Notes in Statutory Construction

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 1L-M5
STUDY NOTES NO. 1
I. STATUTES
A. DEFINITION
1. A statute is an act of the legislature as an organized body, expressed in the
form, and passed according to the procedure required to constitute it as part
of the law of the land.
2. Statutes are enacted by the legislature are those passed by the Philippine
Commission, the Philippine Legislature, Batasang Pambansa, and the
Congress of the Philippines.
3. Statutes may either public or private. Public statutes are those that affects
the public at large while private statutes are those that refers to specific
persons or subjects.
A. DISTINCTION: Statutes are distinct from:

1. Constitution that is hailed as the Supreme Law of the Land to which all laws
conform with. When a provision of a statute is in conflict with the
Constitution, the latter prevails;
2. Ordinances or local laws that are passed by the municipal councils; and
3. Administrative Orders which refers to the acts of the President which relate to
particular aspects of governmental operations in pursuance of his duties as
administrative head. (Executive Order No. 292 [BOOK III/Title I/Chapter 2-
Ordinance Power])
B. CLASSIFICATION: Statutes are classified according to the following:
1. Duration.
a) Permanent statutes are effective until repealed. Neither disuse nor custom
or practice to the contrary operate to render it ineffective or inoperative.
GENERAL RULE: UNLESS REPEALED OR DECLARED VOID, LAWS

REMAIN ACTIVE.
b) Temporary statutes take effect within a limited period of time.

(1) Sunset clause — If the law provides the period that it shall take effect,
its effectivity ends when the specified period ends.
(2) Emergency — When the statute is designed to meet an emergency, its

effectivity also ends when the emergency ceases.
“In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the
President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to
ROSALIE OBADO ABATAYO UNIVERSITY OF CEBU SCHOOL OF LAW 1L-M5

exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless
sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next
adjournment thereof.” (Section 23 (2), Article VI, 1987 Constitution.
1. Applicability
a) Prospective — General rule. Article 4, Civil Code: “Laws shall have no
retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided.”
b) Retroactive — Exemptions to the general rule and may be applied when:
(1) The law EXPRESSLY provides for its retroactive applicability provided
that it will not impair vested rights; (EXEMPTION: EX-POST FACTO
LAWS)
(2) The law is curative or remedial
(3) The law is penal in nature provided it is favorable to the accused who
is not a habitual delinquen;
(4) The law is of an emergency in nature and authorized by the police

power of the state.
(5) The law is curative provided it does not impair vested rights nor affect
final judgments
(6) If a substantive right will be declared for the first time unless vested
rights are impaired.
2. Operation
a) Declaratory — When the statute declares the meaning of a provision of a
previously enacted law that is in question
“When there is doubt regarding the correct meaning of any statute or Act and the same
is removed by passing on Act, such Act is called a Declaratory Act or Declaratory
Statute. This may happen for, instance, where the courts have been interpreting a
particular expression as connoting a specific meaning which in the opinion of the
legislature is a wrong notion of the expression. In such case, the legislature may pass a
declaratory statute declaring the correct meaning of that expression thereby setting
aside the controversy regarding the correct meaning of the expression.” (Kashmir
University, Interpretation of statutes http://law.uok.edu.in/Files/5ce6c765-c013-446c-
b6ac-b9de496f8751/Custom/INTERPRETATION%20OF%20STATUTES.pdf)
b) Curative — to cure defects of previously enacted laws
1. Compliance requirement
a) Mandatory- commands either positively that something be done or
performed in a particular way or negatively that something be done in a
particular way or negatively, that something be not done. Uses:
SHALL/SHALL NOT, MUST/MUST NOT, CANNOT, OUGHT/OUGHT NOT
b) Directory statutes are permissive and discretionary in nature and merely
outline the act to be done in such a way that no injury can result from

ignoring it or that its purpose can be accomplished in a manner other than

that prescribed substantially the same results obtained.
3. Whether or not rights are given
a) Substantive Law — one which creates, defines, and regulates rights
b) Remedial — prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtaining redress
for their invasion [Bustos vs. Lucero, 81 Phil. 640]
4. Form
a) Affirmative (prescribes some element as a requirement)
b) Negative (prohibits something from being done)
5. Whether or not there is a penal provision
a) Penal
b) Non-penal
A. ENACTMENT OF STATUTES:
1. The legislative power of Congress (Section 1, Article 6, 1987 Constitution)
“The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall
consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to
the people by the provision on initiative and referendum.”
• Legislative power is the authority to make, amend, and repeal laws.
• Legislative power is vested upon the Congress — the Senate and the
House of Representatives— who are duly chosen by the people
fulfilling Section I, Article 2 (1987 Constitution) that: “Sovereignty
resides in the people and all government authority emanates from
them.”
• SECTION 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing

increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills
shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the
Senate may propose or concur with amendments
• Bills of local application must come from HR on the theory that the the
members of the House, being elected by their respective districts, are
expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. The
Senators, who are elected in the national level, are expected to
approach these concerns from a national perspective.
THERE IS NO NEED FOR EITHER OF THE TWO HOUSES TO WAIT
FOR EACH OTHER BEFORE STARTING TO HEAR A PROPOSED
MEASURE EXCEPT FOR THE CASES PREVIOUSLY STATED.
• The Congress may enact laws for any purposes of civil government
• Non-self executing provisions of the Constitution require that the

legislative branch enact laws to enable them, e.g. Section 1 to 28 of
Article 2 (Declaration of Principles and State Policies).

• Even Constitutional provisions that are self-executing may not prevent

Congress from enacting further laws to enforce them, impose penalties
for their violation and supply minor details.
2. The legislative process.Apart from the basic constitutional requirements for the
passage of a law, the Congress, through its Rules of Proceedings, provides in
detail the process by which a bill may be enacted in to law.
A bill is a proposed legislative measure introduced by a member/s of either

House, except for those specified by Section 24, Article 6 of the 1987
Constitution. It is signed by its author/s and filed with the Secretary of the
House.
a) First and second readings of the bills

a) The Secretary reports the bill for first reading;
b) First reading consists of reading the number and title of the bill
followed by its referral to the appropriate Committee for study
and recommendation;
c) The Committee may hold public hearings on the proposed

measure and submit its report and recommendation for
Calendar for second reading;
d) On second reading, the bill shall be read in full with amendments

proposed by the Committee, unless copies of which were
distributed to the members of the House and reading is
dispensed with;
e) The bill will be subject to debate, pertinent motions, and

amendments. After the amendments shall have been acted
upon, the bill will be voted on second reading. A bill approved
on second reading shall be included in the Calendar of Bills for
third reading; and
f) on third reading the bill approved on second reading will be

submitted for final vote by yeas and nays.
NO VIVA VOCE; ALL VOTES MUST BE INDIVIDUALLY
CASTED
b) Third reading
“No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has
passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof
in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days

before its passage, except when the President certifies to the

necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or
emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto
shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately
thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.” (Section
26 (2), Article VI, 1987 Constitution)
a) All bills must pass three readings on three different days, and
printed copies thereof must be distributed to its members three
days before its passage, unless it is certified as urgent by the
President.
b) No amendment shall be allowed upon the third reading and the

vote thereon shall be taken immediately, and the yeas and nays
entered in the Journal.
EITHER HOUSE MAY TACKLE A BILL AT ANY GIVEN TIME (NO
NEED TO WAIT FOR THE OTHER HOUSE) EXCEPT FOR THOSE
PROVIDED UNDER SECTION 24 OF ARTICLE 6 OF THE 1987
CONSTITUTION WHICH NEED TO ORIGINATE IN THE HR.
c) Conference Committee Reports

a) A bill approved on third reading in one House will be
transmitted to the other for concurrence;
b) If the other House approves the Bill without amendment, the

bill is passed by Congress then transmitted to the president for
action;
c) If the other House introduces amendments to which the House

of origin does not agree with, differences will be settled by the
Conference Committees of both Chambers.
d) The Conference Committee reports will have to be passed by

both Houses for it to be considered passed by Congress and
thereafter transmitted to the President for action.
CONFERENCE COMMITTEES IS NOT PART OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT.
d) Authentication of the Bill

a) The lawmaking process in Congress ends when the bill is
approved by the body;
b) It is indispensable to the validity of the bill;
c) Before the bill may be transmitted to the President for action,
the bill needs to be authenticated;

d) Authentication comprises the signing of the printed copy of the

bill by the House Speaker and the Senate President and the
secretaries of both to signify that the bill has been duly
approved by the legislature.
e) President’s approval or veto
a) If the President approves of the proposed bill, he shall sign it,
otherwise he shall veto it and return the bill with his objections
to the House where it originated;
b) The House where the bill originated shall enter the objections in
its journal and proceed to reconsider it.
c) If after consideration, two-thirds of all the members of the

House agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent with the objections
to the other house which will also reconsider it. If two-thirds of
the Members of the the other house approves it, it shall become
a law.
d) The President shall communicate his veto to the House where

the Bill originated within 30 days from its receipt, otherwise it
shall become a law as if he signed it.
REFERENCE: SECTIONS 24-27, ARTICLE 6, 1987 CONSTITUTION

SECTION 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills
authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and
private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with
amendments.
SECTION 25. (1) The Congress may not increase the appropriations
recommended by the President for the operation of the
Government as specified in the budget. The form, content, and
manner of preparation of the budget shall be prescribed by law.
(2) No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general
appropriations bill unless it relates specifically to some particular
appropriation therein. Any such provision or enactment shall be
limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates.
(3) The procedure in approving appropriations for the Congress

shall strictly follow the procedure for approving appropriations for
other departments and agencies.
(4) A special appropriations bill shall specify the purpose for which
it is intended, and shall be supported by funds actually available as

certified by the National Treasurer, or to be raised by a

corresponding revenue proposed therein.
(5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of

appropriations; however, the President, the President of the
Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional
Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in
the general appropriations law for their respective offices from
savings in other items of their respective appropriations.
(6) Discretionary funds appropriated for particular officials shall be

disbursed only for public purposes to be supported by appropriate
vouchers and subject to such guidelines as may be prescribed by
law.
(7) If, by the end of any fiscal year, the Congress shall have failed
to pass the general appropriations bill for the ensuing fiscal year,
the general appropriations law for the preceding fiscal year shall be
deemed reenacted and shall remain in force and effect until the
general appropriations bill is passed by the Congress.
SECTION 26. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace
only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.
(2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has
passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof
in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days
before its passage, except when the President certifies to the
necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or
emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto
shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately
thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.
SECTION 27. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it
becomes a law, be presented to the President. If he approves the
same, he shall sign it; otherwise, he shall veto it and return the
same with his objections to the House where it originated, which
shall enter the objections at large in its Journal and proceed to
reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of all the
Members of such House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent,
together with the objections, to the other House by which it shall
likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of all the
Members of that House, it shall become a law. In all such cases,

the votes of each House shall be determined by yeas or nays, and

the names of the Members voting for or against shall be entered in
its Journal. The President shall communicate his veto of any bill to
the House where it originated within thirty days after the date of
receipt thereof; otherwise, it shall become a law as if he had signed
it.
(2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular item
or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto
shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object.
E. ENROLLED BILL DOCTRINE

A. Definition
Under the enrolled bill rule, once an election for the adoption of
a statute is held, the procedural method by which the measure was
placed on the ballot cannot be challenged with a lawsuit since judicial
inquiry into the legislative procedure is barred as an intrusion into the
internal affairs of the lawmaking body.
A. CASES:
a) CASCO PHILIPPINE CHEMICAL CO., INC V.PEDRO GIMENEZ
G.R. No. L-17931, February 28, 1963
FACTS:
Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. filed a petition for review on the
decision of the Auditor General denying its claim for the refund of
its margin fee payment.
Pursuant to the Foreign Exchange Margin Fee Law (R.A. no. 2609)
the Central Bank of the Philippines issued Circular No. 95. fixing a
uniform margin fee of 25% on foreign exchange transactions and
later, a memorandum establishing the procedure for applications
for exemption from the payment of said fee.
Petitioner bought foreign exchange for the importation of urea and

formaldehyde which are main raw materials for synthetic resin
glues that it produces, and paid the said margin fee aggregating
P33,765.42 (November to December 1959) and P6,345.72 (May
1960).
Petitioner sought for refund of its margin fee on the basis of

Monetary Board Resolution no. 1529 declaring that separate
importation of urea and formaldehyde is exempt from said fee

Central Bank issued margin fee vouchers for the refund of the said
amounts but the Auditor of the Bank refused to pass in audit and
approve the vouchers on the ground that the exemption granted by
the Monetary Board for petitioner's separate importations of urea
and formaldehyde is not in accord with the provisions of section 2,
paragraph XVIII of RA 2609, which imposes the exemption of the
payment of the margin fee for “urea formaldehyde.” The Auditor
General of the Bank affirmed the action of the Auditor of the Bank.
The Petitioner maintains that the term "urea formaldehyde"

appearing in this provision should be construed as
"urea and formaldehyde,” contending that the bill approved in
Congress contained the copulative conjunction "and" between the
terms "urea" and "formaldehyde", and that the members of
Congress intended to exempt "urea" and "formaldehyde" separately
as essential elements in the manufacture of the synthetic resin glue
called "urea" formaldehyde", not the latter as a finished product,
citing in support of this view the statements made on the floor of
the Senate, during the consideration of the bill before said House,
by members thereof.
ISSUE:
Whether or not “urea” and “formaldehyde,” as separate imports,
exempt from the margin fee.
RULING:
No. The separate importations of urea and formaldehyde are not

exempt from the payment of the margin fee.
Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the court is barred from conducting
an inquiry into the legislative procedure employed in passing the
law.
In this case, the Supreme Court, speaking through Justice

Concepcion, settles that the enrolled bill is conclusive upon the
courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress
and approved by the President and the process by which it was
approved is beyond the inquiry of the Court.
In this case where the law in question uses the term "urea
formaldehyde" instead of "urea and formaldehyde” as contended
by the petitioner to be the intent of the Congress, the court said it
cannot speculate whether or not there has been any mistake in the

printing of the bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress

and approved by the President without jeopardizing the principle of
separation of powers.
Whether there has been a mistake, the court said, the remedy is by
amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree.
Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the earlier decision of the

Auditor General that urea and formaldehyde, as separate imports, are not
covered by the exemption on the payment of margin fee.
b) ARROYO V DE VENECIA G.R. No. 127255 August 14, 1997
FACTS:
Rep. Joker Arroyo and some members of the House of
Representatives filed a petition for certiorari and/or prohibition
challenging the validity of Republic Act No. 8240 alleging that its
passage was in violation of the rules of the House.
Petitioners argue that R.A. No. 8240 is null and void because it was
passed in violation of the rules of the House; that these rules
embody the constitutional mandate…and that, consequently,
violation of the House rules is a violation of the Constitution itself.
Petitioners said in submitting the conference committee report to

the House, House Speaker did not call for the yeas or nays, but
simply asked for its approval by motion;(2) in violation of Rule XIX,
§112, the Chair deliberately ignored Rep. Arroyo's question, "What
is that . . . Mr. Speaker?" and did not repeat Rep. Albano's motion
to approve or ratify; (3) in violation of Rule XVI, §97, the Chair
refused to recognize Rep. Arroyo and instead proceeded to act on
Rep. Albano's motion and afterward declared the report approved;
and (4) in violation of Rule XX, §§121-122, Rule XXI, §123, and
Rule XVIII, §109, the Chair suspended the session without first
ruling on Rep. Arroyo's question which, it is alleged, is a point of
order or a privileged motion.
Respondents' defense is anchored on the principle of separation of

powers and the enrolled bill doctrine. They argue that the Court is
not the proper forum for the enforcement of the rules of the House
and that there is no justification for reconsidering the enrolled bill
doctrine.

Although the Constitution provides in Art. VI, §16(3) for the

adoption by each House of its rules of proceedings, enforcement of
the rules cannot be sought in the courts except insofar as they
implement constitutional requirements such as that relating to
three readings on separate days before a bill may be passed.
ISSUE
Was the law duly enacted?
RULING:
The Court, speaking through Justice Mendoza, said it finds no

ground for holding that Congress committed a grave abuse of
discretion in enacting R.A. No. 8240. What is alleged to have been
violated in the enactment of R.A. No. 8240 are merely internal rules
of procedure of the House rather than constitutional requirements
for the enactment of a law, i.e., Art. VI, §§26-27.
Unless the rule affects persons other than the members of the
House, Courts ordinarily have no concern with its observance.
Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have the
effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members
have agreed to a particular measure.
In this case no rights of private individuals are involved but only

those of a member. The Court said the judiciary have no more
power to look into the internal proceedings of a House than
members of that House have to look over our shoulders, as long as
no violation of constitutional provisions is shown.
Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of H. No. 7198 by the
Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate and the
certification by the secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it
was passed on November 21, 1996 are conclusive of its due
enactment
The SC dismissed the petition.
SIDE NOTE/DISSENTING OPINION/S: While concurring to the ruling

on the case at bar, Justice Puno dissented to the view that the court has
no jurisdiction over the case, invoking Section 1, Article VIII of our
Constitution which was intentionally cobbled to empower courts,”a
new power that was NOT copied from any foreign state
constitution.

“Sec. 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court

and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle

actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.”
c) ASTORGA V. VILLEGAS G.R. No. L-23475 APRIL 30, 1974
FACTS:
The instant petition is filed by Herminio Astorga, in his capacity as

Vice Mayor of Manila, to compel the respondents to comply with
the law in question, RA 4065.
HB 9262, a bill of local application, was filed in the House of

Representatives on March 1964 and passed on third reading
without amendments on April 21, 1964. The bill was sent to the
Senate for its concurrence.
The Senate returned the bill to the House of Representatives on

May 1964 “with amendments” but the certification of amendment
transmitted to the Lower House was the one recommended by
Senator Gerardo Roxas of the Senate Committee on Provinces and
Municipal Governments and Cities and not those of Senator Arturo
Tolentino which were the actual ones approved by the body. The
HR who approved of the bill and the two bodies proceeded to
authenticate it and transmitted the same to the President who
affixed his signature on the printed copy of the bill, causing its
enactment.
Following the denunciation of respondent city mayor Villegas’, Sen.

Tolentino issued a press statement on July 1964 that the enrolled
copy of the house bill signed that was signed by the president was
a wrong version of the bill as it lacked the amendments he
introduced and that was approved on the Senate floor.
The Senate president on July 11, 1964, addressed a letter to the

President explaining that the enrolled copy of House Bill No. 9266
was not the bill duly approved by Congress and that he considered

his signature on the enrolled bill as invalid and of no effect. A

subsequent letter dated July 21, 1964 made the further clarification
that the invalidation by the Senate President of his signature meant
that the bill on which his signature appeared had never been
approved by the Senate and therefore the fact that he and the
Senate Secretary had signed it did not make the bill a valid
enactment.
On July 31, 1964 the President of the Philippines sent a message to

the presiding officers of both Houses of Congress informing them
that in view of the circumstances he was officially withdrawing his
signature on House Bill No. 9266 (which had been returned to the
Senate the previous July 3), adding that "it would be untenable and
against public policy to convert into law what was not actually
approved by the two Houses of Congress.”
Respondent Villegas then, issued circulars to the department heads

and chiefs of offices of the city government as well as to the
owners, operators and/or managers of business establishments in
Manila to disregard the provisions of Republic Act 4065. He likewise
issued an order to the Chief of Police to recall five members of the
city police force who had been assigned to the Vice-Mayor
presumably under authority of Republic Act 4065.
Petitioner Astorga then filed before the Court on September 7,

1964, a petition for "Mandamus, Injunction and/or Prohibition with
Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction" to compel
respondents Mayor of Manila, the Executive Secretary, the
Commissioner of Civil Service, the Manila Chief of Police, the Manila
City Treasurer and the members of the municipal board to comply
with the provisions of Republic Act 4065.
Respondents' argued that RA 4065 never became law since it was

not the bill actually passed by the Senate, and that the entries in
the journal of that body and not the enrolled bill itself should be
decisive in the resolution of the issue.
ISSUE:
Whether or not R.A. No. 4065 has been duly enacted and
therefore, binding.
RULING:

No. The law was not duly enacted.
The enrolled bill doctrine provides that the a bill that has been
authenticated by the officers of the Congress and their secretaries
is conclusive upon the court. However, in the absence of such
attestation as a result of the withdrawal/declaration of the Senate
President and the President of the invalidity of their signatures,
there is no enrolled bill so to speak of.
In this case, as a result of the disclaimer, and consequently there

being no enrolled bill, the court said it is the entries in the journal
should be consulted. Under the specific facts and circumstances of
this case, this Court can inquire whether the text of House Bill No.
9266 signed by the Chief Executive was the same text passed by
both Houses of Congress and resort to the Senate journal for the
purpose.
The journal discloses that substantial and lengthy amendments

were introduced on the floor and approved by the Senate but were
not incorporated in the printed text sent to the President and
signed by him.
In the face of the manifest error committed, the Court denied the
petition and declared that the so-called Republic Act No. 4065 has
not been duly enacted and therefore did not become law.
A. Parts of the Law

A. Title
A. Single subject rule
Sec. 26 (1), Article VI, 1987 Constitution. Every bill passed by the
Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed
in the title thereof.
Rule:
1. The legislature is to refrain from conglomeration,
under one statute, of heterogeneous subjects.
2. The title of the bill is to be couched in a language
sufficient to notify the legislators and the public and those
concerned of the import of the single subject thereof.
PURPOSE: TO PREVENT A “RIDER”/CONGLOMERATION OF
SUBJECTS
TITLE SHOULD NOT BE MISLEADING/
DECEPTIVE
SO THE LEGISLATORS MAY BE APPRISED
• CASES

A. LIDASAN VS. COMELEC G.R. No. L-28089 October 25,

1967
FACTS:
The Congress passed into law RA No. 4790 entitled “An Act
Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the province of
Lanao del Sur.” The body of the said law provides some of
the barrios that would constitute the new municipality are
not only from the Lanao del Sur but some were also taken
from the municipalities of the adjacent Province of Cotabato.
Prompted by the coming elections, COMELEC adopted its

resolution for the purposes of establishments of precincts,
registration of voters under the newly created town despite
the Office of the President’s recommendation that the
COMELEC wait until the operation of the statute be “clarified
by correcting legislation.”
Bara Lidasan of Parang, Cotabato filed the petition for

certiorari which challenges the validity of the law creating
the municipality of Dianaton on the basis of violation of the
single-subject rule of the 1987 Constitution.
ISSUE: Does the title of the RA 4790 conform with the single
subject rule provided by the Constitution?
RULING:
No. The title of RA No. 4790 does not in conform with the
single subject requirement of the Constitution.
Under Section 26 (1) of Article 6 in the 1987 constitution,

every law passed by Congress shall embrace only one
subject which shall be expressed in its title.
The Supreme Court, through Justice Sanchez, held the title

— "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton, in the
Province of Lanao del Sur"— projects the impression that
solely the province of Lanao del Sur is affected by the
creation of Dianaton. Not the slightest intimation is there
that communities in the adjacent province of Cotabato are
incorporated in this new Lanao del Sur town.

The phrase "in the Province of Lanao del Sur," read without
subtlety or contortion, makes the title misleading, deceptive.
In effect, RA 4790 had two-pronged purpose:(1) the

creation of the municipality of Dianaton; and (2) to
dismember two municipalities in Cotabato, a province
different from Lanao del Sur.
The title did not inform the members of Congress as to the

full impact of the law; it did not apprise the people in the
towns of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in the province
of Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being taken
away from their towns and province and added to the
adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur; it kept the public in the
dark as to what towns and provinces were actually affected
by the bill. These are the pressures which heavily weigh
against the constitutionality of Republic Act 479
The Court held that the purpose of the law is not expressed
in the title hence, RA No. 4790 is null and void.
SIDE NOTE: THE FAULT IS THE INSUFFICIENCY
B. TOBIAS VS ABALOS G.R. No. L-114783 December 8, 1994

FACTS:
Complainants, invoking their right as taxpayers and as
residents of Mandaluyong, filed a petition questioning the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise known
as "An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into
a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of
Mandaluyong." Before the enactment of the law,
Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to the same legislative
district.
Petitioners allege that the inclusion of the assailed Section

49 in the subject law resulted in the latter embracing two
principal subjects, namely: (1) the conversion of
Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city; and (2) the
division of the congressional district of San
Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate districts.
ISSUE:

Whether or not RA 7675 creating the HUC of Mandaluyong

violated the constitutional requirement of single subject in
the title and is therefore null and void.
RULING:
No. RA 7675 did not violate the single subject requirement of the
Constitution.
Under Section 26 (1) of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution,

However, the Supreme Court has adopted that the single

subject requirement of the Constitution should be given a
liberal construction so as not to cripple or impede legislation.
The Court said the single subject requirement should be given
a practical rather than a technical construction. It should be
sufficient compliance with such requirement if the title
expresses the general subject and all the provisions are
germane to that general subject.”
TITLE NEED NOT MENTION/INDEX ALLCONTENT BUT

SHOULD BE SUFFICIENT
In the instant case, the Court held that the creation of a
separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a
subject separate and distinct from the subject of its
conversion into a highly urbanized city but is a natural and
logical consequence of its conversion into a highly urbanized
city. Verily, the title of R.A. No. 7675, "An Act Converting the
Municipality of Mandaluyong Into a Highly Urbanized City of
Mandaluyong" necessarily includes and contemplates the
subject treated under Section 49 regarding the creation of a
separate congressional district for Mandaluyong. The Court
proceeded to dismiss the petition.
The subject as expressed in the title of RA 7675 conforms

with the single subject requirement of the Constitution and
thus, the law is valid.
A. FARIÑAS VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY G.R. No. 147387

December 10, 2003
FACTS:

The petitioners said that the inclusion of Section 14 in RA

9006, repealing Section 67 of the OEC, constitutes a “rider”
because of the supposed dissimilarity in the subject matter
of RA 9006 and Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code as
the former Rep primarily deals with the lifting of the ban on
the use of media for election propaganda and the
elimination of unfair election practices, while the latter
imposes a limitation on elective officials who run for an
office other than the one they are holding .
Petitioners allege that repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus

Election Code is thus not embraced in the title, nor germane
to the subject matter of RA. 9006.
The respondents contend that Section 14 of RA 9006 is not a

proscribed rider nor does it violate the single subject rule as
prescribed by Section 26 (1) of Article VI in the 1987
Constitution.
The title of RA 9006, "An Act to Enhance the Holding of

Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible Elections
through Fair Election Practices," is so broad that it
encompasses all the processes involved in an election
exercise, including the filing of certificates of candidacy by
elective officials.
ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 9006 violates the single subject
requirement of the Constitution.
RULING:
No, RA 9006 did not violate the single subject requirement of the
Constitution. ‘
Under Section 26 (1) of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution,

The Court, in its ruling penned by Justice Callego Sr., said

the proscription is aimed against the evils of the so-called
omnibus bills and log-rolling legislation as well as
surreptitious and/or unconsidered encroaches. The provision

merely calls for all parts of an act relating to its subject

finding expression in its title
To determine whether there has been compliance with the

constitutional requirement that the subject of an act shall be
expressed in its title, the Court laid down the rule that –
Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and
titles of statutes should not be so narrowly construed as to
cripple or impede the power of legislation… It is sufficient if
the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include the
general object which a statute seeks to effect, without
expressing each and every end and means necessary or
convenient for the accomplishing of that object.
In the instant case, the Court said that while some sectors of
society and in government, for sure, may believe that the
repeal of Section 67 is bad policy as it would encourage
political adventurism, policy matters are not the concern of
the Court. Government policy is within the exclusive
dominion of the political branches of the government. It is
not for this Court to look into the wisdom or propriety of
legislative determination.
A. Enacting clause
The enacting clause state the authority by which the act is
enacted.
It is written immediately after the title.
FORMATS:
STATUTE — “Be it enacted by the Senate and the House of
Representatives of the Philippines in Legislature assembled
and by the authority of the same.
PRESIDENTIAL DECREES — “NOW THEREFORE, I, ___, by

virtue of the powers vested in my by the Constitution, do
hereby decree as follows:”
EXECUTIVE ORDERS — “Now, therefore, I, ___, hereby
order.”
A. Body of the statute
1. The purview/body tells what the statute is about;
2. It should contain one subject as reflected by the title;
3. A statute is divided into numbered sections containing a
single proposition;

4. A complex statute contains, in this order: short title, a

policy section, definition section, administrative section,
sections prescribing standards of conduct, section
imposing sanctions for violation of its provisions,
transitory provision, separability clause, repealing clause,
and effectivity clause.
A. Separability Clause
1. It declares that any provision of the act declared invalid
will not affect the rest of the statute.
2. The clause, however, would not stop the Court to
invalidate the whole statute where what is left after the
void part is incomplete and not workable.
A. Effectivity (Based on Art. 2, CIVIL CODE)
A. PUBLICATION REQUIREMENT. Art. 2 of the CIVIL Code provides
PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY, INDESPENSABLE
IF THE LAW PROVIDES FOR ITS IMMEDIATE EFFECTIVITY, IT TAKES
EFFECT ON THE DAY OF ITS PUBLICATION.
CASES:
1. Tañada vs Tuvera G.R. L-63915 April 24,1985
FACTS:
The petitioner came to court with claims that they have a long list
of presidential issuances that were unpublished. They argued that
the law must be published first before it would have the binding
effect pursuant to Art.2 of the Civil Code
The OSG, in response, said the non-publication of the laws in

question should fall within the clause “unless it is otherwise provided,”
and thus, should remain valid.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the publication of the laws are necessary before it

takes effect.
RULING:
Yes, publication is needed before laws should take effect.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that laws shall take effect after
15 days following completion of their publication either in the
Official Gazette or in a newspaper of a general circulation in the
Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided.
The Court, speaking through Justice Escolin, said publication is an

indispensable requirement before a law takes effect and that the
clause “unless otherwise provided” does not refer to the

requirement of publication but of the time when the law takes

effect.
Justice Teehankee, in concurring, said the Court has consistently

stressed that "it is an elementary rule of fair play and justice that a
reasonable opportunity to be informed must be afforded to the
people who are commanded to obey before they can be punished
for its violation,1 citing the settled principle based on due process
enunciated in earlier cases that "before the public is bound by its
contents, especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must
first be published and the people officially and specially informed of said
contents and its penalties.”
The Court said that presidential issuances, as such the subject

being questioned in court, the Court held that the publication of all
presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is
mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines,
forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden or.
the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category.
Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons
or class of persons such as administrative and executive orders
need not be published on the assumption that they have been
circularized to all concerned.
Therefore, the publication of the presidential issuances is needed

before they can have a binding effect. The Court directed the
publication of the presidential issuances which are of general
application, in the Official Gazette.
1. Philippine Veterans Bank Employees Union v. Vega, G.R. No.

105364, June 28, 2001
FACTS:
On January 2, 1992, the Congress enacted R.A. 7169 providing for

the rehabilitation of Philippine Veterans Bank. It was published
in the Official Gazette in February 24, 1992. Thereafter,
petitioners filed with the labor tribunals their residual claims for
benefits and for reinstatement upon reopening the bank. In May
1992, the Central Bank issued a certificate of authority allowing
the PVB to reopen despite the late mandate for rehabilitation
and reopening, Judge Vega continued with the liquidation
proceedings of the bank alleging further that RA 7169 became
effective only on March 10, 1992 or 15 days after its publication
in the Official Gazette on February 24, 1992.

ISSUE: When did RA 7169 take effect?
RULING:
In view of the foregoing, the Court held that it is clear that the
legislature intended to make the law effective immediately upon
its approval. It is undisputed that R.A. No. 7169 was signed into
law by President Corazon C. Aquino on January 2, 1992.
Therefore, said law became effective on said date.
Assuming for the sake of argument that publication is necessary for

the effectivity of R.A. No. 7169, then it became legally effective
on February 24, 1992, the date when the same was published
in the Official Gazette and not on March 10, 1992, or 15 days
following the publication, as erroneously claimed by
respondents Central Bank and Liquidator.
The court held that there…
A. PROSPECTIVE OPERATION OF LAWS

A. General Rule: Article 4 of the Civil Code provides that laws shall
have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided/
B. Exception:
A. When the law provides for its retroactivity;
B. When the penal provision is favorable to the accused ;
CASE: Pang v. People, G.R. No. 176229, October 19, 2011
FACTS:
The baggage of petitioner Ho Wai Pang was found with meth upon arrival
in NAIA on September 6, 1991, and he and co-accused were charged and
convicted for violation of Section 15 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
At the time of the commission of the offense, the penalty imposed under
the law as amended by PD 1683 was life imprisonment to death and a
fine ranging from ₱20,000.00 to ₱30,000.00. RA 7659 enacted in 1993
further introduced amendments to Section 15, Article III and Section 20,
Article IV of R.A. No. 6425, as amended. Under the amendments, the
penalty prescribed in Section 15 was changed from "life imprisonment to
death and a fine ranging from ₱20,000.00 to ₱30,000.00" to "reclusion
perpetua to death and a fine ranging from ₱500,000.00 to ₱10 million".
On the other hand, Section 17 of R.A. No. 7659 amended Section 20,
Article IV of R.A. No. 6425 in that the new penalty provided by the

amendatory law shall be applied depending on the quantity of the

dangerous drugs involved. The lower court imposed the new penalty on
the respondent in the case at bar.
ISSUE: Whether or not the change in penalty as provided in the amendatory law
subsequently passed may be applied on the case of Ho Wai Pang, et al.
RULING:
YES, the new penalty introduced by the subsequent amendatory law is

applicable on the case at bar.
Under Article 4 of the Civil Code, laws shall have no retroactive effect
unless the contrary is provided. Among exceptions of this rule is when the
subsequent law is favorable to the accused.
The Court held that since "reclusion perpetua” is a lighter penalty than life
imprisonment, and considering the rule that criminal statutes with a
favorable effect to the accused, have, as to him, a retroactive effect”, the
penalty imposed by the trial court upon petitioner is proper.
Consequently, the Court sustains the penalty of imprisonment, which is

reclusion perpetua, as well as the amount of fine imposed by the trial
court upon petitioner, the same being more favorable to him.
The Court affirmed the earlier decision rendered by the Court of Appeals
and denied the petition of the respondents.
CASE 2: Hernan v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 217874, December 5, 2017
FACTS: The petitioner worked as Supervising Fiscal Clerk of DOTC-CAR.

She was charged for malversation of funds amounting P11,300 for an
unaccounted deposit in 1996.
Case was arraigned in Baguio City RTC in 1998 and petitioner was
convicted later on with penalty of prision mayor or 7 years, 4 months and
1 day as minimum to 11 years, 6 months and 21 days in its maximum.
Petitioner appealed to CA which affirmed conviction but modified the

penalty but upon motion, set aside its own ruling as Sandiganbayan has
exclusive jurisdiction.
November 2009 - SB affirmed conviction but modified the penalty imposed

to: from 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum, to 11 years, 6 months,
and 21 days of prision mayor as maximum, together with the accessory penalties

under Article 42 of the Revised Penal Code, and that interest of only 6% shall be
imposed on the amount of ₱11,300.00 to be restored by the accused.
In July 2017, RA 10951 took effect adjusting the penalties of crimes

punishable under RPC. The act amended Art. 217 of RPC reducing the
penalty for malversation less than P40,000 to prision correccional.
ISSUE: Whether or not the reduced penalty imposed by RA 10951 be

retroactively applied to modify the accused sentence.
RULING:
Yes the adjusted penalties imposed by RA 10951 may be retroactively applied on

the case of Hernan.
Article 4 of the Civil Code provides for the prospective application of law
unless the contrary is provide and when the retroactive application fulfills
certain requirements such as that it must be favorable to the accused.
The Court held that the recent passage of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10951
which accordingly reduced the penalty applicable to the crime charged
herein is an example of such exceptional circumstance.
Since the amount involved herein is P11,300.00, which does not exceed
P40,000.00, the new penalty that should be imposed is prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods, which has a prison term
of two (2) years, four (4) months, and one (1) day, to six (6) years.
A. RULES OF PROCEDURE
CASE: Resident Marine Mammals v. Reyes, G.R. No. 180771, April 21,2015
FACTS:
On June 13, 2002, the Philippine government through the DOE entered
into a Geophysical Survey and Exploration Contract-102 (GSEC-102) with
JAPEX involving geological and geophysical studies of the Tañon Strait
including surface geology, sample analysis, and reprocessing of seismic
and magnetic data, geophysical and satellite surveys, as well as oil and
gas sampling in Tañon Strait. The GSEC was converted into a Service
Contract (SC-46) for the exploration, development, and production of
petroleum resources in a block covering approximately 2,850 square
kilometers offshore the Tañon Strait in 2004.
Tañon Strait has been declared a protected seascape since 1988 thus,
JAPEX agreed to comply with the Environmental Impact Assessment

requirements pursuant and was then later on granted by EMB with an

ECC.
FILED BEFORE THE COURT in 2007 are two consolidated petitions for
Certiorari, Mandamus, and Injunction/Prohibition seeking to nullify the
ECC issued to and prohibit the implementation of Service Contract (SC-46)
on the basis of that it violates the constitution and certain local and
international laws.
The Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases took effect in 2010,

which allow for a "citizen suit," and permit any Filipino citizen to file an
action before our courts for violations of our environmental law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing to file the suit
RULING:
YES, the petitioners have legal standing to bring action.
Article 4 of the Civil Code mandates that laws shall have no retroactive
effect, however, remedial or procedural legislations are part of the
exemptions thereto.
In the instant case, the Court held that although the petitions were filed in
2007, or long before the effectivity of the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases in 2010, it has been consistently held that rules of
procedure "may be retroactively applied to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage and will not violate any right of
a person who may feel that he is adversely affected, inasmuch as there is
no vested rights in rules of procedure.”
With the effect of the retroactive application of the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases, the Court held that the petitioners have legal
standing to file the suit.
Note: The petition prospered.
A. Exception to the exception of retroactive application

A. RULE ON PROCEDURE INTENDED TO APPLY PROSPECTIVELY
B. RULES THAT ARE SUBSTANTIVE IN CHARACTER
Case: In Re Atty. Robelito B. Diuyan, A.C. 9676, April 2, 2018
FACTS:

In 2003, Diuyan notarized a deed of partition brought before him by eight

indigent farmers who presented CTCs as proof of their identity.
One of the names that appeared as attesters apparently belong to

someone who died in 2001.
The Ombudsman Mindanao furnished the Court of its September 2012

decision citing the said facts for proper action. This decision was treated
by the Court as an administrative complaint against Diuyan who served as
District Public Atty for Mati City and all of Davao Oriental.
Diuyan admitted having notarized the document
The Court also referred the case to IBP for investigation, report, and
recommendation wherein the IBP found Diuyan guilty for violation of the
2004 rules of notarial practice and grossly negligent in the performance of
his functions.
ISSUE: Whether respondent should he held administratively liable for

notarizing a Deed of Partition on the basis of the affiants' CTCs and in
violation of the 2004 Rules of Notarial Practice.
RULING: NO, the respondent did not commit any mistake in notarizing a
deed of partition on the basis of the CTCs.
This Court finds nothing. irregular with respondent's act of notarizing the
Deed of Partition on July 23, 2003 on the basis of the affiants' CTCs. The
law applicable at the time of the notarization only required the
presentation of the CTCs.
Similarly, respondent notarized the Deed of Partition on July 23, 2003,

or prior to the effectivity of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, [16] of which
he is being held accountable by the IBP. However, when the Deed was
notarized on July 23, 2003, the applicable law was the notarial law under
Title IV, Chapter 11, Article VII of the Revised Administrative Code,
[17]
Section 251 of which states:
SECTION 251. Requirement as to notation of payment of (cedula)

residence tax. - Every contract, deed, or other document acknowledged
before a notary public shall have certified thereon that the parties thereto
have presented their proper (cedula) residence certificates or are exempt
from the (cedula) residence tax, and there shall be entered by the notary
public as a part of such certification the number, place of issue, and date
of each (cedula) residence certificate as aforesaid.

In addition, Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 465[18] also reiterated the need to

present a residence certificate when acknowledging documents before a
notary public.
However, a lawyer cannot be held liable for a violation his duties as

Notary-Public when the law in effect at the time of his complained act
does not provide any prohibition to the same, as in the case at bench.
Thus, it was incorrect for the IBP to have applied the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice in holding respondent liable for notarizing the Deed of
Partition.
There was nothing irregular on the face of the Deed that would have
alerted respondent to ask probing questions or inquire about the
circumstances behind the execution of the said instrument. On the
contrary, the Deed was a valid exercise of the farmers' right to divide the
title in their favor as beneficiaries. The Ombudsman affirmed this when it
dismissed the administrative case filed against an agrarian reform officer
concerning the Deed.
In fact, the Ombudsman rule,d that "[t]he eventual breaking of

TCT[20] CLOA[21] No. 454 into individual titles in favor of the farmer-
beneficiaries named in said collective CLOA is not irregular as it is, in fact,
provided by DAR[22] rules and regulations.”[23]
In fine, respondent did not violate any of his duties as Notary Public when
he notarized the Deed of Partition on July 23, 2003.
Although procedural laws may be given a retroactive effect, in the instant

case, there are substantive laws that are applicable. During the time the
act was committed, the rules were not enforced yet. It will result in
injustice.
A. AMENDMENTS
A. ONLY SPECIFIC PROVISIONS
B. FORM
A. GENERAL RULE: express
B. By implication
A. CONSTRUCTION OF AMENDMENTS
Case” Estrada v. Caseda, GR No. L-1560
rule: An amendment becomes part of the original statute as if it has always
been there.
dreamwork: no prejudicial question because the criminal case was not a

subsequent action

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STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 1L-M5

STUDY NOTES NO. 1

A. DISTINCTION: Statutes are distinct from:

GENERAL RULE: UNLESS REPEALED OR DECLARED VOID, LAWS

b) Temporary statutes take effect within a limited period of time.

(2) Emergency — When the statute is designed to meet an emergency, its

ROSALIE OBADO ABATAYO UNIVERSITY OF CEBU SCHOOL OF LAW 1L-M5

(4) The law is of an emergency in nature and authorized by the police

ROSALIE OBADO ABATAYO UNIVERSITY OF CEBU SCHOOL OF LAW 1L-M5

ignoring it or that its purpose can be accomplished in a manner other than

• SECTION 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing

• Non-self executing provisions of the Constitution require that the

ROSALIE OBADO ABATAYO UNIVERSITY OF CEBU SCHOOL OF LAW 1L-M5

• Even Constitutional provisions that are self-executing may not prevent

A bill is a proposed legislative measure introduced by a member/s of either

a) First and second readings of the bills

c) The Committee may hold public hearings on the proposed

d) On second reading, the bill shall be read in full with amendments

e) The bill will be subject to debate, pertinent motions, and

f) on third reading the bill approved on second reading will be

ROSALIE OBADO ABATAYO UNIVERSITY OF CEBU SCHOOL OF LAW 1L-M5

before its passage, except when the President certifies to the

b) No amendment shall be allowed upon the third reading and the

c) Conference Committee Reports

b) If the other House approves the Bill without amendment, the

c) If the other House introduces amendments to which the House

d) The Conference Committee reports will have to be passed by

d) Authentication of the Bill

ROSALIE OBADO ABATAYO UNIVERSITY OF CEBU SCHOOL OF LAW 1L-M5

d) Authentication comprises the signing of the printed copy of the

c) If after consideration, two-thirds of all the members of the

d) The President shall communicate his veto to the House where

REFERENCE: SECTIONS 24-27, ARTICLE 6, 1987 CONSTITUTION

(3) The procedure in approving appropriations for the Congress

ROSALIE OBADO ABATAYO UNIVERSITY OF CEBU SCHOOL OF LAW 1L-M5

certified by the National Treasurer, or to be raised by a

(5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of

(6) Discretionary funds appropriated for particular officials shall be

ROSALIE OBADO ABATAYO UNIVERSITY OF CEBU SCHOOL OF LAW 1L-M5

the votes of each House shall be determined by yeas or nays, and

E. ENROLLED BILL DOCTRINE

Petitioner bought foreign exchange for the importation of urea and

Petitioner sought for refund of its margin fee on the basis of

ROSALIE OBADO ABATAYO UNIVERSITY OF CEBU SCHOOL OF LAW 1L-M5

The Petitioner maintains that the term "urea formaldehyde"

No. The separate importations of urea and formaldehyde are not

In this case, the Supreme Court, speaking through Justice

ROSALIE OBADO ABATAYO UNIVERSITY OF CEBU SCHOOL OF LAW 1L-M5

printing of the bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress

Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the earlier decision of the

b) ARROYO V DE VENECIA G.R. No. 127255 August 14, 1997

Petitioners said in submitting the conference committee report to

Respondents' defense is anchored on the principle of separation of

ROSALIE OBADO ABATAYO UNIVERSITY OF CEBU SCHOOL OF LAW 1L-M5

Although the Constitution provides in Art. VI, §16(3) for the

The Court, speaking through Justice Mendoza, said it finds no

In this case no rights of private individuals are involved but only

The SC dismissed the petition.

SIDE NOTE/DISSENTING OPINION/S: While concurring to the ruling

ROSALIE OBADO ABATAYO UNIVERSITY OF CEBU SCHOOL OF LAW 1L-M5

“Sec. 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle

c) ASTORGA V. VILLEGAS G.R. No. L-23475 APRIL 30, 1974

The instant petition is filed by Herminio Astorga, in his capacity as