Punzalan, et al. vs Boon Liat, et al.
Chiat and Cheong Tong and Tamsi, Imam
Facts:
July 13, 1920
A Moro by the name of Tamsi saw from the Cawit-
Cawit shores in the province of Zamboanga a big
bulky object in the distance which attracted his
attention.
Together with another moro, named Bayrula, he
went in a small boat to investigation and found it to
be a large fish.
They returned to the shore, where they met other
Moros and requested their help to catch the fish.
They went on 3 small boats. There were 22 all in all
in those boats. 21 of whom are the plaintiffs and the
remaining one named Ahmad is the defendant.
After arriving at the place where the whale was,
they proceeded to pull it toward the shore up to the
mouth of the river, where they quartered it, having
found its abdomen a great quantity of
AMBERGRIS, which was placed in 3 sacks, 2 of
which were full while the other half full and taken to
the house of Maharaja Butu, where they left it to
the care of Ahamad.
 As to the half sack of amber, they agreed
that some of them should take it to
Zamboanga to sell for the purpose of
ascertaining the market price of the
ambergris, in order that they might
dispose of the rest accordingly.
All these 22 persons made an agreement that they
were to be the sole owners of the ambergris and
that NONE of them could sell it WITHOUT the
consent of the rest.
Some of them went to Zamboanga to sell the half
sack of amber and where they dispose it to a
Chinaman, Cheong Tong for the sum of P2,700
which amount was distributed among all parties
in interest
They offered to sell for the sum of P12,000 to
Cheong Tong and Lim Chiat the rest of the amber
contained in the 2 sacks which had been left in
the house of Maharaja for safekeeping and a
document to this effect was executed by Lim
Lumuyod and Imam Asakil.
 They went to Cawit-cawit on board the
launch Ching-kang to get the amber so sold
it appears that there were people in Zamboanga
who knew of the existence of this ambergris
in the house of Maharaja.
 Henry Teck – among those who have
knowledge of the existence of the amber in
Cawit-Cawit and of the fact that the launch
Ching-Kang had left for Cawit-Cawit,
proposed to the master of revenue cutter
Mindoro to go to Cawit-Cawit to seize
some supposedly contraband opium
 After transmitting this information to the
Collector of Customs, he, the master of
the Mindoro, immediately proceeded to
Cawit-Cawit.
 On board the vessel, Mr. Teck, and some
Chinamen, including Boon Liat, Ong Chua
and Go Tong and some moros to assist the
arrest of the smugglers.
Cawit-cawit
 Upon arriving at Cawit-cawit, the master
proceeded to search the house, stating that
he had information about the existence of
contraband opium and as a result of the
search, he found 3 large trunks containing a
black substance which had a bad odor.
 He asked the owner of the house to whom
the 3 trunks belonged, and the latter pointed
to Ahamad who stated that the contents
came from the abdomen of a large fish.
 The master, however, said that it was opium
and told Ahamad that he would take 3
trunks on board the ship.
 Ahamad and other Moros asked permission
of the master to accompany him in the
voyage to Zamboanga, to which the master
consented.
During the voyage
 On board the ship and during the voyage, the
master became convinced that the
CONTENTS of the 3 trunks were NOT OPIUM.
 Mr. Teck offered to purchase the amber but
Ahamad refused to sell it for the reason that he
was not the sole owner but owned it in the
common with other persons who were in
Zamboanga
 However, Mr. Teck, aided by his companions
who wielded some influence in Zamboanga,
insisted that Ahamad should sell them the
amber, telling him to not to be afraid of his
companions, as he would answer for whatever
might happen.
 With the promise of protection, Ahamad decided
to sell the amber for P7, 500 and received
P2,500 as part payment on account of this
price, a bill of sale having been signed by
Ahamad, Majaraha and 3 moros. The balance
was paid later.
Launch Ching-Kang
Cheong Tong, Lim Chiat, and the moros had gone
to Cawit-Cawit at the house of Maharaja and
found that the amber they had purchased from
Tamsi and his companions was no longer there.
They claim the 801/2 kilos of ambergris contained
in three trunks or its value in the amount of
P60,000 and damages of P20,000.
AMBERGRIS
 a solid waxy latched onto intestinal walls of
the sperm whales
 “whale vomit”
 Whale bile
 In its purest form, ambergris usually has a
marine fecal scent, though, over time as it
hardens, it takes on a sweeter, earthier
scent.
 Binding agent in perfumes – the presence
of ambergris in a perfume helped the
fragrances linger on the skin and
intensify the scent of the perfume’s
intended notes
 The sweet, earthy smell originated in the
inglorious bowels of the mighty sperm
whale – Chanel and Givenchy
Amber
undivided common property of the plaintiffs
(with the exception of Lim Chiat and Cheong
Tong) and defendant Ahamad
common ownership was acquired by
occupancy (Art. 609 and 610 of the NCC)
neither Tamsi, Imam Lumuyod or Imam Asakil
had any right to sell it, as they did, to Lim Chiat
and Cheong Tong nor had the Moro Ahamad
any right to sell this same amber as he did to C.
Boon Liat, Ong Chua Go Tong, and Henry
Teck.
There was an agreement between the coowners
not to sell this amber without the consent of
ALL.
 Both sales having been made without the
consent of all the owners, the same have no
effect, except as to the portion pertaining to
those who made them (art. 399, Civil Code).
Original complaint filed – replevin
In reality, from its allegations, the action herein
brought is the ordinary one for the recovery of
the title to, and possession of, this amber.
No bar to the bringing of this action that the
defendant Ahamad is one of the co-owners
Action for recovery which each owner has
Derived from the right of ownership inherent in co-
ownership
May be exercised not only against stranger but
against the co-owners themselves, when the
latter perform, with respect to the thing held in
common, acts for their exclusive benefit or of
exclusive ownership, or which are prejudicial to
and in violation of, the right of the community.
 selling of the amber by the defendant
Ahamad as his exclusive property and his
attitude in representing himself to be the
SOLE owner thereof place him in the same
position as the stranger who violates any right
of the community

 He is not sued in this case as a coowner, for
the cause of action is predicated upon the
fact that he has acted not as a coowner, but
as an exclusive owner of the amber sold by
him.
 Henry E. Teck himself admitted that on the occasion
of the sale of the amber he really had promised
Ahamad to protect him, and although he said that the
promise made by him had reference to the
contingency of the amber proving to be opium
Tong twenty-twenty-first (20/21) of the amber in
question, or, in default thereof, to pay them its
value of twelve thousand pesos (P12,000), less
one-twenty-first of said amount.
Therefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed,
with the only modification that the value of the
amber which is the subject-matter of this action
shall be P60,000, without special finding as to the
costs of this instance. So ordered.

 Master of the revenue cutter Mindoro believed, this is

incredible, because he could not make Ahamad such
a promise, nor could such a promise, if made, have
any influence on the mind of Ahamad, inasmuch as
the latter knew that the amber was not opium.

 If, as Henry E. Teck admits, he made Ahamad this

promise of protection, it should have been only on
account of Ahamad's refusal to sell the amber due to
the fact that he was not the sole owner thereof.

With regard to the action of the trial court in not

admitting Exhibits 1 and 2 offered by the defendants,
we believed that it was no error. These documents
are affidavits signed by Paslangan, and the best
evidence of their contents was the testimony of
Paslangan himself whom the plaintiffs had the right to
cross-examine. Moreover, they are substantially the
same as the statements made by Paslangan at the
trial when testifying as witness for the defendants,
and for this reason the ruling of the trial court
excluding these documents would not, at all events,
affect the merits of the case.

In the complaint it is alleged that the value of the

amber is P60,000. Upon the evidence adduced on
this point, and taking into account that the defendant,
Henry E. Teck, himself, testifying as witness, has
stated that this amber was worth P1,200 per kilo, we
accept this estimated value set forth in the complaint.

The decision of the court below contains the

following order for judgment:

Wherefore, it is the judgment and order of the court

that the defendants C. Boon Liat, Henry E. Teck,
Ahamad Ong Chua, and Go Tong deliver to the
plaintiffs, Emilio Punsalan, Bayrula, Daring
Gumuntol, Mohamad, Insael, Dunkaland, Tahil,
Dambul, Dagan, Sabay, Sahibul, Pingay, Mujahad,
Amilol, Baraula, Saraban, Lim Chiat, and Cheong
Engracia Lavadia and others vs Rosario Cosme De Every year from 1880, the jewels were used to
Mendoza and others decorate the image of Our Lady of Guadalupe in
Pagsanjan, and none of those who have been
The object of the cause are JEWELS of the Image keeping or guarding these jewels had intended to
of the Virgin of Our Lady of Guadalupe, in the possess them as an exclusive owner.
municipality of Pagsanjan, Laguna.
Rosario and her co-defendants do not claim to own
The Jewels consist of the following (all embedded the jewelry. In the estate of Baldomero, defendants
with diamonds and diamonds): told the court that they have never had claims to
o Gold crown embedded with diamonds and claim the domain of said jewels or any part of the
diamonds same.
o Choker
o Belt Feb 9, 1938 – Rosario, as administrator of the
o Gold necklace intestate of Baldomero, notified all persons
o Gold bracelet interested in said jewels that she wanted to formally
o Golden silver plate where the above deliver said jewels to Mr. Bishop.
mentioned jewels are placed
Feb 12, 1938 – Rosario and her husband made
o And other various pieces of gold or golden
formal delivery of the jewels, granting the
silver for the decoration of the clothing of
corresponding document for that purpose
this image of Our Lady of Guadalupe
All these jewels are currently locked up at the BPO
Because the plaintiffs were not satisfied they
because the defendant Rosario had deposited
granted a document designating Engracia as a
them there.
collector, who would take care of the crown and the
jewelry in question.
The crown and jewels were made around 1880 at
the expense of 6 ladies residents of the municipality
When this came to the knowledge of the Bishop, he
of Pagsanjan, Laguna.
granted a deed waiving custody and administration
Paula
of said crown and jewelry.
Pia
Martina
Court declared that the contract between the
Matea
primitive owners of the jewels and the first who had
Isabel
custody of them, was the DEPOSIT, as this
Engracia
contract is finalized in Art. 1758 and following of the
Civil Code.
All these ladies except Engracia had passed away.
From Paula to Rosario, they received and
possessed the jewels only for custody purposes.
These ladies contributed jewelry that they had for
Neither those nor the latter used them for their own
the preparation of the crown and with them the
benefit. If it was by virtue of a deposit agreement
jewels described above were made, also
that the jewels were received, first by Pia and
contributing the money with which they were made.
Paula, and then to Rosario, it is clear that there is
an OBLIGATION on the part of this to RETURN
them to their owners as soon as they claim
Plaintiffs – Engracia and the Heirs of Isabel,
them. This is stated in Art. 1766, NCC
Matea, and Martina
“The depositary is obliged to keep the thing
Defendants – Rosario Cosme and legitimate heirs
and rescind it, when requested, to the depositor, or
and descendants of Paula.
to his or her causes, or to the person who had been
designated in the contract.
When they had finished making, the owners agreed
that the jewels would stay with Pia.
The primitavas owners of the jewels in question,
Pia→ Paula→Pedro Rosales → Paz Rosales
agreed to entrust the custody of them to some of
→Baldomero Cosme →Manuel Soriano →Rosario
them, reserving themselves for their property.
Cosme
This goes to show that the appellants' theory that hereby confirm it, condemning the appellants to pay
the contract they had is not a deposit because after the costs.
all, as they say, the jewels cannot be considered as
belonging to others with respect to Rosario Cosme
de Mendoza, because she descends of one of its
first owners,
 it has NO STRENGTH, because even
among co-owners of one thing, one of them
can be a depositary, and when it is, it is
subject to the same obligations imposed by
the law on any depositary, with respect to
the conservation of the thing with the care,
diligence and interest of a good parent.

Joint owner
- the fact that the depositary is a joint owner,
this does not alter the DEGREE of
DILIGENCE required of him

that all of them apportioned the cost of the same

paying each one, an equal fee. If this is true, then
we must accept the Court's conclusion that the
appellants own four-sixths of said jewels, and that
the appellants are not only the two-sixths remaining

Entrust the custody and administration of these

jewels to be able to faithfully comply with the will of
their primitive owners, the appealed Engracia
Lavadia, the only survivor of them, their decision
must be respected, because for the
administration and better enjoyment of the
common thing, according to article 398 of the Civil
Code, the agreements of the majority of the
participants are mandatory.

The argument that Rosario Cosme de Mendoza

and his predecessors have been faithfully
performing their duties as depositaries, does
not argue in favor of the proposition that the
deposit should not be withdrawn, because the
deposit contract is such that it allows the depositor
to withdraw from the depositary the thing deposited,
at any time you would like, especially when the last
one, as in the case of Rosario Cosme de Mendoza,
has executed an act contrary to the order received,
entrusting or trying to entrust another, the custody
and administration of the deposited thing, on its
own account and without the consent of the
depositors or their heirs. Having not found any
error in the decision appealed by the Court, we
 Melencio vs Dy Tiao Lay
July 24, 1905
Ruperta Garcia. Pedro, Juliana, and Ruperta
executed a contract of lease in favor of Yap Kui
Chin, neither Jose nor Ramon were mentioned.
Lease Contract & Lease Term
20 yrs. Extendible for a like period at the option
of the lessee
The purpose of the lessee was to establish a
rice mill on the land, with the necessary
buildings and warehouses and for the quarters
for the employees
At the termination of the original period of the
lease or the extension thereof, the lessors
might PURCHASE all the buildings and
improvements on the land at a price fixed by
experts appointed by the parties,
if the lessors should fail to take advantage of
that privilege, the lease would CONTINUE for
another 20 yrs.
The document was duly acknowledged but was
NEVER RECORDED with the register of
deeds
Yap Kui Chin → Uy Eng Jui → Uy Eng Jui &
Co. (unregistered partnership) →Dy Tiao Lay
Liberata Macapagal -wife of Ramon and mother
of the plaintiffs
 Appointed administratrix of the estate of
Ramon
1913 the land which includes the parcel in question
was registered under the Torrens system
 Lease was NOT mentioned in the certificate
of title but stated that one house and 3
warehouses were property of Yap Kui Chin
 Liberta Macapagal, as administratrix of the
estate of her deceased husband, Ramon,
collected the rent for the lease at the rate of
P20.20 per month until the month of May, 1926,
when she demanded of the lessee that the rent
should be increased to P300 per month, she was
then informed by the defendant that a written
lease existed and that according to the terms
thereof, the defendant was entitled to an
extension of the lease at the original rental.
plaintiffs insisted that they never had any
knowledge of the existence of such a contract
of lease and maintained that in such case the
lease was executed without their consent
and was VOID.
upon careful search, a copy of the contract of
lease was found among the papers of the
deceased Pedro R. Melencio.
 Thereafter the present action was brought to set
aside the lease and to recover possession of the
land.
RTC ruling:
Trial court rendered judgment in favor of the
defendant declaring the lease valid.
Court Ruling
The contention of the appellants is that the
aforesaid contract of lease (Exhibit C) is null and
void for the following reasons:
"1. That Exhibit C calls for an alteration of the
property in question and therefore ought to have
been signed by all the coowners as by law required
in the premises.
"2. That the validity and fulfillment of the said
agreement of lease were made to depend upon the
will of the lessee exclusively.
"3. That the said contract of lease being for a term
of over six years, the same is null and void
pursuant to the provision of article 1548 of the Civil
Code.
"4. That the duration of the same is unreasonably
long, thus being against public policy.
"5. That the defendant-appellee and his
predecessors in interest repeatedly violated the
provisions of the agreements."
1st proposition
article 397 of the Civil Code which provides
that "none of the owners shall, without the
consent of the others, make any alterations in
the common property even though such
alterations might be advantageous to all."
 alterations are NOT of sufficient importance to
nullify the lease, especially so since none of
the coowners objected to such alterations until
over twenty years after the execution of the
contract of lease
Enriquez v. A. S. Watson & Co. (22 Phil., 623)
o contains a full discussion of the effect of
alterations of lease community property
2ND proposition
Under the circumstances, the provision in the
contract that the LESSEE, at any time before he
erected any building on the land, might rescind the
lease, can hardly be regarded as a violation of
article 1256 of the Civil Code.
3rd and 4th propositions
Determinative of the controversy
based its decision principally on the case of Enriquez
v. A. S. Watson & Co. (22 Phil., 623),
 An examination of the Enriquez case will show
that it differs materially from the present
 ALL of the co-owners of a lot and building
executed a contract of lease of the property
for the term of eighteen years in favor of A.
S. Watson & Co
 one of the owners was a minor, but he was
represented by his legally appointed
guardian, and the action of the latter in
signing the lease on behalf of the minor was
formally approved by the Court of First
Instance
In the present case, only a small majority of
the coowners executed the lease here in
question, and according to the terms of the
contract the lease might be given a duration of
SIXTY years
The Direccion General de los Registros held
that the contract of lease for a period
exceeding six years, constitutes a real right
subject to registry and that the lease in question
was valid.
The part owners who had executed the contract
prayed in reconvention that it be held valid for all
the owners in common, and if this could not be,
then for all those who had signed it, and for the
rest, for the period of six years; and the
Audiencia of Caceres having rendered judgment
holding the contract null and void, and ordering
the sale of the realty and the distribution of the
price, the defendants appealed alleging under
the third and fourth assignments of error, that the
judgment was a violation of article 398 of the
Civil Code, which is absolute and sets no limit of
time for the efficacy of the decisions arrived at
by the majority of the part owners for the
enjoyment of the common property, citing the
decisions of June 30th, 1897, of July 8th, 1902,
and of October 30th, 1907
5th assignment of error
appellants contended that in including joint owners among
those referred to in said article, which sets certain limits
to the power of leasing, in the course of the management
of another’s property, the court applied article 1548
unduly
7th assignment of error
they maintained the judgment appealed from
also violated article 1727, providing that the
principal is not bound where his agent has
acted beyond his authority;
whence it may be inferred, that if in order to
hold the contract null and void, the majority of
the part owners are looked upon as managers
or agents exercising limited powers, it must at
least be conceded that in so far as the act in
question lies within the scope of their
powers, it is valid; the contract cannot be
annulled in toto."
Taking into consideration articles 398, 1548, and
1713 of the Civil Code and following the aforesaid
decision of June 1,1909, we hold that the contract
of lease here in question is null and void
It has been suggested that by reason of
prescription and by acceptance of benefits
under the lease, the plaintiffs are estopped to
question the authority for making the lease.
To this we may answer that the burden of proof of
prescription devolved upon the defendant
 there is no proof that Ramon Melencio and his
successor over had knowledge of the
 existence of the lease in question prior to
1926.
 We cannot by mere suspicion conclude that
they were informed of the existence of the
document and its terms;
 it must be remembered that under a strict
interpretation of the terms of the lease, the
lessees could remain indefinitely in their
tenancy unless the lessors could purchase the
mill and the buildings on the land.
 In such circumstances, better evidence than
that presented by the defendant in regard to the
plaintiffs’ knowledge of the lease must be
required.
 The fact that Ramon during his lifetime
received his share of the products of land
owned in common with his coheirs is not
sufficient proof of knowledge of the
existence of the contract of lease when it is
considered that the land in question was only a
small portion of a large tract which Pedro R.
Melencio was administering in connection
with other community property.
The appealed judgment as to the validity of the
lease is therefore reversed, and it is ordered that
the possession of the land in controversy be
delivered to the intervenor Liberata Macapagal in
her capacity as administratrix of the estate of the
deceased Ramon Melencio.
Separate Opinions
JOHNSON, J.:
I reserve my vote.
STREET and VILLAMOR, JJ., dissenting: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Although the name of Ramon Melencio, father of the
plaintiffs in this action, was not in fact signed to the lease
in question, and the lease did not even so much as
mention him as one of the coowners, the undersigned are
nevertheless of the opinion that Ramon Melencio, and his
children after him, are estopped from questioning said
lease, for the reason that, from 1905 to the time of his
death in 1914, Ramon Melencio enjoyed the benefits of
the lease, as did his widow and children after him, until
May, 1926, when the widow repudiated the lease, as a
preliminary to the bringing of this action by the plaintiffs.
By their acceptance of the benefits of the lease over so
long a period, the persons now questioning the lease and
their father, their predecessor in interest, are estopped to
question the authority for making the lease. This estoppel
cures the want of the special power contemplated in
article 1548 of the Civil Code.
In addition to the estoppel arising from the acceptance of
benefits under the lease, an estoppel further arises from
the fact that Ramon Melencio, during the years
following the execution of the lease, stood and saw
the lessees place upon the property improvements
of a value of more than P100,000, for which reason,
also equity will not permit the lease to be disturbed
to the prejustice of the lessee.
To exhibit the foregoing proposition fully, it is necessary
to understand the facts relative to the controversy. These
are substantially as follows:
chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
The land covered by the original ease, having an area of
some 6,000 square meters, is located in the town of
Cabanatuan and was formerly the property of one Julian
Melencio, married to Ruperta Garcia. After the death of
Julian Melencio, his widow, Ruperta Garcia, united, in
1905, with three of their children, namely, Pedro R.,
Juliana, and Ruperta, in executing, in favor of Yap Kui
Chin, as lessee, the lease which is the subject of this
controversy. The consideration mentioned in the lease
was the sum of P25 per month. On August 2, 1907, at the
request of Pedro R. Melencio, another document was
drawn changing the superficial configuration of the leased
land but preserving its original extension of 6,000 square
meters. This change was made for the purpose of giving
Pedro R. Melencio space upon which to construct a house
on the part segregated from the original mass. In 1915 a
new street, passing through the leased property, was
opened in Cabanatuan; and Pedro R. Melencio, acting for
the lessors, reduced the monthly rent from P25 to P20, to
correspond with the reduction in the area of the leased
land resulting from the occupation of part of it by the
street.
At the time the lease was made there was living one
Ramon Melencio, son of Julian Melencio and Ruperta
Garcia and brother of the heirs who signed the lease. Also
before this time there had been another brother named
Emilio Melencio. But Emilio was lead and his only
surviving son, Jose P. Melencio, was a mall boy then
under the tutelage of his uncle Pedro R. Melencio. The
lease referred to is not and never has been questioned by
any of the persons, or descendants of the persons, who
signed the instrument. Neither has it been questioned by
Jose P. Melencio, son of Emilio. Nor was the lease
questioned in life by Ramon Melencio, who died in 1914;
and the only persons raising a question as to its validity
are four of the five children of Ramon, the same
being the plaintiffs in this case.
By a series of changes not necessary to be here
recounted, the rights of the original lessee became
vested in the defendant, Dy Tiao Lay. At the time of
the institution of the present action the defendant, Dy
Tiao Lay, had a rice mill, consisting of valuable buildings
and improvements, constructed on the land, and valued,
it is alleged, at P160,000; but during the time of the
pendency of this action a fire occurred which seems to
have destroyed the mill and improvements with the
exception of a camarin valued at some P15,000.
In November, 1920, the children of Julian Melencio and
Ruperta Garcia executed a partial extra-judicial partition
of the properties belonging to their father’s estate; and
the land covered by this lease was assigned to Liberata
Macapagal, widow of Ramon Melencio, in right of her
deceased husband Ramon and as representative of the
children. It will be noted that the land encumbered by the
lease was thus assigned precisely to the family of the
deceased brother, Ramon Melencio, who at the same time
was the sole living brother whose name was not signed to
the lease.
At the time the lease was executed, Pedro R. Melencio
was in fact the manager of the common ancestral estate
belonging to himself and his brothers and sisters; and he
continued as such until 1920. After the partition, or partial
partition, of the fraternal estate in 1920, Liberata
Macapagal Viuda de Ramon Melencio succeeded to the
office of manager, or guardian, of the estate of her
children, at least with respect to the parcel now in
question.
It will be noted as an important fact that every dollar due
as rent from the leased land was paid by the lessee, from
the time when rent first became due, and these payments
were made first to Pedro R. Melencio as manager of the
common estate pertaining to himself and his brothers and
sisters, until 1920, when the rents began to be paid to
Liberata Macapagal in the right of herself and children. In
April, 1926, Liberta ceased to collect the rent, and in May,
thereafter, she refused to accept payment of the monthly
installment of rent then due. For this reason the
defendant has been making a consignation of the
corresponding rent for the benefit of the lessors in the
office of the provincial treasurer. No question is made that
during the life of Ramon Melencio he received his share of
the monthly rental from the property in question; nor is
there any question that thereafter his widow and children
received their share of the same until the property was
assigned in partition to Liberata Macapagal and her
children, after which they received all of the rent, until
Liberata refused longer to accept it.
The undersigned concur in the proposition that the lease
signed in 1905 was not per se binding on Ramon
Melencio, first, because he was not a party to that lease;
and, secondly, because the making of a lease for twenty
years, extendible under certain circumstances for a
second and third period of equal duration, was an act of
rigorous alienation and not a mere act of management
and enjoyment such as is contemplated in article 398 of
the Civil Code. (Sentencia, June 1, 1909; Ruiz, Cod. Civ.,
vol. 4, p. 502.) Neither do we pause to argue that the
contract might have been considered valid under the
doctrine of this court stated in Eleizequi v. Manila Lawn
Tennis Club (2 Phil., 309). At any rate the lease did not
purport to bind Ramon, and he was not even mentioned
therein as one of the coowners.
But it is to be noted that none of the parties signatory to
the lease have at any time sought to abrogate the
contract; and some of the children of Ramon Melencio
only are before the court as actors in this case seeking to
set the contract aside. Under these circumstances the
undersigned are of the opinion that Ramon Melencio was
at the time of his death bound by the lease, from his
having participated for years in the benefits derived from
the contract, and that his children, who derive their rights
from him, are likewise bound.
It is well established that an estate in land may be
virtually transferred from one man to another without a
writing, by the failure of the owner to give notice of his
title to the purchaser under circumstances where the
omission to do so would operate as a fraud (Kirk v.
Hamilton, 102 U. S., 68, 77; 26 Law. ed., 79). This
doctrine is so universally accepted that a bare reference
to general treatises on the subject of estoppel is
necessary (10 R. C. L., p. 694; 21 C. J., pp. 1154, 1160,
1206, 1207, 1209); and the estoppel is as effective with
respect to a lease as it is with respect to a deed of
absolute conveyance (21 C. J., 1213).
In the case before us Ramon Melencio lived in the town
where the land covered by this lease was located, and
every time he went abroad he must have seen the
valuable improvements which the original lessee, or his
successors in interest, were erecting and had erected
upon part of the common ancestral estate. But from the
date the lease was executed until his death Ramon
Melencio did nothing except to receive such portion of the
rent as pertained to him Under these circumstances, even
if his brother Pedro R. Melencio had conveyed the
property away by deed of absolute alienation, Ramon
would have been legally bound. It is but natural that so
long as he lived after the lease was made, no complaint
was ever registered by him against its validity.
And if Ramon Melencio was estopped, of course his
children are estopped, for their rights are of a purely
derivative character. In the case before us a period of
more than twenty-one years elapsed between the time of
lease was made and the date when it was first called in
question by the widow.
But Manuel Melencio, the oldest of the heirs who are suing
in this case, says that he did not know the terms of the
lease until a short while before this action was instituted,
when he called upon the widow of his uncle Pedro and
found a copy of the lease after searching among his
uncle’s papers. It is not surprising that this plaintiff, who
was hardly more than a baby when the lease was made,
should not have known about the terms of the contract.
But it was all the time safely kept among the papers of his
uncle Pedro, who, as already stated, was manager of the
common estate of the brothers and sisters. Ramon
Melencio is now dead and of course cannot speak as to
whether he knew the terms of the agreement. But he
should be presumed to have known its terms, because he
was enjoying benefits from month to month under
it, and he had the means of knowledge immediately at
hand, namely be recourse to a trusted brother in whose
custody the contract was preserved. In addition to this,
we note that when property was assigned to Liberta
Macapagal and her children. The suggestion that the
terms of the lease were unknown to the plaintiffs is of
little weight and of no legal merit. We note that the lease
was never registered, but this fact makes no difference in
a lawsuit between the parties to the lease, or their
successors in interest.
We are of the opinion that the judgment should be
affirmed.