G.R. No.

205539 Cruz alleged that despite receipt of the demand letter,

Susan refused to vacate and pay the accrued rentals
VELIA J. CRUZ, Petitioner from June 1989 to Febn1ary 2009 in the amount of
vs. ₱237,000.00, computed at ₱l,000.00 per month.
SPOUSES MAXIMO and SUSAN CHRISTENSEN, Thus, Cruz was constrained to file a Complaint 12 for
Respondents unlawful detainer13 on April 27, 2009.

DECISION In her Answer,14 Susan admitted to occupying a

portion of the property since 1969 on a month-to-
LEONEN, J.: month lease agreement. However, she denied that
she failed to pay her rentals since 1989 or that she
refused to pay them, attaching receipts of her rental
The prior service and receipt of a demand letter is
payments as evidence. She alleged that Cruz refused
unnecessary in a case for unlawful detainer if the
to receive her rental payments sometime in 2002.
demand to vacate is premised on the expiration of the
Susan likewise denied receiving any demand letter
lease, not on the non-payment of rentals or non-
from Cruz and claims that the signature appearing on
compliance of the terms and conditions of the lease.
the registry return card of the demand letter 15 was not
her signature.16
This is a, Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assailing
the October 11, 2012 Decision2 and January 21, 2013
On June 3, 2010, Branch 58, Metropolitan Trial Court,
Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
San Juan City rendered a Decision17 dismissing Cruz's
No. 117773. The assailed Decision reversed the
Complaint. It found that for the registry receipts and
Regional Trial Court Decision4 dated December 29,
registry return cards to serve as proof that the
2010, which ordered respondents Maximo and Susan
demand letter was received, it must first be
Christensen (the Spouses Christensen) to pay unpaid
authenticated through an affidavit of service by the
rentals and to vacate petitioner Velia J. Cruz's (Cruz)
person mailing the letter. It also found that Cruz failed
property. The Court of Appeals instead reinstated the
to prove who received the demand letter and signed
Metropolitan Trial Court Decision5 dated June 3, 2010,
the registry return receipt, considering that Susan
dismissing the complaint for unlawful detainer for
denied it.18
Cruz's failure to prove that a demand letter was validly
served on the Spouses Christensen.
Cruz appealed to the Regional Trial Court.19 On
December 29, 2010, Branch 160, Regional Trial
Cruz alleged that she was the owner of a parcel of
Court, Pasig City rendered a Decision20 reversing the
land located at A. Santos Street, Balong Bato, San
Metropolitan Trial Court Decision. It found that the
Juan City, which she acquired through inheritance
bare denial of receipt would not prevail over the
from her late mother, Ruperta D. Javier (Javier). She
registry return card showing actual receipt of the
further alleged that Susan Christensen (Susan) had
demand letter.21 The dispositive portion of this
been occupying the property during Javier's lifetime,
Decision read:
as they had a verbal lease agreement. 6
WHEREFORE, premise
Cruz claimed that ever since she inherited the
property, she tolerated Susan's occupancy of the
property. However, due to Susan's failure and refusal Susan Christensen and all premises considered, the
to pay rentals of ₱l,000.00 per month, she was lower court's decision is hereby REVERSED.
constrained to demand that Susan vacate the
property and pay all unpaid rentals.7 Susan Christensen and all persons claiming rights
under her are hereby ordered:
The matter was referred to barangay conciliation in
Barangay Balong Bato, San Juan, despite the parties 1. To vacate the premises A. Santos Street,
being residents of different cities. The parties, Balong Bato, San Juan City, Metro Manila,
however, were unable to settle into a compromise. As and to surrender possession thereof to
a result, the Punong Barangay issued a Certificate to plaintiff;
File Action8 on August 11, 2005.9
2. To pay the accrued unpaid rentals in the
Three (3) years later, or on August 5, 2008, Cruz, amount of One Thousand Pesos (₱l,000.00)
through counsel, sent Susan a final demand per month reckoned from April 2000 (based
letter,10 demanding that she pay the unpaid rentals on the evidence presented) until such time
and vacate the property within 15 days from receipt.11 defendant-appellee, and all persons claiming
rights under her, actually vacated and
 surrendered peaceful possession of the
subject real property in favor of the plaintiff-
appellant;
3. To pay the sum of Twenty Thousand Pesos
(₱20,000.00) as and by way of attorney's
fees; and
4. The costs of suit.
Costs against appellee.
So ordered.22
The Spouses Christensen appealed to the Court of
Appeals,23 arguing that Cruz was unable to prove
Susan's actual receipt of the demand letter. 24 They
likewise alleged that Cruz's late filing of her
11emorandum before the Regionai Trial Court should
have been ground to dismiss her appeal. 25
On October 11, 2012, the Court of Appeals rendered
a Decision26 reversing the Regional Trial Court
Decision and reinstating the Metropolitan Trial Court
Decision. According to the Court of Appeals, the filing
of a memorandum of appeal within 15 days from the
receipt of order is mandatory under Rule 40, Section
7(b) of the Rules of Court and the failure to comply
will result in the dismissal of the appeal.27 It likewise
concurred with the Metropolitan Trial Court's finding
that registry receipts and return cards are insufficient
proof of receipt.28 The dispositive portion of this
Decision read;
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING[,] the instant Petition
for Review is GRANTED. The assailed Decision
dated 29 December 2010 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 160, Pasig City is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The Decision rendered by the Municipal
[sic] Trial Court, San Juan City dated 3 June 2010 is
hereby ORDERED REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.29
Cruz filed a Motion for Reconsideration30 but it was
denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution31 dated
January 21, 2013. Hence, this Petition32 was filed.
Petitioner concedes that while the 15-day period for
filing the memorandum of appeal is mandatory under
the Rules of Court,33 the Regional Trial Court
nonetheless opted to resolve her appeal on its merits,
showing that the issues and arguments raised in the
appeal outweigh its procedural defect. 34 Petitioner
submits that other than respondent Susan's bare
denial of signing the registry return card, respondents
did not deny receipt of the demand letter at their
known address or the authority of the signatory on the
registry return card to receive registered mail. 35 She
argues that notice by registered mail is considered
service to the recipient, and this cannot be overcome
simply by denying the signature appearing on the
registry return card.36 Petitioner points out that before
receiving the demand letter, the matter was already
the subject of a barangay conciliation proceeding,
leading to the ejectment suit as the reasonable
consequence of respondents' non-compliance with
the demand to pay rentals and to vacate the
property.37
Petitioner likewise submits that a prior demand is not
required in an action for unlawful detainer since prior
demand only applies if the grounds of the complaint
are non-payment of rentals or non-compliance with
the conditions of the lease. She points out that where
the action is grounded on the expiration of the
contract of lease, as in this instance where the lease
was on a month-to-month basis, the failure to pay the
rentals for the month terminates the lease. She
argues that a notice or demand to vacate would be
unnecessary38 since "nothing in the law obligates ...
[the] owner-lessor to allow [the lessees] to stay
forever in the leased property without paying any
reasonable compensation or rental."39
Respondents counter that the Court of Appeals did
not err in finding that the Regional Trial Court should
have dismissed her appeal since petitioner admitted
that she belatedly filed her memorandum of appeal
before the trial court. They maintain that petitioner has
not shown any justifiable reason for the relaxation of
technical rules.40 They insist that the demand to pay or
to vacate is a jurisdictional requirement that must be
complied with before an ejectment suit may be
brought.41
Respondents maintain that registry receipts and
registry return cards are not sufficient to establish that
respondents received the demand letter considering
that they must first be authenticated to serve as proof
of receipt. They argue that the denial of receipt is
sufficient since petitioner had the burden of proving
that respondents actually received the demand
letter.42 They further contend that petitioner's
complaint was grounded on the nonpayment of lease
rentals and not, as petitioner belatedly claims, on the
expiration lease; thus, petitioner must still comply with
the jurisdictional requirement of prior demand.43
The issues for resolution before this Court are the
following:
First, whether or not the Regional Trial Court should
have dismissed the appeal considering that petitioner
Velia J. Cruz's Memorandum of Appeals was not filed
within the required period; and
Finally, whether or not petitioner Velia J. Cruz was
able to prove Spouses Maximo and Susan
Christensen's receipt of her demand letter before filing
her Complaint for unlawful detainer. In order to
resolve the second issue, however, this Comi must
first address whether or not a demand was necessary
considering that Maximo and Susan Christensen had
a month-to-month lease on the property.
The Petition is granted.
I of the appellant to file a memorandum is a ground for
Procedural rules of even the most mandatory
character may be suspended upon a showing of
circumstances warranting the exercise of liberality in
its strict application.
Petitioner admits that her Memorandum of Appeal
was filed nine (9) days beyond the 15"day period but
that the Regional Trial Court opted to resolve her
case on its merits in the interest of substantial
justice.44
Rule 40, Section 7 of the Rules of Court states the
procedure of appeal before the Regional Trial Court. It
provides:
Section 7. Procedure in the Regional Trial Court.—
(a) Upon receipt of the complete record or the record
on appeal, the clerk of court of the Regional Trial
Court shall notify the parties of such fact.
(b) Within fifteen (15) days from such notice, it shall
be the duty of the appellant to submit a memorandum
which shall briefly discuss the errors imputed to the
lower court, a copy of which shall be furnished by him
to the adverse party. Within fifteen (15) days from
receipt of the appellant's memorandum, the appellee
may file his memorandum.
Failure of the appellant to file a memorandum shall be
a ground for dismissal of the appeal.
(c) Upon the filing of the memorandum of the
appellee, or the expiration of the period to do so, the
case shall be considered submitted for decision. The
Regional Trial Court shall decide the case on the
basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in
the court of origin and such memoranda as are filed.
(Emphasis supplied)
The rule requiring the filing of the memorandum within
the period provided is mandatory. Failure to comply
will result in the dismissal of the
appeal.45 Enriquez v. Court of Appeals46explained:
Rule 40, Section 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure is a new provision. Said section is based
on Section 21 (c) and (d) of the Interim Rules Relative
to the Implementation of the Judiciary Reorganization
Act of 1980 (B.P. Blg. 129) with modifications. These
include the following changes: (a) the appellant is
required to submit a memorandum discussing the
errors imputed to the lower court within fifteen (15)
days from notice, and the appellee is given the same
period counted from receipt of the appellant's
memorandum to file his memorandum; (b) the failure
the dismissal of the appeal.
Rule 40, Section 7 (b) provides that, "it shall be the
duty of the appellant to submit a memorandum" and
failure to do so "shall be a ground for dismissal of the
appeal." The use of the word "shall" in a statute or
rule expresses what is mandatory and compulsory.
Further, the Rule imposes upon an appellant the
"duty" to submit his memorandum. A duty is a "legal
or moral obligation, mandatory act, responsibility,
charge, requirement, trust, chore, function,
commission, debt, liability, assignment, role, pledge,
dictate, office, (and) engagement." Thus, under the
express mandate of said Rule, the appellant is duty-
bound to submit his memorandum on appeal. Such
submission is not a matter of discretion on his part.
His failure to comply with this mandate or to perform
said duty will compel the RTC to dismiss his appeal. 47
Rule 40, Section 7 is likewise jurisdictional since the
Regional Trial Court can only resolve errors that are
specifically assigned and properly argued in the
memorandum.48 Thus, dismissals based on this rule
are premised on the non-filing of the memorandum. A
trial court does not acquire jurisdiction over an appeal
where the errors have not been specifically assigned.
In this instance, a Memorandum of Appeal was filed
late but was nonetheless given due course by the
Regional Trial Court. Thus, the jurisdictional defect
was cured since petitioner was able to specifically
assign the Municipal Trial Court's errors, which the
Regional Trial Court was able to address and resolve.
This Court also notes that all substantial issues have
already been fully litigated before the Municipal Trial
Court, the Regional Trial Court, and the Court of
Appeals.
Procedural defects should not be relied on to defeat
the substantive rights of litigants. 49 Even procedural
rules of the most mandatory character may be
suspended where "matters of life, liberty, honor or
property"50 warrant its liberal application. Ginete v.
Court of Appeals51added that courts may also
consider:
1. the existence of special or compelling
circumstances, (2) the merits of the case, (3) a cause
not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of
the party favored by the suspension of the rules, (4) a
lack of any showing that the review sought is merely
frivolous and dilatory[, and that] (5) the other party will
not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.52
Liberality in the application of Rule 40, Section 7 is
warranted in this case in view of the potential inequity
that may result if the rule is strictly applied. As will be
discussed later, petitioner's meritorious cause would
be unduly prejudiced if this case were to be dismissed
on technicalities.
II
Possession of a property belonging to another may be
tolerated or permitted, even without a prior contract
between the parties, as long as there is an implied
promise that the occupant will vacate upon
demand.53 Refusal to vacate despite demand will give
rise to an action for summary ejectment. 54 Thus, prior
demand is a jurisdictional requirement before an
action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer may be
instituted.
Under Rule 70, Section 1 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure, an action for unlawful detainer may be
brought against a possessor of a property who
unlawfully withholds possession after the termination
or expiration of the right to hold possession. Rule 70,
Section 2 of the Rules of Civil Procedure requires that
there must first be a prior demand to pay or comply
with the conditions of the lease and to vacate before
an action can be filed:
Section 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when.
- Subject to the provisions· of the next succeeding
section, a person deprived of the possession of any
land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy,
or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee or other person
against whom the possession of any land or building
is unlawfully withheld after the expiration 'or
te1mination of the right to hold possession, by virtue
of any contract, express or implied, or the legal
representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor,
vendee, or other person, may, at any time within one
(1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding
of possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal
Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully
withholding or depriving of possession, or any person
or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of
such possession, together with damages and costs.
Section 2. Lessor to proceed against lessee only after
demand. - Unless otherwise stipulated, such action by
the lessor shall be commenced only after demand to
pay or comply with the conditions of the lease and to
vacate is made upon the lessee, or by serving written
notice of such demand upon the person found on the
premises, or by posting such notice on the premises if
no person be found thereon, and the lessee fails to
comply therewith after fifteen (15) days in the case of
land or five (5) days in the case of buildings.
The property in this case is owned by petitioner.
Respondents had a month-to-month lease with
petitioner's predecessor-in-interest. Petitioner
contends that no prior demand was necessary in this
case since her Complaint was premised on the
expiration of respondents' lease, not on the failure to
pay rent due or to comply with the conditions of the
lease.
The jurisdictional requirement of prior demand is
unnecessary if the action is premised on the
termination of lease due to expiration of the terms of
contract. The complaint must be brought on the
allegation that the lease has expired and the lessor
demanded the lessee to vacate, not on the allegation
that the lessee failed to pay rents. 55The cause of
action which would give rise to an ejectment case
would be the expiration of the lease. Thus, the
requirement under Rule 70, Section 2 of a prior
"demand to pay or comply with the conditions of the
lease and to vacate" would be unnecessary. 56
In Racaza v. Susana Realty, 57 the lessee was asked
by the lessor to vacate since the lessor needed the
property. In Labastida v. Court of Appeals,58the month-
to-month lease was deemed to have expired upon
receipt of the notice to vacate at the end of the month.
In Tubiano v. Razo,59 the lessee was explicitly
informed that her month-to-month lease would not be
renewed.
Admittedly, the Complaint60 in this case alleges that
petitioner's verbal consent and tolerance was
withdrawn due to respondents' ''continuous failure
~nd adamant refusal to pay rentals"61 and allegations
of accn1ed unpaid rentals from June 1989 to
February 2009.62 The demand letter dated August 5,
2008 also specifies that it was premised on
respondents' non-payment of the "reasonable
compensation verbally agreed upon."63 This would
have been enough to categorize the complaint for
unlawful detainer as one for non-payment of rentals,
not one for expiration of lease.
However, respondents' Answer64 to the Complaint is
telling. Respondents admit that they only had a
month-to-month lease since 1969. They contend that
they had been continuously paying their monthly rent
until sometime in 2002, when petitioner refused to
receive it. 65 Thus, as early as 2002, petitioner, as the
lessor, already refused to renew respondents' month-
to-month verbal lease. Therefore, respondents' lease
had already long expired before petitioner sent her
demand letters.

Respondents cannot feign ignorance of petitioner's

demand to vacate since the matter was brought to
barangay conciliation proceedings in 2005. The
barangay certification issued on August 11, 2005
shows that no compromise was reached between the
parties.66

Therefore, respondents' insistence on the non-receipt

of the demand letter is misplaced. Their verbal lease
over the property had already expired sometime in
2002. They were explicitly told to vacate in 2005.
They continued to occupy the property until petitioner
sent her final demand letter in 2008. The demand
letter would have been unnecessary since
respondents' continued refusal to vacate despite the
expiration of their verbal lease was sufficient ground
to bring the action.

Respondents have occupied the property since 1969,

or for 48 years on a mere verbal month-to-month
lease agreement and by sheer tolerance of petitioner
and her late mother. All this time, respondents have
failed to formalize their agreement in order to protect
their right of possession. Their continued occupation
of the property despite the withdrawal of the property
owner's consent and tolerance deprived the property
owner of her right to use and enjoy the property as
she sees fit.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review

on Certiorari is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals
October 11, 2012 Decision and January 21, 2013
Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 117773
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondents
Maximo and Susan Christensen and all persons
claiming rights under them are ordered, upon finality
of this Decision, to immediately VACATE the property
and DELIVER its peaceful possession to petitioner
Velia J. Cruz. Respondents Maximo and Stisan
Christensen are likewise ordered to PAY petitioner
Velia J. Cruz ₱l,000.00 as monthly rental plus its
interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum, to
be computed from April 27, 2009, the date of judicial
demand, until the finality of this Decision.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 181368 February 22, 2012
GEORGE S. TOLENTINO, MONICA S. TOLENTINO,
GUSTAVO S. TOLENTINO, JR., MA. MARJORIE S.
TOLENTINO, MARILYN S. TOLENTINO, MICHAEL
GLEN S. TOLENTINO, MYLENE S. TOLENTINO,
MILAGROS M. GUEVARRA, MA. VICTORIA T.
RAMIREZ, LORENZA T. ANDES, MICHAEL T.
MEDRANO and JACINTO T.
MEDRANO, Petitioners,
vs.
PACIFICO S. LAUREL, HEIRS OF ILUMINADA
LAUREL-ASCALON, CONSUELO T. LAUREL,
BIENVENIDO LAUREL, HEIRS OF ARCHIMEDES
LAUREL, TEODORO LAUREL, FE LAUREL-
LIMJUCO and CLARO LAUREL, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision1 and
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated
October 18, 2007 and January 22, 2008, respectively,
in CA-G.R. CV No. 78676.
The factual milieu follows.
Respondents, in their complaint before the Regional
Trial Court, alleged that they are the registered
owners of a parcel of land situated
in Barangay Balugo, Tagkawayan, Quezon, with an
area of 1,056,275 square meters, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-43927. For several
years, petitioners have been in actual possession of
the western portion of the said property with a total
area of 620,000 square meters which they tried to
develop into fishponds. In the years 1993 and 1994,
respondents informed petitioners, through Gustavo C.
Tolentino, Sr. (Gustavo) who was then representing
them, that the area they are occupying was inside the
respondents' property and, therefore, they should
vacate and leave the same. Gustavo, however, asked
for time to verify respondents' claim. If found to be
true, then the petitioners were willing to discuss with
respondents the improvements that they have
introduced on the subject area. Respondents have
waited for almost a year for the outcome of the
intended verification, but they waited in vain until
Gustavo died. Petitioners continued to develop the
area they were occupying into fishponds, thereby
manifesting their unwillingness to vacate the premises
and restore the possession thereof in favor of
respondents. Hence, respondents filed a suit against
petitioners to recover the property and demand
payment of unearned income, attorney's fees and
costs of suit.
Petitioners, as defendants in the trial court, averred in
their Answer that the subject property is owned by the
Republic and they are occupying the same by virtue
of a Fishpond Lease Agreement entered with the
Department of Agriculture. Thus, their stay over the
property is lawful.
On August 27, 1996, petitioners were declared in
default, for failure to appear at the pre-trial
conference. However, the trial court set aside the
default order and reset the pre-trial conference.
Despite several resetting of the pre-trial conference of
which petitioners were notified, petitioners failed to
appear. Hence, on March 21, 2000, the trial court
issued an Order allowing respondents to present their
evidence ex parte, instead of declaring petitioners in
default.3
After the ex parte hearing for the reception of
evidence, the RTC ruled in favor of respondents, thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered to wit:
(a) Ordering the defendants [petitioners
herein] George S. Tolentino, Monica S.
Tolentino, Gustavo S. Tolentino, Jr., Ma.
Marjorie S. Tolentino, Marilyn S. Tolentino,
Michael Glenn St. Tolentino and Mylene S.
Tolentino, their assigns, heirs and
representatives to leave and vacate the
portions of land they are occupying which are
part of and inside Lot 647-E of the Subdivision
Plan Csd-5627-D, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-43927 of the Office of
the Register of Deeds of Quezon immediately
upon this decision becoming final and
executory;
(b) Commanding the aforementioned
defendants [petitioners herein] jointly and
severally, to pay the plaintiffs [respondents
herein] the reasonable rental value of the
areas occupied by the aforesaid defendants
[petitioners herein] at the rate of ₱20,000.00
per annum from October 13, 1995 until
possession thereof is returned to the plaintiff.
[respondents herein]; and
(c) Enjoining the aforementioned defendants
[petitioners herein] jointly and severally, to pay
plaintiff [respondents herein] attorney's fees in
the amount of ₱20,000.00, plus litigation
expenses in the sum of ₱10,000.00.
SO ORDERED.4
Aggrieved, petitioners challenged the trial court's
decision before the CA. The CA dismissed petitioners'
appeal and affirmed the decision of the RTC. A
motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners,
but was denied by the CA for lack of merit.
Petitioners then filed this present Petition for Review
on Certiorari under Rule 45, raising the following
issues:
1. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONERS WERE
DENIED THEIR DAY IN COURT.
2. WHETHER OR NOT IT WAS PROPER TO
INCLUDE THE GOVERNMENT THRU THE
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE IN THIS
CASE FOR A COMPLETE DETERMINATION
OF THE CASE.
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE DOCTRINE OF
EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE
REMEDIES FINDS APPLICATION IN THIS
CASE.
4. WHETHER OR NOT ACCION
PUBLICIANA WAS THE PROPER ACTION
TO BE INSTITUTED IN THIS CASE.
Petitioners maintain that they were denied their day in
court, because they were not allowed to present their
evidence before the trial court which resulted in the
denial of their right to due process.
We perused the records of the case and failed to see
the lack of due process claimed by petitioners. On the
contrary, petitioners were given more than ample
opportunity to be heard through counsel. Lest it be
forgotten, petitioners were first declared in default on
August 27, 1996, for their failure to appear at the pre-
trial conference. However, the trial court set aside the
default order and the pre-trial conference was set and
reset for several times. Nonetheless, petitioners failed
to appear on January 9, 1998,5 March 2, 1998,6 May
18, 1999,7 and March 21, 2000,8 prompting the trial
court to allow the respondents to present their
evidence ex parte. Thereafter, judgment was
rendered.
Sections 4 and 5, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court
provides:
Section 4. Appearance of parties. − It shall be the
duty of the parties and their counsel to appear at the
pre-trial. The non-appearance of a party may be
excused only if a valid cause is shown therefor, or if a
representative shall appear in his behalf fully
authorized in writing to enter into an amicable
settlement, to submit to alternative modes of dispute
resolution, and to enter into stipulations or admissions
of facts and of documents.
Section 5. Effect of failure to appear. − The failure of
the plaintiff to appear when so required pursuant to
the next preceding section shall be cause for
dismissal of the action. The dismissal shall be with
prejudice, unless otherwise ordered by the court. A
similar failure on the part of the defendant shall be
cause to allow the plaintiff to present his evidence ex
parte and the court to render judgment on the basis
thereof.
From the foregoing, the failure of a party to appear at
the pre-trial has adverse consequences. If the absent
party is the plaintiff, then his case shall be dismissed.
If it is the defendant who fails to appear, then the
plaintiff is allowed to present his evidence ex parte
and the court shall render judgment on the basis
thereof. Thus, the plaintiff is given the privilege to
present his evidence without objection from the
defendant, the likelihood being that the court will
decide in favor of the plaintiff, the defendant having
forfeited the opportunity to rebut or present its own
evidence.9
In the case at bar, the trial court gave petitioners
every chance to air their side and even reconsidered
its first order declaring petitioners in default.
Notwithstanding, petitioners and their counsel failed to
take advantage of such opportunity and disregarded
the legal processes, by continuously failing to appear
during the pre-trial of the case without any valid
cause. Clearly, when the trial court allowed the
respondents to present evidence ex parte due to the
continued failure of the petitioners to attend the pre-
trial conference, it did so in accordance with Rule 18
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and with due
regard to the constitutional guarantee of due process.
Plainly, petitioners cannot complain that they were
denied due process. What the fundamental law
prohibits is total absence of opportunity to be heard.
When a party has been afforded opportunity to
present his side, he cannot feign denial of due
process.10
In The Philippine American Life & General Insurance
Company v. Enario,11 the Court held that pre-trial
cannot be taken for granted. It is not a mere
technicality in court proceedings for it serves a vital
objective: the simplification, abbreviation and
expedition of the trial, if not indeed its dispensation.
The Court said that:
The importance of pre-trial in civil actions cannot be
overemphasized. In Balatico v. Rodriguez, the Court,
citing Tiu v. Middleton, delved on the significance of
pre-trial, thus:
Pre-trial is an answer to the clarion call for the speedy
disposition of cases. Although it was discretionary
under the 1940 Rules of Court, it was made
mandatory under the 1964 Rules and the subsequent
amendments in 1997. Hailed as "the most important
procedural innovation in Anglo-Saxon justice in the
nineteenth century," pre-trial seeks to achieve the
following:
(a) The possibility of an amicable settlement
or of a submission to alternative modes of
dispute resolution;
(b) The simplification of the issues;
(c) The necessity or desirability of
amendments to the pleadings;
(d) The possibility of obtaining stipulations or
admissions of facts and of documents to avoid
unnecessary proof;
(e) The limitation of the number of witnesses;
(f) The advisability of a preliminary reference
of issues to a commissioner;
(g) The propriety of rendering judgment on the
pleadings, or summary judgment, or of
dismissing the action should a valid ground
therefor be found to exist;
(h) The advisability or necessity of suspending
the proceedings; and
(i) Such other matters as may aid in the
prompt disposition of the action.12
Petitioners' repeated failure to appear at the pre-trial
amounted to a failure to comply with the Rules and
their non-presentation of evidence before the trial
court was essentially due to their fault.
Petitioners' assertion that it was necessary to include
the government, through the Department of
Agriculture, as a party to the case, in order to have a
complete determination of the case, is specious, as
the same was never raised before the RTC and the
CA. It is settled that points of law, theories, issues and
arguments not brought to the attention of the lower
court need not be, and ordinarily will not be,
considered by a reviewing court, as they cannot be
raised for the first time at that late stage. Basic
considerations of due process impel this rule. 13
In the same manner, the Court cannot consider
petitioners' allegation that respondents’ failure to
exhaust administrative remedies is fatal to the cause
of the respondents, as this was not raised before the
trial court.
In substance, the appeal of petitioners hinges on their
possession over the subject lot by virtue of an alleged
Fishpond Lease Agreement with the Department of
Agriculture. They questioned the validity of the
respondents' title by claiming that since the property is
owned by the government, it is part of the public
domain and, therefore, cannot be privately owned by
the respondents. The petitioners' submission is not
meritorious.
It is a rule that a certificate of title cannot be the
subject of collateral attack. Section 48 of Presidential
Decree No. 1529 provides that:
Section 48. Certificate not Subject to Collateral
Attack. - A certificate of title shall not be subject to
collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or
canceled, except in a direct proceeding in accordance
with law.
Petitioners' attack on the legality of TCT No. T-43927,
issued in the name of respondents, is incidental to
their quest to defend their possession of the property
in an accion publiciana, not in a direct action whose
main objective is to impugn the validity of the
judgment granting the title.14 To permit a collateral
attack on the title, such as what petitioners attempt,
would reduce the vaunted legal indefeasibility of a
Torrens title to meaningless verbiage.15
It must be pointed out that notwithstanding petitioners'
submission that the subject property is owned by the
Republic, there is no showing that the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) or its representatives initiated
an action for reversion of the subject property to
become part of the public domain. All actions for the
reversion to the Government of lands of the public
domain or improvements thereon shall be instituted
by the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his
stead, in the proper courts, in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines.16 Unless and until the land
is reverted to the State by virtue of a judgment of a
court of law in a direct proceeding for reversion, the
Torrens certificate of title thereto remains valid and
binding against the whole world.17
Besides, it must be emphasized that the action filed
before the trial court is an accion publiciana, which is
a plenary action for recovery of possession in an
ordinary civil proceeding in order to determine the
better and legal right to possess, independently of
title.18 The objective of the plaintiffs in an accion
publiciana is to recover possession only, not
ownership. However, where the parties raise the
issue of ownership, the courts may pass upon the
issue to determine who between the parties has the
right to possess the property. This adjudication,
however, is not a final and binding determination of
the issue of ownership; it is only for the purpose of
resolving the issue of possession, where the issue of
ownership is inseparably linked to the issue of
possession. The adjudication of the issue of
ownership, being provisional, is not a bar to an action
between the same parties involving title to the
property.19
It is undisputed that the subject property is covered by
TCT No. T-43927, registered in the name of the
respondents. On the other hand, petitioners do not
1âwphi1
claim ownership, but allege that they are leasing the
portion they are occupying from the government.
Respondents' title over the subject property is
evidence of their ownership thereof. It is a
fundamental principle in land registration that the
certificate of title serves as evidence of an
indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in
favor of the person whose name appears therein. 20 It is
conclusive evidence with respect to the ownership of
the land described therein.21 It is also settled that the
titleholder is entitled to all the attributes of ownership
of the property, including possession. 22 Thus, the Court
held that the age-old rule is that the person who has a
Torrens title over a land is entitled to possession
thereof.23
As a final note, the Court finds no factual and legal
basis for the award of attorney’s fees and litigation
expenses. The settled rule is that the matter
of attorney’s fees cannot be mentioned only in the
dispositive portion of the decision. The same goes for
the award of litigation expenses.26 The reasons or
grounds for the award thereof must be set forth in the
decision of the court.27 The discretion of the court to
award attorney's fees under Article 2208 of the Civil
Code demands factual, legal, and equitable
justification, without which the award is a conclusion
without a premise, its basis being improperly left to
speculation and conjecture.28
In the present case, the award of attorney's fees and
litigation expenses was mentioned only in the
dispositive portion of the RTC decision without any
prior explanation and justification in its body, hence,
the same is baseless and must be deleted.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision
and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated
October 18, 2007 and January 22, 2008, respectively,
in CA-G.R. CV No. 78676,
are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the award
of attorney’s fees and litigation expenses
is DELETED.

Petitioners' argument that an accion publiciana is not

the proper remedy available for the respondents,
because more than ten (10) years had already
elapsed since the dispossession of the respondents'
property, does not hold water. As the registered
owners, respondents' right to evict any person illegally
occupying their property is imprescriptible. In the case
of Labrador v. Perlas,24 the Court held that:

x x x As a registered owner, petitioner has a right to

eject any person illegally occupying his property. This
right is imprescriptible and can never be barred by
laches. In Bishop v. Court of Appeals, we held, thus:

As registered owners of the lots in question, the

private respondents have a right to eject any person
illegally occupying their property. This right is
imprescriptible. Even if it be supposed that they were
aware of the petitioners' occupation of the property,
and regardless of the length of that possession, the
lawful owners have a right to demand the return of
their property at any time as long as the possession
was unauthorized or merely tolerated, if at all. This
right is never barred by laches.25

G.R. No. 204626, June 09, 2014 - PAUL P. GABRIEL, JR.,
IRENEO C. CALWAG, THOMAS L. TINGGA-AN, AND THE
HEIRS OF JULIET B. PULKERA, Petitioners, v. CARMELING
CRISOLOGO, Respondent.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 204626, June 09, 2014
PAUL P. GABRIEL, JR., IRENEO C. CALWAG, THOMAS
L. TINGGA-AN, AND THE HEIRS OF JULIET B.
PULKERA, Petitioners, v. CARMELING
CRISOLOGO, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 is the June 14, 2012 Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) and its November 14, 2012 Resolution2 which
reversed the April 18, 2011 Decision3 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 6, Baguio City (RTC), and reinstated the
September 15, 2009 Decision4 of the Municipal Trial Court
in Cities, Branch 1, Baguio City (MTCC), in Civil Case No.
13209, a complaint for recovery of possession.
The Facts
Records show that Carmeling Crisologo (Crisologo),
represented by her attorney-in-fact, Pedro Isican (Isican),
filed her complaint5 for Recovery of Possession and/or
Ownership with Damages against Juliet B. Pulkera, Paul P.
Gabriel, Ireneo C. Calwag, and Thomas L. Tingga-an
(petitioners) before the MTCC.
Crisologo alleged, among others, that she was the
registered owner of two parcels of land with a total area of
approximately 2,000 square meters, described in, and
covered by, two (2) certificates of title – Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT) Nos. T-13935 and T-13936; that the
properties were covered by an Assessment of Real
Property; that the payments of realty taxes on the said
properties were updated; that sometime in 2006, she
discovered that petitioners unlawfully entered, occupied
her properties by stealth, by force and without her prior
consent and knowledge, and constructed their houses
thereon; that upon discovery of their illegal occupation, her
daughter, Atty. Carmelita Crisologo, and Isican personally
went to the properties and verbally demanded that
petitioners vacate the premises and remove their
structures thereon; that the petitioners begged and
promised to buy the said properties for ?3,500.00 per
square meter; that she gave petitioners time to produce
the said amount, but they reneged on their promise to buy
them; that petitioners refused to vacate the subject
properties despite several demands; that the petitioners
knew full well that the subject premises they were
occupying were titled properties but they insisted on
unlawfully holding the same; and that she was unlawfully
dispossessed and displaced from the subject properties due
to petitioners’ illegal occupation.
On the other hand, petitioners countered that the titles of
Crisologo were products of Civil Registration Case No. 1,
Record 211, which were declared void by the Supreme
Court in Republic v. Marcos,6 and reiterated in Republic v.
Marcos;7 that the said case was later enacted into law,
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1271, entitled “An Act
Nullifying Decrees of Registration and Certificates of Title
within the Baguio Townsite Reservation Case No.1, GLRO
Record No. 211, pursuant to Act No. 931, as amended, but
Considering as Valid Certain Titles of Lands that are
Alienable and Disposable Under Certain Conditions and For
Other Purposes” which took effect on December 22, 1977;
that Crisologo failed to comply with the conditions provided
in Section 1 of P.D. No. 1271 for the validation of said titles,
hence, the titles were void; that petitioners had been in
open, actual, exclusive, notorious, uninterrupted, and
continuous possession of the subject land, in good faith;
and that Crisologo was never in prior possession and had
no valid title over the subject land.8
MTCC Ruling
On September 15, 2009, the MTCC rendered a decision in
favor of Crisologo, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
chanroblesvirtuallawlib rary
WHEREFORE, the Court renders JUDGMENT in
favor of the plaintiff directing the defendants, their
heirs, assigns, representatives and/or any person
acting for and in their behalves to:
a) Immediately vacate the subject
properties, and to demolish/dismantle all
their houses and other structures on the
properties; should defendants refuse to
comply, the plaintiff may
demolish/dismantle them at the expense
of the defendants;
b) Pay reasonable rentals of the use and
occupation of the subject properties at
Php4,000.00 per month from January
2006 for each of the defendants;
c) Pay Php20, 000.00 as attorney’s fees,
and
d) Costs of litigation.
SO ORDERED.
The MTCC ruled that Crisologo was the registered owner of
the subject parcels of land, who, as such, had declared
these properties for taxation purposes since 1969 and
regularly paid the realty taxes thereon. It stated that with
Crisologo being the owner, petitioners were illegally
occupying the land.
The MTCC added that petitioners could not question
Crisologo’s titles over the subject parcels of land in an
ordinary civil action for recovery of possession because
such defense was a collateral attack which was prohibited
under P.D. No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property
Registration Decree. Thus, it could not inquire into the
intrinsic validity of Crisologo’s titles.
Ruling of the RTC
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
On April 18, 2011, the RTC reversed and set aside the COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR IN FINDING
decision of the MTCC. It was of the view that petitioners’ THAT THE TAX DECLARATIONS AND
assertion of the TCTs’ invalidity was not a collateral attack. RECEIPTS IN THE NAME OF THE RESPONDENT
It cited the rulings in Republic v. Marcos,9 and Republic v. ESTABLISH HER POSSESSION OVER THE
Marcos,10 which perpetually prohibited the reopening of SUBJECT LOTS.
Civil Reservation Case No. 1, LRC Rec. No. 211, and,
therefore, the registration of parcels of lands. For said (4)
reason, the titles of Crisologo were products of illegal
proceedings nullified by this Court. She also failed to THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
comply with the conditions set forth in P.D. No. 1271. COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR IN FINDING
Accordingly, the titles were void and the same could not be THAT THE SUPPOSED APPOINTMENT OF
a legal basis for Crisologo to justify the eviction of PEDRO ISICAN AS ADMINISTRATOR
petitioners from the subject premises. Having been ESTABLISHES HER POSSESSION OVER THE
nullified, these certificates of title ceased to be the best LANDS IN DISPUTE.
proof of ownership.
(5)
Ruling of the CA
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
On June 14, 2012, the CA rendered the assailed GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT
decision, setting aside the RTC decision and reinstating RESPONDENT IS THE PRESENT POSSESSOR
that of the MTCC. OF THE SUBJECT LANDS REGARDLESS OF THE
ACTUAL CONDITION OF HER TITLES,
The CA held that Crisologo was entitled to the possession IGNORING THE PRINCIPLE OF STARE
of the subject parcels of land. It explained that her DECISIS AND ADHERENCE TO LAW.
possession was established when she acquired the same by
sale sometime in 1967 and when the certificates of title
(6)
covering the properties were subsequently issued. It added
that her payment of realty taxes due on the said properties
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
since 1969 further strengthened her claim of possession.
GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT
Moreover, her appointment of Isican as administrator of the
PETITIONERS DISTURBED THE POSSESSION
subject properties and her offer to sell the lots to the
OF HEREIN RESPONDENT BY FORCE.
petitioners showed that she had control over the same.
Accordingly, the CA concluded that Crisologo’s right to
remain in possession of the subject lots should be preferred (7)
over the petitioners’ possession regardless of the actual
condition of her titles. Hence, the petitioners, who used THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
force in occupying her properties, should respect, restore GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT
and not disturb her lawful possession of the subject parcels RESPONDENT’S SUPPOSED POSSESSION
of land. OVER THE SUBJECT LOTS SHOULD BE
PREFERRED DESPITE THE NATURE OR
Unsatisfied with the CA decision, the petitioners instituted CONDITION OF THE PROPERTY AS PART OF
this petition anchored on the following THE PUBLIC DOMAIN.11

ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS Petitioners’ position

(1) Petitioners aver that Crisologo failed to show documentary

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN LAW
WHEN IT RULED THAT RESPONDENT HAS
ACTUAL OR WAS IN PRIOR POSSESSION OF
THE LANDS INVOLVED CONTRARY TO THE
EVIDENCE, THE FACTS AND THE
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE.
(2)
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR IN FINDING
THAT THE PURPORTED EXECUTION AND
REGISTRATION OF THE PUBLIC
INSTRUMENTS RELATIVE TO THE SALE IN
1967 OF THE SUBJECT LANDS AND THE
SUBSEQUENT ISSUANCE OF THE TITLES IN
HER NAME ESTABLISH POSSESSION.
(3)
or testimonial evidence that she acquired the subject
properties by sale or by any other mode of acquisition from
its previous owner. Her only bases in claiming them were
the titles issued in her name, without a deed of sale.
Petitioners further argue that assuming that there was
really a sale that took place, its execution and registration
cannot establish her right of possession, whether actual or
constructive. First, the validity of the subject titles was
stricken down by Republic vs. Marcos cases and P.D. No.
1271. Hence, the TCTs could not be sources of legal rights.
Second, Crisologo never took actual possession of the
subject properties after the alleged sale in 1967. She
appointed an administrator over the said property only in
2006.
Moreover, petitioners claim that her tax declarations and
receipts evidencing payment of taxes cannot prove her
possession or ownership over the subject properties
without proof of actual possession.
Finally, petitioners submit that there are facts and parcels of land from petitioners. Hence, the case is
circumstances that militate against her claim of possession. an accion publiciana.
They point out that the titles over the subject properties
have no encumbrances or annotations whatsoever; that for Nonetheless, the petitioners have raised the issue of
more than forty (40) years, the subject lots have not been ownership in their pleadings. They mainly argue that
subjected to any deed, agreement, contract, mortgage or Crisologo’s titles on the subject properties are void and that
any other property dealings; that the said titles are not they have been in open, actual, exclusive, notorious,
validated up to the present as certified by the Register of uninterrupted and continuous possession over the subject
Deeds of Baguio City; that she presented no witnesses to properties in good faith.
prove her intention to possess the subject lots; that the
documents she presented are not reliable because they The nullity of the decrees of registration
were issued only in 2008; that no improvements were and certificates of titles in Section 1 of
introduced by her; and that she is guilty of laches due to P.D. No. 1271 is not absolute
her inaction to validate her titles.
Although Section 1 of P.D. No. 127113 invalidated decrees
Respondent’s position of registration and certificates of title within the Baguio
Townsite Reservation Case No. 1, GLRO Record No. 211,
Crisologo opposes the petition mainly on technical grounds. the nullity, however, is not that sweeping. The said
First, she argues that the supposed representatives of the provision expressly states that “all certificates of titles
petitioners who filed this petition and signed the issued on or before July 31, 1973 shall be considered
certification on non-forum shopping have no authority to do valid and the lands covered by them shall be deemed to
so. Hence, they have no standing to prosecute because have been conveyed in fee simple to the registered owners”
they are not the real parties in interest. Second, she claims upon 1) showing proof that the land covered by the subject
that the petitioners failed to furnish the CA a copy of their title is not within any government, public or quasi-public
motion for extension of time to file this petition for review.
cra1awredjgc reservation, forest, military or otherwise, as certified by
appropriating government agencies; and 2) compliance by
The Court’s Ruling the title holder with the payment to the Republic of the
Philippines of the correct assessed value of the land within
The only question that needs to be resolved in this petition the required period.
is – who between petitioners and respondent Crisologo
have a better right of possession over the subject parcels In the case at bench, the records show that the subject
of land. Both contending parties claim that they have a parcels of land were registered on August 24, 1967. The
superior possessory right over the disputed lands. titles are, thus, considered valid although subject to the
conditions set. But whether or not Crisologo complied with
After a careful review of the records, the Court holds that the said conditions would not matter because, this would
Crisologo has a better right of possession over the subject be a collateral attack on her registered titles, as would be
parcels of land. discussed later.

Accion Publiciana: its nature and purpose At any rate, petitioners, as private individuals, are not the
proper parties to question the status of the respondent’s
Also known as accion plenaria de posesion, accion registered titles. Section 6 of P.D. No. 127114 expressly
publiciana is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the states that the “Solicitor General shall institute such
better right of possession of realty independently of title. It actions or suits as may be necessary to recover possession
refers to an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one of lands covered by all void titles not validated under this
year from the accrual of the cause of action or from the Decree.”
unlawful withholding of possession of the realty.
The respondent’s certificates of title
The objective of the plaintiffs in accion publiciana is to give her the better right to possess
recover possession only, not ownership. When parties, the subject parcels of land
however, raise the issue of ownership, the court may pass
upon the issue to determine who between the parties has It is settled that a Torrens title is evidence of indefeasible
the right to possess the property. This adjudication, title to property in favor of the person in whose name the
nonetheless, is not a final and binding determination of the title appears. It is conclusive evidence with respect to the
issue of ownership; it is only for the purpose of resolving ownership of the land described therein. It is also settled
the issue of possession, where the issue of ownership is that the titleholder is entitled to all the attributes of
inseparably linked to the issue of possession. The ownership of the property, including possession. Thus,
adjudication of the issue of ownership, being provisional, is in Arambulo v. Gungab,15 this Court declared that the “age-
not a bar to an action between the same parties involving old rule is that the person who has a Torrens title over a
title to the property. The adjudication, in short, is not land is entitled to possession thereof.”16
conclusive on the issue of ownership.12
The records show that TCT No. T-1393517 and TCT No. T-
In her complaint, Crisologo prayed that she be declared in 1393618 bear the name of Carmeling P. Crisologo, as the
prior actual possession of the properties in dispute and that registered owner. Petitioners do not dispute the fact that
petitioners vacate the same and demolish their houses she has a Torrens title over the subject parcels of land.
therein. She alleged, among others, that she was the
registered owner of the subject parcels of land and that The respondent’s Torrens certificates of title
petitioners unlawfully entered her properties by stealth, are immune from a collateral attack.
force and without her prior consent and knowledge. Clearly,
she primarily wanted to recover possession of the subject As a holder of a Torrens certificate of title, the law protects
Crisologo from a collateral attack on the same. Section 48
of P.D. No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property
Registration Decree, provides that a certificate of title
cannot be the subject of a collateral attack. Thus:
SEC. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack.
– A certificate of title shall not be subject to
collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified,
or canceled except in a direct proceeding in
accordance with law.
This rule has been applied in innumerable cases, one of
which was Francisco Madrid v. Spouses Mapoy,19 where it
was written:chanroblesvirtuallawlib rary
chanroblesvirtuallawl ibrary
has been paying the realty taxes on the said
properties since 1969. She likewise appointed
Isican as administrator of the disputed lands. More
importantly, there is no question that she offered
to sell to petitioners the portions of the subject
properties occupied by them. Hence, she deserves
to be respected and restored to her lawful
possession as provided in Article 539 of the New
Civil Code.20
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

Registration of land under the Torrens system,

aside from perfecting the title and rendering it
indefeasible after the lapse of the period allowed
by law, also renders the title immune from
collateral attack. A collateral attack transpires
when, in another action to obtain a different relief
and as an incident of the present action, an attack
is made against the judgment granting the title.
This manner of attack is to be distinguished from a
direct attack against a judgment granting the title,
through an action whose main objective is to
annul, set aside, or enjoin the enforcement of such
judgment if not yet implemented, or to seek
recovery if the property titled under the judgment
had been disposed of. To permit a collateral attack
on respondents-plaintiffs’ title is to water down the
integrity and guaranteed legal indefeasibility of a
Torrens title.

The petitioners-defendants’ attack on the validity

of respondents-plaintiffs’ title, by claiming that
fraud attended its acquisition, is a collateral attack
on the title. It is an attack incidental to their
quest to defend their possession of the
properties in an "accion publiciana," not in a
direct action whose main objective is to
impugn the validity of the judgment granting
the title. This is the attack that possession of a
Torrens Title specifically guards against; hence, we
cannot entertain, much less accord credit to, the
petitioners-defendants’ claim of fraud to impugn
the validity of the respondents-plaintiffs’ title to
their property.

As the lawful possessor, the respondent

has the right to eject the petitioners

The Court agrees with the CA that the only

question that needs to be resolved in this suit to
recover possession is who between the parties is
entitled to the physical or material possession of
the subject parcels of land. Therefore, the
foremost relevant issue that needs to be
determined here is simply possession, not
ownership.

The testimonial and documentary evidence on

record prove that Crisologo has a preferred claim
of possession over that of petitioners. It cannot be
denied that she bought the subject properties from
the previous owner in 1967, which was why the
transfer certificates of title were subsequently
issued in her name. Records further show that she
HEIRS OF CAYETANO CASCAYAN, REPRESENTED BY
LA PAZ MARTINEZ, Petitioners, v. SPOUSES OLIVER
AND EVELYN GUMALLAOI, AND THE MUNICIPAL
ENGINEER OF BANGUI, ILOCOS NORTE, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
LEONEN, J.:
This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 filed
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court praying that the Court
of Appeals Decision2 dated July 31, 2013 and
Resolution3 dated February 25, 2014 in CA-G.R. CV No.
96900 be reversed and set aside.
On September 10, 2007, La Paz Cascayan-Martinez,
Elpidio Cascayan, Evangeline Cascayan-Siapco, Flor
Cascayan, Nene Cascayan-Alupay, and Virginia Cascayan-
Avida (the Cascayan Heirs),4 all heirs of Cayetano
Cascayan (Cayetano), filed a complaint for Recovery of
Possession, Demolition, and Damages against the spouses
Oliver and Evelyn Gumallaoi (Spouses Gumallaoi) before
Branch 19, Regional Trial Court, Bangui, Ilocos
Norte.5 The Cascayan Heirs alleged that by virtue of a free
patent application, they were co-owners of a parcel of
land covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-
78399,6 denominated as Lot No. 20028, described as
follows:
A parcel of cornland (Lot No. 20028, Cad. 734-D,
Bangui Cadastre), bounded on the Northeast by
Lot No. 20026; on the Southeast by an Alley; and
on the Southwest by Lots Nos. 20029 and 20027
of Cad. 734-D, containing an aggregate area of
1,083 sq. mts., more or less, covered under
Katibayan ng Orihinal na Titulo Blg. No. P-78399
with Tax Declaration No. 03-006-00652 with
Market Value of Php 3,510.00.7
The Cascayan Heirs affirmed that the Spouses Gumallaoi
bought Lot No. 20029, an adjacent lot, described as
follows:
A parcel of land (Lot No. 20029, Cad. 734-D,
Bangui Cadastre), bounded on the Northeast by
Lot No. 20028; on the Southeast by an Alley; and
on the Southwest by Lot No. 20030; and on the
Northwest by Lot No. 20027 of Cad. 734-D,
containing an aggregate area of 999 sq. mts.,
more or less, covered under Tax Declaration No.
03-006-00673.8
The Spouses Gumallaoi built a residential house on Lot
No. 20029 which the Cascayan Heirs alleged encroached
on Lot No. 20028 after renovations and
improvements.9 The Spouses Gumallaoi ignored the
notifications that they had encroached into Lot No.
20028.10 On May 31, 2001, the Spouses Gumallaoi applied
for a Building Permit. Due to renovations on their
residential house, they further encroached on Lot No.
20028.11 Thus, the Cascayan Heirs prayed that the
Spouses Gumallaoi be directed to vacate Lot No. 20028
and to restore it to their possession. They likewise prayed
that the municipal engineer of Bangui issue the necessary
demolition permit as well as cause the demolition of the
portion of the house that encroached on Lot No. 20028.
Finally, they prayed to be paid damages. 12
In response, and by way of counterclaim, the Spouses
Gumallaoi maintained that they were the true owners of
both Lot Nos. 20029 and 20028.13 They claimed that the
Cascayan Heirs secured a free patent to Lot No. 20028
through manipulation. They asserted that the supporting
affidavits for the Cascayan Heirs' free patent application
were obtained through fraud and deception. They
attached in their Amended Answer the affidavits by the
same affiants disowning the latter's previous
affidavits.14 Thus, the Spouses Gumallaoi prayed that they
be declared the legal owners of Lot No. 20028, that OCT
No. P-78399 be annulled, and that they be paid
damages.15
By agreement of the parties, Engr. Gregorio Malacas was
appointed to determine whether Lot No. 20028 was
included in the lot claimed by the Spouses Gumallaoi. In
his report, he said:
From the datas (sic) of the verification survey
that was executed over the premises of the
subject, it appears that a two (2)[-]storey
residential [b]uilding owned by the defendants
was erected partly on Lot 20028 and partly on Lot
20029.16
The parties decided to submit the case for resolution with
the position papers and the evidence on record as bases.17
On January 21, 2010, the Regional Trial Court18 rendered
a Decision declaring the Spouses Gumallaoi the legal
owners of Lot No. 20028. It ruled that petitioners did not
prove that they or their predecessor-in-interest had been
in possession of it. Conversely, noting that the bigger
portion of the Spouses Gumallaoi's residence had been
constructed on this land, the Regional Trial Court found
that it was more likely that the residence was intended to
be constructed on Lot No. 20028.19 The Regional Trial
Court found inconsistencies between the claims of the
Cascayan Heirs and the evidence they presented in
support of their free patent application. It concluded that
OCT No. P-78399 had been secured through fraud,
without legal and proper basis, and hence, disregarded it:
It can be gleaned from the documentary evidence
of the plaintiffs that their predecessor Cayetano
Cascayan was the declared owner of a parcel of
sugarland with an area of 1,600 square meters
under Tax Declaration No. 28278-A, series of
1926 which cancelled Tax Declaration No. 28278.
Tax Declaration No. 28278-A was later cancelled
by Tax Declaration No. 28278-B which was issued
in 1932, also covering the same area. Later, it
was revised in 1949 under Tax Declaration No.
005179, this time covering a bigger area of 1,950
square meters. As per the plaintiffs, the same
parcel of land was issued Tax Declaration No.
601683, series of 1985 although the land area is
indicated only to be 1,940 square meters.
Sometime in the year 1984, a parcel of land
designated as Lot No. 20028 consisting of 1,083
square meters was surveyed for Marcelino Alupay
as shown in the technical description issued by
the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office (CENRO), Bangui, Ilocos Norte
which conducted the survey from November 2 to
25, 2002 and approved the said technical
description on October 12, 1984. Almost 20 years
after the said survey or on February 25, 2004,
plaintiffs through La Paz Cascayan filed an
Application for Free Patent over Lot No. 20028. In
support of the application, said plaintiff submitted
as one of the requirements an Affidavit executed
by Marcelino Alupay dated March 24, 2004 stating
that there was a mistake in placing his name as
survey claimant over the said lot. The applicant
also submitted, among others, the Affidavit of
Estrelita Balbag and Jalibert Malapit who then
attested that plaintiffs as heirs of Cayetano
Cascayan have continuously occupied and
cultivated Lot No. 20028; the Affidavit of Isauro
Pinget, Elvira Pinget and Sixto Rigates stating
that the lot was declared in the name of Cayetano
Cascayan under Tax Declaration No. 03-006-
00652, series of 2003; and a Certification from
Christopher Malapit, Barangay Chairman of Brgy.
Dadaor, Bangui that the notice of application for
free patent was posted from February 24 to
March 24, 2004. As per an Order issued on July 1,
2004, the CENRO approved the application and
Katibayang ng Orighinal na Titulo Blg. P-78399
was issued on the same date.
From these evidences of the plaintiffs, there is
clear and serious disconnect in their claim that
the parcel of land declared earlier in the name of
their predecessor is the same as Lot No. 20028.
The Court notes that indeed the tax declarations
issued in the name of Cayetano Cascayan in
1926, 1932, 1949 and 1985 bear the same
boundaries – Florencio Molina on the north,
Bernardo Acido on the East and Pedro Corpuz on
the south and west. It also notes that as shown at
the back of the tax declaration issued in 1985, it
cancelled Tax Declaration No. 501883 and not the
tax declaration issued in 1949. At any rate,
granting that said tax declaration issued in 1985
refers to the same lot mentioned in the tax
declarations issued in 1926, 1932 and 1949
because of the similar boundaries indicated, there
is simply no basis to show that it is the same as
Lot No. 20028. The Court even wonders why the
1985 tax declaration still refer[red] to a lot with
an area of 1,940 square meters if it was already
surveyed earlier in 1982 and was found to have
an area of only 1,083 square meters. Not only
that, if the plaintiffs were the owners of Lot No.
20028, it also wonders why the survey thereof
was conducted for Marcelino Alupay and not for
Cayetano Cascayan who, as per another technical
description also issued by the CENRO, was the
claimant in the survey also conducted in 1982 of
Lot No. 20033 which is just adjacent to the lot in
question. It further wonders in the absence of any
explanation how it came about that Lot No. 20028
consisted of only 1,083 square meters which is
substantially different to its area th[a]n as
originally declared in the name of Cayetano
Cascayan.
At this juncture, it is noteworthy that Tax
Declaration No. 03-006-00652, series of 2003 in
the name of the Heirs of Cayetano Cascayan who
obviously secured the same for purposes [of]
their application for free patent, was not also
earlier declared in the name of either Marcelino
Alupay or Cayetano Cascayan. A perusal of the
evidences of the defendants spouses . . . show
that the owner was unknown. In fact, as shown in
Tax Declaration No. 97-006-00654, it preceded
Tax Declaration No. 03-006-00652 which is the
same tax declaration issued to the plaintiffs in
2003 before they applied for the free patent. It is
thus clear that, the lot being declared then to an
unknown person, plaintiffs took it upon
themselves and claimed it, secured a tax
declaration in their name in 2003 and applied
thereafter for a free patent therefor the following
year.
In other words, plaintiffs obviously applied for a
free patent without any basis. It is clear from
their evidence that they were never in possession
of the property in suit before they applied for the
free patent. While plaintiffs submitted affidavits to
show that they have occupied and cultivated Lot
No. 20028 and that it was declared in the name
of the heirs of Cayetano Cascayan in support of
their application for free patent, it appears that
such evidences have been manipulated. It
appears that while they were not in fact
cultivating the property and that it was declared
in the name of the heirs of Cayetano Cascayan
only in 2003, they were able to present false
information about their true status as claimants.
In fact, Estrelita Balbag and Jalibert Malapit, who
then in the year 2004 attested in support of
plaintiffs' application for free patent that plaintiffs
and their predecessor have been in continuous
possession of Lot No. 20028 since 1944 or 1945,
have retracted their said Affidavits. Thus, in the
subsequent Affidavits they have executed on
September 19, 2007 which defendants spouses
submitted in support of their claim, Estrelita
Balbag on her part alleged that she has no
knowledge about the contents of her earlier
affidavit which was not explained to her and that
she is not aware of the matters concerning Lot
No. 20028 while Jalibert Malapit stated that his
signature on the Affidavit is not his real signature.
Likewise, Barangay Chairman Christopher Malapit
also retracted the Certification he issued on March
24, 2004 in support [of] the application of the
plaintiffs for free patent by stating in his
subsequent Affidavit dated September 19, 2007
also submitted by the defendants spouses that
there was no posting made of the notice of
application for free patent and that when he was
asked to sign by Elsa Martinez, daughter of La
Paz Martine[z], he was not aware of the contents
of the Certification and that he was made to
believe that it will be used for another purpose
than an application for free patent. . .
Also, Marcelino Alupay retracted the Affidavit
which he executed on March 24, 2004 in favor of
the plaintiffs in connection with their application
for free patent, stating that there was a mistake
in placing his name as survey claimant and that
the lot applied for is in the actual possession and
cultivation of the heirs of Cayetano Cascayan.
Thus in another Affidavit he executed on
September 19, 2007, he alleged that he had no
 knowledge of the contents of what he signed and
that it was not explained to him. SO ORDERED.21

In any case, contrary to the claim of plaintiffs that

The Cascayan Heirs filed a Motion for New Trial22 dated
they were in possession of Lot No. 20028, it
February 19, 2010, citing mistake as a ground. They
appears that even by the year 2004 when
claimed that despite the agreement for the trial court to
plaintiffs applied for a free patent, defendants
consider only the Commissioner's Report to resolve the
spouses have already been in possession of Lot
case,23 it also examined fraudulent affidavits.24 Thus, the
No. 20028 together with the adjacent Lot No.
Cascayan Heirs prayed that the Regional Trial Court
20029. This is clear from the fact that the bigger
Decision be set aside and a new trial be conducted.
portion of their house was constructed over the
lot in dispute. By constructing their house both on
In an Order25 dated March 21, 2011, the Regional Trial
the two lots, it is unthinkable that they would
Court denied the Motion for New Trial:
have done so under notice or threat that they will
eventually be evicted and a substantial part of
their house demolished. Under the circumstances, Mistake as a ground for new trial under Section 1,
the Court cannot believe the claim of the plaintiffs Rule 37 of the Rules of Court must be a mistake
that they have repeatedly warned the defendants of fact, not of law, which relates to the case.
spouses about the encroachment. If this were Here, plaintiffs claim to have committed mistake
true, it is surprising that when the defendants in perceiving that the case was submitted merely
spouses supposedly extended their house, they on the basis of the Commissioner's Report is
did not file a case to immediately stop the unavailing. The Commissioner's Report containing
construction. the findings on the relocation survey was never
meant to be crucial in determining the issue in
.... this case. As per Order of the Court issued on July
10, 2008, the relocation survey was
In fact, all these observations lead the Court to commissioned upon agreement of the parties to
believe that the issuance of the free patent was determine in the first place if the plaintiffs and
not made in accordance with the procedure laid the defendants refer to one and the same
down by Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise identifiable property or if the lot being claimed by
known as the Public Land Act. As provided in the plaintiff is one and the same as or is included
Section 91 thereof, an investigation should be in the lot being claimed by the defendants. It is
conducted for the purpose of ascertaining therefore erroneous on the part of the plaintiffs to
whether the material facts set out in the now claim that they thought that the case was
application are true. In this case, it appears more submitted for resolution only [on] the basis of the
likely that there was never any investigation or results of the relocation survey, particularly the
any verification made by the CENRO as to the finding in the Commissioner's Report which is
actual status of the land in suit at the time the quoted as follows:
application of plaintiffs for a free patent was
processed and before the free patent was "From the datas [sic] of the verification
approved and issued. Otherwise, they would have survey that was executed over the
known that defendants spouses have constructed premises of the subject, it appears that a
the bigger part of their house on Lot No. 20028. two (2)[-]storey residential building
More significantly, when Marcelino Alupay, the owned by the defendants was erected
original survey claimant of Lot No. 20028 in 1982, partly on Lot 20028 and partly on Lot
executed his Affidavit supporting the application 20029".
for free patent on March 24, 2004, he was
immediately dropped on the same day as survey More significantly, it is clear on record contrary to
claimant as shown in [the] Order issued by the the supposed mistaken perception of the plaintiffs
CENRO. If it is any indication, it was only on the that in the Order dated November 5, 2009, that
basis of the Affidavit of Marcelino Alupay stating parties, meaning with the concurrence of both
that his name was erroneously declared as survey plaintiffs and defendants, agreed to submit the
claimant to the property that the dropping of his case for resolution "on the basis of their position
name as such was made and not by virtue of any papers and the evidence already on record" . . .
verification or investigation.20 (Citations omitted) This plaintiffs cannot deny. Lest they have
forgotten, their cause of action is reconveyance
The dispositive portion of the Regional Trial Court Decision based on their claim that they owned the property
read: upon which defendants had partly built their
house. They are also too aware that if their action
WHEREFORE, the instant complaint is DISMISSED is for reconveyance based on their claim of
and the defendants spouses Oliver and Evelyn ownership, it is in the same vein that defendants
Gumallaoi are declared owners of Lot No. 20028 lay claim to the property. They are thus likewise
of the Bangui Cadastre. Consequently, it having aware that a resolution of the case cannot be
been issued fraudulently and without legal and made merely on the basis of the Commissioner's
proper basis, Katibayang [sic] ng Orighinal [sic] Report but must be on the basis of the whole
na Titulo Blg. P-78399 issued in the name of Heirs evidence on record.
of Cayetano Cascayan, represented by La Paz
Martinez, is hereby ordered cancelled. For want of A party who moves for a new trial on the ground
basis, no damages are awarded. of "honest mistake" must show that ordinary
 prudence could not have guarded against it. A
new trial is not a refuge for the obstinate. In this
case, plaintiffs' assertion that they thought that
the case was submitted for resolution only on the
basis of the Commissioner's Report is but a
pretentious and unfounded mistake. Having been
assisted by counsel, such mistake could not have
happened had ordinary prudence been
exercised.26 (Citations omitted)
The Cascayan Heirs appealed the Regional Trial Court
Decision to the Court of Appeals. They argued that the
Regional Trial Court could not order the cancellation of the
patent because they had already been issued a certificate
of title pursuant to a public land patent.27 Furthermore,
under the Public Land Act, it is only the Solicitor General
who could institute an action for reversion of Lot No.
20028.28 Petitioners also insisted that their Motion for New
Trial should have been granted because of their mistake in
believing that the position paper would be the basis of the
Regional Trial Court's decision and because respondents
committed fraud in submitting irrelevant documents.29
The Court of Appeals denied the petition and affirmed the
Regional Trial Court Decision. It held that the action was
in the nature of an accion reivindicatoria, wherein the
plaintiffs claim ownership over a land and seek recovery
of full possession over it.30 Thus, the main issue for
resolution was who had a better claim over Lot No.
20028, based on the parties' evidence.31 Consequently,
pursuant to Article 434 of the Civil Code, the plaintiffs had
to prove the identity of the land claimed and their title to
it.32 The Court of Appeals found that OCT No. P-78399
was not conclusive proof of their title to Lot No. 20028 as
titles secured by fraud and misrepresentation are not
indefeasible. Quoting the Regional Trial Court, the Court
of Appeals found that the evidence proved that the
Cascayan Heirs obtained their title through fraud and
misrepresentation. Additionally, it ruled that the Spouses
Gumallaoi proved their title as well as the identity of the
land pursuant to Article 434 of the Civil Code. The
dispositive portion of the decision read:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The
January 21, 2010 Decision of Regional Trial Court,
Branch 19, Bangui, Ilocos Norte in Civil Case No.
944-19 is hereby AFFIRMED.33
In a Resolution34 dated February 25, 2014, the Court of
Appeals also denied the Cascayan Heirs' motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit.
On April 10, 2014, the Cascayan Heirs filed a petition
before this Court assailing the Court of Appeals Decision
and Resolution. Petitioners argue that regardless of any
application for free patent that may have been filed, Lot
No. 20028 had long been owned by Cayetano since
1925.35 This is shown by evidence submitted to the
Regional Trial Court, namely, a Tax Declaration for the
year 1925 and the presence of the debris of his residence,
still intact on Lot No. 20028.36 Moreover, petitioners insist
that it has been proven that they have possessed Lot No.
20028 since time immemorial.37 They also claim that none
of the evidence shows that respondents own Lot No.
20028. They point out that affidavits retracting the
affidavits of waiver have been submitted to the Court of
Appeals,38 explaining that the signatories of the affidavits
of waiver did not understand what they signed.39
On September 22, 2015, respondents manifested that in
lieu of filing a comment on the Petition, they are adopting
the rulings of the Court of Appeals and of the Regional
Trial Court.40
The sole issue for resolution is whether the Court of
Appeals properly appreciated the evidence presented by
the parties.
The petition is denied.
Petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 shall
pertain only to questions of law.41 In Pascal v. Burgos:42
Review of appeals filed before this court is "not a
matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion[.]"
This court's action is discretionary. Petitions filed
"will be granted only when there are special and
important reasons[.]" This is especially applicable
in this case, where the issues have been fully
ventilated before the lower courts in a number of
related cases.
The Rules of Court require that only questions of
law should be raised in petitions filed under Rule
45. This court is not a trier of facts. It will not
entertain questions of fact as the factual findings
of the appellate courts are "final, binding[,] or
conclusive on the parties and upon this [c]ourt"
when supported by substantial evidence. Factual
findings of the appellate courts will not be
reviewed nor disturbed on appeal to this
court.43 (Citations omitted)
Thus, as a general rule, the factual findings of the Court of
Appeals bind this Court.
Quoting the Regional Trial Court, the Court of Appeals
determined, based on the evidence presented, that
petitioners obtained their title to Lot No. 20028 through
fraud and misrepresentation:
In this case, Spouses Gumallaoi presented
sufficient evidence to show that the Heirs of
Cascayan obtained their title through fraud and
misrepresentation. We quote with approval the
following observations of the RTC, viz.:
At this juncture, it is noteworthy that Tax
Declaration No. 03-006-00652, series of
2003 in the name of the Heirs of
Cayetano Cascayan who obviously
secured the same for purposes (of) their
application for free patent, was not also
earlier declared in the name of either
Marcelino Alupay or Cayetano Cascayan.
A perusal of the evidences [sic] of the
defendants spouses . . . show that the
owner was unknown. In fact, as shown in
Tax Declaration No. 97-006-00654, it
preceded Tax Declaration No. 03-006-
00652 which is the same tax declaration
issued to the plaintiffs in 2003 before
they applied for the free patent. It is thus
clear that, the lot being declared then to
an unknown person, plaintiffs took it
upon themselves and claimed it, secured
a tax declaration in their name in 2003
and applied thereafter for a free patent
therefor the following year.
In other words, plaintiffs obviously
applied for a free patent without any
basis. It is clear from their evidence that
they were never in possession of the
property in suit before they applied for
the free patent. While plaintiffs submitted
affidavits to show that they have
occupied and cultivated Lot No. 20028
and that it was declared in the name of
the heirs of Cayetano Cascayan in
support of their application for free
patent, it appears that such evidences
(sic) have been manipulated. It appears
that while they were not in fact
cultivating the property and that it was
declared in the name of the heirs of
Cayetano Cascayan only in 2003, they
were able to present false information
about their true status as claimants. In
fact, Estrelita Balbag and Jalibert Malapit,
who then in the year 2004 attested in
support of plaintiffs' application for free
patent that plaintiffs and their
predecessor have been in continuous
possession of Lot No. 20028 since 1944
or 1945, have retracted their said
Affidavits. Thus, in the subsequent
Affidavits they have executed on
September 19, 2007 which defendants
spouses submitted in support of their
claim, Estrelita Balbag on her part alleged
that she has no knowledge about the
contents of her earlier affidavit which was
not explained to her and that she is not
aware of the matters concerning Lot No.
20028 while Jalibert Malapit stated that
his signature on the Affidavit is not his
real signature.
Likewise, Barangay Chairman Christopher
Malapit also retracted the Certification he
issued on March 24, 2004 in support [of]
the application of the plaintiffs for free
patent by stating in his subsequent
Affidavit dated September 19, 2007 also
submitted by defendants spouses that
there was no posting made of the notice
of application for free patent and that
when he was asked to sign by Elsa
Martinez, daughter of La Paz Martine[z],
he was not aware of the contents of the
Certification and that he was made to
believe that it will be used for another
purpose than an application for free
patent.. .
Also, Marcelino Alupay retracted the
Affidavit which he executed on March 24,
2004 in favor of the plaintiffs in
connection with their application for free
patent stating that there was mistake in
placing his name as survey claimant and
that the lot applied for is in the actual
possession and cultivation of the heirs of
Cayetano Cascayan. Thus, in another
Affidavit he executed on September 19,
2007, he alleged that he had no
knowledge of the contents of what he
signed and that it was not explained to
him.44
However, petitioners ask that this Court reverse the Court
of Appeals' determination, insisting that regardless of any
impropriety in the filing of an application for a free patent,
they have proven that they owned Lot No. 20028. They
assert that they have established that Lot No. 20028 had
long been owned by Cayetano since 192545 and that they
have possessed it since time immemorial,46 whereas none
of the evidence shows that respondents ever owned it.
Petitioners also insist that the affidavits of waiver should
not have been given weight by the Court of Appeals,
considering that affidavits retracting the affidavits of
waiver have been submitted to it.47
These issues require this Court to review the Court of
Appeals' appreciation of evidence. The Court of Appeals
found that the evidence did not sufficiently prove
petitioners' claims of possession or ownership over Lot No.
20028:
The records are also bereft of evidence showing
that the Heirs of Cascayan or their predecessor-
in-interest had been in possession of Lot No.
20028. There was not even an allegation on how
Cayetano took possession of the land and in what
way he derived his title thereto. Interestingly, the
Heirs of Cascayan merely based their claim of
possession on a series of tax declarations
purportedly showing that Cayetano, their
predecessor-in-interest, had been religiously
paying the taxes thereof and even built a
residential house thereon. However, and as aptly
noted by the RTC, these tax declarations are full
of inconsistent entries that were never explained
and only cast doubt as to the identity of the land
being claimed by the Heirs of Cascayan.48
The Court of Appeals noted that the only basis for the
petitioners' claim of possession was tax declarations,
which the Court of Appeals scrutinized:
A careful perusal of the tax declarations bearing
the name of Cayetano and having similar
boundaries reveal that TD No. 601683 (series of
1985) covered 1,940 sq. m. It cancelled TD No.
501883, not TD No. 005179. On the other hand,
TD No. 005179 (series of 1949), stating an area
of 1,950 sq. m., cancelled TD No. 28278-B (series
of 1932) that has an area of 1,600 sq. m. TD No.
28278-B cancelled TD No. 28278-A (series of
1926) which bore the same dimension and had
cancelled TD No. 28278. We emphasize that TD
No. 03-006-00652 (series of 2003) in the name
of the Heirs of Cascayan covers an area of 1,083
sq. m. and was not earlier declared in the name
of either Cayetano or even Marcelino who
allegedly applied, though erroneously, a patent
for Lot No. 20028. Obviously, its area is
substantially different from that originally
declared in the name of Cayetano . . .
....
 However, TD No. 97-006-00654 was declared to Cascayan, particularly Virginia Abida, Irineo
an unknown owner in 1997 and it cancelled TD Tolentino, Nena Valiente Alupay, Orlino Valinete
No. 94-006-00651 which was likewise declared to and Eden Jacinto, recognizing Jose and Spouses
an unknown owner in 1994, and both covered an Gumallaoi's ownership over Lot No. 20028 and
area of 1,803 sq. m. The Heirs of Cascayan never admitting that it was erroneous on their part to
bothered to explain why Lot No. 20028 was apply for a free patent over the said lot. Also
declared to an unknown owner despite their claim worthy of note is the statement by the Heirs of
that they had been in possession of the same Cascayan in their application alleging that the
since 1942. It is also intriguing that despite the land was public and that no person was claiming
resurvey of the land in 1982, which was used by or occupying the same notwithstanding that
the Heirs of Cascayan in their free patent Spouses Gumallaoi's house was already visibly
application, showing an area of 1,083 sq. m., the erected therein even before the application was
land was allegedly declared in the name of filed in 2003. With these striking
Cayetano in 1985 but still bearing an area of misrepresentations, We uphold the court a quo's
1,940 sq. m. The 1985 tax declaration in the findings that the application for free patent by the
name of Cayetano was likewise silent as to the lot Heirs of Cascayan was not supported by any valid
number of the land being declared for tax basis warranting the cancellation of their title
purposes and it appears therefrom that said lot over the subject property.51
was bounded on the south and west by the land
owned by Pedro and on the east by the land
Petitioners insist that the Court of Appeals should have
owned by Bernardo Acido. In contrast thereto, the
considered the new affidavits submitted by petitioners,
survey conducted in 1982 showed that Lot No.
retracting the affidavits of waiver it previously
20028 is bounded on the east by an alley and not
appreciated.52 Again, this is a matter of appreciation of
by any private land. It is quite plain from the
evidence, not a question of law, and not a proper subject
foregoing observations, and as correctly pointed
of review.
out by the court a quo, that "there is clear and
serious disconnect in their claim that the parcel of
The Court of Appeals found that respondents, on the other
land declared earlier in the name of Cayetano, is
hand, sufficiently identified Lot No. 20028 and proved
the same as Lot No. 20028".49
their title thereto:

The Court of Appeals thoroughly examined the evidence
submitted by petitioners and found it lacking in probative
value to prove petitioners' ownership over Lot No. 20028.
Rather than prove their ownership, it cast doubt on the
title over Lot No. 20028.
Petitioners attempt to address the foregoing
inconsistencies:
As to the discrepancy of the area, and which also
bothered the Honorable Court of Appeals, it must
be noted that indeed the survey was conducted in
the year 1982 (November 2-25, 1982), but it was
only approved in October 12, 1984. There was as
yet no ROAD then, as it could be seen in the
boundaries of the earlier issued Tax Declarations,
but it is still within the allowable area of relevance
and proximity. The present area could be properly
explained with the existence of a road therein as
shown in the Survey Plan submitted by the
Commissioner of the case, but the debris of the
improvements – "House and Kitchen" having been
put up by Cayetano Cascayan in his lifetime,
could not be denied, which serves as a monument
of ownership in fee simple.50
The Court:
The assertions that a road may explain the inconsistencies
are mere factual allegations, not well-substantiated or
adequately discussed fact. They are insufficient to compel
this Court to review the Court of Appeals' appreciation of
the evidence as to the identity of the property covered by
the tax declarations in relation to Lot No. 20028.
The Court of Appeals also considered the waivers
submitted in evidence by the parties:
The Court cannot also close its eyes to the Waiver
of Rights executed by some of the Heirs of
In contrast, the right to possession of Spouses
Gumallaoi of the subject property is hinged on
the "Recibo Ti Pinaglako Ti Daga" (Receipt for the
Sale of Land) dated January 3, 2002. The
boundaries stated in the said receipt are more in
accord with TD Nos. 97-006-00654 and 94-006-
00651 as well as with the resurvey of the lot as it
appears in the description stated in OCT No. P-
78399. Also bolstering Spouses Gumallaoi's claim
of ownership over the subject property pursuant
to the said sale are the waiver of rights and the
acknowledgment of Spouses Gumallaoi's
ownership by the grandchildren of Cayetano
earlier mentioned, and the Affidavit of Barangay
Chairman Christopher stating that Spouses
Gumallaoi's predecessor-in-interest, Raymundo,
was the actual possessor and occupant of Lot No.
20028 since 1940 up to the time that Jose
questioned the legality of his possession. The
Heirs of Cascayan did not bother to rebut these
allegations and during the March 8, 2008 hearing,
their lawyer brought to the attention of the RTC
Raymundo's possession of the subject lot, thus:
That's why the Court is
asking the plaintiffs to
submit the complete
records of the
application for
registration and for the
defendants to show
documents of
ownership of their
 predecessors-in- The Court: Tenant?
interest, meaning Jose
Corpuz and Pedro
Corpuz. Atty. Yes[,] your Honor. And
Garvida: he is already tilling a
portion of said lot, the
Arty. Yes[,] your honor. And subject of this case
Guillermo: this controversy arisen since Jose Corpuz . . .
(Counsel (sic) when Mr. It's been a long time[,]
for the Raymundo Garcia left your [H]onor[,] that
Heirs of for Hawaii and the he has been tilling the
Cascayan) son-in-law came in said parcel of land. So
and possessed the he knows very well
property in 1997 and a that it belongs to Jose
residential . . . Corpuz.
....

Hence, considering the foregoing, it behooves Us

The Court: Raymundo Garcia? to concur with the declaration of the court a
quo that Spouses Gumallaoi are the lawful owners
of the subject property.53 (Citations omitted)

The Court of Appeals' appreciation of the evidence on the

Atty. Yes[,] your Honor, possession of Lot No. 20028 and the weight to be given to
Guillermo: Raymundo Garcia. the parties' Tax Declarations and affidavits, which is
consistent with the Regional Trial Court findings, is
binding on this Court and there is no cogent reason to
review it.

The Court: The father of Evelyn Although not raised as an issue before this Court, it
nonetheless bears emphasizing that when a complaint for
Garcia? recovery of possession is filed against a person in
possession of a parcel of land under claim of ownership,
he or she may validly raise nullity of title as a defense
and, by way of counterclaim, seek its cancellation.
In Heirs of Santiago v. Heirs of Santiago:54
Atty. Yes[,] your Honor, and
Guillermo: it was only in 2002 A certificate of title issued under an
that they got married administrative proceeding pursuant to a
homestead patent covering a disposable public
with said Gumallaoi land within the contemplation of the Public Land
and that was the Law or Commonwealth Act No. 141 is as
indefeasible as a certificate of title issued under a
starting point of this judicial registration proceeding. Under the Land
controversy . . . Registration Act, title to the property covered by
a Torrens certificate becomes indefeasible after
the expiration of one year from the entry of the
decree of registration. Such decree of registration
is incontrovertible and becomes binding on all
Atty. We would like to persons whether or not they were notified of, or
participated in, the in rem registration process.
Garvida: manifest[,] your There is no specific provision in the Public Land
Honor[,] that Law or the Land Registration Act (Act 496), now
Raymundo Garcia is Presidential Decree 1529, fixing a similar one-
year period within which a public land patent can
the tenant of Jose be considered open to review on the ground of
Corpuz[.] actual fraud (such as that provided for in Section
38 of the Land Registration Act, and now Section
32 of Presidential Decree 1529), and clothing a
public land patent certificate of title with
indefeasibility. Nevertheless, this Court has
repeatedly applied Section 32 of Presidential
Decree 1529 to a patent issued by the Director of
Lands, approved by the Secretary of Natural
Resources, under the signature of the President of
the Philippines. The date of the issuance of the
patent corresponds to the date of the issuance of
the decree in ordinary cases. Just as the decree
finally awards the land applied for registration to
In Firaza, Sr. v. Spouses Ugay,56 this Court explained:
the party entitled to it, the patent issued by the
Director of Lands equally and finally grants and
conveys the land applied for to the applicant.
The one-year prescriptive period, however, does
not apply when the person seeking annulment of
title or reconveyance is in possession of the lot.
This is because the action partakes of a suit to
quiet title which is imprescriptible. In David v.
Malay, we held that a person in actual possession
of a piece of land under claim of ownership may
wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is
attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right,
and his undisturbed possession gives him the
continuing right to seek the aid of a court of
equity to ascertain and determine the nature of
the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on
his title.
....
In the case at bar, inasmuch as respondents are
in possession of the disputed portions of Lot
2344, their action to annul Original Certificate of
Title No. P-10878, being in the nature of an
action to quiet title, is therefore not barred by
prescription.
Section 48 of P.D. 1529, the Property Registration
Decree, provides that a certificate of title shall not
be subject to collateral attack and [cannot] be
altered, modified, or canceled except in a direct
proceeding. An action is an attack on a title when
the object of the action is to nullify the title, and
thus challenge the judgment or proceeding
pursuant to which the title was decreed. The
attack is direct when the object of an action is to
annul or set aside such judgment, or enjoin its
enforcement. On the other hand, the attack is
indirect or collateral when, in an action to obtain
a different relief, an attack on the judgment or
proceeding is nevertheless made as an incident
thereof.
In this case, while the original complaint filed by
the petitioners was for recovery of possession,
or accion publiciana, and the nullity of the title
was raised merely as respondents' defense, we
can rule on the validity of the free patent and
OCT No. P-10878 because of the counterclaim
filed by respondents. A counterclaim can be
considered a direct attack on the title.
In Development Bank of the Philippines v. Court
of Appeals, we ruled on the validity of a certificate
of title despite the fact that the nullity thereof
was raised only as a counterclaim. It was held
that a counterclaim is considered a complaint,
only this time, it is the original defendant who
becomes the plaintiff. It stands on the same
footing and is to be tested by the same rules as if
it were an independent action. Moreover, since all
the facts necessary in the determination of the
title's validity are now before the Court, it would
be in the best interest of justice to settle this
issue which has already dragged on for 19
years.55 (Emphasis in the original, citations
omitted)
In Arangote v. Maglunob, the Court, after
distinguishing between direct and collateral
attack, classified a counterclaim under
former, viz.:
The attack is considered direct when the
object of an action is to annul or set
aside such proceeding, or enjoin its
enforcement. Conversely, an attack is
indirect or collateral when, in an action to
obtain a different relief, an attack on the
proceeding is nevertheless made as an
incident thereof. Such action to attack
a certificate of title may be an
original action or a counterclaim, in
which a certificate of title is assailed
as void.
In the recent case of Sampaco v. Lantud, the
Court applied the foregoing distinction
and held that a counterclaim, specifically one for
annulment of title and reconveyance based on
fraud, is a direct attack on the Torrens title upon
which the complaint for quieting of title is
premised. Earlier in, Development Bank of the
Philippines v. CA, the Court ruled similarly and
explained thus:
Nor is there any obstacle to the
determination of the validity of TCT No.
10101. It is true that the indefeasibility of
torrens title cannot be collaterally
attacked. In the instant case, the original
complaint is for recovery of possession
filed by petitioner against private
respondent, not an original action filed by
the latter to question the validity of TCT
No. 10101 on which petitioner bases its
right. To rule on the issue of validity in a
case for recovery of possession is
tantamount to a collateral attack.
However, it should not [b]e overlooked
that private respondent filed a
counterclaim against petitioner, claiming
ownership over the land and seeking
damages. Hence, we could rule on the
question of the validity of TCT No. 10101
for the counterclaim can be considered a
direct attack on the same[.]
The above pronouncements were based on the
well-settled principle that a counterclaim is
essentially a complaint filed by the defendant
against the plaintiff and stands on the same
footing as an independent action.57 (Emphasis in
the original and supplied, citations omitted)

Thus, this Court reiterated Heirs of Santiago58 in the case
of Sampaco v. Hadji Serad Mingca Lantud:59
Further, petitioner contends that the Court of
Appeals erred in ruling that petitioner's
counterclaim is time-barred, since the one-year
prescriptive period does not apply when the
person seeking annulment of title or
reconveyance is in possession of the lot,
citing Heirs of Simplicio Santiago v. Heirs of
Mariano E. Santiago. Petitioner also contends
that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the
counterclaim in this case is a collateral attack on
respondent's title, citing Cimafranca v.
Intermediate Appellate Court. Petitioner cites
the case of Heirs of Simplicio Santiago v.
Heirs of Mariano E. Santiago, which held that a
counterclaim can be considered a direct attack on
the title.
The Court notes that the case of Cimafranca v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, cited by the
Court of Appeals to support its ruling that the
prayer for the cancellation of respondent's title
through a counterclaim included in petitioner's
Answer is a collateral attack on the said title, is
inapplicable to this case.
In Cimafranca, petitioners therein filed a
complaint for Partition and Damages, and
respondents therein indirectly attacked the
validity of the title involved in their counterclaim.
Hence, the Court ruled that a Torrens title cannot
be attacked collaterally, and the issue on its
validity can be raised only in an action expressly
instituted for that purpose.
Here, the case cited by petitioner, Heirs of
Simplicio Santiago v. Heirs of Mariano E.
Santiago, declared that the one-year prescriptive
period does not apply when the party seeking
annulment of title or reconveyance is in
possession of the lot, as well as distinguished a
collateral attack under Section 48 of PD No. 1529
from a direct attack, and held that a counterclaim
may be considered as a complaint or an
independent action and can be considered a direct
attack on the title, thus:
The one-year prescriptive period,
however, does not apply when the
person seeking annulment of title or
reconveyance is in possession of the
lot. This is because the action partakes
of a suit to quiet title which is
imprescriptible. In David v. Malay, we
held that a person in actual possession of
a piece of land under claim of ownership
may wait until his possession is disturbed
or his title is attacked before taking steps
to vindicate his right, and his undisturbed
possession gives him the continuing right
to seek the aid of a court of equity to
ascertain and determine the nature of the
adverse claim of a third party and its
effect on his title.
....
Section 48 of P.D. 1529, the Property
Registration Decree, provides that a
certificate of title shall not be subject to
collateral attack and cannot be altered,
modified, or canceled except in a direct
proceeding. An action is an attack on
a title when the object of the action
is to nullify the title, and thus
challenge the judgment or
proceeding pursuant to which the
title was decreed. The attack is direct
when the object of an action is to
annul or set aside such judgment, or
enjoin its enforcement. On the other
hand, the attack is indirect or collateral
when, in an action to obtain a different
relief, an attack on the judgment or
proceeding is nevertheless made as an
incident thereof.
A counterclaim can be considered a
direct attack on the
title. In Development Bank of the
Philippines v. Court Appeals, we ruled on
the validity of a certificate of title despite
the fact that the nullity thereof was
raised only as a counterclaim. It was
held that a counterclaim is
considered a complaint, only this
time, it is the original defendant who
becomes the plaintiff. It stands on
the same footing and is to be tested
by the same rules as if it were an
independent action[.]
The above ruling of the court on the definition of
collateral attack under Section 48 of P.D. No.
1529 was reiterated in Leyson v. Bontuyan,
Heirs of Enrigrre Diaz v. Virata, Arangote v.
Maglunob, and Catores v.
Afidchao.60(Emphasis in the original, citations
omitted)
Thus, the Court of Appeals did not commit an error of law
in sustaining the cancellation of OCT No. P-78399,
pursuant to respondents' counterclaim, and in its
determination that petitioners obtained it fraudulently.
The presence of fraud is a factual question. It must be
established through clear and convincing evidence, though
the circumstances showing fraud may be varied:61
We begin our resolution of this issue with the
well-settled rule that the party alleging fraud or
mistake in a transaction bears the burden of
proof. The circumstances evidencing fraud are as
varied as the people who perpetrate it in each
case. It may assume different shapes and forms;
it may be committed in as many different ways.
Thus, the law requires that it be established by
clear and convincing evidence.62
In Republic v. Heirs of Alejaga, Sr.,63 this Court
considered several circumstances as evidence that a free
patent had been obtained through fraud. It noted the
discrepancy between the date the application was filed
and the date the investigation and verification were done.
Also, the verification and investigation report supposedly
conducted by the Land Inspector was not signed. Finally,
a special investigator testified that the Land Inspector
admitted to not actually conducting an investigation or an
ocular inspection of the land, and this testimony remained
unrebutted.64

Here, the Court of Appeals' and the Regional Trial Court's

conclusion that petitioners obtained the free patent
fraudulently was based on several findings. They
determined that petitioners were never in possession of
Lot No. 20028. Even the documents submitted to support
their application were flawed: the tax declarations were
inconsistent and the affidavits and Certifications were
subsequently retracted. Considering that the Regional
Trial Court and the Court of Appeals uniformly determined
that fraud existed in the free patent application based on
the evidence presented, there is no reason for this Court
to delve into this issue.

Thus, the Court of Appeals did not commit any error of

law in affirming the Regional Trial Court Decision, which
declared respondents as the legal owners of Lot No.
20028, and in cancelling petitioners' title to it.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari dated

April 10, 2014 is DENIED and the Court of Appeals
Decision dated July 31, 2013 and Resolution dated
February 25, 2014 in CA-G.R. No. 96900 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 202448
JOSEPH O. REGALADO, Petitioner,
vs.
EMMA DE LA RAMA VDA. DE LA
PENA,1 JESUSA2 DE LA PENA, JOHNNY DE LA
PENA, JOHANNA DE LA PENA, JOSE DE LA
PENA, JESSICA DE LA PENA, and JAIME
ANTONIO DE LA PENA, Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This Petition for Review· on Certiorari seeks to
reverse and set aside the May 28, 2012 Decision3 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 02994,
which affirmed the January 20, 2009 Decision4 of the
Regional Trial Court (RIC) of Bacolod City, Branch 42
in Civil Case No. 98-10187 for."Recovery of
Possession and Damages with Injunction."
Factual Antecedents
Emma, Jesusa, Johnny, Johanna, Jose, Jessica, and
Jaime Antonio (Jaime), all surnamed de la Pena
(respondents), are the registered owners of two
parcels of land with a total area of 44 hectares located
in Murcia, Negros Occidental. These properties are
referred to as Lot Nos. 138-D and 138-S, and are
respectively covered by Transfer Certificates of Title
No. T-103187 and T-1031895 (subject properties).
Purportedly, in 1994, without the knowledge and
consent of respondents, Joseph Regalado (petitioner)
entered, took possession of, and planted sugar cane
on the subject properties without paying rent to
respondents. In the crop year 1995-1996,
respondents discovered such illegal entry, which
prompted them to verbally demand from petitioner to
vacate the properties but to no avail. 6
Later, the parties appeared before
the Barangay Office of Cansilayan, Murcia, Negros
Occidental but failed to arrive at any amicable
settlement. On September 29, 1997, the Lupon
Tagapamayapa of said Barangay issued a Certificate
to File Action;7 and, on March 9, 1998, respondents
filed a Complaint8 for recovery of possession and
damages with injunction against petitioner.
In his Answer,9 petitioner countered that in 1994,
Emma, Jesusa, Johnny, Johanna, and Jessica
executed their separate Waivers of Undivided Share
of Lands renouncing their rights and interests over the
subject properties in favor of Jaime. In turn, Jaime
subsequently waived his rights and interests on the
same properties to petitioner.10 Petitioner claimed that
respondents did not attempt to enter the properties as
they already intentionally relinquished their interests
thereon.
Thereafter, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss11 on the
ground, among others, that the RTC has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.
Petitioner posited that based on the allegations in the
Complaint, the action involved recovery of physical
possession of the properties in dispute; said
Complaint was also filed within one year from the date
the parties had a confrontation before
the Barangay; and thus, the case was one for
Ejectment and must be filed with the proper Municipal
Trial Court (MTC).
In their Reply,12 respondents alleged that the waiver of
rights in favor of Jaime was conditioned on the
payment of their ₱6.7 million loan with the Republic
Planters Bank (RPB) and Philippine National Bank
(PNB); and, in case the subject properties would be
sold, its proceeds shall be equally distributed to
respondents. They further stated that such waiver
bestowed rights over the properties solely upon
Jaime. They added that the subsequent waiver
executed by Jaime to petitioner should have been
with conformity of the banks where the properties
were mortgaged; and conditioned on the payment of
the ₱6.7 million loan. They pointed out that neither
Jaime nor petitioner paid any amount to RPB or PNB;
and as a result, the waivers of rights in favor of Jaime,
and later to petitioner, were void.
Subsequently, in their Opposition to Motion to
Dismiss,13 respondents contended that the RTC had
jurisdiction over the case because their demand for
petitioner to vacate the properties was made during
the crop year 1995- 1996, which was earlier than the
refe1Tal of the matter to Barangay Cansilayan.
On July 31, 2000, the RTC denied the Motion to
Dismiss. It held that it had jurisdiction over the case
because the area of the subject properties was 44
hectares, more or less, and "it is safe to presume that
the value of the same is more than ₱20,000.00." 14
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On January 20, 2009, the RTC rendered a Decision
ordering petitioner to turn over the subject properties
to respondents and to pay them ₱50,000.00 as
attorney's fees.
The RTC ratiocinated that the waiver of rights
executed by Jaime to petitioner was coupled with a
consideration. However, petitioner failed to prove that
he paid a consideration for such a waiver; as such,
petitioner was not entitled to possess the subject
properties.
Both parties appealed to the CA.
On one hand, petitioner reiterated that the RTC had
no jurisdiction over the case. He also maintained that
respondents already waived their shares and rights
over the properties to Jaime, who, in turn, renounced
his rights to petitioner.
On the other hand, respondents assailed the RTC
Decision in so far as it failed to award them damages
as a result of petitioner's purported illegal entry and
possession of the subject properties.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On May 28, 2012, the CA affirmed the RTC Decision
The CA dismissed respondents' appeal because they
did not establish entitlement to damages. It likewise
dismissed the appeal interposed by petitioner for
failing to establish that he gave any consideration in
relation to Jaime's waiver of rights in his (petitioner)
favor.
In addition, the CA ruled that the RTC had jurisdiction
over this case considering that the parties stipulated
on the jurisdiction of the RTC but also because the
assessed value of the subject properties is presumed
to have exceeded ₱20,000.00.
Issues
Hence, petitioner filed this Petition raising the issues
as follows:
I. DID THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT HAVE
JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER OF
THE CASE?
II. DID THE COURT OF APPEALS ERR IN RULING
THAT PETITIONER SHOULD RETURN
POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTIES SUBJECT OF
THIS CASE TO THE RESPONDENTS?
III. SHOULD THE PETITIONER BE AWARDED
DAMAGES?15
Petitioner's Arguments
Petitioner insists that respondents filed their
Complaint for recovery of physical possession of the
subject properties on March 9, 1998 or within one
year from the date the parties had their confrontation
before the Barangay of Cansilayan (September 29,
1997). As such, he maintains that the RTC did not
have jurisdiction over the case.
Petitioner also posits that even granting that this
action is considered a plenary action to recover right
of possession, the RTC still had no jurisdiction
because the tax declarations of the properties were
not submitted, and consequently, it cannot be
determined whether it is the MTC or RTC which has
jurisdiction over the case.
Moreover, petitioner argues that Jaime's waiver in his
(petitioner's) favor was coupled with the following
considerations: 1) ₱400,000.00 cash; 2) a car worth
₱350,000.00; and 3) a convenience store worth
₱1,500,000.00. He adds that the delivery of the
properties to him confirms that he (petitioner) gave
said considerations to Jaime.
Later, in his Manifestation and Motion,16 petitioner
points out that although the body of the assailed CA
Decision made reference to the January 20, 2009
RTC Decision, its dispositive portion pertained to a
different case, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the August 29,
2008 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 10
in Civil Case No. CEB- 30866 is AFFIRMED.
Costs against both appellants.
SO ORDERED.17 (Underlining ours)
Consequently, petitioner prays that the dispositive
portion of the CA Decision be rectified to refer to the
actual case subject of the appeal.
Respondents' Arguments
On the other hand, respondents contend that the CA
did not commit any reversible error in rendering the
assailed Decision. They insist that petitioner's
contentions are unsubstantial to merit consideration.
Our Ruling
The Court grants the Petition.
In our jurisdiction, there are three kinds of action for
recovery of possession of real property: 1) ejectment
(either for un]awful detainer or forcible entry) in case
the dispossession has lasted for not more than a
year; 2) accion publiciona or a plenary action for
recovery of real right of possession when
dispossession has lasted for more than one year;
and, 3) accion reinvindicatoria or an action for
recovery of ownership.18
Pursuant to Republic Act No. 7691 (RA 7691), 19 the
proper Metropolitan Trial Court (Me TC), MTC, or
Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) has exclusive
original jurisdiction over ejectment cases. Moreover,
jurisdiction of the MeTC, MTC, and MCTC shall
include civil actions involving title to or possession of
real property, or any interest therein where the
assessed value of the property does not exceed
₱20,000.00 (or ₱50,000.00 in Metro Manila), 20 On the
other hand, the RTC has exclusive original jurisdiction
over civil actions involving title to or possession of real
property, or any interest therein in case the assessed
value of the property exceeds ₱20,000.00(or
₱50,000.00 in Metro Manila).21
Jurisdiction is thus determined not only by the type of
action filed but also by the assessed value of the
property. It follows that in accion
publiciana and reinvindicatoria, the assessed value of
the real property is a jurisdictional element to
determine the court that can take cognizance of the
action.22
In this case, petitioner consistently insists that a) the
Complaint is one for ejectment; or b) if the same is
deemed an accion publiciana, the RTC still lacks
jurisdiction as the assessed value of the subject
properties was not alleged in the Complaint.
As such, to ascertain the proper court that has
jurisdiction, reference must be made to the averments
in the complaint, and the law in force at the
commencement of the action. This is because only
the facts alleged in the complaint can be the basis for
determining the nature of the action, and the court
that can take cognizance of the case.23
Here, the pertinent portions of the Complaint read:
2. That plaintiffs [herein respondents] are the owners
of two (2) parcels of land known as Lot. No. 138-D
with Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-103187 and Lot
No. 138-S with Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
103189, with a total land area of 44 hectares, all of
Murcia Cadastre xxx;
3. That sometime in 1994, without the knowledge and
consent of herein plaintiffs, the defendant [herein
petitioner] entered into and took possession of the
aforementioned parcels of land and planted sugar
cane without paying any rental to herein plaintiffs;
4. That plaintiffs discovered the illegal entry and
occupation by the defendant of the aforementioned
property and demand to vacate the property was
made orally to the defendant sometime in 1995-96
crop year but defendant refused and still refuses to
vacate the premises;
5. A confrontation before the Brgy. Kapitan of Brgy[.]
Cansilayan, Murcia, Negros Occidental, and before
the Pangkat Tagapag[ka]sundo between herein
parties where plaintiffs again demanded orally for the
defendant to vacate the premises but defendant
refused to vacate the premises and no amicable
settlement was reached during the confrontation of
the parties, thus a certificate to file action has been
issued x x x;
6. That plaintiffs were barred by the defendant from
entering the prope1iy of the plaintiffs for the latter to
take possession of the same and plant sugar cane
thereby causing damages to the plaintiffs;
7. That because of the refusal of the defendant to
allow the plaintiffs to take possession and control of
their own property, plaintiffs were constrained to seek
the aid of counsel and consequently thereto this
complaint.24
Under Section 1,25 Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, there
are special jurisdictional facts that must be set forth in
the complaint to make a case for ejectment, which, as
mentioned, may either be for forcible entry or unlawful
detainer.
In particular, a complaint for forcible entry must allege
the plaintiff's prior physical possession of the property;
the fact that plaintiff was deprived of its possession by
force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth; and the
action must be filed within one year from the time the
owner or the legal possessor learned of their
dispossession.26 On the other hand, a complaint for
unlawful detainer must state that the defendant is
unlawfully withholding possession of the real property
after the expiration or termination of his or her right to
possess it; and the complaint is filed within a year
from the time such possession became unlawful.27
In the instant case, respondents only averred in the
Complaint that they are registered owners of the
subject properties, and petitioner unlawfully deprived
them of its possession. They did not assert therein
that they were dispossessed of the subject properties
under the circumstances necessary to make a case of
either forcible entry or unlawful detainer. Hence, in the
absence of the required jurisdictional facts, the instant
action is not one for ejectment.28
Nonetheless, the Court agrees with petitioner that
while this case is an accion publiciana, there was no
clear showing that the RTC has jurisdiction over it. 1âwphi1
Well-settled is the rule that jurisdiction is conferred
only by law. It cannot be presumed or implied, and
must distinctly appear from the law. It cannot also be
vested upon a court by the agreement of the parties;
or by the court's erroneous belief that it had SO ORDERED.
jurisdiction over a case.29

To emphasize, when respondents filed the Complaint

in 1998, RA 7691 was already in force as it was
approved on March 25, 1994 and took effect on April
15, 1994.30 As such, it is necessary that the assessed
value of the subject properties, or its adjacent lots (if
the properties are not declared for taxation
purposes)31 be alleged to ascertain which court has
jurisdiction over the case.32

As argued by petitioner, the Complaint failed to

specify the assessed value of the subject properties.
Thus, it is unclear if the RTC properly acquired
jurisdiction, or the MTC has jurisdiction, over
respondents' action.

Also worth noting is the fact that the RTC took

cognizance of the complaint only on the presumption
that the assessed value of the proper exceeds
₱20,000.00. Aside from affirming such presumption,
the CA, in turn, declared that the RTC had jurisdiction
because the parties stipulated on it. However, as
discussed, jurisdiction cam1ot be presumed. It cannot
be conferred by the agreement of the parties, or on
the erroneous belief of the court that it had jurisdiction
over a case.

Indeed, in the absence of any allegation in the

Complaint of the assessed value of the subject
properties, it cannot be determined which court has
exclusive original jurisdiction over respondents'
Complaint. Courts cannot simply take judicial notice of
the assessed value, or even market value of the
land.33 Resultantly, for lack of jurisdiction, all
proceedings before the RTC, including its decision,
are void,34 which makes it unnecessary to discuss the
other issues raised by petitioner.

As a final note, while the modification of the clerical

error in the dispositive portion of the CA Decision is
rendered irrelevant by the dismissal of the Complaint
for lack of jurisdiction, the Com1, nonetheless,
reminds the CA and all other courts to be more
circumspect in rendering their decision, including
ensuring the correctness of the information in their
issuances. After all, courts are duty-bound to render
accurate decisions, or that which clearly and distinctly
express the facts and the law on which the same is
based.35

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The May

28, 2012 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 02994 is REVERSEDand SETASIDE.
Accordingly, the Complaint in Civil Case No. 98-
10187 is DISMISSED.