73. Domingo vs.
Court of Appeals, 226 SCRA 572 RULING: NO AND NO
FACTS:
Soledad Domingo, married with Roberto Domingo, filed
a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage and
separation of property.
She did not know that Domingo had been previously
married to Emerlinda dela Paz.
She came to know the previous marriage when the latter
filed a suit of bigamy against her.
Furthermore, when she came home from Saudi during
her one-month leave from work, she discovered that
Roberto cohabited with another woman and had been
disposing some of her properties which is administered
by Roberto.
The latter claims that because their marriage was void
ab initio, the declaration of such voidance is unnecessary
and superfluous.
On the other hand, Soledad insists the declaration of the
nullity of marriage not for the purpose of remarriage, but
in order to provide a basis for the separation and
distribution of properties acquired during the marriage.
ISSUES: whether or not a petition for judicial
declaration of a void marriage is necessary. If in the
affirmative, whether the same should be filed only for
purposes of remarriage.
The Family Law Revision Committee and the Civil Code
Revision Committee 16 which drafted what is now the
Family Code of the Philippines took the position that
parties to a marriage should not be allowed to
assume that their marriage is void even if such be
the fact but must first secure a judicial declaration of
the nullity of their marriage before they can be
allowed to marry again.
With the judicial declaration of the nullity of his or her
first marriage, the person who marries again cannot be
charged with bigamy.
Article 40 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage
void. (n)
Crucial to the proper interpretation of Article 40 is the
position in the provision of the word "solely."
As it is placed, the same shows that it is meant to qualify
"final judgment declaring such previous marriage void."
The precise intent of the Committee members, the
provision in question, as it finally emerged, did not state
"The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
invoked solely for purposes of remarriage . . .," in which
case "solely" would clearly qualify the phrase "for
purposes of remarriage."
Had the phraseology been such, the absolute nullity of a
previous marriage may be invoked solely for purposes of
remarriage, thus rendering irrelevant the clause "on the
basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void."
That Article 40 as finally formulated included the
significant clause denotes that such final judgment
declaring the previous marriage void need not be
obtained only for purposes of remarriage.