REPUBLIC 

OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, v. GREGORIO affirming the trial court’s decision declaring Janet Monica Parker
NOLASCO,respondent. presumptively dead is hereby reversed and both Decisions are hereby
G.R. No. 94053. March 17, 1993. nullified and set aside.

Facts: On 5 August 1988, respondent Gregorio Nolasco filed before the
Regional Trial Court a petition for the declaration of presumptive death
of his wife Janet Monica Parker, involving Article 41 of the Family
Code. The petition prayed that respondent’s wife be declared
presumptively dead or, in the alternative, that the marriage be declared
null and void.
The Republic of the Philippines opposed the petition through the
Provincial Prosecutor of Antique who had been deputized to assist the
Solicitor-General in the instant case. The Republic argued, first, that
Nolasco did not possess a well-founded belief that the absent spouse
was already dead; and second, Nolasco’s attempt to have his marriage
annulled in the same proceeding was a cunning attempt to circumvent
the law on marriage.
Respondent Nolasco testified that he was a seaman and that he had first met
Janet Monica Parker, a British subject, in a bar in England during one of his
ship’s port calls. From that chance meeting onwards, Janet Monica Parker lived
with respondent Nolasco on his ship for six months until they returned to
respondent’s hometown of San Jose, Antique on 19 November 1980 after his
seaman’s contract expired. On 15 January 1982, respondent married Janet
Monica Parker in San Jose, Antique, in Catholic rites officiated by Fr. Henry van
Tilborg in the Cathedral of San Jose.
He obtained another employment contract as a seaman and left his wife
with his parents in San Jose, Antique. Sometime in January 1983, while
working overseas, respondent received a letter from his mother
informing him that Janet Monica had given birth to his son. The same
letter informed him that Janet Monica had left Antique.
LILIA OLIVA WIEGEL, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE
ALICIA V. SEMPIO-DIY and KARL HEINZ WIEGEL,
respondents.
G.R. No. L-53703 August 19, 1986
Facts: Karl Heinz Wiegel before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court of Caloocan City filed for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage with Lilia Oliva Wiegel on the ground of Lilia’s previously
existing marriage to one Eduardo A. Maxion. Lilia, while admitting
the existence of the said prior subsisting marriage claimed that the said
marriage was null and void as she and first husband Eduardo Maxion
was forced to enter the said marital union. In the pre-trial that ensued,
the issue agreed upon by both parties was the status of the first
marriage (whether the said prior marriage is void or merely voidable).
Lilia contested the validity of the pre trial order asking for respondent
court for an opportunity to present evidence.
Issue: Whether or not there is a need for Lilia Wiegel to prove that
her first marriage was vitiated by fore.
Ruling: There is no need for petitioner to prove that her first
marriage was vitiated by force committed against both parties because
assuming this to be so, the marriage will not be void but merely
voidable. Since no annulment has yet been made, it is clear that when
she married respondent she was still validly married to her first
husband, consequently, her marriage to respondent is void.

Respondent further testified that his efforts to look for her himself
whenever his ship docked in England proved fruitless. He also stated
that all the letters he had sent to his missing spouse at No. 38 Ravena
Road, Allerton, Liverpool, England, the address of the bar where he and
Janet Monica first met, were all returned to him. He also claimed that
he inquired from among friends but they too had no news of Janet
Monica.

The trial court granted Nolasco’s petition hereby declaring the

presumptively death of Janet Monica Parker Nolasco, without prejudice
to her reappearance.

The Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals contending that the trial

court erred in declaring Janet Monica Parker presumptively dead
because respondent Nolasco had failed to show that there existed a well
founded belief for such declaration. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
trial court’s decision, holding that respondent had sufficiently
established a basis to form a belief that his absent spouse had already
died.

Issue: Whether or not Nolasco has a well-founded belief that his wife
is already dead.

Ruling: No. The Court believes that respondent Nolasco failed to

conduct a search for his missing wife with such diligence as to give rise
to a “well-founded belief” that she is dead. Pursuant to Article 41 of the
Family Code, a marriage contracted by any person during the
subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before
the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been
absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well
founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In fine,
respondent failed to establish that he had the well-founded belief
required by law that his absent wife was already dead that would
sustain the issuance of a court order declaring Janet Monica Parker
presumptively dead. Thus, the Decision of the Court of Appeals

LEONILO DONATO, petitioner, vs. HON ARTEMON LUNA and
PAZABAYAN,respondents. April 15, 1988
Facts: On September 28, 1979, before the petitioner’s arraignment,
private respondent filed with the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court a civil action for declaration of nullity of her marriage with
petitioner contracted on September 26, 1978. Said civil case was based
on the ground that private respondent consented to entering into the
marriage, which was petitioner Donato’s second one, since she had no
previous knowledge that petitioner was already married to Rosalinda
Maluping on June 30, 1978. Petitioner’s answer in the civil case for
nullity interposed the defense that his second marriage was void since it
was solemnized without a marriage license and that force, violence,
intimidation, and undue influence were employed by private respondent
to obtain petitioner’s consent to the marriage. Prior to the solemnization
of the subsequent marriage, petitioner and private respondent had lived
together and deported themselves as husband and wife without the
benefit of wedlock for a period of at least five years as evidenced by a
joint affidavit executed by them on September 26, 1978, for which
reason, the requisite marriage license was dispensed with pursuant to
Article76 of the New Civil Code pertaining to marriages of exceptional
character. Prior to the date set for the trial on the merits of Criminal
Case, petitioner filed a motion to suspend the proceedings of said case
contending Civil Case seeking the annulment of his second marriage
filed by private respondent raises a prejudicial question which must first
be determined or decided before the criminal case can proceed.
Issue: Whether or not a criminal case for bigamy pending before the
Court of First Instance should be suspended in view of a civil case
for annulment of marriage pending before the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court on the ground that the latter constitutes a
prejudicial question
Ruling: The respondent judge ruled in the negative and the Supreme
Court sustains him. A prejudicial question has been defined to be one
which arises in a case, the resolution of question is a logical antecedent
of the issue involved in said case, and the cognizance of which pertains
to another tribunal. It is based on a fact distinct or separate from the
crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or
innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it
must appear not only in the said case involves facts intimately related to
those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that
in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt
or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. The issue
before the Juvenile and Domestic Relation Court is not determinative of
petitioner’s guilt or innocence in the crime of bigamy. It was
petitioner’s second wife, who filed the complainant for annulment of
the second marriage on the ground that her consent was obtained
through deceit. Pursuant to the doctrine discussed in Landicho vs.
Relova, petitioner cannot apply the rule on prejudicial question since a
case for annulment of marriage can be considered as a prejudicial
question to the bigamy case against the accused only if it is proved that
the petitioner’s consent to such marriage was obtained by means of
duress, violence, and intimidation in order to establish that his act in the
subsequent marriage was an involuntary one and as such the same
cannot be the basis for conviction. The preceding elements do not exist
in case at bar. Another event which militates against petitioner’s
contentions is the fact that it was only when the civil case was filed on
September 28, 1979, or more than the lapse of one year from the
solemnization of the second marriage that petitioner came up with the
story that his consent to the marriage was secured through the use of
force, violence, intimidation, and undue influence. Petitioner also
continued to live with private respondent until November 1978, when
the latter left their abode upon learning that Leonilo Donatowas already
previously married.
TERREv.TERRE
July 3, 1992 (A.M. No. 2349)
PARTIES:
Complainant: DOROTHY B. TERRE
Respondent: ATTY. JORDAN TERRE
FACTS: On December 24, 1981, complainant Dorothy B. Terre
charged respondent Jordan Terre, a member of the Philippine Bar with
“grossly immoral conduct,” consisting of contracting a second marriage
and living with another woman other than complainant, while his prior
marriage with complainant remained subsisting No judicial action
having been initiated or any judicial declaration obtained as to the
nullity of such prior marriage of respondent with complainant.
Respondent was charged with abandonment of minor and bigamy by
complainant. Dorothy Terre was then married to a certain Merlito
Bercenillo her first cousin, with this fact, Atty. Jordan Terre succesfully
convinced complainant that her marriage was void ab initio and they
are free to contract marriage. In their marriage license, despite her
objection, he wrote “single” as her status. After getting the complainant
pregnant, Atty. Terre abandoned them and subsequently contracted
another marriage to Helina Malicdem believing again that her previous
marriage was also void ab initio.
ISSUE: (1) WON a judicial declaration of nullity is needed to enter
into a subsequent marriage
HELD: Yes. The Court considers this claim on the part of respondent
Jordan Terre as a spurious defense. In the first place, respondent has not
rebutted complainant’s evidence as to the basic fact which underscores
that bad faith of respondent Terre. In the second place, the pretended
defense is the same argument by which he inveigled complainant into
believing that her prior marriage or Merlito A. Bercenilla being
incestuous and void ab initio (Dorothy and Merlito being allegedly first
cousins to each other), she was free to contract a second marriage with
the respondent. Respondent Jordan Terre, being a lawyer, knew or
should have known that such an argument ran counter to the prevailing
case law of the supreme Court which holds that for purposes of
determining whether a person is legally free to contract a second
marriage , a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and
void ab initio is essential.
SERMONIA, vs. CA G.R. No. 109454 June 14, 1994 Morigo v. People, G.R. No. 145226, February 06, 2004

FACTS: On 26 May 1992, petitioner Jose C. Sermonia was charged
with bigamy before the RTC of Pasig, Br. 151, for contracting marriage
with Ma. Lourdes Unson on 15 February 1975 while his prior marriage
to Virginia C. Nievera remained valid and subsisting.
Petitioner moved to quash the information on the ground that his
criminal liability for bigamy has been extinguished by prescription.
In the order of 1 October 1992, respondent judge denied the motion to
quash. On 27 October 1992, he likewise denied the motion to
reconsider his order of denial.
Petitioner challenged the above orders before the Court of Appeals
through a petition for certiorari and prohibition. In the assailed decision
of 21 January 1993, his petition was dismissed for lack of merit.
In this recourse, petitioner contends that his criminal liability for
bigamy has been obliterated by prescription. He avers that since the
second marriage contract was duly registered with the Office of the
Civil Registrar in 1975, such fact of registration makes it a matter of
public record and thus constitutes notice to the whole world. The
offended party therefore is considered to have had constructive notice
of the subsequent marriage as of 1975; hence, prescription commenced
to run on the day the marriage contract was registered. For this reason,
the corresponding information for bigamy should have been filed on or
before 1990 and not only in 1992.
On the other hand, the prosecution maintains that the prescriptive
period does not begin from the commission of the crime but from the
time of discovery by complainant which was in July 1991.
FACTS: Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates in Bohol
for four years. The lost contacts when the school year ended. When
Lucio received a card from Lucia Barrete from Singapore, constant
communication took place between them. They later became
sweethearts. In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but left again for
Canada to work there. While in Canada, they maintained constant
communication. In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and
proposed to petition appellant to join her in Canada. Both agreed to get
married, thus they were married on August 30, 1990 in Bohol. Lucia
reported back to her work in Canada leaving appellant Lucio behind.
On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court a petition for
divorce against appellant which was granted on January 17, 1992 and to
take effect on February 17, 1992. On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio
Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago in Bohol. On September 21,
1993, accused filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of the
first marriage on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took
place.
ISSUE: Whether Morigo must have filed declaration for the nullity of
his marriage with Barrete before his second marriage in order to be free
from the bigamy case.
HELD: Morigo’s marriage with Barrete is void ab initio considering
that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between them
by a solemnizing officer instead they just merely signed a marriage
contract. The petitioner does not need to file declaration of the nullity
of his marriage when he contracted his second marriage with
Lumbago.  Hence, he did not commit bigamy and is acquitted in the
case filed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the prosecution of Jose C. Sermonia for bigamy

has already prescribed.

HELD: No. The non-application to the crime of bigamy of the

principle of constructive notice is not contrary to the well entrenched
policy that penal laws should be construed liberally in favor of the
accused. To compute the prescriptive period for the offense of bigamy
from registration thereof would amount to almost absolving the
offenders thereof for liability therefor. While the celebration of the
bigamous marriage may be said to be open and made of public record
by its registration, the offender however is not truthful as he conceals
from the officiating authority and those concerned the existence of his
previous subsisting marriage. He does not reveal to them that he is still
a married person. He likewise conceals from his legitimate spouse his
bigamous marriage. And for these, he contracts the bigamous marriage
in a place where he is not known to be still a married person. And such
a place may be anywhere, under which circumstance, the discovery of
the bigamous marriage is rendered quite difficult and would take time.
It is therefore reasonable that the prescriptive period for the crime of
bigamy should be counted only from the day on which the said crime
was discovered by the offended party, the authorities or their agency.
Montanez v. Cipriano, G.R. No. 181089, October 22, 2012

FACTS: On April 8, 1976, respondent married Socrates Flores. On

January 24, 1983, during the subsistence of the said marriage,
respondent married Silverio V. Cipriano. In 2001, respondent filed with
the RTC of Muntinlupa a Petition for the Annulment of her marriage
with Socrates on the ground of the latter’s psychological incapacity as
defined under Article 36 of the Family Code. On July 18, 2003, the
RTC of Muntinlupa, declared the marriage of respondent with Socrates
null and void. Said decision became final and executory on October 13,
2003. On May 14, 2004, petitioner Merlinda Cipriano Montañez,
Silverio’s daughter from the first marriage, filed with the MTC of San
Pedro, Laguna, a Complaint for Bigamy against respondent. Lourdes
Cipriano alleged that her first marriage was already declared void ab
initio in 2003. Thus, there was no more marriage to speak of prior to
her marriage to Silverio on January 24, 1983. The prosecution argued
that the crime of bigamy had already been consummated when
respondent filed her petition for declaration of nullity. RTC ruled in
favor of respondent on the ground that both wedding were governed by
the Civil Code, and not the Family Code, hence, no judicial declaration
of absolute nullity as a condition precedent to contracting a subsequent
marriage.

ISSUE: Whether the declaration of nullity of respondent's first

marriage in 2003 justifies the dismissal of the Information for bigamy
filed against her.

HELD: NO. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not

violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely
affected. The reason is that as a general rule, no vested right may attach
to, nor arise from, procedural laws. In the case at bar, the respondent’s
clear intent was to obtain judicial declaration of nullity to escape from
the bigamy charges against her.