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G.R. No.

L-18009             January 10, 1923

EMILIO PUNSALAN, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,


vs.
C. BOOT LIAT, ET AL., defendants-appellants.

Yeager and Armstrong, C. A. Sobral and Lorenzo and Mañalac for plaintiffs-appellants.
Kincaid, Perkins and Kincaid and P. J. Moore for defendants-appellants.

AVANCEÑA, J.:

On or about the 13th of July, 1920, a Moro by the name of Tamsi saw from the Cawit-Cawit shores
in the Province of Zamboanga, a big bulky object in the distance which attracted his attention.
Thereupon, together with another Moro named Bayrula, he went in a small boat to investigation and
found it to be a large fish. They then returned to shore, where they met other Moros and requested
their help to catch the fish. They went in three small boats, there being then in one, seven in the
other, and five in the third, twenty-two men, in all, twenty-one of whom are plaintiffs herein, and the
remaining one named Ahamad is defendant. After having arrived at the place where the fish was,
which was found to be a whale, they proceeded to pull it toward the shore up to the mouth of the
river, where they quartered it, having found in its abdomen a great quantity of ambergris, which was
placed in three sacks, two of which were full and the other half full, and taken to the house of
Maharaja Butu, where they left it to the care of Ahamad. Then the contents of the two full sacks were
placed in three trunks. All of these twenty-two persons made an agreement that they were to be the
sole owners of this ambergris and that none of them could sell it without the consent of the rest. As
to the half sack of amber they agreed that some of them should take it to Zamboanga to sell for the
purpose of ascertaining the market price of the ambergris, in order that they might dispose of the
rest accordingly. Some of them, with Tamsi in charge, went to Zamboanga to sell the half sack of
amber where they did dispose of it to a Chinaman, Cheong Tong, for the sum of P2,700, which
amount was distributed among all the parties in interest. Then they offered to sell for the sum of
P12,000 to the Chinamen, Cheong Tong and Lim Chiat, the rest of the amber contained in the two
sacks which had been left in the house of Maharaja Butu, for safekeeping, and a document (Exhibit
A) to this effect was executed by Lim Chiat and Cheong Tong, on the one hand, and Tamsi, Imam
Lumuyod, and Imam Asakil, on the other. Thereupon they went to Cawit-Cawit on board the
launch Ching-kang to get the amber so sold.

It appears that there were other people in Zamboanga who knew of the existence of this ambergris
in the house of Maharaja Butu. While the above related events were taking place, Mr. Henry E.
Teck, who was one of those having knowledge of the existence of this amber in Cawit-Cawit and of
the fact that the launch Ching-kang had left for Cawit-Cawit, proposed to the master of the revenue
cutter Mindoro to go to Cawit-Cawit to seize some supposedly contraband opium. After transmitting
this information to the Collector of Customs, he, the master of the Mindoro, immediately proceeded
to Cawit-Cawit. There were on board the vessel Mr. Teck, some Chinamen, among whom were C.
Boon Liat, Ong Chua, and Go Tong, and some Moros who, according to Mr. Teck, were to assist in
the arrest of the smugglers. Upon the arrival of the Mindoro at Cawit-Cawit, the master,
accompanied by Mr. Teck and some Moros, went to the house of Maharaja Butu. As is to be
presumed, this information about the supposed contraband opium was but a trick to have
the Mindoro at their disposal. The master proceeded to search the house, stating that he had
information to the effect that there was contraband opium and as a result of the search, he found
three large trunks containing a black substance which had a bad odor. He then asked the owner of
the house to whom those three trunks belonged, and the latter pointed to Ahamad who was present
and who stated that the contents came from the abdomen of a large fish. The master, however, said
that it was opium and told Ahamad that he would take the three trunks on board the ship. Then
Ahamad and other Moros asked permission of the master to accompany him on the voyage to
Zamboanga, to which the master consented. When already on board and during the voyage the
master became convinced that the contents of the three trunks were not opium.

During the voyage, Mr. Teck offered to purchase the amber contained in the three trunks, but
Ahamad refused to sell it for the reason that he was not the sole owner thereof, but owned it in
common with other persons who were in Zamboanga. However Mr. Teck, aided by his companions
who wielded some influence in Zamboanga, insisted that Ahamad should sell them the amber, telling
him not to be afraid of his companions, as he would answer for whatever might happen. With this
promise of protection, Ahamad decided to sell the amber for P7,500 and received P2,500 as part
payment on account of this price, a bill of sale having been signed by Ahamad, Maharaja Butu and
three Moros more. The balance of this price was paid later.

When Cheong Tong, Lim Chiat, and the Moros who had gone to Cawit-Cawit on board the
launch Ching-kang arrived at the house of Maharaja Butu, they found that the amber they had
purchased from Tamsi and his companions was no longer there.

The plaintiffs are twenty-one of the twenty-two Moros who had caught the whale, and Lim Chiat and
Cheong Tong, who had purchased from Tamsi and his companions the amber contained in the three
trunks deposited in the house of Maharaja Butu for safekeeping. They claim the 80-½ kilos of
ambergris contained in three trunks, or its value in the amount o P60,000, and damages in the sum
of P20,000. This action is brought against C. Boon Liat, Ong Chua, Go Tong, Henry E. Teck, and the
Moro, Ahamad, the first four being the persons who purchased this same amber from the one last
named while on board the revenue cutter Mindoro.

It appears from the foregoing that the amber in question was the undivided common property of the
plaintiffs (with the exception of Lim Chiat and Cheong Tong) and the defendant Ahamad. This
common ownership was acquired by occupancy (arts. 609 and 610 of the Civil Code), so that neither
Tamsi, Imam Lumuyod, or Imam Asakil had any right to sell it, as they did, to Lim Chiat and Cheong
Tong, nor had the Moro Ahamad any right to sell this same amber, as he did, to C. Boon Liat, Ong
Chua, Go Tong, and Henry E. Teck. There was an agreement between the coowners not to sell this
amber without the consent of all. Both sales having been made without the consent of all the
owners, the same have no effect, except as to the portion pertaining to those who made them (art.
399, Civil Code).

Although the original complaint filed in this case was entitled as one for replevin, in reality, from its
allegations, the action herein brought is the ordinary one for the recovery of the title to, and
possession of, this amber. It is no bar to the bringing of this action that the defendant Ahamad is one
of the coowners. The action for recovery which each coowner has, derived from the right of
ownership inherent in the coownership, may be exercised not only against strangers but against the
coowners themselves, when the latter perform, with respect to the thing held in common, acts for
their exclusive benefit, or of exclusive ownership, or which are prejudicial to, and in violation of, the
right of the community. (Decision of the supreme court of Spain of June 22, 1892.) In this case the
selling of the amber by the defendant Ahamad as his exclusive property and his attitude in
representing himself to be the sole owner thereof place him in the same position as the stranger who
violates any right of the community. He is not sued in this case as a coowner, for the cause of action
is predicated upon the fact that he has acted not as a coowner, but as an exclusive owner of the
amber sold by him.

As to the sale made by Ahamad, it is urged that the purchaser acted in good faith. It is contended
that the latter did not know that the amber belonged to some others besides Ahamad. But the
evidence shows otherwise. Henry E. Teck himself admitted that on the occasion of the sale of the
amber he really had promised Ahamad to protect him, and although he said that the promise made
by him had reference to the contingency of the amber proving to be opium, as the master of the
revenue cutter Mindoro believed, this is incredible, because he could not make Ahamad such a
promise, nor could such a promise, if made, have any influence on the mind of Ahamad, inasmuch
as the latter knew that the amber was not opium. If, as Henry E. Teck admits, he made Ahamad this
promise of protection, it should have been only on account of Ahamad's refusal to sell the amber due
to the fact that he was not the sole owner thereof.

With regard to the action of the trial court in not admitting Exhibits 1 and 2 offered by the defendants,
we believed that it was no error. These documents are affidavits signed by Paslangan, and the best
evidence of their contents was the testimony of Paslangan himself whom the plaintiffs had the right
to cross-examine. Moreover, they are substantially the same as the statements made by Paslangan
at the trial when testifying as witness for the defendants, and for this reason the ruling of the trial
court excluding these documents would not, at all events, affect the merits of the case.

In the complaint it is alleged that the value of the amber is P60,000. Upon the evidence adduced on
this point, and taking into account that the defendant, Henry E. Teck, himself, testifying as witness,
has stated that this amber was worth P1,200 per kilo, we accept this estimated value set forth in the
complaint.

The decision of the court below contains the following order for judgment:

Wherefore, it is the judgment and order of the court that the defendants C. Boon Liat, Henry
E. Teck, Ahamad Ong Chua, and Go Tong deliver to the plaintiffs, Emilio Punsalan, Bayrula,
Daring Gumuntol, Mohamad, Insael, Dunkaland, Tahil, Dambul, Dagan, Sabay, Sahibul,
Pingay, Mujahad, Amilol, Baraula, Saraban, Lim Chiat, and Cheong Tong twenty-twenty-first
(20/21) of the amber in question, or, in default thereof, to pay them its value of twelve
thousand pesos (P12,000), less one-twenty-first of said amount.

Therefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with the only modification that the value of the
amber which is the subject-matter of this action shall be P60,000, without special finding as to the
costs of this instance. So ordered.

Araullo, C. J., Malcolm, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns, and Romualdez, JJ., concur.
Street, J., reserves his vote.

G.R. No. 2426            January 24, 1906

FERNANDO MONTAÑO LOPEZ, plaintiff-appellee,


vs.
PEDRO MARTINEZ ILUSTRE, defendant-appellant.

Hartigan, Marple, Rohde and Gutierrez for appellant.


Carlos Casademunt for appellee.

WILLARD, J.:

On the 26th day of December, 1902, Francisco Martinez and the defendant, Pedro Martinez, his
son, were the owners as tenants in common of two separate parcels of land in Calle Dulumbayan, in
the city of Manila, each being the owner of an undivided one-half of each of said tracts of land. On
the 26th day of December, 1902, Francisco Martinez conveyed to the plaintiff his undivided half
interest in both said tracts of land. This deed contained a clause giving Martinez the right to
repurchase the property within one year from December 26, 1902. He did not repurchase it, and on
the 28th of December, 1903, the plaintiff caused the proper marginal entry to be made upon the
books in the registry of property in which registry the conveyance had been recorded, and
afterwards brought this action in March, 1904, asking for a partition of the two lots of land, between
himself and the defendant, and that defendant account for and pay to the plaintiff his part of the rents
of the said properties from the 26th day of December, 1903.

It appeared that Francisco Martinez and the defendant, his son, were the owners as tenants in
common of twenty-six other parcels of land; that in June, 1903, before the expiration of the year in
which Francisco Martinez had the right to repurchase the property so conveyed to the plaintiff, he
and the defendant, his son, made a voluntary partition of these twenty-eight tracts of land, which
partition was approved by the Court of First Instance of manila on the 15th day of June, 1903. These
twenty-eight tracts of land had been acquired by Francisco Martinez during his marriage with his
wife, Doña Germana Ilustre. The wife having died, her estate was in process of administration in the
Court of First Instance of Manila, and the partition above mentioned was made on the theory that
these lands were the property of the conjugal partnership existing between Francisco Martinez and
his wife. In this partition the two parcels of land in question in this case fell to the defendant, and his
claim is that by this partition plaintiff lost all his interest in the property. Judgment was entered in the
court below in favor of plaintiff as prayed for in his complaint, and the defendant has brought the
case here by bill of exceptions.

Article 399 of the Civil Code is as follows:

Every coowner shall have full ownership of his part and in the fruits and benefits derived
therefrom, and he therefore may alienate, assign, or mortgage it, and even substitute
another person in its enjoyment, unless personal rights are in question. But the effect of the
alienation or mortgage, with regard to the coowners, shall be limited to the share which may
be awarded him in the division on the dissolution of the community.

This article gives the owner of an undivided interest in the property the right to freely sell and
dispose of it — that is, of his undivided interest. he has no right to sell a divided part of the real
estate. If he is the owner of an undivided half of a tract of land, he has a right to sell and convey an
undivided half, but he has no right to divide the lot into two parts, and convey the whole of one part
by metes and bounds. All that Francisco Martinez undertook to do in this case was to convey his
undivided interest in these two properties. This he had a perfect right to do, in accordance with the
terms of said article. There is nothing in the last clause of the article inconsistent with this position.
That declares simply that when the property is divided the purchaser gets an interest only in that part
which may be assigned to him. For the purposes of this case we see no difference between it and a
case in which the tenant in common makes an absolute conveyance of his undivided interest in the
property, without reserving the right to repurchase. In the case of an absolute conveyance of that
character, the relation between the grantor in the deed and his cotenant is terminated. They are no
longer cotenants. The grantee in the deed takes the place of the grantor, and he and the other
owner of the property become cotenants. In such a case the grantor loses all interest in the property,
and of course has no right to take any part in the partition of it. It would be absurd to say that after
such conveyance the grantor, who had lost all his interest in the property, could by agreement with
the other owner make a partition of property in which he had no interest that would be binding upon
his grantee.

We do not see how the fact that Francisco Martinez and his son were the owners of other pieces of
property as tenants in common can affect the question presented in this case. Each tract was
separate and distinct from all the others. The parties had a right to deal with one lot without any
reference to the other twenty-seven. The fact that the defendant acquired title to all of them by
inheritance from his mother did not make them physically one tract of land, so that a conveyance by
the son of his undivided half interest in one of these lots would amount to a conveyance of a divided
part of a tract of land held by him in common with this father.

The judgment of the court below is affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the appellant, and
after the expiration of twenty days judgment should be entered in accordance herewith and the case
remanded to the court below for execution. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Mapa, Johnson, and Carson, JJ., concur.

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