G.R. No.
140500               January 21, 2002 been filed during the lifetime of the alleged father to give him the opportunity to either affirm or
ERNESTINA BERNABE, petitioner,
vs.
CAROLINA ALEJO as guardian ad litem for the minor ADRIAN BERNABE, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The right to seek recognition granted by the Civil Code to illegitimate children who were still
minors at the time the Family Code took effect cannot be impaired or taken away. The minors
have up to four years from attaining majority age within which to file an action for recognition.
Statement of the Case
Before us is a Petition1 for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, praying
for (1) the nullification of the July 7, 1999 Court of Appeals2 (CA) Decision3 in CA-GR CV
No. 51919 and the October 14, 1999 CA Resolution4 denying petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration, as well as (2) the reinstatement of the two Orders issued by the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Pasay City (Branch 109) concerning the same case. The dispositive portion of
the assailed Decision reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the order of the lower court dismissing Civil Case No.
94-0562 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let the records of this case be remanded to the lower
court for trial on the merits."5
The Facts
The undisputed facts are summarized by the Court of Appeals in this wise:
"The late Fiscal Ernesto A. Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with his secretary of twenty-three
(23) years, herein plaintiff-appellant Carolina Alejo. The son was born on September 18, 1981
and was named Adrian Bernabe. Fiscal Bernabe died on August 13, 1993, while his wife
Rosalina died on December 3 of the same year, leaving Ernestina as the sole surviving heir.
"On May 16, 1994, Carolina, in behalf of Adrian, filed the aforesaid complaint praying that
Adrian be declared an acknowledged illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe and as such he (Adrian)
be given his share in Fiscal Bernabe’s estate, which is now being held by Ernestina as the sole
surviving heir.
"On July 16, 1995, the Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint, ruling that under the
provisions of the Family Code as well as the case of Uyguangco vs. Court of Appeals, the
complaint is now barred x x x."6
Orders of the Trial Court
In an Order dated July 26, 1995, the trial court granted Ernestina Bernabe’s Motion for
Reconsideration of the trial court’s Decision and ordered the dismissal of the Complaint for
recognition. Citing Article 175 of the Family Code, the RTC held that the death of the putative
father had barred the action.
In its Order dated October 6, 1995, the trial court added that since the putative father had not
acknowledged or recognized Adrian Bernabe in writing, the action for recognition should have
deny the child’s filiation.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals ruled that in the interest of justice, Adrian should be
allowed to prove that he was the illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe. Because the boy was born in
1981, his rights are governed by Article 285 of the Civil Code, which allows an action for
recognition to be filed within four years after the child has attained the age of majority. The
subsequent enactment of the Family Code did not take away that right.
Hence, this appeal.7
Issues
In her Memorandum,8 petitioner raises the following issues for our consideration:
I
"Whether or not respondent has a cause of action to file a case against petitioner, the legitimate
daughter of the putative father, for recognition and partition with accounting after the putative
father’s death in the absence of any written acknowledgment of paternity by the latter.
II
"Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that respondents had four years
from the attainment of minority to file an action for recognition as provided in Art. 285 of the
Civil Code, in complete disregard of its repeal by the [express] provisions of the Family Code
and the applicable jurisprudence as held by the Honorable Court of Appeals.
III
"Whether or not the petition for certiorari filed by the petition[er] is fatally defective for failure
to implead the Court of Appeals as one of the respondents."9
The Court’s Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
First and Second Issues: Period to File Action for Recognition
Because the first and the second issues are interrelated, we shall discuss them jointly.
Petitioner contends that respondent is barred from filing an action for recognition, because
Article 285 of the Civil Code has been supplanted by the provisions of the Family Code. She
argues that the latter Code should be given retroactive effect, since no vested right would be
impaired. We do not agree.
Article 285 of the Civil Code provides the period for filing an action for recognition as follows:
"ART. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only during the
lifetime of the presumed parents, except in the following cases:
(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter may file
the action before the expiration of four years from the attainment of his majority;
(2) If after the death of the father or of the mother a document should appear of which nothing
had been heard and in which either or both parents recognize the child.
"In this case, the action must be commenced within four years from the finding of the
document."
The two exceptions provided under the foregoing provision, have however been omitted by
Articles 172, 173 and 175 of the Family Code, which we quote:
"ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument
and signed by the parent concerned.
"In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws."
"ART. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime
and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a state of insanity.
In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five years within which to institute the action.
"The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the death of either or
both of the parties."
"ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on
the same, evidence as legitimate children.
"The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the
action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought
during the lifetime of the alleged parent."
Under the new law, an action for the recognition of an illegitimate child must be brought within
the lifetime of the alleged parent. The Family Code makes no distinction on whether the former
was still a minor when the latter died. Thus, the putative parent is given by the new Code a
chance to dispute the claim, considering that "illegitimate children are usually begotten and
raised in secrecy and without the legitimate family being aware of their existence. x x x The
putative parent should thus be given the opportunity to affirm or deny the child’s filiation, and
this, he or she cannot do if he or she is already dead."10
Nonetheless, the Family Code provides the caveat that rights that have already vested prior to its
enactment should not be prejudiced or impaired as follows:
"ART. 255. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair
vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws."
The crucial issue to be resolved therefore is whether Adrian’s right to an action for recognition,
which was granted by Article 285 of the Civil Code, had already vested prior to the enactment of
the Family Code. Our answer is affirmative.
A vested right is defined as "one which is absolute, complete and unconditional, to the exercise
of which no obstacle exists, and which is immediate and perfect in itself and not dependent upon
a contingency x x x."11 Respondent however contends that the filing of an action for recognition
is procedural in nature and that "as a general rule, no vested right may attach to [or] arise from
procedural laws."12
Bustos v. Lucero13 distinguished substantive from procedural law in these words:
"x x x. Substantive law creates substantive rights and the two terms in this respect may be said to
be synonymous. Substantive rights is a term which includes those rights which one enjoys under
the legal system prior to the disturbance of normal relations. Substantive law is that part of the
law which creates, defines and regulates rights, or which regulates the rights and duties which
give rise to a cause of action; that part of the law which courts are established to administer; as
opposed to adjective or remedial law, which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtains
redress for their invasion."14 (Citations omitted)
Recently, in Fabian v. Desierto,15 the Court laid down the test for determining whether a rule is
procedural or substantive:
"[I]n determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the practice and
procedure of the lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or modifies any substantive right, the test is
whether the rule really regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for enforcing rights and
duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for a
disregard or infraction of them. If the rule takes away a vested right, it is not procedural. If the
rule creates a right such as the right to appeal, it may be classified as a substantive matter; but if
it operates as a means of implementing an existing right then the rule deals merely with
procedure."16
Applying the foregoing jurisprudence, we hold that Article 285 of the Civil Code is a substantive
law, as it gives Adrian the right to file his petition for recognition within four years from
attaining majority age. Therefore, the Family Code cannot impair or take Adrian’s right to file an
action for recognition, because that right had already vested prior to its enactment.
Uyguangco v. Court of Appeals17 is not applicable to the case at bar, because the plaintiff
therein sought recognition as an illegitimate child when he was no longer a minor. On the other
hand, in Aruego Jr. v. Court of Appeals18 the Court ruled that an action for recognition filed
while the Civil Code was in effect should not be affected by the subsequent enactment of the
Family Code, because the right had already vested.
Not Limited to Natural Children
To be sure, Article 285 of the Civil Code refers to the action for recognition of "natural"
children. Thus, petitioner contends that the provision cannot be availed of by respondent,
because at the time of his conception, his parents were impeded from marrying each other. In
other words, he is not a natural child.
A "natural child" is one whose parents, at the time of conception, were not disqualified by any
legal impediment from marrying each other. Thus, in De Santos v. Angeles,19 the Court
explained:
"A child’s parents should not have been disqualified to marry each other at the time of
conception for him to qualify as a ‘natural child.’"20
A strict and literal interpretation of Article 285 has already been frowned upon by this Court in
the aforesaid case of Aruego, which allowed minors to file a case for recognition even if their
parents were disqualified from marrying each other. There, the Complaint averred that the late
Jose Aruego Sr., a married man, had an extramarital liason with Luz Fabian. Out of this
relationship were born two illegitimate children who in 1983 filed an action for recognition. The
two children were born in 1962 and 1963, while the alleged putative father died in 1982. In
short, at the time of their conception, the two children’s parents were legally disqualified from
marrying each other. The Court allowed the Complaint to prosper, even though it had been filed
almost a year after the death of the presumed father. At the time of his death, both children were
still minors.
Moreover, in the earlier case Divinagracia v. Rovira,21 the Court said that the rules on voluntary
and compulsory acknowledgment of natural children, as well as the prescriptive period for filing
such action, may likewise be applied to spurious children. Pertinent portions of the case are
quoted hereunder:
"The so-called spurious children, or illegitimate children other than natural children, commonly
known as bastards, include those adulterous children or those born out of wedlock to a married
woman cohabiting with a man other than her husband or to a married man cohabiting with a
woman other than his wife. They are entitled to support and successional rights. But their
filiation must be duly proven.
"How should their filiation be proven? Article 289 of the Civil Code allows the investigation of
the paternity or maternity or spurious children under the circumstances specified in articles 283
and 284 of the Civil Code. The implication is that the rules on compulsory recognition of natural
children are applicable to spurious children.
To emphasize, illegitimate children who were still minors at the time the Family Code took
effect and whose putative parent died during their minority are thus given the right to seek
recognition (under Article 285 of the Civil Code) for a period of up to four years from attaining
majority age. This vested right was not impaired or taken away by the passage of the Family
Code.
Indeed, our overriding consideration is to protect the vested rights of minors who could not have
filed suit, on their own, during the lifetime of their putative parents. As respondent aptly points
out in his Memorandum,24 the State as parens patriae should protect a minor’s right. Born in
1981, Adrian was only seven years old when the Family Code took effect and only twelve when
his alleged father died in 1993. The minor must be given his day in court.
Third Issue: Failure to Implead the CA
Under Section 4(a) of Rule 45 of the current Rules of Court, it is no longer required to implead
"the lower courts or judges x x x either as petitioners or respondents." Under Section 3, however,
the lower tribunal should still be furnished a copy of the petition. Hence, the failure of petitioner
to implead the Court of Appeals as a party is not a reversible error; it is in fact the correct
procedure.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision and Resolution
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

"Spurious children should not be in a better position than natural children. The rules on proof of
filiation of natural children or the rules on voluntary and compulsory acknowledgment for
natural children may be applied to spurious children.

"That does not mean that spurious children should be acknowledged, as that term is used with
respect to natural children. What is simply meant is that the grounds or instances for the
acknowledgment of natural children are utilized to establish the filiation of spurious children.

"A spurious child may prove his filiation by means of a record of birth, a will, a statement before
a court of record, or in any authentic writing. These are the modes of voluntary recognition of
natural children.

"In case there is no evidence on the voluntary recognition of the spurious child, then his filiation
may be established by means of the circumstances or grounds for compulsory recognition
prescribed in the aforementioned articles 283 and 284.

"The prescriptive period for filing the action for compulsory recognition in the case of natural
children, as provided for in article 285 of the Civil Code, applies to spurious children."22
(Citations omitted, italics supplied)

Thus, under the Civil Code, natural children have superior successional rights over spurious
ones.23 However, Rovira treats them as equals with respect to other rights, including the right to
recognition granted by Article 285.
G.R. No. 178902               April 21, 2010
MANUEL O. FUENTES and LETICIA L. FUENTES, Petitioners,
vs.
CONRADO G. ROCA, ANNABELLE R. JOSON, ROSE MARIE R. CRISTOBAL and
PILAR MALCAMPO, Respondents.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This case is about a husband’s sale of conjugal real property, employing a challenged affidavit of
consent from an estranged wife. The buyers claim valid consent, loss of right to declare nullity
of sale, and prescription.
The Facts and the Case
Sabina Tarroza owned a titled 358-square meter lot in Canelar, Zamboanga City. On October 11,
1982 she sold it to her son, Tarciano T. Roca (Tarciano) under a deed of absolute sale. 1 But
Tarciano did not for the meantime have the registered title transferred to his name.
Six years later in 1988, Tarciano offered to sell the lot to petitioners Manuel and Leticia Fuentes
(the Fuentes spouses). They arranged to meet at the office of Atty. Romulo D. Plagata whom
they asked to prepare the documents of sale. They later signed an agreement to sell that Atty.
Plagata prepared2 dated April 29, 1988, which agreement expressly stated that it was to take
effect in six months.
The agreement required the Fuentes spouses to pay Tarciano a down payment of ₱60,000.00 for
the transfer of the lot’s title to him. And, within six months, Tarciano was to clear the lot of
structures and occupants and secure the consent of his estranged wife, Rosario Gabriel Roca
(Rosario), to the sale. Upon Tarciano’s compliance with these conditions, the Fuentes spouses
were to take possession of the lot and pay him an additional ₱140,000.00 or ₱160,000.00,
depending on whether or not he succeeded in demolishing the house standing on it. If Tarciano
was unable to comply with these conditions, the Fuentes spouses would become owners of the
lot without any further formality and payment.
The parties left their signed agreement with Atty. Plagata who then worked on the other
requirements of the sale. According to the lawyer, he went to see Rosario in one of his trips to
Manila and had her sign an affidavit of consent. 3 As soon as Tarciano met the other conditions,
Atty. Plagata notarized Rosario’s affidavit in Zamboanga City. On January 11, 1989 Tarciano
executed a deed of absolute sale4 in favor of the Fuentes spouses. They then paid him the
additional ₱140,000.00 mentioned in their agreement. A new title was issued in the name of the
spouses5 who immediately constructed a building on the lot. On January 28, 1990 Tarciano
passed away, followed by his wife Rosario who died nine months afterwards.
Eight years later in 1997, the children of Tarciano and Rosario, namely, respondents Conrado G.
Roca, Annabelle R. Joson, and Rose Marie R. Cristobal, together with Tarciano’s sister, Pilar R.
Malcampo, represented by her son, John Paul M. Trinidad (collectively, the Rocas), filed an
action for annulment of sale and reconveyance of the land against the Fuentes spouses before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Zamboanga City in Civil Case 4707. The Rocas claimed that the
sale to the spouses was void since Tarciano’s wife, Rosario, did not give her consent to it. Her
signature on the affidavit of consent had been forged. They thus prayed that the property be
reconveyed to them upon reimbursement of the price that the Fuentes spouses paid Tarciano. 6
The spouses denied the Rocas’ allegations. They presented Atty. Plagata who testified that he
personally saw Rosario sign the affidavit at her residence in Paco, Manila, on September 15,
1988. He admitted, however, that he notarized the document in Zamboanga City four months
later on January 11, 1989. 7 All the same, the Fuentes spouses pointed out that the claim of
forgery was personal to Rosario and she alone could invoke it. Besides, the four-year
prescriptive period for nullifying the sale on ground of fraud had already lapsed.
Both the Rocas and the Fuentes spouses presented handwriting experts at the trial. Comparing
Rosario’s standard signature on the affidavit with those on various documents she signed, the
Rocas’ expert testified that the signatures were not written by the same person. Making the same
comparison, the spouses’ expert concluded that they were. 8
On February 1, 2005 the RTC rendered judgment, dismissing the case. It ruled that the action
had already prescribed since the ground cited by the Rocas for annulling the sale, forgery or
fraud, already prescribed under Article 1391 of the Civil Code four years after its discovery. In
this case, the Rocas may be deemed to have notice of the fraud from the date the deed of sale
was registered with the Registry of Deeds and the new title was issued. Here, the Rocas filed
their action in 1997, almost nine years after the title was issued to the Fuentes spouses on
January 18, 1989.9
Moreover, the Rocas failed to present clear and convincing evidence of the fraud. Mere variance
in the signatures of Rosario was not conclusive proof of forgery. 10 The RTC ruled that, although
the Rocas presented a handwriting expert, the trial court could not be bound by his opinion since
the opposing expert witness contradicted the same. Atty. Plagata’s testimony remained
technically unrebutted.11
Finally, the RTC noted that Atty. Plagata’s defective notarization of the affidavit of consent did
not invalidate the sale. The law does not require spousal consent to be on the deed of sale to be
valid. Neither does the irregularity vitiate Rosario’s consent. She personally signed the affidavit
in the presence of Atty. Plagata.12
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the RTC decision. The CA found sufficient
evidence of forgery and did not give credence to Atty. Plagata’s testimony that he saw Rosario
sign the document in Quezon City. Its jurat said differently. Also, upon comparing the
questioned signature with the specimen signatures, the CA noted significant variance between
them. That Tarciano and Rosario had been living separately for 30 years since 1958 also
reinforced the conclusion that her signature had been forged.
Since Tarciano and Rosario were married in 1950, the CA concluded that their property relations
were governed by the Civil Code under which an action for annulment of sale on the ground of
lack of spousal consent may be brought by the wife during the marriage within 10 years from the
transaction. Consequently, the action that the Rocas, her heirs, brought in 1997 fell within 10
years of the January 11, 1989 sale.
Considering, however, that the sale between the Fuentes spouses and Tarciano was merely
voidable, the CA held that its annulment entitled the spouses to reimbursement of what they paid
him plus legal interest computed from the filing of the complaint until actual payment. Since the
Fuentes spouses were also builders in good faith, they were entitled under Article 448 of the
Civil Code to payment of the value of the improvements they introduced on the lot. The CA did
not award damages in favor of the Rocas and deleted the award of attorney’s fees to the Fuentes
spouses.13
Unsatisfied with the CA decision, the Fuentes spouses came to this court by petition for review. 14
The Issues Presented
The case presents the following issues:
1. Whether or not Rosario’s signature on the document of consent to her husband Tarciano’s sale
of their conjugal land to the Fuentes spouses was forged;
2. Whether or not the Rocas’ action for the declaration of nullity of that sale to the spouses
already prescribed; and
3. Whether or not only Rosario, the wife whose consent was not had, could bring the action to
annul that sale.
The Court’s Rulings
First. The key issue in this case is whether or not Rosario’s signature on the document of consent
had been forged. For, if the signature were genuine, the fact that she gave her consent to her
husband’s sale of the conjugal land would render the other issues merely academic.
The CA found that Rosario’s signature had been forged. The CA observed a marked difference
between her signature on the affidavit of consent 15 and her specimen signatures. 16 The CA gave
no weight to Atty. Plagata’s testimony that he saw Rosario sign the document in Manila on
September 15, 1988 since this clashed with his declaration in the jurat that Rosario signed the
affidavit in Zamboanga City on January 11, 1989.
The Court agrees with the CA’s observation that Rosario’s signature strokes on the affidavit
appears heavy, deliberate, and forced. Her specimen signatures, on the other hand, are
consistently of a lighter stroke and more fluid. The way the letters "R" and "s" were written is
also remarkably different. The variance is obvious even to the untrained eye.
Significantly, Rosario’s specimen signatures were made at about the time that she signed the
supposed affidavit of consent. They were, therefore, reliable standards for comparison. The
Fuentes spouses presented no evidence that Rosario suffered from any illness or disease that
accounted for the variance in her signature when she signed the affidavit of consent. Notably,
Rosario had been living separately from Tarciano for 30 years since 1958. And she resided so far
away in Manila. It would have been quite tempting for Tarciano to just forge her signature and
avoid the risk that she would not give her consent to the sale or demand a stiff price for it.
What is more, Atty. Plagata admittedly falsified the jurat of the affidavit of consent. That jurat
declared that Rosario swore to the document and signed it in Zamboanga City on January 11,
1989 when, as Atty. Plagata testified, she supposedly signed it about four months earlier at her
residence in Paco, Manila on September 15, 1988. While a defective notarization will merely
strip the document of its public character and reduce it to a private instrument, that falsified
jurat, taken together with the marks of forgery in the signature, dooms such document as proof
of Rosario’s consent to the sale of the land. That the Fuentes spouses honestly relied on the
notarized affidavit as proof of Rosario’s consent does not matter. The sale is still void without an
authentic consent.
Second. Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, the law that applies to this case is the
Family Code, not the Civil Code. Although Tarciano and Rosario got married in 1950, Tarciano
sold the conjugal property to the Fuentes spouses on January 11, 1989, a few months after the
Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988.
When Tarciano married Rosario, the Civil Code put in place the system of conjugal partnership
of gains on their property relations. While its Article 165 made Tarciano the sole administrator
of the conjugal partnership, Article 16617 prohibited him from selling commonly owned real
property without his wife’s consent. Still, if he sold the same without his wife’s consent, the sale
is not void but merely voidable. Article 173 gave Rosario the right to have the sale annulled
during the marriage within ten years from the date of the sale. Failing in that, she or her heirs
may demand, after dissolution of the marriage, only the value of the property that Tarciano
fraudulently sold. Thus:
Art. 173. The wife may, during the marriage, and within ten years from the transaction
questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of any contract of the husband entered into without
her consent, when such consent is required, or any act or contract of the husband which tends to
defraud her or impair her interest in the conjugal partnership property. Should the wife fail to
exercise this right, she or her heirs, after the dissolution of the marriage, may demand the value
of property fraudulently alienated by the husband.
But, as already stated, the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. Its Chapter 4 on Conjugal
Partnership of Gains expressly superseded Title VI, Book I of the Civil Code on Property
Relations Between Husband and Wife. 18 Further, the Family Code provisions were also made to
apply to already existing conjugal partnerships without prejudice to vested rights. 19 Thus:
Art. 105. x x x The provisions of this Chapter shall also apply to conjugal partnerships of gains
already established between spouses before the effectivity of this Code, without prejudice to
vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws, as provided in
Article 256. (n)
Consequently, when Tarciano sold the conjugal lot to the Fuentes spouses on January 11, 1989,
the law that governed the disposal of that lot was already the Family Code.
In contrast to Article 173 of the Civil Code, Article 124 of the Family Code does not provide a
period within which the wife who gave no consent may assail her husband’s sale of the real
property. It simply provides that without the other spouse’s written consent or a court order
allowing the sale, the same would be void. Article 124 thus provides:
Art. 124. x x x In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in
the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which
must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of
such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. x x x
Under the provisions of the Civil Code governing contracts, a void or inexistent contract has no
force and effect from the very beginning. And this rule applies to contracts that are declared void
by positive provision of law,20 as in the case of a sale of conjugal property without the other
spouse’s written consent. A void contract is equivalent to nothing and is absolutely wanting in
civil effects. It cannot be validated either by ratification or prescription. 21
But, although a void contract has no legal effects even if no action is taken to set it aside, when
any of its terms have been performed, an action to declare its inexistence is necessary to allow
restitution of what has been given under it. 22 This action, according to Article 1410 of the Civil
Code does not prescribe. Thus:
Art. 1410. The action or defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not
prescribe.
Here, the Rocas filed an action against the Fuentes spouses in 1997 for annulment of sale and
reconveyance of the real property that Tarciano sold without their mother’s (his wife’s) written
consent. The passage of time did not erode the right to bring such an action.
Besides, even assuming that it is the Civil Code that applies to the transaction as the CA held,
Article 173 provides that the wife may bring an action for annulment of sale on the ground of
lack of spousal consent during the marriage within 10 years from the transaction. Consequently,
the action that the Rocas, her heirs, brought in 1997 fell within 10 years of the January 11, 1989
sale. It did not yet prescribe.
The Fuentes spouses of course argue that the RTC nullified the sale to them based on fraud and
that, therefore, the applicable prescriptive period should be that which applies to fraudulent
transactions, namely, four years from its discovery. Since notice of the sale may be deemed
given to the Rocas when it was registered with the Registry of Deeds in 1989, their right of
action already prescribed in 1993.
But, if there had been a victim of fraud in this case, it would be the Fuentes spouses in that they
appeared to have agreed to buy the property upon an honest belief that Rosario’s written consent
to the sale was genuine. They had four years then from the time they learned that her signature
had been forged within which to file an action to annul the sale and get back their money plus
damages. They never exercised the right.
If, on the other hand, Rosario had agreed to sign the document of consent upon a false
representation that the property would go to their children, not to strangers, and it turned out that
this was not the case, then she would have four years from the time she discovered the fraud
within which to file an action to declare the sale void. But that is not the case here. Rosario was
not a victim of fraud or misrepresentation. Her consent was simply not obtained at all. She lost
nothing since the sale without her written consent was void. Ultimately, the Rocas ground for
annulment is not forgery but the lack of written consent of their mother to the sale. The forgery
is merely evidence of lack of consent.
Third. The Fuentes spouses point out that it was to Rosario, whose consent was not obtained,
that the law gave the right to bring an action to declare void her husband’s sale of conjugal land.
But here, Rosario died in 1990, the year after the sale. Does this mean that the right to have the
sale declared void is forever lost?
The answer is no. As stated above, that sale was void from the beginning. Consequently, the land
remained the property of Tarciano and Rosario despite that sale. When the two died, they passed
on the ownership of the property to their heirs, namely, the Rocas. 23 As lawful owners, the Rocas
had the right, under Article 429 of the Civil Code, to exclude any person from its enjoyment and
disposal.1avvphi1
In fairness to the Fuentes spouses, however, they should be entitled, among other things, to
recover from Tarciano’s heirs, the Rocas, the ₱200,000.00 that they paid him, with legal interest
until fully paid, chargeable against his estate.
Further, the Fuentes spouses appear to have acted in good faith in entering the land and building
improvements on it. Atty. Plagata, whom the parties mutually entrusted with closing and
documenting the transaction, represented that he got Rosario’s signature on the affidavit of
consent. The Fuentes spouses had no reason to believe that the lawyer had violated his
commission and his oath. They had no way of knowing that Rosario did not come to Zamboanga
to give her consent. There is no evidence that they had a premonition that the requirement of
consent presented some difficulty. Indeed, they willingly made a 30 percent down payment on
the selling price months earlier on the assurance that it was forthcoming.
Further, the notarized document appears to have comforted the Fuentes spouses that everything
was already in order when Tarciano executed a deed of absolute sale in their favor on January
11, 1989. In fact, they paid the balance due him. And, acting on the documents submitted to it,
the Register of Deeds of Zamboanga City issued a new title in the names of the Fuentes spouses.
It was only after all these had passed that the spouses entered the property and built on it. He is
deemed a possessor in good faith, said Article 526 of the Civil Code, who is not aware that there
exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it.
As possessor in good faith, the Fuentes spouses were under no obligation to pay for their stay on
the property prior to its legal interruption by a final judgment against them. 24 What is more, they
are entitled under Article 448 to indemnity for the improvements they introduced into the
property with a right of retention until the reimbursement is made. Thus:
Art. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith,
shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the
indemnity provided for in Articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay
the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter
cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of the building or
trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to
appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of
the lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof. (361a)
The Rocas shall of course have the option, pursuant to Article 546 of the Civil Code, 25 of
indemnifying the Fuentes spouses for the costs of the improvements or paying the increase in
value which the property may have acquired by reason of such improvements.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS WITH MODIFICATION the
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV 00531 dated February 27, 2007 as follows:
1. The deed of sale dated January 11, 1989 that Tarciano T. Roca executed in favor of Manuel O.
Fuentes, married to Leticia L. Fuentes, as well as the Transfer Certificate of Title T-90,981 that
the Register of Deeds of Zamboanga City issued in the names of the latter spouses pursuant to
that deed of sale are DECLARED void;
2. The Register of Deeds of Zamboanga City is DIRECTED to reinstate Transfer Certificate of
Title 3533 in the name of Tarciano T. Roca, married to Rosario Gabriel;
3. Respondents Gonzalo G. Roca, Annabelle R. Joson, Rose Marie R. Cristobal, and Pilar
Malcampo are ORDERED to pay petitioner spouses Manuel and Leticia Fuentes the
₱200,000.00 that the latter paid Tarciano T. Roca, with legal interest from January 11, 1989 until
fully paid, chargeable against his estate;

4. Respondents Gonzalo G. Roca, Annabelle R. Joson, Rose Marie R. Cristobal, and Pilar
Malcampo are further ORDERED, at their option, to indemnify petitioner spouses Manuel and
Leticia Fuentes with their expenses for introducing useful improvements on the subject land or
pay the increase in value which it may have acquired by reason of those improvements, with the
spouses entitled to the right of retention of the land until the indemnity is made; and

5. The RTC of Zamboanga City from which this case originated is DIRECTED to receive
evidence and determine the amount of indemnity to which petitioner spouses Manuel and Leticia
Fuentes are entitled.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-57062 January 24, 1992
MARIA DEL ROSARIO MARIATEGUI, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JACINTO MARIATEGUI, JULIAN MARIATEGUI and
PAULINA MARIATEGUI, respondents.
Montesa, Albon & Associates for petitioners.
Parmenio B. Patacsil, Patacsil Twins Law Office for the heirs of the late Maria del Rosario
Mariategui.
Tinga, Fuentes & Tagle Firm for private respondents.
BIDIN, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision * of the Court of Appeals dated
December 24, 1980 in CA-G.R. No. 61841, entitled "Jacinto Mariategui, et al. v. Maria del
Rosario Mariategui, et al.," reversing the judgment of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Branch VIII ** at Pasig, Metro Manila.
The undisputed facts are as follows:
Lupo Mariategui died without a will on June 26, 1953 (Brief for respondents, Rollo, pp. 116; 8).
During his lifetime, Lupo Mariategui contracted three (3) marriages. With his first wife, Eusebia
Montellano, who died on November 8, 1904, he begot four (4) children, namely: Baldomera,
Maria del Rosario, Urbana and Ireneo. Baldomera died and was survived by her children named
Antero, Rufina, Catalino, Maria, Gerardo, Virginia and Federico, all surnamed Espina. Ireneo
also died and left a son named Ruperto. With his second wife, Flaviana Montellano, he begot a
daughter named Cresenciana who was born on May 8, 1910 (Rollo, Annex "A", p. 36).
Lupo Mariategui and Felipa Velasco (Lupo's third wife) got married sometime in 1930. They
had three children, namely: Jacinto, born on July 3, 1929, Julian, born on February 16, 1931 and
Paulina, born on April 19, 1938. Felipa Velasco Mariategui died in 1941 (Rollo, Ibid).
At the time of his death, Lupo Mariategui left certain properties which he acquired when he was
still unmarried (Brief for respondents, Rollo, pp. 116; 4). These properties are described in the
complaint as Lots Nos. 163, 66, 1346 and 156 of the Muntinglupa Estate (Rollo, Annex "A", p.
39).
On December 2, 1967, Lupo's descendants by his first and second marriages, namely, Maria del
Rosario, Urbana, Ruperto, Cresencia, all surnamed Mariategui and Antero, Rufina, Catalino,
Maria, Gerardo, Virginia and Federico, all surnamed Espina, executed a deed of extrajudicial
partition whereby they adjudicated unto themselves Lot No. 163 of the Muntinglupa Estate.
Thereafter, Lot No. 163 was the subject of a voluntary registration proceedings filed by the
adjudicatees under Act No. 496, and the land registration court issued a decree ordering the
registration of the lot. Thus, on April 1, 1971, OCT No. 8828 was issued in the name of the
above-mentioned heirs. Subsequently, the registered owners caused the subdivision of the said
lot into Lots Nos. 163-A to 163-H, for which separate transfer certificates of title were issued to
the respective parties (Rollo, ibid).
On April 23, 1973, Lupo's children by his third marriage with Felipa Velasco (Jacinto, Julian
and Paulina) filed with the lower court an amended complaint claiming that Lot No. 163 together
with Lots Nos. 669, 1346 and 154 were owned by their common father, Lupo Mariategui, and
that, with the adjudication of Lot No. 163 to their co-heirs, they (children of the third marriage)
were deprived of their respective shares in the lots. Plaintiffs pray for partition of the estate of
their deceased father and annulment of the deed of extrajudicial partition dated December 2,
1967 (Petition, Rollo, p. 10). Cresencia Mariategui Abas, Flaviana Mariategui Cabrera and
Isabel Santos were impleaded in the complaint as unwilling defendants as they would not like to
join the suit as plaintiffs although they acknowledged the status and rights of the plaintiffs and
agreed to the partition of the parcels of land as well as the accounting of their fruits ( Ibid., Rollo,
p. 8; Record on Appeal, p. 4).
The defendants (now petitioners) filed an answer with counterclaim (Amended Record on
Appeal, p. 13). Thereafter, they filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of lack of cause of
action and prescription. They specifically contended that the complaint was one for recognition
of natural children. On August 14, 1974, the motion to dismiss was denied by the trial court, in
an order the dispositive portion of which reads:
It is therefore the opinion of the Court that Articles 278 and 285 of the Civil Code cited by
counsel for the defendants are of erroneous application to this case. The motion to dismiss is
therefore denied for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED. (Ibid, p. 37).
However, on February 16, 1977, the complaint as well as petitioners' counterclaim were
dismissed by the trial court, in its decision stating thus:
The plaintiffs' right to inherit depends upon the acknowledgment or recognition of their
continuous enjoyment and possession of status of children of their supposed father. The evidence
fails to sustain either premise, and it is clear that this action cannot be sustained. ( Ibid, Rollo, pp.
67-68)
The plaintiffs elevated the case to the Court of Appeals on the ground that the trial court
committed an error ". . . in not finding that the parents of the appellants, Lupo Mariategui and
Felipa Velasco (were) lawfully married, and in holding (that) they (appellants) are not legitimate
children of their said parents, thereby divesting them of their inheritance . . . " (Rollo, pp. 14-15).
On December 24, 1980, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision declaring all the children and
descendants of Lupo Mariategui, including appellants Jacinto, Julian and Paulina (children of the
third marriage) as entitled to equal shares in the estate of Lupo Mariategui; directing the
adjudicatees in the extrajudicial partition of real properties who eventually acquired transfer
certificates of title thereto, to execute deeds of reconveyance in favor, and for the shares, of
Jacinto, Julian and Paulina provided rights of innocent third persons are not prejudiced otherwise
the said adjudicatees shall reimburse the said heirs the fair market value of their shares; and
directing all the parties to submit to the lower court a project of partition in the net estate of
Lupo Mariategui after payment of taxes, other government charges and outstanding legal
obligations.
The defendants-appellees filed a motion for reconsideration of said decision but it was denied for
lack of merit. Hence, this petition which was given due course by the court on December 7,
1981.
The petitioners submit to the Court the following issues: (a) whether or not prescription barred
private respondents' right to demand the partition of the estate of Lupo Mariategui, and (b)
whether or not the private respondents, who belatedly filed the action for recognition, were able
to prove their successional rights over said estate. The resolution of these issues hinges,
however, on the resolution of the preliminary matter, i.e., the nature of the complaint filed by the
private respondents.
The complaint alleged, among other things, that "plaintiffs are the children of the deceased
spouses Lupo Mariategui . . . and Felipa Velasco"; that "during his lifetime, Lupo Mariategui
had repeatedly acknowledged and confirmed plaintiffs as his children and the latter, in turn, have
continuously enjoyed such status since their birth"; and "on the basis of their relationship to the
deceased Lupo Mariategui and in accordance with the law on intestate succession, plaintiffs are
entitled to inherit shares in the foregoing estate (Record on Appeal, pp. 5 & 6). It prayed, among
others, that plaintiffs be declared as children and heirs of Lupo Mariategui and adjudication in
favor of plaintiffs their lawful shares in the estate of the decedent (Ibid, p. 10).
A perusal of the entire allegations of the complaint, however, shows that the action is principally
one of partition. The allegation with respect to the status of the private respondents was raised
only collaterally to assert their rights in the estate of the deceased. Hence, the Court of Appeals
correctly adopted the settled rule that the nature of an action filed in court is determined by the
facts alleged in the complaint constituting the cause of action (Republic vs. Estenzo, 158 SCRA
282 [1988]).
It has been held that, if the relief demanded is not the proper one which may be granted under
the law, it does not characterize or determine the nature of plaintiffs' action, and the relief to
which plaintiff is entitled based on the facts alleged by him in his complaint, although it is not
the relief demanded, is what determines the nature of the action (1 Moran, p. 127, 1979 ed.,
citing Baguioro vs. Barrios, et al., 77 Phil. 120).
With respect to the legal basis of private respondents' demand for partition of the estate of Lupo
Mariategui, the Court of Appeals aptly held that the private respondents are legitimate children
of the deceased.
Lupo Mariategui and Felipa Velasco were alleged to have been lawfully married in or about
1930. This fact is based on the declaration communicated by Lupo Mariategui to Jacinto who
testified that "when (his) father was still living, he was able to mention to (him) that he and (his)
mother were able to get married before a Justice of the Peace of Taguig, Rizal." The spouses
deported themselves as husband and wife, and were known in the community to be such.
Although no marriage certificate was introduced to this effect, no evidence was likewise offered
to controvert these facts. Moreover, the mere fact that no record of the marriage exists does not
invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its validity are present (People vs. Borromeo,
133 SCRA 106 [1984]).
Under these circumstances, a marriage may be presumed to have taken place between Lupo and
Felipa. The laws presume that a man and a woman, deporting themselves as husband and wife,
have entered into a lawful contract of marriage; that a child born in lawful wedlock, there being
no divorce, absolute or from bed and board is legitimate; and that things have happened
according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life (Section 5 (z), (bb),
(cc), Rule 131, Rules of Court; Corpus v. Corpus, 85 SCRA 567 [1978]; Saurnaba v. Workmen's
Compensation, 85 SCRA 502 [1978]; Alavado v. City Gov't. of Tacloban, 139 SCRA 230
[1985]; Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA 439 [1985]).
Courts look upon the presumption of marriage with great favor as it is founded on the following
rationale:
The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage. Marriage in this
jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance
of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward
legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the
absence of any counterpresumption or evidence special to that case, to be in fact married. The
reason is that such is the common order of society and if the parties were not what they thus hold
themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of
law . . . (Adong vs. Cheong Seng Gee, 43 Phil. 43, 56 [1922] quoted in Alavado vs. City
Government of Tacloban, 139 SCRA 230 [1985]).
So much so that once a man and a woman have lived as husband and wife and such relationship
is not denied nor contradicted, the presumption of their being married must be admitted as a fact
(Alavado v. City Gov't. of Tacloban, supra).
The Civil Code provides for the manner under which legitimate filiation may be proven.
However, considering the effectivity of the Family Code of the Philippines, the case at bar must
be decided under a new if not entirely dissimilar set of rules because the parties have been
overtaken by events, to use the popular phrase (Uyguangco vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
76873, October 26, 1989). Thus, under Title VI of the Family Code, there are only two classes of
children — legitimate and illegitimate. The fine distinctions among various types of illegitimate
children have been eliminated (Castro vs. Court of Appeals, 173 SCRA 656 [1989]).
Article 172 of the said Code provides that the filiation of legitimate children may be established
by the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment or by the open and
continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child.
Evidence on record proves the legitimate filiation of the private respondents. Jacinto's birth
certificate is a record of birth referred to in the said article. Again, no evidence which tends to
disprove facts contained therein was adduced before the lower court. In the case of the two other
private respondents, Julian and Paulina, they may not have presented in evidence any of the
documents required by Article 172 but they continuously enjoyed the status of children of Lupo
Mariategui in the same manner as their brother Jacinto.
While the trial court found Jacinto's testimonies to be inconsequential and lacking in substance
as to certain dates and names of relatives with whom their family resided, these are but minor
details. The nagging fact is that for a considerable length of time and despite the death of Felipa
in 1941, the private respondents and Lupo lived together until Lupo's death in 1953. It should be
noted that even the trial court mentioned in its decision the admission made in the affidavit of
Cresenciana Mariategui Abas, one of the petitioners herein, that " . . . Jacinto, Julian and Paulina
Mariategui ay pawang mga kapatid ko sa
ama . . ." (Exh. M, Record on Appeal, pp. 65-66).
In view of the foregoing, there can be no other conclusion than that private respondents are
legitimate children and heirs of Lupo Mariategui and therefore, the time limitation prescribed in
Article 285 for filing an action for recognition is inapplicable to this case. Corollarily,
prescription does not run against private respondents with respect to the filing of the action for
partition so long as the heirs for whose benefit prescription is invoked, have not expressly or
impliedly repudiated the co-ownership. In other words, prescription of an action for partition
does not lie except when the co-ownership is properly repudiated by the co-owner (Del Banco
vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 156 SCRA 55 [1987] citing Jardin vs. Hollasco, 117 SCRA
532 [1982]).
Otherwise stated, a co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners
absent a clear repudiation of co-ownership duly communicated to the other co-owners (Mariano
vs. De Vega, 148 SCRA 342 [1987]). Furthermore, an action to demand partition is
imprescriptible and cannot be barred by laches (Del Banco vs. IAC, 156 SCRA 55 [1987]). On
the other hand, an action for partition may be seen to be at once an action for declaration of co-
ownership and for segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the property involved
(Roque vs. IAC, 165 SCRA 118 [1988]).
Inasmuch as petitioners registered the properties in their names in fraud of their co-heirs
prescription can only be deemed to have commenced from the time private respondents
discovered the petitioners' act of defraudation (Adille vs. Court of Appeals, supra). Hence,
prescription definitely may not be invoked by petitioners because private respondents
commenced the instant action barely two months after learning that petitioners had registered in
their names the lots involved.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated
December 24, 1980 is Affirmed.
SO ORDERED.

Petitioners contend that they have repudiated the co-ownership when they executed the
extrajudicial partition excluding the private respondents and registered the properties in their
own names (Petition, p. 16; Rollo, p. 20). However, no valid repudiation was made by
petitioners to the prejudice of private respondents. Assuming petitioners' registration of the
subject lot in 1971 was an act of repudiation of the co-ownership, prescription had not yet set in
when private respondents filed in 1973 the present action for partition (Ceniza vs. C.A., 181
SCRA 552 [1990]).

In their complaint, private respondents averred that in spite of their demands, petitioners, except
the unwilling defendants in the lower court, failed and refused to acknowledge and convey their
lawful shares in the estate of their father (Record on Appeal, p. 6). This allegation, though
denied by the petitioners in their answer (Ibid, p. 14), was never successfully refuted by them.
Put differently, in spite of petitioners' undisputed knowledge of their relationship to private
respondents who are therefore their co-heirs, petitioners fraudulently withheld private
respondent's share in the estate of Lupo Mariategui. According to respondent Jacinto, since
1962, he had been inquiring from petitioner Maria del Rosario about their (respondents) share in
the property left by their deceased father and had been assured by the latter (Maria del Rosario)
not to worry because they will get some shares. As a matter of fact, sometime in 1969, Jacinto
constructed a house where he now resides on Lot No. 163 without any complaint from
petitioners.

Petitioners' registration of the properties in their names in 1971 did not operate as a valid
repudiation of the co-ownership. In Adille vs. Court of Appeals (157 SCRA 455, 461-462
[1988]), the Court held:

Prescription, as a mode of terminating a relation of co-ownership, must have been preceded by

repudiation (of the co-ownership). The act of repudiation, in turn, is subject to certain
conditions: (1) a co-owner repudiates the co-ownership; (2) such an act of repudiation is clearly
made known to the other co-owners; (3) the evidence thereon is clear and conclusive; and (4) he
has been in possession through open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the
property for the period required by law.

xxx xxx xxx

It is true that registration under the Torrens system is constructive notice of title, but it has
likewise been our holding that the Torrens title does not furnish shield for fraud. It is therefore
no argument to say that the act of registration is equivalent to notice of repudiation, assuming
there was one, notwithstanding the long-standing rule that registration operates as a universal
notice of title.