G.R. No.

211290, June 01, 2016

OMBUDSMAN-MINDANAO vs LILING LANTO IBRAHIM, PROJECT

MANAGER, NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION, NIA-PIO,
LANAO DEL NORTE

To be considered a newly discovered evidence under the Rules of Court, the

following requisites must be present: (a) the evidence was discovered after trial;
(b) such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial with
reasonable diligence; and (c) it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or
impeaching, and is of such weight that, if admitted, will probably change the
judgment.

G.R. No. 82072 April 17, 1989

GEORGIA TUMANG, vs HON. COURT OF APPEALS and SPOUSES

DANIEL DEL MUNDO, JR. and HAYDEE T. DEL MUNDO

Newly discovered evidence, under prevailing jurisprudence, need not be newly

created evidence; newly discovered evidence in other words, may and does
commonly refer to evidence already in existence prior or during the trial but which
could not have been secured and presented during the trial despite reasonable
diligence on the part of the litigant offering it or his counsel. 1 Newly discovered
evidence, again, is not limited to evidence which, though already in existence
before or during trial was not known to the offering litigant. So-called "forgotten"
evidence may, upon the other hand, be seen to refer to evidence already in
existence or available before or during trial, which was known to and obtainable by
the party offering it and,2 which could have been presented and offered in a
seasonable manner were it not for the oversight or forgetfullness of such party or
his counsel.3

In order that a particular piece of evidence may be properly regarded as "newly

discovered" for purposes of a grant of new trial, what is essential is not so much
the time when the evidence offered first sprang into existence nor the time when it
first came to the knowledge of the party now submitting it; what it essential is,
rather, that the offering party had exercised reasonable diligence in seeking to
locate such evidence before or during trial but had nonetheless failed to secure it.
Thus, a party who, prior to the trial had, no means of knowing that a specific piece
of evidence existed and was in fact obtainable, can scarcely be charged with lack
of diligence. It is commonplace to observe that the term "diligence" is a relative
and variable one, not capable of exact definition and the contents of which must
depend entirely on the particular configuration of facts obtaining in each case.

1
People v. Ventura, 115 Phil. 718 (1962).
2
Bersabal v. Bernal, 13 Phil. 463 (1909).

3
Manila Railroad v. Mitchel, 49 Phil. 801 (1926).
DISMISSAL
Deeply entrenched in our jurisprudence is the doctrine that an employer can
terminate the services of an employee only for valid and just causes which must be
supported by clear and convincing evidence.4
The employer has the burden of proving that the dismissal was indeed for a valid
and just cause.5
Further, the termination must be effected in compliance with due process of law.
The procedural aspect requires that the employee be given two written notices
before he is terminated consisting of a notice which apprises the employee of the
particular acts/omissions for which the dismissal is sought, and the subsequent
notice which informs the employee of the employer's decision to dismiss him.6

Article 282 of the Labor Code requires that to constitute neglect of duties as a
ground for the termination of an employee, the same must not only be gross but
also habitual. Department of Labor Manual, Sec. 4343.01(2) provides:

To constitute a just cause for the employee's dismissal, the neglect of

duties must not only be gross but also habitual. Thus, the single or isolated
acts of negligence do not constitute a just cause for the dismissal of the
employee.

Gross negligence means an absence of that diligence that an ordinarily

prudent man would use in his own affairs.
To justify the dismissal of an employee for neglect of duties, however,
it does not seem necessary that the employer show that he has incurred
actual loss, damage, or prejudice by reason of the employee's conduct. It is
sufficient that the gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties
tends to prejudice the employer's interest since it would be unreasonable to
require the employer to wait until he is materially injured before removing
the cause of the impending evil.

4
Better Buildings Incorporated v. National Labor Relations Commission, 347 Phil. 521, 528-529 (1997)
5
Id.
6
Colegio de San Juan de Letran-Calamba v. Belen P. Villas, supra note 35.