expunction of the pleadings from the records.
Q: Can a lawyer who lacks the number of units
required by the MCLE Board continue to
practice the profession? (2014 Bar)
A: YES. A lawyer, not being exempted from MCLE,
who fails to comply with the required legal
education activities shall receive a Non-
Compliance Notice and shall be required to
explain the deficiency or otherwise show
compliance with the requirements. A member
who fails to satisfactory comply therewith shall
be listed as a delinquent member by the IBP,
wherein he shall be included in the inactive status
(Rule 12 and Rule 13, B.M. 850).
He may still practice the profession but all his
pleadings submitted to court may be expunged
from the records since it is required that
practicing members of the Bar to indicate in all
pleadings filed before the courts or quasi-judicial
bodies, the number and date of issue of their
MCLE Certificate of Compliance or Certificate of
Exemption, as may be applicable (Bar Matter No.
1922, June 3, 2008).
BAR MATTER NO. 2012
RULE ON MANDATORY LEGAL AID SERVICE
The mandatory Legal Aid Service mandates every
practicing lawyer to render a minimum of 60
hours of free legal aid services to indigent
litigants yearly.
Purpose
The rule seeks to enhance the duty of lawyers to
the society as agents of social change and to the
courts as officers thereof by helping improve
access to justice by the less privileged members
of society and expedite the resolution of cases
involving them. Mandatory free legal service by
members of the bar and their active support
thereof will aid the efficient and effective
administration of justice especially in cases
involving indigent and pauper litigants (Sec. 2,
B.M. No. 2012).
Scope
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
2018 GOLDEN NOTES
134
It shall govern the mandatory requirement for
practicing lawyers to render free legal aid
services in all cases (whether, civil, criminal or
administrative) involving indigent and pauper
litigants where the assistance of a lawyer is
needed. It shall also govern the duty of other
members of the legal profession to support the
legal aid program of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (Sec. 3,B.M. No. 2012).
Practicing lawyers are members of the Philippine
Bar who appear for and in behalf of parties in
courts of law and quasi-judicial agencies.
The term “practicing lawyers” shall EXCLUDE:
1. Government employees and incumbent
elective officials not allowed by law to
practice;
2. Lawyers who by law are not allowed to
appear in court;
3. Supervising lawyers of students enrolled in
law student practice in duly accredited legal
clinics of law schools and lawyers of non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) and
peoples’ organizations (POs) like the Free
Legal Assistance Group who by the nature of
their work already render free legal aid to
indigent and pauper litigants; and
4. Lawyers not covered under subparagraphs 1
to 3 including those who are employed in the
private sector but do not appear for and in
behalf of parties in courts of law and quasi-
judicial agencies (Sec. 4[a], B.M. 1. 2012).
Legal aid cases
It includes actions, disputes, and controversies
that are criminal, civil and administrative in
nature in whatever stage wherein indigent and
pauper litigants need legal representation (Sec.
4[c], B. M.2012).
REQUIREMENTS FOR MANDATORY
LEGAL AID SERVICE
Under the Rule, a practicing lawyer, among
others, shall coordinate with the Clerk of Court or
the Legal Aid Chairperson of one’s Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) Chapter for cases where
the lawyer may render free legal aid service:
1. Every practicing lawyer is required to render
a minimum of 60 hours of free legal aid
services to indigent litigants in a year. Said 60
hours shall be spread within the period of 12
 MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION
months, with a minimum of 5 hours of free
legal aid services each month. However,
where it is necessary for the practicing
lawyer to render legal aid service for more
than 5 hours in one month, the excess hours
may be credited to the said lawyer for the
succeeding periods (Sec. 5[a] first par., B.M.
2012).
2. The practicing lawyer shall report
compliance with the requirement within 10
days of the last month of each quarter of the
year (Sec. 5[a] third par., B.M. 2012).
3. A practicing lawyer shall be required to
secure and obtain a certificate from the Clerk
of Court attesting to the number of hours
spent rendering free legal aid services in a
case (Sec. 5[b], B.M. 2012).
4. Said compliance report shall be submitted to
the Legal Aid Chairperson of the IBP Chapter
within the Court’s jurisdiction (Sec. 5[c], B.M.
2012).
5. The IBP chapter shall, after verification, issue
a compliance certificate to the concerned
lawyer. The IBP Chapter shall also submit
compliance reports to the IBP’s National
Committee on Legal Aid (NCLA) for recording
and documentation. The submission shall be
made within forty-five (45) days after the
mandatory submission of compliance reports
by the practicing lawyers (Sec. 5[d], B.M.
2012).
6. Practicing lawyers shall indicate in all
pleadings filed before the courts or quasi-
judicial bodies the number and date of issue
of their certificate of compliance for the
immediately preceding compliance period
(Sec 5[e], B.M. 2012).
Contents of a certificate from the Clerk of
Court attesting the number of hours spent in
rendering free legal services
1. The case or cases where the legal aid service
was rendered, the party or parties in the said
case(s), the docket number of the said case(s)
and the date(s) the service was rendered
2. The number of hours actually spent
3. The number of hours actually spent attending
mediation, conciliation or any other mode of
ADR on a particular case
4. A motion (except a motion for extension of
time to file a pleading or for postponement of
hearing or conference) or pleading filed on a
particular case shall be considered as one (1)
hour of service (Sec 5[b], B.M. 2012).
NOTE: The Clerk of Court shall issue the
135
certificate in triplicate, one (1) copy to be
retained by the practicing lawyer, one (1) copy to
be retained by the Clerk of Court and one (1) copy
to be attached to the lawyer's compliance report
(Sec 5[b][iv] second par., B.M. 2012)
CREDITS TO LAWYERS WHO RENDER FREE
LEGAL AID SERVICE
A lawyer who renders mandatory legal aid
service for the required number of hours in a year
for the three year-period covered by a
compliance period under the Rules on MCLE shall
be credited the following:
1. Two (2) credit units for legal ethics
2. Two (2) credit units for trial and pretrial
skills
3. Two (2) credit units for alternative dispute
resolution
4. Four (4) credit units for legal writing and oral
advocacy
5. Four (4) credit units for substantive and
procedural laws and jurisprudence
6. Six (6) credit units for such subjects as may
be prescribed by the MCLE Committee under
Section 2(g), Rule 2 of the Rules on MCLE
A lawyer who renders mandatory legal aid
service for the required number of hours in a year
for at least two consecutive years within the three
year- period covered by a compliance period
under the Rules on MCLE shall be credited the
following:
1. One (1) credit unit for legal ethics
2. One (1) credit unit for trial and pretrial skills
3. One (1) credit unit for alternative dispute
resolution
4. Two (2) credit units for legal writing and oral
advocacy
5. Two (2) credit units for substantive and
procedural laws and jurisprudence
6. Three (3) credit units for such subjects as
may be prescribed by the MCLE Committee
under Section 2(g), Rule 2 of the Rules on
MCLE (Sec. 8, B.M. 2012).
PENALTIES FOR NON-COMPLIANCE WITH
THERULE ON MANDATORY LEGAL AID
SERVICE
1. At the end of every calendar year, any
practicing lawyer who fails to meet the
minimum prescribed 60 hours of legal aid
service each year shall be required by the
IBP, through the National Committee on
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
 Legal Ethics
Legal Aid (NCLA), to explain why he was
unable to render the minimum prescribed
number of hours.
2. If no explanation has been given or if the
NCLA finds the explanation unsatisfactory,
the NCLA shall make a report and
recommendation to the IBP Board of
Governors that the erring lawyer be declared
a member of the IBP who is not in good
standing.
3. Upon approval of the NCLA’s
recommendation, the IBP Board of Governors
shall declare the erring lawyer as a member
not in good standing.
4. The notice to the lawyer shall include a
directive to pay P4,000.00 penalty which
shall accrue to the special fund for the legal
aid program of the IBP.
5. The “not in good standing” declaration shall
be effective for a period of 3 months from the
receipt of the erring lawyer of the notice from
the IBP Board of Governors.
6. During the said period, the lawyer cannot
appear in court or any quasi-judicial body as
counsel.
7. Provided, however, that the “not in good
standing” status shall subsist even after the
lapse of the 3-month period until and unless
the penalty shall have been paid.
8. Any lawyer who fails to comply with his
duties under this Rule for at least 3
consecutive years shall be the subject of
disciplinary proceedings to be instituted
motu proprio by the Committee on Bar
Discipline (Sec. 7, B.M. 2012).

NOTE: The falsification of a certificate or any

contents thereof by any Clerk of Court or by any
Chairperson of the Legal Aid Committee of the
IBP local chapter where the case is pending or by
the Director of a legal clinic or responsible officer
of an NGO (non-governmental organizations) or
PO (people’s organizations) shall be a ground for
an administrative case against the said Clerk of
Court or Chairperson. This is without prejudice to
the filing of the criminal and administrative
charges against the malfeasor (Sec. 7[e], B.M. NO.
2012).

UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS

2018 GOLDEN NOTES
136
 NOTARIAL PRACTICE
NOTARIAL PRACTICE
Purpose of the Notarial Law
1. To promote, serve, and protect public
interest;
2. To simplify, clarify, and modernize the rules
governing notaries public; and
3. To foster ethical conduct among notaries
public (Sec. 2, Rule I, A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC)
Effect of notarized document
A document acknowledged before a notary public
is a public document (Sec. 19, Rule 132, RRC) and
may be presented in evidence without further
proof, the certificate of acknowledgment being
prima facie evidence of the execution of the
instrument or document involved (Sec. 30, Rule
132, RRC).
QUALIFICATIONS OF NOTARY PUBLIC
Notary public
A person appointed by the court whose duty is to
attest to the genuineness of any deed or writing
in order to render them available as evidence of
facts stated therein and who is authorized by the
statute to administer various oaths.
NOTE: “Notary Public" and "Notary" refer to any
person commissioned to perform official acts
under the rules on Notarial Practice (Sec. 9, Rule
II, A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC).
Qualifications of a notary public [C21-RMC]
To be eligible for commissioning as notary public,
the petitioner must be:
1. A citizen of the Philippines;
2. Over 21 years of age;
3. A resident in the Philippines for at least 1 year
and maintains a regular place of work or
business in the city or province where the
commission is to be issued;
NOTE: This is to prohibit the practice of some
notaries who maintain makeshift “offices” in
sidewalks and street corners of government
offices (Tirol, 2010).
4. A member of the Philippine Bar in good
137
standing with clearances from the Office of
the Bar Confidant of the Supreme Court and
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and
5. Has NOT been convicted in the first instance
of any crime involving moral turpitude
(Second par., Sec. 1, Rule III, 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice, A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC).
LAWYERS AS NOTARY PUBLIC
GR: Only those admitted to the practice of law are
qualified to be notaries public.
XPNs: When there are no persons with the
necessary qualifications or where there are
qualified persons but they refuse appointment. In
which case, the following persons may be
appointed as notaries:
1. Those who passed the studies of law in a
reputable university; or
2. A clerk or deputy clerk of court for a period
of not less than two years.
Non-Lawyers as Notaries
The Rules now requires that notaries must be
members of the Philippine Bar. The Supreme
Court no longer approves requests from non-
lawyers for appointment or reappointment as
notaries.
Government Lawyers as Notaries
Acts of notarization are within the ambit of the
term “practice of law”. Pursuant to Memorandum
Circular No. 17, “No Government officer or
employee shall engage directly in any private
business, vocation, or profession or be connected
with any commercial, credit, agricultural, or
industrial undertaking without a written
permission from the head of Department”. The
law now allows government lawyers to serve as
notaries provided there is written permission
from the head of Department.
NOTE: In a case, a lawyer was reprimanded for
engaging in notarial practice without the
authority from the Secretary of Justice. The
Registry of Deeds with whom he obtained
authority is not the head of the Department
(Abella v. Atty. Cruzabra, A.C. No. 5688, June 4,
2009).
Clerk of Court as Notary Public
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
 Legal Ethics
Clerk of court may act as notary public, provided
he is commissioned and has been permitted by
his superior. Such consent is necessary because
the act of notarizing a document is a practice of
law.
NOTE: Clerks of Court of RTCs are authorized to
notarize not only documents relating to the
exercise of official functions but also private
documents, subject to conditions that: (a) all
notarial fees charged shall be for the account of
the Judiciary; and (b) they certify in the notarized
documents that there are no notaries public
within the territorial jurisdiction of the RTC.
Prohibition against the RTC judges to notarize
Section 35, Rule 138, of the Revised Rules of
Court as well as Canon 5, Rule 5.07 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct provides that no judge or other
official or employee of the superior courts shall
engage in private practice as a member of the bar
or give professional advice to clients.
Notarization of documents is considered a
practice of law.
The rights, duties, privileges and functions of the
office of an attorney-at-law are so inherently
incompatible with the official functions, duties,
powers, discretions and privileges of a judge of
the Regional Trial Court.
Authority of MTC judges to notarize and its
limitation
MTC and MCTC judges may act as notaries public
ex-officio in the notarization of documents
connected only with the exercise of their official
functions and duties. They may not, as notaries
public ex-officio, undertake the preparation and
acknowledgment of private documents, contracts
and other acts of conveyances which bear no
direct relation to the performance of their
functions as judges.
However, MTC and MCTC judges assigned to
municipalities or circuits with no lawyers or
notaries public may, in the capacity as notaries
public ex-officio, perform any act within the
competence of a regular notary public, provided
that:
1. All notarial fees charged be for the account of
the Government and turned over to the
municipal treasurer
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
2018 GOLDEN NOTES
138
2. Certification be made in the notarized
documents attesting to the lack of any lawyer
or notary public in such municipality or
circuit.
Their authority to notarize is limited to their sala.
Hence, they cannot notarize documents filed in
another town because it will be considered as
practice of law.
Q: Vicente Batic charged Judge Victorio
Galapon Jr. with engaging in unauthorized
notarial practice for having notarized a Deed
of Absolute Sale between Antonio Caamic and
Lualhati Ellert. Under the deed of sale, Ellert,
was described as single. At the time of
Galapon’s notarization of the Deed of Sale,
there was a notary public in Dulag, Leyte.
Judge Galapon claims that he did not prepare
the document and that his participation was
limited to its acknowledgment, for which the
corresponding fee was collected by and paid
to the clerk of court. Is Judge Galapon
authorized to notarize the Deed of Absolute
Sale?
A: NO. While Judge Galapon explains that he
sincerely believed that when no notary public is
available, the MTC may act as ex-officio notary
public, provided the fees shall be for the
government, such is not enough to exonerate him
from liability. His acts do not fall under the
exception because at the time of his notarization
of the Deed of Sale, there was a notary public in
Dulag, Leyte (Vicente Batic v. Judge Victorio
Galapon Jr., A.M. No. MTJ-99-1239, July 29, 2005).
COMMISSION
It refers to the grant of authority to perform
notarial acts and to the written evidence of the
authority (Sec. 3, Rule II, A.M. 02-8-13-SC).
Issuance of notarial commission
A notarial commission may be issued by an
Executive Judge to any qualified person who
submits a petition in accordance with the Rules
on Notarial Practice (Sec. 1, first par., Rule III, A.M.
No. 02-8-13-SC).
Form of the petition and supporting
documents for a notarial commission
 NOTARIAL PRACTICE
Every petition for a notarial commission shall be
in writing, verified, and shall include the
following:
1. A statement containing the petitioner's
personal qualifications, including the
petitioner's date of birth, residence,
telephone number, professional tax receipt,
roll of attorney's number and IBP
membership number;
2. Certification of good moral character of the
petitioner by at least 2 executive officers of
the local chapter of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines where he is applying for
commission;
3. Proof of payment for the filing of the petition
as required by the Rules on Notarial Practice;
and
4. Three passport-size color photographs with
light background taken within 30 days of the
application. The photograph should not be
retouched. The petitioner shall sign his name
at the bottom part of the photographs (Sec.
2,Rule III, A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC).
NOTE: Every petitioner for a notarial commission
shall pay the application fee as prescribed in the
Rules of Court (Sec. 3, Rule III, A.M. No. 02-8-13-
SC).
Requirements before the executive judge
conduct a summary hearing on the petition
1. The petition is sufficient in form and
substance;
2. The petitioner proves the allegations
contained in the petition; and
3. The petitioner establishes to the satisfaction
of the Executive Judge that he has read and
fully understood the Rules on Notarial
Practice.
NOTE: The Executive Judge shall forthwith
issue a commission and a Certificate of
Authorization to Purchase a Notarial Seal in
favor of the petitioner (Sec. 4, Rule III, A.M.
No. 02-8-13-SC)
Two kinds of duties
1. Execution of formalities required by law; and
2. Verification of the capacity and identity of
the parties as well as the legality of the act
executed
139
DUTIES OF A NOTARY PUBLIC
1. To keep a notarial register
2. To make the proper entry or entries in his
notarial register touching his notarial acts in
the manner required by the law
3. To send the copy of the entries to the proper
clerk of court within the first 10 days of the
month next following
4. To affix to acknowledgments the date of
expiration of his commission, as required by
law
5. To forward his notarial register, when filled,
to the proper clerk of court
6. To make report, within reasonable time to
the proper judge concerning the performance
of his duties, as may be required by such
judge
7. To make the proper notation regarding
residence certificates (Sec. 240, Rev. Adm.
Code).
FEES OF NOTARY PUBLIC
1. For performing a notarial act, a notary public
may charge the maximum fee as prescribed
by the Supreme Court unless he waives the
fee in whole or in part (Sec. 1, Rule V, A. M. 02-
8-13-SC);
2. A notary public may charge travel fees and
expenses separate from the notarial fees
when traveling to perform a notarial act if the
notary public and the person requesting the
notarial act agree prior to the travel (Sec. 2,
Rule, A. M. 02-813-SC);
3. No fee or compensation of any kind, except
those expressly prescribed and allowed
herein, shall be collected or received for any
notarial service (Sec. 3, Rule V, A. M. 02-813-
SC);
4. A notary public shall not require payment of
any fees specified prior to the performance of
a notarial act unless otherwise agreed upon
(Sec. 4, first par.,, Rule V, A. M. 02-813-SC);
5. Any travel fees and expenses paid to a notary
public prior to the performance of a notarial
act are not subject to refund if the notary
public already traveled but failed to complete
in whole or in part the notarial act for
reasons beyond his control and without
negligence on his part (Sec. 4, second par.,
Rule V, A. M. 02-813-SC).
NOTE: A notary public who charges fee for
notarial services shall issue a receipt registered
with the Bureau of Internal Revenue and keep a
journal of notarial fees. He shall enter in the
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
 Legal Ethics
journal all fees charges for services rendered. A
notary public shall post in a conspicuous place in
his office a complete schedule of chargeable
notarial fees (Sec. 5, Rule V, A. M. 02-813-SC).
Q: Ms. Seller and Mr. Buyer presented to a
commissioned notary public a deed of sale for
notarization. The notary public explained to
them the transaction the deed embodies and
asked them if they were freely entering the
transaction. After the document was signed by
all the parties, the notary public collected the
notarial fee but did not issue any BIR-
registered receipt. Is the notarization of the
deed proper? (2013 Bar)
A: The notarization of the deed is proper because
any irregularity in the payment of the notarial
fees does not affect the validity of the
notarization made (Ocampo v. Land Bank of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 164968, July 3, 2009).
TERM OF OFFICE OF A NOTARY PUBLIC
Term of office of a notary public (1995 Bar)
A notary public may perform notarial acts for a
period of 2 years commencing the 1st day of
January of the year in which the commissioning is
made until the last day of December of the
succeeding year regardless of the actual date
when the application was renewed, unless earlier
revoked or the notary public has resigned under
the Rules on Notarial Practice and the Rules of
Court (Section 11, Rule III, A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC).
E.g. Atty. Antonio applied for and was given
notarial commission on 12 November 2010, such
term will expire on 31 December 2011 (2011
Bar).
Q: Juan dela Cruz was commissioned as a
notary public in 2001. His friend asked him to
notarize a deed of absolute sale sometime in
2004, to which he agreed free of charge. A
complaint for malpractice was filed against
him. Is Juan dela Cruz guilty of malpractice?
A: YES. Absent any showing that his notarial
commission has been renewed, his act constitutes
malpractice because at the time he notarized the
document, his notarial commission has already
expired. It is not a defense that no payment has
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
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140
been received. The requirement for the issuance
of the commission as notary public must not be
treated as a mere casual formality. In fact, Juan’s
act also constitutes falsification of public
document.
EXPIRED COMMISSION
A notary public may file a written application
with the Executive Judge for the renewal of his
commission within 45 days before the expiration
thereof. A mark, image or impression of the seal
of the notary public shall be attached in the
application (Sec. 13, first par., Rule III, A.M. No. 02-
8-13-SC).
NOTE: If a person is applying for a commission
for the first time, what he files is a petition and
not an application.
Failure of the notary public to file an
application for the renewal of his commission
Failure to file said application will result in the
deletion of the name of the notary public in the
register of notaries public and may only be
reinstated therein after he is issued a new
commission (Sec. 13, second and third pars., Rule
III, A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC).
NOTE: The Executive Judge shall, upon payment
of the application fee, act on an application for
renewal of a commission within thirty (30) days
from receipt thereof. If the application is denied,
the Executive Judge shall state the reasons
therefor (Sec. 14, Rule III, A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC).
POWERS AND LIMITATIONS
A notary public is empowered to perform the
following notarial acts: [JAO-CAS]
1. Acknowledgments;
2. Oaths and affirmations;
3. Jurats;
4. Signature witnessing;
5. Copy certifications; and
6. Any other act authorized by the rules (Section
1(a), Rule IV, A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC)
NOTARIZATION OF A PRIVATE DOCUMENT
Notarization converts a private document to a
public instrument, making it admissible in
evidence without the necessity of preliminary
 NOTARIAL PRACTICE
proof of its authenticity and due execution. A
notarized document is by law entitled to full
credit upon its face and it is for this reason that
notaries public must observe the basic
requirements in notarizing documents (Dolores
dela cruz, et al. v. Atty. Jose Dimaano, Jr.,
September 12, 2008, A.C. No. 7781).
A notary public should not notarize a document
unless the persons who signed the same are the
very same persons who executed and personally
appeared before him to attest to the contents and
truth of what are stated therein. The presence of
the parties to the deed will enable the notary
public to verify the genuineness of the signature
of the affiant.
Absence of notarization in a deed of sale
The absence of notarization of the Deed of Sale
would not necessarily invalidate the transaction
evidenced therein. Article 1358 of the Civil Code
requires that the form of a contract that transmits
or extinguishes real rights over immovable
property should be in a public document, yet it is
also an accepted rule that the failure to observe
the proper form does not render the transaction
invalid. Thus, it has been uniformly held that the
form required in Article 1358 is not essential to
the validity or enforceability of the transaction,
but required merely for convenience (Leonor
Camcam v. CA; Tigno v. Aquino).
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
Refers to an act in which an individual on a single
occasion:
1. Appears in person before the notary public
and presents an integrally complete
instrument or document;
NOTE: A notary public cannot perform a
notarial act over a document that has missing
pages, or that contains blanks that should be
filled-in prior to the notarial act.
2. Is attested to be personally known to the
notary public or identified by the notary
public through competent evidence of
identity as defined by the Rules on Notarial
Practice; and
3. Represents to the notary public that the
signature on the instrument or document
was voluntarily affixed by him for the
purposes stated in the instrument or
document, declares that he has executed the
141
instrument or document as his free and
voluntary act and deed, and, if he acts in a
particular representative capacity, that he
has the authority to sign in that capacity (Sec.
1, Rule II, A.M. 02-8-13-SC).
Q: Cabanilla filed a complaint against Atty.
Cristal-Tenorio with the IBP, alleging that he
never appeared before her when she
notarized the deed of sale of his house, and
that the signatures appearing opposite their
respective names were forgeries. Did Atty.
Cristal-Tenorio fail to comply with the
mandates of the law when she notarized the
deed of sale without the complainant and his
children? Does such failure warrant the
revocation of her notarial commission?
A: YES. Under Section 1(a) of Act 2103, a notary
public taking the acknowledgment in a document
or instrument is mandated to certify that the
person acknowledging the instrument or
document is known to him and that he is the
same person who executed it and acknowledged
that the same is his free act and deed. To
"acknowledge before" means to avow; to own as
genuine, to assert, to admit; and "before" means
in front or preceding in space or ahead of. A party
acknowledging must appear before the notary
public. A notary public should not notarize a
document unless the persons who signed the
same are the very same persons who executed
and personally appeared before the said notary
public to attest to the contents and truth of what
are stated therein. The presence of the parties to
the deed making the acknowledgment will enable
the notary public to verify the genuineness of the
signature of the affiant. A notary public is
enjoined from notarizing a fictitious or spurious
document. The function of a notary public is,
among others, to guard against any illegal deed
(Cabanilla v. Cristal-Tenorio, A.C. No. 6139,
November 11, 2003).
Q: “Before me personally appeared this 30th of
August 2010 Milagros A. Ramirez, who proved
her identity to me through witnesses: 1.
Rosauro S. Balana, Passport UU123456; 1-5-
2010/Baguio City; and 2. Elvira N. Buela,
Passport VV200345; 1-17-2009/Manila. “Both
witnesses, of legal ages, under oath declare
that: Milagros A. Ramirez is personally known
to them; she is the same seller in the foregoing
deed of sale; she does not have any current
identification document nor can she obtain
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
 Legal Ethics
one within a reasonable time; and they are
not privy to or are interested in the deed he
signed.” What is the status of such a notarial
acknowledgement? (2011 Bar Question)
A: Valid, since it is a manner of establishing the
identity of the person executing the document.
and clerks of court, are not obliged to administer
oaths or execute certificates save in matters of
official business or in relation to their functions
as such; and with the exception of notaries public,
the officer performing the service in those
matters shall charge no fee, unless specifically
authorized by law (Section 42, Chapter I, Book I,
E.O. No. 292).

AFFIRMATION OR OATH NOTE: P.A.O. Lawyers now have the authority to

Refers to act in which an individual on a single
occasion:
1. Appears in person before the notary public;
2. Is personally known to the public or
identified by the notary through competent
evidence of identity as defined by the Rules;
and
3. Avows under penalty of law, to the whole
truth of the contents of the instrument or
document.
administer oaths, provided it is in connection
with the performance of their duties.
The fiscal or the state prosecutor has the
authority to administer oaths (RA No. 5180, as
amended by P.D. 911).
JURAT
Refers to an act in which an individual on a single
occasion:

Officers allowed to administer oaths 1. Appears in person before the notary public
(Republic Act No. 9406): and presents an instrument or document;
2. Is personally known to the notary public or
1. President;
identified by the notary public through
2. Vice-President;
competent evidence of identity as defined by
3. Members and Secretaries of both Houses of
the Rules on Notarial Practice;
the Congress;
4. Members of the Judiciary; 3. Signs the instrument or document in the
5. Secretaries of Departments; presence of the notary; and
6. Provincial governors and lieutenant-
4. Takes an oath or affirmation before the
governors;
notary public as to such instrument or
7. City mayors;
document (Sec. 6, Rule II, A.M. 02-8-13-SC).
8. Municipal mayors;
9. Bureau directors;
10. Regional directors;
11. Clerk of courts; NOTE: A jurat is not a part of a pleading but
12. Registrars of deeds; merely evidences the fact that the affidavit was
13. Other civilian officers in the public service of properly made. The claim or belief of Atty. Dela
the government of the Philippines whose Rea that the presence of petitioner Gamido was
appointments are vested in the President and not necessary for the jurat because it is not an
are subject to confirmation by the acknowledgment is patently baseless. If this had
Commission on Appointments; been his belief since he was first commissioned as
14. All other constitutional officers; a notary public, then he has been making a
15. PAO lawyers in connection with the mockery of the legal solemnity of an oath in a
performance of duty; and jurat. Notaries public and others authorized by
16. Ombudsman (Sec. 15(8), RA 6770) law to administer oaths or to take
17. Notaries public (Sec. 41, Chapter I, Book I, acknowledgments should not take for granted the
E.O.292) solemn duties appertaining to their offices. Such
duties are dictated by public policy and are
Duty to administer oaths impressed with public interest (Gamido v. Bilibid
Prisons Officials, G.R. No. 114829, March 1, 1995).
Officers authorized to administer oaths, with the
exception of notaries public, municipal judges

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Acknowledgment v. Jurat
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
Act of one who has
executed a deed, in going
to some competent officer
or court and declaring It to
be his act or deed
The notary public or
officer taking the
acknowledgment shall
certify that the person
acknowledging the
instrument or document is
known to him and he is
the same person who
executed it and
acknowledged that the
same is his free act and
deed.
Two-fold purpose: To
authorize the deed to be
given in evidence without
further proof of its
execution, and, to entitle it
to be recorded.
Where used:
1. To authenticate an
agreement between two or
more persons; or
2. Where the document
contains a disposition of
property.
E.g. The acknowledgment
in a deed of lease of land.
NOTE: In notarial wills, acknowledgment is
required, not merely a jurat.
SIGNATURE WITNESSING
Refers to a notarial act in which an individual on a
single occasion:
NOTARIAL PRACTICE
1. Appears in person before the notary public
and presents an instrument or document;
JURAT 2. Is personally known to the notary public or
That part of an identified by the notary public through
affidavit in which competent evidence of identity as defined by
the notary public or the Rules on Notarial Practice; and
officer certifies that 3. Signs the instrument or document in the
the instrument was presence of the notary public (Sec. 14, Rule II,
sworn to before A. M. No. 02-8-13-SC).
him.
It is not part of a Q: Is a notary public authorized to certify the
pleading but merely affixing of a signature by thumb or other mark
evidences the fact on an instrument or document presented for
that the affidavit notarization? (1995 Bar)
was properly made.
A: YES. It is also within the powers of a notary
public, provided:
1. The thumb or other mark is affixed in the
presence of the notary public and of two (2)
disinterested and unaffected witnesses to the
instrument or document;
Purpose: Gives the 2. Both witnesses sign their own names in
document a legal addition to the thumb or other mark;
character. 3. The notary public writes below the thumb or
other mark: “thumb or other mark affixed by
(name of signatory by mark) in the presence
of (names and addresses of witnesses) and
undersigned notary public”; and
Where used: 4. The notary public notarizes the signature by
1. Affidavits; thumb or other mark through an
2. Certifications; acknowledgment, jurat or signature
3. Whenever the witnessing (Sec. 1(b), Rule IV, A.M. No. 02-8-
person executing 13-SC)
makes a statement
of facts or attests to
the truth of an Q: Is a notary public authorized to sign on
event, under oath. behalf of a person who is physically unable to
sign or make a mark on an instrument or
E.g. An affidavit document? (1995 Bar Question)
subscribed before a
notary public or A: YES. It likewise falls within the powers of a
public official notary public, provided:
authorized for the
purpose. 1. The notary public is directed by the person
unable to sign or make a mark to sign on his
behalf;
2. The signature of the notary public is affixed
in the presence of 2 disinterested and
unaffected witnesses to the instrument or
document;
3. Both witnesses sign their own names;
4. The notary public writes below his signature:
“Signature affixed by notary in the presence
of (names and addresses of person and 2
witnesses)”; and
143 UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
 Legal Ethics
5. The notary public notarizes his signature by
acknowledgment or jurat(Sec. 1(c), Rule IV,
A.M. 02-8-13-SC).
COPY CERTIFICATION
Refers to a notarial act in which a notary public:
1. Is presented with an instrument or document
that is neither a vital record, a public record,
nor publicly recordable;
2. Copies or supervises the copying of the
instrument or document;
3. Compares the instrument or document with
the copy; and
4. Determines that the copy is accurate and
complete (Sec. 4, Rule II, A.M. 02-8-13-SC).
NOTE: The document copied must be an original
document. It cannot be a copy itself.
NOTARIAL CERTIFICATE
Refers to the part of, or attachment to a notarized
instrument or document that is completed by the
notary public which bears the notary's signature
and seal, and states the facts attested to by the
notary public in a particular notarization as
provided for by the Rules on Notarial Practice
(Sec. 8, Rule II, A. M. No. 02-8-13).
NOTE: “Loose notarial certificate” refers to a
notarial certificate that is attached to a notarized
instrument or document.
LIMITATIONS TO THE PERFORMANCE OF A
NOTARIAL ACT
LIMITATION AS TO THE PLACE
GR: A notary public shall NOT perform a notarial
act outside his regular place of work or business
XPN: On certain exceptional occasions or
situations, a notarial act may be performed at the
request of the parties in the following sites
located within his territorial jurisdiction:
1. Public offices, convention halls, and similar
places where oaths of office may be administered;
2. Public function areas in hotels and similar
places for the signing of instruments or
documents requiring notarization;
3. Hospitals and other medical institutions where
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144
a party to an instrument or document is confined
for treatment; and
4. Any place where a party to an instrument or
document requiring notarization is under
detention. (Sec. 2(a), Rule IV, A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC)
NOTE: It is improper for a notary public to
notarize documents in sidewalk since it is now
required that a notary public should maintain a
regular place of work or business within the city
or province where he is commissioned. The SC
evidently wants to eradicate the practice of “fly by
night” notaries public who notarized documents
in “improvised” offices.
LIMITATION AS TO WHO IS THE SIGNATORY
A person shall NOT perform a notarial act if the
person involved as signatory to the instrument or
document is:
a. Not in the notary's presence personally at the
time of the notarization; and (Sec. 2(b)(1),
Rule IV, A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC).
b. Not personally known to the notary public or
otherwise identified by the notary public
through competent evidence of identity as
defined by the Rules on Notarial Practice
(Sec.2(b)(2), Rule IV, A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC)
c. The document is blank or incomplete; (Sec.6
(a) Rule IV, A.M. 02-8-13-SC)
d. An instrument or document is without
appropriate notarial certification (Sec. 6, Rule
IV, A.M. 02-8-13-SC).
Q: Cynthia filed an application for building
permit in connection with the renovation of a
building situated on a lot owned by her
brother Rolando de la Cruz. One of the
documents required in the processing of the
application was an affidavit to be executed by
the lot owner. Since Rolando de la Cruz was a
resident abroad, an affidavit was prepared
wherein it was made to appear that he was a
resident of Leyte. Atty. Francisco Villamor
notarized the purported affidavit. According
to him, a Chinese mestizo appeared in his law
office one time, requesting that his affidavit be
notarized. Said person declared that he was
Rolando de la Cruz. Atty. Villamor then asked
for the production of his residence certificate,
but he said, he did not bother to bring the
same along with him anymore as, he has
already indicated his serial number in the
jurat portion together with the date of issue
 NOTARIAL PRACTICE
and place of issue. Did Atty. Francisco
Villamor commit a violation of notarial law?
A: YES. It is the duty of the notarial officer to
demand that the document presented to him for
notarization should be signed in his presence. By
his admission, the affidavit was already signed by
the purported affiant at the time it was presented
to him for notarization. Atty. Villamor thus failed
to heed his duty as a notary public to demand that
the document for notarization be signed in his
presence (Traya Jr. v. Villamor, A.C. No. 4595,
February 6, 2004).
Q: During their lifetime, the Spouses
Villanueva acquired several parcels of land.
They were survived by their 5 children:
Simeona, Susana, Maria, Alfonso, and
Florencia. Alfonso executed an Affidavit of
Adjudication stating that as “the only
surviving son and sole heir” of the spouses, he
was adjudicating himself a parcel of land.
Thereafter, he executed a Deed of Absolute
Sale, conveying the property to Adriano
Villanueva. Atty. Salud Beradio appeared as
notary public on both the affidavit of
adjudication and the deed of sale. Atty.
Beradio knew of the falsity of Alfonso’s
statement. Florencia and descendants of the
other children of the spouses were still alive
at the time of execution of both documents.
Was there a failure to discharge properly the
duties of a notary public?
A: YES. Atty. Beradio’s conduct breached the
Code of Professional Responsibility, which
requires lawyers to obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for the law and legal processes
as well as Rule 1.01 of the Code which proscribes
lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral, or deceitful conduct. She herself
admitted that she knew of the falsity of Alfonso’s
statement that he was the “sole heir” of the
spouses. She therefore notarized a document
while fully aware that it contained a material
falsehood. The affidavit of adjudication is
premised on this very assertion. By this
instrument, Alfonso claimed a portion of his
parents’ estate all to himself, to the exclusion of
his co-heirs. Shortly afterwards, Atty. Beradio
notarized the deed of sale, knowing that the deed
took basis from the unlawful affidavit of
adjudication (Heirs of the Late Spouses Lucas v
.Atty. Beradio, A.C. No. 6270, January 22, 2007).
145
NOTE: If the notary public admitted that he has
personal knowledge of a false statement
contained in the instrument to be notarized yet
proceeded to affix his or her notarial seal on it,
the court must not hesitate to discipline the
notary public accordingly as the circumstances of
the case may dictate. Otherwise, the integrity and
sanctity of the notarization process may be
undermined and public confidence on notarial
documents diminished (Ibid.).
DISQUALIFICATION OF A NOTARY PUBLIC TO
PERFORM A NOTARIAL ACT
A notary public is disqualified to perform notarial
act when he:
1. Is a party to the instrument or document that
is to be notarized;
NOTE: The function would be defeated if the
notary public is one of the signatories to the
instrument. For then, he would be interested
in sustaining the validity thereof as it directly
involves himself and the validity of his own
act. It would place him in an inconsistent
position, and the very purpose of the
acknowledgment, which is to minimize fraud,
would be thwarted (Villarin v. Sabate, A.C. No.
3224, February 9, 2000).
2. Will receive, as a direct or indirect result, any
commission, fee, advantage, right, title,
interest, cash, property, or other
consideration, except as provided by the
Rules on Notarial Practice and by law; or
3. Is a spouse, common-law partner, ancestor,
descendant, or relative by affinity or
consanguinity of the principal within the
fourth civil degree (Sec. 3, Rule IV, A.M. No.
02-8-13-SC).
Q: On March 2012, Kintanar’s wife,
Evangeline, filed a complaint against Mabini
among other persons, for reconveyance,
annulment of title, damages with prayer for
preliminary injunction or restraining order.
Attached to said complaint was an Affidavit of
Loss Owner’s Duplicate Copy of Title executed
by Evangeline and notarized by Kintanar on
April 25, 2002. According to Mabini, Kintanar
knew that he was not authorized to notarize a
document of his wife, or any of his relative
within the fourth civil degree, whether by
affinity or consanguinity. Kintanar countered
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
 Legal Ethics
that the subject Affidavit purportedly
executed by his wife appeared to have been
notarized on April 25, 2002; as such, it was
governed by Revised Administrative Code of
1917. Did Kintanar commit misconduct by
notarizing his wife’s affidavit of loss in 2002?
A: NO. A lawyer cannot be held liable for a
violation of his duties as Notary Public when the
law in effect at the time of his complained act
does not provide any prohibition to the same, as
in the case at bench. Prior to 1917, governing law
for notaries public in the Philippines was the
Spanish Notarial Law of 1889. However, the law
governing Notarial Practice is changed with the
passage of the January 3, 1916 Revised
Administrative Code, which took effect in 1917. In
2004, the Revised Rules on Notarial Practice was
passed by the Supreme Court. Considering the
foregoing, there is indeed no basis to hold Atty.
Kintanar liable for misconduct for notarizing his
wife’s Affidavit in 2002 (Mabini v. Kintanar, A.C.
9512, Feb 5, 2018).
INSTANCES WHEN NOTARY PUBLIC MAY
REFUSE TO NOTARIZE
1. The notary knows or has good reason to
believe that the notarial act or transaction is
unlawful or immoral;
2. The signatory shows a demeanor which
engenders in the mind of the notary public
reasonable doubt as to the former's
knowledge of the consequences of the
transaction requiring a notarial act;
3. In the notary's judgment, the signatory is not
acting of his or her own free will (Sec.4, Rule
V, A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC); or
4. If the document or instrument to be
notarized is considered as an improper
document by the Rules on Notarial Practice.
Example of an “Improper instrument”
1. A blank or incomplete instrument or
document; or
2. An instrument or document without
appropriate notarial certification (Sec. 6, Rule V,
A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC).
Q: The Office of the Ombudsman finds it
unsettling that the Deed of Partition
submitted before the DAR was notarized by
Atty. Robellito B. Diuyan on 23 July 2003,
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
2018 GOLDEN NOTES
146
when one of the signatories therein, Alejandro
F. Camilo, had earlier died on 23 August 2001.
Atty. Diuyan admitted notarizing the Deed of
Partition in his capacity as District Public
Attorney of the Public Attorney’s Office. He
claimed that the signature as Notary Public in
that Deed of Partition was indeed his. He
added that Eight (8) persons appeared before
him with the document deed of partition
prepared by them. Atty. Diuyan asked them
one by one if the document is true and correct
and with their Community Tax Certificates,
they answered in the affirmative and after
being satisfied with their answer Atty. Diuyan
notarized the document for free as they are
considered as indigents. Should Atty. Diuyan
be held liable for notarizing a Deed of
Partition on the basis of the affiants’ CTCs?
A: NO. A lawyer cannot be held liable for a
violation of his duties as Notary Public when the
law in effect at the time of his complained act
does not provide any prohibition, to the same, as
in the case at bench. Similarly, Atty. Diuyan
notarized the Deed of Partition on July 23, 2003,
or prior to the effectivity of the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice, of which he is being held
accountable by the IBP. However, when the Deed
was notarized on July 23, 2003, the applicable
law was the notarial law under Title IV, Chapter
11, Article VII of the Revised Administrative Code,
Section 251 of which only required the
presentation of the CTCs (In re: Decision dated
September 26, 2012 in OMB-M-A-10-023-A etc.
against Atty. Robelito Diuyan, A.C. No. 9676, Apr. 2,
2018).
NOTARIAL REGISTER
Notarial register
It refers to a permanently bound book with
numbered pages containing a chronological
record of notarial acts performed by a notary
public (Sec 1, [a] par. 1, Rule VI, A.M. No. 02-8-13-
SC)
Duty of Notary Public
A notary public shall keep, maintain, protect and
provide for lawful inspection as provided in these
Rules, a chronological official notarial register of
notarial acts consisting of a permanently bound
book with numbered pages.
 NOTARIAL PRACTICE
The register shall be kept in books to be
furnished by the Solicitor General to any notary
public upon request and upon payment of the
cost thereof. The register shall be duly paged, and
on the first page, the Solicitor General shall certify
the number of pages of which the book consists
(Sec. 1(a), Rule VI, A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC).
NOTE: Failure of the notary to make the proper
entry or entries in his notarial register touching
his notarial acts in the manner required by law is
a ground for revocation of his commission
(Father Ranhilio C. Aquino Et. Al., v. Atty. Edwin
Pascua, A.C. No. 5095, November 28, 2007, En
Banc).
Notary public is personally accountable for all
entries in his notarial register. They cannot be
relieved of responsibility for the violation of the
aforesaid sections by passing the buck to their
secretaries (Lingan v. Atty. Calibaquib, A.C. No.
5377, June 15, 2006).
Effect of failure to submit Report
Notary’s negligence in failing to submit his
notarial report will not affect the admissibility as
evidence of an instrument he notarized (Tirol,
2010). Parties who appear before a notary public
to have their documents notarized should not be
expected to follow up on the submission of the
notarial reports. They should not be made to
suffer the consequences of the negligence of the
Notary Public in following the procedures
prescribed by the Notarial Law (Destreza v. Atty.
Riñoza-Plazo, G.R. No. 176863, October 30, 2009).
Signing or affixing a thumbmark in the
notarial register
At the time of notarization, the notary's notarial
register shall be signed or a thumb or other mark
affixed by each:
1. Principal;
2. Credible witness swearing or affirming to the
identity of a principal; and
3. Witness to a signature by thumb or other
mark, or to a signing by the notary public on
behalf of a person physically unable to sign
(Sec. 3, Rule VI, A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC).
Inspection of a notarial register by private
persons
1. The inspection is made in the notary’s
presence;
147
2. During regular business hours;
3. The person's identity is personally known to
the notary public or proven through
competent evidence of identity as defined in
these Rules;
4. The person affixes a signature and thumb or
other mark or other recognized identifier, in
the notarial register in a separate, dated
entry;
5. The person specifies the month, year, type of
instrument or document, and name of the
principal in the notarial act or acts sought;
and
6. The person is shown only the entry or entries
specified by him (Sec.4 (a), Rule VI, A.M. No.
02-8-13-SC).
Examination of notarial register by law
enforcement officer
The notarial register may be examined by a law
enforcement officer in the course of an official
investigation or by virtue of a court order (Sec.
4(b), Rule VI, A. M. No. 02-8-13-SC).
LOSS, DESTRUCTION and DAMAGE OF
NOTARIAL REGISTER
1. In case the notarial register is stolen, lost,
destroyed, damaged, or otherwise rendered
unusable or illegible as a record of notarial
acts, the notary public shall, within ten (10)
days after informing the appropriate law
enforcement agency in the case of theft or
vandalism, notify the Executive Judge by any
means providing a proper receipt or
acknowledgment, including registered mail
and also provide a copy or number of any
pertinent police report.
2. Upon revocation or expiration of a notarial
commission, or death of the notary public,
the notarial register and notarial records
shall immediately be delivered to the office of
the Executive Judge (Sec. 5, Rule VI, A. M. No.
02-8-13-SC).
The notary public may refuse the request of
inspection for register of deeds
If the notary public has a reasonable ground to
believe that a person has a criminal intent or
wrongful motive in requesting information from
the notarial register, the notary shall deny access
to any entry or entries therein (Sec. 4(c), Rule VI,
A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC).
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
 Legal Ethics
JURISDICTION OF NOTARY PUBLIC AND PLACE
OF NOTARIZATION
A notary public may perform notarial acts in any
place within the territorial jurisdiction of the
commissioning court. Outside the place of his
commission, a notary public is bereft of power to
perform any notarial act.
Under the Notarial Law, the jurisdiction of a
notary public is co-extensive with the province
for which he was commissioned; and for the
notary public in the city of Manila, the jurisdiction
is co-extensive with said city. Circular 8 of 1985,
however, clarified further that the notary public
may be commissioned for the same term only by
one court within the Metro Manila region.
“Regular place of work or business” of a
notary public meaning
The regular place of work or business refers to a
stationary office in the city or province wherein
the notary public renders legal and notarial
services (Sec. 11, Rule II, 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice).
Q: Atty. Sabungero obtained a notarial
commission. One Sunday, while he was at the
cockpit, a person approached him with an
affidavit that needed to be notarized. Atty.
Sabungero immediately pulled out from his
pocket his small notarial seal, and notarized
the document. Was the affidavit validly
notarized? (2009 Bar)
A: Section 2, Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice provides that a Notary Public shall not
perform a notarial act outside his regular place of
work, except in few exceptional occasions or
situations, at the request of the parties.
Notarizing in a cockpit is not one of such
exceptions. The prohibition is aimed to eliminate
the practice of ambulatory notarization. However,
assuming that the cockpit is within his notarial
jurisdiction, the notarization may be valid but the
notary public should be disciplined.
REVOCATION OF COMMISSION
Who may revoke the notarial commission
1. The Executive Judge of the RTC who issued
the commission on any ground on which an
application for commission may be denied
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
2018 GOLDEN NOTES
148
(Sec. 1, Rule XI, A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC); or
2. By the Supreme Court itself in the exercise of
its general supervisory powers over lawyer.
GROUNDS FOR REVOCATION
The executive Judge shall revoke a notarial
commission for any ground on which an
application for a commission may be denied. In
addition, the Executive Judge may revoke the
commission of, or impose appropriate
administrative sanctions upon, any notary public
who:
1. Fails to keep a notarial register;
2. Fails to make the proper entry or entries in
his notarial register concerning his notarial
acts;
3. Fails to send the copy of the entries to the
Executive Judge within the first ten (10) days
of the month following;
4. Fails to affix to acknowledgments the date of
expiration of his commission;
5. Fails to submit his notarial register, when
filled, to the Executive Judge;
6. Fails to make his report, within a reasonable
time, to the Executive Judge concerning the
performance of his duties, as may be required
by the judge;
7. Fails to require the presence of a principal at
the time of the notarial act;
NOTE: "Principal" refers to a person
appearing before the notary public whose
act is the subject of notarization.
8. Fails to identify a principal on the basis of
personal knowledge or competent evidence;
9. Executes a false or incomplete certificate
under Section 5, Rule IV;
10. Knowingly performs or fails to perform any
other act prohibited or mandated by these
Rules; and
11. Commits any other dereliction or act which in
the judgment of the Executive Judge
constitutes good cause for revocation of
commission or imposition of administrative
sanction (Sec. 1, Rule XI, 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice).
NOTE: Functions of notary public – violations:
suspension as notary not for the practice of law
(Villarin v. Sabate, A.C. No. 3224, February 9,
2000).
 NOTARIAL PRACTICE
COMPETENT EVIDENCE OF IDENTITY
Competent evidence of identity refers to the
identification of an individual based on the
following:
1. At least one current identification document
issued by an official agency bearing the
photograph and signature of the individual
such as but not limited to:
a. Passport
b. Driver's license
c. PRC
d. NBI clearance
e. Police clearance
f. Postal ID
g. Voter's ID
h. Any other government issued ID (Sec 12
of Rule 2, 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice,
as amended by A.M. No.02-8-13-SC dated
February 19, 2008).
2. The oath or affirmation of one credible
witness not privy to the instrument,
document or transaction who is personally
known to the notary public and who
personally knows the individual, or of two
credible witnesses neither of whom is privy
to the instrument, document or transaction
who each personally knows the individual
and shows to the notary public documentary
identification (Amendment to Sec. 12 (a), Rule
II of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice,
February 19, 2008).
NOTE: Competent evidence of identity is not
required in cases where the affiant is personally
known to the Notary Public (Amora, Jr. v. Comelec,
G.R. No.192280, January 25, 2011).
Q: Atty. Regino Tamabago notarized a last will
and testament under which the decedent
supposedly bequeathed his entire estate to his
wife, save for a parcel of land which he
devised to Vicente Lee, Jr. and Elena Lee, half
siblings of Manuel Lee, the complainant. The
will was purportedly executed and
acknowledged before respondent on June 30,
1965. However, the residence certificate of
the testator noted in the acknowledgment of
the will was dated January 5, 1962. There is
also absence of notation of the residence
certificates of the purported witnesses. Did
Atty. Regino Tamabago violate any of the
duties of a notary public?
149
A: Atty. Tamabago, as notary public, evidently
failed in the performance of the elementary
duties of his office. There is absence of a notation
of the residence certificates of the notarial
witnesses in the will in the acknowledgment.
Further, the notation of the testator’s old
residence certificate in the same
acknowledgment was a clear breach of the law.
The Notarial Law then in force required the
exhibition of the residence certificate upon
notarization of a document or instrument. By
having allowed decedent to exhibit an expired
residence certificate, Atty. Tamabago failed to
comply with the requirements of the old Notarial
Law. As much could be said of his failure to
demand the exhibition of the residence
certificates of notarial witnesses. Defects in the
observance of the solemnities prescribed by law
render the entire will invalid (Manuel Lee v. Atty.
Regino Tamabago, A.C. No. 5281, February 12,
2008).
SANCTIONS
Punishable acts under the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice
The Executive Judge shall cause the prosecution
of any person who knowingly:
1. Acts or otherwise impersonates a notary
public;
2. Obtains, conceals, defaces, or destroys the
seal, notarial register, or official records of a
notary public; and
3. Solicits, coerces, or in any way influences a
notary public to commit official misconduct
(Sec. 1, Rule XII, Rule on Notarial Practice).
NOTE: Notarizing documents without the
requisite commission therefore constitutes
malpractice, if not the crime of falsification of
public documents (St. Louis Laboratory High
School Faculty And Staff V. Dela Cruz, A.C. No.
6010. August 28, 2006).
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
 Legal Ethics
JUDICIAL ETHICS the other office (Luna v. Rodriguez and De Los
Angeles, G.R. No. L-13744, November 29, 1918).

Judicial ethics Proper judicial deportment

The branch of moral science which treats of the
right and proper conduct to be observed by all
judges in trying and deciding controversies
brought before them for adjudication and which
conduct must be demonstrative of impartiality,
integrity, competence, independence and
freedom from improprieties. This freedom from
improprieties must be observed in both the
public and private life of a judge who is the visible
representation of the law (Pineda, 2009)
1. Attitude toward counsel – He must be
courteous especially to the young and
inexperienced, should not interrupt in
their arguments except to clarify his
minds as to their positions, must not be
tempted to an unnecessary display of
learning or premature judgment, may
criticize and correct unprofessional
conduct of a lawyer but not in an insulting
manner.

Judge 2. Attitude toward litigants and witnesses

– He must be considerate, courteous and
A judge is a public officer who, by virtue of his civil, must not utter intemperate language
office, is clothed with judicial authority and is during the hearing of a case.
lawfully appointed to decide litigated questions in
accordance with law (People v. Manantan, G.R. No. Proper judicial conduct
L-14129, August 30, 1962).
Judges and justices must conduct themselves
NOTE: This refers to persons only. There may be as to be beyond reproach and suspicion and
a judge without a court. free from appearance of impropriety in their
personal behavior, not only in the discharge of
official duties but also in their everyday lives.
De jure judge v. De facto judge
SOURCES
De Jure judge De Facto judge
One who exercises the An officer who is not Two main sources:
office of a judge as a fully vested with all the
matter of right, fully powers and duties a. New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
vested with all the conceded to judges but, Philippine Judiciary (NCJC); and
powers and functions one who exercises the b. Code of Judicial Conduct (CJC).
conceded to him office of judge under
under the law (Luna v. some color of right. He Other sources of Judicial Ethics:
Rodriguez, G.R. No. L- has the reputation of 1. 1987 Constitution particularly Article VIII
13744, November 29, the officer he assumes (Judicial Department), Article XI
1918). to be, yet he has some (Accountability of Public Officers), and
defect in his right to Article III (Bill of Rights);
exercise judicial
2. New Civil Code (Articles 9, 20, 27, 32, 35,
functions at the
particular time (Luna v. 739, 1491, 2005, 2025 to 2035, and 2046);
Rodriguez, G.R. No. L- 3. Rules of Court (Rule 71, 135, 137, 139-B, and
13744, November 29, 140);
1918). 4. Revised Penal Code (Articles 204, 205, 206,
and 207);
NOTE: There cannot be a de facto judge when 5. Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA
there is a de jure judge in the actual performance
3019)
of the duties of the office. Moreover, one cannot
be actually acting under any color of right when 6. Canons of Judicial Ethics (Admin. Order No.
he has ceased to be a judge and has actually 162)
vacated the office by the acceptance of another 7. Code of Professional Responsibility;
office and by actually entering upon the duties of

UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS

2018 GOLDEN NOTES
150
 JUDICIAL ETHICS
8. Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (BP in the moral authority and integrity of the
129) judiciary is of utmost importance in a modern
9. Supreme Court decisions; democratic society; and that it is essential that
judges, individually and collectively, respect and
10. Foreign decisions on judicial ethics which are
honor judicial office as a public trust and strive to
relevant and persuasive; enhance and maintain confidence in the judicial
11. Opinions of Authorities in Legal and Judicial system.
Ethics;
12. Other Statutes; and The purpose of the New Code of Judicial Conduct
13. Administrative Orders and Supreme Court for the Philippine Judiciary is to update and
Circulars (Pineda, 2009). correlate the code of judicial conduct and canons
of judicial ethics adopted for the Philippines, and
New Code of Judicial Conduct for the also to stress the Philippines’ solidarity with the
Philippine Judiciary v. Code of Judicial universal clamor for a universal code of judicial
Conduct ethics (See aforementioned "four Ins" and "four
ACID" problems by Chief Justice Artemio V.
NCJC CJC Panganiban).
Focuses on the Concerned primarily
NOTE: The New Code contains 6 Canons and 44
institutional and with the institutional
Rules.
personal independence independence of the
of judicial officers judiciary.
The six (6) canons under the New Code of
Contains eight norms of Contained three
Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary
conduct that judges guidelines explaining
“shall follow” what judges “should
1. Independence
do”
2. Integrity
* Canon 1 of the 1989
3. Impartiality
Code created a weaker
4. Propriety
mandate.
5. Equality
6. Competence and Diligence

Duties of a magistrate that will bolster the

THE NEW CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
public’s confidence in the judicial system
FOR THE PHILIPPINE JUDICIARY
(BANGALORE DRAFT)
1. Duty to be above reproach and to appear
(A.M. NO. 03-05-01)
above reproach (NCJC, Sec.1, Canon 2)
2. Duty to be impartial (NCJC, Canon 3)
The New Code of Judicial Conduct (NCJC) for the
3. Duty to avoid improprieties and appearance
Philippine Judiciary took effect on June 1, 2004
of improprieties (NCJC, Sec. 1, Canon 4)
supersedes the Canons of Judicial Ethics and the
4. Duty of financial transparency and duty to
Code of Judicial Conduct. Provided, however, that
avoid financial conflicts of interest (NCJC, Sec.
in case of deficiency or absence of specific
7, Canon 4)
provisions in the NCJC, the Canons of Judicial
5. Duty to be efficient, fair and prompt (NCJC,
Ethics and Code of Judicial Conduct shall be
Sec. 5, Canon 6)
applicable in a suppletory character (2007,
6. Duty to be free from favor, bias, or prejudice
2009 Bar).
(NCJC, Sec. 1, Canon 3).
This was adopted from the universal declaration
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
of standards for ethical conduct embodied in the
(1989)
Bangalore Draft as revised at the Round Table
Conference of Chief Justices at the Hague.
Applicability
This code applies suppletorily to the Bangalore
It is founded upon a universal recognition that a
Draft.
competent, independent and impartial judiciary
is essential if the courts are to fulfill their role in CANON 1
upholding constitutionalism and the rule of law; A JUDGE SHOULD UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY
that public confidence in the judicial system and AND INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY.

151 UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS

FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
 Legal Ethics
RULE 1.01, CANON 1
A judge should be the embodiment of
competence, integrity and independence.
NOTE: Failure to decide cases and other matters
within the reglementary period constitutes gross
inefficiency and warrants the imposition of
administrative sanction against the erring
magistrate. Judges must decide cases and resolve
matters with dispatch because any delay in the
administration of justice deprives litigants of
their right to a speedy disposition of their case
and undermines the people’s faith in the
judiciary. Indeed, justice delayed is justice denied
(Angelia v. Grageda, A.M. No. RTJ-10-2220,
February 7, 2011).
RULE 1.02, CANON 1
A judge should administer justice impartially
and without delay.
RULE 1.03, CANON 1
A judge should be vigilant against any
attempt to subvert the independence of the
judiciary and resist any pressure from
whatever source.
CANON 2
A JUDGE SHOULD AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND
THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY IN ALL
ACTIVITES.
RULE 2.01, CANON 2
A judge should so behave at all times as to
promote public confidence in the integrity
and impartiality of the judiciary.
Q: Judge Canoy was charged with several
counts of gross ignorance of the law and/or
procedures, grave abuse of authority, and
appearance of impropriety (CJC, Canon 2) for
granting bail to Melgazo, the accused in a
criminal case, without any application or
petition for the grant of bail filed before his
court or any court. Also, he did not require
Melgazo to sign a written undertaking
containing the conditions of the bail under
Sec. 2, Rule 114 to be complied with by
Melgazo. Thus, Judge Canoy ordered the police
escorts to release Melgazo without any
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
2018 GOLDEN NOTES
152
written order of release. Should respondent
Judge Canoy be held administratively liable?
A: YES. Granting of bail without any application
or petition to grant bail is a clear deviation from
the procedure laid down in Sec. 17 of Rule 114. As
regards the insistence of Judge Canoy that such
may be considered as “constructive bail,” there is
no such species of bail under the Rules. Despite
the noblest of reasons, the Rules of Court may not
be ignored at will and at random to the prejudice
of the rights of another. Rules of procedure are
intended to ensure the orderly administration of
justice and the protection of substantive rights in
judicial and extrajudicial proceedings. In this
case, the reason of Judge Canoy is hardly
persuasive enough to disregard the Rules (Pantilo
III v. Canoy, A.M. No. RTJ-11-2262, February 9,
2011).
RULE 2.02, CANON 2
A judge should not seek publicity for personal
vainglory.
RULE 2.03, CANON 2
A judge shall not allow family, social, or other
relationships to influence judicial conduct or
judgment. The prestige of judicial office shall
not be used or lent to advance the private
interests of others, nor convey or permit
others to convey the impression that they are
in special position to influence the judge.
Q: Judge Belen filed a complaint for Estafa
against complainant’s father. Judge Belen
started harassing and threatening the
complainant by filing of several cases against
the latter. He also wrote using his personal
stationery several letters addressed to certain
local government authorities and employees
requesting information on complainant’s
piggery and poultry business and advising
them of the alleged violations by the
complainant of the National Building Code
and certain environmental laws. An
administrative complaint was filed against the
judge for violation of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct. Is the judge liable?
A: YES. While the use of the title is an official
designation as well as an honor that an
incumbent has earned, a line still has to be drawn
based on the circumstances of the use of the
appellation. While the title can be used for social
 JUDICIAL ETHICS
and other identification purposes, it cannot be
used with the intent to use the prestige of his
judicial office to gainfully advance his personal,
family or other pecuniary interests. Nor can the
prestige of a judicial office be used or lent to
advance the private interests of others, or to
convey or permit others to convey the impression
that they are in a special position to influence the
judge. To do any of these is to cross into the
prohibited field of impropriety (Belen v. Belen,
A.M. No. RTJ-08-2139, August 9, 2010).
Q: Benoncillo claims that the judge called her
and her counsel to a meeting in his chambers.
They agreed to the meeting but they did not
proceed when they learned that the
intervenors were joining them. Subsequent to
the judge’s meeting with the intervenors, he
issued an Order which rescinded his previous
Order. Thereafter, he denied the
complainant’s motion for reconsideration.
In his Comment, the judge claimed that the
complainant was motivated by her “insatiable
greed to have exclusive control and
possession pending trial of the case of all the
properties of the Underworld Divers Panglao,
Inc. of Paul John Belot.” He added that the
“complainant is only a live-in partner of Belot
with no specific address which was branded
repeatedly by Belot as a ‘prostitute’ and ‘only
after his money.’ He also averred that the
complainant “masterminded all the legal
manipulations to get possession of Belot.’ Is
he administratively liable?
A: YES. First, the respondent judge acted
inappropriately in calling the complainant and
the intervenors to a meeting inside his chambers.
This act of respondent judge would logically
create an impression to complainant that the
meeting of the judge with the intervenors had
turned his views around towards issuing a
revocation of the October 2, 2007 Order.
Moreover, respondent judge used derogatory and
irrelevant language in relation to the
complainant. His comments besmirched the
character of complainant and his accusations are
unfair and unwarranted. His depiction of
complainant is also inconsistent with the
Temporary Protection Order he issued in her
favor as a victim of domestic violence. Verily,
Judge Amila should be more circumspect in his
language (Benancillo v. Judge Amila, A.M. No. RTJ-
082149, March 9, 2011).
153
RULE 2.04, CANON 2
A judge should refrain from influencing in
any manner the outcome of litigation or
dispute pending before another court or
administrative agency.
ADJUDICATIVE RESPONSIBILITIES
CANON 3
A JUDGE SHOULD PERFOM OFFICIAL
DUTIES HONESTLY, AND WITH
IMPARTIALITY AND DILIGENCE.
RULE 3.01, CANON 3
A judge shall be faithful to the law and
maintain professional competence.
A judge may not be administratively sanctioned
from mere errors of judgment in the absence of
showing of any bad faith, fraud, malice, gross
ignorance, corrupt purpose, or a deliberate intent
to do an injustice on his or her part. Judicial
officers cannot be subjected to administrative
disciplinary actions for their performance of duty
in good faith. (Atoc v. Camello et al., I.P.I. No. 16-
241-CA-J, November 29, 2016)
Indeed, while a judge may not be held liable for
gross ignorance of the law for every erroneous
order that he renders, this does not mean that a
judge need not observe due care in the
performance of his/her official functions. When a
basic principle of law is involved and when an
error is so gross and patent, error can produce an
inference of bad faith, making the judge liable for
gross ignorance of the law. (Lorenzana v. Judge
Austria, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2200, April 2, 2014)
Q: Conquilla was charged with Direct Assault
after respondent Judge B conducted a
preliminary investigation and found probable
cause to hold the complainant for trial for the
said crime. Complainant then filed an
administrative complaint, alleging that under
A.M. No. 05-08-[2]6-SC, first level court judges
no longer have the authority to conduct
preliminary investigations. Is the respondent
judge guilty of gross ignorance of the law?
A: YES. When a law or a rule is basic, judges owe
it to their office to simply apply the law. Anything
less is gross ignorance of the law. Judges should
exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
 Legal Ethics
with the statutes and procedural rules, and
should be diligent in keeping abreast with
developments in law and jurisprudence.
It was, therefore, incumbent upon respondent
judge to forward the records of the case to the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for
preliminary investigation, instead of conducting
the preliminary investigation himself, upon
amendment of the law stripping the power of first
level court judges to conduct preliminary
investigation (Conquilla v. Bernando, A.M. No.MTJ-
09-1737, February 9, 2011).
RULE 3.02, CANON 3
In every case, a judge shall endeavor diligently
to ascertain the facts and the applicable law
unswayed by partisan interests, public opinion
or fear of criticism.
A judge is expected to decide cases only on the
basis of the applicable law on the matter, not on
any other extraneous factors, such as public
opinion, personal convictions and partisan
interests (Lapena, 2009). )
RULE 3.03, CANON 3
A judge shall maintain order and proper
decorum in the court.
RULE 3.04, CANON 3
A judge should be patient, attentive, and
courteous to lawyers, especially the
inexperienced, to litigants, witnesses, and
others appearing before the court.
A judge should avoid unconsciously falling
into the attitude of mind that the litigants are
made for the courts, instead of the courts for
the litigants.
Q: How would you characterize the
relationship between the judge and a lawyer?
Explain. (1996 Bar)
A: The Code of Professional Responsibility
requires lawyers to observe and maintain respect
for judicial officers (Canon 11, CPR). On the other
hand, the Code of Judicial Conduct requires
judges to be patient, attentive and courteous to
lawyers (Rule 3.03, CJC). In a word, lawyers and
judges owe each other mutual respect and
courtesy.
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RULE 3.05, CANON 3
A judge shall dispose of the court’s business
promptly and decide cases within the required
periods.
Article VIII, Section 15(1) of the 1987
Constitution mandates lower court judges to
decide a case within the reglementary period of
90 days. The Code of Judicial Conduct under Rule
3.05 of Canon 3 likewise enunciates that judges
should administer justice without delay and
directs every judge to dispose of the court’s
business promptly within the period prescribed
by law. Rules prescribing the time within which
certain acts must be done are indispensable to
prevent needless delays in the orderly and
speedy disposition of cases. Thus, the 90-day
period is mandatory. (Re: Cases Submitted for
Decision Before Hon. Teresito A. Andoy, A.M. No.
09-9-163-MTC, May 6, 2010)
Prompt disposition of cases is attained basically
through the efficiency and dedication to duty of
judges. If judges do not possess those traits, delay
in the disposition of cases is inevitable to the
prejudice of the litigants. Accordingly, judges
should be imbued with a high sense of duty and
responsibility in the discharge of their obligation
to administer justice promptly (Garado v.
Gutierrez-Torres, A.M. No. MTJ-11-1778, June 5,
2013).
Justice delayed is often justice denied, and delay
in the disposition of the cases erodes the faith and
confidence of the people in the judiciary, lowers
its standard and brings it into disrepute.
Q: The present administrative matter arose
from the judicial audit conducted on Br. 20 of
the RTC of CDO then presided by Judge
Macabaya. The audit team found that out of
the 573 cases examined by it (1) 69 cases
were submitted for decision but have yet to be
decided despite the lapse of the 90-day
period; (2) 33 cases with pending incidents
were not yet resolved despite the lapse of the
reglementary period to resolve them; and (3)
155 cases were dormant and unacted upon for
a considerable length of time. Is Judge
Macabaya guilty of gross misconduct?
A: YES. The office of the judge exacts nothing less
than faithful observance of the Constitution and
the law in the discharge of official duties. Section
15 (1), Article VIII of the Constitution mandates
 JUDICIAL ETHICS
that cases or matters filed with the lower courts
must be decided or resolved within three months
from the date they are submitted for decision or
resolution. Moreover, Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct directs judges to
'dispose of the court's business promptly and
decide cases within the required periods.' Judges
must closely adhere to the Code of Judicial
Conduct in order to preserve the integrity,
competence, and independence of the judiciary
and make the administration of justice more
efficient. Failure to decide cases within the
reglementary period, without strong and
justifiable reason, constitutes gross inefficiency
warranting the imposition of administrative
sanction on the defaulting judge (Re: Judicial
Audit Conducted in the RTC, Branch 20, Cagayan
De Oro City, Misamis Oriental, A.M. No. 14-11-350-
RTC, Dec. 5, 2017).
RULE 3.06, CANON 3
While a judge may, to promote justice, prevent
waste of time or clear up some obscurity,
properly intervene in the presentation of
evidence during the trial, it should always be
borne in mind that undue interference may
prevent the proper presentation of the cause
or the ascertainment of truth.
RULE 3.07, CANON 3
A judge should abstain from making public
comments on any pending or impending case
and should require similar restraint on the
part of court personnel.
ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSIBILITIES
RULE 3.08, CANON 3
A judge should diligently discharge
administrative responsibilities, maintain
professional competence in court
management, and facilitate the performance
of the administrative functions or other
judges and court personnel.
RULE 3.09, CANON 3
A judge should organize and supervise the
court personnel to ensure the prompt and
efficient dispatch of business, and require at
all times the observance of high standards
of public service and fidelity.
RULE 3.10, CANON 3
155
A judge should take or initiate appropriate
disciplinary measures against lawyers or
court personnel for unprofessional conduct
of which the judge may have become aware.
RULE 3.11, CANON 3
A judge should appoint commissioners,
receivers, trustees, guardians,
administrators and others strictly on the
basis of merit and qualifications, avoiding
nepotism, and favoritism. Unless otherwise
allowed by law, the same criteria should be
observed in recommending appointment of
court personnel. Where the payment of
compensation is allowed, it should be
reasonable and commensurate with the fair
value of services rendered.
DISQUALIFICATION
Q: In a hearing before the Court of Tax
Appeals, Atty. G was invited to appear as
amicus curiae. One of the Judges hearing the
tax case is the father of Atty. G. The counsel for
the respondent moved for the inhibition of the
judge in view of the father-son relationship. Is
there merit to the motion? Decide. (1996 Bar)
A: NO, there is no merit to the motion. Rule 3.12
of the CJC provides that “a judge should take no
part where the judge’s impartiality might
reasonably be questioned. Among the instances
for the disqualification of a judge is that he is
related to a party litigant within the sixth degree
or to counsel within the fourth degree of
consanguinity or affinity. But this refers to
counsel of the parties. As amicus, he represents
no party to the case. There is, therefore, no
ground to fear the loss of the judge’s impartiality
in this case if his son is appointed amicus curiae.
NOTE: A judge’s close friendship with a person
who is a party to his case does not render
him/her guilty of violating any canon of judicial
ethics as long as his friendly relations did not
influence his official conduct as a judge.
However, it would have been more prudent if
the judge concerned avoided hearing the cases
where his friend was a party because their
close friendship could reasonably tend to raise
suspicion that the former’s social relationship
would be an element in his determination of
the case.
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
 Legal Ethics
RULE 3.12, CANON 3
A judge should take no part in a proceeding
where the judge’s impartiality might
reasonably be questioned.
These cases include among others,
proceedings where:
a. The judge has personal knowledge of
disputed evidentiary facts concerning
the proceeding;
b. The judge served as executor,
administrator, guardian, trustee or
lawyer in the case or matter in
controversy, or a former associate of the
judge served as counsel during their
association, or the judge or lawyer was a
material witness therein;
c. The judge’s ruling in a lower court is
the subject of review;
d. The judge is related by consanguinity
or affinity to a party litigant within the
sixth degree or to counsel within the
fourth degree;
e. The judge knows the judge’s spouse or
child has a financial interest, as heir,
legatee, creditor, fiduciary, or otherwise,
in the subject matter in controversy or in
a party to the proceeding,
f. Any other interest that could be
substantially affected by the outcome of
the proceeding.
In every instance, the judge shall indicate
the legal reason for inhibition.
NOTE: A motion for inhibition cannot be granted
on mere imputation of bias or partiality. It must
be for just and valid reasons (Rodica v. Atty.
Lazaro, A.C. No. 9259, March 13, 2013.
REMITTAL OF DISQUALIFICATION
RULE 3.13, CANON 3
A judge disqualified by the terms of Rule 3.12
may, instead of withdrawing from the
proceeding, disclose on the record the basis of
disqualification.
If, based on such disclosure the parties and
lawyers independently of the judge’s
participation, all agree in writing that the
reason for the inhibition is immaterial or
insubstantial, the judge may then participate in
the proceeding.
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The agreement, signed by the parties, shall be
incorporated in the record of the proceeding.
CANON 4
A JUDGE MAY, WITH DUE REGARD TO
OFFICIAL DUTIES, ENGAGE IN ACTIVITIES
TO IMPROVE THE LAW, THE LEGAL
SYSTEM AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF
RULE 4.01, CANON 4
A judge may, to the extent that the following
activities do not impair the performance of
judicial duties or cast doubt on the judge’s
impartiality:
a. Speak, write, lecture, teach of participate
in activities concerning the law, the legal
system and the administration of justice;
b. Appear at a public hearing before a
legislative or executive body on matters
concerning the law, the legal system or the
administration of justice and otherwise
consult with them on matters concerning the
administration of justice;
c. Serve on any organization devoted to the
improvement of the law, the legal system or
the administration of justice.
Q: Judge Cristina has many law-related
activities. She teaches law and delivers
lectures on law. Some people in the
government consult her on their legal
problems. She also serves as director of a
stock corporation devoted to penal reform,
where she participates in both fund raising
and fund management. Which of the aforesaid
activities is she allowed to do? (2011 Bar)
A: She can teach and deliver lectures on law (Sec.
10(a) Canon 4 New Code of Judicial Conduct) but
she cannot give legal advice since it is considered
as practice of law to which judges are prohibited
to do (Sec. 11 Canon 4, New Code of Judicial
Conduct). Also, she cannot serve as director of a
stock corporation since the same is incompatible
with the diligent discharge of judicial duties. (Sec.
7 Canon 6, New Code of Judicial Conduct) She can
be a director of her Family Corporation but not
part of the management.
 JUDICIAL ETHICS
CANON 5,
A JUDGE SHOULD REGULATE
EXTRAJUDICIAL ACTIVITIES TO
MINIMIZE THE RISK OF CONFLICT WITH
JUDICIAL DUTIES.
(1995, 1997, 1999, 2000, 2002 Bar)
Advocational, Civil and Charitable Activities
RULE 5.01, CANON 5
A judge may engage in the following activities
provided that they do not interfere with the
performance of judicial duties or detract from
dignity of the court:
1. Write, teach and speak on non-legal subjects;
2. Engage in the arts, sports, and other special
recreational activities;
3. Participate in civic and charitable activities;
4. Serve as an officer, director, trustee, or non-
legal advisor of non-profit or non-political,
educational, religious, charitable, fraternal, or
civic organization.
FINANCIAL ACTIVITIES
RULE 5.02, CANON 5
A judge shall refrain from financial and
business dealings that tend to reflect adversely
on the court’s impartiality, interfere with the
proper performance of judicial activities or
increase involvement with lawyers or persons
likely to come before the court.
A judge should so manage investments and
other financial interests as to minimize the
number of cases giving grounds for
disqualifications.
Rule regarding financial activities
A judge shall refrain from financial and business
dealings that tend to:
1. Reflect adversely on the court’s impartiality;
2. Interfere with the proper performance of
judicial activities; or
3. Increase involvement with lawyers or
persons likely to come before the court. [Rule
5.02, Canon 5, Code of Judicial Conduct (1989)]
By allowing himself to act as agent in the sale of
the subject property, respondent judge has
increased the possibility of his disqualification to
act as an impartial judge in the event that a
157
dispute involving the said contract of sale arises.
Also, the possibility that the parties to the sale
might plead before his court is not remote and his
business dealings with them might not only
create suspicion as to his fairness but also to his
ability to render it in a manner that is free from
any suspicion as to its fairness and impartiality,
and also as to the judge’s integrity (Alloro vs.
Judge Barte, A.M. No. MTJ-02-1443, July 31, 2002).
NOTE: A judge shall make full financial disclosure
as required by law. [Rule 5.08, Canon 5, Code of
Judicial Conduct (1989)]
RULE 5.03, CANON 5
Subject to the provisions of the proceeding
rule, a judge may hold and manage
investments but should not serve as officer,
director, manager or advisor, or employee of
any business except as director of a family
business of the judge.
Rule on judges having investments
GR: A judge may hold and manage investments
but should not serve as:
1. An officer
2. Director
3. Manager
4. Advisor
5. Employee of any business
XPN: As director of a family business of the judge.
(Rule 5.03, Canon 5, Code of Judicial Conduct
(1989))
RULE 5.04, CANON 5
A judge or any immediate member of the
family shall not accept a gift, bequest,
factor or loan from anyone except as may
be allowed by law.
Prohibited Activities of Judges
a. Accept a gift, bequest, factor or loan from
anyone except as may be allowed by law
(Rule 5.04)
b. Engage in the private practice of law (Rule
5.07)
c. Accept appointment or designation to any
agency performing quasi-judicial or
administrative functions (Rule 5.09)
d. Make political speeches, contribute to
party funds, publicly endorse candidates
for political office or participate in other
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
 Legal Ethics
partisan political activities [Rule 5.02,
Canon 5, Code of Judicial Conduct (1989)]
NEW CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
INDEPENDENCE
CANON 1
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IS A PRE-
REQUISITE TO THE RULE OF LAW AND A
FUNDAMENTAL GUARANTEE OF A FAIR
TRIAL.
A JUDGE SHALL, THEREFORE, UPHOLD
AND EXEMPLIFY JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
IN BOTH ITS INDIVIDUAL AND
INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS.
Judicial Independence
An independent Judiciary is one free from
inappropriate outside influence.
Individual Judicial Independence focuses on each
particular case and seeks to insure the ability of
the judge to decide cases with autonomy and
within the constraints of the law while
Institutional Judicial Independence focuses on the
independence of the judiciary as a branch of the
government and protects judges as a class (In the
Matter of the Allegations Contained in the Columns
of Mr. Amado P. Macasaet Published in Malaya
dated September 18, 19, 20 and 21, 2007).
NOTE: The treatment of independence as a single
Canon is the primary difference between the new
Canon 1 and the Canon 1 of the 1989 Code.
SECTION 1, CANON 1, NCJC
Judges shall exercise the judicial function
independently on the basis of their assessment
of the facts and in accordance with a
conscientious understanding of the law, free of
any extraneous influence, inducement,
pressure, threat or interference, direct or
indirect, from any quarter or for any reason.
Judges should inspire public confidence in the
judiciary which can be attained only if judges are
perceived by the public to be fair, honest,
competent, principled, dignified and honorable.
Accordingly, the first duty of judges is to conduct
themselves at all times in a manner that is beyond
reproach.
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Judges must reject pressure by maintaining
independence from, but not limited to the
following:
1. Independence from public officials – the
public laid their confidence on the fact that
the official is mentally and morally fit to pass
upon the merits of their varied intentions.
2. Independence from government as a
whole– avoid inappropriate connections, as
well as any situation that would give rise to
the impression of the existence of such
inappropriate connections.
3. Independence from family, social, or other
relationships– avoid sitting in litigation
where a near relative is a part of or counsel;
be independent from judicial colleagues (Sec.
2) and avoid such actions as may reasonably
tend to wake the suspicion that his social or
business relations constitute an element in
determining his judicial course.
4. Independence from public opinion– the
only guide of the official is the mandate of
law.
Q: In a civil case submitted for a decision,
Judge Corpuz-Macandog acted based on a
telephone call from a government official
telling her to decide the case in favor of the
defendant, otherwise she will be removed.
The judge explained that she did so under
pressure considering that the country was
under a revolutionary government at that
time. Did the judge commit an act of
misconduct?
A: YES. A judge must decide a case based on its
merits. For this reason, a judge is expected to be
fearless in the pursuit to render justice, to be
unafraid to displease any person, interest or
power, and to be equipped with a moral fiber
strong enough to resist temptation lurking in her
office. Here, it is improper for a judge to have
decided a case based only on a directive from a
government official and not on the judge’s own
ascertainment of facts and applicable law
(Ramirez v. Corpuz-Macandog, A.M. No. R-351-RTJ,
September 26, 1986).
Q: Mayor C was shot by B, the bodyguard of
Mayor D, inside the court room of Judge
Dabalos. Consequently, an information with
no bail recommendation was filed against B
and D. The murder case was then scheduled
 JUDICIAL ETHICS
for raffle but before the scheduled date, the
son of Mayor C together with their counsel,
Atty. Libarios, and other sympathizers staged
a rally demanding immediate arrest of the
accused. Judge Dabalos then issued an order
without prior hearing directing the issuance
of a warrant of arrest against the accused. Did
the judge commit an act of misconduct?
A: YES. The judge should not issue warrant of
arrest without personally evaluating the
resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting
evidence to establish judicial probable cause
(Sec.6, Rule 112, RRC). A judge in every case
should endeavor diligently to ascertain the facts
and the applicable law unswayed by partisan or
personal interests, public opinion or fear of
criticism. Here, the judge should not have allowed
himself to be swayed into issuing a warrant of
arrest (Libarios v. Dabalos A.M. No.RTJ-89-286,
July 11, 1991).
SEC. 2, CANON 1, NCJC
In performing judicial duties, judges shall be
independent from judicial colleagues in respect
of decisions which the judge is obliged to make
independently.
Degree of independence
The highest degree of independence is required
of judges. He must be independent in decision-
making. He cannot consult with staff and court
officials. However, he can ask colleagues purely
academic or hypothetical questions but not to the
extent of asking them to decide a case.
Every judge must decide independently, even in
collegial court. While there may be discussions
and exchange of ideas among judges, the judge
must decide on the basis of his own, sole,
judgment (Funa, 2009).
NOTE: It is every judge’s duty to respect the
individual independence of fellow judges.
SEC. 3, CANON 1, NCJC
Judges shall refrain from influencing in any
manner the outcome of litigation or dispute
pending before another court or
administrative agency.
Principle of Subjudice
159
A judge is prohibited from making public
statements in the media regarding a pending case
so as not to arouse public opinion for or against a
party. (2007 Bar)
This section affirms that a judge’s restraint from
exerting influence over other judicial or quasi-
judicial bodies is required for more than just
propriety.
Any attempt, whether successful or not, to
influence the decision-making process of another
judge, especially one who is of lower rank and
over whom a judge exercises supervisory
authority constitutes serious misconduct.
SEC. 4, CANON 1, NCJC
Judges shall not allow family, social, or other
relationships to influence judicial conduct or
judgment.
The prestige of judicial office shall not be used
or lent to advance the private interests of
others, nor convey or permit others to convey
the impression that they are in a special
position to influence the judge.
Purpose of Sec. 4, Canon 1 of NCJC
It is intended to ensure that judges are spared
from potential influence of family members by
disqualifying them even before any opportunity
for impropriety presents itself.
The term “judge’s family” includes:
1. Judge’s spouse
2. Son/s
3. Daughter/s
4. Son/s-in-law
5. Daughter/s-in-law
6. Other relatives by consanguinity or affinity
within the sixth civil degree, or
7. Any person who is a companion or employee
of the judge and who lives in the judge’s
household. (NCJC of the Philippine Judiciary-
Annotated, February 2007)
When the judge is related to one of the parties
within the sixth degree of consanguinity or
affinity, a judge’s disqualification to sit in a
case is mandatory.
NOTE: Judges should ensure that their family
members, friends and associates refrain from
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
 Legal Ethics
creating the impression that they are in a position
to influence the judge. Judges should, therefore, at
all times remind themselves that they are not in
the judiciary to give out favors but to dispense
justice. They should also make it clear to the
members of their family, friends and associates
that they will neither be influenced by anyone,
nor would they allow anyone to interfere in their
work.
SEC. 5, CANON 1, NCJC
Judges shall not only be free from
inappropriate connections with, and influence
by, the executive and legislative branches of
government, but must also appear to be free
therefrom to a reasonable observer.
This section affirms the independence of the
judiciary from the two other branches of
government.
NOTE: Judicial independence is the reason for
leaving exclusively to the Court the authority to
deal with internal personnel issues, even if the
court employees in question are funded by the
local government (Bagatsing v. Herrera, G.R. No.
L-34952, July 25, 1975).
Q: Several employees of the city government
of Quezon City were appointed and assigned
at the office of the Clerk of Court-MeTC QC to
assist the organic staff of the judiciary.
However, the executive judge of MeTC QC, in
view of a reorganization plan, returned those
employees to different offices of QC
government saying that the court was already
overstaffed. The judge also requested the QC
Mayor to re-employ the laid off employees.
Did the judge commit any improper conduct?
A: YES. An executive judge has no authority to
cause the transfer of court employees as the
jurisdiction to do so is lodged solely upon the SC
through the Office of the Court Administrator.
This is so because of the need to maintain judicial
independence. Moreover, a judge shall be free
from inappropriate connections with and
influence from the executive and legislative
branch. Here, the judge did not act independently
of the LGU when she asked the Mayor of QC to re-
employ the displaced employees instead of
informing the SC through the OCA of the need to
streamline her court of its personal needs
(Alfonso v. Alonzo-Legasto, A.M. No. MTJ 94-995,
September 5, 2002).
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Q: Judges of the first and second level courts
are allowed to receive assistance from the
local government units where they are
stationed. This assistance could be in the form
of equipment or allowance. Justices at the
Court of Appeals in the regional stations in the
Visayas and Mindanao are not necessarily
residents thereof, hence, they incur additional
expenses for their accommodations. Pass on
the propriety of the justices' receipt of
assistance/allowance from the local
governments. (2010 Bar)
A: Section 5, Cannon 1 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine judiciary provides that
Judges shall be free from inappropriate
connections with, and influence by, the executive
branch, and must appear to be free therefrom to a
reasonable extent. It is a common perception that
the receipt of allowances or assistance from a
local government unit may affect the judge's
ability to rule independently in cases involving
the said unit.
SEC. 6, CANON 1, NCJC
Judges shall be independent in relation to
society in general and in relation to the
particular parties to a dispute which he or she
has to adjudicate.
The act of a judge in meeting with litigants
outside the office premises beyond office hours
violate the standard of judicial conduct required
to be observed by members of the Bench (Tan v.
Judge Rosete, A.M. No. MTJ-04-1563, September 8,
2004).
It is desirable that the judge should, as far as
reasonably possible, refrain from all relations
which would normally tend to arouse suspicion
that such relations warp or bias his judgment,
and prevent an impartial attitude of minds in the
administration of judicial duties. Judges should
not fraternize with litigants and their counsel;
they should make a conscious effort to avoid
them in order to avoid the perception that their
independence has been compromised (Ibid.).
SEC. 7, CANON 1, NCJC
Judges shall encourage and uphold safeguards
for the discharge of judicial duties in order to
maintain and enhance the institutional and
operational independence of the judiciary.
 JUDICIAL ETHICS
SEC. 8, CANON 1, NCJC
Judges shall exhibit and promote high
standards of judicial conduct in order to
reinforce public confidence in the judiciary,
which is fundamental to the maintenance of
judicial independence.
NOTE: Sections 7 and 8 of Canon 1 are intended
to serve as catch-all provisions for all other acts
that would guarantee the independence of the
judiciary.
There can be no sure guarantee of judicial
independence than the character of those
appointed to the Bench.
Judges must remain conscious of their character
and reputation as judges and should avoid
anything which will not dignify their public
positions and demean the institution to which
they belong, in whatever atmosphere or
environment they may happen to be.
Q: Palma and Mercado sent e-mails to
Supreme Court regarding an alleged marriage
scams in Davao City—among which is the
matrimony of a certain Echeverria. According
to Echeverria, his marriage was solemnized
by Judge Omelio in his house and as proof,
Echeverria presented pictures of his wedding.
However, in the marriage certificate, the
solemnizing officer was Judge Murcia and the
same was done in Island Garden, City of
Samal. Judge Omelio explained that he was
merely invited to a dinner and the
Echeverrias requested him to reenact the
wedding for the purpose of picture taking;
while Judge Murcia claimed that he
solemnized the subject marriage on February
28, 2008 at about 5:30 in the afternoon in his
courtroom and that the contracting parties, as
well as their witnesses, appeared before him.
Are Judge Omelio and Judge Murcia
administratively liable?
A:YES, they are liable. Judge Murcia affixed his
signature in the Marriage Contract of Julius and
Khristine Echeverria without actually
solemnizing their marriage. Judge Murcia's claim
that the contracting parties personally appeared
before him was belied by the groom himself.
Meanwhile, Judge Omelio's contention that he
merely re-enacted the wedding ceremony upon
the request of the groom's parents was similarly
debunked by Echeverria’s admission that it was
actually Judge Omelio who solemnized his
marriage at his home in Davao City. Besides, his
161
defense of reenactment would not justify his
infraction. As a duly-authorized solemnizing
officer, Judge Omelio is expected to know that
marriage should not be trifled with, and its
sanctity and inviolability should never be
undermined, especially by such a lame ground as
picture-taking (Ms. Palma etc. v. Judge Omelio,
A.M. No. RTJ-10-2223, August 30, 2017).
INTEGRITY
CANON 2
INTEGRITY IS ESSENTIAL NOT ONLY TO THE
PROPER DISCHARGE OF THE JUDICIAL
OFFICE, BUT ALSO TO THE PERSONAL
DEMEANOR OF JUDGES.
A judge should act with integrity and behave with
integrity at all times so as to promote public
confidence in the integrity of the judiciary.
The integrity of the judiciary rests not only upon
the fact that it is able to administer justice but
also upon the perception and confidence of the
community that people who run the system have
done justice. Justice must not be merely done but
must also be seen to be done (Panaligan v. Judge
Ibay, A.M. No. TJ-06-1972, June 21, 2006).
By the very nature of the bench, judges, more
than the average man, are required to observe an
exacting standard of morality and decency. The
character of a judge is perceived by the people
not only through his official acts but also through
his private morals as reflected in his external
behavior. It is therefore paramount that a judge’s
personal behavior both in the performance of his
duties and his daily life, be free from the
appearance of impropriety as to be beyond
reproach. (De la Cruz v. Judge Bersamira, A.M. No.
RTJ-00-1567. January 19, 2001)
NOTE: Under the 1989 Code, the values of
INTEGRITY and INDEPENDENCE were grouped
together, but the New Code of Judicial Conduct
separated them to emphasize the need to
maintain a life of PERSONAL and PROFESSIONAL
INTEGRITY in order to properly carry out their
judicial functions.
Presumption regarding judges
Judges are presumed honest and men of integrity,
unless proven otherwise.
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
 Legal Ethics
SECTION 1, CANON 2, NCJC
Judges shall ensure that not only is their
conduct above reproach, but that it is
perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable
observer.
The maintenance of the court’s integrity is not
the sole duty of the judge. It is also the duty of
court personnel to see to it that its integrity is
unblemished.
NOTE: A judge’s personal behavior, both in the
performance of his duties and in his daily life,
must be free from any appearance of impropriety
as to be beyond reproach.
Q: Justice B of the CA was a former RTC Judge.
A case which he heard as a trial judge was
raffled off to him. The appellant sought his
disqualification from the case but he refused
on the ground that he was not the judge who
decided the case as he was already promoted
to the appellate court before he could decide
the case. Was the refusal of Justice B to recuse
from the case proper? (2014 Bar)
A: Justice B's refusal to recuse is not proper. After
hearing the evidence during the trial when he
was still a judge, he has personal knowledge of
the disputed evidentiary facts concerning the
proceedings. The standard under the New Code of
Judicial Conduct on the inability of Justice B to
decide the matter impartially is not in him but the
appearance of the disqualification of Justice D to a
reasonable observer that he is unable to decide
the matter impartially. The conduct of a
judge/justice should not only be above reproach
but it should be also perceived to be so in the
view of a reasonable observer (Canon 2, Integrity,
New Code of Judicial Conduct).
Q: Judge Ferdinand Marcos of RTC Cebu is
married to Rotilla with whom he begot 2
children. However, during a Fun Run
sponsored by Philippine Judges Association
(PJA), Judge Marcos appeared with a woman
other than his wife whom he even introduced
to Justice Davide as his living partner. Should
the judge be disciplined?
A: YES. The Code of Judicial Conduct requires a
judge to be the embodiment of integrity, and to
avoid appearance of impropriety in all activities.
Here, Judge Marcos’ conduct of flaunting his
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
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mistress is a conduct unbecoming of a judge. By
living with a woman other than his legal wife,
Judge Marcos has demonstrated himself to be
wanting in integrity, thus, unfit to remain in office
and continue discharging the functions of a judge
(Re: Complaint of Mrs. Rotilla A. Marcos and Her
Children against Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos, RTC,
Br. 20, Cebu City, A.M. No. 97-2-53 RTC, July 6,
2001).
Judges must always wear their robes at
hearings
A judge must take care not only to remain true to
the high ideals of competence and integrity his
robe represents, but also that he wears one in the
first place (Chan v. Majaducan A.M. No. RTJ-02-
1697, October 15, 2003).
Q: After being diagnosed with stress
dermatitis, Judge Rosalind, without seeking
permission from the Supreme Court, refused
to wear her robe during court proceedings.
When her attention was called, she explained
that whenever she wears her robe she is
reminded of her heavy caseload, thus making
her tense. This, in turn, triggers the outbreak
of skin rashes. Is Judge Rosalind justified in
not wearing her judicial robe? Explain. (2009
Bar)
A: Judge Rosalind is not justified. In Chan v.
Majaducon, the Supreme Court emphasized that
the wearing of robes of judges as required by
Admin. Circular No. 25, dated June 9, 1989, serves
the dual purpose of heightening public
consciousness on the solemnity of judicial
proceedings and in impressing upon the judge the
exacting obligations of his office. The robe is part
of the judge’s appearance and is as important as a
gavel. The Supreme Court added while
circumstances, such as medical condition claimed
by the respondent judge, may exempt one from
complying with AC No. 25, the judge must first
secure the Court’s permission for such
exemption.
SEC. 2, CANON 2, NCJC
The behavior and conduct of judges must
reaffirm the people’s faith in the integrity of
the Judiciary.
 JUDICIAL ETHICS
Justice must not merely be done, but must
also be seen to be done.
A judge has the duty to not only render a just and
impartial decision, but also render it in such a
manner as to be free from any suspicion as to its
fairness and impartiality, and also as to the
judge’s integrity. While judges should possess
proficiency in law in order that they can
completely construe and enforce the law, it is
more important that they should act and behave
in such a manner that the parties before them
should have confidence in their impartiality
(Sibayan-Joaquin v. Javellana, A.M. No. RTJ-00-
1601, November 13, 2001).
In pending or prospective litigations before them,
judges should be scrupulously careful to avoid
anything that may tend to awaken the suspicion
that their personal, social or sundry relations
could influence their objectivity.
Q: Justice Mariano Del Castillo was charged
with plagiarism, twisting of cited materials,
and gross neglect in connection with the
decision he wrote for the court in Vinuya v.
Romulo. Petitioners, members of the Malaya
Lolas Organization, seek reconsideration of
the decision of the Court dated October 12,
2010 that dismissed the said complaint.
Petitioners claim that the Court has by its
decision legalized or approved of the
commission of plagiarism in the Philippines.
Should the respondent justice be held guilty
for plagiarism?
A: NO. A judge writing to resolve a dispute,
whether trial or appellate, is exempted from a
charge of plagiarism even if ideas, words or
phrases from a law review article, novel thoughts
published in a legal periodical or language from a
party’s brief are used without giving attribution.
Thus, judges are free to use whatever sources
they deem appropriate to resolve the matter
before them, without fear of reprisal. This
exemption applies to judicial writings intended to
decide cases for two reasons: the judge is not
writing a literary work and, more importantly,
the purpose of the writing is to resolve a
dispute. As a result, judges adjudicating cases are
not subject to a claim of legal plagiarism (In re:
charges A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC of the plagiarism
etc., against Associate Justice Mariano C. Del
Castillo, Feb 8, 2011)
163
SEC. 3, CANON 2, NCJC
Judges should take or initiate appropriate
disciplinary measures against lawyers or
court personnel for unprofessional conduct of
which the judge may have become aware.
A judge may summarily punish any person
including lawyers and court personnel, for direct
contempt for misbehavior committed in the
presence of or so near a court or a judge as to
obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the
same (Rule 71, RRC).
He may also punish any person for indirect
contempt after appropriate charge and hearing,
for acts enumerated under Section 3, Rule 71 of
the Rules of Court.
Judge’s duty with respect to court employees
A judge should constantly keep a watchful eye on
the conduct of his employees. His constant
scrutiny of the behavior of his employees would
deter any abuse on the part of the latter in the
exercise of their duties (Buenaventura v.
Benedicto, A.C. No. 137-5, March 27, 1971).
A judge cannot dismiss court personnel. The
power to dismiss a court employee is vested in
the Supreme Court (Dailay-Papa v. Almora, A.M.
Nos. 543-MC and 1525-MJ, December 19, 1981).
NOTE: Judges should not be lenient in the
administrative supervision of employees. As an
administrator, the judge must ensure that all
court personnel perform efficiently and promptly
in the administration of justice. (Ramirez v.
Corpuz-Macandog, A.M. No. R-351-RTJ, September
26, 1986)
All court personnel, from the lowliest employees
to the clerks of court, are involved in the
dispensation of justice like judges and justices,
and parties seeking redress from the courts for
grievances look upon them also as part of the
judiciary. In performing their duties and
responsibilities, court personnel serve as
sentinels of justice, that any act of impropriety
they commit immeasurably affects the honor and
dignity of the judiciary and the people's
confidence in the judiciary. They are, therefore,
expected to act and behave in a manner that
should uphold the honor and dignity of the
judiciary, if only to maintain the people’s
confidence in the judiciary (Guerrero v.Ong, A.M.
No. P-09-2676, December 16, 2009).
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
 Legal Ethics
Q: While Judge Tuparin was in his chambers
dictating an order to a stenographer, two
lawyers who were in the courtroom waiting
for the start of the session almost came to
blows as a result of a heated argument.
Tuparin came out of his chambers and after
identifying the lawyers involved in the
commotion promptly declared them in
contempt of court. Was the action of Judge
Tuparin proper?
A: NO. The act committed by the two lawyers was
indirect contempt violative of the rule punishing
“any improper conduct tending directly or
indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the
administration of justice”, since the judge was
then engaged in dictating an order before the
morning session was called. The act of the two
lawyers constituted obstruction of the
administration of justice, which was indirect
contempt. Accordingly, they could only be
punished after notice and hearing.
Q: A complaint against Judge Melo was filed
for violating the NCJC and for gross ignorance
of the law. It was alleged that he solemnized
marriages without the required marriage
license. He instead notarized affidavits of
cohabitation and issued them to the
contracting parties. He notarized these
affidavits on the day of the parties’ marriage.
It was argued that affidavits of cohabitation
are not connected with a judge’s official
functions and duties as solemnizing officer.
Will the complaint prosper?
A: YES. Judge Melo notarized affidavits of
cohabitation, which were documents not
connected with the exercise of his official
functions and duties as solemnizing officer. He
also notarized affidavits of cohabitation without
certifying that lawyers or notaries public were
lacking in his court’s territorial jurisdiction, thus
he violated Circular No. 1–90. Further, Judge Melo
violated NCJC provisions on integrity since it is
well-settled that if the law involved is basic,
ignorance constitutes “lack of integrity.” Violating
basic legal principles and procedure nine times is
gross ignorance of the law. (Tupal vs. Judge Rojo,
A.M. No. MTJ–14–1842, February 24, 2014)
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164
IMPARTIALITY
CANON 3
IMPARTIALITY IS ESSENTIAL TO THE
PROPER DISCHARGE OF THE JUDICIAL
OFFICE. IT APPLIES NOT ONLY TO THE
DECISION ITSELF BUT ALSO TO THE
PROCESS BY WHICH THE DECISION IS MADE.
Principle of cold neutrality of an impartial
judge
While a judge should possess proficiency in law in
order that he can competently construe and
enforce the law, it is more important that he
should act and behave in such a manner that the
parties before him should have confidence in his
impartiality. Thus, it is not enough that he decides
cases without bias and favoritism. Nor is it
sufficient that he in fact rids himself of
prepossessions. His actuations should moreover
inspire that belief. (Rosauro v. Judge Villanueva Jr.,
A.M. No. RTJ-99-1433, June 26, 2000)
NOTE: A judge has both duties: the duty of
rendering a just decision; and, doing it in a
manner completely free from suspicion as to his
fairness and as to his integrity.
SEC. 1, CANON 3, NCJC
Judges shall perform their judicial duties
without favor, bias or prejudice.
It is the duty of all judges not only to be impartial
but also to appear impartial. A judge must
exercise prudence and restraint and should
reserve personal views and predilections to
himself so as not to stir up suspicions of bias and
unfairness.
Degree of proof required to prove bias on the
part of the judge
The complainant must prove the same by clear
and convincing evidence since allegations of bias
are quite serious. Mere allegations are not
sufficient to constitute a violation of the rule. Bias
and prejudice cannot be presumed and mere
suspicion of partiality is not enough.
Q: A filed an action for specific performance
with the RTC of Quezon City, presided by
 JUDICIAL ETHICS
Judge Santiago, against X Corporation asking
for the delivery of the title of 1 subdivision lot
in Batangas which lot was given to him in
payment for his services as geodetic surveyor.
Meanwhile X Corporation filed with MTC of
Batangas an action for an unlawful detainer
against certain lot buyers on motion of A.
Judge Santiago issued TRO against X
Corporation and the Judge of MTC and
enjoining the latter from proceeding with the
case. X Corporation now filed a motion to
inhibit the judge on the ground that he
arbitrarily issued such TRO, but without
presenting evidence showing partiality on the
part of the judge. Should the judge be
inhibited?
A: NO. For a judge to be inhibited, allegations of
partiality and pre-judgment must be proven by
clear and convincing evidence. Here, mere
allegation that the judge arbitrarily issued the
TRO without presenting evidence showing bias
on his part is not sufficient. While Judge Santiago
acted in excess of his jurisdiction when he issued
the TRO for such should only be enforceable
within his territorial jurisdiction, such error may
not necessarily warrant inhibition, at most it is
correctible by certiorari. (Dimo Realty
&Development, Inc. v. Dimaculangan, G.R. No.
130991, March 11, 2004)
Extra-judicial source rule
It means that the decision is based on some
influence other than the facts and law presented
in the courtroom.
Q: A motion to inhibit Judge Dicdican was filed
on the ground of partiality and bias on his
part for allegedly denying a motion to hear
affirmative defenses, thereby denying the
movant the opportunity to be heard. Should
the judge be inhibited?
A: NO. Judge Dicdican cannot be charged with
bias and partiality, merely on the basis of his
decision not to grant a motion for a preliminary
hearing. Allegations and perceptions of bias from
the mere tenor and language of a judge are
insufficient to show pre-judgment. Moreover, as
long as opinions formed in the course of judicial
proceedings are based on the evidence presented
and the conduct observed by the judge, such
opinion – even if later found to be erroneous on
appeal or made with grave abuse of discretion on
165
certiorari –will not necessarily prove personal
bias or prejudice on the part of the judge. To
allow inhibition for such reason would open
floodgates to abuse. (Gochan v. Gochan,G.R. No.
143089, February 27, 2003)
SEC. 2, CANON 3, NCJC
Judges shall ensure that his or her conduct,
both in and out of court, maintains and
enhances the confidence of the public, the
legal profession and litigants in the
impartiality of the judge and of the Judiciary.
Rationale
No judge should handle a case in which he might
be perceived, rightly or wrongly, to be susceptible
to bias and impartiality. His judgment must not
be tainted by even the slightest suspicion of
improbity or preconceived interest. The rule is
aimed at preserving at all times the faith and
confidence in courts of justice by any party to the
litigation. (Urbanes, Jr. v. C.A., G.R. No. 117964,
March 28, 2001)
There is undue interference where the judge’s
participation in the conduct of the trial tends to
build or to bolster a case of one of the parties. (Ty
v. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank, CA
and Hon. Tac-an G.R. Nos. 149797-98, February 13,
2004)
Q: Banco Filipino filed a complaint for
reconveyance of property against Ty and Tala
Realty Services Corp. which was dismissed on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction. However, on
motion for reconsideration filed by Banco
Filipino, the case was reinstated and the judge
even relieved Banco Filipino from its
obligation to prove service of its motion for
reconsideration and presumed actual receipt
of the same by the other party. Thereafter, the
judge directed the Ty and Tala to present
certain documents despite failure of Banco
Filipino to tender the costs for such
production and inspection. Did the judge
commit any improper conduct?
A: YES. a judge may not be legally prohibited
from sitting in litigation, but when circumstances
appear that will induce doubt as to his honest
actuations and probity in favor of either party, or
incite such state of mind, he should conduct a
careful self-examination. He should exercise his
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
 Legal Ethics
discretion in a way that the people’s faith in the
courts of justice is not impaired. The better
course for the judge under such circumstances is
to disqualify himself. That way, he avoids being
misunderstood; his reputation for probity and
objectivity is preserved. What is more important
is that the ideal of impartial administration of
justice is lived up to. Here, the judge, by assuming
actual receipt by the respondents of proof of
service of the motion for reconsideration,
absolving Banco Filipino from paying the
expenses of production of documents, and
suggesting to Banco Filipino what evidence to
present to prove its case, transgressed the
boundaries of impartiality. Thus, the judge should
inhibit himself (Ty v. Banco Filipino Savings and
Mortgage Bank, et. Al., G.R. Nos. 149797-98,
February 13, 2004).
NOTE: In disposing of a criminal case, a judge
should avoid appearing like an advocate for
either party. It is also improper for the judge to
push actively for amicable settlement against the
wishes of the complainant. A judge’s unwelcome
persistence makes the judge vulnerable to
suspicions of favoritism. (Montemayor v. Bermejo,
Jr.,A.M. No.MTJ-04-1535, March 12, 2004)
SEC. 3, CANON 3,NCJC
Judges shall, so far as is reasonable, so
conduct themselves as to minimize the
occasions on which it will be necessary for
them to be disqualified from hearing or
deciding cases.
Meaning of “duty to sit”
It means that a judge must ensure that he will not
be unnecessarily disqualified from a case.
A judge cannot inhibit himself as he pleases. A
decision to inhibit must be based on good, sound
or ethical grounds, or for just and valid reasons. It
is not enough that a party cast some tenuous
allegations of partiality at the judge.
Rule of necessity
It states that a judge is not disqualified to sit in a
case where there is no other judge available to
hear and decide the case. Furthermore, when all
judges will be disqualified as a result, it will not
be permitted to destroy the only tribunal with the
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power in the premises. The doctrine operates on
the principle that a basic judge is better than no
judge at all. It is the duty of the disqualified judge
to hear and decide the case regardless of
objections or disagreements. (Parayno vs.
Meneses, G.R. No. 112684, April 26, 1994)
SEC. 4, CANON 3, NCJC
Judges shall not knowingly, while a proceeding
is before or could come before them, make any
comment that might reasonably be expected to
affect the outcome of such proceeding or
impair the manifest fairness of the process.
Nor shall judges make any comment in public
or otherwise that might affect the fair trial of
any person or issue.
Reason for the rule
This section warns judges against making any
comment that might reasonably be expected to
affect the outcome of the proceedings before
them; or those that the judge may later decide but
not yet before him; or "impair the manifest
fairness of the process.”
A judge’s language, both written and spoken,
must be guarded and measured, lest the best of
intentions be misconstrued. (Fecundo v.
Berjamen, G.R. No. 88105, December 18, 1989)
Q: After the pre-trial of a civil case for
replevin, Judge D advised B’s counsel to settle
the case because according to Judge D, his
initial assessment of the case shows that B’s
evidence is weak.
a. Did Judge D commit an act of impropriety?
Explain
b. What remedy or remedies may be taken
by B’s lawyer against Judge D? Discuss
Fully. (2014 Bar)
A:
a. YES, Judge D violated Canon 3 of the NCJC.
He should not make any comment that might
reasonably be expected to affect the outcome
of the proceedings or impair the manifest
fairness of the process.
b. B's lawyer can file a motion for the
disqualification of the judge under Canon 3
for bias or prejudice based on the appearance
of the comment to a reasonable observer. A
 JUDICIAL ETHICS
pre-trial is not yet the complete and
exhaustive presentation of evidence of the
parties.
Q: Justice Antonio Carpio penned a decision
regarding the invalidity of the amended joint
venture agreement between Public Estates
Authority (PEA) and Amari Coastal Bay
Development Corporation saying that the
agreement is unconstitutional as PEA cannot
transfer ownership of a reclaimed land to a
private corporation. Amari now filed a motion
to inhibit Justice Carpio on the ground of bias
and pre-judgment allegedly because he had
previously written in his column in Manila
Times a statement to the effect that the law
required public bidding of reclaimed projects
and that the PEA-Amari contract was flawed
for it was not bid by the PEA. Decide on the
motion.
A: The motion to inhibit must be denied for three
reasons:
1. The motion to inhibit must be denied if filed
after a member of the court had already
rendered his opinion on the merits of the
case. Here, the motion was filed after Justice
Carpio had already rendered a decision;
2. The ratio decidendi of the decision was not
based on his statements on the column. Here,
the decision was based on constitutional
grounds and not in the absence of public
bidding; and
3. Judges and justices are not disqualified from
participating in a case just because they have
written legal articles on the law involved in
the case. (Chavez v. PEA, G.R. No. 133250, May
6, 2003)
No absolute prohibition against judges from
making comments
Not all comments are impermissible. Judges may
express their open-mindedness regarding a
pending issue in cases where the judges’
comments do not necessarily favor one side over
the other.
However, judges should avoid side remarks,
hasty conclusions, loose statements or gratuitous
utterances that suggest they are prejudging a
case. Judges should be aware that the media
might consider them a good and credible source
of opinion or ideas, and, therefore, should refrain
167
from making any comment on a pending case.
There is danger not only of being misquoted, but
also of compromising the rights of the litigants in
the case.
SEC. 5, CANON 3, NCJC
Judges shall disqualify themselves from
participating in any proceeding in which they
are unable to decide the matter impartially or
in which it may appear to a reasonable
observer that they are unable to decide the
matter impartially. Such proceedings include,
but are not limited to instances where:
(a) The judge has actual bias or prejudice
concerning a party or personal
knowledge of disputed evidentiary
facts concerning the proceedings;
(b) The judge or member of his or her
family, has an economic interest in the
outcome of the matter in controversy;
(c) The judge or a member of his or her
family, has an economic interest in the
outcome of the matter in controversy
(d) The judge served as executor,
administrator, guardian, trustee, or
lawyer in the case or matter in
controversy, or a former associate of
the judge served as counsel during
their association, or the judge or
lawyer was a material witness
therein;
(e) The judge's ruling in a lower court is
the subject of review
(f) The judge is related by consanguinity
or affinity to a party litigant within
the sixth civil degree or to counsel
within the fourth civil degree; or
(g) The judge knows that his or her
spouse or child has a financial
interest, as heir, legatee, creditor,
fiduciary, or otherwise, in the subject
matter in controversy or in a party to
the proceeding, or any other interest
that could be substantially affected by
the outcome of the proceedings
The phrase “any proceeding” includes, but is
not limited to instances where:
1. The rule also requires disqualification if a
judge has outside knowledge of disputed
facts. To be a ground for disqualification, the
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
 Legal Ethics
knowledge must have been obtained extra-
judicially like out-of-court observations. This
prohibition also disallows extra-judicial
research on the internet;
2. The judge previously served as a lawyer or
was a material witness in the matter in
controversy (Sec. 5(b), Canon 3, CJC);
3. A judge may be disqualified if he was
formerly associated with one of the parties or
their counsel;
4. A judge who previously notarized the
affidavit of a person to be presented as a
witness in a case before him shall be
disqualified from proceeding with the case;
5. A municipal judge who filed complaints in his
own court for robbery and malicious mischief
against a party for the purpose of protecting
the property interests of the judge’s co-heirs,
and then issued warrants of arrest against
the party, was found guilty of serious
misconduct and ordered dismissed from the
bench before he was able to rescue himself
(Oktubre v. Velasco A.M. No. MTJ-02-02-1444,
July 20, 2004);
6. The restriction extends to judges who served
as lawyers in closely related cases;
An associate justice of the Court of Appeals
refused to inhibit himself from reviewing the
decision in a case which he had partially
heard as a trial judge prior to his promotion,
on the ground that the decision was not
written by him. The Supreme Court upheld
his refusal, but nevertheless commented that
he "should have been more prudent and
circumspect and declined to take on the case
owing to his earlier involvement in the case”.
The Court has held that a judge should not
handle a case in which he might be perceived,
rightly or wrongly, to be susceptible to bias
and prejudice. (Sandoval v. CA, G.R. No.
106657, August 1, 1996)
NOTE: A preliminary injunction issued by a
judge in favor of his sister before inhibiting
himself was found reprehensible. (Hurtado v.
Judajena, G.R. No. L-40603, July 13, 1978)
7. The judge is not wholly free, disinterested,
impartial and independent (Garcia v. De La
Pena. A.M.No.MTJ-92-637, February 9, 1994);
or
Q: When Atty. Rojas was appointed as a judge,
he inherited a criminal case in which he acted
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
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168
as prosecutor. He explained that his delay in
inhibiting himself from presiding on that case
was because it was only after the belated
transcription of the stenographic notes that
he remembered that he handled that case. He
also said that the counsels did not object and
he never held “full-blown” hearings anyway.
Should Judge Rojas be reprimanded?
A: YES. The Rules of Court prevents judges from
trying cases where they acted as counsel
“without” the consent of the parties. This
prevents not only a conflict of interest but also
the appearance of impropriety on the part of the
judge. Here, the judge should not have taken part
in the proceeding as his impartiality will naturally
be questioned considering that he previously
handled the case as prosecutor. He should
administer justice impartially & without delay.
The prohibition does not only cover hearings but
all judicial acts (e.g. orders, resolutions) some of
which, Judge Rojas did make. (Re: Inhibition of
Judge Eddie R. Rojas, A.M. No. 98-6-185-RTC,
October 30, 1998)
Q: Judge Mijares was charged with grave
misconduct for taking cognizance and
deciding a special proceeding for correction of
entry in the record of her grandson,
notwithstanding such relationship. It was also
alleged that the judge dispensed with the
publication requirement in said proceeding.
In her answer, Judge Mijares contended that
the prohibition provided for under the Code
did not apply to special proceedings which are
not controversial in nature and that she does
not have any pecuniary interest in the case. Is
the contention correct?
A:NO. A judge who is related to a party within the
6th degree of consanguinity is mandated to inhibit
himself from hearing the case “notwithstanding
lack of pecuniary interest in the case”. This is so
because lack of such interest does not mean that
she can already be free from bias and partiality in
resolving the case by reason of her close blood
relationship. (Villaluz v. Mijares, A.M. No. RTJ -98-
1402 288, April 3, 1998)
Degree of compliance required by the rule
under Canon 3, Section 5 of NCJC
Strict compliance of the rule is required so as to
protect the rights of the parties and assure an
impartial administration of justice, as well as to
 JUDICIAL ETHICS
prevent erosion of the people's confidence in the
judiciary. (Marfil v. Cuachon, A.M. No. 2360-MJ,
August 31, 1981)
SEC. 6, CANON 3, NCJC
A judge disqualified as stated above may,
instead of withdrawing from the proceeding,
disclose on the records the basis of
disqualification.
If, based on such disclosure, the parties and
lawyers, independently of the judge’s
participation, all agree in writing that the
reason for inhibition is immaterial or
unsubstantial, the judge may then participate
in the proceeding.
The agreement, signed by all parties and
lawyers, shall be incorporated in the record of
the proceedings.
Types of disqualification
1. Mandatory or compulsory disqualification
2. Voluntary disqualification or inhibition
Disqualification v. Inhibition
DISQUALIFICATION INHIBITION
There are specific The rule only provides
grounds enumerated broad basis for
under the rules of inhibition.
court for
disqualification.
The judge has no The rule leaves the
discretion; mandatory matter to the judge’s
sound discretion
The right of a party to seek the inhibition or
disqualification of a judge who does not appear to
be wholly free, disinterested, impartial and
independent in handling the case must be
balanced with the latter’s sacred duty to decide
cases without fear of repression. Thus, it was
incumbent upon a lawyer to establish by clear
and convincing evidence the ground of bias and
prejudice in order to disqualify a Judge from
participating in a particular trial. (Presiding Judge
Madrid v. Atty. Dealca, A.C. No. 7474, September
09, 2014)
Grounds for mandatory disqualification
1. When he, or his wife, or child is pecuniarily
interested as heir, legatee, creditor, or
otherwise;
169
2. When he is related to either party within the
6th degree of consanguinity or affinity or to
counsel within the 4th civil degree;
3. When he has been an executor, guardian,
administrator, trustee, or counsel; or
4. When he has presided in an inferior court
where his ruling or decision is subject to
review, without the written consent of the
parties. (Rule 137, RRC)
Q: In a verified complaint, Kathy said that
Judge Florante decided a petition for
correction of entry involving the birth record
of her grandson, Joshua, who happened to be
child of Judge Florante’s daughter, Pilita.
Judge Florante insisted that he committed no
wrong since the proceeding was non-
adversarial and since it merely sought to
correct an erroneous entry in the child’s birth
certificate. Is Judge Florante liable? (2011
Bar)
A: YES. Sec. 5, Canon 3 provides that: “Judges
shall disqualify themselves from participating in
any proceedings in which they are unable to
decide the matter impartially or in which it may
appear to a reasonable observer that they are
unable to decide the matter impartially. Such
proceedings include, but are not limited to
instances where: “xx 6. The judge is related by
consanguinity or affinity to a party litigant within
the 6th civil degree or to counsel within the fourth
civil degree.” This is considered as a MANDATORY
INHIBITION. Strict compliance with the rules on
disqualification is required.
Inhibition
An act when a judge personally prevents himself
from taking cognizance of the case. This is made
through a written petition to inhibit which shall
state the grounds for the same. The explanation
of the judge whether or not to take cognizance of
the case must also be in writing.
If the judge inhibits himself from taking
cognizance of the case, the same cannot be
appealed. However, the judge should not
immediately inhibit himself. He should make a
careful examination by first taking into
consideration the following:
1. General consideration – whether the people’s
faith in the judicial system will be impaired
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
 Legal Ethics
2. Special consideration –He must reflect on the
probability that the losing party will nurture
at the back of his mind that he tilted the scale
of justice
Voluntary inhibition of a judge
The judge may in his discretion inhibit himself,
for just and valid reasons other than the grounds
for mandatory disqualification. The rule on
voluntary disqualification or inhibition is
discretionary upon the judge on the basis of his
conscience.
This leaves the discretion to the judge to decide
for himself questions as to whether he will desist
from sitting in a case for other just and valid
reasons with only his conscience to guide him,
unless he cannot discern for himself his inability
to meet the test of cold neutrality required of him,
in which event the appellate court will see to it
that he disqualifies himself.
A decision to disqualify himself is not conclusive
and his competency may be determined on
application for mandamus to compel him to act. A
judge’s decision to continue hearing a case in
which he is not legally prohibited from trying
notwithstanding challenge to his objectivity may
not constitute reversible error.
NOTE: The filing of an administrative case against
a judge does not automatically disqualify him
from sitting in a case. It must be shown that there
are other acts or conducts by the judge which
constitute a ground for his disqualification.
A judge may by mandamus be compelled to act on
questions regarding his disqualification from
sitting in a case.
Q: Judge Clint Braso is hearing a case between
Mr. Timothy and Khristopher Company, a
company where his wife used to work as one
of its Junior Executives for several years.
Doubting the impartiality of the Judge, Mr.
Timothy filed a motion to inhibit Judge Clint
Braso. Judge Clint Braso refused on the
ground that his wife has long resigned from
the company. Decide. (2014 Bar)
A: The matter of inhibition is addressed to the
judicious discretion of the judge; hence, only he
can examine is his conscience if he can answer to
the call of cold neutrality.
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
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170
Time to file the petition to disqualify a judge
It must be filed before rendition of the judgment,
and cannot be raised on appeal. Otherwise, the
parties are deemed to have waived any objection
regarding the impartiality of the judge.
Q: Judge Nacy personally witnessed a
vehicular accident near his house. Later, the
Reckless Imprudence case was raffled to his
sala. Is there a valid ground for his inhibition?
(2012 Bar)
A: YES, under Canon 3, Sec. 5 (a), a judge should
decide a case on the basis of the evidence
presented before him and not on extraneous
matters. This tendency will be for him to decide
the case based on his personal knowledge and not
necessarily on the basis of the evidence that will
be presented. The judge, however, is not
precluded from testifying about his personal
knowledge of the case. After, disqualifying
himself, he can be a presented as a witness in the
case before the substitute judge.
Q: A judge rendered a decision in a criminal
case finding the accused guilty of estafa.
Counsel for the accused filed a motion for
reconsideration which was submitted without
arguments. Later, another lawyer entered his
appearance for the accused. The judge issued
an order inhibiting himself from further
sitting in the case because the latter lawyer
had been among those who recommended
him to the bench. Can the judge’s voluntary
inhibition be sustained?
A: The judge may not voluntarily inhibit himself
by the mere fact that a lawyer recommended him
to the bench. In fact, the appearance of said
lawyer is a test as to whether the judge can act
independently and courageously in deciding the
case according to his conscience. “Inhibition is
not allowed at every instance that a friend,
classmate, associate or patron of a presiding
judge appears before him as counsel for one of
the parties to a case. ‘Utang na loob’ per se, should
not be a hindrance to the administration of
justice. Nor should recognition of such value in
Philippine society prevent the performance of
one’s duties as judge. However, in order to avoid
any suspicion of partiality, it is better for the
 JUDICIAL ETHICS
judge to voluntarily inhibit himself. (Query of
Executive Judge Estrella T. Estrada, Regional Trial
Court of Malolos, Bulacan, on the Conflicting Views
of Regional Trial Court – Judges Masadao and
Elizaga Re: Criminal Case No. 4954-M, A.M. No. 87-
9-3918-RTC, October 26, 1987)
Q: Does a judge’s active participation during
the hearing of the writ of preliminary
injunction amount to an evident display of his
bias and partiality in favor of the private
respondents and should he therefore
disqualify himself from further hearing the
civil case?
A: NO. Mere intervention of the respondent judge
during the hearing of preliminary injunction by
simply asking the materiality of a question
directed upon the witness and ruling against the
petitioners are within the prerogatives and
powers of the judge. The fact that the judge asked
questions in the course of the trial does not make
him a biased judge. (Hizon v. Dela Fuente, G.R. No.
152328, March 23, 2004)
Remittal of disqualification
A judge disqualified may, instead of withdrawing
from the proceeding, disclose in the records the
basis of disqualification. If, based on such
disclosure, the parties and lawyers,
independently of the judge’s participation, all
agree in writing that the reason for the inhibition
is immaterial or insubstantial; the judge may then
participate in the proceeding. The agreement,
signed by all parties and lawyers, shall be
incorporated in the record of the proceedings.
(Sec. 6, Canon 3, NCJC)
Requirements for a judge to continue hearing
a case despite the existence of reasons for
disqualifications
1. The bona fide disclosure to the parties in
litigation; and
2. The express acceptance by all the parties of
the cited reason as not material or
substantial.
PROPRIETY
171
CANON 4
PROPRIETY AND THE APPEARANCE OF
PROPRIETY ARE ESSENTIAL TO THE
PERFORMANCE OF ALL THE ACTIVITIES OF
A JUDGE.
The judge’s own perception of motives is not
relevant when considering appearance of
impropriety.
SEC. 1, CANON 4, NCJC
Judges shall avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety in all of their
activities.
The public holds judges to higher standards of
integrity and ethical conduct than lawyers and
other persons not invested with public trust.
Prohibition provided by the Code
It prohibits not only actual impropriety but even
the mere appearance of impropriety.
Appearance of impropriety
Impropriety occurs when the conduct of a judge
creates in reasonable minds a perception that the
judge’s ability to carry out judicial responsibilities
with integrity, impartiality and competence is
impaired.
NOTE: Acts done by a judge which are not illegal
may still constitute a violation of this rule.
Q: After the prosecution cross-examined
Sheila, a witness for the accused, Judge Pedro
asked her ten additional questions that were
so intense, they made her cry. One question
forced Sheila to admit that her mother was
living with another man, a fact that weighed
against the accused. This prompted the
latter’s counsel to move to move to expunge
the judge’s questions for building on the
prosecution’s case Did Judge Pedro commit an
impropriety? (2011 Bar)
A: YES, because he effectively deprived the
defense of its right to due process when he acted
both as prosecutor and judge.
Q: Judge A accepted a gift consisting of
assorted canned goods other grocery items
from his compadre whose friend has a
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
 Legal Ethics
pending case with him. He accepted the gift
just so as not to embarrass his compadre.
When his compadre left his chambers, he
asked his secretary to donate the gift he
received to the victims of Typhoon Yolanda.
Did the judge cross the ethical line? Explain
your answer. (2014 Bar)
A: YES, Judge A crossed the ethical line. He
violated the canon of Propriety. As a subject of
public scrutiny, judges must accept personal
restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome
by ordinary citizens and should do so freely and
voluntarily (Sec. 1, Canon 4, NCJC).
Examples of acts of a judge which are not
illegal but will constitute a violation of this
rule
1. The act of a judge of hearing cases on a day
when he is supposed to be on official leave
(Re: Anonymous complaint Against Judge
Edmund Acuña, A.M. No. RTJ-04-1891, July 28,
2005);
2. Photograph showing the judge and a
subordinate coming out of a hotel together
even if there was no clear evidence of sexual
congress between (Liwanag v. Lustre, A.M. No.
MTJ-98-1168, April 21 1999);
3. Joking remark made by a judge to a litigant
suggesting that the litigant prove he
harbored no ill feelings towards the judge (Co
v. Plata, A.M. No. MTJ-03-1501, March 14,
2005).
NOTE: The judge’s act in riding in defendant’s car
deserves the stern probation of the Court. By such
act, he openly exposed himself and the office he
holds to suspicion, thus impairing the trust and
faith of the people in the administration of justice.
A judge’s official conduct should be free from the
appearance of impropriety and his personal
conduct and behavior should be beyond reproach
(Spouses Cabreana v. Avelino A.M. No. 1733 CFI,
September 30, 1981).
Q: During the hearing of an election protest
filed by the brother of Judge Dojillo, the latter
sat beside the counsel of his brother allegedly
to give moral support. Did the judge commit
any improper conduct?
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
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172
A: YES. The judge violated the rule on
impropriety under Sec 1, Canon 4, NCJC for even
if he did not intend to use his position as a judge
to influence the outcome of his brother’s election
protest, it cannot be denied that his presence in
the courtroom during the hearing of his brother’s
case would immediately give cause for the
community to suspect that his being a colleague
in the judiciary would influence the judge trying
the case to favor his brother (Vidal v. Judge Dojillo
Jr., A.M. No. MTJ-05-1591, July 14, 2005).
Q: Judge Duque of the RTC was charged with
Impropriety, Corruption and Gross
Misconduct. At the hearing, Atty. Ubana, the
lawyer of Reyes, introduced her to Judge
Duque who allegedly gave Reyes 30 days to
settle matters with the bank. She was unable
to re-negotiate with the bank. Reyes then
allegedly received a phone call from Judge
Duque and he instructed Reyes to go “to his
house and bring some money in order that he
can deny the pending motion to break open.”
When she already had the money, she went to
his house where Judge Duque demanded the
money from her.
Another incident happened, whereby Reyes
went to the house of Judge Duque for the
payment of a sum of money. Judge Duque
allegedly scolded her for not bringing the
whole amount. Judge Duque then locked the
main door of his house and asked Reyes to
step into his office. Judge Duque held the waist
of Reyes, embraced and kissed her. Reyes
tried to struggle and free herself. Judge Duque
raised her skirt, opened her blouse and
sucked her breasts. He touched her private
parts and attempted to have sexual
intercourse with Reyes. Reyes shouted for
help but the TV was too loud. As a desperate
move, Reyes appealed to Judge Duque saying:
“kung gusto mo, huwag dito. Sa hotel, sasama
ako sayo”. Judge Duque suddenly stopped his
sexual advances and ordered Reyes to fix her
hair. Is the respondent judge guilty of
impropriety and gross misconduct?
A: YES. Judges should avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety in all of their
activities. Judges should conduct themselves in a
way that is consistent with the dignity of the
judicial office. Judges, like any other citizen, are
entitled to freedom of expression, belief,
association and assembly, but in exercising such
 JUDICIAL ETHICS
rights, they should always conduct themselves in
such a manner as to preserve the dignity of the
judicial office and the impartiality and
independence of the judiciary.
The conduct of Judge Duque fell short of the
exacting standards for members of the judiciary.
He failed to behave in a manner that would
promote confidence in the judiciary. Considering
that a judge is a visible representation of the law
and of justice, he is naturally expected to be the
epitome of integrity and should be beyond
reproach. Judge Duque’s conduct indubitably
bore the marks of impropriety and immorality.
He failed to live up to the high moral standards of
the judiciary and even transgressed the ordinary
norms of decency of society. (Reyes v. Duque, A.M.
No. RTJ-08-2136, September 21, 2010)
SEC. 2, CANON 4, NCJC
As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges
must accept personal restrictions that might
be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary
citizen and should do so freely and willingly. In
particular, judges shall conduct themselves in
a way that is consistent with the dignity of the
judicial office.
Membership in the judiciary circumscribes one’s
personal conduct and imposes upon him certain
restrictions, the faithful observance of which, is
the price one has to pay for holding such a
distinguished position. Accordingly, a magistrate
of the law must comort himself in a manner that
his conduct must be free of a whiff of impropriety,
not only with respect to the performance of his
official duties, but also to his behavior outside his
sala and as a private individual. His conduct must
be able to withstand the most searching public
scrutiny, for the ethical principles and sense of
propriety of a judge are essential to the
preservation of the people’s faith in the judicial
system lest public confidence in the judiciary
would be eroded by the incompetent,
irresponsible and negligent conduct of judges
(Bayaca v. Judge Ramos, A.M. No. MTJ-07-1676,
January 29, 2009).
In Macias v. Arula, A judge was admonished for
the appearance of engaging in partisan politics
when he participated in a political rally
sponsored by one party, even though he only
explained the mechanics of block voting to the
audience (A.M. No. 1895-CFI, July 20, 1982).
173
Dignified conduct
It is best described as conduct befitting men and
women possessed of temperance and respect for
the law and for others.
Q: Judge Gonzales, together with his two male
friends, went to the house of A and asked the
two girls who were then boarding in A’s house
to accompany his two male friends and take a
stroll in the beach. When the girls refused, the
judge admonished them. Consequently, the
judge was charged with conduct unbecoming
of a judge. Will the action prosper?
A: YES. A judge should so comport himself as not
to degrade or bring embarrassment to his office.
Here, Judge Gonzales’ act of imposing his will on
the complainants constitutes conducts
unbecoming of a judge who should be civil,
humble and considerate of the rights of others
(Mariano v. Gonzales, A.M. No. 2180-MJ 114, May
31, 1982).
Q: A complaint was filed against Judge Austria
alleging that the judge committed an act of
impropriety when she displayed her
photographs in a social networking website
“Friendster”, some of which showed her
wearing an "off-shouldered" attire. Judge
Maranan contended that an "off-shouldered"
attire is an acceptable social outfit under
contemporary standards and is not forbidden.
Decide.
A: Judge Austria disregarded the propriety and
appearance of propriety required of her when she
posted photos of herself wearing an "off-
shouldered" suggestive dress and made this
available for public viewing. When she made this
picture available for public consumption, she
placed herself in a situation where she, and the
status she holds as a judge, may be the object of
the public’s criticism and ridicule. The act of
posting her photos would seem harmless and
inoffensive had this act been done by an ordinary
member of the public. As the visible
personification of law and justice, however,
judges are held to higher standards of conduct
and, thus, must accordingly comport themselves
(Lorenzana vs. Judge Austria, A.M. No. RTJ-09-
2200, April 2, 2014).
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
 Legal Ethics
NOTE: NCJC does not prohibit a judge from
joining or maintaining an account in a social
networking sites. Section 6, Canon 4 of the New
Code of Judicial Conduct recognizes that judges,
like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of
expression. However, the same provision also
imposes a correlative restriction on judges: in the
exercise of their freedom of expression, they
should always conduct themselves in a manner
that preserves the dignity of the judicial office
and the impartiality and independence of the
Judiciary (Ibid.).
Q: An anonymous letter called on the Court to
look into the morality of respondent Judge
Achas and alleged that: (1) it is of public
knowledge in the city that Judge Achas is
living scandalously with a woman who is not
his wife; (2) he lives beyond his means; (3) he
is involved with illegal activities ( 4) he comes
to court very untidy and dirty; (5) he decides
his cases unfairly in exchange for material and
monetary consideration; and (6) he is
involved with cockfighting/gambling. Judge
Achas denied all the charges but admitted that
he was married and only separated de
facto from his legal wife for 26 years, and that
he reared game cocks for leisure and extra
income, having inherited such from his
forefathers. Should Judge Achas be
disciplined?
A: YES. The investigation revealed that the
respondent judge found for himself a suitable
young lass whom he occasionally goes out with in
public and such a fact is not a secret around town.
It is not commendable, proper or moral for a
judge to be perceived as going out with a woman
not his wife. Such is a blemish to his integrity and
propriety, as well as to that of the judiciary. While
rearing fighting cocks is not illegal, Judge Achas
should avoid mingling with a crowd of
cockfighting enthusiasts and bettors as it
undoubtedly impairs the respect due him. As a
judge, he must impose upon himself personal
restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome
by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely
and willingly (Anonymous v.Achas, A.M. No. MTJ-
11-1801, February 27, 2013).
SEC. 3, CANON 4, NCJC
Judges shall, in their personal relations with
individual members of the legal profession
who practice regularly in their court, avoid
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
2018 GOLDEN NOTES
174
situations which might reasonably give rise to
the suspicion or appearance of favoritism or
partiality.
This section is directed at bolstering the principle
of cold neutrality of an impartial judge as it
requires judges to scrupulously guard against any
act that may be construed as an expression of
bias in favor of a litigant.
NOTE: Constant company with a lawyer tends to
breed intimacy and camaraderie to the point that
favors in the future may be asked from the judge
which he may find hard to resist. If a judge is seen
eating and drinking in public places with a lawyer
who has cases pending in his or her sala, public
suspicion may be aroused, thus tending to erode
the trust of litigants in the impartiality of the
judge (Padilla v. Zantua, G.R. No. 110990, October
23, 1994).
Q: Complainant Prosecutor filed an
administrative complaint against the
Sandiganbayan Justices for grave misconduct,
conduct unbecoming a justice, and conduct
grossly prejudicial to the interest of the
service. Allegedly, during a hearing, Justice
Ong uttered words like “We are playing Gods
here, we will do what we want to do, your
contempt is already out, we fined you eighteen
thousand pesos, even if you will appeal, by that
time I will be there, Justice of the Supreme
Court.” Also, he often asked lawyers from
which law schools they had graduated, and
frequently inquired whether the law school in
which Justice Hernandez had studied and
from which he had graduated was better than
his (Justice Ong’s) own alma mater. The
complainant opined that the query was
manifestly intended to emphasize that the San
Beda College of Law, the alma mater of Justice
Ong, and the UP College of Law, that of Justice
Hernandez, were the best law schools. On
another occasion in that hearing in Cebu City,
Justice Hernandez discourteously shouted at
Prosecutor HazelinaTujan-Militante, who was
then observing trial from the gallery and said
“You are better than Director Somido? Are you
better than Director Chua? Are you here to
supervise Somido? Your office is wasting funds
for one prosecutor who is doing nothing”.
Finally, Justice Hernandez berated Atty.
Pangalangan, the father of former UP Law
Dean Raul Pangalangan, and uttered words
 JUDICIAL ETHICS
such as “Just because your son is always
nominated by the JBC to Malacañang, you are
acting like that! Do not forget that the brain of
the child follows that of their (sic) mother.”
Should the respondent justices be held liable
for conduct unbecoming?
A: YES. Publicizing professional qualifications or
boasting of having studied in and graduated from
certain law schools, no matter how prestigious,
might have even revealed, on the part of Justice
Ong and Justice Hernandez, shows their bias for
or against some lawyers. Their conduct was
impermissible, consequently, for Section 3, Canon
4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary, demands that judges avoid
situations that may reasonably give rise to the
suspicion or appearance of favoritism or
partiality in their personal relations with
individual members of the legal profession who
practice regularly in their courts. Judges should
be dignified in demeanor, and refined in speech.
In performing their judicial duties, they should
not manifest bias or prejudice by word or
conduct towards any person or group on
irrelevant grounds. It is very essential that they
should live up to the high standards their noble
position on the Bench demands (Jamsani-
Rodriguez v. Ong, A.M. No. 08-19-SB-J, August 24,
2010).
Q: In a complaint filed by a former court
stenographer against Judge Agabas, he
contended that her appointment was not
renewed because the judge refused to sign the
requirements for the change of her
employment status from temporary to
permanent despite her two-year service.
Complainant states that many of her
officemates have questioned the “satisfactory”
rating given to her by the judge considering
their non-performing utility clerk received a
higher rating despite respondent judge’s
knowledge of the latter’s misdeeds. Worse,
she claims that the judge even recommended
the utility clerk for a position in the court of
her “kumare’. Is the judge guilty of favoritism?
A: NO. Complainant’s appointment was under
temporary status in view of her lack of two years
relevant experience which was required for the
position. Respondent judge, who is the immediate
supervisor of complainant, is in the best position
to observe the fitness, propriety and efficiency of
the employee for the position. It should be
impressed upon complainant that her
175
appointment in the judiciary is not a vested right.
It is not an entitlement that she can claim simply
for the reason that she had been in the service for
almost two years.
Since there is no proof that respondent judge
abused her position, the case against her should
be dismissed. Respondent judge should, however,
be reminded to be circumspect in her actuations
so as not to give the impression that she is guilty
of favoritism (Magtagñob v. Judge Gapas
Agbada. OCA IPI No. 11-3631-RTJ, January 16,
2013).
Q: In an action to prevent the condominium
developer from building beyond ten (10)
floors, Judge Cerdo rendered judgment in
favor of the defendant developer. The
judgment became final after the plaintiffs
failed to appeal on time. Judge Cerdo
thereafter purchased a condominium unit
from the developer. Did Judge Cerdo commit
any act of impropriety? (2013 Bar Question)
A: YES, Judge Cerdo is guilty of an act of
impropriety. It is desirable that he should, so far
as reasonably possible, refrain from all relations
which would normally tend to arouse the
suspicion that such relations warp or bias his
judgment, or prevent his impartial attitude of
mind in the administration of his judicial duties.
SEC. 4, CANON 4, NCJC
Judges shall not participate in the
determination of a case in which any member
of their family represents a litigant or is
associated in any manner with the case
This rule rests on the principle that no judge
should preside in a case in which the judge is not
wholly free, disinterested, impartial and
independent.
SEC. 5, CANON 4, NCJC
Judges shall not allow the use of their residence
by a member of the legal profession to receive
clients of the latter or of other members of the
legal profession.
The reason is that judges are required to always
exhibit cold neutrality of an impartial judge.
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
 Legal Ethics
NOTE: It was inappropriate for a judge to have
entertained a litigant in his house particularly
when the case is still pending before his sala (J.
King and Sons. v. Hontanosas, Adm. Matter No. RTJ-
03-1802, September 21, 2004).
SEC. 6, CANON 4, NCJC
Judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to
freedom of expression, belief, association and
assembly, but in exercising such rights, they
shall always conduct themselves in such a
manner as to preserve the dignity of the
judicial office and the impartiality and
independence of the judiciary.
While judges are not expected to live a hermit-
like existence or cease functioning as citizens of
the Republic, they should remember that they do
not disrobe themselves of their judicial office
upon leaving their salas. In the exercise of their
civil liberties, they should be circumspect and
ever mindful that their continuing commitment to
upholding the judiciary and its values places upon
them certain implied restraints to their freedom.
Q: Judge Acuña was charged with improper
conduct for allegedly making humiliating
statements such as “putris,” and “putang-ina”.
Judge Acuña explained that those words are
only his favorite expressions and they are not
directed to any particular person. He also
explained that his behavior is justified by the
fact that he is still mourning the sudden
demise of his eldest son. Is the Judge guilty of
improper conduct?
A: YES. Judges are demanded to be always
temperate, patient and courteous both in the
conduct and language. Indeed, judges should so
behave at all times because having accepted the
esteemed position of a judge he ought to have
known that more is expected of him than
ordinary citizen. Here, the judge’s use of
humiliating and insensitive expressions like
“putris” and ”putang-ina” is improper as such
intemperate language detracts from how he
should conduct himself. Moreover, it does not
matter whether such expressions were directed
to a particular person, as they give the impression
of a person’s ill manners (Re: Anonymous
complaint Against Judge Acuña, A.M. No. RTJ-04-
1891, July 28, 2005).
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Q: An administrative complaint was filed
against Judge Amila because he used
derogatory and irreverent language towards
the complainant. The former in effect
maliciously besmirched the character of
complainant by calling her as “only a live-in
partner of Belot” and presenting her as an
opportunist and a mistress in an illegitimate
relationship. The judge also called her a
prostitute. Likewise, the judge accused the
complainant that the complaint was
motivated by insatiable greed. Will the case
prosper?
A: YES. The court holds that Judge Amila should
have been more circumspect in his language. It is
reprehensible for a judge to humiliate a lawyer,
litigant or witness. The act betrays lack of
patience, prudence and restraint. Thus, a judge
must at all times be temperate in his language. He
must choose his words, written or spoken, with
utmost care and sufficient control. The wise and
just man is esteemed for his discernment.
Pleasing speech increases his persuasiveness
(Benancillo v. Judge Amila, A.M. No. RTJ-08-2149,
March 9, 2011).
SEC. 7, CANON 4, NCJCc
Judges shall inform themselves about their
personal fiduciary and financial interests and
shall make reasonable efforts to be informed
about the financial interests of members of
their family.
This section should be read in conjunction with
Sec. 7 of the R.A. 6713 (Code of Conduct and
Ethical standards for Public Officials and
Employee), which prohibits certain personal
fiduciary and financial conflicts. A judge shall
refrain from financial and business dealings that
tend to reflect adversely on the court's
impartiality, interfere with the proper
performance of judicial activities, or increase
involvement with lawyers or persons likely to
come before the court.
SEC. 8, CANON 4, NCJC
Judges shall not use or lend the prestige of the
judicial office to advance their private
interests, or those of a member of their family
or of anyone else, nor shall they convey or
permit others to convey the impression that
anyone is in a special position improperly to
influence them in the performance of judicial
duties.
 JUDICIAL ETHICS
Prohibited acts by the rule
1. Judge’s act of using judicial office to
advance private interests.
NOTE: An RTC judge took advantage of his
position, by filing in the Makati court a
collection case in which he and his wife were
the complainants. The Court ruled that
although a stipulation in the contract gave
the judge, as creditor, choice of venue, the
judge had nonetheless fallen short of what is
expected of him as a judicial officer. This act
of the judge would lead the public, and in
particular the judge’s adversary, to suspect
that the judge would use the choice of venue
as a means to exert influence in favor of
himself (Javier v. De Guzman, A.M. No. RTJ-89-
380, December 19, 1990).
2. Judge’s act of giving impression that he can
be influenced to use the judicial office to
advance the private interests of others.
Q: Judge Escano was charged with allegedly
using court facilities (bulletin board) in
advertising for attractive waitresses and
cooks for employment in their restaurant
business. He also allowed the use of the court
address to receive applications as well as his
office in screening the applicants. The judge
explained that he merely wanted to give
assistance to his wife, and the posting of
advertisements as well as the conduct of
screening in his office is the most convenient
way for him considering the difficulty of
locating the residence. Did the judge commit
any unethical act?
A: YES. Judges shall not use or lend the prestige of
the judicial office to advance their private
interests for those of a member of a family. This is
so to avoid possible interference which may be
created by such business involvements in the
exercise of their duties which may tend to
corrode the respect and dignity of the court as
bastion of justice. Here, the act of the judge in
using the court facilities to promote family
business is improper (Dionisio v. Escano, A.M. No.
RTJ-98-1400, February 1, 1999).
Ticket fixing
177
It is misconduct in which judges impermissibly
take advantage of their public position to avoid
punishment for traffic violations.
SEC. 9, CANON 4, NCJC
Confidential information acquired by judges
in their judicial capacity shall not be used or
disclosed for any other purpose not related to
their judicial duties.
Court records or judicial records
Court records do not only refer to the orders,
judgments, or verdict of courts but comprise the
official collection of all papers, exhibits, pleadings
filed by the parties, all processes issued and
returns made thereon, appearances, and word-
for-word testimony which took place during the
trial and which are in the possession, custody, or
control of the judiciary or the courts (Hilado v.
Judge Reyes, G.R. No. 163155, July 21, 2006).
Q: Judge Lilagam was charged with improper
conduct for allowing his wife to have access to
court records. In his answer, the judge
admitted that he requested his wife who was
previously a legal researcher, to go over the
records and pinpoint problem areas and to
suggest measures to rectify the same and to
improve the system of case monitoring. Is the
judge guilty of improper conduct?
A: YES. Records of cases are necessarily
confidential, and to preserve their integrity and
confidentiality, access thereto ought to be limited
only to the judge, the parties or their counsel and
the appropriate court personnel in charge of the
custody of said records. Here, since Mrs. Lilagam
is not a court employee specifically in charge of
the custody of said records, the judge’s act of
allowing her to have access thereto is improper
as such would convey the impression that she is
the one who can influence the judge’s official
function (Gordon v. Lilagam, A.M. No. RTJ-00-1564,
July 26, 2001).
Acts of judges which would constitute a
criminal offense
The following, under Sec. 3[k] of R.A. 3019, and
under Art. 229 and 230 of the RPC, are violations
of the rule which also constitute criminal offense:
1. Divulging valuable information of a
confidential character, acquired by his office
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
 Legal Ethics
or by him on account of his official position to
unauthorized persons, or releasing such
information in advance of its authorized
release date (R.A. 3019, Sec. 3[k]).
2. Reveal any secret known to him by reason of
his official capacity, or shall wrongfully
deliver papers or copies of papers of which
he may have charge and which should not be
published, shall suffer imprisonment
(Art.229, RPC).
3. Public officer revealing secrets of private
individual –Any public officer to whom the
secrets of any private individual shall become
known by reason of his office who shall
reveal such secrets (Art.230, RPC).
SEC. 10, CANON 4, NCJC
Subject to the proper performance of judicial
duties, judges may:
1. Write, lecture, teach and participate in
activities concerning the law, the legal system,
the administration of justice or related matter;
2. Appear at a public hearing before an official
body concerned with matters relating to the
law, the legal system, the administration of
justice or related matters;
3. Engage in other activities if such activities do
not detract from the dignity of the judicial
office or otherwise interfere with the
performance of judicial duties.
This section allows the judge to participate in
legal academia and public discourse on legal
matters with the proviso that there shall be no
interference in the performance of the judge’s
primary functions with respect to his or her
jurisdiction
This section’s tolerance of judicially-related
activities is limited by Sec. 12, Article VIII of the
Constitution, which prohibits judges from being
“designated to any agency performing quasi-
judicial or administrative functions”.
Judge cannot be a member of Provincial
Committee on Justice
Such membership would violate the
constitutional provision on the discharge by
members of the judiciary of administrative
functions in quasi-judicial or administrative
agencies. This does not mean, however, that
judges should adopt an attitude of monastic
insensibility or unbecoming indifference to the
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Provincial/City Committee on Justice. As
incumbent judges, they form part of the structure
of government. Even as non-members, judges
should render assistance to said committees to
help promote the laudable purposes for which
they exist, but only when such assistance may be
reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of their
judicial duties (In Re: Designation of Judge Rodolfo
U. Manzano, A.M. No. 88-7-1861-RTC, October 5,
1988).
NOTE: Under Sec. 10(c), Section 10, Canon 4, a
judge may engage in private business without the
written permission of the Supreme Court (Borre
v. Moya, A.M. No. 1765-CFI, October 17, 1980).
SEC. 11, CANON 4, NCJC
Judges shall not practice law whilst a holder
of judicial office.
The prohibition is based on sound reasons of
public policy, considering that the rights, duties,
privileges and functions of the office of an
attorney are inherently incompatible with the
high official functions, duties, powers, discretion
and privileges of a sitting judge. It also aims to
ensure that judges give their full time and
attention to their judicial duties, prevent them
from extending favors to their own private
interests, and assure the public of their
impartiality in the performance of their functions.
These objectives are dictated by a sense of moral
decency and desire to promote the public interest
(Decena v. Malanyaon, A.M. No. RTJ-10-2217, April
8, 2013).
NOTE: Sec. 35 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court
prohibits judges from engaging in the practice of
law or giving professional advice to clients.
Philippine courts not only prohibit judges from
overtly representing clients as counsel of record,
but also from acting more subtly in a way more
befitting an advocate than a judge.
The rule disqualifying a municipal judge from
engaging in the practice of law seeks to avoid the
evil of possible use of the power and influence of
his office to affect the outcome of the litigation
where he is retained as counsel. Compelling
reasons of public policy lie behind this
prohibition, and judges are expected to conduct
themselves in such a manner as to preclude any
suspicion that they are representing the interests
of party litigant (Dia-Anonuevo v. Bercacio, A.M.
No. 177-MTJ, November 27, 1975).
 JUDICIAL ETHICS
Q: Judge Malanyaon was present in the
hearing of her daughter to advise her on what
to do and say during the hearing, to the point
of coaching her. Was the act of the judge
considered contrary to Section 11, Canon 4 of
the NCJC, prohibiting judges from engaging in
the private practice of law or giving
professional advice to clients?
A: YES. The Court held that the judge engaged in
the private practice of law by assisting his
daughter at his wife’s administrative case,
coaching his daughter in making manifestations
or posing motions to the hearing officer, and
preparing the questions that he prompted to his
daughter. The term practice of law is not limited
to the conduct of cases in court or to
participation in court proceedings, but extends to
the preparation of pleadings or papers in
anticipation of a litigation, the giving of legal
advice to clients or persons needing the same, the
preparation of legal instruments and contracts by
which legal rights are secured, and the
preparation of papers incident to actions and
special proceedings (Decena v. Malanyaon, A.M.
No. RTJ-10-2217, April 8, 2013).
Q: Judge Lelina was administratively charged
for violation of Section 35, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court and Rule 5.07, Canon 5 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct. He was then
preventively suspended by the Court on
account of an earlier administrative
complaint filed charging him with
harassment. Subsequently he appealed to the
Court to grant him the permission to practice
law during the remainder of his preventive
suspension or, if such cannot be granted, to
consider him resigned from the judiciary. It
turned out that before he filed the above-said
Manifestation, Appeal and Omnibus Motion,
Judge Lelina engaged in the private practice of
law. Did the judge commit any unethical act?
A: YES. Since Section 35, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court and Section 11, Canon 4 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary do
not make any distinction in prohibiting judges
from engaging in the private practice of law while
holding judicial office, no distinction should be
made in its application. In the present case, Judge
Lelina, having been merely suspended and not
dismissed from the service, was still bound under
the prohibition (Binalay v. Lelina Jr, A.M. No. RTJ-
08-2132, July 31, 2009).
179
Q: In an extrajudicial settlement of the estate
of the late Juan Mayaman, the heirs requested
Judge Maawain, a family friend, to go over the
document prepared by a new lawyer before
they signed it. Judge Maawain agreed and
even acted as an instrumental witness. Did
Judge Maawain engage in the unauthorized
practice of law? Why? (2002 Bar)
A: NO. In the case of de Castro v. Capulong, (118
SCRA 5, 1982), the Supreme Court held that a
judge who merely acted as a witness to a
document and who explained to the party
waiving his rights of redemption over mortgaged
properties the consequences thereof, does not
engage himself in the practice of law. This
appears to be more applicable to the case of Judge
Maawain. He did not give professional advice in
anticipation of litigation. He was just asked to
review a deed of extrajudicial settlement of
estate. He signed merely as an instrumental
witness and not as a legal counsel. Besides, his act
was an isolated act.
SEC. 12, CANON 4, NCJC
Judges may form or join associations of judges
or participate in other organizations
representing the interests of judges.
This rule recognizes the difference between
membership in associations of judges and
membership in associations of other legal
professionals. While attendance at lavish events
hosted by lawyers might create an appearance of
impropriety, participation in judges-only
organizations does not.
Rules relating to prohibition against
accepting gifts, bequests, or loans
GR: Sections 13 and 14 of Canon 4 of the NCJC.
XPN: Section 15 of Canon 4 of the NCJC.
SEC. 13, CANON 4, NCJC
Judges and members of their families shall
neither ask for nor accept, any gift, bequest,
loan or favor in relation to anything done or to
be done or omitted to be done by him or her in
connection with the performance of judicial
duties.
SEC. 14, CANON 4, NCJC
Judges shall not knowingly permit court staff
or others subject to their influence, direction or
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
 Legal Ethics
authority, to ask for, or accept, any gift,
bequest, loan or favor in relation to anything
done, to be done or omitted to be done in
connection with their duties or functions.
Sec 14 Canon 4 of NCJC assures that what the
judge cannot do directly (soliciting gifts), may not
be done indirectly through the use of employees
or staff members.
NOTE: Section 13 should be read in conjunction
with Section 7(d) of R.A. 6713 (Code of Conduct
and Ethical Standards for Public officials and
Employee) which provides that, public officials
and employees shall not solicit or accept, directly
or indirectly, any gift, gratuity, favor,
entertainment, loan or anything of money value
from any person in the course of their official
duties or in connection with any operation being
regulated by, or any transaction which may be
affected by the functions of their office.
Q: Judge Ganay received law books worth fifty
thousand pesos, cellular phones and monthly
cellular phone prepaid cards from the
property guardians of the late Rev. Fr.
Aspiras, who was then the ward of the court.
Further, he issued Orders directing the
manager of the PNB, La Union Branch to draw
checks amounting to thousands of pesos from
the account of the late Rev. Fr. Aspiras. Is
Judge Ganay guilty of impropriety?
A: YES. Respondent Judge Ganay clearly fell short
of the exacting standards set by the New Code of
Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary. His
acts constitute impropriety which the Court
cannot allow. Respondent Judge Ganay’s act of
issuing Orders to draw checks creates the
impression of impropriety and subjects the court
to suspicion of irregularities in the conduct of the
proceedings (Heirs of the late Rev. Fr. Jose
Aspirasv.JudgeGanay, A.M. No. RTJ-07-2055,
December 17, 2009).
Q: X was charged with grave threats before
the sala of Judge Elias Lelina. During the
pendency of the case, X offered a business
partnership to the daughter of Judge Lelina
who then accepted the same. Should the judge
be disciplined?
A: YES. Judges should not allow members of their
family to accept gifts nor favor in relation to
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anything done, to be done, or omitted to be done
by the judge in connection with the performance
of his official duties. Here, the judge’s act of
allowing his daughter to accept the business offer
of X despite knowledge of the possible intention
of the latter who has pending case in his sala is
improper (Dulay v. Lelina Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-99-
1516, July 14, 2005).
SEC. 15, CANON 4, NCJC
Subject to law and to any legal requirements of
public disclosure, judges may receive a token
gift, award or benefit as appropriate to the
occasion on which it is made, provided that
such gift, award or benefit might not
reasonably be perceived as intended to
influence the judge in the performance of
official duties or otherwise give rise to an
appearance of partiality.
Judges are allowed to accept token gifts, awards,
or benefits when given as a consequence of a
special occasion.
Gifts and grants allowed from foreign
countries
1. The acceptance and retention by a public
official or employee of a gift of nominal value
tendered and received as a souvenir or mark
of courtesy;
2. The acceptance by a public official or
employee of a gift in the nature of a
scholarship or fellowship grant or medical
treatment; or
3. The acceptance by a public official or
employee of travel grants or expenses for
travel taking place entirely outside the
Philippines (such as allowances,
transportation, food and lodging) of more
than nominal value if such acceptance is
appropriate or consistent with the interest of
the Philippines, and permitted by the head
office, branch or agency to which the judge
belongs (Sec. 7[d], R.A. 6713).
OTHER LAWS PROHIBITING THE ACCEPTANCE
OF GIFTS OR OTHER MATERIAL BENEFITS
Indirect and direct bribery of judges
Acceptance of gifts given by reason of the office of
the judge is indirect bribery (Art. 211, RPC) Acts
punishable in direct bribery are as follows:
 JUDICIAL ETHICS
a) By agreeing to perform an act which
constitutes a crime in connection with his
official duties for a consideration;
b) By accepting a gift in consideration of the
execution of an act which does not constitute
a crime in consideration with the
performance of his official duty; and
c) By refraining, from doing something which it
is his official duty to do, in consideration of
gift or promise (Art. 210, RPC).
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act: Judges
receiving gifts or other material benefits
GR: The judge is liable criminally for directly or
indirectly receiving gifts, presents or other
pecuniary or material benefit for himself or for
another under conditions provided in Section 2,
pars. b and c of the law.
XPN: Unsolicited gifts or presents of small value
offered or given as a mere ordinary token of
gratitude or friendship according to local custom
or usage (Section 14, RA 3019).
NOTE: Under Section 16 Article XI of the 1987
Constitution “No loan, guarantee or other form of
financial accommodation for any business
purpose may be granted, directly or indirectly, by
any government-owned or controlled bank or
financial institution to members of the Supreme
Court during their tenure.
It is a serious misconduct for a judge to receive
money from a litigant in the form of loans which
he never intended to pay back. Even if the judge
intends to pay, it is an act of impropriety to take a
loan from a party litigant. The judge could not be
wholly free from bias in deciding a case where his
lender is a party. A judge should always strive to
be free from suspicion and all forms of
improprieties (Ompoc v. Judge Torres, A.M. No.
MTJ-86-11, September 27, 1989).
EQUALITY
CANON 5
ENSURING EQUALITY OF TREATMENT TO
ALL BEFORE THE COURTS IS ESSENTIAL TO
THE DUE PERFORMANCE OF THE JUDICIAL
OFFICE.
A judge must be able to render substantial justice
and maintain public confidence in the judicial
181
system, by being aware of the diversity in society.
With that awareness, a judge should not yield to
first impression, reach hasty conclusions or
prejudge matters (Castillo v. Judge Juan, 62 SCRA
124).
SEC. 1, CANON 5, NCJC
Judges shall be aware of and understand
diversity in society and differences arising
from various sources, including, but not
limited to, race, color, sex, religion, national
origin, caste, disability, age, marital status,
sexual orientation, social and economic status,
and other like causes.
Judges should be mindful of the various
international instruments and treaties ratified by
the Philippines, which affirm the equality of all
human beings and establish a norm of non-
discrimination without distinction as to race, sex,
language, or religion. Judges should not yield to
first impression, reach hasty conclusions or
prejudge matters. They have a duty to ensure that
the minority status of a party plays no part in
their decisions.
SEC. 2, CANON 5, NCJC
Judges shall not, in the performance of judicial
duties, by words or conduct, manifests bias or
prejudice towards any person or group on
irrelevant grounds.
Magistrates of law must comport themselves at
all times in such a manner that their conduct, can
withstand the highest level of public scrutiny.
Judges should avoid private remarks, hasty
conclusions, or distasteful jokes that may give
even erroneous impressions of prejudice and lead
the public to believe that cases before them are
being prejudged.
SEC. 3, CANON 5, NCJC
Judges shall carry out judicial duties with
appropriate consideration for all persons,
such as the parties, witnesses, lawyers, court
staff and judicial colleagues, without
differentiation on any irrelevant ground,
immaterial to the proper performance of such
duties.
As arbiters of the law, judges should be
conscientious, studious, courteous, patient and
punctual in the discharge of their judicial duties,
recognizing that the time of litigants, witnesses
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
 Legal Ethics
and counsel is of value. Judges should act with
decorum toward jurors, parties, court staff,
spectators, and alike.
Q: Judge Tormis made a comment in a certain
case to the effect that the same should be
dismissed as the act complained of was
already decriminalized by a special law.
Thereafter, Judge Navarro, who previously
handled the case before he was appointed as a
judge, barged into the office of Judge Tormis
and told the staff that their judge did not
know her law. Judge Tormis then retaliated by
saying that to her, the office of Judge Navarro
did not exist. Are the judges guilty of conduct
unbecoming of a judge?
A: YES. Judges, being dispensers of justice, should
not act in a way that would cast suspicion in
order to preserve faith in the administration of
justice. They should so behave to avoid poor
public impression on the judiciary. Here, the
judges act of fighting each other by uttering
derogatory remarks against each other is a
conduct unbecoming of a judge for which they
should be disciplined as their fight has impaired
the image of the judiciary (Navarro v. Tormis, A.M.
No. MTJ-00-1337, April 27, 2004).
Q: Atty. Quinto was the defense counsel in a
criminal case. He alleged that during the
hearing, he manifested that he was waiving
the presentation of evidence for the accused
and Judge Vios then allegedly got angry,
shouted and scolded him, stating that the
defense had no right to waive the
presentation of evidence. He did not even
listen to Atty. Quinto’s explanation and,
thereafter, compelled the latter to withdraw
his appearance as counsel of the accused,
under pain of contempt. In the presence of the
complainant, Judge Vios appointed a counsel
de oficio. May Judge Vios be held
administratively liable for compelling the
lawyer to withdraw as counsel for the
accused?
A: YES. A judge should avoid unconsciously
falling into the attitude of mind that the litigants
are made for the courts, instead of the courts for
the litigants. Here, the judge should be held liable
for misconduct when he threatened to punish
complainant for contempt of court if he would
refuse to withdraw his appearance, as counsel for
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182
the accused, when the latter insisted on waiving
the presentation of the evidence for the defense
(Atty. Quinto v. Judge Vios, A.M. No. MTJ-04-1551,
May 21, 2004).
SEC. 4, CANON 5, NCJC
Judges shall not knowingly permit court staff
or others subject to his or her influence,
direction or control to differentiate between
persons concerned, in a matter before the
judge, on any irrelevant ground.
Duties of judges under this section
1. To ensure that court personnel under their
supervision do not discriminate by
dispensing special favors or disclosing
confidential information to any unauthorized
person, regardless of whether such
information came from authorized or
unauthorized sources; and
2. To organize their courts to ensure the
prompt and convenient dispatch of business
and should not tolerate misconduct by clerks,
sheriffs and other assistants who are
sometimes prone to expect favors or special
treatment due to their professional
relationship with the judge.
NOTE: All personnel involved in the dispensation
of justice should conduct themselves with a high
degree of responsibility (Mataga v. Rosete, A.M.
No.MTJ-03-1488, October 13, 2004).
SEC. 5, CANON 5, NCJC
Judges shall require lawyers in proceedings
before the court to refrain from manifesting, by
words or conduct, bias or prejudice based on
irrelevant grounds, except such as are legally
relevant to an issue in proceedings and may be
the subject of legitimate advocacy.
Judges should conduct proceedings in court with
dignity and in a manner that reflects the
importance and seriousness of proceedings. They
should maintain order and proper decorum in the
court (Rule 3.03, Canon 3, 1989 Code of Judicial
Conduct).
Judges have the duty to prevent lawyers from
abusing witnesses with unfair treatment.
Q: During the hearing of a case for statutory
rape filed against X, the lawyer was asking the
 JUDICIAL ETHICS
6-year-old victim to relate exactly and step by
step the sexual intercourse between her and
the accused. The lawyer was also asking
questions whether at the time of the alleged
rape, the accused’s penis was hard, and
whether at the time they were caught, the
accused was still pushing and pulling his penis
inside her vagina. Should the judge allow such
questions?
A: NO. The judge shall require lawyers to refrain
from making abusive and uncalled for queries.
Here, considering the fact that the victim of rape
is a child of tender years, there is more reason to
require the lawyer to be tactful. No woman
especially child of tender years would exactly
remember step by step the sexual intercourse in
the hands of the maniacal beast. Hence, all the
questions asked are excessive (People v. Boras,
G.R. No. 127495, December 22, 2000).
COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE
CANON 6
COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE ARE PRE-
REQUISITES TO THE DUE PERFORMANCE OF
JUDICIAL OFFICE.
A judge upon assumption to office, becomes the
visible representation of law and of justice, hence,
the Constitution (Section 7 (3), Article VIII),
prescribes that he must be a person of proven
competence as a requisite of his membership in
the judiciary.
A judge should be the epitome of competence,
integrity and independence to be able to render
justice and uphold public confidence in the legal
system. He must be conversant with basic legal
principles and well-settled doctrines. He should
strive for excellence and seek the truth with
passion (Rino v. Judge Cawaling, A.M. No. MTJ-02-
1391, June 7, 2004).
NOTE: As members of the judiciary, judges ought
to know the fundamental legal principles;
otherwise, they are susceptible to administrative
sanction for gross ignorance of the law (Heirs of
Piedad v. Estrella, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2170, December
16, 2009).
Q: Bayaca was convicted by Judge Ramos in a
criminal case for arson through reckless
183
imprudence and imposed upon him the
penalty of imprisonment, with all the
accessory penalties imposed by law in
addition to the payment of costs and damages.
On appeal, the RTC deleted the penalty of
imprisonment. However, Judge Ramos
subsequently issued a warrant of arrest and
commitment on final sentence which led to
complainant’s incarceration for 20 days. In his
comment, the judge clarified that his issuance
of the warrant of arrest against Bacaya was a
mistake done in good faith and that the same
was just a simple negligence. Should the judge
be disciplined?
A: YES. The judge was inexcusably negligent
when he issued a Warrant of Arrest and
Commitment to Final Sentence despite the
deletion by the appellate court of that portion of
the judgment imposing the penalty of
imprisonment. In the performance of his duties,
Judge Ramos failed to observe that diligence,
prudence and circumspection which the law
requires in the rendition of any public service. If
only Judge Ramos had exercised the requisite
thoroughness and caution, he would have noted
not only the modification of the monetary awards
by the appellate court, but also the deletion of the
penalty of imprisonment upon which the Warrant
of Arrest and Commitment to Final Sentence that
he signed was based (Bayaca v. Judge Ramos, A.M.
No. MTJ-07-1676, January 29, 2009).
SEC.1, CANON 6, NCJC
The judicial duties of a judge take precedence
over all activities.
Duties of a judge under this section
1. A judge must perform his judicial duties with
regard to a case where he is not disqualified
to do so and, may not divest himself of such
case if he is not so disqualified; and
2. A judge shall not inhibit himself simply to
avoid sitting on difficult or controversial
cases.
Q: An administrative case against Judge
Calderon was filed for incurring leaves of
absence for almost a straight period of 3
years. In his comment, he claimed that he was
suffering from a lingering illness of malignant
hypertension which was supported by
medical certificates prepared by his personal
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
 Legal Ethics
doctor. However, when the court physician
conducted some tests, the same contradicted
the diagnosis given by the judge’s personal
doctor. Is Judge Calderon guilty of gross
misconduct?
A: YES. A judge shall be cautious of his court
duties. Here, the judge should have been aware
that, in frequently leaving his station, he has
caused great disservice to many litigants and has
denied them speedy justice (Re: Leaves of Absence
Without Approval of Judge Eric Calderon,
Municipal Trial Court Judge of Calumpit, Bulacan,
A.M. No. 98-8-105-MTC, January 26, 1999).
Q: Judge Limsiaco admitted that he decided an
ejectment case two (2) years after it was
declared submitted for resolution. He was
found guilty of gross ignorance of law and
procedure. Despite the extension of time
given, Judge Limsiaco failed to file his motion
for reconsideration and the required
explanation thrice. In another complaint
against him for Delay in the Disposition of a
Case, the OCA issued an order for him to file a
comment for the administrative complaint. Is
the judge administratively liable for unethical
conduct and gross inefficiency under the
provisions of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct, specifically, Sections 7 and 8 of
Canon 1, and Section 5 of Canon 6?
A: YES. A judge is the visible representation of the
law, and more importantly of justice; he or she
must, therefore, be the first to follow the law and
weave an example for the others to follow. For a
judge to exhibit indifference to a resolution
requiring him to comment on the accusations in
the complaint thoroughly and substantially is
gross misconduct, and may even be considered as
outright disrespect for the Court. The office of the
judge requires him to obey all the lawful orders of
his superiors. After all, a resolution of the
Supreme Court is not a mere request and should
be complied with promptly and completely. Such
failure to comply accordingly betrays not only a
recalcitrant streak in character, but has likewise
been considered as an utter lack of interest to
remain with, if not contempt of the judicial
system.
Moreover, the Court should not and will not
tolerate future indifference of respondents to
administrative complaints and to resolutions
requiring comment on such administrative
complaints. Under the circumstances, the conduct
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
2018 GOLDEN NOTES
184
exhibited by Judge Limsiaco constitutes no less
than clear acts of defiance against the Court’s
authority. His conduct also reveals his deliberate
disrespect and indifference to the authority of the
Court, shown by his failure to heed our warnings
and directives. (Inoturan, v. Limsiaco, Jr., A.M. No.
MTJ-01-1362, February 22, 2011).
SEC. 2, CANON 6, NCJC
Judges shall devote their professional activity
to judicial duties, which include not only the
performance of judicial functions and
responsibilities in court and the making of
decisions, but also other tasks relevant to the
judicial office or the court’s operations.
Violations of this section often involve a failure to
keep records or handle funds in compliance with
court rules.
Q: Judge Daguman was charged with neglect of
duty in failing to retain a copy and to register
with the Local Civil Registrar a marriage
contract. The judge explained that his failure
was occasioned by circumstances beyond his
control. He averred that after the wedding
ceremony, the copies of the marriage contract
were left on top of his desk in his private
office where the ceremony was held but after
few days, when he gathered all the documents
relating to the marriage, the copies were
already missing. He also explained that he was
not able to inform the parties about the fact of
loss as they were already out of the country.
Should the judge be disciplined?
A: YES. A judge is charged with extra care in
ensuring that records of the cases and official
documents in his custody are intact. Moreover,
judges must adopt a system of record
management, and organize their dockets in order
to bolster the prompt and efficient dispatch of
business. Here, the circumstances show that the
loss of the documents was occasioned by the
carelessness on the part of the judge. The judge
should not have left such important documents in
his table to be gathered only after few days,
instead, he should have devised a filing system in
his court so as to avoid such incident (Beso v.
Daguman, A.M. No. MTJ-99-1211, January 28,
2000).
Q: X charged Judge Garillo with dishonesty
and corrupt practices for allegedly requiring
 JUDICIAL ETHICS
the former to deposit with the latter a sum of
money in connection with a pending case in
the latter’s sala but failed to give the
deposited sums of money to the adverse
party. It was also alleged that when X
demanded the return of money, the judge
failed to return the same despite his promise.
Is the judge guilty of serious misconduct?
A: YES. A judge should always be a symbol of
rectitude and propriety, and should always
comport himself in a manner that will raise no
doubt whatsoever about his honesty. Here, the
judge’s act of misappropriating the money
entrusted to him by litigants in connection with a
case pending in his court constitutes gross
misconduct. Moreover, the judge violated Circular
No. 50-95 which provides that, fiduciary
collections should be deposited with the Land
Bank of the Philippines. Because of his actuations,
the image of the judiciary was impaired (De
Pacete v. Judge Garillo, A.M. No. MTJ-03-1473,
August 20, 2003).
Judges should return records upon retirement
Since the proper and efficient management of the
court is the responsibility of the judge, he is the
one directly responsible for the proper discharge
of official functions. Thus, a judge is obliged to
return to the court the records of the cases filed
in his sala upon his retirement (Office of the Court
Administrator v. Retired Judge Carteciano, A.M. No.
MTJ-07-1664, February 18, 2008).
SEC. 3, CANON 6, NCJC
Judges shall take reasonable steps to maintain
and enhance their knowledge, skills and
personal qualities necessary for the proper
performance of judicial duties, taking
advantage for this purpose the training and
other facilities which should be made
available, under judicial control, to judges.
Service in the judiciary means a continuous study
and research on the law from beginning to end.
Judges are regarded as persons learned in the
law. The maxim “ignorance of the law excuses no
one” has special application to judges.
Though good faith and absence of malice or
corruption are sufficient defenses, such do not
apply where the issues are so simple and the
applicable legal principles evident and basic as to
185
be beyond possible margin of error (Corpus v.
Ochotoresa, A.M. No. RTJ 04-1861, July 30, 2004).
One who accepts the exalted position of a judge
owes the public and the Court the duty to
maintain professional competence at all times.
When a judge displays an utter lack of familiarity
with the rules, he erodes the confidence of the
public in the courts. A judge owes the public and
the Court the duty to be proficient in the law and
is expected to keep abreast of laws and prevailing
jurisprudence. Ignorance of the law by a judge
can easily be the mainspring of injustice
(Villanueva v.Judge Buaya, A.M. No. RTJ-08-2131,
November 22, 2010).
Q: Judge Delos Santos averred that Judge
Mangino of the MTC Tarlac approved the bail
bond for provisional liberty of the accused
Santos who was arrested and whose criminal
cases were pending in Angeles City before
him. It was also made to appear from the
contents of the said bond that the accused
appeared before notary public Ancanan in
Makati City. According to the accused, she
never went to Tarlac and appeared before
said Judge Mangino. She also alleged that she
never went to Makati City and appeared
before Notary Public Ancanan. Is Judge
Mangino guilty of grave misconduct?
A: YES. Judges should be diligently acquainted
with the law and jurisprudence. As an advocate of
justice and a visible representation of the law, a
judge is expected to keep abreast with and be
proficient in the application and interpretation of
the law. Here, by merely glancing at the bail bond
application, the judge ought to know that he had
absolutely no authority or jurisdiction to approve
the bail bond of the accused as the case was
pending with another court. By approving the bail
bond application, the judge failed to exert such
conscientiousness, studiousness, and
thoroughness expected and demanded of a judge
(Judge de los Santos v. Judge Mangino, A.M. No.
MTJ-03-1496, July 10, 2003).
SEC. 4, CANON 6, NCJC
Judges shall keep themselves informed about
relevant developments of international law,
including international conventions and other
instruments establishing human rights norms.
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
 Legal Ethics
SEC. 5, CANON 6, NCJC
Judges shall perform all judicial duties,
including the delivery of reserved decisions,
efficiently, fairly and with reasonable
promptness.
A judge’s foremost consideration is the
administration of justice. Thus, he should follow
the time limit set for deciding cases. The
Constitution mandates that all cases or matters
filed before all lower courts shall be decided or
resolved within 90 days from the time the case is
submitted for decision. Judges are enjoined to
dispose of the court’s business promptly and
expeditiously and decide cases within the period
fixed by law. Failure to comply within the
mandated period constitutes a serious violation
of the constitutional right of the parties to a
speedy disposition of their cases. It also
undermines the people’s faith and confidence in
the judiciary, lowers its standards and brings it to
disrepute. Decision making, among other duties,
is the most important duty of a member of the
bench (Salvador v. Judge Limsiaco, A.M. No. MTJ-
08-1695, April 16, 2008).
The honor and integrity of the judicial system is
measured not only by the fairness and
correctness of decisions rendered, but also by the
efficiency with which disputes are resolved. The
mandate to promptly dispose of cases or matters
also applies to motions or interlocutory matters
or incidents pending before the magistrate.
Unreasonable delay of a judge in resolving a
pending incident is a violation of the norms of
judicial conduct and constitutes gross inefficiency
that warrants the imposition of an administrative
sanction against the defaulting magistrate (Office
of the Court Administrator v. Hon. Rosabella M.
Tormis, A.M. No. MTJ-12-1817, March 12, 2013).
Q: Cabasares filed a complaint for Malicious
Mischief against a certain Rodolfo Hebaya.
The case was subsequently assigned to Judge
Tandingco. As early as February 27, 2002, the
case had been submitted for decision, but the
judge did not pen a decision. He was charged
with violation of Section 15 (1), Article VIII of
the Constitution and Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct. Is the judge guilty?
A: YES. Judges should meticulously observe the
periods prescribed by the Constitution for
deciding cases because failure to comply with the
said period transgresses the parties’
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
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186
constitutional right to speedy disposition of their
cases. Thus, failure to decide cases within the
ninety (90)-day reglementary period may
warrant the imposition of administrative
sanctions on the erring judge. However, the
Court is not unmindful of circumstances that
justify the delay in the disposition of the cases
assigned to judges. When a judge sees such
circumstances before the reglementary period
ends, all that is needed is to simply ask the Court,
with the appropriate justification, for an
extension of time within which to decide the
case. Evidently, respondent Judge failed to do any
of these options (Antonio Y. Cabasares v. Judge
Filemon A. Tandinco, Jr. Municipal Trial Court in
Cities, 8th Judicial Region, Calbayog City, Western
Samar, A.M. No. MTJ-11-1793, October 19, 2011).
SEC. 6, CANON 6, NCJC
Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all
proceedings before the court and be patient,
dignified and courteous in relation to litigants,
witnesses, lawyers and others with whom the
judge deals in an official capacity. Judges shall
require similar conduct of legal
representatives, court staff and others subject
to their influence, direction or control.
Besides possessing the requisite learning in the
law, a magistrate must exhibit that hallmark
judicial temperament of utmost sobriety and self-
restraint which are indispensable qualities of
every judge (Rodriguez v. Bonifacio, A.M. No. RTJ-
99-1510, November. 6, 2000). A magistrate should
not descend to the level of a sharp-tongued, ill-
mannered petty tyrant by uttering harsh words,
snide remarks and sarcastic comments (Dela Cruz
v. Judge Carretas, A.M. No. RTJ-07-2043, September
5, 2007). Judges are required to always be
temperate, patient and courteous, both in conduct
and in language.
Q: Judge Belen was charged with conduct
unbecoming of a judge for humiliating,
demeaning and berating a young lawyer who
appeared in his sala. When the judge learned
that the lawyer was an alumnus of MCQU and
not of UP, the judge made the following
statement: “You’re not from UP. Then you
cannot equate yourself to me because there is
a saying and I know this not all law schools
are created equal, not all lawyers are created
equal despite what the Supreme Being stated
 JUDICIAL ETHICS
that we all are created equal in His form and
substance.” Should the judge be disciplined?
A: YES. The judge’s sarcastic, humiliating,
threatening and boastful remarks to a young
lawyer are improper. A judge must be aware that
an alumnus of a particular law school has no
monopoly of knowledge of the law. By hurdling
the Bar Examinations, taking of the Lawyer’s
oath, and signing of the Roll of Attorneys, a
lawyer is presumed to be competent to discharge
his functions and duties as, inter alia, an officer of
the court, irrespective of where he obtained his
law degree. For a judge to determine the fitness
or competence of a lawyer primarily on the basis
of his alma mater is clearly an engagement in an
argumentum ad hominem. As a judge, he must
address the merits of the case and not on the
person of the counsel. Judges must be that even
on the face of boorish behavior from those they
deal with, they ought to conduct themselves in a
manner befitting gentlemen and high officers of
the court (Atty. Mane v. Judge Belen, A.M. No.RTJ-
08-2119, June 30, 2008).
Q: Judge Ante Jr. was charged with grave
misconduct and acts unbecoming of a judge. It
was alleged that when the court employee
placed the docket book on top of the filing
cabinet, the same fell on the floor causing a
loud sound. Unexpectedly, the judge shouted
saying “Why did you throw the docket book?
You get out of here, punyeta, we don’t need
you!” The judge also threw a monobloc chair
at the court employee. Should the judge be
disciplined?
A: YES. The judge, for shouting invectives and
hitting complainant with a chair displayed a
predisposition to use physical violence and
intemperate language which reveals a marked
lack of judicial temperament and self-restraint -
traits which, aside from the basic equipment of
learning in the law - are indispensable qualities of
every judge (Briones v. Judge Ante Jr., A.M. No.MTJ-
02-1411, April 11, 2002).
SEC. 7, CANON 6, NCJC
Judges shall not engage in conduct
incompatible with the diligent discharge of
judicial duties.
A judge shall not accept duties that will interfere
with his devotion to the expeditious and proper
administration of his official functions
187
Q: Judge Bandong was accused of the
following: (1) watching television during
office hours; (2) predeliction to delegate
mediation of cases to court personnel; and (3)
delegation to Process Server Atienza the
performance of the functions and duties
pertaining to a Clerk III. Is she
administratively liable?
A:YES. Judge Bandong is guilty of conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service. For
a judge to allow an activity, and an unofficial one
at that, to take precedence over the conduct of
hearings is a patent derogation of Sections 1 and
2 of Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
Additionally, Judge Bandong’s habit of watching
television during office hours violates Section 7 of
the same Canon 6 which requires Judges “not to
engage in conduct incompatible with the diligent
discharge of judicial duties.”
Judge Bandong’s wanton disregard and mockery
of the proper procedure in mediation of cases
was tantamount to misconduct. While courts and
their personnel are enjoined to assist in the
successful implementation of mediation, A.M. No.
01-10-05-SC-PHILJA does not authorize them to
conduct mediation themselves (Re: Anonymous
Complaints against Hon. Dinah Evangeline
Bandong, A.M. No. RTJ-17-2507, October 10, 2009).
NOTE: When a judge, along with two other
people, acted as real estate agents for the sale of a
parcel of land for which he agreed to give a
commission of P100,000 to each of his
companions, and after the transaction was
completed only gave the complainants P25,000
each, the high Court held that the judge violated
the section of the prior Code of Judicial Conduct
(Catbagan v. Barte, A.M. No. MTJ-02-1452, April 6,
2005).
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
 Legal Ethics
branch 19, Cagayan De Oro City A.M. No. Rtj-01-
DISCIPLINE OF THE MEMBERS OF THE 1657, 23 February 2004, en banc).
JUDICIARY

Power to discipline members of the bench DISCIPLINE OF THE MEMBERS OF THE

The Supreme Court shall have the administrative
supervision over all courts and the personnel
(Section 6, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution).
The Court en banc has the power to discipline all
judges of lower courts including justices of the
Court of Appeals (Section 11, Art. VIII, 1987
Constitution).
Disbarment of judges and justices
Judges and justices, being lawyers, may also be
disbarred, if found guilty of certain crimes and/or
other causes for disbarment under the Rules of
Court.
SUPREME COURT
Impeachment
It is a constitutional process of removing public
servants from office as an assurance against
abusive officials in the country (Impeachment
Primer, Official Gazette, 2012).
Object of impeachment
The object of impeachment is solely to determine
whether the official is worthy of the trust
conferred upon him/her. It is not a determination
of criminal guilt or innocence as in criminal case
(Ibid.).

Condition before Justices of the Supreme The nature of impeachment proceedings against
Court may be disbarred SC justices is “sui generis” or “a class of its own”.

Justices of the Supreme Court in order to be Grounds for impeachment

disbarred must first be impeached in accordance
with the Constitution. 1. Treason;
2. Bribery;
NOTE: While it is the duty of the court to 3. Other High Crimes;
investigate and determine the truth behind every 4. Graft and Corruption; and
matter in complaints against judges and other 5. Betrayal of Public Trust (Sec. 2 Art. XI, 1987
court personnel, it is also their duty to see to it Constitution)
that they are protected and exonerated from
baseless administrative charges. The Court will Impeachable officers
not shirk from its responsibility of imposing
discipline upon its magistrates, but neither will it 1. The President;
hesitate to shield them from unfounded suits that 2. Vice-President;
serve to disrupt rather than promote the orderly 3. Members of the Supreme Court;
administration of justice (Ocenar v. Judge 4. Members of the Constitutional Commissions;
Mabutin, A.M. No. MTJ 05- 1582, February 28, and
2005). 5. Ombudsman

A judge may be disciplined for acts committed
before his appointment to the judiciary
It is settled that a judge may be disciplined for
acts committed prior to his appointment to the
judiciary. In fact, even the new Rule itself
recognizes this, as it provides for the immediate
forwarding to the Supreme Court for disposition
and adjudication of charges against justices and
judges before the IBP, including those filed prior
to their appointment to the judiciary (Heinz Heck
vs. Judge Anthony E. Santos, regional trial court,
All other public officers and employees may be
removed from office as provided by law, but not
by impeachment (Sec. 2 Art. XI, 1987
Constitution).
The Philippine Congress holds the sole power in
impeachment process.
1. House of Representatives - initiates all cases
of impeachment.
2. Senate – tries and decides on all the cases.

UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS

2018 GOLDEN NOTES
188
 DISCIPLINE OF MEMBERS OF THE JUDICIARY
Who can file an impeachment complaint
1. Any member of the House of Representatives
2. Any citizen with an endorsement of any
member of the House of Representatives.
NOTE: 16 votes are required to convict on any
article while 8 negative votes can prevent
conviction on any article.
Effect of conviction

Procedure of impeachment Removal from office. The Senate can additionally

impose penalty of disqualification from holding
1. Initiate impeachment through filing of a any office in the Philippine government.
verified complaint
However, the party convicted shall nevertheless
2. Complaint is included in Order of Business
be subject to prosecution, trial, and punishment
within 10 session days
according to law. Criminal liability must be
3. Complaint is referred to the proper
established by criminal trial (Impeachment
committee within 3 session days
Primer, Official Gazette, 2012).
4. Committee conducts hearing
5. Committee votes
6. If YES, the matter will be referred to the
IMPEACHMENT
Plenary within 60 days.
ETHICAL ASPECTS
7. Plenary votes – at least 1/3 vote is required
8. If at least 1/3 vote is attained, Resolution and
Constitutional provisions on the
Articles of Impeachment are referred to
accountability of public officers
Senate
9. House elects its prosecutors
Public officers and employees must at all times be
10. Senate as plenary body adopts its rules on
accountable to the people, serve them with
impeachment
utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and
11. Senate convenes as impeachment court
efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and
12. Senate issues summons to respondent
lead modest lives (Sec. 1, Article XI, 1987
13. Respondent appears and files answer
Constitution).
14. Senate receives testimonial and documentary
evidence
Nature of public office
15. Senator-judges interpose questions
16. Submission for voting (To convict or to
A public office is a public trust. It is not to be
acquit)
understood as a position of honor, prestige and
power but a position of rendering service to the
Fast track procedure for impeachment
public.
If an impeachment complaint or resolution is filed
Principle of accountability
by at least one-third (1/3) of all members of the
House, the Articles of Impeachment shall be sent
It sets down the mandate that all government
to Senate for trial.
officials and employees, whether they be the
highest in the land or the lowliest public servants,
Determination for conviction or acquittal
shall at all times be answerable for their
misconduct to the people from whom the
Senators are expected to vote according to their
government derives its powers.
conscience. The standard of proof required is
NOT “proof beyond reasonable doubt” because it
Purpose of impeachment in relation to the
is not a criminal trial. Rather, it is a political
accountability of public officers
process (Impeachment Primer, Official Gazette,
2012).
Its purpose is to protect the people from official
delinquencies or malfeasances. It is therefore
Votes needed for conviction
primarily intended for the protection of the State,
not for the punishment of the offender.
A vote of at least two-thirds (2/3) of all members
of the Senate for any one article of impeachment.
Importance of maintaining public trust in
public offices

189 UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS

FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
 Legal Ethics
It is essential that responsible and competent
public officers be chosen for public office to
maintain the faith and confidence of the people to
the government, otherwise it becomes ineffective.
No popular government can survive without the
confidence of the people. It is the lone guarantee
and justification of its existence.
ETHICAL LESSONS FROM THE FORMER CHIEF
JUSTICE CORONA’S IMPEACHMENT
Reason for CJ Corona’s Impeachment
He was convicted under Article II of the Articles
of impeachment, which is the failure to disclose to
the public his statement of assets, liabilities, and
net worth as required under sec. 17, Art. XI of the
1987 Constitution, by a vote of 20-3.
NOTE: It is the "obligation" of an employee to
submit a sworn statement, as the "public has a
right to know" the employee's assets, liabilities,
net worth and financial and business interests.
Hence, a court interpreter who failed to include in
her SALN rental payments she received from a
market stall was dismissed from service (Rabe v.
Flores, A.M. No. P-97-1247, May 14, 1997). The
Senator-judges ruled that the law applies to all,
including the Chief Justice of the Philippines, thus,
his failure to include his dollar accounts in his
SALN warrants his impeachment from office.
Q: Is the Law on Secrecy of Foreign Currency
Deposit Account (FCDA) a defense in failing to
include a dollar deposit in a SALN?
A: NO. The issue is not the conflict between the
FCDA requiring secrecy of foreign currency
deposits and the disclosure required by the SALN
law, but the Constitution which requires public
officials to declare their assets and does not
distinguish between peso and foreign accounts
(Senator Judge Pangilinan).
The Supreme Court in one case said that the
FCDA cannot be used as a haven for the corrupt
and the criminals. To interpret it in the manner
that the Chief Justice would want … is to say that
the law could be used as a haven to hide proceeds
of criminal acts (Senator Judge Drilon).
Mandate of the Chief Justice to disclose his
statement of assets and liabilities
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
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190
1. 1987 Constitution - Section 17. A public
officer or employee shall, upon assumption of
office and as often thereafter as may be
required by law, submit a declaration under
oath of his assets, liabilities, and net worth. In
the case of the President, the Vice-President,
the Members of the Cabinet, the Congress, the
Supreme Court, the Constitutional
Commissions and other constitutional offices,
and officers of the armed forces with general
or flag rank, the declaration shall be disclosed
to the public in the manner provided by law.
2. R.A. 6713 - Section 8. Statements and
Disclosure. Public officials and employees
have an obligation to accomplish and submit
declarations under oath of, and the public has
the right to know, their assets, liabilities, net
worth and financial and business interests
including those of their spouses and of
unmarried children under eighteen (18)
years of age living in their households.
Statements of Assets and Liabilities and
Financial Disclosure. - All public officials and
employees, except those who serve in an
honorary capacity, laborers and casual or
temporary workers, shall file under oath
their Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net
Worth and a Disclosure of Business Interests
and Financial Connections and those of their
spouses and unmarried children under
eighteen (18) years of age living in their
households.
The Statements of Assets, Liabilities and Net
Worth and the Disclosure of Business
Interests and Financial Connections shall be
filed by:
xxx
(2) Senators and Congressmen, with the
Secretaries of the Senate and the House of
Representatives, respectively; Justices, with
the Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court;
Judges, with the Court Administrator; and all
national executive officials with the Office of
the President.
Basis for the public’s right to inquire upon the
statement of assets and liabilities of public
officers
The postulate of public office is a public trust,
institutionalized in the Constitution to protect the
people from abuse of governmental power. This
would certainly be mere empty words if access to
 DISCIPLINE OF MEMBERS OF THE JUDICIARY
such information of public concern is denied.
The right to information (Section 7, Article III of
Constitution) goes hand-in-hand with the
constitutional policies of full public disclosure
and honesty in the public service. It is meant to
enhance the widening role of the citizenry in
governmental decision-making as well as in
checking abuse in government (Valmonte v.
Belmonte, Jr., 252 Phil. 264, February 13 1989).
Established limitations to the right to
information, with its companion right of
access to official records
1. National security matters and intelligence
information
2. Trade secrets and banking transactions
3. Criminal matters
4. Other confidential information such as
confidential or classified information
officially known to public officers and
employees by reason of their office and not
made available to the public as well as
diplomatic correspondence, closed door
cabinet meetings and executive sessions of
either house of Congress, and the internal
deliberations of the Supreme Court.
Probity
It is the uncompromising adherence to the
highest principles and ideals or impeachable
integrity (Webster's 3rd New International
Dictionary).
Importance of probity as a quality of a
magistrate
Canons 3 and 4 of the new Code of Judicial
Conduct mandate, respectively, that “judges shall
ensure that not only is their conduct above
reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the
view of the reasonable observer” and that “judges
shall avoid improprieties and the appearance of
impropriety in all of their activities.” These very
stringent standards of decorum are demanded of
all magistrates and employees of the courts. As
such, those who serve in the judiciary,
particularly justices and judges, must not only
know the law but must also possess the highest
degree of integrity and probity, and an
unquestionable moral uprightness both in their
public and private lives (Veloso v. Caminade, A.M.
No. RTJ- 01-1655, July 8, 2004).
191
Integrity
It is a steadfast adherence to a strict moral or
ethical code. It is honesty and honorableness put
into one.
Observance of integrity in the judiciary
In the judiciary, moral integrity is more than a
cardinal virtue, it is a necessity. The exacting
standards of conduct demanded from judges are
designed to promote public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. When
the judge himself becomes the transgressor of the
law which he is sworn to apply, he places his
office in disrepute, encourages disrespect for the
law and impairs public confidence in the integrity
of the judiciary itself (Lachica vs. Tormis, A.M. No.
MTJ-05-1609, September 20, 2005).
Importance of maintaining the confidence of
the people upon the judiciary
The integrity of the judiciary rests not only upon
the fact that it is able to administer justice, but
also upon the perception and confidence of the
community that the people who run the system
have administered justice. In order to create such
confidence, the people who run the judiciary,
particularly judges and justices, must not only be
proficient in both the substantive and procedural
aspects of the law, but more importantly, they
must possess the highest integrity, probity, and
unquestionable moral uprightness, both in their
public and in their private lives. Only then can the
people be reassured that the wheels of justice in
this country run with fairness and equity, thus
creating confidence in the judicial system (Tan v.
Pacuribot, A.M. No. RTJ-06-1982, December 14,
2007).
DISCIPLINE OF LOWER COURT JUDGES AND
JUSTICES OF THE COURT OF APPEALS AND
SANDIGANBAYAN
The acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not
subject to disciplinary action. In the absence of
fraud, malice or dishonesty in rendering the
assailed decision or order, the remedy of the
aggrieved party is to elevate the assailed decision
or order to the higher court for review and
correction. However, an inquiry into a judge’s
civil, criminal and/or administrative liability may
be made after the available remedies have been
exhausted and decided with finality (Republic v.
Caguioa, A.M. No. RTJ-07-2063, June 26, 2009).
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
 Legal Ethics
Administrative sanction and criminal liability
should be imposed only when the error is so
gross, deliberate and malicious, or is committed
with evident bad faith, or only in clear cases of
violations by him of the standards and norms of
propriety and good behavior prescribed by law
and the rules of procedure, or fixed and defined
by pertinent jurisprudence (Re: Verified
complaint of Engr. Oscar L. Ongjoco, Chairman of
the Board/CEO etc. against Hon. Juan Q. Enriquez,
Jr., et al. A.M. No. 11-184-CA-J. January 31, 2012).
Administrative complaint is NOT an
appropriate remedy where judicial recourse
is still available
Judicial recourse such as a motion for
reconsideration, an appeal, a petition for
certiorari, or an administrative complaint is not
appropriate, unless the assailed order or decision
is tainted with fraud, malice, or dishonesty. As an
established rule, an administrative, civil or
criminal action against a judge cannot be a
substitute for an appeal (Fernandez et. al. v. Court
of Appeals Assoc. Justices Ramon M. Bato, Jr., Isaias
P. Dicdican, A.M. OCA IPI No. 12-201-CA-J. February
19, 2013).
Institution of proceedings for the discipline of
judges
Proceedings for the discipline of judges of regular
and special courts and justices of the Court of
Appeals and the Sandiganbayan may be
instituted:
1. Motu proprio by the Supreme Court;
2. Upon a verified complaint filed before the
Supreme Court supported by:
a. Affidavit of persons who have personal
knowledge of the facts alleged therein; or
b. Documents which may substantiate said
allegations.
3. Anonymous complaint supported by public
records of indubitable integrity filed with the
Supreme Court.
Form and content of the complaint
The complaint shall be in writing and shall state
clearly and concisely the acts and omissions
constituting violations of standards of conduct
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
2018 GOLDEN NOTES
192
prescribed for judges by law, the Rules of Court,
or the Code of Judicial Conduct.
GROUNDS
Grounds for discipline of judges
1. Serious Misconduct– implies malice or
wrongful intent, not mere error of judgment.
Judicial acts complained of:
a. must be corrupt or inspired by an
intention to violate the law; or
b. were in persistent disregard for well-
known legal rules.
A judge was found guilty of gross misconduct
for failure to heed the Court’s pronouncements.
He did not file the required comment to the
Court’s show-cause resolutions despite several
opportunities granted him. His willful
disobedience and disregard to the show-cause
resolutions constitutes grave and serious
misconduct affecting his fitness and worthiness
of the honor and integrity attached to his office.
It is noteworthy that the judge was afforded
several opportunities to explain his failure to
decide the subject cases long pending before
his court and to comply with the directives of
this Court, but he has failed, and continuously
refuses to heed the same. This continued
refusal to abide by lawful directives issued by
this Court is glaring proof that he has become
disinterested to remain with the judicial system
to which he purports to belong (Office of the
Court Administrator v. Judge Go, et al. A.M. No.
MTJ-07-1667, April 10, 2012).
2. Inefficiency– implies negligence,
incompetence, ignorance and carelessness. A
judge would be inexcusably negligent if he
failed to observe in the performance of his
duties that diligence, prudence and
circumspection which the law requires in the
rendition of any public service.
Q: A property of Spouses Sombilon was
forclosed in favor of PNB. 1 year lapsed
without the spouses redeeming the subject
property. The spouses sought the help of Atty.
Garay to redeem the property but
subsequently, they learned that Atty. Garay
went to PNB to purchase the property for
himself. A Final Deed of Conveyance and a
Transfer Certificate Title were issued in favor
 DISCIPLINE OF MEMBERS OF THE JUDICIARY
of PNB and PNB decided to approve the
purchase of Atty. Garay. PNB, thereafter, filed
an Ex-Parte Petition for Issuance of a Writ of
Possession before the RTC. Judge Venadas, Sr.,
who was the presiding judge in the case,
granted the petition but when the spouses
moved for a reconsideration, he issued an
order holding in abeyance the
implementation of the writ. Should Judge
Venadas, Sr. be held guilty of grave abuse of
discretion and gross ignorance of the law?
A: YES. The redemption period had long lapsed
when PNB applied for the issuance of the Writ of
Possession.In fact, the title over the subject
property had already been consolidated in PNB’s
name. Thus, it was ministerial upon Judge
Venadas, Sr. to issue the Writ of Possession in
favor of PNB, the registered owner of the subject
property. Though there are instances when the
issuance of the Writ of Possession may be
deferred, we find none of these recognized
exceptions present in the instant case. Spouses
Sombilon claim that the sale between PNB and
Atty. Garay was invalid as it was done in violation
of paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the Civil Code.
However, the alleged invalidity of the sale is not a
ground to oppose or defer the issuance of the
Writ of Possession as this does not affect PNB’s
right to possess the subject property. Thus, there
was no reason for Judge Venadas, Sr. to hold in
abeyance the implementation of the Writ of
Possession. Clearly, he committed grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the assailed Order holding in
abeyance the implementation of the Writ of
Possession because PNB, as the registered owner,
is entitled to the possession of the subject
property as a matter of right(Sps Sombilon v.
Garay and Philippine National Bank, G.R. No.
179914, June 16, 2014).
Q: Judge Abul failed to cause the raffle of an
injunction case and failed to follow the
procedural requirements in issuing a TRO and
a writ of preliminary injunction as he issued
them without prior notice to the defendant
and without a hearing. Is he liable for gross
ignorance of the law?
A: YES. Though not every judicial error bespeaks
ignorance of the law or of the rules, and that,
when committed in good faith, does not warrant
administrative sanction, the rule applies only in
cases within the parameters of tolerable
misjudgment. When the law or the rule is so
193
elementary, not to be aware of it or to act as if one
does not know it constitutes gross ignorance of
the law. A judge is expected to keep abreast of the
developments and amendments thereto, as well
as of prevailing jurisprudence. Ignorance of the
law by a judge can easily be the mainspring of
injustice. In the absence of fraud, dishonesty or
corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial
capacity are not subject to disciplinary action.
However, the assailed judicial acts must not be in
gross violation of clearly established law or
procedure, which every judge must be familiar
with (Sps. Lago v. Judge Abul, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-10-
2255, January 17, 2011).
Q: Cruz was the defendant in an ejectment
case filed by the Province of Bulacan involving
a parcel of land owned by the said province. A
decision was rendered against Cruz. He then
filed an appeal and several motions for
reconsideration but Justice Alino-
Hormachuelos, before whom the motions
were filed, subsequently denied all of them.
Consequently, Cruz charged all the judges and
justices with grave misconduct, gross
inexcusable negligence, and rendering a void
judgment. Should the judges be held liable for
grave misconduct and gross ignorance of the
law?
A: NO. The Court has consistently held that judges
will not be held administratively liable for mere
errors of judgment in their rulings or decisions
absent a showing of malice or gross ignorance on
their part. Bad faith or malice cannot be inferred
simply because the judgment is adverse to a
party. To hold a judge administratively
accountable for every erroneous ruling or
decision he renders, assuming that he has erred,
would be nothing short of harassment and would
make his position unbearable. Here, the fact that
the judge or justices rendered a decision not
favorable to Cruz is not enough to make them
liable for grave misconduct (Cruz v. Justice Alino-
Hormachuelos et. al., A.M. No. CA-04-38, March 31,
2004).
Disciplinary and criminal actions NOT a
substitute for judicial remedies
Disciplinary and criminal actions against a judge,
are not complementary or suppletory of, nor a
substitute for, judicial remedies, whether
ordinary or extraordinary. Resort to and
exhaustion of judicial remedies are prerequisites
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
 Legal Ethics
for the taking of other measures against the
persons of the judges concerned, whether of civil,
administrative, or criminal nature. It is only after
the available judicial remedies have been
exhausted and the appellate tribunals have
spoken with finality that the door to an inquiry
into his criminal, civil, or administrative liability
may be said to have opened, or closed (Maquiran
v. Grageda, A.M. No. RTJ-04-1888, February 11,
2005).
Q: Santiago’s Petition for Reconstitution of
Lost/Destroyed Original Certificate of Title
was granted by the Quezon City RTC. Upon
appeal to the CA, the decision was reversed by
the special division where Justice Enriquez
was Chairperson. His MR having been denied,
complainant filed a complaint before the SC.
Pending the decision of the SC, an
administrative charge of Gross Ignorance of
the law/Gross Incompetence was filed against
Associate Justice Enriquez. Is the filing of the
administrative complaint against him proper?
A: NO. The remedy of the aggrieved party is not
to file an administrative complaint against the
judge, but to elevate the assailed decision or
order to the higher court for review and
correction. An administrative complaint is not an
appropriate remedy where judicial recourse is
still available, such as a motion for
reconsideration, an appeal, or a petition for
certiorari, unless the assailed order or decision is
tainted with fraud, malice, or dishonesty.
The failure to interpret the law or to properly
appreciate the evidence presented does not
necessarily render a judge administratively liable.
A judicial officer cannot be called to account in a
civil action for acts done by him in the exercise of
his judicial function, however erroneous. In the
words of Alzua and Arnalot v. Johnson, “it is a
general principle of the highest importance to the
proper administration of justice that a judicial
officer, in exercising the authority vested in him,
shall be free to act upon his own convictions,
without apprehension of personal consequences
to himself." This concept of judicial immunity
rests upon consideration of public policy, its
purpose being to preserve the integrity and
independence of the judiciary. This principle is of
universal application and applies to all grades of
judicial officers from the highest judge of the
nation and to the lowest officer who sits as a
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
2018 GOLDEN NOTES
194
court (Santiago III v. Justice Enriquez, Jr. A.M. No.
CA-09-47-J, February 13, 2009).
GROUNDS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
DISCIPLINARY ACTION
Classifications of administrative charges
1. Serious
2. Less serious
3. Light
NOTE: Administrative penalties imposed on
judges are both punitive and corrective (2011
Bar).
Serious charges
For serious misconduct to exist, the judicial act
complained of should be corrupt or inspired by
an intention to violate the law or a persistent
disregard of well-known legal rules
1. Bribery, direct or indirect
2. Dishonesty and violations of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Law (R.A. 3019)
3. Gross misconduct constituting violations of
the Code of Judicial Conduct
4. Knowingly rendering an unjust judgment or
order as determined by a competent court in
an appropriate proceeding
5. Conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude
6. Willful failure to pay a just debt
7. Borrowing money or property from lawyers
and litigants in a case pending before the
court
8. Immorality
9. Gross ignorance of the law or procedure
10. Partisan political activities
11. Alcoholism and/or vicious habits
NOTE: While reference to a debt necessarily
implies a transaction that is private and outside
of official transactions, the rules do not thereby
intrude into public officials’ private lives; they
simply look at their actions from the prism of
public service and consider these acts
unbecoming of a public official (Grio Lending
Services v. Sermonia, A.M. No. P-03-1757,
December 10, 2003).
 DISCIPLINE OF MEMBERS OF THE JUDICIARY
Less serious charges
1. Undue delay in rendering a decision or order,
or in transmitting the records of a case
2. Frequently and unjustified absences without
leave or habitual tardiness
3. Unauthorized practice of law
4. Violation of Supreme Court rules, directives,
and circulars
5. Receiving additional or double compensation
unless specifically authorized by law
6. Untruthful statements in the certificate of
service
7. Simple misconduct
Light charges
1. Vulgar and unbecoming conduct
2. Gambling in public
3. Fraternizing with lawyers and litigants with
pending case/cases in his court
4. Undue delay in the submission of monthly
reports
Confidentiality of proceedings
Proceedings against judges of regular and special
courts and justices of the Court of Appeals and
the Sandiganbayan shall be private and
confidential, but a copy of the decision or
resolution of the Court shall be attached to the
record of the respondent in the Office of the Court
Administrator (Sec 12, Rule 140, RRC).
Resignation or retirement pending
administrative case
The retirement of a judge or any judicial officer
from service does not preclude the finding of any
administrative liability to which he should still be
answerable. Also, the withdrawal or recantation
of the complaint does not necessarily result in the
dismissal of the case (Atty. Molina v. Judge Paz,
A.M. No. RTJ -01-1638, December 8, 2003).
Q: May the heirs of a judge, who was found
guilty of gross neglect of duty and dismissed
from the service with disqualification from
holding public office for an offense committed
before he was appointed judge, be entitled to
gratuity benefits?
A: YES. Upon the demise of a judge, any
administrative complaint filed by the OCA against
him or her has to be considered closed and
195
terminated. Therefore, there is no valid reason
why the heirs of the deceased should not be
entitled to gratuity benefits for the period he
rendered service as MTCC judge up to the finality
of the CSC Resolution which imposed the penalty
of "dismissal from service with all the accessory
penalties including disqualification from holding
public office and forfeiture of benefits”.
The penalty of disqualification from holding
public office and forfeiture of benefits may not be
applied retroactively. However,the judge should
be considered terminated from service in the
judiciary as his appointment as MTCC judge is
deemed conditional upon his exoneration of the
CSC administrative charges against him (Re:
Application for retirement/gratuity benefits under
R.A. 910 as amended by R.A. 5095 and P.D. 1438
filed by Mrs. Butacan, surviving spouse of the late
Hon. Jimmy Butacan, former judge of MTC,
Tuguegarao City, who died on July 28, 2005, A.M.
No. 12535-Ret, April 22, 2008).
Quantum of evidence required
The ground for removal of a judicial officer
should be established beyond reasonable doubt.
Such is the rule where the charge on which the
removal is sought is misconduct in office, willful
neglect, corruption or incompetence. The general
rules in regard to admissibility of evidence in
criminal trials apply.
Q: May a judge be disciplined by the Supreme
Court based solely on a complaint filed by the
complainant and the answer of respondent
judge? If so, in what circumstances? What is
the rationale behind this power of the
Supreme Court? (1996 Bar)
A: YES. A judge may be disciplined by the
Supreme Court based solely on the basis of the
complaint filed by the complainant and the
answer of the respondent judge, under the
principle of res ipsa loquitor. The Supreme Court
has held that when the facts alleged in the
complaint are admitted or are already shown on
the record, and no credible explanation that
would negate the strong inference of evil intent is
forthcoming, no further hearing to establish such
facts to support a judgment as to culpability of
the respondent is necessary (In Re: Petition for
dismissal of Judge Dizon, A.M. No. 3086, May 3,
1989).
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
 Legal Ethics
NOTE: The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not
and cannot dispense with the twin requirements
of due process, notice and the opportunity to be
heard. It merely dispenses with the procedure
laid down in Rule 140, RRC (Rule 140: Discipline
of Judges of Regular and Special Courts and
Justices of the Court of Appeals and the
Sandiganbayan).
Suspension pendente lite not applicable to
judges
While it is true that preventive suspension
pendente lite does not violate the right of the
accused to be presumed innocent as the same is
not a penalty, the rules on preventive suspension
of judges, not having been expressly included in
the Rules of Court, are amorphous at best.
Moreover, it is established that any
administrative complaint leveled against a judge
must always be examined with a discriminating
eye, for its consequential effects are, by their
nature, highly penal, such that the respondent
judge stands to face the sanction of dismissal or
disbarment. As aforementioned, the filing of
criminal cases against judges may be used as
tools to harass them and may, in the long run,
create adverse consequences (Re: Conviction of
Judge Adoracion G. Angeles, A.M. No. 06-9-545-
RTC, January 31, 2008).
Grievance procedure in the Rules of Court is
not applicable to justices and judges
Complaints against justices and judges are filed
with the Supreme Court which has exclusive
administrative supervision over all courts and the
personnel thereof pursuant to Section 6, Art. VIII
of the Constitution. The Court en banc has the
power to discipline all judges of lower courts
including justices of the Court of Appeals (Section
11, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution).
As a matter of practice, the Supreme Court has
assigned complaints against Municipal or
Metropolitan Trial Judges to an Executive Judge of
a Regional Trial Court and complaints against
judges of Regional Trial Courts to a justice of the
Court of Appeals, while a complaint against a
member of the Court of Appeals would probably
be assigned to a member of the Supreme Court
for investigation, report and recommendation.
Retired SC Justices are now tasked for this
purpose.
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
2018 GOLDEN NOTES
196
Rules on the liability of judges
GR: A judge is not liable administratively, civilly,
or criminally, when he acts within his legal
powers and jurisdiction, even though such acts
are erroneous so long as he acts in good faith. In
such a case, the remedy of aggrieved party is not
to file an administrative complaint against the
judge but to elevate the error to a higher court for
review and correction.
NOTE: The reason behind such rule is to free the
judge from apprehension of personal
consequences to himself and to preserve the
integrity and independence of the judiciary.
XPN: Where an error is gross or patent,
deliberate and malicious, or is incurred with
evident bad faith; or when there is fraud,
dishonesty, or corruption.
Promotion as Judge does not exculpate
liability
Promotion as a judge during the pendency of
administrative case committed while still a Clerk
of Court cannot be considered either as a
mitigating or an exculpatory circumstance to
excuse him from any administrative liability. A
judge is still bound by the same principle
enshrined in Section 1, Article XI of the
Constitution, which states that a public office is a
public trust, and all public officers and employees
must at all times be accountable to the people,
serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity,
loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and
justice, and lead modest lives (OCA v. Atty. Mario
Melchor, Jr., A.M. No. P-06-2227, August 19, 2014).
Civil liabilities under the New Civil Code
1. Article 27– refusal or neglect without just
cause by a public servant to perform his
official duty
2. Article 32– directly or indirectly obstructing,
defeating, violating or in any manner
impeding or impairing civil liberties
guaranteed by the Constitution
This responsibility for damages is not,
however, demandable of judges except when
his act or omission constitutes a violation of
the Penal Code or other penal statute.
 DISCIPLINE OF MEMBERS OF THE JUDICIARY
Disabilities/restrictions under the New Civil interpretation (In Re: Climaco, A.C. No. 134-J,
Code January 21, 1974).

1. Article 1491 (5)– Justices, judges,
prosecuting attorneys, clerks of court of
superior and inferior courts and other
officers and employees connected with the
administration of justice cannot acquire by
purchase, even at a public or judicial action,
either in person or through the mediation of
another the property and rights in litigation
or levied upon an execution before the court
within whose jurisdiction or territory they
exercise their respective functions.
This prohibition includes the act of acquiring
by assignment and shall apply to lawyers
with respect to the property and rights that
may be the objects of any litigation in which
they may take part by virtue of their
profession (1996 Bar).
2. Article 739 – Donations made to a judge, his
wife, descendants and ascendants by reason
of his office are void.
Criminal Liabilities under the RPC and the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
1. Article 204- Knowingly rendering unjust
judgment.
a. Manifestly Unjust Judgment – one which
is so patently against the law, public
order, public policy and good morals that
a person of ordinary discernment can
easily sense its invalidity and injustice.
3. Article 206– Knowingly rendering an unjust
interlocutory order; and
4. Maliciously delaying the administration of
justice.
NOTE: The act must be committed
maliciously or with deliberate intent to
prejudice a party in a case.
SANCTIONS IMPOSED BY THE SUPREME
COURT ON ERRING MEMBERS OF THE
JUDICIARY
Sanctions for a judge found guilty of a
SERIOUS charge
Any of the following sanctions may be imposed:
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or
part of the benefits as the Court may
determine, and disqualification from
reinstatement or appointment to any public
office, including government-owned or
controlled corporations. Provided, however,
that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case
include accrued leave credits;
2. Suspension from office without salary and
other benefits for more than three (3) but not
exceeding six (6) months; or
3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not
exceeding P40,000.00.

NOTE: It must be shown beyond doubt that
the judgment is unjust as it is contrary to
law or is not supported by evidence and the
same was made with conscious and
deliberate intent to do an injustice (In Re:
Climaco, A.C. No. 134-J, January 21, 1974).
If the decision rendered by the judge is still
on appeal, the judge cannot be disqualified
on the ground of knowingly rendering an
unjust judgment (Abad v. Bleza, A.M. No. R-
227-RTJ, October 13, 1986).
2. Article 205– Judgment rendered through
negligence – committed by reason of
inexcusable negligence or ignorance.
NOTE: Negligence and ignorance are
inexcusable if they imply a manifest injustice,
which cannot be explained by reasonable
Sanctions for a judge found guilty of a LESS
serious charge
1. Suspension from office without salary and
other benefits for not less than one (1) nor
more than three (3) months; or
2. A fine of more than P10,000.00 but not
exceeding P20,000.00.
Sanctions for a judge found guilty of a LIGHT
charge
Any of the following sanctions shall be imposed:
1. A fine of not less than P1,000.00 but not
exceeding P10,000.00; and/or
2. Censure;
3. Reprimand; or
4. Admonition with warning

197 UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS

FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
 Legal Ethics
REINSTATEMENT OF A JUDGE PREVIOUSLY
DISCIPLINED

Propriety of reinstatement

Reinstatement is proper when there is no

indication that the judge is inspired by corrupt
motives or reprehensive purpose in the
performance of his functions.

Factors to be considered in reinstatement

1. Unsullied name and service of record prior to

dismissal
2. Commitment to avoid situations that spur
suspicion of arbitrary conditions
3. Complainant mellowed down in pushing
from his removal
4. Length of time separated from service.

UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS

2018 GOLDEN NOTES
198
 DISCIPLINE OF MEMBERS OF THE JUDICIARY
PROCEDURE FOR DISCIPLINE OF JUDGES OF REGULAR AND SPECIAL COURTS AND JUSTICES OF THE
COURT OF APPEALS AND THE SANDIGANBAYAN
(A.M. NO. 01-8-10-SC)
(2005 BAR)

If the complaint is sufficient in form and If the complaint is not sufficient

substance, a copy thereof shall be served in form and substance, the same
upon the respondent and he shall be shall be dismissed.
required to comment within 10 days from
date of service.

Upon the filing of the respondent’s

comment or upon the expiration of the time
for filing the same and unless other pleadings
or documents are required, the Supreme Court
shall refer the matter to:

The investigating justice or judge shall

Office of the Court Administrator for
evaluation, report, and recommendation
Or assign the case for investigation,
report, and recommendation to a
retired member of the Supreme
Court, if the respondent is a justice of
the CA and the Sandiganbayan
set a day of the HEARING and send
notice thereof to both parties. At such
hearing the parties may present oral
and documentary evidence.
If, after due notice, the respondent
fails to appear, the investigation shall
proceed ex parte.

The investigating justice or judge shall

Or to a justice of the Court of Appeals,
if the respondent is a judge of a Regional
Trial Court or of a special court of
equivalent rank
Or to a judge of the Regional Trial
Court if the respondent is a judge of an
inferior court.
terminate the investigation within
ninety (90) days from the date of its
commencement or within such
extension as the Supreme Court may
grant.

Within thirty (30) days from the termination of the investigation,

The Court shall take such
ACTION on the report as the
facts and the law may
warrant.
the investigating Justice or Judge shall submit to the Supreme
Court a REPORT containing findings of fact and recommendation.
The report shall be accompanied by the record containing the
evidence and the pleadings filed by the parties. The report shall
be confidential and shall be for the exclusive use of the Court.

NOTE: Before the Court approved this resolution, administrative and disbarment cases against members of
the bar who were likewise members of the court were treated separately. However, pursuant to the new
rule, an administrative case against a judge of a regular court based on grounds which are also grounds for
the disciplinary action against members of the Bar shall be automatically considered as disciplinary
proceedings against such judge as a member of the Bar. Since membership in the bar is an integral
qualification for membership in the bench, the moral fitness of a judge also reflects his moral fitness as a
lawyer. A judge who disobeys the basic rules of judicial conduct also violates his oath as a lawyer (Samson v.
Judge Caballero, A.M. No. RTJ-08-2138, August 5, 2009).

199 UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS

FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
 Legal Ethics
DISQUALIFICATION OF JUSTICES AND
JUDGES
(RULE 137)
COMPULSORY
Disqualification of justices and judges
GR: Section 1 of Rule 137 provides that a judge
is mandated by law to be disqualified under any
of the following instances:
1. The judge, or his wife, or child is pecuniarily
interested as heir, legatee, or creditor
2. The judge is related to either party of the
case within the sixth degree of
consanguinity or affinity, or to the counsel
within the fourth degree (computed
according to the rule of civil law)
3. The judge has been an executor,
administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel
4. The judge has presided in any inferior court
when his ruling or decision is the subject of
review
XPN: The same rule also provides that the judge
may hear and decide the case despite the
presence of a disqualification provided the
interested parties both give their written
consent, signed by them and entered upon the
record. It has been decided by the Supreme
Court that oral consent is not valid, even though
both parties have agreed (Lazo v. Judge Tiong,
A.M. No. MTJ-98-1173, December 15, 1998).
VOLUNTARY
Voluntary Inhibition according to the Rules of
Court states that a judge through the exercise of
sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting
in a case, for just or valid reasons other than
those mentioned above.
NOTE: A presiding judge must maintain and
preserve the trust and faith of the parties-
litigants. He must hold himself above reproach
and suspicion. At the very sign of lack of faith
and trust in his actions, whether well-grounded
or not, the judge has no other alternative but to
inhibit himself from the case (Gutang v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 124760 July 8, 1998).
The self-examination of the judge is necessary.
He should exercise his discretion in a way that
people’s faith in the courts of justice will not be
impaired. His decision, as to whether to hear the
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
2018 GOLDEN NOTES
200
case or not should be based and dependent on
giving importance to the public confidence in the
impartiality of a judge.
A judge may not be legally prohibited from sitting
in a litigation, but when circumstances appear that
will induce doubt as to his honest actuations and
probity in favor of either party, or incite such state
of mind, he should conduct a careful examination.
He should exercise his discretion in a way that
people’s faith in the Courts of Justice is not
impaired. The better course for the judge under
such circumstances is to disqualify himself
(Borromeo Herrera v. Borromeo, G.R. No. L-
41171, July 23, 1987).
Intimacy or friendship between a judge and an
attorney of record of one of the parties to a suit
It is NOT a ground for disqualification. That one of
the counsels in a case was a classmate of the trial
judge is not a legal ground for the disqualification
of the said judge. To allow it would unnecessarily
burden other trial judges to whom the case would
be transferred. But if the relationship between the
judge and an attorney for a party is such that there
would be a natural inclination to prejudice the
case, the judge should be disqualified in order to
guaranty a fair trial (Query of Executive Judge
Estrada, 1987).
It is well-established that inhibition is not allowed
at every instance that a schoolmate or classmate
appears before the judge as counsel for one of the
parties. A judge, too, is not expected to
automatically inhibit himself from acting in a case
involving a member of his fraternity (Jimenez, Jr. v.
People, G.R. No. 209195, September 17, 2014).
Rationale
The intendment of Rule 137 is incontestably that a
judge, sitting in a case, must at all times be wholly
free, disinterested, impartial and independent.
A judge has both the duty of rendering a just
decision and the duty of doing it in a manner
completely free from suspicion as to its fairness
and as to his integrity. The law conclusively
presumes that a judge cannot objectively or
impartially sit in such a case and, for that reason,
prohibits him and strikes at his authority to hear
and decide it (Garcia v. de la Pena, A.M. No. MTJ-92-
687, February 9, 1994).
 POWERS AND DUTIES OF COURTS AND JUDICIAL OFFICERS
Q: An information was filed charging Manuel
Jimenez and several others of the crime of
murder. One of the alleged co-conspirators,
Montero, filed a Mation for his discharge as a
state witness for the prosecution. Judge
Docena acted upon the said motion and
ruled that Montero is qualified to be a state
witness. Jimenez then filed a motion for
inhibition, praying that Judge Docena
inihibit himself from further acting upon the
case on the ground of bias, Jimenez being the
judge’s fraternity brother and State
Prosecutor Villanueva was his classmate.
Should Judge Docena inhibit himself from
hearing the case?
A: NO.The second paragraph of Section 1 of Rule
137 does not give judges the unlimited
discretion to decide whether or not to desist
from hearing a case. The inhibition must be for
just and valid causes. The mere imputation of
bias or partiality is likewise not enough ground
for their inhibition, especially when the charge
is without basis.It is well-established that
inhibition is not allowed at every instance that a
schoolmate or classmate appears before the
judge as counsel for one of the parties.In
attributing bias and prejudice to Judge Docena,
Jimenez must prove that the judge acted or
conducted himself in a manner clearly indicative
of arbitrariness or prejudice so as to defeat the
attributes of the cold neutrality that an
impartial judge must possess. Unjustified
assumptions and mere misgivings that the judge
acted with prejudice, passion, pride and
pettiness in the performance of his functions
cannot overcome the presumption that a judge
shall decide on the merits of a case with an
unclouded vision of its facts (Jimenez, Jr. v.
People, G.R. No. 209195, September 17, 2014).
POWERS AND DUTIES OF COURTS AND
JUDICIAL OFFICERS (RULE 135)
Nature of the office of the Judge
Justices and judges must ever realize that they
have no constituency, serve no majority or
minority but serve only the public interest as
they see it in accordance with their oath of
office, guided only by the Constitution and their
own conscience and honor (Galman v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 72670, September 12,
1986).
Courts always open; justice to be promptly
and impartially administered. (Sec. 1)
201
GR: Courts of justice shall always be open for:
1. filing of any pleading, motion or other papers;
2. the trial of cases;
3. hearing of motions; and
4. the issuance of orders or rendition of
judgments
XPN: Legal holidays
Exclusion of the public from the proceedings
GR: The sitting of every court of justice shall be
public
XPN: But any court may, in its discretion, exclude
the public when the evidence to be adduced is of
such nature as to require their exclusion in the
interest of morality or decency.
Records of a court of justice are NOT always
public (Sec. 2)
GR: The records of every court of justice shall be
considered public records and shall be available for
the inspection of any interested person, at all
proper business hours, under the supervision of
the clerk having custody of such records.
XPN: Unless the court shall, in any special case,
have forbidden their publicity, in the interest
of morality or decency.
Instances in which Superior Court processes
are enforceable in any part of the Philippines
(Sec. 3)
1. A case is pending to bring in a defendant
2. For the arrest of an accused person
3. Execution of any order or judgment of the
court
Enforceability of the processes in inferior
courts (Sec. 4)
Process of inferior court shall be enforceable
within the province where the municipality or city
lies.
It shall not be served outside its boundaries,
provided the enforcement is made with the
approval of judge of first instance of said province.
Cases where the judge of the first instance of a
particular province can approve the service of
process of inferior courts outside the
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
 Legal Ethics
boundaries of province in which they are
comprised
1. When an order for the delivery of personal
property lying outside the province is to be
complied with;
2. When an attachment of real or personal
property lying outside the province is to be
made;
3. When the action is against two or more
defendants residing in different provinces;
and
4. When the place where the case has been
brought is that specified in a contract in
writing between the parties, or is the place
of the execution of such contract as appears
therefrom
Criminal processes served outside judge’s
jurisdiction is allowed
When the district judge, or in his absence the
provincial fiscal, shall certify that in his opinion
the interests of justice require such service.
Writs of execution by inferior courts
Writs of execution issued by inferior courts may
be enforced in any part of the Philippines
without any previous approval of the judge of
first instance.
Inherent powers of the courts (Sec. 5)
Inherent powers of courts-- Every court shall
have power:
a. To preserve and enforce order in its
immediate presence;
b. To enforce order in proceedings before it, or
before a person or persons empowered to
conduct a judicial investigation under its
authority;
c. To compel obedience to its judgments,
orders and processes, and to the lawful
orders of a judge out of court, in a case
pending therein;
d. To control, in furtherance of justice, the
conduct of its ministerial officers, and of all
other persons in any manner connected
with a case before it, in every manner
appertaining thereto;
e. To compel the attendance of persons to
testify in a case pending therein;
f. To administer or cause to be administered
oaths in a case pending therein, and in all
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
2018 GOLDEN NOTES
202
other cases where it may be necessary in the
exercise of its powers;
g. To amend and control its process and orders
so as to make them comfortable to law and
justice;
h. To authorize a copy of a lost or destroyed
pleading or other paper to be filed and used
instead of the original, and to restore, and
supply deficiencies in its records and
proceedings.
Carrying jurisdiction into effect (Sec. 6)
When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or
judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and
other means necessary to carry it into effect may
be employed by such court or officer.
Procedure to be followed in the exercise of such
jurisdiction not specifically pointed out by law
or rules (Sec. 6)
Any suitable process or mode of proceeding may be
adopted which appears conformable to the spirit of
said law or rules.
Trials upon merits, where conducted (Sec. 7)
All trials upon the merits shall be conducted in
open court and so far as convenient in a regular
court room.
Orders in chambers (Sec. 8)
All other acts or proceedings, excluding trial upon
the merits, may be done or conducted by a judge in
chambers, without the attendance of the clerk or
other court officials.
Instances where the hearings may be had at any
place in the judicial district which the judge
shall deem convenient (Sec. 8)
1. On the filing of a petition for the writ of habeas
corpus
2. For release upon bail or reduction of bail in
any Court of First Instance (Section 8, Rule 135
of Rules of Court).
Signing judgments outside of province (Sec. 9)
When a judge who is appointed or assigned in any
province or branch of a Court of First Instance in a
province shall leave the province by transfer or
assignment to another court of equal jurisdiction
or by expiration of his temporary assignment
 POWERS AND DUTIES OF COURTS AND JUDICIAL OFFICERS
without having decided a case totally heard by
him and which was argued or an opportunity
given for argument to the parties or their
counsel, it shall be lawful for him to prepare and
sign his decision in the said case anywhere in
the Philippines.
Instances when Supreme Court can
authorize the judge to continue hearing and
to decide said case notwithstanding his
transfer or appointment to another court of
equal jurisdiction
1. Upon petition of any of the parties to the
case and the recommendation of the
respective district judge;
2. If a case has been heard only in part; and
3. If no other judge had heard the case in part.
COURT RECORDS AND GENERAL DUTIES OF
CLERKS AND STENOGRAPHERS
(RULE 136)
Style of process (Sec. 2)
Processes shall be under the seal of the court
from which it issues, styled under Republic of
the Philippines, Province or City of, signed by
the clerk and shall bear the date on which it was
actually issued.
Clerk’s office (Sec. 3)
The clerk’s office, with the clerk or his deputy in
attendance, shall be open during business hours
on all days except on Sundays and legal
holidays. The clerk of the Supreme Court and
that of the Court of Appeals shall keep office at
Manila and all papers authorized or required to
be filed therein shall be filed at Manila.
Duty of a clerk of court
The Branch Clerk of Court, being the
administrative assistant of the Presiding Judge,
has the duty of assisting in the management of
the calendar of the court and in other matters
not involving the exercise of judicial discretion
or judgment of the judge. He should be a model
for his co-employees to act speedily and with
dispatch on their assigned tasks to avoid the
clogging of the court’s docket, and thereby assist
in the sound and speedy administration of
justice. Clerks of court must be assiduous in
performing their official duties and in
supervising and managing court dockets and
203
record (Office of the Court Administrator v. Sheriff
IV Julius Cabe, A.M. No. P-96-1185, June 26, 2000).
Time and again, the Court has emphasized the
heavy burden and responsibility which court
personnel are saddled with in view of their exalted
positions as keepers of public faith. They must be
constantly reminded that any impression of
impropriety, misdeed or negligence in the
performance of official functions must be avoided.
In the case of Mendoza v. Mabutas, the Court held
that it condemns and would never countenance
any conduct, act or omission on the part of all those
involved in the administration of justice which
would violate the norm of public accountability and
diminish or even just tend to diminish the faith of
the people in the Judiciary (Ibid.).
Issuance by clerk of process (Sec. 4)
The clerk of a superior court shall issue under the
seal of the court all ordinary writs and process
incident to pending cases, the issuance of which
does not involve the exercise of functions
appertaining to the court or judge only; and may,
under the direction of the court or judge, make out
and sign letters of administration, appointments of
guardians, trustees, and receivers, and all writs and
process issuing from the court.
Duties of the clerk in the absence or by
direction of the judge (Sec. 5)
In the absence of the judge, the clerk may perform
all the duties of the judge in receiving applications,
petitions, inventories, reports, and the issuance of
all orders and notices that follow as a matter of
course under these rules, and may also, when
directed so to do by the judge, receive the accounts
of executors, administrators, guardians, trustees,
and receivers, and all evidence relating to them, or
to the settlement of the estates of deceased
persons, or to guardianships, trusteeships, or
receiverships, and forthwith transmit such reports,
accounts, and evidence to the judge, together with
his findings in relation to the same, if the judge
shall direct him to make findings and include the
same in his report.
Clerk shall receive papers and prepare minutes
(Sec. 6)
The clerk of each superior court shall receive and
file all pleadings and other papers properly
presented, endorsing on each such paper the time
when it was filed, and shall attend all of the
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
 Legal Ethics
sessions of the court and enter its proceedings
for each day in a minute book to be kept by him.
Safekeeping of property (Sec. 7)
The clerk shall safely keep all records, papers,
files, exhibits and public property committed to
his charge, including the library of the court, and
the seals and furniture belonging to his office.
General Docket (Sec. 8)
The clerk shall keep a general docket, each page
of which shall be numbered and prepared for
receiving all the entries in a single case, and
shall enter therein all cases, numbered
consecutively in the order in which they were
received, and, under the heading of each case
and a complete title thereof, the date of each
paper filed or issued, of each order or judgment
entered, and of each other step taken in the case
so that by reference to a single page the history
of the case may be seen.
Q: Judge Tormis was accused of
mismanagement of the court and case
records. The report revealed that Branch 4
failed to maintain a docket book or any
similar system of record-keeping and
monitoring and to keep a General Docket
Book. Judge Tormis claimed that she
faithfully conducted semestral physical
inventories of case records except during the
period which comprised her three
suspensions as she was then denied access to
her courtroom and case records. On the
other hand, the Clerk of Court, Mr. Teves,
explained that the alleged error in his
reports can be attributed to the discrepancy
in procedure or appreciation in the
preparation of the reports. Is Judge Tormis
guilty of violation of Supreme Court rules,
directives, and circulars?
A: YES, for her failure to comply with her duty
of providing an efficient court management
system in her court which includes the
preparation and use of docket inventory and
monthly report of cases as tools. Although the
duty is vested with Mr. Teves, it is the duty of
Judge Tormis to make sure that the members of
her staff perform their duties. This failure
contributed to their inability to keep track of the
number of cases assigned as well as to account
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
2018 GOLDEN NOTES
204
for all the cases and records assigned to the court.
The OCA noted that Judge Tormis failed to conduct
an actual physical inventory of cases to keep
abreast of the status of the pending cases and to be
informed that every case is in proper order. If the
same was conducted, she would have discovered
that Mr. Teves had been committing a mistake in
the inventory of cases. Likewise, Mr. Teves is liable
for simple neglect of duty (Office of the Court
Administrator v. Hon. Rosabella M. Tormis, A.M. No.
MTJ-12-1817, March 12, 2013).
Judgment and entries book (Sec. 9)
The clerk shall keep a judgment book containing a
copy of each judgment rendered by the court in
order of its date, and a book of entries of judgments
containing at length in chronological order entries
of all final judgments or orders of the court.
Execution book (Sec. 10)
The clerk shall keep an execution book in which he
or his deputy shall record at length in chronological
each execution, and the officer’s return thereon, by
virtue of which real property has been sold.
Certified copies (Sec. 11)
The clerk shall prepare, for any person demanding
the same, a copy certified under the seal of the
court of any paper, record, order, judgment, or
entry in his office, proper to be certified, for the
fees prescribed by these rules.
Index (Sec. 13)
The general docket, judgment book, entries book
and execution book shall be indexed in alphabetical
order in the names of the parties, and each of them.
If the court so directs, the clerk shall keep two or
more of either or all of the books and dockets
above-mentioned, separating civil from criminal
cases, or actions from special proceedings, or
otherwise keeping cases separated by classes as
the court shall deem best.
Taking of record from the clerk’s office (Sec.
14)
GR: No record shall be taken from the clerk’s office
without an order of the court except as otherwise
provided by these rules.
XPN: The Solicitor General or any of his assistants,
the provincial fiscal or his deputy, and the
 POWERS AND DUTIES OF COURTS AND JUDICIAL OFFICERS
attorneys de officio shall be permitted, upon
proper receipt, to withdraw from the clerk’s
office the record of any cases in which they are
interested.
Docket and other records of inferior courts
(Sec. 18)
Every municipal and city judge shall keep a
well-bound book labeled docket, in which he
shall enter for each case:
a. The title of the case including the names of
all the parties;
b. The nature of the case, whether civil or
criminal, and if the latter, the offense
charged;
c. The date of issuing preliminary and
intermediate processes including orders of
arrest and subpoenas, and the date and
nature of the return thereon;
d. The date of the appearance or default of the
defendant;
e. The date of presenting the plea, answer, or
motion to quash, and the nature of the
same;
f. The minutes of the trial, including the date
thereof and of all adjournments;
g. The names and addresses of all witnesses;
h. The date and nature of the judgment, and, in
a civil case, the relief granted;
i. An itemized statement of the costs;
j. The date of any execution issued, and the
date and contents of the return thereon;
and
k. The date of any notice of appeal filed, and
the name of the party filing the same.
A municipal (or city) judge may keep two
dockets, one for civil and one for criminal cases.
He shall also keep all the pleadings and other
papers and exhibits in cases pending in his
court, and shall certify copies of his docket
entries and other records proper to be certified,
for the fees prescribed by these rules. It shall
not be necessary for the municipal (or city)
judge to reduce to writing the testimony of
witnesses, except that of the accused in
preliminary investigations.
NOTE: An orderly and efficient case
management system is no doubt essential in the
expeditious disposition of judicial caseloads,
because only thereby can the judges, branch
clerks of courts, and the clerks-in-charge of the
civil and criminal dockets ensure that the court
205
records, which will be the bases for rendering the
judgments and dispositions, and the review of the
judgments and dispositions on appeal, if any, are
intact, complete, updated, and current. Such a
system necessarily includes the regular and
continuing physical inventory of cases to enable
the judge to keep abreast of the status of the
pending cases and to be informed that everything
in the court is in proper order. In contrast,
mismanaged or incomplete records, and the lack of
periodic inventory definitely cause unwanted
delays in litigations and inflict unnecessary
expenses on the parties and the State (In Re: Report
on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the Regional Trial
Court, Br. 45, Urdaneta City, Pangasinan, A.M.
No. 08-4-253-RTC, January 12, 2011).
Inventory of cases
Although the presiding judge and his or her staff
share the duty of taking a continuing and regular
inventory of cases, the responsibility primarily
resides in the presiding judge. The continuity and
regularity of the inventory are designed to invest
the judge and the court staff with the actual
knowledge of the movements, number, and ages of
the cases in the docket of their court, knowledge
essential to the efficient management of caseload.
The judge should not forget that he or she is duty-
bound to perform efficiently, fairly, and with
reasonable promptness all his or her judicial
duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions.
Thus, the judge must devise an efficient recording
and filing system for his or her court that enables
him or her to quickly monitor cases and to manage
the speedy and timely disposition of the cases
(Ibid.).
Stenographer (Sec. 17)
It shall be the duty of the stenographer who has
attended a session of a court either in the morning
or in the afternoon, to deliver to the clerk of court,
immediately at the close of such morning or
afternoon session, all the notes he has taken, to be
attached to the record of the case; and it shall
likewise be the duty of the clerk to demand that the
stenographer comply with said duty. The clerk of
court shall stamp the date on which such notes are
received by him. When such notes are transcribed
the transcript shall be delivered to the clerk, duly
initialed on each page thereof, to be attached to the
record of the case. Whenever requested by a party,
any statement made by a judge of First Instance, or
by a commissioner, with reference to a case being
tried by him, or to any of the parties thereto, or to
any witness or attorney, during the hearing of such
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
 Legal Ethics
case, shall be made of record in the stenographic
notes.
LEGAL FEES
(RULE 141, A.M. NO. 04-2-04-SC)
MANNER OF PAYMENT
Payment shall be made upon the filing of the
pleading or other application which initiates an
action or proceeding. The fees prescribed shall
be paid in full upon filing of the pleading or
application.
Q: Plaintiff Jun Ahorro filed a complaint for
collection of sum of money before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila. Because of
the large amount of his claim, he had to pay a
sizeable docket fee. He insisted on paying
the docket fee and other fees in installments
because staggered payment is allowed under
Rule 141, as amended. The Office of the Clerk
of Court (OCC) refused to accept the
complaint unless he paid the full amount of
the docket and other required fees. Plaintiff
Jun Ahorro’s position correct? (2013 Bar)
A: NO, docket and other required fees must be
paid in full(A.M. No. 00-2-01-SC).
FEES IN LIEN
Where the court in its final judgment awards a
claim not alleged, or a relief different from, or
more than that claimed in the pleading, the
party concerned shall pay the additional fees
which shall constitute a lien on the judgment in
satisfaction of said lien.
PERSONS AUTHORIZED TO COLLECT LEGAL
FEES
Except as otherwise provided, these officers and
persons, together with their assistants and
deputies, may demand, receive, and take the
several fees hereinafter mentioned and allowed
for any business by them respectively done by
virtue of their several offices, and no more:
1. Clerks of the Supreme Court, Court of
Appeals, Sandiganbayan and Court of Tax
Appeals
2. Clerks of Regional Trial Courts
3. Clerks of Court of the First Level Courts
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
2018 GOLDEN NOTES
206
4. Sheriffs, process servers and other persons
serving processes
5. Notaries
6. Other officers taking depositions
The following persons are also entitled to receive
fees/ compensation under rule 141:
1. Stenographers
2. Witnesses
3. Appraisers
4. Commissioners in eminent domain
proceedings
5. Commissioners in the proceedings for partition
of real estate
NOTE: The persons herein authorized to collect
legal fees shall be accountable officers and shall be
required to post bond in such amount as
prescribed by the law.
Basis of the amount of fee in filing an action or
proceeding
1. For filing an action or proceeding with SC, CA
or Sandiganbayan for each action or
proceeding, including petition for intervention,
and for all services in the same – amount of fee
would be = P3,000
2. Petition for review from a decision of the RTC
or of the Central Board of Assessment Appeals
or a special civil action with the CTA or an
appeal from a decision of a CTA Division to the
CTA En Banc – P3,000.
Sheriff’s expense is NOT the same as Sheriff’s
fees
Sheriff’s expenses are not exacted for any service
rendered by the court; they are the amount
deposited to the Clerk of Court upon filing of the
complaint to defray the actual travel expenses of
the sheriff, process server or other court-
authorized persons in the service of summons,
subpoena and other court processes that would be
issued relative to the trial of the case. It is not the
same as sheriff’s fees under Section 10, Rule 141 of
the Rules of Court, which refers to those imposed
by the court for services rendered to a party
incident to the proceedings before it (Re: Letter
dated April 18, 2011 of Chief Public Attorney Persida
Rueda-Acosta Requesting Exemption From the
 POWERS AND DUTIES OF COURTS AND JUDICIAL OFFICERS
Payment Of Sheriff’s Expenses, A.M. No. 11-10-03-
0, July 30, 2013).
Persons exempt from payment of legal fees
1. Indigent litigants
2. Republic of the Philippines
NOTE: The clients of PAO shall be exempt from
payment of docket and other fees incidental to
instituting an action in court and other quasi-
judicial bodies, as an original proceeding or on
appeal (Section 6, R.A. No. 9406).
Rule with regard to indigent litigants
Indigent litigants are exempt from payment of
legal fees. However, the legal fees shall be a lien
on any judgment rendered in the case favorable
to the indigent litigant unless the court
otherwise provides.
Requisites for the indigents to be able to
enjoy exemption
He must execute an affidavit that he and his
immediate family do not earn a gross income of
an amount double the monthly minimum wage
of an employee, and they do not own any real
property with the fair value (as stated in the
current tax declaration) of more than P300,000.
This affidavit shall be supported by an affidavit
of a disinterested person attesting to the truth
of the litigant’s affidavit. The current tax
declaration, if any, shall be attached to the
litigant’s affidavit.
Any falsity in the affidavit of litigant or
disinterested person shall be sufficient cause to
dismiss the complaint or action or to strike out
the pleading of that party, without prejudice to
whatever criminal liability may have been
incurred (Sec. 19, A.M. No. 08-11-7-SC).
Rule as to Republic of the Philippines
GR: The Republic of the Philippines, its agencies
and instrumentalities are exempt from paying
the legal fees provided in the rule.
XPN: Local governments and government-
owned or controlled corporations with or
without independent charters are not exempt
from paying such fees.
However, all court actions, criminal or civil,
instituted at the instance of the provincial, city
207
or municipal treasurer or assessor under Sec. 280
of the Local Government Code of 1991 shall be
exempt from the payment of court and sheriff’s
fees.
Purpose of mediation fund
The fund shall be utilized for the promotion of
court-annexed mediation and other relevant modes
of alternative dispute resolution (ADR), training of
mediators, payment of mediator’s fees, and
operating expenses of the Philippine Mediation
Center (PMC) units including expenses for
technical assistance and organizations/individuals,
transportation/communication expenses,
photocopying, supplies and equipment, expense
allowance and miscellaneous expenses, whenever
necessary, subject to auditing rules and
regulations.
Fees do NOT form part of the Judiciary
Development Fund
The mediation fees shall not form part of the
Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) under P.D. No.
1949 nor of the special allowances granted to
justices and judges under Republic Act No. 9227.
The amount collected shall be receipted and
separated as part of a special fund to be known as
the “Mediation Fund” and shall accrue to the SC-
PHILJA-PMC Fund, disbursements from which are
and shall be pursuant to guidelines approved by
the Supreme Court.
Exceptions in paying mediation fees
The following are exempt from contributing to the
mediation fund:
1. Pauper litigant; and
NOTE: However, the court shall provide that
the unpaid contribution to the Mediation Fund
shall be considered a lien on any monetary
award in a judgment favorable to the pauper
litigant.
2. Accused-appellant
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
 Legal Ethics
COSTS
(RULE 142)
RECOVERY OF COSTS
PREVAILING PARTY
Costs allowed to a prevailing party
GR: Costs shall be allowed to a prevailing party
as a matter of course. However, the court shall
have power, for special reasons, to adjudge that
either party shall pay the costs of an action, or
that the same be divided, as may be equitable
(Sec. 1, Rule 142, RRC).
XPN: Unless otherwise provided in these rules
Costs to the Republic of the Philippines (Sec.
1, Rule 142, RRC)
GR: Costs shall not be allowed against the
Republic of the Philippines
XPN: Unless otherwise provided by law.
Q: Is the Land bank of the Philippines liable
to the cost of suit in the performance of a
governmental function such as disbursement
of agrarian funds to satisfy awards of just
compensation?
A:NO, the Land Bank of the Philippines is in the
performance of a governmental function in an
agrarian reform proceeding, hence, according to
Rule 142, it is exempt from the payment of costs
of suit (Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Esther
Anson Rivera, G.R. No. 182431, November17,
2010).
DISMISSED APPEAL OR ACTION
Power of the court to render judgment for
costs even if an appeal has been dismissed
If an action or appeal is dismissed, for want of
jurisdiction or otherwise, the court retains the
power to render judgment for costs, as justice
may require (Sec. 2, Rule 142, RRC).
FRIVOLOUS APPEAL
If an appeal is deemed frivolous, double or
treble costs shall be imposed on the plaintiff or
appellant, which shall be paid by his attorney, if
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
2018 GOLDEN NOTES
208
so ordered by the Court (Sec. 3, Rule 142, RRC).
Q: A vehicular accident between a Fuso truck
owned by Maglana Rice and Corn Mill and a
Honda Accord owned by Sps. Tan occurred on
Aug. 28, 1996. Sps. Tan filed a complaint in the
MTCC which was ruled in their favor. Maglana
Rice appealed, but the RTC upheld the MTCC.
An appeal and the MR to the CA were later
denied by the CA, hence, Maglana Rice appealed
to the Supreme Court. The issue is whether or
not the appeal was frivolous.
A: YES, the rejection by CA indicated that the three
lower courts with legal capacity and official
function to resolve issues, all found the same set of
facts. In this recourse, the petitioners presented no
ground sufficient to persuade the court to warrant
a review of the uniform findings of fact. Given the
frivolousness of the appeal, the court imposes
treble costs of suit on the petitioners under Rule
142 (Maglana Rice and Corn Mill Inc. v. Annie L. Tan,
G.R. No. 159051, September 21, 2011).
FALSE ALLEGATIONS
A false allegation made without reasonable cause
and found untrue shall subject the offending party
to the reasonable expenses as may have been
necessarily incurred by the other party by reason
of such untrue pleading. The amount shall be fixed
by the judge and shall be taxed as costs (Sec. 4, Rule
142, RRC).
NON-APPEARANCE OF WITNESSES
If a witness fails to appear at the time and place
specified in the subpoena issued by any inferior
court, the costs of the warrant of arrest and of the
arrest of the witness shall be borne by him, if the
court determines that his failure to answer the
subpoena was willful and without excuse (Sec. 12,
Rule 142, RRC).
 LEGAL FORMS
LEGAL FORMS

QUITCLAIM IN LABOR CASES

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:

That I, __________________, Filipino, of legal age, a resident of __________________, and formerly employed
with __________________, do by these presents acknowledge receipt of the sum of __________________, Philippine
Currency, from _____________________ in full payment and final settlement of the (financial assistance or
separation pay, overtime pay, salary or salaries, wage or wages, commutable sick and vacation leaves,
gratuities or any kind of compensation or emoluments) due to me or which may be due to me from
____________________ under the law or under any existing agreement with respect thereto, as well as any
and all claims of whatever kind and nature which I have or may have against ________________, arising from
my employment with (and the termination of my employment with ______________________.

In consideration of said payment, I do hereby quitclaim, release, discharge and waive any and all
actions of whatever nature, expected, real or apparent, which I may have against _______________, its
directors, officers, employees, agents and clients by reason of or arising from my employment with the
company. I will institute no action, whether civil, criminal, labor or administrative against
_________________, its directors, officers, employees, agents and clients. Any and all actions which I may
have commenced either solely in my name or jointly with others before any office, board, bureau, court,
or tribunal against _________________, its directors, officers, employees, agents and clients are hereby
deemed and considered voluntary withdrawn by me and I will no longer testify or continue to prosecute
said action(s).

I declare that I have read this document and have fully understood its contents. I further declare
that I voluntarily and willingly executed this Release, Waiver and Quitclaim with full knowledge of my
rights under the law.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand at _____________, this ___ day of _______________,
2000.

_______________________
Affiant

SIGNED IN THE PRESENCE OF

_______________________ ______________________

LEASE CONTRACT

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:

This CONTRACT OF LEASE is made and executed at the City of _____, this day of _______________, 20____, by
and between:

(NAME OF LESSOR), of legal age, single/married to (Name of spouse if any), Filipino, and with
residence and postal address at (Address), hereinafter referred to as the LESSOR.

-AND-

(NAME OF LESSEE), Filipino and with residence and postal address at (Address), hereinafter
referred to as the LESSEE.

209 UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS

FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
 LEGAL FORMS

WITNESSETH; That

WHEREAS, the LESSOR is the owner of THE LEASED PREMISES, a residential property situated at
(Address of property to be leased);

WHEREAS, the LESSOR agrees to lease-out the property to the LESSEE and the LESSEE is willing to
lease the same;

NOW THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing premises, the LESSOR leases unto the
LESSEE and the LESSEE hereby accepts from the LESSOR the LEASED premises, subject to the
following:

TERMS AND CONDITIONS

1. PURPOSES: That premises hereby leased shall be used exclusively by the LESSEE for residential
purposes only and shall not be diverted to other uses. It is hereby expressly agreed that if at any time
the premises are used for other purposes, the LESSOR shall have the right to rescind this contract
without prejudice to its other rights under the law.

2. TERM: This term of lease is for ONE (1) YEAR. from (Date) to (Date) inclusive. Upon its expiration,
this lease may be renewed under such terms and conditions as my be mutually agreed upon by both
parties, written notice of intention to renew the lease shall be served to the LESSOR not later than seven
(7) days prior to the expiry date of the period herein agreed upon.

3. RENTAL RATE: The monthly rental rate for the leased premises shall be in PESOS: AMOUNT IN
WORDS (P 00,000.00), Philippine Currency. All rental payments shall be payable to the LESSOR.

4. DEPOSIT: That the LESSEE shall deposit to the LESSOR upon signing of this contract and prior to
move-in an amount equivalent to the rent for THREE (3) MONTHS or the sum of PESOS: AMOUNT IN
WORDS (P 00,000.00), Philippine Currency. wherein the two (2) months deposit shall be applied as rent
for the 11th and 12th months and the remaining one (1) month deposit shall answer partially for
damages and any other obligations, for utilities such as Water, Electricity, CATV, Telephone, Association
Dues or resulting from violation(s) of any of the provision of this contract.

5. DEFAULT PAYMENT: In case of default by the LESSEE in the payment of the rent, such as when the
checks are dishonored, the LESSOR at its option may terminate this contract and eject the LESSEE. The
LESSOR has the right to padlock the premises when the LESSEE is in default of payment for One (1)
month and may forfeit whatever rental deposit or advances have been given by the LESSEE.

6. SUB-LEASE: The LESSEE shall not directly or indirectly sublet, allow or permit the leased premises
to be occupied in whole or in part by any person, form or corporation, neither shall the LESSEE assign its
rights hereunder to any other person or entity and no right of interest thereto or therein shall be
conferred on or vested in anyone by the LESSEE without the LESSOR'S written approval.

7. PUBLIC UTILITIES: The LESSEE shall pay for its telephone, electric, cable TV, water, Internet,
association dues and other public services and utilities during the duration of the lease.

8. FORCE MAJEURE: If whole or any part of the leased premises shall be destroyed or damaged by fire,
flood, lightning, typhoon, earthquake, storm, riot or any other unforeseen disabling cause of acts of God,
as to render the leased premises during the term substantially unfit for use and occupation of the
LESSEE, then this lease contract may be terminated without compensation by the LESSOR or by the
LESSEE by notice in writing to the other.

9. LESSOR'S RIGHT OF ENTRY: The LESSOR or its authorized agent shall after giving due notice to the
LESSEE shall have the right to enter the premises in the presence of the LESSEE or its representative at
any reasonable hour to examine the same or make repairs therein or for the operation and maintenance
of the building or to exhibit the leased premises to prospective LESSEE, or for any other lawful purposes
which it may deem necessary.

210
 LEGAL FORMS
10. EXPIRATION OF LEASE: At the expiration of the term of this lease or cancellation thereof, as
herein provided, the LESSEE will promptly deliver to the LESSOR the leased premises with all

corresponding keys and in as good and tenable condition as the same is now, ordinary wear and tear
expected devoid of all occupants, movable furniture, articles and effects of any kind. Non-compliance
with the terms of this clause by the LESSEE will give the LESSOR the right, at the latter's option, to refuse
to accept the delivery of the premises and compel the LESSEE to pay rent therefrom at the same rate
plus Twenty Five (25) % thereof as penalty until the LESSEE shall have complied with the terms hereof.
The same penalty shall be imposed in case the LESSEE fails to leave the premises after the expiration of
this Contract of Lease or termination for any reason whatsoever.

11. JUDICIAL RELIEF: Should any one of the parties herein be compelled to seek judicial relief against
the other, the losing party shall pay an amount of One Hundred (100) % of the amount clamed in the
complaint as attorney's fees which shall in no case be less than P50,000.00 pesos in addition to other
cost and damages which the said party may be entitled to under the law.

12. This CONTRACT OF LEASE shall be valid and binding between the parties, their successors-in-
interest and assigns.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, parties herein affixed their signatures on the date and place above written.

(Name of Lessor) (Name of Lessee)

LESSOR LESSEE

Signed in the presence of:

_____________________________ ______________________________

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT – By an individual – One Party Instrument

Republic of the Philippines)
City/Municipality of _________________________) S.S

ACKNOWLEDGMENT
BEFORE ME, a Notary Public for and in the (Province/City/Municipality) of _____________,
personally appeared _____________ with Community Tax Certificate No. _____________ issued on _____________
at _____________ (and Tax Identification No. (T.I.N.) _____________), known to me and to me known to be the
same person who executed the foregoing instrument which (he/she) acknowledged to me as (his/her)
free and voluntary act and deed, consisting of only ______ (____) page/s, including this page in which this
Acknowledgement is written, duly signed by (him/her) and (his/her) instrumental witnesses on each
and every page hereof.
WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL this _____________ at _____________, Philippines.

NOTARY PUBLIC
Doc. No. ______;
Page No. ______;
Book No. ______;
Series of ______;

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT – By Individuals Multi-party Instrument

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES)

CITY/MUNICIPALITY OF ______) SS.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

211 UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS

FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
 LEGAL FORMS

BEFORE ME, a Notary Public for and in the (Province/City/Municipality) of _____________, personally
appeared the following persons, with their respective Community Tax Certificates as follows:
Name C.T.C. No. Date / Place Issued
1. ____________ _____________ _____________
2. _____________ _____________ _____________
3. _____________ _____________ _____________

all known to me and to me known to be the same persons who executed the foregoing instrument which
they acknowledged to me to be their free and voluntary act and deed, consisting of only ______ (____)
page/s, including this page in which this Acknowledgement is written, duly signed by them and their
instrumental witnesses on each and every page hereof.
WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL this _____________ at _____________, Philippines.

NOTARY PUBLIC
Doc. No. ______;
Page No. ______;
Book No. ______;
Series of ______;

DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:

This DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE is made, executed and entered into by:

(NAME OF SELLER), of legal age, single/married to (Name of spouse if any), Filipino, and with
residence and postal address at (Address of Seller), hereinafter referred to as the SELLER

-AND-

(NAME OF BUYER), Filipino and with residence and postal address at (Address of Buyer),
hereinafter referred to as the BUYER.

WITNESSETH;

WHEREAS, the SELLER is the registered owner of a parcel of land with improvements located at
(Address of property to be sold) and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. (TCT Number)
containing a total area of (Land Area of Property in Words) (000) SQUARE METERS, more or less, and
more particularly described as follows:

TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 0000

"(Insert the technical description of the property on the title) Example: A PARCEL OF LAND
(Lot 20 Blk 54 of consolidation subdivision plan (LRC) Pcs-13265, being a portion of the consolidation of
Lots 4751-A and 4751-B (LRC) Psd-50533, Lot 3, Psd-100703, Lot 1, Psd-150980, LRC Rec. Nos. Nos. N-
27024, 51768, 89632, N-11782, N-13466, and 21071 situated in the Bo. of San Donisio, Mun of
Paranaque, Prov of Rizal, Is. of Luzon. Bounded on NE., point 4 to 1 by Road Lot 22, on...to the point of
beginning; containing an area of (280) square meters more or less..."

WHEREAS, the BUYER has offered to buy and the SELLER has agreed to sell the above mentioned
property for the amount of (Amount in words) (P 000,000.00) Philippine Currency;

NOW THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the sum of (Amount in words) (P 000,000.00)
Philippine Currency, hand paid by the vendee to the vendor, the SELLER DO HEREBY SELL, TRANSFER,
and CONVEY by way of Absolute Sale unto the said BUYER, his heirsand assigns, the certain parcel of
land together with all the improvements found thereon, freefrom all liens and encumbrances
of whatever nature including real estate taxes as of the date of this sale.

212
 LEGAL FORMS
(NAME OF SELLER) (NAME OF BUYER)
Seller Buyer

WITH MARITAL CONSENT:

________________________ _________________________
Name of Seller's Spouse Name of Buyer's Spouse

SIGNED IN THE PRESENCE OF:

__________________________ ____________________________

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES)

_____________________________ ) SS.

BEFORE ME, a Notary Public for and in the City of ___________________, personally appeared:

Name CTC Number Date/Place Issued

(Name of Seller) 10000000 Jan 15, 20__ / Angeles City

(Name of Buyer) 10000000 Jan 9, 20__ / Manila

Known to me and to me known to be the same persons who executed the foregoing instrument and
acknowledged to me that the same are their free act and voluntary deed.

This instrument, consisting of (__) pages, including the page on which this acknowledgment is written,
has been signed on the left margin of each and every page thereof by the concerned parties and their
witnesses, and sealed with my notarial seal.

WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL on this ___day of __________________20__ at_______________.

Notary Public

Doc. No. ........;

Page No. .......;
Book No. .......;
Series of 20__.

PROMISSORY NOTE

P__________

FOR VALUE RECEIVED, I promise to pay without need of demand to the order of __Payee__, at his office
at _____________, the principal amount of PESOS: _______________(P_________), on or before _____________.

__Date__, _____________, Philippines.

Maker

213 UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS

FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
 LEGAL FORMS

VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATE OF

NON-FORUM SHOPPING

I._____________________________________________, of legal age, ______________________ _______________________, and a

resident
(name) (citizenship) (civil status)
of _______________________________________________________________, after having been duly sworn to in accordance
with law, hereby, depose and say:

1. That I am the ____________________in the above-entitled case and have caused this
___________________________________ to be prepared; that I read and understood its contents which are true
and correct of my own personal knowledge and/or based on authentic records.

2. That I have not commenced any action of proceeding involving the same issue in the Supreme Court,
the Court of Appeals or any other tribunal or agency; that to the best of my knowledge, no such action or
proceeding is pending in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or any tribunal or agency, and that, if I
should learn thereafter that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending before these
courts of tribunal or agency, I undertake to report that the fact to the Court within five (5) days
therefrom.

IN WITNESS WHEREFOR, I have hereunto set my hand this ____ day of __________________,20____.

Affiant SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this______day of _______________, 20_____ .

NOTARY PUBLIC

NOTICE OF HEARING

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

_______________________________
_______________________________
__________________________________,
Plaintiff, Civil Case No. _________________
(Naghahabla) (Kaso Sibil Blg.)
For __________________________
Vs. (Para)
__________________________________,
Defendant,
(Hinahabla)

NOTICE OF HEARING
(ABISO NG PAGDINIG)

YOUR CASE IS SET for hearing before the Presiding Judge of this Court on _________________________
at ___________________________________________.

(Ang iyong kaso ay diringgin ng Pinunong hukuman ng Hukumang ito sa

_____________________________, ganap na ________________________________.)

YOU MUST ATTEND THE HEARING, IF YOU CANNOT ATTEND BECAUSE IT IS PHYSICALLY
IMPOSSIBLE FOR YOU TO DO SO, YOU MAY AUTHORIZE A REPRESENTATIVE WHO IS NOT A
LAWYER TO APPEAR FOR YOU. FOR THIS PURPOSE YOU SHOULD FILL UP FORM 5-SCC (SPECIAL
POWER OF ATTORNEY).

(KINAKAILANGAN NINYONG DUMALO SA PAGDINIG. Kung hindi kaya ng katawan ninyo ang
pagdalo nang personal sa pagdinig ng iyong kaso, maaari kang magpadala ng iyong kinatawan na hindi
abogado sa pagdinig. Sa ganitong layunin, punuan ninyo ang Form 5-SCC [Natatanging Gawad-
Kapangyarihan – Special power of attorney.])

214
 LEGAL FORMS
WITNESS the HON. __________________________________, Presiding Judge of this court, this ____ day of
___________________, 20___, at _______________________, Philippines.

(Saksi si Kgg. __________________________, Pinunong Hukuman ng Hukumang ito, ngayong

_____________________, 20____ ditto sa _______________________________, Pilipinas.)

____________________________
Branch Clerk of Court

(Sangay na Kawani ng Hukuman)

NOTE: FOR INQUIRIES, CALL TEL. #____________

(Tala: Para sa katanungan tumawag sa Korte sa Tel. Blg. _____________.)

AFFIDAVIT OF LOSS

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES)

_____________________________ ) S.S.

I, (Name of Affiant)., Filipino, of legal age, residing at (Address of Affiant), after having been sworn
in accordance with law hereby depose and state:

That I am the true and lawful owner of a certain motor vehicle which is more
particularly described as follows:

MAKE : MOTOR NO. :

SERIES : SERIAL/CHASSIS NO. :
TYPE OF BODY : PLATE NO. :
YEAR MODEL : FILE NO. :

(Change the declaration below to the actual circumstances)

That sometime in June of this year, I was looking for the original Certificate of
Registration of my car but to my surprise, said Owner’s original Copy could not found;

That I took pains to look for said Certificate of Registration, but to no avail;

That I am executing this affidavit to attest to the truth of the foregoing and to
request from the Land Transportation Office of Angeles City, a copy of said Certificate of
Registration.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this _____ day of _______________.
20___ at _________________________.

(Name Over Signature of Affiant)

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me, this ____ day of ______________, 20___ in ___________________ City,
with affiant exhibiting his CTC No. _______________ ,
Issued on ______________________ at _________________________.

215 UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS

FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
 LEGAL FORMS

NOTARY PUBLIC
Until December 31, 200___

Doc. No. : ________;

Page No. : ________;
Book No. : ________;
Series of 20_______.

CHANGE OF NAME

Republic of the Philippines

Philippine Consulate
City/State:_______________
Country:_________________

____________________)
____________________)SS Petition No.___________

PETITION FOR CHANGE OF FIRST NAME

I, ______________________________, of legal age, ___________________, and a resident of

_____________________________,
(complete name of petitioner) (nationality /citizenship) (complete address)
after having been duly sworn to in accordance with law, hereby declare that:

1) I am the petitioner seeking the change of first name in:

a) my Certificate of Live Birth
b) the Certificate of Live Birth of __________________________
(complete name of owner)
who is my ______________________________________________,
(relation of owner to the petitioner)

2) I/He/She was born on _______________ at ________________________,

(date of birth) (city/municipality)
_______________________________, ____________________________.
(province) (country)

3) The birth was recorded under registry number ________________________.

4) The first name to be changed is from ________________ to_____________.

5) The grounds for filing this petition are the following: (Ground selected should be explained/justified in
a separate sheet of paper to be attached to this form.)

a) The first name is extremely difficult to write or pronounce;

b) I have/He/She has habitually and continuously used __________________ and I/he/she is publicly
known in the community with that first name;
c) The first name is tainted with dishonor;
d) The first name is ridiculous;
e) The first name causes confusion;

6) I submit the following documents to support this petition: (Use additional sheets, if necessary.)
a) _______________________________________________________
b) _______________________________________________________
c) _______________________________________________________
d) _______________________________________________________
e) _______________________________________________________

216
 LEGAL FORMS

7) I have/He/She has not filed any similar petition and that, to the best of my knowledge, no other
similar petition is pending with any LCRO, Court or Philippine Embassy/Consulate.

8) I have/He/She has no pending criminal, civil or administrative case in any court or quasi-judicial
body.

9) I am filing this petition at the Philippine Consulate of __________________________,

(City/State/Country)
in accordance with R.A. 9048 and its implementing rules and regulations.

________________________________
Signature over printed name of petitioner

VERIFICATION

I, _____________________________________, the petitioner, hereby certify that the allegations herein are
true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

_________________________________
Signature over printed name of petitioner

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this _____ day of ___________ in the city/municipality of
____________________, petitioner exhibiting his/her Passport No. ___________________ issued _____________ on
______________.

_________________________________
Administering Officer

Doc. No. ____________

Page No. ____________
Book No. ____________
Series of ____________

JURAT FOR AN INDIVIDUAL AFFIANT

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me, this _____________, by _____________ who exhibited to me (his/her)
Community Tax Certificate No. _____________ issued at _____________, Philippines on _____________.

Notary Public
Doc. No. ______;
Page No. ______;
Book No. ______;
Series of ______;

JURAT FOR JOINT AFFIANT

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me, this _____________, by _____________ who exhibited to me (his/her)
Community Tax Certificate No. _____________ issued at _____________ on _____________ and by _____________ who

217 UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS

FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
 LEGAL FORMS

exhibited to me (his/her) Community Tax Certificate No. _____________ issued at _____________ on

_____________.

Notary Public
Doc. No. ______;
Page No. ______;
Book No. ______;
Series of ______;

JUDICIAL AFFIDAVIT (SAMPLE)

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION
METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT
MAKATI CITY, BRANCH x

BANK OF LUZON
Plaintiff,

-versus- CIVIL CASE NO. xxxx

For: SUM OF MONEY

JOSE REYES
Customer No. xxxxxxxxxx
Defendant,
x---------------------------------------------------x

AFFIDAVIT

I, MARIBEL A. CRUZ, of legal age, and resident of 20 Altura St., Sta. Mesa Manila, after
having duly sworn to in accordance with law, hereby depose and say that:

1. I am an Account Specialist of Bank of Luzon, (hereafter referred to as “BL”) a

corporation engaged in the credit card business under the name and style “BL Card” and with
principal office at Paseo de Roxas, Makati City.

2. As Account Officer presently assigned with the Collection/Legal Department of

the corporation, I handle the records and monitor payments of delinquent cardholders, send
demand letters to them, and actively participate in the collection of the obligations of the
cardholders. I have also been authorized to represent the corporation in court cases involving
collections as may be gleaned from by Special Power of Attorney issued by the said corporation,
which is hereto attached as Exhibit “A” and Corporate Secretary’s Certificate as Exhibit “A-1”.

3. In the course of the performance of my duties, functions and responsibilities as

Account Officer of the corporation, I came to know that Jose Reyes applied with the corporation
for the issuance of BL Card under Customer Number xxxx-xxxx, became some of the delinquent
accounts that I am handing and monitoring.

A copy of the BL signed Application Form is hereto and made an integral part hereof
and marked as Exhibit “B” and signature of the defendant Jose Reyes who applied for BL Credit
Card is bracketed and marked as Exhibit “B-1”.

A copy of the BL Credit card package delivery receipt is hereto attached and made an
integral part hereof and marked as Exhibit “C” and the name and signature of the defendant Jose
Reyes marked the said Delivery Receipt is attached and marked as Exhibit “C-1” and the terms
and conditions for the issuance and use of the BL card issued to the defendant is marked as
Exhibit “C-2”.

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 LEGAL FORMS
4. As part of the terms and conditions for the issuance and use or availment of the
BL card issued to the defendant, the latter expressly agreed that she will keep track of her total
obligations with the plaintiff so as not to exceed the approved credit limit. In addition, he also
expressly agreed to pay the plaintiff, without necessity of demand, on the date indicated in the
monthly statement of account containing a summary of all purchase/charges made through the
use of said credit card. He further expressly agreed that the said charges or balance thereof,
remaining unpaid after the due date indicated in the statement of account shall bear a finance
charge at the rate of 3.5% based on the average balance and a late payment charge at the rate of
6% for every month or a fraction of a month’s delay.

5. On several occasions, the defendant through the use of his BL card, purchased
goods and/or services on credit as shown by the Ledgers/Monthly Statements of Account sent
to her which are hereto attached and made integral parts hereof as follows:

The Ledger of Account dated September 06, 2009 with total amount due in the sum of
P263,817.11 marked as Exhibit “D”.

The Ledger/Statement of Account dated July 06, 2008 with total amount due in the sum of
P100,150.88 marked as Exhibit “D-1”.

The Ledger/Statement of Account dated August 08, 2008 with total amount due in the sum of
P104, 902.87 marked as Exhibit “D-2”.

The Ledger/ Statement of Account dated September 07, 2008 with total amount due in the sum
of P100,518.27 marked as Exhibit “D-3”.

The Ledger/ Statement of Account dated October 05, 2008 with total amount due in the sum of
P103,438.53 marked as Exhibit “D-4”.

The Ledger/ Statement of Account dated November 05, 2008 with total amount due in the sum
of P109,413.11 marked as Exhibit “D-5”.

The Ledger/ Statement of Account dated December 07, 2008 with total amount due in the sum
of P116,131.47 marked as Exhibit “D-6”.

The Ledger/ Statement of Account dated January 05, 2009 with total amount due in the sum of
P121,543.86 marked as Exhibit “D-7”.

The Ledger/ Statement of Account dated February 05, 2009 with total amount due in the sum of
P156,607.37 marked as Exhibit “D-8”.

The Ledger/ Statement of Account dated March 06, 2009 with total amount due in the sum of
P169,259.02 marked as Exhibit “D-9”.

The Ledger/ Statement of Account dated April 06, 2009 with total amount due in the sum of
P182,954.60 marked as Exhibit “D-10”.

The Ledger/ Statement of Account dated May 05, 2009 with total amount due in the sum of
P195,661.68 marked as Exhibit “D-11”.

The Ledger/ Statement of Account dated June 07, 2009 with total amount due in the sum of
P211,588.04 marked as Exhibit “D-12”.

The Ledger/ Statement of Account dated July 05, 2009 with total amount due in the sum of
P227,776.30 marked as Exhibit “D-13”.

The Ledger/ Statement of Account dated August 05, 2009 with total amount due in the sum of
P244,804.24 marked as Exhibit “D-14”.

219 UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS

FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
 LEGAL FORMS

6. Because the defendant defaulted on his obligation for the use of his credit card,
demands were made for his to failure to pay his obligation, a copy of demand letter dated
August 17, 2009 addressed to defendant Jose Reyes and received by guard Ruel and August 26,
2009 addressed to defendant Jose Reyes and received by Defendant himself are hereto attached
and made an integral part hereof as Exhibit “E”,”E-1,”E-2” and “E-3” respectively.

7. As a consequence thereof, plaintiff engaged the services of its external counsel,

Atty. Fe Laurel, for which the plaintiff agreed to pay 25% of the total amount due as and by way
of attorney’s fees for the purpose of enforcing its claim against the defendant.

8. Thus, the plaintiff through the above-mentioned counsel, filed complaint

against Jose Reyes, and docketed as Civil Case No. xxxx which is pending before Metropolitan
Trial Court in Makati City, Branch x.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this ____ day of ____ 2010 at
Makati City.

MARIBEL CRUZ
Affiant

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me in the City of Makati this ____ day of ____ 2010,
affiant exhibited to me her Comm. Certificate No. 03861183 issued at Manila on March 4, 2009.

Doc. No. ____

Page No. ____
Book No. ____
Series of 2010

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