Abbas v.
COMELEC, 179 SCRA 287 6) The creation of an Oversight Committee is merely procedural and in fact will
Facts: Datu Firdausi Abbas, et.al. challenged the constitutionality of R.A. 6734
on the following grounds:
1) R. A. 6734 conflicts with the Tripoli Agreement (what conflicts the case
doesn’t say)
2) R. A. 6734 provides for the unconditional creation of the ARMM and not
through the mode of a plebiscite as provided in the Constitution
3) The Constitution provides that ARMM shall be approved by a majority of
votes cast in a plebiscite by all voters residing in the provinces and cities
affected, but R.A. 6734 says “by a majority or votes cast by the constituent
units in a plebiscite and only those provinces and cities where a majority of
votes cast in favor of the Organic Act shall be included in the Autonomous
Region. R.A. 6734 thus conflicts the Constitution
4) R. A. 6734 includes provinces and cities which do not have the same cultural
and historical heritage and other relevant characteristics needed for admission
to the ARMM
5) R. A. 6734 violates constitutional guarantee on freedom of exercise of
religion as some its provisions run counter to the Koran
6) The creation of an Oversight Committee to supervise the transfer of power
to the ARMM is contrary to the constitutional mandate that the creation of the
autonomous region hinges solely on the result of the plebiscite
7)R. A. 6734 says “…that only the provinces and cities voting favorably in such
plebiscite shall be included in the ARMM. The provinces and cities which in the
plebiscite do not vote for inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall remain in
the existing administrative regions: Provided however, that the President may,
by administrative determination, merge the existing regions. This provision,
Abbas claims, is contrary to the Constitutional mandate that, “No province city,
municipality or barangay may be created, divided, merged,abolished or its
boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria
established with thelocal government code and subject to approval by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the unitsdirectly affected.” (Art. 10,
Sec. 10, 1987 Constitution)
Held: Abbas is wrong. Reasons:
1) R. A. 6734 as an enactment of Congress, is superior to the Tripoli Agreement,
being a subsequent law to the Tripoli Agreement (though in my opinion it
wouldn’t matter if R. A. 6734 was prior to the Tripoli Agreement)
2) The transitory provisions of R. A. 6734 does provide for a plebiscite (1 guess
nobody reads the transitory provisions)
3) The framers of the Constitution must have intended that the majority of
votes must come from each of the constituent units and not all the votes of the
provinces and cities (I couldn’t understand how the justices arrived at this
conclusion)
4) It is not for the Court to decide on the wisdom of the law concerning the
inclusion of provinces and cities which Abbas claims should not be included in a
plebiscite
5) There is no actual controversy yet as to any violation of freedom of religion,
only a potential one
aid in the timely creation of the ARMM
7) The power of the President to merge administrative regions is inherent in his
power of general supervisionover local governments. Besides, administrative
regions are not territorial or political regions. Examples of administrative
regions are Regions I to XII and the NCR
Abbas vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 89651 November 10, 1989
Topics: nature of plebiscite, constitutionality of RA 6734
Facts: A plebiscite in thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) cities in Mindanao and
Palawan, was scheduled for November 19, 1989, in implementation of RA 6734,
entitled "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao" (Organic Act). These consolidated petitions pray that the
Court: (1) enjoin the COMELEC from conducting the plebiscite; and (2) declare
RA 6734, or parts thereof, unconstitutional. The arguments against R.A. 6734
raised by petitioners may generally be categorized into either of the following:
(a) that R.A. 6734, or parts thereof, violates the Constitution, and (b) that
certain provisions of R.A. No. 6734 conflict with the Tripoli Agreement.
Issue: Whether or not certain provisions of the Organic Act are
unconstitutional.
Held: The petition has no merit and the law is constitutional.
1. Petitioner contends that the tenor of a provision in the Organic Act makes
the creation of an autonomous region absolute, such that even if only two
provinces vote in favor of autonomy, an autonomous region would still be
created composed of the two provinces where the favorable votes were
obtained. there is a specific provision in the Transitory Provisions (Article XIX) of
the Organic Act, which incorporates substantially the same requirements
embodied in the Constitution and fills in the details, thus:
SEC. 13. The creation of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao shall take
effect when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units
provided in paragraph (2) of Sec. 1 of Article II of this Act in a plebiscite which
shall be held not earlier than ninety (90) days or later than one hundred twenty
(120) days after the approval of this Act: Provided, That only the provinces and
cities voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao. The provinces and cities which in the plebiscite do
not vote for inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall remain the existing
administrative determination, merge the existing regions.
Thus, under the Constitution and R.A. No 6734, the creation of the autonomous
region shall take effect only when approved by a majority of the votes cast by
the constituent units in a plebiscite, and only those provinces and cities where
a majority vote in favor of the Organic Act shall be included in the autonomous
region. The provinces and cities wherein such a majority is not attained shall
not be included in the autonomous region. It may be that even if an
autonomous region is created, not all of the thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9)
cities mentioned in Article II, section 1 (2) of R.A. No. 6734 shall be included
therein. The single plebiscite contemplated by the Constitution and R.A. No.
6734 will therefore be determinative of (1) whether there shall be an
autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao and (2) which provinces and cities,
among those enumerated in R.A. No. 6734, shall compromise it.
2. The question has been raised as to what this majority means. Does it refer to
a majority of the total votes cast in the plebiscite in all the constituent units, or
a majority in each of the constituent units, or both?
The 1987 Constitution provides: The creation of the autonomous region shall Gutierrez, J.
be effective when approved by majority of the votes cast by the constituent
units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities
and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the
autonomous region. [Art. X, sec, 18, para, 2]. It will readily be seen that the
creation of the autonomous region is made to depend, not on the total
majority vote in the plebiscite, but on the will of the majority in each of the FACTS
constituent units and the proviso underscores this.
- January 30, 1990, pursuant to Republic Act No. 6766 entitled “An Act
3. Petitioner avers that not all of the thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) cities Providing for an Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region”, the people
included in the Organic Act, possess such concurrence in historical and cultural of the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra and Kalinga-
heritage and other relevant characteristics. By including areas, which do not Apayao and the city of Baguio cast their votes in a plebiscite.
strictly share the same characteristic as the others, petitioner claims that
- Results of plebiscite: approved by majority of 5,889 votes in Ifugao, rejected
Congress has expanded the scope of the autonomous region which the
by 148,676 in the rest provinces and city. The province of Ifugao makes up only
constitution itself has prescribed to be limited.
11% of total population, and as such has the second smallest number of
Petitioner's argument is not tenable. The Constitution lays down the standards inhabitants, of the abovementioned areas.
by which Congress shall determine which areas should constitute the
- February 14, 1990, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2259 stating that the
autonomous region. Guided by these constitutional criteria, the ascertainment
Organic Act for the Region has been approved and/or ratified by majority of
by Congress of the areas that share common attributes is within the exclusive
votes cast only in the province of Ifugao. Secretary of Justice also issued a
realm of the legislature's discretion. Any review of this ascertainment would
memorandum for the President reiterating COMELEC resolution, stating that
have to go into the wisdom of the law.
“…Ifugao being the only province which voted favorably – then. Alone, legally
4. Both petitions also question the validity of R.A. No. 6734 on the ground that and validly constitutes CAR.”
it violates the constitutional guarantee on free exercise of religion [Art. III, sec.
- March 8, 1990, Congress ebacted Republic Act No. 6861 setting elections in
5]. The objection centers on a provision in the Organic Act which mandates that
CAR of Ifugao on first Monday of March 1991.
should there be any conflict between the Muslim Code and the Tribal Code on
the one had, and the national law on the other hand, the Shari'ah courts
- Even before COMELEC resolution, Executive Secretary issued February 5, 1990
created under the same Act should apply national law. Petitioners maintain
a memorandum granting authority to wind up the affairs of the Cordillera
that the islamic law (Shari'ah) is derived from the Koran, which makes it part of
Executive Board and Cordillera Regional Assembly created under Executive
divine law. Thus it may not be subjected to any "man-made" national law.
Order No. 220.
Petitioner Abbas supports this objection by enumerating possible instances of
conflict between provisions of the Muslim Code and national law, wherein an - March 30, 1990, President issued Administrative Order No. 160 declaring
application of national law might be offensive to a Muslim's religious among others that the Cordillera Executive Board and Cordillera Regional
convictions. Assembly and all offices under Executive Order No. 220 were abolished in view
of the ratification of Organic Act.
In the present case, no actual controversy between real litigants exists. There
are no conflicting claims involving the application of national law resulting in an - Petitioners: there can be no valid Cordillera Autonomous Region in only one
alleged violation of religious freedom. This being so, the Court in this case may province as the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766 require that the said
not be called upon to resolve what is merely a perceived potential conflict Region be composed of more than one constituent unit.
between the provisions the Muslim Code and national law.
- Petitioners therefore pray that the court:
5. According to petitioners, said provision grants the President the power to
merge regions, a power which is not conferred by the Constitution upon the declare null and void COMELEC resolution No. 2259, the memorandum of the
President. Secretary of Justice, Administrative Order No. 160, and Republic Act No. 6861
and prohibit and restrain the respondents from implementing the same and
While the power to merge administrative regions is not expressly provided for spending public funds for the purpose
in the Constitution, it is a power which has traditionally been lodged with the
President to facilitate the exercise of the power of general supervision over declare Executive Order No. 220 constituting the Cordillera Executive Board and
local governments. There is no conflict between the power of the President to the Cordillera Regional Assembly and other offices to be still in force and effect
merge administrative regions with the constitutional provision requiring a until another organic law for the Autonomous Region shall have been enacted
plebiscite in the merger of local government units because the requirement of by Congress and the same is duly ratified by the voters in the constituent units.
a plebiscite in a merger expressly applies only to provinces, cities, municipalities
or barangays, not to administrative regions.

6. Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. Based on the
grounds raised by petitioners to challenge the constitutionality of R.A. No.
6734, the Court finds that petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption.
The dismissal of these two petitions is, therefore, inevitable.
ISSUE
WON the province of Ifugao, being the only province which voted
favorably for the creation of the Cordillera Autonomous Region can, alone,
legally and validly constitute such region.

Ordillo v. COMELEC
HELD
G.R. No. 93054, December 4, 1990
- The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly constitute the Cordillera
Autonomous Region.
The keyword ins Article X, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution – provinces,
cities, municipalities and geographical areas connote that “region” is to be
made up of more than one constituent unit. The term “region” used in its
ordinary sense means two or more provinces.
- rule in statutory construction must be applied here: the language of the
Constitution, as much as possible should be understood in the sense it has in
common use and that the words used in constitutional provisions are to be
given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed.
The entirety of Republic Act No. 6766 creating the Cordillera Autonomous
Region is infused with provisions which rule against the sole province of Ifugao
constituting the Region.
- It can be gleaned that Congress never intended that a single province may
constitute the autonomous region.
- If this were so, we would be faced with the absurd situation of having two sets
of officials: a set of provincial officials and another set of regional officials
exercising their executive and legislative powers over exactly the same small
area. (Ifugao is one of the smallest provinces in the Philippines, population-
wise) (Art III sec 1 and 2; Art V, sec 1 and 4; Art XII sec 10 of RA 6766)
- Allotment of Ten Million Pesos to Regional Government for its initial
organizational requirements can not be construed as funding only a lone and
small province [Art XXI sec 13(B)(c)]
- Certain provisions of the Act call for officials “coming from different provinces
and cities” in the Region, as well as tribal courts and the development of a
common regional language. (Art V sec 16; Art VI sec 3; Art VII; Art XV RA 6766)
- Thus, to contemplate the situation envisioned by the COMELEC would not
only violate the letter and intent of the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766
but would be impractical and illogical.
SEMA VS. COMELEC
The Province of Maguindanao is part of ARMM. Cotabato City is part of the
province of Maguindanao but it is not part of ARMM because Cotabato City
voted against its inclusion in a plebiscite held in 1989. Maguindanao has two
legislative districts. The 1st legislative district comprises of Cotabato City and 8
other municipalities.
A law (RA 9054) was passed amending ARMM’s Organic Act and vesting it with
power to create provinces, municipalities, cities and barangays. Pursuant to this
law, the ARMM Regional Assembly created Shariff Kabunsuan (Muslim
Mindanao Autonomy Act 201) which comprised of the municipalities of the
1st district of Maguindanao with the exception of Cotabato City.
For the purposes of the 2007 elections, COMELEC initially stated that the
1st district is now only made of Cotabato City (because of MMA 201). But it
later amended this stating that status quo should be retained; however, just for
the purposes of the elections, the first district should be called Shariff
Kabunsuan with Cotabato City – this is also while awaiting a decisive
declaration from Congress as to Cotabato’s status as a legislative district (or
part of any).
Bai Sandra Sema was a congressional candidate for the legislative district of S.
Kabunsuan with Cotabato (1st district). Later, Sema was contending that
Cotabato City should be a separate legislative district and that votes therefrom
should be excluded in the voting (probably because her rival Dilangalen was
from there and D was winning – in fact he won). She contended that under the
Constitution, upon creation of a province (S. Kabunsuan), that province
automatically gains legislative representation and since S. Kabunsuan excludes
Cotabato City – so in effect Cotabato is being deprived of a representative in
the HOR.
COMELEC maintained that the legislative district is still there and that
regardless of S. Kabunsuan being created, the legislative district is not affected
and so is its representation.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 9054 is unconstitutional. Whether or not ARMM can
create validly LGUs.
HELD: RA 9054 is unconstitutional. The creation of local government units is
governed by Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided,
merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance
with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to
approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units
directly affected.
Thus, the creation of any of the four local government units province, city,
municipality or barangay must comply with three conditions. First, the creation
of a local government unit must follow the criteria fixed in the Local
Government Code. Second, such creation must not conflict with any provision
of the Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in the political units
affected.
There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the
Constitution for Congress to delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the
power to create local government units. However, under its plenary legislative
powers, Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies the power to create
local government units, subject to reasonable standards and provided no
conflict arises with any provision of the Constitution. In fact, Congress has
delegated to provincial boards, and city and municipal councils, the power to
create barangays within their jurisdiction, subject to compliance with the
criteria established in the Local Government Code, and the plebiscite
requirement in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. Hence, ARMM cannot
validly create Shariff Kabunsuan province.
Note that in order to create a city there must be at least a population of at least
250k, and that a province, once created, should have at least one
representative in the HOR. Note further that in order to have a legislative
district, there must at least be 250k (population) in said district. Cotabato City
did not meet the population requirement so Sema’s contention is untenable.
On the other hand, ARMM cannot validly create the province of S. Kabunsuan
without first creating a legislative district. But this can never be legally possible
because the creation of legislative districts is vested solely in Congress. At most,
what ARMM can create are barangays not cities and provinces.
026 Sema v. Comelec & AUTHOR: Nikki Tolentino
Dilangalen
TOPIC: Creation of
NOTES/QUICKIE FACTS:
autonomous regional
bodies - Sec. 1, Sec. 4,
Only Congress can create provinces and cities
Sec. 13 & Sec. 14 Article X
because the creation of provinces and cities
General Rule: An organic necessarily includes the creation of legislative
act creates autonomous districts, a power only Congress can exercise
under Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution
regional bodies.
PONENTE: Carpio, J
FACTS
Petitions seek to annul Resolution No. 7902, dated 10 May 2007, of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) treating Cotabato City as part of the
legislative district of the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan.
Maguindanao forms part of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
(ARMM), created under its Organic Act, Republic Act No. 6734 (RA 6734), as
amended by Republic Act No. 9054  (RA 9054). Although under the
Ordinance, Cotabato City forms part of Maguindanao’s first legislative district, it
is not part of the ARMM but of Region XII, having voted against its inclusion in
the ARMM in the plebiscite held in November 1989.
The ARMM Regional Assembly, exercising its power to create provinces under
Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No.
201 (MMA Act 201) creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan composed of
the eight municipalities in the first district of Maguindanao.
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cotabato City passed Resolution No. 3999
requesting the COMELEC to “clarify the status of Cotabato City in view of the
conversion of the First District of Maguindanao into a regular province” under
MMA Act 201.
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 07-0407 on 6 March 2007 "maintaining the
status quo with Cotabato City as part of Shariff Kabunsuan in the First
Legislative District of Maguindanao.”
However, in preparation for the 14 May 2007 elections, the COMELEC
promulgated on 29 March 2007 Resolution No. 7845 stating that
Maguindanao’s first legislative district is composed only
of Cotabato City because of the enactment of MMA Act 201
On 10 May 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7902, subject of these
petitions, amending Resolution No. 07-0407 by renaming the legislative district
in question as “Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City (formerly First
District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City).”
Petitioner:
Sema, who was a candidate in the 14 May 2007 elections for Representative of
“Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City,” prayed for the nullification of
COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 and the exclusion from canvassing of the votes
cast in Cotabato City for that office.
Sema asserted that the COMELEC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in
issuing Resolution No. 7902 which maintained the status quo in Maguindanao’s
first legislative district despite the COMELEC’s earlier directive in Resolution No.
7845 designating Cotabato City as the lone component of Maguindanao’s
reapportioned first legislative district.
Sema further claimed that in issuing Resolution No. 7902, the COMELEC
usurped Congress’ power to create or reapportion legislative districts.
Respondent COMELEC:
Chose not to reach the merits of the case and merely contended that (1) Sema
wrongly availed of the writ of certiorari to nullify COMELEC Resolution No. 7902
because the COMELEC issued the same in the exercise of its administrative, not
quasi-judicial, power and (2) Sema’s prayer for the writ of prohibition in G.R.
No. 177597 became moot with the proclamation of respondent Didagen P.
Dilangalen (respondent Dilangalen) on 1 June 2007 as representative of the
legislative district of Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City.
Respondent Dilangalen:
Countered that Sema is estopped from questioning COMELEC Resolution No.
7902 because in her certificate of candidacy filed on 29 March 2007, Sema
indicated that she was seeking election as representative of “Shariff Kabunsuan
including Cotabato City.”  
COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is constitutional because it did not apportion a
legislative district for Shariff Kabunsuan or reapportion the legislative districts in
Maguindanao but merely renamed Maguindanao’s first legislative district.
COMELEC could not reapportion Maguindanao’s first legislative district to make
Cotabato City its sole component unit as the power to reapportion legislative
districts lies exclusively with Congress
Court:
Required the parties to comment on the issue of whether a province created by
the ARMM Regional Assembly under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is entitled
to one representative in the House of Representatives without need of a
national law creating a legislative district for such new province.
Petitioner Sema:
Answered the issue in the affirmative on the following grounds: (a) the Court
in Felwa v. Salas stated that “when a province is created by statute, the
corresponding representative district comes into existence neither by authority
of that statute — which cannot provide otherwise — nor by apportionment, but
by operation of the Constitution, without a reapportionment”; (b) Section 462
of Republic Act No. 7160 (RA 7160) “affirms” the apportionment of a legislative
district incident to the creation of a province; and (c)  Section 5 (3), Article VI of
the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution
mandate the  apportionment of a legislative district in newly created provinces.
Petitioner Comelec:
Abandoned its earlier stance on the propriety of issuing Resolution Nos. 07-
0407 and 7902 and joined causes with Sema, contending that Section 5 (3),
Article VI of the Constitution is “self-executing.” Thus, every new province
created by the ARMM Regional Assembly is ipso facto entitled to one
representative in the House of Representatives even in the absence of a
national law;
Respondent Dilangalen:
Answered the issue in the negative on the following grounds: (a) the “province”
contemplated in Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution is one that is
created by an act of Congress taking into account the provisions in RA 7160 on
the creation of provinces; (b) Section 3, Article IV of RA 9054 withheld from the
ARMM Regional Assembly the power to enact measures relating to national
elections, which encompasses the apportionment of legislative districts for
members of the House of Representatives; (c) recognizing a legislative district in
every province the ARMM Regional Assembly creates will lead to the
disproportionate representation of the ARMM in the House of Representatives
as the  Regional Assembly can create provinces without regard to the
requirements in Section 461 of RA 7160; and (d) Cotabato City, which has a
population of less than 250,000, is not entitled to a representative in the House
of Representatives.
On the question of the constitutionality of Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054:
Petitioner Sema:
Sema contended that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is constitutional (a) as a
valid delegation by Congress to the ARMM of the power to create provinces
under Section 20 (9), Article X of the Constitution granting to the autonomous
regions, through their organic acts, legislative powers over “other matters as
may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare of the
people of the region” and (b) as an amendment to Section 6 of RA 7160.
However, Sema concedes that, if taken literally, the grant in Section 19,  Article
VI of RA 9054 to the ARMM Regional Assembly of the power to “prescribe
standards lower than those mandated” in RA 7160 in the creation of provinces
contravenes Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.
Thus, Sema proposed that Section 19 “should be construed as prohibiting the
Regional Assembly from prescribing standards x x x that do not comply with the
minimum criteria” under RA 7160.
Respondent Dilangalen:
Contended that  Section 19,  Article VI of RA 9054 is unconstitutional on the
following grounds:
the power to create provinces was not among those granted to the
autonomous regions under Section 20, Article X of the Constitution; and
the grant under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054  to the ARMM Regional
Assembly of the power to prescribe standards lower than those mandated in
Section 461 of RA 7160 on the creation of provinces contravenes Section 10,
Article X of the Constitution and the Equal Protection Clause
Respondent COMELEC:
Joined causes with respondent Dilangalen (thus effectively abandoning the
position the COMELEC adopted in its Compliance with the Resolution of 4
September 2007) and contended that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is
unconstitutional because
it contravenes Section 10 and Section 6, Article X of the Constitution; and
the power to create provinces was withheld from the autonomous regions
under Section 20, Article X of the Constitution.
ISSUES:
Whether Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, delegating to the ARMM Regional
Assembly the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, is
constitutional; and
If in the affirmative, whether a province created by the ARMM Regional
Assembly under MMA Act 201 pursuant to Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is
entitled to one representative in the House of Representatives without need of
a national law creating a legislative district for such province.
HELD:
We rule that
(1) Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants to the
ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces and cities;
(2) MMA Act 201 creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan is void; and
(3) COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is valid.
RATIO:
Whether the ARMM Regional Assembly Can Create the Province of Shariff
Kabunsuan:
The creation of local government units is governed by Section 10, Article X of
the Constitution, which provides:
 
Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided,
merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance
with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to
approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units
directly affected.
Thus, the creation of any of the four local government units – province, city,
municipality or barangay – must comply with three conditions. First, the
creation of a local government unit must follow the criteria fixed in the Local
Government Code.   Second, such creation must not conflict with any provision
of the Constitution.  Third, there must be a plebiscite in the political units
affected.
There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the
Constitution for Congress to delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the
power to create local government units. However, under its plenary legislative
powers, Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies the power to create
local government units, subject to reasonable standards and provided no
conflict arises with any provision of the Constitution.  In fact, Congress has
delegated to provincial boards, and city and municipal councils, the power to
create barangays within their jurisdiction, subject to compliance with the
criteria established in the Local Government Code, and the plebiscite
requirement in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.   However, under the
Local Government Code, “only x x x an Act of Congress” can create provinces,
cities or municipalities.
Under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, Congress delegated to the ARMM
Regional Assembly the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and
barangays within the ARMM.   Congress made the delegation under its plenary
legislative powers because the power to create local government units is not
one of the express legislative powers granted by the Constitution to regional
legislative bodies
The creation of the ARMM, and the grant of legislative powers to its Regional
Assembly under its organic act, did not divest Congress of its exclusive authority
to create legislative districts. This is clear from the Constitution and the ARMM
Organic Act, as amended. Thus, Section 20, Article X of the Constitution
provides:
SECTION 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of
this Constitution and national laws, the organic act of autonomous regions shall
provide for legislative powers over:
(1)        Administrative organization;
(2)        Creation of sources of revenues;
(3)        Ancestral domain and natural resources;
(4)        Personal, family, and property relations;
(5)        Regional urban and rural planning development;
district.  Moreover, the ARMM Regional Assembly cannot enact a law creating a
national office like the office of a district representative of Congress because
the legislative powers of the ARMM Regional Assembly operate only within its
territorial jurisdiction as provided in Section 20, Article X of the
Constitution.  Thus, SC ruled that MMA Act 201, enacted by the ARMM Regional
Assembly and creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, is void.  

(6)        Economic, social, and tourism development;

(7)        Educational policies;
(8)        Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and
(9)        Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of
the general welfare of the people of the region.
Consequently, we hold that COMELEC Resolution No. 7902, preserving the
geographic and legislative district of the First District of Maguindanao with
Cotabato City, is valid as it merely complies with Section 5 of Article VI and
Section 20 of Article X of the Constitution, as well as Section 1 of the Ordinance
appended to the Constitution.

[apologies for this long digest, but caveat as well, there is a whole other
discussion regarding the requirements of reapportionment/count of
Nothing in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution authorizes autonomous
representatives in Congress which I didn’t include anymore assuming that
regions, expressly or impliedly, to create or reapportion legislative districts for
discussion sticks with the topic outline]
Congress.  

On the other hand, Section 3, Article IV of RA 9054 amending the ARMM

Organic Act, provides, “The Regional Assembly may exercise legislative power x
x x  except on the following matters: x x x (k) National elections. x x x.”  Since
the ARMM Regional Assembly has no legislative power to enact laws relating to
national elections, it cannot create a legislative district whose representative is
elected in national elections. PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO VS GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES

Posted by kaye lee on 9:43 PM

It is axiomatic that organic acts of autonomous regions cannot prevail over the
Constitution.  Section 20, Article X of the Constitution expressly provides that
the legislative powers of regional assemblies are limited “[w]ithin its territorial
jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of the Constitution and national
laws, x x x.”  The Preamble of the ARMM Organic Act (RA 9054) itself states that G.R. No. 183591                October 14 2008
the ARMM Government is established “within the framework of the
Constitution.”   This follows Section 15, Article X of the Constitution which Province of North Cotabato vs Government of the Republic of the Philippines
mandates that the ARMM “shall be created x x x within the framework of this
Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the
Republic of the Philippines.”  
FACTS:
 
On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the
The present case involves the creation of a local government unit that Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of
necessarily involves also the creation of a legislative district.  The Court will not Agreement of the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP - MILF Tripoli
pass upon the constitutionality of the creation of municipalities and barangays Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
that does not comply with the criteria established in Section 461 of RA 7160, as
mandated in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, because the creation of Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, the petitioners
such municipalities and barangays does not involve the creation of legislative seek to compel respondents to disclose and furnish them the complete and
districts.   official copies of the MA-AD and to prohibit the slated signing of the MOA-AD
and the holding of public consultation thereon. They also pray that the MOA-
AD be declared unconstitutional. The Court issued a TRO enjoining the GRP
from signing the same.
In summary, SC ruled that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, insofar as it grants
to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces and cities, is
void for being contrary to Section 5 of Article VI and Section 20 of Article X of
the Constitution, as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the ISSUES:
Constitution.   Only Congress can create provinces and cities because the
1. Whether or not the constitutionality and the legality of the MOA is ripe for
creation of provinces and cities necessarily includes the creation of legislative
adjudication;
districts, a power only Congress can exercise under Section 5, Article VI of the
Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution.  The
2. Whether or not there is a violation of the people's right to information on
ARMM Regional Assembly cannot create a province without a legislative district
matters of public concern (Art 3 Sec. 7) under a state policy of full disclosure of
because the Constitution mandates that every province shall have a legislative
all its transactions involving public interest (Art 2, Sec 28) including public
consultation under RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991)
3. Whether or not the signing of the MOA, the Government of the Republic of
the Philippines would be binding itself
a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate
state, or a juridical, territorial or political subdivision not recognized by law;
b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the
MOA;
c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for
ancestral domain in violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997),
particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION,
RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)
RULINGS:
1. Yes, the petitions are ripe for adjudication. The failure of the respondents to
consult the local government units or communities affected constitutes a
departure by respondents from their mandate under EO No. 3. Moreover, the
respondents exceeded their authority by the mere act of guaranteeing
amendments to the Constitution. Any alleged violation of the Constitution by
any branch of government is a proper matter for judicial review.
As the petitions involve constitutional issues which are of paramount public
interest or of transcendental importance, the Court grants the petitioners,
petitioners-in-intervention and intervening respondents the requisite locus
standi in keeping with the liberal stance adopted in David v. Macapagal- Arroyo.
In Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre, this Court held:
x x x [B]y the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the
challenged action, the dispute is said to have ripened into a judicial controversy
even without any other overt act . Indeed, even a singular violation of the
Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty.x x x x
By the same token, when an act of the President, who in our constitutional
scheme is a coequal of Congress, is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution and the laws x x x settling the dispute becomes the duty and the
responsibility of the courts.
That the law or act in question is not yet effective does not negate ripeness.
2. Yes. The Court finds that there is a grave violation of the Constitution
involved in the matters of public concern (Sec 7 Art III) under a state policy of
full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest (Art 2, Sec 28)
including public consultation under RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991).
(Sec 7 ArtIII) The right to information guarantees the right of the people to
demand information, while Sec 28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to give
information even if nobody demands. The complete and effective exercise of
the right to information necessitates that its complementary provision on
public disclosure derive the same self-executory nature, subject only to
reasonable safeguards or limitations as may be provided by law.
The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount public concern involving
public interest in the highest order. In declaring that the right to information
contemplates steps and negotiations leading to the consummation of the
contract, jurisprudence finds no distinction as to the executory nature or
commercial character of the agreement.
E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for continuing consultations on both
national and local levels and for a principal forum for consensus-building. In
fact, it is the duty of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process to conduct
regular dialogues to seek relevant information, comments, advice, and
recommendations from peace partners and concerned sectors of society.
3.
a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate
state, or a juridical, territorial or political subdivision not recognized by law;
Yes. The provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the Parties
aimed to vest in the BJE the status of an associated state or, at any rate, a
status closely approximating it.
The concept of association is not recognized under the present Constitution.
No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under our
laws as having an “associative” relationship with the national government.
Indeed, the concept implies powers that go beyond anything ever granted by
the Constitution to any local or regional government. It also implies the
recognition of the associated entity as a state. The Constitution, however, does
not contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine State,
much less does it provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any part
of Philippine territory for independence.
The BJE is a far more powerful entity than the autonomous region recognized in
the Constitution. It is not merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the status
of its relationship with the national government being fundamentally different
from that of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a state in all but name as it meets the
criteria of a state laid down in the Montevideo Convention, namely, a
permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and a capacity to
enter into relations with other states.
Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would not necessarily sever any
portion of Philippine territory, the spirit animating it – which has betrayed itself
by its use of the concept of association – runs counter to the national
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic.
The defining concept underlying the relationship between the national
government and the BJE being itself contrary to the present Constitution, it is
not surprising that many of the specific provisions of the MOA-AD on the
formation and powers of the BJE are in conflict with the Constitution and the
laws. The BJE is more of a state than an autonomous region. But even assuming
that it is covered by the term “autonomous region” in the constitutional
provision just quoted, the MOA-AD would still be in conflict with it.
b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the
MOA:
The MOA-AD provides that “any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring
amendments to the existing legal framework shall come into force upon the
signing of a Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the necessary changes
to the legal framework,” implying an amendment of the Constitution to
accommodate the MOA-AD. This stipulation, in effect, guaranteed to the MILF
the amendment of the Constitution .
It will be observed that the President has authority, as stated in her oath of
office, only to preserve and defend the Constitution. Such presidential power
does not, however, extend to allowing her to change the Constitution, but
simply to recommend proposed amendments or revision. As long as she limits
herself to recommending these changes and submits to the proper procedure
for constitutional amendments and revision, her mere recommendation need
not be construed as an unconstitutional act.
The “suspensive clause” in the MOA-AD viewed in light of the above-discussed
standards.
Given the limited nature of the President’s authority to propose constitutional
amendments, she cannot guarantee to any third party that the required
amendments will eventually be put in place, nor even be submitted to a
plebiscite. The most she could do is submit these proposals as
recommendations either to Congress or the people, in whom constituent
powers are vested.
c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for
ancestral domain in violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997),
particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION,
RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)
This strand begins with the statement that it is “the birthright of all Moros and
all Indigenous peoples of Mindanao to identify themselves and be accepted as
‘Bangsamoros.’” It defines “Bangsamoro people” as the natives or original
inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent islands including Palawan and the
Sulu archipelago at the time of conquest or colonization, and their descendants
whether mixed or of full blood, including their spouses.
Thus, the concept of “Bangsamoro,” as defined in this strand of the MOA-AD,
includes not only “Moros” as traditionally understood even by Muslims, but all
indigenous peoples of Mindanao and its adjacent islands. The MOA-AD adds
that the freedom of choice of indigenous peoples shall be respected. What this
freedom of choice consists in has not been specifically defined. The MOA-AD
proceeds to refer to the “Bangsamoro homeland,” the ownership of which is
vested exclusively in the Bangsamoro people by virtue of their prior rights of
occupation. Both parties to the MOA-AD acknowledge that ancestral domain
does not form part of the public domain.
Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 provides
for clear-cut procedure for the recognition and delineation of ancestral domain,
which entails, among other things, the observance of the free and prior
informed consent of the Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples.
Notably, the statute does not grant the Executive Department or any
government agency the power to delineate and recognize an ancestral domain
claim by mere agreement or compromise.
Two, Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 requires all
national offices to conduct consultations beforeany project or program critical
to the environment and human ecology including those that may call for the
eviction of a particular group of people residing in such locality, is implemented
therein. The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally and
unilaterally vests ownership of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro people,
which could pervasively and drastically result to the diaspora or displacement
of a great number of inhabitants from their total environment.
CONCLUSION:
In sum, the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process committed grave abuse
of discretion when he failed to carry out the pertinent consultation process, as
mandated by E.O. No. 3, Republic Act No. 7160, and Republic Act No. 8371. The
furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs contrary
to and in excess of the legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious,
oppressive, arbitrary and despotic exercise thereof. It illustrates a gross evasion
of positive duty and a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined.
The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not
only its specific provisions but the very concept underlying them, namely, the
associative relationship envisioned between the GRP and the BJE, are
unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the associated entity is a
state and implies that the same is on its way to independence.
PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO VS. GRP PEACE PANEL
Facts: On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines
(GRP) and the MILF, through the Chairpersons of their respective peace
negotiating panels, were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement on
the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on
Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The MILF is a rebel group which was
established in March 1984 when, under the leadership of the late Salamat
Hashim, it splintered from the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) then
headed by Nur Misuari, on the ground, among others, of what Salamat
perceived to be the manipulation of the MNLF away from an Islamic basis
towards Marxist-Maoist orientations.[1] The signing of the MOA-AD between
the GRP and the MILF was not to materialize, however, for upon motion of
petitioners, specifically those who filed their cases before the scheduled signing
of the MOA-AD, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the
GRP from signing the same. The MOA-AD was preceded by a long process of
negotiation and the concluding of several prior agreements between the two
parties beginning in 1996, when the GRP-MILF peace negotiations began. On
July 18, 1997, the GRP and MILF Peace Panels signed the Agreement on General
Cessation of Hostilities. The following year, they signed the General Framework
of Agreement of Intent on August 27, 1998. The Solicitor General, who
represents respondents, summarizes the MOA-AD by stating that the same
contained, among others, the commitment of the parties to pursue peace
negotiations, protect and respect human rights, negotiate with sincerity in the
resolution and pacific settlement of the conflict, and refrain from the use of
threat or force to attain undue advantage while the peace negotiations on the
substantive agenda are on-going.[2] Early on, however, it was evident that
there was not going to be any smooth sailing in the GRP-MILF peace process.
Towards the end of 1999 up to early 2000, the MILF attacked a number of
municipalities in Central Mindanao and, in March 2000, it took control of the
town hall of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.[3] In response, then President Joseph
Estrada declared and carried out an "all-out-war" against the MILF. When
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo assumed office, the military offensive
against the MILF was suspended and the government sought a resumption of
the peace talks. The MILF, according to a leading MILF member, initially
responded with deep reservation, but when President Arroyo asked the
Government of Malaysia through Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad to help
convince the MILF to return to the negotiating table, the MILF convened its
Central Committee to seriously discuss the matter and, eventually, decided to
meet with theGRP. The parties met in Kuala Lumpur on March 24, 2001, with
the talks being facilitated by the Malaysian government, the parties signing on
the same date the Agreement on the General Framework for the Resumption
of Peace Talks Between the GRP and the MILF. The MILF
thereaftersuspended all its military actions. Formal peace talks between the
parties were held in Tripoli, Libya from June 20-22, 2001, the outcome of which
was the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace (Tripoli Agreement 2001)
containing the basic principles and agenda on the following aspects of the
negotiation: Security Aspect, Rehabilitation Aspect, and Ancestral Domain
Aspect. With regard to the Ancestral Domain Aspect, the parties in Tripoli
Agreement 2001 simply agreed "that the same be discussed further by the
Parties in their next meeting." A second round of peace talks was held in
Cyberjaya, Malaysia on August 5-7, 2001 which ended with the signing of the
Implementing Guidelines on the Security Aspect of the Tripoli Agreement 2001
leading to a ceasefire status between the parties. This was followed by the
Implementing Guidelines on the Humanitarian Rehabilitation and Development
Aspects of the Tripoli Agreement 2001, which was signed on May 7, 2002 at
Putrajaya, Malaysia. Nonetheless, there were many incidence of violence
between government forces and the MILF from 2002 to 2003. Meanwhile, then
MILF Chairman Salamat Hashim passed away on July 13, 2003 and he was
replaced by Al Haj Murad, who was then the chief peace negotiator of the
MILF. Murad's position as chief peace negotiator was taken over by
Mohagher Iqbal.[6] In 2005, several exploratory talks were held between the
parties in Kuala Lumpur, eventually leading to the crafting of the draft MOA-AD
in its final form, which, as mentioned, was set to be signed last August 5, 2008.
Held: The Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the
GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 is declared contrary to law and
the Constitution.
Ratio: The petitions are ripe for adjudication. The failure of respondents to
consult the local government units or communities affected constitutes a
departure by respondents from their mandate under E.O. No. 3. Moreover,
respondents exceeded their authority by the mere act of guaranteeing
amendments to the Constitution. Any alleged violation of the Constitution by
any branch of government is a proper matter for judicial review. As the
petitions involve constitutional issues which are of paramount public interest or
of transcendental importance, the Court grants the petitioners, petitioners-in-
intervention and intervening respondents the requisite locus standi in keeping
with the liberal stance adopted in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo. Contrary to the
assertion of respondents that the non- signing of the MOA-AD and the eventual
dissolution of the GRP Peace Panel mooted the present petitions, the Court
finds that the present petitions provide an exception to the "moot and
academic" principle in view of (a) the grave violation of the Constitution
involved; (b) the exceptional character of the situation and paramount public
interest; (c) the need to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, the
bar, and the public; and (d) the fact that the case is capable of repetition yet
evading review. The MOA-AD is a significant part of a series of agreements
necessary to carry out the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace signed by the
government and the MILF back in June 2001. Hence, the present MOA-AD can
be renegotiated or another one drawn up that could contain similar or
significantly dissimilar provisions compared to the original. The Court, however,
finds that the prayers for mandamus have been rendered moot in view of the
respondents' action in providing the Court and the petitioners with the official
copy of the final draft of the MOA-AD and its annexes. The people's right to
information on matters of public concern under Sec. 7, Article III of the
Constitution is in
splendid symmetry with the state policy of full public
disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest under Sec. 28, Article II
of the Constitution. The right to information guarantees the right of the people
to demand information, while Section 28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to
give information even if nobody demands. The complete and effective exercise
of the right to information necessitates that its complementary provision on
public disclosure derive the same self-executory nature, subject only to
reasonable safeguards or limitations as may be provided by law. The contents
of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount public concern involving public
interest in the highest order. In declaring that the right to information
contemplates steps and negotiations leading to the consummation of the
contract, jurisprudence finds no distinction as to the executory nature or
commercial character of the agreement. An essential element of these twin
freedoms is to keep a continuing dialogue or process of communication
between the government and the people. Corollary to these twin rights is the
design for feedback mechanisms. The right to public consultation was
envisioned to be a species of these public rights. At least three pertinent laws
animate these constitutional imperatives and justify the exercise of the
people's right to be consulted on relevant matters relating to the peace agenda.
One, E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for continuing consultations on
both national and local levels and for a principal forum for consensus-building.
In fact, it is the duty of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process to conduct
regular dialogues to seek relevant information, comments, advice, and
recommendations from peace partners and concerned sectors of society.
Two, Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 requires all
national offices to conduct consultations before any project or program critical
to the environment and human ecology including those that may call for the
eviction of a particular group of people residing in such locality, is implemented
therein. The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally and
unilaterally vests ownership of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro people,
which could pervasively and drastically result to the diaspora or displacement
of a great number of inhabitants from their total environment.
Three, Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997
provides for clear-cut procedure for the recognition and delineation of
ancestral domain, which entails, among other things, the observance of the
free and prior informed consent of the Indigenous Cultural
Communities/Indigenous Peoples. Notably, the statute does not grant the
Executive Department or any government agency the power to delineate and
recognize an ancestral domain claim by mere agreement or compromise. The
invocation of the doctrine of executive privilege as a defense to the general
right to information or the specific right to consultation is untenable. The
various explicit legal respondents effectively waived such defense after it
unconditionally disclosed the official copies of the final draft of the MOA-AD,
for judicial compliance and public scrutiny. In sum, the Presidential Adviser on
the Peace Process committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed to carry
out the pertinent consultation process, as mandated by E.O. No. 3, Republic Act
No. 7160, and Republic Act No. 8371. The furtive process by which the MOA-AD
was designed and crafted runs contrary to and in excess of the legal authority,
and amounts to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and despotic
exercise thereof. It illustrates a gross evasion of positive duty and a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined. The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with
the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific provisions but the very
concept underlying them, namely, the associative relationship envisioned
between the GRP and the BJE, are unconstitutional , for the concept
presupposes that the associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on
its way to independence. While there is a clause in the MOA-AD stating that the COMELEC stopped its preparations for the ARMM elections.
provisions thereof inconsistent with the present legal framework will not be
effective until that framework is amended, the same does not cure its defect. I. On the issue of synchronization
The inclusion of provisions in the MOA-AD establishing an associative
relationship between the BJE and the Central Government is, itself, a violation Petitioner
of the Memorandum of Instructions From The President dated March 1, 2001,
addressed to the government peace panel. Moreover, as the clause is worded, Respondent
it virtually guarantees that the necessary amendments to the Constitution and
the laws will eventually be put in place. Neither the GRP Peace Panel nor the SC
President herself is authorized to make such a guarantee. Upholding such an
act would amount to authorizing a usurpation of the constituent powers vested • the synchronization mandated by the Constitution does not include the
only in Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people themselves regional elections of the ARMM.
through the process of initiative, for the only way that the Executive can ensure
the outcome of the amendment process is through an undue influence or Synchronization as a recognized constitutional mandate. The Constitution
interference with that process. While the MOA-AD would not amount to an mandates synchronization, and in support of this position, cites Sections 1, 2
international agreement or unilateral declaration binding on the Philippines and 5, Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of the 1987 Constitution
under international law, respondents' act of guaranteeing amendments is, by
itself, already a constitutional violation that renders the MOA-AD 1. While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to
fatally defective. synchronize national and local elections, the clear intent towards this objective
can be gleaned from the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution,
which show the extent to which the Constitutional Commission, by deliberately
making adjustments to the terms of the incumbent officials, sought to attain
synchronization of elections.

Digester: Geronimo, Stan CASE TITLE: Kida vs. Senate (Decision) Date of Case:
2011 October DOCTRINE: Congress acted within its powers and pursuant to a
constitutional mandate – the synchronization of national and local elections –
when it enacted RA No. 10153. This Court cannot question the manner by
which Congress undertook this task nor can the Court presume to dictate the
means by which Congress should address what is essentially a legislative
problem. Petitioner: Datu Michael Abas Kida
– in his personal capacity and in representation of Maguindanao Federation of
Autonomous Irrigators Association, etc. Other petitioners include Rep. Edcel
Lagman and Jacinto Paras as a member of the House of Representatives, Atty.
Romulo Macalintal as a taxpayer, Louis “Barok” Biraogo Respondent: Senate of
the Philippines, Executive Secretary Paquito Ochoa, COMELEC
FACTS: 1. On June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153, entitled “An Act Providing for the
Synchronization of the Elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao (ARMM) with the National and Local Elections and for Other
Purposes” was enacted. The law reset the ARMM elections from the 8th of
August 2011, to the second Monday of May 2013 and every 3 years thereafter,
to coincide with the country’s regular national and local elections. The law as
well granted the President the power to “appoint officers-in-charge (OICs) for
the Office of the Regional Governor, the Regional Vice-Governor, and the
Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly, who shall perform the functions
pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013
elections shall have qualified and assumed office.”
*History and Trivia: On August 1, 1989 Congress acted through RA No. 6734
entitled “An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao.” A plebiscite was held on November 6, 1990 as required by
Section 18(2), Article X of RA No. 6734, thus fully establishing the ARMM. RA
No. 9054 (Expanded Organic Act) was the subsequently passed which, among
others, reset the regular elections for the ARMM regional officials to the second
Monday of September 2001. 2. A No. 9140 was passed in 2001. This law reset
the first regular elections originally scheduled under RA No. 9054, to November
26, 2001. 3. RA No. 9333 was subsequently passed by Congress to reset the
ARMM regional elections to the 2nd Monday of August 2005, and on the same
date every 3 years thereafter. Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM
regional elections should have been held on August 8, 2011. COMELEC had
begun preparations for these elections and had accepted certificates of
candidacies for the various regional offices to be elected. But on June 30, 2011,
RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting the ARMM elections to May 2013, to
coincide with the regular national and local elections of the country. Thus, the
2. The objective behind setting a common termination date for all elective
officials is to synchronize the holding of all future elections – whether national
or local – to once every three years. This intention finds full support in the
discussions during the Constitutional Commission deliberations. 3. Although
called regional elections, the ARMM elections should be included among the
elections to be synchronized as it is a “local” election based on the wording and
structure of the Constitution. A basic rule in constitutional construction is that
the words used should be understood in the sense that they have in common
use and given their ordinary meaning, except when technical terms are
employed. Understood in its ordinary sense, the word “local” refers to
something that primarily serves the needs of a particular limited district, ARMM
officials will serve within the limited region of ARMM.
II. On ths issue of President’s Certification on the Urgency of RA No. 10153
• RA No. 10153 is unconstitutional for its failure to comply with the three-
reading requirement of Section 26(2), Article VI of the Constitution.
• The phrase "except when the President certifies to the necessity of its
immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI, Section 26[2] qualifies the two stated
conditions before a bill can become a law: [i] the bill has passed three readings
on separate days and [ii] it has been printed in its final form and distributed
three days before it is finally approved.
1. In Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, the court held that the phrase "except
when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment, etc."
in Art. VI, Section 26[2] qualifies the two stated conditions before a bill can
become a law: [i] the bill has passed three readings on separate days and [ii] it
has been printed in its final form and distributed three days before it is finally
approved.
2. In the present case, the records show that the President wrote to the
Speaker of the House of Representatives to certify the necessity of the
immediate enactment of a law synchronizing the ARMM elections with the
national and local elections. Following our Tolentino ruling, the President’s
certification exempted both the House and the Senate from having to comply
with the three separate readings requirement.
RA No. 10153 fails to comply with Section 26(2), Article VI of the Constitution
which provides that before bills passed by either the House or the Senate can
become laws, they must pass through three readings on separate days. The
exception is when the President certifies to the necessity of the bill’s immediate Congress to amend, revise or repeal the laws it had passed. 4. Re: plebiscite
enactment requirement: the enlargement of the plebiscite requirement required under
Section 18, Article X of the Constitution to be excessive to point of absurdity
III. On the issue of RA 10153 being amendments to RA No. 9054 and, hence, a violation of the Constitution. Section 18, Article X of the
Constitution states that the plebiscite is required only for the creation of
• RA 9150, 9333 and 10153 amend RA No. 9054 and thus, have to comply with autonomous regions and for determining which provinces, cities and
the supermajority vote and plebiscite requirements prescribed under Sections geographic areas will be included in the autonomous regions. With these
1 and 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 in order to become effective. wordings as standard, we interpret the requirement to mean that only
amendments to, or revisions of, the Organic Act constitutionally-essential to
• The postponement of the ARMM regular elections does not constitute an the creation of autonomous regions. The date of the ARMM elections does not
amendment to Section 7, Article XVIII of RA No. 9054. Adoption of fall under any of the matters that the Constitution specifically mandated
supermajority voting requirement unconstitutional for giving RA No. 9054 the Congress to provide for in the Organic Act.
character of an irrepealable law
IV. On the issue of local autonomy granted to the ARMM
3. In any case, despite the President’s certification, the two-fold purpose that
underlies the requirement for three readings on separate days of every bill • alleged violations of the right of suffrage of the people of ARMM
must always be observed to enable our legislators and other parties interested
in pending bills to intelligently respond to them. We find that both advocates • failure to adhere to the “elective and representative” character of the
and the opponents of the proposed measure had sufficient opportunities to executive and legislative departments of the ARMM.
present their views. In this light, no reason exists to nullify RA No. 10153 on the
cited ground. 1. Neither RA No. 9333 nor RA No. 10153 amends RA No. 9054. • Faced with the problem of how to provide the ARMM with governance in the
RA No. 9054 only provides for the schedule of the first ARMM elections and intervening period between the expiration of the term of those elected in
does not fix the date of the regular elections. A need therefore existed for the August 2008 and the assumption to office – 21 months away – of those who
Congress to fix the date of the subsequent ARMM regular elections, which it will win in the synchronized elections on May 13, 2013, the Court identified the
did by enacting RA No. 9333 and thereafter, RA No. 10153. Obviously, these three options open to Congress in order to resolve this problem. o (1) to allow
subsequent laws cannot be considered amendments to RA No. 9054 as they did the elective officials in the ARMM to remain in office in a hold over capacity,
not change or revise any provision in the latter law; they merely filled in a gap pursuant to Section 7(1), Article VII of RA 9054, until those elected in the
in RA No. 9054 or supplemented the law by providing the date of the synchronized elections assume office o (2) to hold special elections in the
subsequent regular elections. ARMM, with the terms of those elected to expire when those elected in the
synchronized elections assume office; or o (3) to authorize the President to
• The effectivity of RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 has also been challenged appoint OICs, pursuant to Section 3 of RA No. 10153, also until those elected in
because they did not comply with Sections 1 and 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 the synchronized elections assume office. •
in amending this law. (Act may only be reamended or revised by the Congress
of the Philippines upon a vote of two-thirds (2/3) of the Members of the House The Court ruled:
of Representatives and of the Senate voting separately and approved by a
majority of the vote cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose xxx) · 1st – ruled out. Holdover for those who were elected in executive and
legislative positions in the ARMM during the 2008-2011 term – as an option
• It also does not require a plebiscite as such requirement applies only in the that Congress could have chosen because a holdover violates Section 8, Article
creation of autonomous regions under paragraph 2, Section 18, Article X of the X of the Constitution.[1]
1987 Constitution.
• 2nd - COMELEC has no authority to order special elections. The power to fix
2. This view – that Congress thought it best to leave the determination of the the date of elections is essentially legislative in nature. After Congress has so
date of succeeding ARMM elections to legislative discretion – finds support in acted, neither the Executive nor the Judiciary can act to the contrary by
ARMM’s recent history. The First Organic Act (RA No. 6734) left the date to be ordering special elections instead at the call of the COMELEC. • 3rd- The Court
fixed in another legislative enactment. RA No. 9054 then provided that the first has no power to shorten the terms of elective officials, the Court is not
elections would be held on the second Monday of September 2001 but empowered to adjust the terms of elective officials. Based on the Constitution,
Congress passed RA No. 9140 and 9333 to reset the date of the ARMM the power to fix the term of office of elective officials, which can be exercised
elections. From these legislative actions, we see the clear intention of Congress only in the case of barangay officials, is specifically given to Congress.
to treat the laws which fix the date of the subsequent ARMM elections as
separate and distinct from the Organic Acts. Congress only acted consistently · [1] Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay
with this intent when it passed RA No. 10153 without requiring compliance officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such
with the amendment prerequisites embodied in Section 1 and Section 3, Article official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. V. On the issue of
XVII of RA No. 9054. appointment of OICs

3. Re: supermajority voting: Even assuming that RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 • petitioners challenged the grant to the President of the power to appoint
did in fact amend RA No. 9054, the supermajority (2/3) voting requirement OICs to undertake the functions of the elective ARMM officials until the officials
required under Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 has to be struck down for elected under the May 2013 regular elections shall have assumed office.
giving RA No. 9054 the character of an irrepealable law by requiring more than Corrolarily,
what the Constitution demands. Section 16(2), Article VI of the Constitution
provides that a “majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do • The President can appoint those whom the President may be authorized by
business.” In contrast, Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 requires a vote of law to appoint; and since the President’s authority to appoint OICs emanates
no less than two-thirds (2/3) of the Members of the House of Representatives from RA No. 10153, it falls under the third group of officials that the President
and of the Senate, voting separately, in order to effectively amend RA No. 9054. can appoint pursuant to Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. Thus, the
Clearly, this 2/3 voting requirement is higher than what the Constitution assailed law facially rests on clear constitutional basis.
requires for the passage of bills, and served to restrain the plenary powers of
• the power of appointment also gave the President the power of control over
the ARMM, in complete violation of Section 16, Article X of the Constitution.
• Admittedly, the grant of the power to the President under other situations or
where the power of appointment would extend beyond the adjustment period
for synchronization would be to foster a government that is not “democratic
and republican.” But this conclusion would not be true under the very limited
circumstances contemplated in RA No. 10153 where the period is fixed and,
more importantly, the terms of governance – both under Section 18, Article X
of the Constitution and RA No. 9054 – will not systemically be touched nor
affected at all. To repeat what has previously been said, RA No. 9054 will
govern unchanged and continuously, with full effect in accordance with the
Constitution, save only for the interim and temporary measures that
synchronization of elections requires.
Dispositive Portion:
Court DISMISSED the consolidated petitions assailing the validity of RA No.
10153 for lack of merit, and UPHELD the constitutionality of this law.
Datu Michael Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines, et al., G.R. No. 196271,
October 18, 2011
DECISION
BRION,
I.      THE FACTS
Several laws pertaining to the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
(ARMM) were enacted by Congress. Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 is the organic
act that established the ARMM and scheduled the first regular elections for the
ARMM regional officials. RA No. 9054 amended the ARMM Charter and reset
the regular elections for the ARMM regional officials to the second Monday of
September 2001. RA No. 9140 further reset the first regular elections to
November 26, 2001. RA No. 9333 reset for the third time the ARMM regional
elections to the 2nd Monday of August 2005 and on the same date every 3
years thereafter.
Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have been
held on August 8, 2011. COMELEC had begun preparations for these elections
and had accepted certificates of candidacies for the various regional offices to
be elected.  But on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting the
next ARMM regular elections to May 2013 to coincide with the regular national
and local elections of the country.
In these consolidated petitions filed directly with the Supreme Court, the
petitioners assailed the constitutionality of RA No. 10153.
II.   THE ISSUES:
1.    Does the 1987 Constitution mandate the synchronization of elections
[including the ARMM elections]?
2.    Does the passage of RA No. 10153 violate the three-readings-on-separate-
days rule under Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution?
3.    Is the grant [to the President] of the power to appoint OICs constitutional?  
III. THE RULING
[The Supreme Court] DISMISSED the petitions and UPHELD the constitutionality
of RA No. 10153 in toto.]
1.    YES, the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections.
While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to
synchronize national and local elections, the clear intent towards this objective
can be gleaned from the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the
Constitution, which show the extent to which the Constitutional Commission,
by deliberately making adjustments to the terms of the incumbent officials,
sought to attain synchronization of elections. The Constitutional Commission
exchanges, read with the provisions of the Transitory Provisions of the
J.:
Constitution, all serve as patent indicators of the constitutional mandate to
hold synchronized national and local elections, starting the second Monday of
May 1992 and for all the following elections.
In this case, the ARMM elections, although called “regional” elections, should
be included among the elections to be synchronized as it is a “local” election
based on the wording and structure of the Constitution.
Thus, it is clear from the foregoing that the 1987 Constitution mandates the
synchronization of elections, including the ARMM elections.
2.    NO, the passage of RA No. 10153 DOES NOT violate the three-readings-on-
separate-days requirement in Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
The general rule that before bills passed by either the House or the Senate can
become laws they must pass through three readings on separate days, is
subject to the EXCEPTION when the President certifies to the necessity of the
bill’s immediate enactment. The Court, in Tolentino v. Secretary of
Finance, explained the effect of the President’s certification of necessity in the
following manner:
The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of
printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days. The phrase "except
when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment, etc."
in Art. VI, Section 26[2] qualifies the two stated conditions before a bill can
become a law: [i] the bill has passed three readings on separate days and [ii] it
has been printed in its final form and distributed three days before it is finally
approved.
In the present case, the records show that the President wrote to the Speaker
of the House of Representatives to certify the necessity of the immediate
enactment of a law synchronizing the ARMM elections with the national and
local elections. Following our Tolentino ruling, the President’s certification
exempted both the House and the Senate from having to comply with the three
separate readings requirement.  completely removing this provision. The deletion is a policy decision that is
3.    YES, the grant [to the President] of the power to appoint OICs in the ARMM
is constitutional
[During the oral arguments, the Court identified the three options open to
Congress in order to resolve the problem on who should sit as ARMM officials
in the interim [in order to achieve synchronization in the 2013 elections]: (1)
allow the [incumbent] elective officials in the ARMM to remain in office in
a hold over capacity until those elected in the synchronized elections assume
office; (2) hold special elections in the ARMM, with the terms of those elected
to expire when those elected in the [2013] synchronized elections assume
office; or (3) authorize the President to appoint OICs, [their respective terms to
last also until those elected in the 2013 synchronized elections assume office.]
3.1.    1st option: Holdover is unconstitutional since it would extend the terms
of office of the incumbent ARMM officials
We rule out the [hold over] option since it violates Section 8, Article X of the
Constitution.  This provision states:
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials,
which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall
serve for more than three consecutive terms. [emphases ours]
Since elective ARMM officials are local officials, they are covered and bound by
the three-year term limit prescribed by the Constitution; they cannot extend
their term through a holdover. xxx.
If it will be claimed that the holdover period is effectively another term
mandated by Congress, the net result is for Congress to create a new term and
to appoint the occupant for the new term. This view – like the extension of the
elective term – is constitutionally infirm because Congress cannot do indirectly
what it cannot do directly, i.e., to act in a way that would effectively extend the
term of the incumbents. Indeed, if acts that cannot be legally done directly can
be done indirectly, then all laws would be illusory. Congress cannot also create
a new term and effectively appoint the occupant of the position for the new
term. This is effectively an act of appointment by Congress and an
unconstitutional intrusion into the constitutional appointment power of the
President. Hence, holdover – whichever way it is viewed – is a constitutionally
infirm option that Congress could not have undertaken.
Even assuming that holdover is constitutionally permissible, and there had
been statutory basis for it (namely Section 7, Article VII of RA No. 9054) in the
past, we have to remember that the rule of holdover can only apply as an
available option where no express or implied legislative intent to the contrary
exists; it cannot apply where such contrary intent is evident.
Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, made it explicitly clear that it had the
intention of suppressing the holdover rule that prevailed under RA No. 9054 by
wholly within the discretion of Congress to make in the exercise of its plenary
legislative powers; this Court cannot pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or
expediency of legislation, except where an attendant unconstitutionality or
grave abuse of discretion results.
3.2.    2nd option: Calling special elections is unconstitutional since COMELEC,
on its own, has no authority to order special elections.
The power to fix the date of elections is essentially legislative in nature. [N]o
elections may be held on any other date for the positions of President, Vice
President, Members of Congress and local officials, except when so provided by
another Act of Congress, or upon orders of a body or officer to whom Congress
may have delegated either the power or the authority to ascertain or fill in the
details in the execution of that power.
Notably, Congress has acted on the ARMM elections by postponing the
scheduled August 2011 elections and setting another date – May 13, 2011 – for
regional elections synchronized with the presidential, congressional and other
local elections.  By so doing, Congress itself has made a policy decision in the
exercise of its legislative wisdom that it shall not call special elections as an
adjustment measure in synchronizing the ARMM elections with the other
elections.
After Congress has so acted, neither the Executive nor the Judiciary can act to
the contrary by ordering special elections instead at the call of the
COMELEC.  This Court, particularly, cannot make this call without thereby
supplanting the legislative decision and effectively legislating.  To be sure, the
Court is not without the power to declare an act of Congress null and void for
being unconstitutional or for having been exercised in grave abuse of
discretion. But our power rests on very narrow ground and is merely to annul a
contravening act of Congress; it is not to supplant the decision of Congress nor
to mandate what Congress itself should have done in the exercise of its
legislative powers. 
Thus, in the same way that the term of elective ARMM officials cannot be
extended through a holdover, the term cannot be shortened by putting an
expiration date earlier than the three (3) years that the Constitution itself
commands.  This is what will happen – a term of less than two years – if a call
for special elections shall prevail. In sum, while synchronization is achieved, the
result is at the cost of a violation of an express provision of the Constitution. 
  
3.3.    3rd option: Grant to the President of the power to appoint ARMM OICs in
the interim is valid.
The above considerations leave only Congress’ chosen interim measure – RA
No. 10153 and the appointment by the President of OICs to govern the ARMM
during the pre-synchronization period pursuant to Sections 3, 4 and 5 of this
law – as the only measure that Congress can make.  This choice itself, however,
should be examined for any attendant constitutional infirmity.
At the outset, the power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the
limitations on or qualifications to the exercise of this power should be strictly
construed; these limitations or qualifications must be clearly stated in order to
be recognized. The appointing power is embodied in Section 16, Article VII of
the Constitution, which states:
Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive
departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls or officers of the
armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers
whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also
appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law
to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers
lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of
departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. [emphasis ours]
This provision classifies into four groups the officers that the President can
appoint. These are:
First, the heads of the executive departments; ambassadors; other public
ministers and consuls; officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, from the
rank of colonel or naval captain; and other officers whose appointments are
vested in the President in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; and
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law
vest in the President alone.
Since the President’s authority to appoint OICs emanates from RA No. 10153, it
falls under the third group of officials that the President can appoint pursuant
to Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. Thus, the assailed law facially rests
on clear constitutional basis. 
If at all, the gravest challenge posed by the petitions to the authority to appoint
OICs under Section 3 of RA No. 10153 is the assertion that the Constitution
requires that the ARMM executive and legislative officials to be “elective and
representative of the constituent political units.” This requirement indeed is an
express limitation whose non-observance in the assailed law leaves the
appointment of OICs constitutionally defective. 
After fully examining the issue, we hold that this alleged  constitutional
problem is more apparent than real and becomes very real only if RA No. 10153
were to be mistakenly read as a law that changes the elective and
representative character of ARMM positions.  RA No. 10153, however, does not
in any way amend what the organic law of the ARMM (RA No. 9054) sets outs
in terms of structure of governance.  What RA No. 10153 in fact only does is
to “appoint officers-in-charge for the Office of the Regional Governor, Regional
Vice Governor and Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly who shall
perform the functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly
elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed
office.”  This power is far different from appointing elective ARMM officials for
the abbreviated term ending on the assumption to office of the officials elected
in the May 2013 elections.
[T]he legal reality is that RA No. 10153 did not amend RA No. 9054.  RA No.
10153, in fact, provides only for synchronization of elections and for the interim
measures that must in the meanwhile prevail.  And this is how RA No. 10153
should be read – in the manner it was written and based on its unambiguous
facial terms. Aside from its order for synchronization, it is purely and simply an
interim measure responding to the adjustments that the synchronization
requires. 
JOHN HAY PEOPLES ALTERNATIVE COALITION vs. LIM
G. R. No. 119775, October 24, 2003
FACTS:
R.A. No. 7227 otherwise known as the "Bases Conversion and Development Act
of 1992," which was enacted setting out the policy of the government to
accelerate the sound and balanced conversion into alternative productive uses
of the former military bases under the 1947 Philippines-United States of
America Military Bases Agreement, namely, the Clark and Subic military
reservations as well as their extensions including the Camp John Hay Station in
the City of Baguio. It created public respondent Bases Conversion and
Development Authority2 (BCDA), and the Subic Special Economic [and Free
Port] Zone (Subic SEZ). Also the said law granted the Subic SEZ incentives
ranging from tax and duty-free importations, exemption of businesses therein
from local and national taxes.
On August 16, 1993, BCDA entered into a Memorandum of Agreement and
Escrow Agreement with private respondents Tuntex (B.V.I.) Co., Ltd (TUNTEX)
and Asiaworld Internationale Group, Inc. (ASIAWORLD), preparatory to the
formation of a joint venture for the development of Poro Point in La Union and
Camp John Hay as premier tourist destinations and recreation centers. Four
months later, BCDA, TUNTEX and ASIAWORD executed a Joint Venture
Agreement whereby they bound themselves to put up a joint venture company
known as the Baguio International Development and Management
Corporation.
Meanwhile, the Baguio City government passed a number of resolutions in
response to the actions taken by BCDA in their MOA and as owner and
administrator of Camp John Hay. One of which is Resolution No. 255, seeking
and supporting the issuance by then President Ramos of a presidential
proclamation declaring an area of 288.1 hectares of the camp as a SEZ in
accordance with the provisions of R.A. No. 7227.
On July 5, 1994 then President Ramos issued Proclamation No. 420 which
established a SEZ on a portion of Camp John Hay, and in effect, granted tax
exemptions pursuant to R.A. No. 7227 to Subic SEZ extends to other SEZs.
The petitioners now allege that nowhere in R. A. No. 7227 is there a grant of tax
exemption to SEZs yet to be established in base areas, unlike the grant under
Section 12 thereof of tax exemption and investment incentives to the therein
established Subic SEZ. The grant of tax exemption to the John Hay SEZ,
petitioners conclude, thus contravenes Article VI, Section 28 (4) of the
Constitution which provides that "No law granting any tax exemption shall be
passed without the concurrence of a majority of all the members of Congress."
On the other hand, respondents contend that by extending to the John Hay SEZ
economic incentives similar to those enjoyed by the Subic SEZ which was
established under R.A. No. 7227, the proclamation is merely implementing the
legislative intent of said law to turn the US military bases into hubs of business
activity or investment. They underscore the point that the government's policy
of bases conversion can not be achieved without extending the same tax
exemptions granted by R.A. No. 7227 to Subic SEZ to other SEZs.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Proclamation No. 420 (particularly Sec. 3) is unconstitutional
since it provides for national and local tax exemption and grants other
economic incentives to the John Hay SEZ
RULING:
Yes. The SC ruled in favor of the Petitioners.
It is clear that under Section 12 of R.A. No. 7227 it is only the Subic SEZ which
was granted by Congress with tax exemption, investment incentives and the
like. There is no express extension of the aforesaid benefits to other SEZs still to
be created at the time via presidential proclamation.
While the grant of economic incentives may be essential to the creation and
success of SEZs, free trade zones and the like, the grant thereof to the John Hay
SEZ cannot be sustained. The incentives under R.A. No. 7227 are exclusive only
to the Subic SEZ, hence, the extension of the same to the John Hay SEZ finds no
support therein. Neither does the same grant of privileges to the John Hay SEZ
find support in the other laws specified under Section 3 of Proclamation No.
420, which laws were already extant before the issuance of the proclamation or
the enactment of R.A. No. 7227.
More importantly, the nature of most of the assailed privileges is one of tax
exemption. It is the legislature, unless limited by a provision of the state
constitution, that has full power to exempt any person or corporation or class
of property from taxation, its power to exempt being as broad as its power to
tax. Other than Congress, the Constitution may itself provide for specific tax
exemptions, or local governments may pass ordinances on exemption only
from local taxes.
The challenged grant of tax exemption would circumvent the Constitution's
imposition that a law granting any tax exemption must have the concurrence of
a majority of all the members of Congress. In the same vein, the other kinds of
privileges extended to the John Hay SEZ are by tradition and usage for Congress
to legislate upon. If it were the intent of the legislature to grant to the John Hay
SEZ the same tax exemption and incentives given to the Subic SEZ, it would
have so expressly provided in the R.A. No. 7227.
Thus, the second sentence of Section 3 of Proclamation No. 420 is hereby
declared NULL AND VOID and is accordingly declared of no legal force and
effect.
Cordillera Broad Coalition vs. Commission on Audit
Facts:Pursuant to a ceasefire agreement signed on September 13, 1986, the
Cordillera People’s Liberation Army (CPLA) and the Cordillera Bodong
Administration agreed that the Cordillera people shall not undertake their
demands through armed and violent struggle but by peaceful means, such as
political negotiations.
A subsequent joint agreement was then arrived at by the two parties. Such
agreement states that they are to:
Par. 2.  Work together in drafting an Executive Order to create a preparatory
body that could perform policy-making and administrative functions and
undertake consultations and studies leading to a draft organic act for the
Cordilleras.
Par. 3. Have representatives from the Cordillera panel join the study group of
the R.P. Panel in drafting the Executive Order.
Pursuant to the above joint agreement, E.O. 220 was drafted by a panel of the
Philippine government and of the representatives of the Cordillera people. This
was then signed into law by President Corazon Aquino, in the exercise of her
legislative powers, creating the Cordillera Administrative Region [CAR], which
covers the provinces of Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga-Apayao and Mountain
Province and the City of Baguio.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of E.O. 220 on the primary ground that
by issuing the said order, the President, in the exercise of her legislative
powers, had virtually pre-empted Congress from its mandated task of enacting
an organic act and created an autonomous region in the Cordilleras.
Issue:Whether or not E.O. 220 is constitutional
Ruling:The Supreme Court has come to the conclusion that petitioners’ are
unfounded.
E.O. 220 does not create the autonomous region contemplated in the
Constitution. It merely provides for transitory measures in anticipation of the
enactment of an organic act and the creation of an autonomous region. In
short, it prepares the ground for autonomy. This does not necessarily conflict
with the provisions of the Constitution on autonomous regions.
The Constitution outlines a complex procedure for the creation of an
autonomous region in the Cordilleras. Since such process will undoubtedly take
time, the President saw it fit to provide for some measures to address the
urgent needs of the Cordilleras in the meantime that the organic act had not
yet been passed and the autonomous region created. At this time, the
President was still exercising legislative powers as the First Congress had not
yet convened.
Based on Article X Section 18 of the Constitution (providing the basic structure
of government in the autonomous region), the Supreme Court finds that E. O.
No. 220 did not establish an autonomous regional government. The bodies
created by E. O. No. 220 do not supplant the existing local governmental
structure; nor are they autonomous government agencies. They merely
constitute the mechanism for an "umbrella" that brings together the existing
local governments, the agencies of the National Government, the ethno-
linguistic groups or tribes and non-governmental organizations in a concerted
effort to spur development in the Cordilleras.
In fact, it was Republic Act No. 6766, the organic act for the Cordillera
autonomous region signed into law on October 23, 1989, and the plebiscite for
the approval of the act which completed the autonomous region-creating
process outlined in the Constitution.
Therefore, E.O. 220 is constitutional. Petition is dismissed for lack of merit.
Badua vs. Cordillera Bodong Association (1991)
Spouses Badua, allegedly own a farm land in faraway Abra and were forcibly
ejected from the land by virtue of a "decision" of the Cordillera Bodong
Administration of the Cordillera People's Liberation Army. Fearful for his life,
the brave Leonor Badua went into hiding while his wife, Rosa, was arrested by
the Cordillera People's Liberation Army and detained for two days. The Baduas
filed this petition. 3.
Issue: WON a tribal court of the Cordillera Bodong Administration can render a
valid and executory decision in a land dispute.
rejected by all the provinces and city of the Cordillera region, except Ifugao
province, hence, the Cordillera Autonomous Region did not come to be. As a
logical consequence of that judicial declaration, the Cordillera Bodong
Administration, the indigenous and special courts for the indigenous cultural
communities of the Cordillera region and the Cordillera People's Liberation
Army, do not legally exist. Since the Cordillera Autonomous Region did not
come into legal existence, the Maeng Tribal Court was not constituted into an
indigenous or special court under R.A. No. 6766. Hence, the Maeng Tribal Court
is an ordinary tribal court existing under the customs and traditions of an
indigenous cultural community. They do not possess judicial power.
Issue II: WON the CAR is a territorial and political subdivision.
NO. 1. 2. Not a public corporation and without separate juridical personality,
unlike provinces, cities and municipalities. Created primarily for expediting the
delivery of services - The CAR is in the same genre as the administrative regions
created under the Reorganization Plan, albeit under E.O. No. 220. The
operation of the CAR requires the participation not only of the line
departments and agencies of the National Government but also the local
governments, ethno-linguistic groups and NGOs in bringing about the desired
objectives and the appropriation of funds solely for that purpose. President’s
power of control and supervision – allowed because it is merely a regional
coordinating agency, similar to the regional development councils which the
President may create under the Constitution (CAR more sophisticated version)
MMDA vs. Garin 2005 Respondent Garin was issued a traffic violation receipt
and his driver’s license was confiscated for parking illegally. Garin wrote MMDA
Chairman Prospero Oreta requesting the return of his license and expressed his
preference for case to be filed in Court. Without an immediate reply from the
reply from the Chairman, Garin filed a complaint for preliminary injunction
assailing among other that Sec 5(+) of RA 7942 violates the constitutional
prohibition against undue delegation of legislative authority, allowing MMDA to
fix and impose unspecified and unlimited fines and penalties. RTC rules in his
favor directing MMDA to return Garin’s driver’s license and for MMDA to desist
from confiscating driver’s license without first giving the driver to opportunity
to be heard in an appropriate proceeding. 3.
Issue III: WON it contravened the constitutional guarantee of local autnonomy
for the provinces (Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga-Apayao and Mountain
Province … and Baguio City).
BADUA VS. CORILLERA
Facts: Spouses Leonor and Rosa Badua allegedly own farm land from which
they were forcibly ejected through the decision of the Cordillera Bodong
Administration, with the case entitled David Quema v. Leonor Badua. The
background of this case reveals that David Quema owns the parcels of land
evidenced by Tax Declarations 4997 and 4998. The parcels of land were
purchased from Dr. Erotida Valera. Twenty-two (22) years later, he was able to
redeem the parcels of land through payment of 10,000 to the vendor's heir,
Jessie Macaraeg. Quema was prevented from tilling the land by Rosa Badua.
Prompted by such turn of events, David Quema filed a case in the Baranggay
Council but failed to have the dispute settled. A judge advised Quema to file his
case in the provincial courts. However, Quema did not, and filed it in the tribal
court of the Maeng Tribe. Due to several warnings from the tribe, spouses
Badua filed a petition for special relief, with the following to be settled: a. That
the respondents be enjoined from enforcing the decision of the tribal court in
the pending case. b. The respondents be prohibited from usurping judicial
power. c. That the legal personality of the Cordillera Bodong Administration be
clarified. The Baduas also allege that they were denied due process (or hearing)
and that the tribal court has NO jurisdiction over the case, since neither they
nor the respondent are members of the Maeng tribe. The respondents contend
that the SC has no jurisdiction over the case since the tribal court is NOT a part
of the judicial system.
 
Issue: Whether the tribal court has jurisdiction over the case.
 
Held: No. Tribal courts are not a part of the Philippine judicial system which
consists of the Supreme Court and the lower courts which have been
established by law (Sec. 1, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution). They do not possess
judicial power. Like the pangkats or conciliation panels created by P.D. No. 1508
in the barangays, they are advisory and conciliatory bodies whose principal
objective is to bring together the parties to a dispute and persuade them to
make peace, settle, and compromise. An amicable settlement, compromise,
and arbitration award rendered by a pangkat, if not seasonably repudiated, has
the force and effect of a final judgment of a court (Sec. 11, P.D. 1508), but it can
be enforced only through the local city or municipal court to which the
secretary of the Lupon transmits the compromise settlement or arbitration
award upon expiration of the period to annul or repudiate it (Sec. 14, P.D.
1508). Similarly, the decisions of a tribal court based on compromise or
arbitration, as provided in P.D. 1508, may be enforced or set aside, in and
through the regular courts today.