RULE 13

MERCEDES S. GATMAYTAN, Petitioner - versus -FRANCISCO DOLOR (SUBSTITUTED BY HIS

HEIRS) AND HERMOGENA DOLOR, Respondents
G.R. No. 198120, SECOND DIVISION, February 20, 2017, LEONEN, J.

FACTS:
The instant case stemmed from the RTC's March 27, 2006 Decision, resolving an action for
reconveyance against petitioner Gatmaytan, and in favor of the respondents-spouses Francisco and
Hermogena Dolor (Dolor Spouses). The RTC ordered Gatmaytan to convey the subject lot to the
Dolor Spouses.

Gatmaytan filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied. Gatmaytan then filed an appeal
with the CA.

The CA dismissed Gatmaytan's appeal, ruling that the RTC's March 27, 2006 Decision had already
attained finality as Gatmaytan filed her Motion for Reconsideration beyond the requisite 15-day
period.

Gatmaytan filed a Motion for Reconsideration. The CA denied the same. It emphasized that the
Receipt at the back of the last page of the RTC's Decision indicated that a copy of the same Decision
was received.

Gatmaytan filed the Present Petition, insisting that the RTC's March 27, 2006 Decision has not
attained finality as the April 14, 2006 service was made to her counsel's former
as opposed to the address that her counsel indicated in a June 8, 2004 Notice of Change of
Address filed with the RTC. Gatmaytan adds that the RTC noted the change of address in an Order,
and directed that, from then on, service of papers, pleadings, and processes was to be made at her
counsel's updated address at Unit 602, No. 42 Prince Jun Condominium, Timog Avenue, Quezon
City.

ISSUE:
Whether the RTC’s March 27, 2006 Decision has already attained finality, thus, precluding the filing
of petitioner Gatmaytan’s appeal with the CA. (YES)

RULING:
It is just as basic that a judgment can no longer be disturbed, altered, or modified as soon as it
becomes final and executory. Once a case is decided with finality, the controversy is settled and the
matter is laid to rest. Accordingly, a final judgment may no longer be modified in any respect, even
if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or
law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it
or by the highest court of the land.

We sustain petitioner's position that the service made on her counsel's former address was
ineffectual. We find however, that petitioner failed to discharge her burden of proving the
specific date - allegedly June 1, 2006 - in which service upon her counsel's updated address
was actually made. Having failed to establish the reckoning point of the period for filing her
Motion for Reconsideration, we cannot sustain the conclusion that petitioner insists on, and which
is merely contingent on this reckoning point. We cannot conclude that her Motion for
Reconsideration was timely filed. Having failed to discharge her burden of proof, we are
constrained to deny her Petition.

RULE 36
Beverly Anne C. Yap, Petitioner, -versus- Republic of the Philippines, represented by the
Regional Executive Director, Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR),
Respondent.
G.R. No. 199810 March 15, 2017 REYES, J.

FACTS:
In this case, RTC Branch 16 falsely appreciated the decision of RTC Branch 13. The foregoing shows
that the question of whether or not Yap and Villamar are innocent purchasers was not an actual issue
of fact in the case before the RTC Branch 13, and which called for said court's adjudication. "An issue
of fact is a point supported by one party's evidence and controverted by another's." Yap and Villamor
being buyers in good faith was merely an allegation which was not proven in court and RTC Branch 13
did not actually make any clear pronouncement on the matter.

ISSUE:
Whether the decision of the CA run counter to the rule on conclusiveness of judgment. (NO)
RULING:
The doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment, as a concept of res judicata,states that a fact or question
which was in issue in a former suit and was there judicially passed upon and determined by a court
of competent jurisdiction, is conclusively settled by the judgment therein as far as the parties to
that action and persons in privity with them are concerned and cannot be again litigated in any
future action between such parties or their privies, in the same court or any other court of
concurrent jurisdiction on either the same or different cause of action, while the judgment remains
unreversed by proper authority. It is essential that the issue be identical. If a particular point or
question is in issue in the second action, and the judgment will depend on the determination of that
particular point or question, a former judgment between the same parties or their privies will be
final and conclusive in the second if that same point or question was in issue and adjudicated in the
first suit. Identity of cause of action is not required but merely identity of issue.

RULE 59
MILA CABOVERDE TANTANO and ROSELLER CABOVERDE, Petitioners,
vs. DOMINALDA ESPINA-CABOVERDE, EVE CABOVERDE-YU, FE CABOVERDE-LABRADOR, and
JOSEPHINE E. CABOVERDE, Respondents.
G.R. No. 203585, THIRD DIVISION, July 29, 2013, VELASCO, JR., J

FACTS:
Petitioners files a complaint of annulment of the Deed of Sale purportedly transferring lots from
their parents Maximo and Dominalda. During the pendency of the case the parties executed a Partial
Settlement Agreement (PSA) where they fixed the sharing of the uncontroverted properties
among themselves, in particular, the adverted additional eight (8) parcels of land including their
respective products and improvements. Under the PSA, Dominalda’s daughter, Josephine, shall be
appointed as Administrator. The PSA provided that Dominalda shall be entitled to receive a share of
one-half (1/2) of the net income derived from the uncontroverted properties. The PSA also
provided that Josephine shall have special authority, among others, to provide for the medicine of
her mother.

Both Annabelle Saldia and Jesus Tan then took their respective oaths of office and filed a motion to
fix and approve bond which was approved by the trial court over petitioners’ opposition.
Petitioners harp on the fact that the court a quo failed to require Dominalda to post a bond prior to
the issuance of the order appointing a receiver, in violation of Section 2, Rule 59 of the Rules of
court
Respondents insist that where there is sufficient cause to appoint a receiver, there is no need for an
applicant’s bond because under Sec. 2 of Rule 59, the very purpose of the bond is to answer for all
damages that may be sustained by a party by reason of the appointment of a receiver in case the
applicant shall have procured such appointment without sufficient cause.

ISSUE:
Whether or not posting bond is required in receivership. (YES)

RULING:
Sec. 2 of Rule 59 is very clear in that before issuing the order appointing a receiver the court shall
require the applicant to file a bond executed to the party against whom the application is presented.
The use of the word "shall" denotes its mandatory nature; thus, the consent of the other party, or as
in this case, the consent of petitioners, is of no moment. Hence, the filing of an applicant’s bond is
required at all times. On the other hand, the requirement of a receiver’s bond rests upon the
discretion of the court. Sec. 2 of Rule 59 clearly states that the court may, in its discretion, at any
time after the appointment, require an additional bond as further security for such damages.

RULE 82 and 105- dili naman ni apil

RULE 128
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,-versus –
ANTONIO LAUGA Y PINA ALIAS TERIO, Respondent.
G.R. No. 186228, SECOND DIVISION, March 15, 2010, PEREZ, J.

FACTS:
Antonio Lauga was accused of qualified rape committed against his 13-year old daughter. One of the
witnesses for the prosecution was Moises Boy Banting, a bantay bayan in the barangay. Banting
testified that after his assistance was sought, he proceeded to Lauga's house and found the latter
wearing only his underwear. He invited Lauga to the police station, to which Lauga obliged. At the
police outpost, Lauga admitted to him that he raped his daughter AAA because he was unable to
control himself. Lauga contested the admissibility in evidence of his alleged confession with Banting.
He argues that even if he, indeed, confessed to Moises Boy Banting, a “bantay bayan,” the confession
was inadmissible in evidence because he was not assisted by a lawyer and there was no valid waiver
of such requirement.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the extrajudicial confession made with a "bantay bayan" admissible in evidence.

RULING: NO.
Extrajudicial confession before a bantay bayan taken without counsel is inadmissible in evidence.
This Court is convinced that barangay-based volunteer organizations in the nature of watch groups,
as in the case of the "bantay bayan," are recognized by the local government unit to perform functions
relating to the preservation of peace and order at the barangay level. Thus, without ruling on the
legality of the actions taken by Moises Boy Banting, and the specific scope of duties and
responsibilities delegated to a "bantay bayan," particularly on the authority to conduct a custodial
investigation, any inquiry he makes has the color of a state-related function and objective insofar as
the entitlement of a suspect to his constitutional rights provided for under Article III, Section 12 of
the Constitution, otherwise known as the Miranda Rights, is concerned. We, therefore, find the
extrajudicial confession of appellant, which was taken without a counsel, inadmissible in evidence.