LINDA VDA. DE ESPINO vs.ATTY. PEPITO C. PRESQUITO prepare his evidence.

prepare his evidence. We note that respondent was first scheduled to present his
FACTS: Mrs. Linda Vda. de Espino filed a letter-complaint with the Court
Administrator Alfredo Benipayo for "having employed fraud, trickery and
dishonest means in refusing to honor and pay [her] late husband Virgilio Espino,
when he was still alive, the sum of P763,060.00" against Atty Pepito C.
Presquito (respondent). Mr. Espino and the respondent entered into an
agreement for a purchase of land by the latter from the former. The price of the
land was P1,437,410.00, payable on a staggered basis and by installments.
Respondent issues post dated checks as payment. Respondent then entered into a
joint venture or partnership agreement with Mrs. Guadalupe Ares for the
subdivision of the land into home-size lots and its development, with a portion
of the land retained by respondent for his own use. The land was eventually
titled in the name of respondent and Mrs. Ares, and subdivided into 35 to 36
lots.
The 8 post-dated checks issued by respondent were all dishonored. Mr. Espino
made repeated demands for payment from respondent but the latter refused. Mr.
Espino died in December 1996. His widow, complainant, then tried to collect
from respondent the value of the eight checks. When complainant’s numerous
pleas remained unheeded, she filed the complaint in June 1997.
evidence on December 14, 1998. Two years—five resettings, and three orders
submitting the case for resolution—later, respondent still had not proffered
testimonial or documentary evidence.
Same; Same; Gross Misconduct; Bouncing Checks; The issuance of worthless
checks constitutes gross misconduct, and puts the erring lawyer’s moral
character in serious doubt, though it is not related to his professional duties as a
member of the bar.—It should be stressed that respondent issued eight (8)
worthless checks, seemingly without regard to its deleterious effects to public
interest and public order. We have already declared, most recently in Lao v.
Medel, that the issuance of worthless checks constitutes gross misconduct, and
puts the erring lawyer’s moral character in serious doubt, though it is not related
to his professional duties as a member of the bar. He not only sets himself liable
for a serious criminal offense under B.P. Blg. 22, but also transgresses the Code
of Professional Responsibility, specifically the mandate of Canon 1 to obey the
laws of the land and promote the respect for law.

Respondent denied any wrongdoing, and said that the allegations that he had
employed "fraud, trickery and dishonest means" with the late Mr. Espino were
totally false and baseless.
Respondents claim that he and Mr. Espino, agreed that Mr Espino will not
encash the checks until the right of way problem has been resolved. In addition,
respondent claims that the balance would be offset with the cost he incurred
when he defended Mr. Espino’s son in a criminal case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent failed to act with candor and fairness
towards the complainant.
HELD: Complainant’s testimony and exhibits have clearly established that: (1)
there was an agreement between respondent and complainant’s late husband for
the sale of the latter’s land; (2) respondent had issued the eight checks in
connection with said agreement; (3) these checks were dishonored and remain
unpaid; and (4) the land sold had an existing road-rightof- way.
Same; Same; Same; Same; A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any
misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to
be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.—It behooves
respondent to remember that a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any
misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to
be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor. Possession of
good moral character is not only a good condition precedent to the practice of
law, but a continuing qualification for all members of the bar. A lawyer may be
disciplined for any conduct, in his professional or private capacity, that renders
him unfit to continue to be an officer of the court. Thus, the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides: Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. x x x x x x x x x Rule 7.03 A lawyer
shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law,
nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to
the discredit of the legal profession. [Vda. de Espino vs. Presquito, 432 SCRA
609(2004)]

The responded failed to prove that he had legal cause to refuse payment, or that
he was entitled to legal compensation. Respondent’s failure to present evidence
is a breach of Rule

12.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Having no legal defense to refuse payment of the 8 dishonored checks,

respondent’s indifference to complainant’s entreaties for payment was conduct
unbecoming of a member of the bar and an officer of the court. Respondent
violated the Code of Professional Responsibility by his unlawful, dishonest and
deceitful conduct towards complainant and her late husband, first by allowing
the 8 checks he issued to bounce, then by ignoring the repeated demands for
payment until complainant was forced to file this complaint, and finally by
deliberately delaying the disposition of this case with dilatory tactics.

Attorneys; Legal Ethics; A respondent lawyer’s failure to present evidence is a

breach of Rule 12.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, especially in
light of the numerous postponements and resettings he requested for and was
granted with, on the ground that he needed to prepare his evidence.—From the
termination of complainant’s presentation of evidence on December 1998 until
Commissioner Dulay’s report on November 12, 2002, the records show that
respondent was unable to present evidence—either testimonial or documentary
—to prove that he had legal cause to refuse payment, or that he was entitled to
legal compensation. Even respondent’s own statements—which, without
corroborating evidence, remain mere self-serving allegations—fall short of
testimony, as he failed to submit to cross-examination by opposing counsel or
for clarificatory questions by the IBP-CBD. Worse, respondent attached eighteen
documents to his comment, but only went so far as to mark (without a formal
offer) the agreement between him and Mr. Espino (for the sale of the land), and
the partnership agreement between him and Mrs. Ares. Thus, respondent had no
evidence other than his own allegations. Respondent’s failure to present
evidence is a breach of Rule 12.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
especially in the light of the numerous postponements and resettings he
requested for and was granted with, on the ground that he needed more time to
Vaflor-Fabroa v. Paguinto
Facts:Complainant filed for the disbarment due to the allegations that
respondent: promoted or sued a groundless, false or unlawful suit, and gave aid
and consent to the same; disobeyed laws of the land, promoted disrespect for law
and the legal profession; did not conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and
candor toward his professional colleague and engaged in harassing tactics
against opposing counsel; violated Canon 19 – A lawyer shall represent his
client with zeal within the bounds of the law; and ruined and damaged not only
the Gen. Mariano Alvarez Services Cooperative, Inc. (GEMASCO, INC.) but
the entire water-consuming community as well.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent may be disbarred from the violations of
Canons 1, 8, 10, 19, and Rule 12.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Held: IBP found that respondent is guilty of violating the Lawyer’s Oath as well
as Canons 1, 8, 10, and Rule 12.03 of the Code. The Court also noted that
respondent previously been suspended from the practice of law for six months
for violation of the Code. It appears, however, that respondent has not reformed
his ways, calling for a more severe penalty this time.
Vaflor-Fabroa v. Paguinto
FACTS: June 21 2001, An information for estafa was filed against Atty.
Illuminada Vaflor-Fabroa (Petitioner) amongst others. Atty. Oscar Pagunto
prepared and notarized the joint affidavit-complained.
The affidavit-complaint didn't include Vaflor-Fabroa's involvement. She filed a
motion to quash the information. Trial Court granted the motion. Atty.
Paguinto's motion for reconsideration was denied.
Atty. Paguinto filed six other criminal complaints against Vaflor-Fabroa against
violations of Art 21 of RA 6938 (Cooperative Code of the Philippines). He filed
a motion to withdraw those.
October 21 2001 Atty. Vaflor-Fabroa, as chair of the General Mariano Alvarez
Service Cooperative (GEMASCO) received a notice of a special general
assembly on Oct 14, 2001. Agenda was to consider the removal of 4 members of
the Board of Directors including her and the General Manager.
October 14, 2001, PNP Sr Supt Angelito Gerango, complainant's predecessor,
presided over Special GA that included people who were not members of current
Board. Gerangco declared himself Chair, appointed others to replaced removed
directors and appointed Atty. Paguinto as Board Secretary.
October 15 2001, Gerango and his group took over GEMASCO offices and
pumpohouses, water facilities and operations. Atty Paguinto sent notices to
Chair and removed directors of their removial of the board. They advised
recipients to cease and desist discharging duties of their position.
October 16 2001, Atty. Vaflor-Fabroa filed complaint for annulment of
proceedings from Oct 14, with the Cooperative Development Authority –
Calamba (CDA).
February 21 2002, The CDA Acting Regional Director issued a resolution
declaring the assembly null and void due to being in violation of GEMASCO’s
by laws and cooperative code. CDA later vacated the Regional Director’s
decision for lack of jurisdiction.
Atty. Vaflor-Fabroa then filed a disbarment case alleging that he:
1. Promoted or sued groundless, false, unlawful suit
2. Disobeyed laws of the land, promoted disrespect for the law and legal
profession
3. Did not conduct himself with courtesy, fairness, candor toward his
professional colleague and engaged in harassing tactics against opposing counsel
4. Violated canon 19 – a lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the
bounds of the law Ruined
5. Damaged not only GEMASCO but water consuming community too
Court granted Paguinto’s request for extension. He didn’t file an answer. He was
asked to show just cause but failed to do so. Case was recommended to IBP for
investigation, report and recommendation.
IBP: Violations against Code of Professional Responsibility: Canons 1, 8, 10,
19, Rule 12.03
Violations against lawyers oath: “Promoted or sued groundless, false, unlawful
suit, “Will do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court” “Will delay
no man for money or malice”
After conference, both parties were asked to file position paper on issue of
whether misconduct was committed by respondent. Atty Vaflor- Fabroa
complied while Atty Paguinto again failed to submit an a position paper.
Commissioner Quisumbing found him guilty of violations against lawyers oath,
and canons 1,8,10 and rule 12.03. She recommended a suspension of 2 years.
He was previously suspended for 6 months.
IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline opted to dismiss the complaint for lack of
merit. After M for Reconsideration, IBP-CBD recommended 6 month
suspension
SC:
1. violation was conniving with GEMASCO board and Gerango on the take
over, he violated its by-laws and the Cooperative Code. He violated lawyers oath
:  to uphold constitution and obey laws
2. violation committed when he filed baseless criminal complaints which
promoted or sued groundless, false, unlawful suit. He violated lawyer’s oath.
3. he failed to submit comment after asking for an extension, he ignored court’s
order show a cavalier attitude towards the court and disrespect for its institution.
Sebastien v. Bajar, repeatedly ignoring orders of the SC constitutes disrespect
for judicial institution
Lawyers must respect court orders and processes and deference shows wilful
disregard that must be punished or subject to disciplinary action.
Because he was previously suspended, he must be meted a higher penalty.
He is suspended for two years from the practice of law for violation of Canons 1,
8, 10, and Rule 12.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the
Lawyer’s Oath, effective immediately.
Same; Same; Code of Professional Responsibility; Respondent violated Rule
12.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states that “a lawyer
shall not, often obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or
briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an
explanation for his failure to do so.”—When, after obtaining an extension of
time to file comment on the complaint, respondent failed to file any and ignored
this Court’s subsequent show cause order, he violated Rule 12.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which states that “A lawyer shall not, after
obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the
period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation for his
failure to do so.” [Vaflor-Fabroa vs. Paguinto, 615 SCRA 223(2010)]

Mary Ann T. Mattus vs. Atty. Albert T. Villaseca
FActs: Petitioner and her husband, German Bernardo D. Mattus, engaged the
services of Atty. Villaseca to represent them in a case for estafa thru falsification
of public document filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 20, Imus,
Cavite. Petitioner maintained that she and German were convicted due to Atty.
Villaseca’s gross and inexcusable negligence in performing his duties as their
counsel.
Issue: won atty.villesca is guilty in delaying the case.
RULING: YES. Undoubtedly, Atty. Ricafort was required to hold in trust any
money and property of his clients that came into his possession, and he needed
to be always mindful of the trust and confidence his clients reposed in him.
Thus, having obtained the funds from the Tarogs in the course of his
professional employment, he had the obligation to deliver such funds to his
clients (a) when they became due, or (b) upon demand.
other counsel if there were no such misinformation, if there was no such attempt
to mislead.
Malonso vs. Principe, 447 SCRA 1, December 16, 2004
Administrative Law; Attorneys; Requisites before a lawyer may be suspended
from the practice of law by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).—It is
clear that before a lawyer may be suspended from the practice of law by the IBP,
there should be (1) a review of the investigator’s report; (2) a formal voting; and
(3) a vote of at least five (5) members of the Board. The rationale for this rule is
simple: a decision reached by the Board in compliance with the procedure is the
official decision of the Board as a body and not merely as the collective view of
the individual members thereof. This is in keeping with the very nature of a
collegial body which arrives at its decisions only after deliberation, the exchange
of views and ideas, and the concurrence of the required majority vote. Thus, the
vote of the majority would be necessary for the validity of the Board’s
resolution. Without a vote having been taken, Resolution No. XVI-2003-241
(CBD Case No. 01-848) is void and has no effect.

The Supreme Court held that Atty. Villaseca’s failure to submit a demurrer to
evidence constitutes inexcusable negligence; it showed his lack of devotion and
zeal in preserving his clients’ cause. Furthermore, Atty. Villaseca’s failure to
present any testimonial, object or documentary evidence for the defense reveals
his lack of diligence in performing his duties as an officer of the Court; it
showed his indifference towards the cause of his clients. Considering that the
liberty and livelihood of his clients were at stake, Atty. Villaseca should have
exerted efforts to rebut the presented prosecution evidence. The Court
emphasized that while a lawyer has complete discretion on what legal strategy to
employ in a case entrusted to him, he must present every remedy or defense
within the authority of the law to support his client’s cause.
Manila Pest Control vs. Workmen’s Compensation Commission
FACTS: WCC considered a complaint filed against it by Mario Abitria for compensation. It
was submitted for decision after he and a physician had testified. The counsel of Manila Pest
Control failed to appear at the hearing. A motion for reconsideration was filed praying he be
allowed to present evidence on his behalf however, this was denied. Arbitria was employed
by the MPC since February 4, 1956, working six (6) days a week and receiving an average
monthly wage of P180.00 as labourer. He was assigned in the Research Division which
conducted research on rat traps and other matters regarding extermination of pests, animals
and insects. In the place of his employment he was made to inhale dangerous fumes as the
atmosphere was polluted with poisonous chemical dusts. The working condition of his place
of work was also warm and humid in view of the products being manufactured by the
respondent. He was not extended any protective device and he was also made to lift heavy
objects in the painting and the soldering. Atty. Corpuz is impugning the delivery of the
decision to Atty. Camacho. It was then alleged in the petition that on April 11, 1967, a MR
of the aforesaid order was filed with the averment that petitioner was not aware of any
decision rendered in the case as no copy of the same had theretofore been furnished to its
counsel. The motion for reconsideration was consequently denied. On June 14, 1967, a plea
for execution was granted on behalf of the Arbiria and subsequently the City Sherriff of
Manila levied on the petitioner‘s properties.
Same; Same; While the practice of law is not a business venture, a lawyer
nevertheless is entitled to be duly compensated for professional services
rendered.—With the validity of its contract for services and its authority
disputed, and having rendered legal service for years without having received
anything in return, and with the prospect of not getting any compensation for all
the services it has rendered to SANDAMA and its members, respondent and his
law firm auspiciously moved to protect their interests. They may have been
mistaken in the remedy they sought, but the mistake was made in good faith.
Indeed, while the practice of law is not a business venture, a lawyer nevertheless
is entitled to be duly compensated for professional services rendered. It is but
natural that he protect his interest, most especially when his fee is on a
contingent basis.
Same; Same; Contingent fees are not per se prohibited by law; Its validity
depends, in large measure, upon the reasonableness of the amount fixed as
contingent fee under the circumstances of the case.—The fact that the contract
stipulates a maximum of forty percent (40%) contingent fees does not make the
contract illegal or unacceptable. Contingent fees are not per se prohibited by law.
Its validity depends, in large measure, upon the reasonableness of the amount
fixed as contingent fee under the circumstances of the case. Nevertheless, when
it is shown that a contract for a contingent fee was obtained by undue influence
exercised by the attorney upon his client or by any fraud or imposition, or that
the compensation is clearly excessive, the Court must, and will protect the
aggrieved party. [Malonso vs. Principe, 447 SCRA 1(2004)]

ISSUE/S: WON Atty. Corpuz misused the processes of the Court to delay the
delivery of justice.

HELD: Yes.Atty. Corpuz refused to receive the copy of the decision of the WCC
and he is nowimpugning the delivery of the decision to Atty. Camacho and
denying the knowledgeof it when in fact and in truth the delivery of the decision
to Atty. Camacho was madeper his instruction.An effort was made to serve
petitioner with a copy of the decision; that such effort‘sfailure was due to the
conduct of its own counsel

Constitutional law; Due process; Acts showing no denial of.—Petitioner alleges

that it was not officially furnished a copy of the decision of the Workmen's
Compensation Commission since the same was not delivered to its counsel but
to another and hence it was denied due process to be heard. In the reply-
memorandum of the Workmen's Compensation Commission it was shown that a
copy of the decision was furnished to petitioners counsel but its counsel refused
to received the same and instead instructed the server to deliver the same to
another counsel. In view of the instruction the server proceeded to the law office
of the named counsel where the said decision was received by a clerk of the said
office, evidenced by a stamp pad bearing its name. Held: Under the above
circumstances, no due process question arose. What was done satisfied the
constitutional requirement. An effort was made to serve petitioner with a copy of
the decision; that such ef f ort f ailed was attributable to the conduct of its own
counsel. There is no reason why the decision would have been served on some

Bugaring and RBBI v. Hon Espanol [G.R. No. 130990, January 19, 2001 (Canon 12
Court Process)]
Canon 12, section 4: Effect of non-compliance. It the order is not obeyed, or in case of
insufficient compliance therewith, the court may order the striking out of the pleading or the
portions thereof to which the order was directed or make such other order as it deems just.
PONENTE: De Leon, JR, J:
FACTS: Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision dated March 6, 1998 of the Court of
Appeals affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 90, Imus, Cavite, declaring
petitioner Rexie Efren A. Bugaring guilty in direct contempt of court.
The incident subject of the petition occurred during a hearing held on December 5, 1996 of Civil Case No.
1266-96 entitled “Royal Becthel Builders, Inc. vs. Spouses Luis Alvaran and Beatriz Alvaran, et al.”, for
Annulment of Sale and Certificates of Title, Specific Performance and Damages with Prayer for
Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order in the sala of respondent judge Dolores S.
Español of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 90, Imus, Cavite.
Pursuant to a motion filed by the previous counsel of Royal Bechtel Builders, Inc., the trial court issued an
order on February 27, 1996 directing the Register of Deeds of the Province of Cavite to annotate at the back
of certain certificates of title a notice of lis pendens. Before the Register of Deeds of the Province of Cavite
could comply with said order, the defendant Spouses Alvaran on April 15, 1996, filed a motion to cancel lis
pendens. On July 19, 1996, petitioner, the newly appointed counsel of Royal Bechtel Builders, Inc., filed
an opposition to the motion to cancel lis pendens. On August 16, 1996, the motion to cancel lis pendens
was granted by the court. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was opposed by the
defendants. On November 5, 1996, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to Resolve, and on November 6,
1996, filed a Rejoinder to Opposition and a Motion for Contempt of Court.
During the hearing of the motion for contempt of court held on December 5, 1996, Judge Español cited
petitioner in direct contempt of court, thus:
During the hearing of this case, plaintiffs and counsel were present together with one (1) operating a video
camera who was taking pictures of the proceedings of the case while counsel, Atty. Rexie Efren Bugaring
was making manifestation to the effect that he was ready to mark his documentary evidence pursuant to his
Motion to cite (in contempt of court) the Deputy Register of Deeds of Cavite, Diosdado Concepcion.
The Court called the attention of said counsel who explained that he did not cause the appearance of the
cameraman to take pictures, however, he admitted that they came from a function, and that was the reason
why the said cameraman was in town with him and the plaintiffs. Notwithstanding the flimsy explanation
given, the counsel sent out the cameraman after the Court took exception to the fact that although the
proceedings are open to the public and that it being a court of record, and since its permission was not
sought, such situation was an abuse of discretion of the Court.
When the respondent, Deputy Register of Deeds Concepcion manifested that he needed the services of
counsel and right then and there appointed Atty. Elpidio Barzaga to represent him, the case was allowed to
be called again. On the second call, Atty. Bugaring started to insist that he be allowed to mark and present
his documentary evidence in spite of the fact that Atty. Barzaga was still manifesting that he be allowed to
submit a written pleading for his client, considering that the Motion has so many ramifications and the
issues are complicated.
At this point, Atty. Bugaring was insisting that he be allowed to mark his documentary evidence and was
raring to argue as in fact he was already perorating despite the fact that Atty. Barzaga has not yet finished
with his manifestation. As Atty. Bugaring appears to disregard orderly procedure, the Court directed him to
listen and wait for the ruling of the Court for an orderly proceeding.
While claiming that he was listening, he would speak up anytime he felt like doing so. Thus, the Court
declared him out of order, at which point, Atty. Bugaring flared up and uttered words insulting the Court;
such as: ‘that he knows better than the latter as he has won all his cases of certiorari in the appellate Courts,
that he knows better the Rules of Court; that he was going to move for the inhibition of the Presiding Judge
for allegedly being antagonistic to his client,’ and other invectives were hurled to the discredit of the Court.
Thus, in open court, Atty. Bugaring was declared in direct contempt and order the Court’s sheriff to arrest
and place him under detention.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Bugaring is guilty of contempt of court.
HELD: Yes, Atty. Bugaring is guilty of contempt of court.
RATIONALE: Petitioner insists that a careful examination of the transcript of stenographic
notes of the subject proceedings would reveal that the contempt order issued by respondent
judge had no factual and legal basis. It would also show that he was polite and respectful
towards the court as he always addressed the court with the phrase “your honor please.”
The Supreme Court disagree.
Section 1, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court as amended by Administrative Circular No. 22-95
provides:
Direct contempt punished summarily. - A person guilty of misbehavior in the presence of or
so near a court or judge as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same,
including disrespect toward the court or judge, offensive personalities toward others, or
refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when
lawfully required to do so, may be summarily adjudged in contempt by such court or judge
and punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand pesos or imprisonment not exceeding
ten (10) days, or both, if it be a superior court, or a judge thereof, or by a fine not exceeding
two hundred pesos or imprisonment not exceeding one (1) day, or both, if it be an inferior
court.
We agree with the statement of the Court of Appeals that petitioner’s alleged deference to
the trial court in consistently addressing the respondent judge as “your Honor please”
throughout the proceedings is belied by his behavior therein:
1. the veiled threat to file a petition for certiorari against the trial court (pp. 14-15, tsn,
December 5, 1996; pp. 41-42, Rollo) is contrary to Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which mandates that “a lawyer shall abstain from scandalous,
offensive or menacing language or behavior before the Courts”.
2. the hurled uncalled for accusation that the respondent judge was partial in favor of the
other party (pp. 13-14, tsn, December 5, 1996; pp. 40-41, Rollo) is against Rule 11.04,
Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which enjoins lawyers from attributing
to a judge “motives not supported by the record or have no materiality to the case”.
3. behaving without due regard to the trial court’s order to maintain order in the
proceedings (pp. 9-13, tsn, December 5, 1996; pp. 36-40, Rollo) is in utter disregard to
Canon 1 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which makes it a lawyer’s duty to “maintain
towards the courts (1) respectful attitude” in order to maintain its importance in the
administration of justice, and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
mandates lawyers to “observe and maintain the respect due to the Courts and to judicial
officers and should insist on similar conduct by others”.
4. behaving without due regard or deference to his fellow counsel who at the time he was
making representations in behalf of the other party, was rudely interrupted by the petitioner
and was not allowed to further put a word in edgewise (pp. 7-13, tsn, December 5, 1996;
pp. 34-39, Rollo) is violative of Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
Canon 22 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which obliges a lawyer to conduct himself
with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional colleagues, and
5. the refusal of the petitioner to allow the Registrar of Deeds of the Province of Cavite,
through counsel, to exercise his right to be heard (Ibid) is against Section 1 of Article III,
1997 Constitution on the right to due process of law, Canon 18 of the Canons of
Professional Ethics which mandates a lawyer to always treat an adverse witness “with
fairness and due consideration,” and Canon 12 of Code of Professional Responsibility which
insists on a lawyer to “exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and
efficient administration of justice.”
The Court cannot therefore help but notice the sarcasm in the petitioner’s use of the phrase
“your honor please.” For, after using said phrase he manifested utter disrespect to the court
in his subsequent utterances. Surely this behavior from an officer of the Court cannot and
should not be countenanced, if proper decorum is to be observed and maintained during
court proceedings.
But “a lawyer should not be carried away in espousing his client’s cause” (Buenaseda v.
Flavier, 226 SCRA 645, 656). He should not forget that he is an officer of the court, bound
to exert every effort and placed under duty, to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice pursuant to Canon 12, Canons of Professional Responsibility
(Gomez v. Presiding Judge, RTC, Br. 15, Ozamis City, 249 SCRA 432, 439). He should
not, therefore, misuse the rules of procedure to defeat the ends of justice per Rule 10.03.
Canon 10 of the Canons of Professional Responsibility, or unduly delay a case, impede the
execution of a judgment or misuse court processes, in accordance with Rule 12.04, Canon
12 of the same Canons (Ibid).
“Lawyers should be reminded that their primary duty is to assist the courts in the
administration of justice. Any conduct which tends to delay, impede or obstruct the
administration of justice contravenes such lawyer’s duty.”
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision dated March 6, 1998 of the Court of Appeals is
hereby AFFIRMED, Bugaring was sentenced to 3 day imprisonment and a fine of P3,000.
The Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 90, Imus, Cavite is ordered to return to the
petitioner, Rexie Efren A. Bugaring, the sum of P1,000.00 out of the original fine of
P3,000.00.
Same; Same; Legal Ethics; Attorneys; A lawyer should not be carried away in espousing his
client’s cause—he should not forget that he is an officer of the court, bound to exert every
effort and placed under duty, to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.—
Petitioner argued that while it might appear that he was carried by his emotions in espousing
the case of his client—by persisting to have his documentary evidence marked despite the
respondent judge’s contrary order—he did so in the honest belief that he was bound to
protect the interest of his client to the best of his ability and with utmost diligence. The
Court of Appeals aptly stated: But “a lawyer should not be carried away in espousing his
client’s cause” (Buenaseda v. Flavier, 226 SCRA 645, 656). He should not forget that he is
an officer of the court, bound to exert every effort and placed under duty, to assist in the
speedy and efficient administration of justice pursuant to Canon 12, Canons of Professional
Responsibility (Gomez v. Presiding Judge, RTC, Br. 15, Ozamis City, 249 SCRA 432, 439).
He should not, therefore, misuse the rules of procedure to defeat the ends of justice per Rule
10.03. Canon 10 of the Canons of Professional Responsibility, or unduly delay a case,
impede the execution of a judgment or misuse court processes, in accordance with Rule
12.04, Canon 12 of the same Canons (Ibid.).
Same; Same; Same; Same; A judge errs if, in citing a person in direct contempt of court, she
imposes a fine which exceeds the ceiling of P2,000.00 under Supreme Court Administrative
Circular No. 22-95 which took effect on November 16, 1995.—Although respondent judge
was justified in citing petitioner in direct contempt of court, she erred in imposing a fine in
the amount of P3,000.00 which exceeded the ceiling of P2,000.00 under Supreme Court
Administrative Circular No. 22-95 which took effect on November 16, 1995. It was not
established that the fine was imposed in bad faith. The Court of Appeals thus properly
ordered the return of the excess of P1,000.00. Aside from the fine, the three days
imprisonment meted out to petitioner was justified and within the 10-day limit prescribed in
Section 1, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, as amended. [Bugaring vs. Español, 349 SCRA
687(2001)]
RENERIO SAMBAJON, et al. vs. ATTY. JOSE A. SUING
Facts: Complainants sought the disbarment of Atty. Jose A. Suing on the
grounds of deceit, malpractice, violation of Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
Complainants were the complainants in NLRC Case Microplast Inc.
vs Ardan, et al., for Unfair Labor Practice (ULP), Illegal Dismissal and Illegal
Strike, while Atty. Suing was the counsel for the respondents.
Said case was dismissed by Labor Arbiter Ariel Cadiente Santos and
the respondent employer was declared guilty of ULP. The employer was directed
to reinstate all the complainants to their former position with full back wages.
The decision having become final and executory, the Labor Arbiter issued a Writ
of Execution.
In the meantime, on the basis of individual Release Waiver and
Quitclaims purportedly signed and sworn to by seven (7) of the complainants in
the ULP and Illegal Dismissal case before Labor Arbiter, in the presence of the
respondent, the Labor Arbiter dismissed said case insofar as the seven (7)
complainants were concerned.
Four (4) of the seven (7) complainants who purportedly executed the
Release Waiver and Quitclaims, denied having signed and sworn to before the
Labor Arbiter the said documents or having received the considerations therefor.
Hence, spawned the administrative complaint at bar, alleging that respondent,
acting in collusion with his clients, “frustrated” the implementation of the Writ
of Execution by presenting before the Labor Arbiter the spurious documents.
In a related move, complainants also filed a criminal complaint for
Falsification against respondent together with his clients.
In his Report and Recommendation, IBP Commissioner Salvador B.
Hababag, who conducted an investigation of the administrative complaint at bar,
recommended that respondent be faulted for negligence and that he be
reprimanded therefor with warning.
The Board of Governors of the IBP approved and adopted the Report
and Recommendation of Commissioner Hababag.
The Court notes the attempt of respondent to influence the answers of
his client Manuel Rodil when the latter testified before Commissioner Manuel
Hababag.
Issues: 1) May respondent, Atty. Jose A. Suing, be disbarred for his alleged
manipulation of four (4) alleged RELEASE WAIVER AND QUITCLAIM by
herein complainants who subsequently disclaimed the same as bogus and
falsified?
2) Was respondent guilty of coaching his client in the latter’s
testimony before Commissioner Hababag?
Law: Canon 12
Case History: Investigated by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) through
IBP Commissioner Salvador B. Hababag on 27 September, 2015.
Ruling: 1) Disbarment is not in order. Instead, the respondent is found guilty of
negligence and gross misconduct. The Court says that a lawyer serves his client
with diligence by adopting that norm of practice expected of men of good
intentions. Diligence is the attention and care required of a person in a given
situation and is the opposite of negligence.
2) Yes, respondent was guilty of coaching his client in the latter’s
testimony before Commissioner Hababag. Not only did respondent try to coach
his client or influence him to answer questions in an apparent attempt not to
incriminate him (respondent).
Any act on the lawyer’s part that tends to obstruct, perverts or
impedes the administration of justice constitutes misconduct. While the
Commission on Bar Discipline is not a court, the proceedings therein are
nonetheless part of a judicial proceeding, a disciplinary action being in reality an
investigation by the Court into the misconduct of its officers or an examination
into his character.
The respondent is likewise suspended from the practice of law for a
period of six (6) months, with warning that a repetition of the same or similar
acts will be dealt with more severely.
Attorneys; A lawyer takes an oath when he is admitted to the Bar—by doing so
he thereby becomes an Officer of the Court on whose shoulders rests the grave
responsibility of assisting the courts in the proper, fair, speedy and efficient
administration of justice.—A lawyer takes an oath when he is admitted to the
Bar. By doing so he thereby becomes an Officer of the Court on whose
shoulders rests the grave responsibility of assisting the courts in the proper, fair,
speedy and efficient administration of justice. Mindful of the fact that the present
proceedings involve, on the one hand, the right of a litigant to seek redress
against a member of the Bar who has, allegedly caused him damaged, either
through malice or negligence, while in the performance of his duties as his
counsel, and, on the other, the right of that member of the Bar to protect and
preserve his good name and reputation, we have again gone over and considered
[the] aspects of the case.
Same; Pleadings and Practice; Words and Phrases; Diligence is the “attention
and care required of a person in a given situation and is the opposite of
negligence.” A lawyer serves his client with diligence by adopting that norm of
practice expected of men of good intentions.—Diligence is “the attention and
care required of a person in a given situation and is the opposite of negligence.”
A lawyer serves his client with diligence by adopting that norm of practice
expected of men of good intentions. He thus owes entire devotion to the interest
of his client, warm zeal in the defense and maintenance of his rights, and the
exertion of his utmost learning, skill, and ability to ensure that nothing shall be
taken or withheld from him, save by the rules of law legally applied. It is
axiomatic in the practice of law that the price of success is eternal diligence to
the cause of the client. The practice of law does not require extraordinary
diligence (exactissima diligentia) or that “extreme measure of care and caution
which persons of unusual prudence and circumspection use for securing and
preserving their rights. All that is required is ordinary diligence (diligentia) or
that degree of vigilance expected of a bonus pater familias. x x x
Commission on Bar Discipline; While the Commission on Bar Discipline is not
a court, the proceedings therein are nonetheless part of a judicial proceeding, a
disciplinary action being in reality an investigation by the Court into the
misconduct of its officers or an examination into his character.—As an officer of
the court, a lawyer is called upon to assist in the administration of justice. He is
an instrument to advance its cause. Any act on his part that tends to obstruct,
perverts or impedes the administration of justice constitutes misconduct. While
the Commission on Bar Discipline is not a court, the proceedings therein are
nonetheless part of a judicial proceeding, a disciplinary action being in reality an
investigation by the Court into the misconduct of its officers or an examination
into his character.
Attorneys; Misconduct; In Bantolo v. Castillon, Jr. (478 SCRA 443 [2005]), the
lawyer was found guilty of gross misconduct for his attempt to delay and
obstruct the investigation being conducted by the IBP—nonetheless, this court
found that a suspension of one month from the practice of law was enough to
give him “the opportunity to retrace his steps back to the virtuous path of the
legal profession.” While the disbarment of respondent is, under the facts and
circumstances attendant to the case, not reasonable, neither is reprimand as
recommended by the IBP. This court finds that respondent’s suspension from the
practice of law is in order—In Bantolo v. Castillon, Jr., 478 SCRA 443 (2005),
the respondent lawyer was found guilty of gross misconduct for his attempts to
delay and obstruct the investigation being conducted by the IBP. Nonetheless,
this Court found that a suspension of one month from the practice of law was
enough to give him “the opportunity to retrace his steps back to the virtuous path
of the legal profession.” While the disbarment of respondent is, under the facts
and circumstances attendant to the case, not reasonable, neither is reprimand as
recommended by the IBP. This Court finds that respondent’s suspension from
the practice of law for six months is in order. [Sambajon vs. Suing, 503 SCRA
1(2006)]
THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, plaintiff-appellant, vs.UY TENG
PIAO, defendant-appellee.
Topic: a lawyer shall avoid being a witness for a client
Facts:
            On September 9, 1924, the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered a
judgment in favor of the Philippine National Bank and against Uy Teng Piao in
civil case No. 26328 for the sum of P17,232.42 with interest at 7 per cent per
annum from June 1, 1924, plus 10 per cent of the sum amount for attorney's fees
and costs. The court ordered the defendant to deposit said amount with the clerk
of the court within three months from the date of the judgment, and in case of his
failure to do so that the mortgaged properties described in transfer certificates of
title Nos. 7264 and 8274 should be sold at public auction in accordance with the
law and the proceeds applied to the payment of the judgment.
Uy Teng Piao failed to comply with the order of the court, and the sheriff of the
City of Manila sold the two parcels of land at public auction to the Philippine
National Bank on October 14, 1924 for P300 and P1,000 respectively.
On February 11, 1925, the Philippine National Bank secured from Uy Teng Piao
a waiver of his right to redeem the property described in Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 8274, and on the same date the bank sold said property to Mariano
Santos for P8,600.1awphil.net
Evidently the other parcel, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 7264, was
subsequently resold by the bank for P2,700, because the account of the
defendant was credited with the sum of P11,300. In other words, the bank
credited the defendant with the full amount realized by it when it resold the two
parcels of land.
The bank brought the present action to revive the judgment for the balance of
P11,574.33, with interest at 7 per cent per annum from August 1, 1930.
In re: De Vera, 385 scra 285 (2003)
Facts: Atty. De Vera made some remarks to the Philippine Daily Inquirer
regarding a pending case involving theconstitutionality of the Plunder Law. In
one statement, “he asked the SC to dispel rumors that it wouldvote in favor of a
petition filed by Estrada’s lawyers to declare the plunder law unconstitutional”
and thathis group was greatly disturbed by the rumors. In another statement, he
said that a decision in favor ofthe law’s unconstitutionality would trigger mass
actions and the people would not just swallow any SCdecision that is basically
wrong. Atty. De Vera admitted to making the statements but that these
werefactually accurate and that these are within his right to freedom of speech.
Also, his second statement isallegedly historically correct (Marcos and Erap
times) but that both statements are not to degrade thecourt, to destroy public
confidence and to bring it into disrepute.
Issue:Whether or not Atty. De Vera’s acts constitute a violation of the provisions
of the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility.
Applicable Law
-Rule 71, Section 3 (d)of the Revised Rules of Court authorizes the courts to
hold liable forcriminal contempt a person guilty of conduct that is directed
against the dignity or authority ofthe court, or of an act obstructing the
administration of justice which tends to bring the courtinto disrepute or
disrespect
.-People vs. Godoy– The Court explained that while a citizen may comment
upon the proceedingsand decisions of the court and discuss their correctness, and
even express his opinions on thefitness or unfitness of the judges for their
stations, and the fidelity with which they perform theimportant public trusts
reposed in them, he has no right to attempt to degrade the court,destroy public
confidence in it, and encourage the people to disregard and set naught itsorders,
judgments and decrees.Such publications are said to be an abuse of the liberty
ofspeech and of the press, for they tend to destroy the very foundation of good
order and well-being in society by obstructing the course of justice.

One of the attorneys for the plaintiff testified that the defendant renounced his
right to redeem the parcel of land in Calle Ronquillo, Exhibit 1, because a friend RULING Yes. Freedom of speech is not absolute, and must be balanced with the
of the defendant was interested in buying it. requirements of equallyimportant public interests, such as the maintenance of the
integrity of the courts and orderly functioningof the administration of justice. De
Vera is in abuse of his right. Unwarranted attacks on the dignity of thecourts
Issue: Whether or not lawyers shall avoid being a witness for a client cannot be disguised as free speech, for the exercise of said right cannot be used
to impair theindependence and efficiency of courts or public respect and
confidence thereof. His statements are notfair criticisms of any decision of the
Court, but are threats made against it to force the Court to decidethe issue in a
Held: particular manner, or risk earning the ire of the public. It tends to promote
distrust an
Yes.  With respect to the testimony of the bank's attorney, we should like to
observe that although the law does not forbid an attorney to be a witness and at
the same time an attorney in a cause, the courts prefer that counsel should not
testify as a witness unless it is necessary, and that they should withdraw from the
active management of the case. (Malcolm, Legal Ethics, p. 148.) Canon 19 of the
Code of Legal Ethics reads as follows:

When a lawyer is a witness for his client, except as to merely formal matters,
such as the attestation or custody of an instrument and the like, he should leave
the trial of the case to other counsel. Except when essential to the ends of justice,
a lawyer should avoid testifying in court in behalf of his client.

Attorney and Client; Attorney as Witness.—Although the law does not forbid an
attorney to be a witness and at the same time an attorney in a cause, the courts
prefer that counsel should not testify as a witness unless it is necessary, and that
they should withdraw from the active management of the case. (Malcolm: Legal
Ethics, p. 148.)
Nestle Philippines Inc. vs. Sanchez per curiam, September 30, 1987
FACTS:
-During the period July 8-10, 1987, members of the respondent labor unions
(Union of Filipino Employees and Kimberly Independent Labor Union for
Solidarity, Activism and Nationalism-Olalia) intensified the intermittent pickets
they had been conducting since June 17, 1987 in front of the Padre Faura gate of
the Supreme Court building. They set up pickets' quarters on the pavement in
front of the Supreme Court building, at times obstructing access to and egress
from the Court's premises and offices of justices, officials and employees. They
constructed provisional shelters along the sidewalks, set up a kitchen and littered
the place with food containers and trash in utter disregard of proper hygiene and
sanitation. They waved their red streamers and placards with slogans, and took
turns haranguing the court all day long with the use of loudspeakers.
-These acts were done even after their leaders had been received by Justices
Pedro L. Yap and Marcelo B. Fenian as Chairmen of the Divisions where their
cases are pending, and Atty. Jose C. Espinas, counsel of the Union of Filipro
Employees, had been called in order that the pickets might be informed that the
demonstration must cease immediately for the same constitutes direct contempt
of court and that the Court would not entertain their petitions for as long as the
pickets were maintained. Thus, on July 10, 1987, the Court en banc issued a
resolution giving the said unions the opportunity to withdraw graciously and
requiring the leaders of the respondent union leaders to appear before the Court
on July 14, 1987 at 10:30 A.M. and then and there to SHOW CAUSE why they
should not be held in contempt of court. Atty. Jose C. Espinas was further
required to SHOW CAUSE why he should not be administratively dealt with.
-On the appointed date and time, the above-named individuals appeared before
the Court, represented by Atty. Jose C. Espinas, apologizing for their actions
described and assuring that the acts would not be repeated. Atty. Espinas
likewise manifested to the Court that he had explained to the picketers why their
actions were wrong and that the cited persons were willing to suffer such penalty
as may be warranted under the circumstances. He, however, prayed for the
Court's leniency considering that the picket was actually spearheaded by the
leaders of the "Pagkakaisa ng Mang. gagawa as Timog Katagalogan"
(PAMANTIK), an unregistered loose alliance of about seventy-five (75) unions
in the Southern Tagalog area, and not by either the Union of Filipro Employees
or the Kimberly Independent Labor union.
-Atty. Espinas further stated that he had explained to the picketers that any delay
in the resolution of their cam is usually for causes beyond the control of the
Court and that the Supreme Court has always remained steadfast in its role as the
guardian of the Constitution.
-To confirm for the record that the person cited for contempt fully understood
the reason for the citation and that they win abide by their promise that said
incident will not be repeated, the Court required the respondents to submit a
written manifestation to this effect, which respondents complied with on July 17,
1987
ISSUE:
WON THE RESPONDENTS and ATTY. ESPINAS SHOULD BE HELD IN
DIRECT CONTEMPT OF COURT?
HELD: NO. Contempt charges dismissed.
Ratio The respondents who are nonlawyers are not knowledgeable in her
intricacies of substantive and adjective laws. They are not aware that even as the
rights of free speech and of assembly are protected by the Constitution, any
attempt to pressure or influence courts of justice through the exercise of either
right amounts to an abuse thereof, is no longer within the ambit of constitutional
protection, nor did they realize that any such efforts to influence the course of
justice constitutes contempt of court. The duty and responsibility of advising
them, therefore, rest primarily and heavily upon the shoulders of their counsel of
record. Atty. Jose C. Espinas, when his attention was called by this Court, did
his best to demonstrate to the pickets the untenability of their acts and posture. It
is their duty as officers of the court to properly apprise their clients on matters of
decorum and proper attitude toward courts of justice, and to labor leaders of the
importance of a continuing educational program for their members.
Reasoning The Court will not hesitate in future similar situations to apply the
full force of the law and punish for contempt those who attempt to pressure the
Court into acting one way or the other in any case pending before it. Grievances,
if any, must be ventilated through the proper channels, i.e., through appropriate
petitions, motions or other pleadings in keeping with the respect due to the
Courts as impartial administrators of justice entitled to "proceed to the
disposition of its business in an orderly manner, free from outside interference
obstructive of its functions and tending to embarrass the administration of
justice.
- courts and juries, in the decision of issues of fact and law should be immune
from every extraneous influence; that facts should be decided upon evidence
produced in court; and that the determination of such facts should be
uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or sympathies.
Dispositive WHEREFORE, the contempt charges against herein respondents are
DISMISSED. Henceforth, no demonstrations or pickets intended to pressure or
influence courts of justice into acting one way or the other on pending cases
shall be allowed in the vicinity and/or within the premises of any and all courts.
SO ORDERED.
Courts; Supreme Court cannot be pressured to act one way or the other in any
case pending before it; Apologies of respondents accepted—We accept the
apologies offered by the respondents and at this time, forego the imposition of
the sanction warranted by the contemptuous acts described earlier. The liberal
stance taken by this Court in these cases as well as in the earlier case of
AHS/PHILIPPINES EMPLOYEES UNION vs. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION, et al., G.R. No. 73721, March 30, 1987, should
not, however, be considered in any other light than an acknowledgment of the
euphoria apparently resulting from the rediscovery of a long-repressed freedom.
The Court will not hesitate in future similar situations to apply the full force of
the law and punish for contempt those who attempt to pressure the Court into
acting one way or the other in any case pending before it. Grievances, if any,
must be ventilated through the proper channels, i.e., through appropriate
petitions, motions or other pleadings in keeping with the respect due to the
Courts as impartial administrators of justice entitled to "proceed to the
disposition of its business in an orderly manner, free from outside interference
obstructive of its functions and tending to embarrass the administration of
justice."
Same; Same; Courts and juries immune from every extraneous influence.—The
right of petition is conceded to be an inherent right of the citizen under all free
governments. However, such right, natural and inherent though it may be, has
never been invoked to shatter the standards of propriety entertained for the
conduct of courts. For "it is a traditional conviction of civilized society
everywhere that courts and juries, in the decision of issues of fact and law should
be immune from every extraneous influence; that facts should be decided upon
evidence produced in court; and that the determination of such facts should be
uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or sympathies.''
Same; Same; Same; Abuse of rights of free speech and of assembly not within
the ambit of constitutional protection; Counsel of record and all members of the
legal profession are reminded to apprise their clients on matters of docorum and
proper attitude toward courts of justice—We realize that the individuals herein
cited who are non-lawyers are not knowledgeable in the intricacies of
substantive and adjective laws. They are not aware that even as the rights of free
speech and of assembly are protected by the Constitution, any attempt to
pressure or influence courts of justice through the exercise of either right
amounts to an abuse thereof, is no longer within the ambit of constitutional
protection, nor did they realize that any such efforts to influence the course of
justice constitutes contempt of court. The duty and responsibility of advising
them, therefore, rest primarily and heavily upon the shoulders of their counsel of
record. Atty. Jose C. Espinas, when his attention was called by this Court, did
his best to demonstrate to the pickets the untenability of their acts and posture.
Let this incident therefore serve as a reminder to all members of the legal
profession that it is their duty as officers of the court to properly apprise their
clients on matters of decorum and proper attitude toward courts of justice and to
labor leaders of the importance of a continuing educational program f or their
members. [Nestlé Philippines, Inc. vs. Sanchez, 154 SCRA 542(1987)]
CRUZ V SALVA
NATURE
Original action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and Prohibition with
Preliminary Injunction.
FACTS
- A certain Manuel Monroy was murdered. CFI Pasay found Castelo, de Jesus,
Bonifacio, Mendoza, Berdugo et al. guilty of murder. They all appealed and
Castelo sought new trial. Castelo was again found guilty.
- Pres Magsaysay ordered reinvestigation. Philippine Constabulary questioned
people and got confessions pointing to persons other than those convicted.
- Castelo et al wrote to Fiscal Salva to conduct reinvestigation on basis of new
confessions. Fiscal conferred w/ SolGen and the Justice Sec decided to have the
results of investigation made available to counsel for appellants.
- Chief of Phil Constabulary furnished Fiscal Salva copies of the affidavits and
confessions. Salva organized a committee for reinvestigation and subpoenaed
Timoteo Cruz, who was implicated as instigator and mastermind in the new
affidavits and confessions. Cruz’ counsel questioned jurisdiction of the
committee and of Salva to conduct preliminary investigation bec the case was
pending appeal in the SC. Counsel filed this present petition.
- Salva said he subpoenaed Cruz bec of Cruz’ oral and personal request to allow
him to appear at the investigation.
- SC issued writ of preliminary injunction stopping the prelim investigation.
ISSUES
1. WON Salva and his committee can push through with the investigation
2. WON Cruz can be compelled to appear and testify before Salva
3. WON Salva conducted the investigation property
HELD
1. Yes.
- SC believed Salva that it was Cruz who personally reqested to allow him to
appear at the investigation.
- Normally, when a criminal case handled by fiscal is tried and decided and
appealed to a higher court, functions of fiscal have terminated. However, Salva
has justified his reinvestigation bec in the orig case, one of the defendants
(Salvador Realista y de Guzman) was not included in the trial.
- The duty of a prosecuting attorney is not only to prosecute and secure
conviction of the guilty but also to protect the innocent.
- Writ of preliminary injunction dissolved. Investigation may continue.
- Petition for certiorari and prohibition granted in part, denied in part.
2. No
- Under the law, Cruz had right to be present at the investigation but he need not
be present. His presence is more of a right than a legal obligation.
3. No
- Salva shld have done investigation privately in his office and not publicly in
the session hall of Municipal Court of Pasay where microphones were installed
and media people were present. He should also not have made the media people
ask questions. SC was disturbed and annoyed by such publicity.
- Salva is publicly reprehended and censured.
MARTELINO vs. ALEJANDRO
FACTS:
Major Eduardo Martelino is charged with the violation of the 94th
and 97th Articles of War, as a result of the alleged shooting on March 18, 1968
of some Muslim recruits then undergoing commando training on the island of
Corregidor.
On August 12, 1969 Martelino sought the disqualification of the
President of the general court-martial, following the latter's admission that he
read newspaper stories of the Corregidor incident. Martelino contended that the
case had received such an amount of publicity in the press and other news media
and in fact was being exploited for political purposes in connection with the
presidential election on November 11, 1969 as to imperil his right to a fair trial.
After deliberating, the military court denied the challenge.
Respondents assert that despite the publicity which the case had
received, no proof has been presented showing that the court-martial's
president's fairness and impartiality have been impaired. On the contrary, they
claim, the petitioner's own counsel expressed confidence in the "integrity,
experience and background" of the members of the court.
ISSUE:
Whether the publicity given to the case against the petitioners was
such as to prejudice their right to a fair trial?
HELD:
NO, the spate of publicity in this case did not focus on the guilt of the
petitioners but rather on the responsibility of the Government for what was
claimed to be a "massacre" of Muslim trainees.
If there was a "trial by newspaper" at all, it was not of the petitioners
but of the Government. Absent here is a showing of failure of the court-martial
to protect the accused from massive publicity encouraged by those connected
with the conduct of the trial either by a failure to control the release of
information or to remove the trial to another venue or to postpone it until the
deluge of prejudicial publicity shall have subsided. Indeed we cannot say that the
trial of the petitioners was being held under circumstances which did not permit
the observance of those imperative decencies of procedure which have come to
be identified with due process.
Granting the existence of "massive" and "prejudicial" publicity, since
the petitioners here do not contend that the respondents have been unduly
influenced but simply that they might be by the "barrage" of publicity, we think
that the suspension of the court-martial proceedings has accomplished the
purpose sought by the petitioners' challenge for cause, by postponing the trial of
the petitioner until calmer times have returned. The atmosphere has since been
cleared and the publicity surrounding the Corregidor incident has so far abated
that we believe the trial may now be resumed in tranquility.
RE: REQUEST RADIO-TV COVERAGE OF THE TRIAL IN THE
SANDIGANBAYAN OF THE PLUNDER CASES AGAINST THE
FORMER PRESIDENT JOSEPH E. ESTRADA
PART I. DECISION (JUNE 2001)
FACTS: The Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas (KBP) sent a letter requesting the
SC to allow the live media coverage of the anticipated trial of the plunder and other criminal
cases filed against former Pres. Estrada before the Sandiganbayan “to assure the public of
full transparency in the proceedings of an unprecedented case in our history.”
The petition averred that public interest should be evident bearing in mind the right of the
public to vital information affecting the nation. In effect, the petition seeks the re-
examination of the October 23, 1991 resolution of the SC in a case for libel filed by then
President Aquino. The said resolution resolved to prohibit live radio and television coverage
of court proceedings, in view order to protect the parties’ right to due process, to prevent the
distraction of the participants in the proceedings and to avoid miscarriage of justice. Video
footages of court hearings for news purposes shall be limited and restricted.
ISSUE:Whether live radio and TV coverage of the court proceedings should be
allowed.
RULING: Petition is denied. The propriety of granting or denying the instant
petition involve the weighing out of the constitutional guarantees of freedom of
the press and the right to public information, on the one hand, and the
fundamental rights of the accused, on the other hand, along with the
constitutional power of a court to control its proceedings in ensuring a fair and
impartial trial. When these rights race against one another, the right of the
accused must be preferred to win.
With the possibility of losing not only liberty but also the very life of the
accused, it behooves all to make absolutely certain than an accused receives a
verdict solely on the basis of a just and dispassionate judgment, a verdict that
would come only after the presentation of credible evidence testified to by6
unbiased witnesses unswayed by any kind of pressure, whether open or subtle, in
proceedings that are devoid of histrionics that might detract from its basic aim to
ferret veritable facts free from improper influence, and decreed by a judge with
an unprecedented mind, unbridled by running emotions or passions.
Even while it may be difficult to quantify the influence, or pressure that media
can bring to bear on them directly and through the shaping of public opinion, it
is a fact, nonetheless, that, indeed, it does so in so many ways and in varying
degrees.  The conscious or unconscious effect that such coverage may have on
the testimony of witnesses and the decision of judges cannot be evaluated but, it
can likewise be said, it is not at all unlikely for a vote of guilt or innocence to
yield to it. To say that actual prejudice should first be present would leave to
near nirvana the subtle threats to justice that a disturbance of the mind so
indispensable to the calm and deliberate dispensation of justice can create.
An accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that belongs to him, more than anyone
else, where his life or liberty can be held critically in balance. A public trial is not
synonymous with publicized trial; it only implies that the court doors must be open to those
who wish to come, sit in the available seats, conduct themselves with decorum and observe
the trial process.
The courts recognize the constitutionally embodied freedom of the press and the right to
public information. Nevertheless, within the courthouse, the overriding consideration is still
the paramount right of the accused to due process which must never be allowed to suffer
diminution in its constitutional proportions.
PART II. MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION (SEPT 2001)
FACTS: The Secretary of Justice filed a MR arfuing that there is really no conflict between
the right of the people to public information and the freedom of the press, on the one hand,
and the right of the accused to a fair trial, on the other hand; that if there is a clash, it must
be resolved in favor of the right of the people and the press because the people are entitled
to information.
RULING: In lieu of live TC and radio coverage of the trial, the Court resolved to order the
audio-visual recording of the trial for documentary purposes, considering the significance of
the trial before the Sandiganbayan of former President Estrada and the importance of
preserving the records thereof.
There are several reasons for such televised recording.  First, the hearings are of historic
significance.  They are an affirmation of our commitment to the rule that "the King is under
no man, but he is under God and the law." Second, the Estrada cases involve matters of vital
concern to our people who have a fundamental right to know how their government is
conducted.  This right can be enhanced by audio-visual presentation.  Third, audio-visual
presentation is essential for the education and civic training of the people. Above all, there is
the need to keep audio-visual records of the hearings for documentary
purposes.  The recordings will be useful in preserving the essence of the
proceedings in a way that the cold print cannot quite do because it cannot
capture the sights and sounds of events.  They will be primarily for the use of
appellate courts in the event a review of the proceedings, rulings, or decisions of
the Sandiganbayan is sought or becomes necessary.  The accuracy of the
transcripts of stenographic notes taken during the trial can be checked by
reference to the tapes.
On the other hand, by delaying the release of the tapes for broadcast, concerns
that those taking part in the proceedings will be playing to the cameras and will
thus be distracted from the proper performance of their roles – whether as
counsel, witnesses, court personnel, or judges – will be allayed.  The possibility
that parallel trials before the bar of justice and the bar of public opinion may
jeopardize, or even prevent, the just determination of the cases can be
minimized.  The possibility that judgment will be rendered by the popular
tribunal before the court of justice can render its own will be avoided.
The right of privacy of the accused is not a bar to the production of such
documentary. In Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd. v. Capulong, the Court held that "a
limited intrusion into a person's privacy has long been regarded as permissible
where that person is a public figure and the information sought to be elicited
from him or to be published about him constitute matters of a public character."
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, an audio-visual recording of the trial of former
President Estrada before the Sandiganbayan is hereby ordered to be made, for
the account of the Sandiganbayan, under the following conditions: (a) the trial
shall be recorded in its entirety, excepting such portions thereof as the
Sandiganbayan may determine should not be held public under Rule 119, §21 of
the Rules of Criminal Procedure; (b) cameras shall be installed inconspicuously
inside the courtroom and the movement of TV crews shall be regulated
consistent with the dignity and solemnity of the proceedings; (c) the audio-visual
recordings shall be made for documentary purposes only and shall be made
without comment except such annotations of scenes depicted therein as may be
necessary to explain them; (d) the live broadcast of the recordings before the
Sandiganbayan shall have rendered its decision in all the cases against the
former President shall be prohibited under pain of contempt of court and other
sanctions in case of violations of the prohibition; (e) to ensure that the conditions
are observed, the audio-visual recording of the proceedings shall be made under
the supervision and control of the Sandiganbayan or its Division concerned and
shall be made pursuant to rules promulgated by it; and (f) simultaneously with
the release of the audio-visual recordings for public broadcast, the original
thereof shall be deposited in the National Museum and the Records Management
and Archives Office for preservation and exhibition in accordance with law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It must also be conceded that
“television can work profound changes in the behavior of the people it focuses
on.”—Witnesses and judges may very well be men and women of fortitude, able
to thrive in hardy climate, with every reason to presume firmness; of mind and
resolute endurance, but it must also be conceded that “television can work
profound changes in the behavior of the people it focuses on.” Even while it may
be difficult to quantify the influence, or pressure that media can bring to bear on
them directly and through the shaping of public opinion, it is a fact, nonetheless,
that, indeed, it does so in so many ways and in varying degrees. The conscious
or unconscious effect that such a coverage may have on the testimony of
witnesses and the decision of judges cannot be evaluated but, it can likewise be
said, it is not at all unlikely for a vote of guilt or innocence to yield to it. It might
be farcical to build around them an impregnable armor against the influence of
the most powerful media of public opinion. To say that actual prejudice should
first be present would leave to near nirvana the subtle threats to justice that a
disturbance of the mind so indispensable to the calm and deliberate dispensation
of justice can create. The effect of television may escape the ordinary means of
proof, but it is not far-fetched for it to gradually erode our basal conception of a
trial such as we know it now.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Right to Public Trial; An accused has a
right to a public trial but it is a right that belongs to him, more than anyone else,
where his life or liberty can be held critically in balance.—An accused has a
right to a public trial but it is a right that belongs to him, more than anyone else,
where his life or liberty can be held critically in balance. A public trial aims to
ensure that he is fairly dealt with and would not be unjustly condemned and that
his rights are not compromised in secrete conclaves of long ago. A public trial is
not synonymous with publicized trial; it only implies that the court doors must
be open to those who wish to come, sit in the available seats, conduct themselves
with decorum and observe the trial process. In the constitutional sense, a
courtroom should have enough facilities for a reasonable number of the public to
observe the proceedings, not too small as to render the openness negligible and
not too large as to distract the trial participants from their proper functions, who
shall then be totally free to report what they have observed during the
proceedings.
Foodsphere, Inc. vs. Atty. Mauricio, Jr. [AC No. 7199. July 22, 2009]
FACTS: [A] certain Alberto Cordero (Cordero) purportedly bought from a
grocery in Valenzuela City canned goods including a can of CDO Liver
spread.  As Cordero and his relatives were eating bread with the CDO Liver
spread, they found the spread to be sour and soon discovered a colony of worms
inside the can. This was complained before the BFAD. After conciliation
meetings between Cordero and the petitioner, the Corderos eventually forged
a KASUNDUAN seeking the withdrawal of their complaint before the
BFAD.  The BFAD thus dismissed the complaint. Respondent, Atty. Mauricio,
Jr.,  who affixed his signature to the KASUNDUAN as a witness, later wrote in
one of his articles/columns in a tabloid that he prepared the document.
Complainant filed criminal complaints against respondent and several others for
Libel and Threatening to Publish Libel under Articles 353 and 356 of the
Revised Penal Code before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City and
Valenzuela City.  The complaints were pending at the time of the filing of the
present administrative complaint. Despite the pendency of the civil case against
him and the issuance of a status quo order restraining/enjoining further
publishing, televising and broadcasting of any matter relative to the complaint of
CDO, respondent continued with his attacks against complainant and its
products.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
HELD: YES. Respondent suspended for three (3) years from the practice of law.
RATIO: The above actuations of respondent are also in violation of Rule 13.03
of the Canon of Professional Responsibility which reads: “A lawyer shall not
make public statements in the media regarding a pending case tending to arouse
public opinion for or against a party.”
respondent lawyer also violated Rule 13.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which mandates: A lawyer shall not make public statements in
the media regarding a pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or
against a party. For despite the pendency of the civil case against him and the
issuance of a status quo order restraining/enjoining further publishing, televising
and broadcasting of any matter relative to the complaint of CDO, respondent
continued with his attacks against complainant and its products. At the same
time, respondent violated Canon 1 also of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which mandates lawyers to “uphold the Constitution, obey the
laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes.” For he defied
said status quo order, despite his (respondent’s) oath as a member of the legal
profession to “obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted
authorities.”
Same; Same; While a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and
courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and abusive
language—language abounds with countless possibilities for one to be emphatic
but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive.—
Respondent violated Canon 8 and Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which mandate, viz.: “CANON 8—A lawyer shall conduct
himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional colleagues,
and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel. Rule 8.01—A
lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive,
offensive or otherwise improper,”—by using intemperate language. Apropos is
the following reminder in Saberon v. Larong, 551 SCRA 359 (2008): “To be
sure, the adversarial nature of our legal system has tempted members of the bar
to use strong language in pursuit of their duty to advance the interests of their
clients. However, while a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and
courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and abusive
language. Language abounds with countless possibilities for one to be emphatic
but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive. On
many occasions, the Court has reminded members of the Bar to abstain from all
offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor and
reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with
which he is charged. In keeping with the dignity of the legal profession, a
lawyer’s language even in his pleadings must be dignified.”

------------(Despite the pendency of civil case against him, he continued with his
attacks against complainant and its products)

The language employed by respondent undoubtedly casts aspersions on the

integrity of the Office of the City Prosecutor and all the Prosecutors connected
with said Office. Respondent clearly assailed the impartiality and fairness of the
said Office in handling cases filed before it and did not even design to submit
any evidence to substantiate said wild allegations. The use by respondent of the
above-quoted language in his pleadings is manifestly violative of Canon 11 and
the fundamental Canon 1 also of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
mandates lawyers to “uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law and legal processes.”  Respondent defied said
status quo order, despite his (respondent’s) oath as a member of the legal
profession to “obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted
authorities.”

Further, respondent violated Canon 8 and Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility which mandate, and by failing to live up to his oath and to
comply with the exacting standards of the legal profession, respondent
also violated Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which directs a
lawyer to “at all times uphold the integrity and the dignity of the legal
profession.”

Legal Ethics; Attorneys; It is necessary for every lawyer to act and comport
himself in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity of the legal
profession, which confidence may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper
conduct of a member of the bar.—The Court, once again, takes this occasion to
emphasize the necessity for every lawyer to act and comport himself in a manner
that promotes public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession, which
confidence may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a
member of the bar. By the above-recited acts, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility which mandates lawyers to refrain from
engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. For, as the IBP
found, he engaged in deceitful conduct by, inter alia, taking advantage of the
complaint against CDO to advance his interest—to obtain funds for his Batas
Foundation and seek sponsorships and advertisements for the tabloids and his
television program.

Same; Same; A lawyer shall not make public statements in the media regarding
a pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or against a party.—The
Maglasang vs. People [G.R. No. 90083, October 4, 1990] and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and
abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and
unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts."

Facts: Khalyxto Maglasang was convicted in the court in San Carlos, Negros
Occidental. His counsel, Atty. Castellano, filed for a petition for certiorari
through registered mail. Due to non-compliance with the requirements, the court
dismissed the petition and a motion for reconsideration. Atty. Castellano then
sent a complaint to the Office of the President where he accused the five justices
of the 2nd division, with biases and ignorance of the law or knowingly rendering
unjust judgments. He accused the court of sabotaging the Aquino administration
for being Marcos appointees, and robbing the Filipino people genuine justice
and democracy. He also said that the SC is doing this to protect the judge who
was impleaded in the petition and for money reasons. He alleges further that the
court is too expensive to be reached by ordinary men. The court is also
inconsiderate and overly strict and meticulous. When asked to show cause why
he should not be cited in contempt, Castellano said that the complaint was
constructive criticism intended to correct in good faith the erroneous and very
strict practices of the justices concerned. He also said that the justices have no
jurisdiction over his act and that they should just answer the complaint. The SC
found him guilty of contempt and improper conduct and ordered to pay P1, 000
or imprisonment of 15 days, and to suffer six months suspension. 
Same; Same; Same; Same; Supreme Court; The Supreme Court is supreme—no
other department or agency may pass upon its judgments or declare them
"unjust", not even the President of the Philippines.—We further note that in
filing the "complaint" against the justices of the Court's Second Division, even
the most basic tenet of our government system—the separation of powers
between the judiciary, the executive, and the legislative branches—has been lost
on Atty. Castellano. We therefore take this occasion to once again remind all and
sundry that "the Supreme Court is supreme—the third great department of
government entrusted exclusively with the judicial power to adjudicate with
finality all justiciable disputes, public and private. No other department or
agency may pass upon its judgments or declare them 'unjust.'" Consequently,
and owing to the foregoing, not even the President of the Philippines as Chief
Executive may pass judgment on any of the Court's acts. [Maglasang vs. People,
190 SCRA 306(1990)]

Issue: Whether or not the Atty. Castellano’s acts constitute a violation of the
provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility. 

Held: Yes. The court found his comments scurrilous and contumacious. He went
beyond the bounds of constructive criticism. What he said are not relevant to the
cause of his client. They cast aspersion on the Court’s integrity as a neutral and
final arbiter of all justiciable controversies before it. 

The explanation of Castellano in his negligence in the filing of the petition for
certiorari did not render his negligence excusable. It is clear that the case was
lost not by the alleged injustices Castellano irresponsibly ascribed to the
members of the Court, but his inexcusable negligence and incompetence. 

As an officer of the court, he should have known better than to smear the honor
and integrity of the Court just to keep the confidence of his client. 

Also, with the complaint he filed, the most basic tenet of the system of
government – separation of power - has been lost. He should know that not even
the President of the Philippines can pass judgment on any of the Court’s acts.

Lawyers; Legal Ethics; A lawyer's duty is not to his client but to the
administration of justice; to that end, his client's success is wholly subordinate;
and his conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of law and
ethics.—It is clear that the case was lost not by the alleged injustices Atty.
Castellano irresponsibly ascribed to the members of the Court's Second Division,
but simply because of his inexcusable negligence and incompetence. Atty.
Castellano, however, seeks to pass on the blame for his deficiencies to the Court,
in the hope of salvaging his reputation before his client. Unfortunately, the
means by which Atty. Castellano hoped to pass the buck so to speak, are grossly
improper. As an officer of the Court, he should have known better than to smear
the honor and integrity of the Court just to keep the confidence of his client.
Time and again we have emphasized that a "lawyer's duty is not to his client but
to the administration of justice; to that end, his client's success is wholly
subordinate; and his conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously
observant of law and ethics." Thus, "while a lawyer must advocate his client's
cause in utmost earnest and with the maximum skill he can marshal, he is not at
liberty to resort to arrogance, intimidation, and innuendo."

Same; Same; Same; Courts; Contempt of Court; Criticisms towards the Court
should be bona fide, and should not spill over the walls of decency and
propriety.—To be sure, the Court does not pretend to be immune from
criticisms. After all, it is through the criticism of its actions that the Court,
composed of fallible mortals, hopes to correct whatever mistake it may have
unwittingly committed. But then again, "[i]t is the cardinal condition of all such
criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency