CONTINENTAL STEEL VS MONTANO DIGEST

In January 2006, the wife of Rolando Hortillano had a miscarriage which caused the death of their
unborn child. Hortillano, in accordance with the collective bargaining agreement, then filed death
benefits claim from his employer, the Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation which denied the
claim. Eventually, the issue was submitted for arbitration and both parties agreed to have Atty.
Allan Montaño act as the arbitrator. Montaño ruled that Hortillano is entitled to his claims. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of Montaño.

On appeal, Continental Steel insisted that Hortillano is not entitled because under the CBA, death
benefits are awarded if an employee’s legitimate dependent has died; but that in this case, no “death”
has occurred because the fetus died inside the womb of the mother, that a fetus has no juridical
personality because it was never born pursuant to Article 40 of the Civil Code which provides a
conceived child acquires personality only when it is born; that the fetus was not born hence it is not a
legitimate dependent as contemplated by the CBA nor did it suffer death as contemplated under civil
laws.

ISSUES: 

1. Whether or not the fetus is a legitimate dependent?

2. Whether or not a person has to be born before it could die?

HELD: 

1. Yes. In the first place, the fact of marriage between Hortillano and his wife was never put in question,
hence they are presumed to be married. Second, children conceived or born during the marriage of the
parents are legitimate. Hence, the unborn child (fetus) is already a legitimate dependent the moment it
was conceived (meeting of the sperm and egg cell).

2. No. Death is defined as “cessation of life”. Certainly, a child in the womb has life. There is no need to
discuss whether or not the unborn child acquired juridical personality – that is not the issue here. But
nevertheless, life should not be equated to civil personality. Moreover, while the Civil Code expressly
provides that civil personality may be extinguished by death, it does not explicitly state that only those
who have acquired juridical personality could die. In this case, Hortillano’s fetus had had life inside the
womb as evidenced by the fact that it clung to life for 38 weeks before the unfortunate miscarriage.
Thus, death occurred on a dependent hence Hortillano as an employee is entitled to death benefit
claims as provided for in their CBA.

Doctrines:
Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire civil personality first before he/she
could die. Even a child inside the womb already has life.
In case of doubt in the interpretation of any law or provision affecting labor, such should be interpreted
in favor of labor.

Facts:
Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation (Continental Steel)
filed a claim for Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave and Death and Accident Insurance for dependent,
pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA).

The claim was based on the death of Hortillano’s unborn child. Hortillano’s wife had a premature
delivery while she was in the 38th week of pregnancy. The female fetus died during labor due to fetal
Anoxia secondary to uteroplacental insufficiency.

Petitioner immediately granted Hortillano’s claim for paternity leave but denied his claims for
bereavement leave and other death benefits.

It was maintained by Hortillano, through the Labor Union, that the provisions of the CBA did not
specifically state that the dependent should have first been born alive or must have acquired juridical
personality so that his/her subsequent death could be covered by the CBA death benefits.

Petitioner argued that the express provision of the CBA did not contemplate the death of an unborn
child, a fetus, without legal personality. It claimed that there are two elements for the entitlement to
the benefits, namely: (1) death and (2) status as legitimate dependent, none of which existed in
Hortillano’s case. Continental Steel contended that only one with civil personality could die, relying on
Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code which provides:

Article 40. Birth determines personality; but the conceived child shall be considered born for all
purposes that are favorable to it, provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the following
article.

Article 41. For civil purposes, the fetus is considered born if it is alive at the time it is completely
delivered from the mother’s womb. However, if the fetus had an intra-uterine life of less than seven
months, it is not deemed born if it dies within twenty-four hours after its complete delivery from the
maternal womb.

Article 42. Civil personality is extinguished by death. The effect of death upon the rights and obligations
of the deceased is determined by law, by contract and by will.

Hence according to the petitioner, the unborn child never died because it never acquired juridical
personality. Proceeding from the same line of thought, Continental Steel reasoned that a fetus that was
dead from the moment of delivery was not a person at all. Hence, the term dependent could not be
applied to a fetus that never acquired juridical personality.

Labor arbiter Montaño argued that the fetus had the right to be supported by the parents from the very
moment he/she was conceived. The fetus had to rely on another for support; he/she could not have
existed or sustained himself/herself without the power or aid of someone else, specifically, his/her
mother.

Petitioner appealed with the CA, who affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s resolution. Hence this petition.
Issues:
1. Whether or not only one with juridical personality can die
2. Whether or not a fetus can be considered as a dependent
3. Whether or not any ambiguity in CBA provisions shall be settled in favor of the employee

Held:
1. No. The reliance of Continental Steel on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code for the legal definition
of death is misplaced. Article 40 provides that a conceived child acquires personality only when it is
born, and Article 41 defines when a child is considered born. Article 42 plainly states that civil
personality is extinguished by death. The issue of civil personality is not relevant in this case.

The above provisions of the Civil Code do not provide at all a definition of death. Moreover, while the
Civil Code expressly provides that civil personality may be extinguished by death, it does not explicitly
state that only those who have acquired juridical personality could die.

Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire civil personality first before he/she
could die. Even a child inside the womb already has life.

No less than the Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from conception, that the State must
protect equally with the life of the mother. If the unborn already has life, then the cessation thereof
even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies as death.

2. Yes. Even an unborn child is a dependent of its parents. Hortillano’s child could not have reached 38-
39 weeks of its gestational life without depending upon its mother, Hortillano’s wife, for sustenance.
The CBA did not provide a qualification for the child dependent, such that the child must have been born
or must have acquired civil personality. Without such qualification, then child shall be understood in its
more general sense, which includes the unborn fetus in the mother’s womb.

3. Time and again, the Labor Code is specific in enunciating that in case of doubt in the interpretation of
any law or provision affecting labor, such should be interpreted in favor of labor. In the same way, the
CBA and CBA provisions should be interpreted in favor of labor. As decided by this Court, any doubt
concerning the rights of labor should be resolved in its favor pursuant to the social justice policy.
(Terminal Facilities and Services Corporation v. NLRC [199 SCRA 265 (1991)])

Bereavement leave and other death benefits are granted to an employee to give aid to, and if possible,
lessen the grief of, the said employee and his family who suffered the loss of a loved one. It cannot be
said that the parents’ grief and sense of loss arising from the death of their unborn child, who, in this
case, had a gestational life of 38-39 weeks but died during delivery, is any less than that of parents
whose child was born alive but died subsequently.

EUGENIO vs. VELEZ

185 SCRA 45

FACTS:

Vitaliana Vargas a 25 y.o single was forcibly taken from her residence sometime in 1987 and was
confined by the petitioner, Tomas Eugenio in his palacial residence in Jasaan, Misamis Oriental. She
cohabited with the petitioner against her will and always had the intention of escaping. She died of
heart failure due to toxemia of pregnancy in Eugenio’s residence on Aug. 28, 1988.

Unaware of her death her brothers and sisters (Vargases) filed a petition for Habeas Corpus on
September 27, 1988 before the RTC of Misamis Oriental alleging. The court then issued a writ of habeas
corpus but petitioner refused to surrender the Vitaliana’s body to the sheriff on the ground that a corpse
cannot be subjected to habeas corpus proceedings. The court ordered that the body should be delivered
to a funeral parlor for autopsy but Eugenio assailed the lack of jurisdiction of the court.

ISSUE:

Who has the right to claim custody of the deceased?

HELD:

The court held that the custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was correctly awarded to the surviving
brothers and sisters pursuant to Section 1103 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides:

“Persons charged with duty of burial if the deceased was an unmarried man or woman or a child and left
any kin; the duty of the burial shall devolve upon the nearest kin of the deceased.”

Petitioner’s claim that he is the spouse cannot be valid as contemplated under Art. 294 of the Civil Code,
Philippine law does not recognize common law marriages where “a man and a woman not legally
married who cohabit for many years as husband and wife, who represent themselves to the public as
husband and wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife in the community where they live may
be considered legally married in common law jurisdictions”.

In addition, it requires that the man and woman living together must not in any way be incapacitated to
contract marriage.  Whereas, the petitioner has a subsisting marriage with another woman, legal
impediment that disqualified him from even legally marrying Vitaliana.

Eugenio vs Velez

185 SCRA 45

FACTS:

Vitaliana Vargas’ brothers and sisters unaware of the former’s death on August 28, 1988 filed a petition
for Habeas Corpus on September 27, 1988 before the RTC of Misamis Oriental alleging that she was
forcible taken from her residence sometime in 1987 and was confined by the herein petitioner, Tomas
Eugenio in his palacial residence in Jasaan, Misamis Oriental.  The court then issued a writ of habeas
corpus but petitioner refused to surrender the Vitaliana’s body to the sheriff on the ground that a corpse
cannot be subjected to habeas corpus proceedings.  Vitaliana, 25 year old single, died of heart failure
due to toxemia of pregnancy in Eugenio’s residence.  The court ordered that the body should be
delivered to a funeral parlor for autopsy but Eugenio assailed the lack of jurisdiction of the court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner can claim custody of the deceased.

HELD:

The court held that the custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was correctly awarded to the surviving
brothers and sisters pursuant to Section 1103 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides:

      

“Persons charged with duty of burial- if the deceased was an unmarried man or woman or a child and
left any kin; the duty of the burial shall devolve upon the nearest kin of the deceased.

Albeit, petitioner claims he is the spouse as contemplated under Art. 294 of the Civil Code, Philippine
law does not recognize common law marriages where “a man and a woman not legally married who
cohabit for many years as husband and wife, who represent themselves to the public as husband and
wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife in the community where they live may be considered
legally mauled in common law jurisdictions”.  In addition, it requires that the man and woman living
together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract marriage.  Whereas, the petitioner has a
subsisting marriage with another woman, legal impediment that disqualified him from even legally
marrying Vitaliana.

Angela M. Butte vs Manuel Uy and Sons, Inc

G.R. No. L-15499             February 28, 1962

ANGELA M. BUTTE, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
MANUEL UY and SONS, INC., defendant-appellee.

FACTS

1.    Jose V. Ramirez was a co-owner of a house and lot located at Sta Cruz, Manila. Upon the death of
Jose V. Ramirez, all his property including the 1/6 undivided share was bequeathed to his children and
grandchildren and 1/3 of the free portion to Mrs. Angela M. Butte.
2.    Mrs. Marie Garnier Vda de Ramirez sold the property to Manuel Uy and Sons, Inc. including the
undivided 1/6 share  property in Sta Cruz, Manila. On the same day, a copy of letter regarding the
above-mentioned sell was sent to Bank of the Philippine Islands, as administrator of the property of Jose
V. Ramirez.

3.    Mrs. Angela M. Butte filed a case against Manuel Uy and Sons, Inc for legal redemption when the
latter refused Mrs. Butte to redeem the said sold property.

ISSUE

Whether or not Mrs. Angela M. Butte has the right of succession to exercise legal redemption over the
share sold by Mrs. Marie Garnier Vda de Ramirez.

HELD

Yes, Mrs. Angela M. Butte has the right of succession to exercise legal redemption over the share sold by
Mrs. Marie Garnier Vda de Ramirez for being one of the co-owners of the heirs of the 1/6 undivided
property of Jose V. Ramirez.

According to Article 1620 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, a co-owner of a thing may exercise the
right of redemption in case the shares of all the other co-owners or of any of them, are sold to a third
person. If the price of the alienation is gross expensive, the redemptioner shall pay only a reasonable
one.

Should two or more co-owners desire to exercise the right to redemption, they may only do so in
proportion to the share that may respectively have in the thing owned in common.

G.R. No. L-15499 February 28, 1962ANGELA M. BUTTE,

plaintiff-appellant,vs.

MANUEL UY and SONS, INC.,

defendant-appellee.
Delgado, Flores and Macapagal for plaintiff-appellant.Pelaez and Jalandoni for defendant-appellee.

FACTS: Jose V. Ramirez, during his lifetime, was a co-owner of a house and lot located at Sta.
Cruz,Manila, as shown by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 52789, issued in the name of the following co-
owners:Marie Garnier Vda. de Ramirez, 1/6; Jose V. Ramirez, 1/6; Jose E. Ramirez, 1/6; Rita de Ramirez,
1/6; andJose Ma. Ramirez, 1/6. In his last will and testament, Jose bequeathed his estate which included
his 1/6undivided portion in the said property to his children and grandchildren and 1/3 of the free
portion to Mrs. Angela Butte.Eight years after Jose’s death, and while the estate proceeding was still
pending

on account of theclaims of creditors which exceed the assets of the deceased. The Bank of the Philippine
Islands was appointed judicial administrator 

, And during such pendency, One of the co-owners sold her 1/6 share in the property toManuel Uy and
Sons. After being informed of said sale, Mrs. Butte offered to redeem said 1/6 share sold toManuel Uy
and Sons and filed the corresponding legal action for legal redemption.

On January 15, 1959, Mrs. Angela M. Butte, thru Atty. Resplandor Sobretodo, sent a letter and
aPhilippine National Bank cashier's check in the amount of P500,000.00 to Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc.
offering toredeem the 1/6 share sold by Mrs. Marie Garnier Vda. de Ramirez. This tender having been
refused, plaintiff on the same day consigned the amount in court and filed the corresponding action for
legal redemption.Without prejudice to the determination by the court of the reasonable and fair market
value of the property sold

which she alleged to be grossly excessive, plaintiff prayed for conveyance of the property, and for actual,
moraland exemplary damages

ISSUE: Whether or not Mrs. Angela M. Butte can exercise the right of legal redemption despite
thepresence of the judicial administrator and pending the final distribution of shares in the testate
proceedings

HELD:By law, the rights to the succession of a deceased person are transmitted to his heirs from
themoment of his death, and the right of succession includes all property, rights and obligations that
survivethe decedent so from the instant of Jose Ramirez’ death, his heirs became co-owners of an
undivided shareand co-owner of the whole property thus they became entitled to exercise the right of
legal redemption assoon as another co-owner has sold his undivided share to a stranger.The presence of
the judicial administrator is of no moment because the rights of the administrator of possession and
administration of the real and personal estate of the deceased do not include the right of legal
redemption of the undivided share sold to Manuel Uy and Sons because the right to redeem only
cameinto existence when the sale was perfected 8 years from the death of Jose Ramirez. Theadministrat
or cannot exercise the right of redemption since the land was sold AFTER the death of Ramirez.The
administrator may exercise the right to redeem only if the right pertains to the estate, and this can
onlyhappen if the sale of said portion to Uy was done before the death of Ramirez.
ANGELA M. BUTTE vs. MANUEL UY

September 12, 2016

By Robinson Manaig

Art 42

ANGELA M. BUTTE, plaintiff-appellant, vs. MANUEL UY a SONS, INC., defendant-appellee

Facts:  Jose V. Ramirez, during his lifetime, was a co-owner of a house and lot located at Sta. Cruz,
Manila. Other owners are Marie GarnierVda. de Ramirez, 1/6; José V. Ramirez, 1/6; José E. Ramirez, 1/6;
Belen T. Ramirez, 1/6; Rita De Ramirez, 1/6; and José Ma. Ramirez, 1/6.

On October 20, 1951. José V. Ramirez died. Subsequently, Special Proceeding No. 15026 was instituted
to settle his estate, that included the one-sixth (1/6) undivided share in the aforementioned property.
His last will and testament has been admitted to probate, wherein he bequeathed his estate to his
children and grandchildren and one-third (1/3) of the free portion to Mrs. Angela M. Butte, hereinafter
referred to as plaintiff-appellant. The Bank of the Philippine Islands was appointed judicial administrator.

Meanwhile, on December 9, 1958, Mrs. Marie GarnierVda. de Ramirez, one of the co-owners of the late
José V. Ramirez in the Sta. Cruz property, sold her undivided 1/6 share to Manuel Uy& Sons, Inc.,
defendant-appellee herein, for the sum of P500,000.00. After the execution an affidavit to the effect
that formal notices of the sale had been sent to all possible redemptioners, the deed of sale was duly
registered and the old TCT was cancelled in lieu of which a new one was issued in the name of the
vendee and the other-co-owners.

On the same day (December 9, 1958), Manuel Uya l Son Inc. sent a letter to the Bank of the Philippine
Islands as judicial administrator of the estate of the late José V. Ramirez informing it of the above-
mentioned sale. This letter, together with that of the bank, was forwarded by the latter to Mrs. Butte.

On January 15, 1959, Mrs. Angela M. Butte, sent a letter and a Philippine National Bank cashier’s check
in the amount of P500,000.00 to Manuel Uy a l Sons, Inc. offering to redeem share sold by Mrs. Marie
GarnierVda. de Ramirez. This tender having been refused, plaintiff on the same day consigned the
amount in court and filed the corresponding action for legal redemption. Without prejudice to the
determination by the court of the reasonable and fair market value of the property sold which she
alleged to be grossly excessive, plaintiff prayed for conveyance of the property, and for actual, moral
and exemplary damages.

May 13, 1959, the court dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint.

Issue: WON the plaintiff in the case at bar has a right to redeem the property

Held: By law, the rights to the succession of a deceased person are transmitted to his heirs from the
moment of his death, and the right of succession includes all property, rights and obligations that
survive the decedent so from the instant of Jose Ramirez’ death, his heirs became co-owners of an
undivided share and co-owner of the whole property thus they became entitled to exercise the right of
legal redemption as soon as another co-owner has sold his undivided share to a stranger. The presence
of the judicial administrator is of no moment because the rights of the administrator of possession and
administration of the real and personal estate of the deceased do not include the right of legal
redemption of the undivided share sold to Manuel Uy and Sons because the right to redeem only
came into existence when the sale was perfected 8 years from the death of Jose Ramirez. Theadministra
tor cannot exercise the right of redemption since the land was sold AFTER the death of Ramirez. The
administrator may exercise the right to redeem only if the right pertains to the estate, and this can only
happen if the sale of said portion to Uy was done before the death of Ramirez.

324 SCRA 85 – Civil Law – Torts and Damaqges – Human Relations – Article 26 – “Human Personality
Exalted By Laws”

The spouses Nestor and Allem Nicolas were the lessees of Florence Concepcion. The spouses were
engaged in an office supply business where they cater to various government agencies. In 1985, the
spouses agreed to let Florence in on the business. Hence, Florence contributed capital.

But sometime in July 1985, Rodrigo Concepcion, the brother of the dead husband of Florence, called
Florence interrogating her about the rumored affair that she was having with Nestor. Florence denied
the said rumor. Unsatisfied, Rodrigo met with Nestor face-to-face. Nestor denied the allegations of
Rodrigo. Rodrigo then dared Nestor to meet the neighbors, friends, and relatives, who allegedly know of
the relationship. Nestor agreed. And so in front of these neighbors, friends, and relatives, Rodrigo
reiterated his allegations but then these neighbors, friends, and relatives denied having ever known any
illicit affair between Nestor and Florence.

Because of the incident, Nestor felt debased so much so that he was ashamed of going out in public. As
a result, his business started to decline. Florence also stopped contributing capital. Even his wife started
doubting his fidelity. Nestor then wrote a letter to Rodrigo asking him to publicly apologize for the
incident as well as to pay the spouses damages. Rodrigo refused hence he was sued by the spouses. The
trial court as well as the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the spouses and awarded in their favor a total
of P85k in moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney’s fees.

On appeal, Rodrigo insisted that there was no legal basis for the award of damages against him because
the acts complained of are not those found in Article 26 and Article 2219 of the Civil Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not the award of damages is proper.

HELD: Yes. The provisions of Articles 26 and 2219 are as follows:

Art. 26. – Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors
and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense,
shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief: (1) Prying into the privacy of
another’s residence; (2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another; (3)
Intriguing or humiliating another on account of his religious beliefs, lowly station in life, place of birth,
physical defect, or other personal condition.

Art. 2219. – Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases: (1) A criminal
offense resulting in physical injuries; (2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries; (3) Seduction, abduction,
rape or other lascivious acts; (4) Adultery or concubinage; (5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest; (6)
Illegal search; (7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation; (8) Malicious prosecution; (9) Acts
mentioned in Art. 309 (referring to disrespect for the dead or wrongfully interfering in a funeral);
(10) Acts or actions referred to in Arts. 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35 x x x x

Certainly, what Rodrigo did is a violation of Nestor’s person. The Supreme Court went on to explain the
rationale behind Article 26 and why the enumerations therein are not exclusive: The Code Commission
stressed in no uncertain terms that the human personality must be exalted. The sacredness of human
personality is a concomitant consideration of every plan for human amelioration. The touchstone of
every system of law, of the culture and civilization of every country, is how far it dignifies man. If the
statutes insufficiently protect a person from being unjustly humiliated, in short, if human personality is
not exalted – then the laws are indeed defective. Thus, under this article, the rights of persons are amply
protected, and damages are provided for violations of a person’s dignity, personality, privacy and peace
of mind.

G.R. No. 120706 January 31, 2000

RODRIGO CONCEPCION, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and SPS. NESTOR NICOLAS and ALLEM NICOLAS,respondents.
Facts:
Nestor Nicolas and Allem Nicolas, the respondents, resided in an apartment leased to them by the
owner thereof, Florence “Bing”Concepcion”. The Nicolas spouses were engaged in business of supplying
office equipment appliances and other fixtures, and Florence Concepcion joined this venture by
contributing capital to the business and sharing with the earned profit thereafter.
Sometime in the second week of July 1985, petitioner Rodrigo Concepcion, brother of the deceased
husband of Florence, angrily accosted Nestor at his apartment and accused him of conducting an
adulterous relationship with Florence. To clarify matters, Nestor went with Rodrigo to see some
members of Conception family to clarify everything, but the family members including Florence denied
knowledge of such affair. Thereafter, however, Rodrigo called Florence over the phone reiterating his
accusation and gave some death threats to her.

As a result of the incident, Nestor Nicolas felt extreme embarrassment and shame. Florence Concepcion
also ceased to do business with him by not contributing capital anymore so much so that the business
venture of the Nicolas spouses declined. Additionally, Allem Nicolas started to doubt Nestor’s fidelity. As
such, petitioned Rodrigo to express a public apology and pay the damages. Rodrigo ignored the demand,
which caused the Nicolas spouses to file a civil suit against him for damages.

Issues:
1. Whether there is basis to review the facts which are of weight and influence by which were
overlooked and misapplied by the respondent appellate court.
2. Whether there is basis in law for the award of damages to private respondents, the Nicolas spouses.
Held:
1. Yes.
Originally, petitioner alleged that certain facts and circumstances of the case were manifestly
overlooked by respondent court on the grounds that the trial judge who penned the decision was in no
position to observe first-hand the demeanor of the witnesses of respondent spouses as he was not the
original judge who heard the case.
The Supreme Court contends that petitioner did not give any sufficient reason to engender doubt as to
the factual findings of the court. The fact that the case was handled by different judges brooks no
consideration at all. The Supreme Court accords the highest respect to the evaluation made by the lower
court of the testimonies of the witnesses presented before it, and that it can be fairly assumed under
the performance of duties of public officers that the transcripts of stenographic notes were thoroughly
scrutinized and evaluated by the judge himself.
2. Yes.
Petitioner originally claimed that the lower courts were without legal basis to justify its verdict as it does
not fall under Arts. 26 and 2219 of Civil Code since it does not constitute libel, slander, or any other form
of defamation, nor involve prying into privacy of another’s residence or meddling with or disturbing the
private life or family relation of another.
The Supreme Court rejected the petitioner’s contention that no legal provision supports such award for
damages. It is understandable that the incident charged of petitioner was no less than an invasion of
right of the respondent, Nestor, as a person. Under this article, the rights of persons are protected, and
damages are provided for violations thereof. The violations mentioned in the codal provisions are not
exclusive but are merely examples and do not preclude other similar or analogous acts. Due to the
incident, respondent Nestor Nicolas suffered mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings
and social humiliation as a proximate result of petitioner’s abusive, scandalous and insulting language.
As such, the Supreme Court held that the incident clearly falls under the aforementioned articles and
the person who violated those rights should be liable of the damages.
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing premises, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming
the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Br. 167, holding Rodrigo Concepcion liable to the
spouses Nestor Nicolas and Allem Nicolas for F50,000.00 as moral damages, P25,000.00 for exemplary
damages, P10,000.00 for attorney’s fees, plus costs of suit, is AFFIRMED.

Political Law – Constitutional Law – Bill of Rights – Right to Privacy – Online Privacy (Social Media)
Remedial Law – Special Proceedings – Writ of Habeas Data
Vivares vs stc
In January 2012, Angela Tan, a high school student at St. Theresa’s College (STC), uploaded on Facebook
several pictures of her and her classmates (Nenita Daluz and Julienne Suzara) wearing only their
undergarments.
Thereafter, some of their classmates reported said photos to their teacher, Mylene Escudero. Escudero,
through her students, viewed and downloaded said pictures. She showed the said pictures to STC’s
Discipline-in-Charge for appropriate action.
Later, STC found Tan et al to have violated the student’s handbook and banned them from “marching” in
their graduation ceremonies scheduled in March 2012.
The issue went to court but despite a TRO (temporary restraining order) granted by the Cebu RTC
enjoining the school from barring the students in the graduation ceremonies, STC still barred said
students.
Subsequently, Rhonda Vivares, mother of Nenita, and the other mothers filed a petition for the issuance
of the writ of habeas data against the school. They argued, among others, that:
1. The privacy setting of their children’s Facebook accounts was set at “Friends Only.” They, thus, have a
reasonable expectation of privacy which must be respected.
2.  The photos accessed belong to the girls and, thus, cannot be used and reproduced without their
consent. Escudero, however, violated their rights by saving digital copies of the photos and by
subsequently showing them to STC’s officials. Thus, the Facebook accounts of the children were
intruded upon;
3. The intrusion into the Facebook accounts, as well as the copying of information, data, and digital
images happened at STC’s Computer Laboratory;
They prayed that STC be ordered to surrender and deposit with the court all soft and printed copies of
the subject data and have such data be declared illegally obtained in violation of the children’s right to
privacy.
The Cebu RTC eventually denied the petition. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for writ of habeas data is proper.
HELD: Yes, it is proper but in this case, it will not prosper.
Contrary to the arguments of STC, the Supreme Court ruled that:
1. The petition for writ of habeas data can be availed of even if this is not a case of extralegal killing or
enforced disappearance; and
2. The writ of habeas data can be availed of against STC even if it is not an entity engaged in the business
of “gathering, collecting, or storing data or information regarding the person, family, home and
correspondence of the aggrieved party”.
First, the Rule on Habeas Data does not state that it can be applied only in cases of extralegal killings or
enforced disappearances. Second, nothing in the Rule would suggest that the habeas data protection
shall be available only against abuses of a person or entity engaged in the business of gathering, storing,
and collecting of data.
Right to Privacy on Social Media (Online Networking Sites)
The Supreme Court ruled that if an online networking site (ONS) like Facebook has privacy tools, and the
user makes use of such privacy tools, then he or she has a reasonable expectation of privacy (right to
informational privacy, that is). Thus, such privacy must be respected and protected.
In this case, however, there is no showing that the students concerned made use of such privacy tools.
Evidence would show that that their post (status) on Facebook were published as “Public”.
Facebook has the following settings to control as to who can view a user’s posts on his “wall” (profile
page):
(a) Public – the default setting; every Facebook user can view the photo;
(b) Friends of Friends – only the user’s Facebook friends and their friends can view the photo;
(c) Friends – only the user’s Facebook friends can view the photo;
(d) Custom – the photo is made visible only to particular friends and/or networks of the Facebook user;
and
(e) Only Me – the digital image can be viewed only by the user.
The default setting is “Public” and if a user wants to have some privacy, then he must choose any setting
other than “Public”. If it is true that the students concerned did set the posts subject of this case so
much so that only five people can see them (as they claim), then how come most of their classmates
were able to view them. This fact was not refuted by them. In fact, it was their classmates who informed
and showed their teacher, Escudero, of the said pictures. Therefore, it appears that Tan et al never use
the privacy settings of Facebook hence, they have no reasonable expectation of privacy on the pictures
of them scantily clad.
STC did not violate the students’ right to privacy. The manner which the school gathered the pictures
cannot be considered illegal. As it appears, it was the classmates of the students who showed the
picture to their teacher and the latter, being the recipient of said pictures, merely delivered them to the
proper school authority and it was for a legal purpose, that is, to discipline their students according to
the standards of the school (to which the students and their parents agreed to in the first place because
of the fact that they enrolled their children there).

ing Judge, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 90, PEOPLE OF THE    PHILIPPINES and
CATERPILLAR, INC., respondents. (G.R. Nos. 160054-55,  July 21, 2004)
 Facts:
The petitioner, owner/proprietor of ITTI Shoes/Mano Shoes Manufactuirng Corporation,allegedly sold or
offers the sale of garment product using the trademark ³Caterpillar´ to the prejudice of Caterpillar, Inc.,
private respondent in this case. The respondent filed the case withthe RTC. The petitioner questioned
the jurisdiction of the trial court over the offense chargedcontending that the case should be filed with
the MTC because violation of unfair competition is penalized with imprisonment not exceeding 6 years
under RA 7691.
Issue: Which court has jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases for violation of intellectual propertyrights?
Ruling of the Court:
The SC held that under Section 163 of the IPC, actions for unfair competition shall be brought before the
proper courts with appropriate jurisdiction under existing laws. The law contemplatedin Section 163 of
IPC is RA 166 otherwise known as the Trademark Law. Section 27 of theTrademark Law provides that
jurisdiction over cases for infringement of registered marks, unfair competition, false designation of
origin and false description or representation, is lodged with theCourt of First Instance (now Regional
Trial Court). Since RA 7691 is a general law and IPC inrelation to Trademark Law is a special law, the
latter shall prevail. Actions for unfair competitiontherefore should be filed with the RTC.

Hambon vs CA
G.R. No. 122150
March 17, 2003

FACTS:

Herein respondent filed a complaint for damages against respondent for the injuries and expenses he
sustained when the latter’s truck bumped him that night of December 9, 1985.

However, the criminal case (Serious Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence) filed previously against
the respondent was dismissed by the court for petitioner’s lack of interest.

Respondent alleges that the dismissal of criminal case includes that of the civil action.
Trial Court rendered decision in favor of petitioner,

Court of Appeals reversed the decision, on the grounds that the Hambon failed to file the civil case.
Hence, it is impliedly instituted with the Criminal case. The dismissal of the criminal case also includes the
dismissal of the civil case.

ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT A CIVIL CASE FOR DAMAGES BASED ON AN INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION
FALLING UNDER ARTICLE 32, 33, 34 AND 2176 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE BE DULY DISMISSED
FOR FAILURE TO MAKE RESERVATION TO FILE A SEPARATE CIVIL ACTION IN A CRIMINAL CASE
FILED ARISING FROM THE SAME ACT OR OMISSION OF THE ACCUSED PURSUANT TO RULE
111, SECTION 1 OF THE RULES OF COURT, THE FAILURE TO MAKE RESERVATION BEING DUE
TO THE FACT THAT THE CRIMINAL CASE WAS DISMISSED BEFORE THE PROSECUTION
STARTED TO PRESENT EVIDENCE FOR FAILURE OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT TO APPEAR
DESPITE NOTICE

HELD:

1quite clearly requires that a reservation must be made to institute separately all civil actions for the
recovery of civil liability, otherwise they will de deemed to have been instituted with the criminal case....  In
other words the right of the injured party to sue separately for the recovery of the civil liability whether
arising from crimes (ex delicto) or from quasi-delict under Art. 2176 of the Civil Code must be reserved
otherwise they will de deemed instituted with the criminal action.
Contrary to private respondent's contention, the requirement that before a separate civil action may be
brought it must be reserved does not impair, diminish or defeat substantive rights, but only regulates their
exercise in the general interest of procedure.  The requirement is merely procedural in nature.  For that
matter the Revised Penal Code, by providing in Art. 100 that any person criminally liable is also civilly
liable, gives the offended party the right to bring a separate civil action, yet no one has ever questioned
the rule that such action must be reserved before it may be brought separately.
While the Abellana case ruled that a reservation is not necessary, the 1988 amendment of the rule
explicitly requires reservation of the civil action.
x x x Prior reservation is a condition sine qua non before any of these independent civil actions can be
instituted and thereafter have a continuous determination apart from or simultaneous with the criminal
action.
. . . Far from altering substantive rights, the primary purpose of the reservation is, to borrow the words of
the Court in "Caños v. Peralta":
‘. . . to avoid multiplicity of suits, to guard against oppression and abuse, to prevent delays, to clear
congested dockets, to simplify the work of the trial court; in short, the attainment of justice with the least
expense and vexation to the parties-litigants.
Thus, herein petitioner Hambon should have reserved his right to separately institute the civil action for
damages in Criminal Case No. 2049. Having failed to do so, Civil Case No. 1761-R for damages
subsequently filed by him without prior reservation should be dismissed.  With the dismissal of Criminal
Case No. 2049, whatever civil action for the recovery of civil liability that was impliedly instituted therein
was likewise dismissed.chan robles virtual law library
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED for lack of merit, and the
decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 8, 1995, is AFFIRMED in toto