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Democratization and the Arab Spring

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Edward D. Mansfield & Jack Snyder
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 722 Commentary

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Democratization and the Arab Spring

EDWARD D. MANSFIELD
University of Pennsylvania

JACK SNYDER
Columbia University

Over the past half century, a substantial number of countries have undergone
transitions to democracy. This development has been greeted with enthusi-
asm by those observers who point out that since war has never broken out
between mature democracies, regime change toward democracy is likely to
reduce the risk of conflict (Russett and Oneal 2001). Although the Middle
East has lagged behind the global trend toward democratization, various
countries in the area have held elections over the past decade and especially
since the Arab Spring revolutions of 2011, raising the hope that a wave of
democracy and peace might envelope a region where both have been in
short supply.
Frequently, however, these elections produced outcomes that frustrated
and disappointed democracy advocates. Lebanon, Iraq, the Palestinian ter-
ritories, and other Middle Eastern states elected ethnic militants, sectarian
extremists, terrorists, Holocaust-deniers, and nuclear proliferation advocates,
which has contributed to both civil and international conflict (Mansfield and
Snyder 2005/06). The 2011 Tunisian revolution prompted orderly, competi-
tive elections, but other Middle Eastern revolutions followed a path that was
less democratic, less peaceful, or both. Thus, it is far from clear whether the

For helpful comments, we are grateful to Lisa Anderson, Paul Diehl, F. Gregory Gause, Rumi Morishima,
Sarah Salwen, David Spiro, and Robert Vitalis.
 Commentary 723

Arab Spring will actually foster democratization in most countries or whether

those countries that do experience a democratic transition will become more
peaceful as a result. History shows that the consolidation of democracy tends
to promote peace and stability, but the initial stages of democratization can
stimulate both international and civil wars (Mansfield and Snyder 2005/06,
2012; Snyder 2000).
This link between democratization and the use of force has existed
for centuries, and it has not weakened over time. Since the end of the
Cold War, democratization has contributed to the 1992 hostilities between
newly independent Armenia and Azerbaijan, the 1995 border war between
Ecuador and Peru, and conflicts during the breakup of the former Yugoslavia
(Mansfield and Snyder 2005/06: chapter 8). Ethiopia experienced an incom-
plete democratic transition in the decade prior to its 1998 war with Eritrea,
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and Pakistan’s attack on Indian Kashmir in the 1999 Kargil War followed con-
stitutional changes in a democratic direction. More recently, elections have
fueled cross-border violence in Georgia, Iraq, Lebanon, and the Palestinian
territories (Mansfield and Snyder 2009).
Our argument is not that all democratic transitions are dangerous. Those
that occur in the context of strong, stable domestic institutions are often
quite peaceful. In contrast, there is a considerable risk of war in states that
are starting to democratize and that lack the coherent political institutions
needed to make democracy function, such as an effective state, the rule of
law, organized parties that compete in fair elections, and professional news
media. When these institutions are deformed or weak, politicians are better
able to resort to nationalist or sectarian appeals, tarring their opponents as
enemies of the nation, in order to prevail in electoral competition. The use
of such appeals generally heightens the prospect that democratization will
stimulate hostilities at home and abroad. In addition to institutional capacity,
other factors facilitating a peaceful democratic consolidation include the
absence of severe ethnic divisions, the democratic character of the surround-
ing international neighborhood, and the availability of an effective power
sharing system to mitigate the consequences of electoral defeat. Together
these factors help to explain the range of outcomes stemming from the Arab
Spring revolutions.

REGIME CHANGE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Any analysis of the Arab Spring is subject to the important caveat that it is
too early to tell how the changes unfolding in the region will ultimately
culminate. As many observers hope, it may ultimately produce a set of
fully democratic regimes. However, it may also produce a set of mixed
(or anocratic) regimes that have both democratic and autocratic character-
istics, failed states, or countries in which autocrats or the military reassert
 724 Commentary

control. Although events are still unfolding, the first year and a half fol-
lowing the Tunisian revolution provides some preliminary evidence with
which to assess our argument about institutional capacity and regime change.
We begin by explaining the domestic political changes prompted by the Arab
Spring. We then analyze how the institutional capacity of states in the region
has conditioned the trajectory and the effects of these changes.
To date, the Arab Spring and its aftermath have produced a wide range
of outcomes. Only Egypt and Tunisia have experienced regime change in
a democratic direction, although other countries in the region could move
down this path in the coming years (Marshall and Cole 2011:19–20). The
Arab Spring began in December of 2010, when a Tunisian fruit vendor set
himself on fire to protest corruption and ill treatment, sparking widespread
demonstrations. At that time, the Polity Project considered Tunisia to
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be a “closed anocracy,” a mixed regime but one marked by significant

autocratic characteristics (Marshall and Jaggers 2010).1 Within a month, the
23-year reign of President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali ended and the “Jasmine
Revolution” took hold, leading to a set of democratic reforms. Elections
for the National Constituent Assembly were announced shortly after Ben
Ali’s government collapsed and were subsequently held in October 2011.
The result has been a coalition government involving a moderate Islamist
party (En-Nahda), a center-left party (Ettakatol), and a centrist secular
party (Congress for the Republic). The Assembly has been charged with
drafting a new constitution and establishing the framework for a permanent
government. While Tunisia’s transition to democracy is far from complete
and has sometimes threatened to veer off course, the country has certainly
taken steps in a democratic direction.
Like Tunisia, Egypt seems to be in the throes of a democratic transition.
Until 2005, the Polity Project had coded Egypt as an autocracy (with a regime
score of −6). From that time until the Arab Spring, some modest liberaliza-
tion in the process of electing the president led Egypt to be considered a
closed anocracy (with a regime score of −3) (Marshall and Jaggers 2010).
As protests mounted in Tunisia, the Arab Spring spread to Egypt. Beset by
widespread economic problems and corruption, Egyptians took to the street
and hundreds of thousands of protestors flocked to Cairo’s Tahrir Square.
Following President Hosni Mubarak’s ouster, Egypt held a constitutional
referendum in which 45% of the eligible voters cast ballots. This referen-
dum, which passed with over three-quarters approval, called for term limits
on the president, judicial oversight of elections, greater ability for individuals

1
More specifically, Tunisia received a score of −4 on the Polity Project’s 21-point regime type index that
ranges from −10 (highly autocratic) to 10 (highly democratic). Closed anocracies range from 0 to −5 on
this index. Autocracies range from −6 to −10. See Marshall and Jaggers (2010) and Marshall and Cole
(2011).
 Commentary 725

to run for president, and the formation of a commission to draft a new con-
stitution. Late in 2011, parliamentary elections produced a large majority for
Islamist parties that had formed the best-organized opposition group during
the Mubarak era, with almost two-thirds of the eligible voters participating.
In May 2012, the first round of the Presidential elections included a wide
range of secular, Islamist, and military candidates, notwithstanding a court
decision disqualifying two of the leading candidates on technicalities. In the
runoff, the candidate of the Muslim Brotherhood defeated the ex-military
candidate backed by remnants of the Mubarak regime, including the armed
forces and the police.
Each of these elections was relatively free, fair, and largely nonviolent.
Yet they took place under the cloud of attempts by the military and holdovers
from the old regime to manipulate Mubarak-appointed judges and use coer-
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cive force in the streets for political advantage. These autocratic actors tried
to dissolve the elected Parliament, harassed peaceful demonstrators, and sub-
jected civilians and journalists to military trials. Although secular reformists
worried that the showdown between the military and the Brotherhood could
lead to the repression of democracy and personal freedom no matter who
prevailed, Egypt has clearly made significant, albeit unconsolidated, steps in
a democratic direction as a result of the Arab Spring.
The Arab Spring has visited various other countries in the region as well.
Unlike Tunisia and Egypt, however, there is little clear-cut evidence that the
changes occurring in these countries are the start of democratization. Libya
and Syria, both highly autocratic countries, became embroiled in full-blown
civil wars during 2011. As a result, Muammar al-Qaddafi was forced from
office and ultimately killed. Reasonably free, fair, and peaceful multiparty
elections in July 2012 were won by a former political science professor
at the University of Pittsburgh who promised to govern via an inclusive
power-sharing system. These elections may be the initial steps toward
democratization in Libya, although some observers worry that the elected
government will have trouble ruling because power remains Balkanized in
the hands of myriad tribes, localities, and armed militias (Salam and Kadlec
2012). Syria continues to experience widespread civil violence and it is possi-
ble that Bashar al-Assad awaits the same fate as Qaddafi. Regardless, it is too
early to tell whether the end of these civil wars and the fall of the Qaddafi
and Assad governments will precipitate democratization. Such events might
just as easily result in a new military regime or in state failure.
In Yemen, anti-regime protests, at times quite violent, were mounted
throughout 2011 and into 2012. President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who ruled
North Yemen and then unified Yemen since 1978, promised repeatedly to
leave office but maneuvered to surrender power to his hand-picked suc-
cessor, Vice President Abed Rabbo Mansour al-Hadi, via an uncontested
referendum. Genuine democratic regime change in Yemen is unlikely to
occur anytime soon. In response to protests in Morocco, King Mohammed VI
 726 Commentary

announced a set of plans to improve the rule of law, and a new constitution
has increased the power of parliament and the judiciary, as well as improv-
ing the rights of women and the Berber minority (Yerkes 2011). However,
most of these reforms fall far short of what would be needed for democratic
change. More generally, Mohammed has a history of promising reforms that
fail to meet expectations.
The Arab Spring has also touched Algeria, Bahrain, Iraq, and Jordan.
None of these countries, however, experienced significant democratic
change as a result. In Iraq, for example, domestic institutions were already
marked by various democratic features prior to 2011 (Marshall and Jaggers
2010).2 Thus, there was no closed autocracy to revolt against, limiting the
impact of the Arab Spring. In Bahrain, protesters against the traditional
Sunni-dominated autocratic government demanded that electoral institutions
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be opened to meaningful participation by the majority of the population,

including its sizeable Shi’a component. Aided and abetted by Saudi Arabia, a
powerful Sunni neighbor and rival of Shi’ite Iran, the government succeeded
in crushing the uprising and made no meaningful political changes.
How have variations in institutional capacity conditioned the effects of
domestic political change in the year and a half since the debut of the Arab
Spring, and what other factors have shaped the trajectory of these changes?

INSTITUTIONAL STRENGTH AND VIOLENCE

IN THE MIDDLE EAST

We have argued that states in the initial stages of a democratic transition are
prone to both international and civil violence when they take place in a con-
text of weak domestic institutions (Mansfield and Snyder 2005/06). Under
these circumstances, countries face rising demands for political participa-
tion by groups that had been shut out of the political process, but lack the
institutional infrastructure to manage these demands and the mobilization of
newly enfranchised groups. All too frequently, the result is belligerent ethnic
nationalism or sectarianism that either stimulates civil violence or prompts
neighboring states to attack.
In such settings, efforts to expand popular political participation often
spur the nationalism of ethnic minorities, which envision a chance to escape
domination by culturally alien groups that control the state. At the same time,
ethnic or statist nationalism of dominant groups is also likely to intensify
in an effort to regain control (Hechter 2000). International violence may
arise because politically mobilized ethnic populations straddle international
borders and because nationalism makes the diplomacy of the democratizing
state rigid or belligerent. Civil violence may occur because democratization
2
In 2010, the Polity Project coded Iraq as an “open anocracy” (Marshall and Jaggers 2010).
 Commentary 727

enhances the political competition among parties and other organizations

that are divided along ethnic or national lines, and domestic institutions
are not sufficiently robust to prevent that competition from boiling over.
Nearly half a century ago, Samuel Huntington (1968:4) famously argued that
instability and violence are “in large part the product of rapid social change
and the rapid mobilization of new groups into politics coupled with the
slow development of political institutions.” At the heart of the Arab Spring
lie disaffected groups in society that are mobilized and demanding a greater
role in politics.
With a few qualifications, recent Arab transitions bear out these expecta-
tions. Arab states with popular movements and fairly strong institutions have
in general moved farther in a democratic direction and more peacefully than
those states whose popular movements operated in more weakly institution-
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alized settings. In those countries with relatively robust political institutions,

this process has not led to massive bloodshed. Either autocratic governments
have effectively repressed the protestors or the government has fallen and a
nascent democracy has formed. In those countries with weak political insti-
tutions, by contrast, the Arab Spring has precipitated substantial violence and
instability. That said, a host of other factors, such as ethnic demography and
the international setting, are also important considerations in understanding
the varying trajectories of Arab revolutionary movements.
To aid in this analysis, a measure of government effectiveness included
in the Worldwide Governance Indicators permits a comparison across the
states that have experienced popular uprisings during the Arab Spring. This
measure is based on the perceptions of individuals working in the private
sector, the public sector, and nongovernmental organizations throughout the
world. It captures “perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of
the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures,
the quality of policy formation and implementation, and the credibility of the
government’s commitment to such policies” (Kaufman, Kraay, and Mastruzzi
2010:4; 2011).
In 2010, the government effectiveness of Libya was among the bot-
tom 10% of countries worldwide. Yemen was among the worst 14%. Syria
was among the worst 35%. None of the Middle Eastern countries that have
avoided large-scale civil violence during the Arab Spring score as poorly,
including Tunisia (63rd percentile), Jordan (57th percentile), Morocco (49th
percentile), and Egypt (40th percentile). The violent repression in Bahrain
(70th percentile) reflected its international location rather than its domestic
institutional capacity. Obviously, these estimates should be treated cautiously
since they reflect individuals’ perceptions of government effectiveness and
because the factors being assessed do not exhaust the institutions needed to
manage social change and political mobilization. Nonetheless, there has been
a striking tendency for the Middle Eastern countries that are perceived to
 728 Commentary

have the least effective governments to experience the most serious domestic
violence.
The two countries where the Arab Spring precipitated a democratic
transition are characterized by relatively stable administrative institutions.
Lisa Anderson (2011:3; see also Hamid 2011a:111), for example, argues
that “Tunisia’s government institutions were relatively healthy, raising the
prospect for a clean, efficient, and technocratic government to replace Ben
Ali.” Furthermore, external actors, including the United States, have provided
Tunisia with resources to help construct democratic institutions.
Egypt also has a track record of entrenched administrative institutions.
In part, these stem from the role that the military has played in Egyptian
society. As in the case of Tunisia, this legacy is a mixed blessing. It has
contributed to widespread corruption and clientelism. Moreover, in both
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Tunisia and Egypt, one of the biggest threats to democracy is a military coup.
If, however, the military chooses to remain outside of civilian affairs and sub-
mits to civilian control, these relatively robust administrative institutions may
limit the risk of anarchic violence and could provide elected officials with
an effective tool for enforcing their authority. Egypt also has the makings
of institutions that will be needed to foster democracy. Since Anwar Sadat,
for example, Egypt has permitted certain nonruling parties to hold a limited
number of seats in the parliament. There are currently a large number of
civil society groups in Egypt, and, as Shadi Hamid (2011a:106–107) points
out, “beginning in 2003, a vibrant independent press flourished, and despite
Mubarak’s best efforts, the judiciary, one of the country’s most respected
institutions, fought hard to maintain its independence.”
During the political maneuvering of 2012, the partially independent,
partially professionalized legal system served as a rallying point for secu-
lar reformers who felt caught between the illiberal forces of the old regime
remnants and the Islamic parties. This faith in the rule of law turned out
to be overly optimistic, since the Mubarak-appointed courts repeatedly did
the bidding of the military in attempting to check the electoral power of the
Muslim Brotherhood. Thus, both Tunisian and Egyptian institutions are beset
by various defects and limitations that make for awkward accommodations to
democratic politics. Through the first year following the Arab Spring, how-
ever, these institutions have been sturdy enough to manage the pressures
accompanying democratization.
While institutional capacity has played a crucial role in shaping these
developments, it is equally important that neither Tunisia nor Egypt is beset
by politically crippling ethnic, tribal, or sectarian divisions, notwithstanding
tension between the Islamic majority and the Coptic Christian minority in
Egypt (Hamid 2011b:114). Instead, both countries have been marked by civic
nationalism, which promotes loyalty to institutions rather than a distinctive
culture and that is inclusive rather than divisive in nature. Partly as a result,
Kenneth Pollack (2011:5) observes, “the protests actually brought disparate
 Commentary 729

groups together in these states, while they tore people apart elsewhere in the
region.” Equally, the lack of severe divisions in Tunisia and Egypt contributed
to the military’s willingness to help overthrow Ben Ali and Mubarak. Because
neither country’s army had strong ethnic, tribal, or sectarian ties to the ruler,
military leaders in both states could imagine a safe and secure future after
the dictator was replaced if they facilitated regime change.
The situation faced by the Copts might be seen as an exception that
proves the rule. During the popular political mobilization of 2011, some
Coptic churches were burned, and authorities repressed peaceful Coptic
demonstrators who were merely demanding their right to be protected. This
conforms to the typical pattern of groups or leaders playing the ethnic card
in the early stages of a transition in an attempt to polarize the masses around
identity issues, mobilize supporters against minorities, or justify the retention
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of coercive power by old ruling elites. Yet in Egypt violent attempts to play
identity politics remained a sideshow that failed to distract attention from
the central drama featuring the military and several Islamist factions. The
Copts comprise only 10% of the population, which is roughly the threshold
at which minorities can start to become politically problematic (Sambanis
2000). Despite the history of repression from the regime, the Copts for the
most part passively support the mainstream secular authorities against the
greater danger of an Islamist regime, and they have not been an especially
effective tool or target in political gamesmanship.
Various other countries in the region, however, are not so fortunate,
either in their institutional capacity or other conditions facilitating peaceful
democratic transition. They are vested with a much weaker set of domes-
tic institutions, which is a source of serious trouble for countries trying to
manage social change. Such ineffectual institutions are a particular source of
danger in the face of democratization.
Libya and Syria, as we discussed earlier, have spiraled into full-blown
civil wars; some observers have expressed concern that Yemen stands on the
brink of civil war as well (for example, Roach 2011). It comes as no surprise
that these countries are among the weakest institutionally in the Middle East.
In Libya, Akram Al-Turk (2011:119; see also Anderson 2011) observes, “by
early 2011 there were effectively no strong institutions, civil society, or inde-
pendent media.” The relative peacefulness of Libya’s 2012 national election
arguably reflects the fact that the choice of a moderate power sharing coali-
tion did not substantially challenge local power bases. Yemen, as Sharqieh
(2011:224) notes, “has a fragile state system.” With almost half the popula-
tion living below the poverty line and a limited water supply, approximately
30% of which is used to cultivate qat, it has some of the worst institutional
infrastructure in the world.
In some respects, the domestic institutions of Syria’s old regime had
been considerably stronger than those of Libya and Yemen. Syria has
been vested with sturdy and highly centralized coercive and administrative
 730 Commentary

institutions, which gave the government the capacity to forcibly repress

demands for greater popular political participation. But Syria’s participatory
and legal institutions are very weak, and the country has long been marked
by massive corruption. Successful democratization requires all of these types
of institutions, and transitions in countries whose participatory and legal insti-
tutions are as weak as Syria’s rarely sustain movement in a liberal direction
(Snyder 2000:74–81).
Not only are Libya, Syria, and Yemen institutionally weak, they are
also ethnically and geographically splintered. Libya, for example, is deeply
cleaved along territorial and tribal lines. Qaddafi actively used these divisions
to ward off any potential opposition and maintain power. In the aftermath
of his regime, they will severely complicate efforts to promote democracy
in Libya (Anderson 2011:6). The situation in Yemen is not much better.
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In 1962, Yemen split into two countries. North Yemen and South Yemen
reunified in 1990, but fought a bloody civil war in 1994. Deep divisions
remain between these regions. Yemen is also beset by cleavages among
parties, tribes, and warlords. Like Qaddafi, Saleh’s ruling strategy centered
on manipulating these divisions (Sharqieh 2011). Syria is marked by splits
among numerous religious and ethnic groups. Sunnis outnumber other reli-
gious groups—including the Alawites, which is the Assad family’s religious
community—by roughly fourfold, but have had little political influence for
decades. There is widespread concern within elite circles about what would
happen in a democracy, where the Sunnis would gain substantial power.

THE PROSPECTS FOR DANGEROUS DEMOCRATIZATION

IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The trajectory of the Arab Spring revolutions is far from complete, but pop-
ular political mobilization in the Middle East has already triggered domestic
armed conflict in Libya, Syria, and Yemen, as well as international interven-
tions in Bahrain and Libya. The possibility of Syria’s internal conflict spilling
across its borders has also raised the specter of external military intervention.
These are states that lack the institutional capacity to regulate pluralistic polit-
ical contestation, suffer from serious ethnic divisions, or face conflict-prone
regional dynamics.
It is worth noting, however, that these conflicts grew out of demands
to overthrow repressive authoritarian regimes, not out of electoral strug-
gles per se. As such, it would be misleading to refer to them as wars of
democratization. In fact, the countries that have held relatively competitive
elections since the Arab Spring—notably Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya—did so
fairly peacefully.
Many observers were particularly surprised that Libya’s elections were
not beset by extensive violence given the weakness of its governmental
 Commentary 731

institutions and the lure of its oil wealth. That said, it is too early to conclude
that institutionally weak states can safely hold competitive elections. Indeed,
a comparative historical perspective suggests that democratization in cer-
tain Middle Eastern countries could be a dangerous process. The Worldwide
Governance Indicators, which we used to classify the perceived governance
capacity of Arab states experiencing recent popular revolts, also include data
on perceptions of government effectiveness from 1996 to 2010. During that
time, three international wars occurred, two of which (Ethiopia-Eritrea and
the Kargil War) were precipitated by democratizing belligerents (Mansfield
and Snyder 2009). The institutional weakness of these countries rendered
democratization especially dangerous and helped to propel these liberaliz-
ing countries into armed conflict (Mansfield and Snyder 2005/06:236–253).
In 2010, Syria’s government effectiveness was about the same as Pakistan’s
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on the eve of the Kargil War. In 2010, Libya’s and Yemen’s government
effectiveness was similar to Ethiopia’s and Eritrea’s in the run-up to their
hostilities.
In short, the Arab Spring has brought significant armed violence where
institutions were especially weak, where ethnic, tribal, and sectarian divisions
were deep, and where effective power-sharing arrangements to mitigate the
effects of these cleavages were lacking. Consequently, there is reason to pro-
ceed with substantial caution in efforts to promote democracy in Syria, Libya,
and Yemen, a point acknowledged by various experts on Middle Eastern
politics (Al-Turk 2011:125; Sharqieh 2011:224). The Arab Spring has already
proven to be a messy, violent process in these countries and launching a
democratic transition before the underlying institutions needed to manage
this process are in place would be very dangerous indeed.
Elsewhere in the Middle East, however, these dangers are less acute.
Egypt and Tunisia have already made headway toward democracy. With
relatively sturdy administrative institutions in place and lacking the deep
cleavages that beset some countries in the region, democratization has
proven to be a fairly peaceful process. The possibility that Egyptian pop-
ulist politicians would try to win votes with a confrontational policy toward
Israel gained little traction, mainly because of the prudence and domestic
priorities of most Egyptian voters. As a backstop, another factor limiting the
prospect of international conflict was the institutional interest and position
of the Egyptian military, whose State Council of the Armed Forces decreed
that elected officials would not have the power to declare war.
Other states—including Morocco and Jordan—also seem to have some
of the institutional preconditions needed to manage further steps in the pro-
cess of democratization. Especially if the broader international environment
is supportive, the Arab Spring may in due course lead to the Middle East’s
first experiment with genuinely democratic politics. However, not all states
will be ready to liberalize politically at the same time. Recognizing this fact
and working to establish the infrastructure needed to support democracy in
 732 Commentary

those countries that are not yet ready to take this step is likely to help avoid
some of the dangerous side effects of democratization.

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