Antonio vs. Reyes (GR No.
155800, March 10, 2006) Republic vs San Jose
FACTS: Leonilo Antonio, 26 years of age, and Marie Ivonne Reyes, 36
years of age met in 1989.  Barely a year after their first meeting, they
got married at Manila City Hall and then a subsequent church wedding
at Pasig in December 1990.  A child was born but died 5 months later.  incapacitated spouse is needed
Reyes persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her
occupation, income, educational attainment and other events or things. 
She even did not conceal bearing an illegitimate child, which she
represented to her husband as adopted child of their family.  They were
separated in August 1991 and after attempt for reconciliation, he finally
left her for good in November 1991.  Petitioner then filed in 1993 a
petition to have his marriage with Reyes declared null and void
anchored in Article 36 of the Family Code.
ISSUE: Whether Antonio can impose Article 36 of the Family Code as
basis for declaring their marriage null and void.
HELD: Psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand
the obligations of marriage as opposed to a mere inability to comply
with them.  The petitioner, aside from his own testimony presented a
psychiatrist and clinical psychologist who attested that constant lying
and extreme jealousy of Reyes is abnormal and pathological and
corroborated his allegations on his wife’s behavior, which amounts to
psychological incapacity.  Respondent’s fantastic ability to invent,
fabricate stories and letters of fictitious characters enabled her to live in
a world of make-believe that made her psychologically incapacitated as
it rendered her incapable of giving meaning and significance to her
marriage.  The root causes of Reyes’ psychological incapacity have
been medically or clinically identified that was sufficiently proven by
experts.  The gravity of respondent’s psychological incapacity was
considered so grave that a restrictive clause was appended to the
sentence of nullity prohibited by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal from contracting marriage without their consent.  It would be
difficult for an inveterate pathological liar to commit the basic tenets of
relationship between spouses based on love, trust and respect. 
Furthermore, Reyes’ case is incurable considering that petitioner tried
to reconcile with her but her behavior remain unchanged.  
Hence, the court conclude that petitioner has established his cause of
action for declaration of nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Joblessness and Irresponsibility is not Psychological Incapacity
FACTS: When examination of the alleged psychologically
In 1988, Laila Tanyag, then 19 years old, and Manolito San Jose, then
20 years old, got married to each other, albeit knowing each other for
only a short period.  The next year, they had a daughter.
Their marriage turned out to be not an ideal one, however. Manolito
refused to get himself a job. He spent most of his available time with
his friends drinking intoxicating substances and gambling activities. It
was Laila who had to work in order to support the family. Laila gave
Manolito all the chances to change but Manolito never did.
In 1997, Laila gave birth to their second child, a boy. Laila thought this
would be the beginning of change for Manolito but that change never
happened. Thus, in 1998, Laila filed a petition to have their marriage be
declared a nullity on the ground that Manolito is psychologically
incapacitated due the fact that he was oblivious of his marital
obligations.
Laila submitted herself to psychological evaluation under Dr. Nedy
Tayag. Laila described Manolito to Tayag as a happy-go-lucky
individual spending most of his time hanging out with friends.
Considered to be a bad influence, he was into gambling, drinking sprees
and prohibited drugs as well. Ultimately, Tayag concluded that
Manolito is psychologically incapacitated – this was even without
actually examining Manolito. The RTC denied Laila’s petition but on
appeal, the Court of Appeals gave weight to Dr. Tayag’s expert
testimony and the appellate court reversed the RTC decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not Manolito San Jose was proven to be
psychologically incapacitated.
HELD: No. It is true that the guidelines set in the case of Republic vs
Court of Appeals and Molina did not require that the person sought to
be declared psychologically incapacitated should be personally
examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non to
arrive at such declaration. In fact, if such incapacity can be proven by
independent means, there is no reason why the same should not be
credited. However, in this case, the findings, and ultimately the
testimony in court, of Dr. Tayag is merely hearsay. The doctor had no
personal knowledge of the facts he testified to, as these had merely
been relayed to him by Laila. Tayag was working on pure suppositions
and secondhand information fed to him by one side. Consequently, his
testimony can be dismissed as unscientific and unreliable. This is more
so because the questioned CA decision was solely grounded on Tayag’s
expert testimony (which was merely based on the information fed to
him by Laila) – there was no other independent evidence which will
support a conclusion of psychological incapacity on the part of
Manolito.
And based on Laila’s description of Manolito, whcih she gave to
Tayag, Manolito’s alleged psychological incapacity was merely
premised on his being jobless and a drug user, as well as his inability to
support his family and his refusal or unwillingness to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Manolito’s state or condition or
attitude has not been shown, however, to be a malady or disorder rooted
on some incapacitating or debilitating psychological condition.
Manolito merely has a “difficulty” if not outright “refusal” or “neglect”
in the performance of some marital obligations – but not psychological
incapacity.
Note: Compare this with Marcos vs Marcos, in that case, the spouse
who was declared to be psychologically incapacitated was not
personally evaluated by a psychologist. The difference however was
that, said spouse refused to be examined. In this case, there was no
showing that Manolito refused to be examined
Te vs. Te (GR No. 161793, February 13, 2009)
FACTS: Petitioner Edward Te first met respondent Rowena Te in a
gathering organized by the Filipino-Chinese association in their
college.  Initially, he was attracted to Rowena’s close friend but, as the
latter already had a boyfriend, the young man decided to court Rowena,
which happened in January 1996.  It was Rowena who asked that they
elope but Edward refused bickering that he was young and jobless.  Her
persistence, however, made him relent.  They left Manila and sailed to
Cebu that month; he, providing their travel money of P80,000 and she,
purchasing the boat ticket.
They decided to go back to Manila in April 1996. Rowena proceeded to her
uncle’s house and Edward to his parents’ home. Eventually they got married but
without a marriage license.  Edward was prohibited from getting out of the
house unaccompanied and was threatened by Rowena and her uncle.  After a
month, Edward escaped from the house, and stayed with his parents.  Edward’s
parents wanted them to stay at their house but Rowena refused and demanded
that they have a separate abode.  In June 1996, she said that it was better for
them to live separate lives and they then parted ways.
After four years in January 2000, Edward filed a petition for the
annulment of his marriage to Rowena on the basis of the latter’s
psychological incapacity.
ISSUE: Whether the marriage contracted is void on the ground of
psychological incapacity.
HELD: The parties’ whirlwind relationship lasted more or less six
months. They met in January 1996, eloped in March, exchanged marital
vows in May, and parted ways in June. The psychologist who provided
expert testimony found both parties psychologically incapacitated.
Petitioner’s behavioral pattern falls under the classification of
dependent personality disorder, and respondent’s, that of the narcissistic
and antisocial personality disorder
There is no requirement that the person to be declared psychologically
incapacitated be personally examined by a physician, if the totality of
evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity.  Verily, the evidence must show a link, medical or the like,
between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the
psychological disorder itself.
The presentation of expert proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth
assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive
diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological
incapacity.
 Indeed, petitioner, afflicted with dependent personality disorder,
cannot assume the essential marital obligations of living together,
observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering help and support, for
he is unable to make everyday decisions without advice from others,
and allows others to make most of his important decisions (such as
where to live).  As clearly shown in this case, petitioner followed
everything dictated to him by the persons around him. He is insecure,
weak and gullible, has no sense of his identity as a person, has no
cohesive self to speak of, and has no goals and clear direction in life.
As for the respondent, her being afflicted with antisocial personality
disorder makes her unable to assume the essential marital obligations
on account for her disregard in the rights of others, her abuse,
mistreatment and control of others without remorse, and her tendency
to blame others.  Moreover, as shown in this case, respondent is
impulsive and domineering; she had no qualms in manipulating
petitioner with her threats of blackmail and of committing suicide.
Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable
psychological incapacity, the precipitous marriage that they contracted
on April 23, 1996 is thus, declared null and void.
Ting vs velez-ting
Note: This reinforced the case of Te vs Te which relaxed the
application of the Molina Guidelines.
FACTS: In 1972, Benjamin Ting and Carmen Velez met each other in
medical school. In 1975, they married each other.
In 1980, Benjamin became a full-fledged doctor and he practiced at the
Velez Hospital (owned by Carmen’s family).
Benjamin and Carmen had six children during their marriage. But after
18 years of marriage, Carmen went to court to have their marriage be
declared void on the ground that Benjamin was psychologically
incapacitated.
She alleged that even before she married Benjamin, the latter was
already a drunkard; that Benjamin was a gambler, he was violent, and
would rather spend on his expensive hobby; that he rarely stayed home
and even neglected his children and family obligations.
Carmen presented an expert witness (Dr. Pureza Trinidad-Oñate) to
prove Benjamin’s psychological incapacity. However, Oñate merely
based her findings on the deposition submitted by Benjamin. Oñate was
not able to personally examine Benjamin because at that time,
Benjamin was already working as an anesthesiologist in South Africa.
On his part, Benjamin opposed the petition. He also presented his own
expert witness (Dr. Renato Obra) to disprove Carmen’s allegations.
Obra was not able to personally examine Benjamin but he also
evaluated the same deposition evaluated by Oñate. Also, Benjamin
submitted himself for evaluation to a South African doctor (Dr. A.J.L.
Pentz) and the transcript of said evaluation was submitted to Obra and
the latter also evaluated the same. Obra found Benjamin not to be
psychologically incapacitated.
The trial court, and eventually the Court of Appeals, ruled in favor of
Carmen.
ISSUE: Whether or not Benjamin Ting’s psychological incapacity was
proven.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court found the evidence presented to be
lacking in order to support a finding of psychological incapacity on the
part of Benjamin. Said the Supreme Court:
we are not condoning Benjamin’s drinking and gambling problems, or
his violent outbursts against his wife. There is no valid excuse to justify
such a behavior. Benjamin must remember that he owes love, respect,
and fidelity to his spouse as much as the latter owes the same to him.
Unfortunately, this court finds Carmen’s testimony, as well as the
totality of evidence presented by Carmen, to be too inadequate to
declare Benjamin psychologically unfit pursuant to Article 36.
Carmen failed to prove that such attitude by Benjamin is
psychologically rooted so as to make Benjamin unaware of his marital
obligations. It should be remembered that the presumption is always in
favor of the validity of marriage.
Anent the issue that Benjamin was not personally evaluated by the psychologists
which deviates from the Molina Guidelines, the Supreme Court ruled that as
early as the case of Te vs Te, the Molina Guidelines were already relaxed. Cases
involving Article 36 must be tried on a case-to-case basis. Each case involving
the application of Article 36 must be treated distinctly and judged not on the
basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its
own attendant facts. Courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-
case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church
tribunals. The Supreme Court however emphasized that the Molina case
was not abandoned, its application was merely relaxed.
Azcueta vs. Republic (G.R. No. 180668)
Facts: Marietta Azcueta (Marietta) filed a petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of her marriage to Rodolfo Azcueta (Rodolfo) before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Marietta averred that Rodolfo was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations
of marriage. Marietta complained that despite her encouragement,
Rodolfo never bothered to look for a job and always depended on his
mother for financial assistance and for his decisions. It was Rodolfo’s
mother who found them a room near the Azcueta home and paid the
monthly rental. Rodolfo also pretended to have found work and gave
Marietta money which actually came from Rodolfo’s mother. When
Marietta confronted him, Rodolfo cried like a child and told her his
parents could support their needs. They had sex only once a month
which Marietta never enjoyed. When they discussed this, Rodolfo told
Marietta that sex was sacred and should not be enjoyed or abused.
Rodolfo also told her he was not ready for a child. When Marietta asked
Rodolfo if they could move to another place, he did not agree and she
was forced to leave and see if he would follow her. He did not.
Rodolfo’s first cousin, who at one time lived with Rodolfo’s family,
corroborated Marietta’s testimony that Rodolfo was not gainfully
employed and relied on the allowance given by his mother who also
paid the rentals for the room the couple lived in. The psychiatrist who
examined Marietta testified that she found the latter to be mature,
independent, focused, responsible, had a direction and ambition in life,
and was not psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties and
responsibilities of marriage. Based on information gathered from
Marietta, the same psychiatrist found Rodolfo to be suffering from
Dependent Personality Disorder characterized by loss of self-
confidence, constant self-doubt, inability to make his own decisions and
dependency on other people. The psychiatrist explained that the root
cause of the disorder was a cross-identification with Rodolfo’s mother
who was the dominant figure in the family considering that Rodolfo’s
father, a seaman, wasalways out of the house. She added that the
problem began during the early stages of Rodolfo’s life but manifested
only after his marriage. She stated that the problem was severe, because
he would not be able take on the responsibilities of a spouse, and
incurable, because it began in early development and had been deeply
ingrained in his personality. She, thus,concluded that Rodolfo was
psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital duties and
responsibilities.
Rodolfo failed to appear and file an answer despite service of summons
on him. The City Prosecutor found no collusion between the parties.
Based on the evidence presented by Marietta, the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) declared the marriage void ab initio.
The Solicitor General appealed the RTC’s decision, arguing that the
psychiatric report was based solely on the information given by
Marietta, and there was no showing that the alleged psychological
disorder was present at the start of the marriage or that it was grave,
permanent and incurable.The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC’s
decision. Marietta, thus, brought the case to the Supreme Court on a
petition for review on certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not Rodolfo is psychologically incapacitated to
justify a declaration that his marriage to Marrieta is void ab initio under
Article 36 of the Family Code.
Held: Rodolfo was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital
duties because of his Dependent Personality Disorder. His marriage to
Marietta was declared void ab initio.
Marietta sufficiently discharged her burden to prove her husband’s
psychological incapacity. As held in Marcos vs. Marcos [397 Phil. 840 (2000)],
there is no requirement that the respondent spouse should be personally
examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the
declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity. What
matters is whether the totality of evidence presented is adequate to sustain a
finding of psychological incapacity. Marietta’s testimony was corroborated in
material points by Rodolfo’s close relative, and supported by the psychiatrist’s
testimony linking the manifestations of Rodolfo’s psychological incapacity and
the psychological disorder itself. It is a settled principle of civil procedure that
the conclusions of the trial court regarding the credibility of witnesses are
entitled to great respect from the appellate courts because the trial court had an
opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses while giving testimony which
may indicate their candor or lack thereof. Since the trial court itself accepted the
veracity of Marietta’s factual premises, there is no cause to dispute the
conclusion of psychological incapacity drawn therefrom by her expert witness.
The root cause of Rodolfo’s psychological incapacity was alleged in the
petition, medically or clinically identified, sufficiently proven by
testimony of an expert witness with more than 40 years experience in
the field of psychology and psychological incapacity, and clearly
explained in the trial court’s decision. As held in Te vs. Te (G.R. No.
161793, 13 February 2009), “(b)y the very nature of Article 36, courts,
despite having the primary task and burden of decision-making, must
not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert
opinion on the psychological and mental temperaments of the parties.”
Rodolfo’s psychological incapacity was also established to have clearly
existed at the time of and even before the celebration of marriage.
Witnesses were united in testifying that from the start of the marriage,
Rodolfo’s irresponsibility, overdependence on his mother and abnormal
sexual reticence were already evident. These manifestations of
Rodolfo’s Dependent Personality Disorder must have existed even prior
to the marriage being rooted in his early development and a by-product
of his upbringing and family life.
Furthermore, Rodolfo’s psychological incapacity had been shown to be grave so
as to render him unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage. The
Court of Appeals’ opinion that Rodolfo’s requests for financial assistance from
his mother might have been due to embarrassment for failing to contribute to the
family coffers and that his motive for not wanting a child was a “responsible”
realization since he was unemployed, were dismissed by the High Court for
being speculative and unsupported by evidence. The Supreme Court likewise
disagreed with the Court of Appeals’ finding that Rodolfo’s irresponsibility and
overdependence on his mother could be attributed to immaturity, noting that at
the time of his marriage, Rodolfo was almost 29 years old. Also, the expert
testimony identified a grave clinical or medical cause
for Rodolfo’s abnormal behavior – Dependent Personality Disorder.
A person afflicted with Dependent Personality Disorder cannot assume
the essential marital obligations of living together, observing love,
respect and fidelity and rendering help and support, for he is unable to
make everyday decisions without advice from others, allows others to
make most of his importantdecisions (such as where to live), tends to
agree with people even when he believes they are wrong, has difficulty
doing things on his own, volunteers to do things that are demeaning in
order to get approval from other people, feels uncomfortable or helpless
when alone and is often preoccupied with fears of being abandoned. (Te
vs. Te, supra)
One who is unable to support himself, much less a wife; one who
cannot independently make decisions regarding even the most basic
matters that spouses face every day; and one who cannot contribute to
the material, physical and emotional well-being of his spouse, is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the marital obligations
within the meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code.
This is not to say, however, that anyone diagnosed with Dependent
Personality Disorder is automatically deemed psychologically
incapacitated to perform his/her marital obligations. The court must
evaluate the facts, as guided by expert opinion, and carefully examine
the type of disorder and the gravity thereof before declaring the nullity
of a marriage under Article 36. Finally, it has been established that
Rodolfo’s condition is incurable, having been deeply
ingrained in his system since his early years.

ASPILLAGA VS ASPILLAGA PAZ VS PAZ

FACTS: In 1977, Rodolfo Aspillaga and Aurora Apon met each other
in college. They became sweethearts after 5 months of courtship. In
1982, they got married. In 1983, they again married each other as a sign
of affirmation of their love to each other.
But in 1991, when Aurora returned from Japan, she discovered that
Rodolfo was living with her cousin. From that point, their marital
relations soured. In 1992, Rodolfo left Aurora to live with her cousin.
In 1995, Aurora filed a petition for annulment of marriage on the
ground that Rodolfo is psychologically incapacitated.
Dr. Eduardo Maaba evaluated Rodolfo and Aurora. After evaluation, he
concluded that both are psychologically incapacitated. He explained
that due to Aurora’s dark and traumatic childhood past, she has the
tendency for self dramatization and attention getting behavior. Lapses
in judgment and shallow heterosexual relationship was projected. Sign
of immaturity and desire to regress to a lower level of development
were likewise projected. Self-esteem was also low. Deep-seated sense
of dejection, loneliness and emptiness hamper her objectivity.
On the part of Rodolfo, the doctor found that: he is an intelligent adult
male, who is egoistic and harbors an inner sense of inadequacy,
helplessness and anxiety in losing agility. He, however, projects himself
as dominant person, to cover his deep-seated insecurity and inadequacy.
He tends to be suspicious and blames others for his mistakes. He claims
for adulation, reassurance and attention from other people. These can be
traced from an unhealthy familial relationship during the early
maturational development specifically in the form of a domineering and
protective maternal image.
ISSUE: Whether or not both are psychologically incapacitated.
HELD: No. Dr. Maaba only found that Rodolfo and Aurora are
suffering from psychological disorders but not the kind contemplated
under the law on psychological incapacity which renders them
incapable to perform essential marital obligations.
When personal examination by psychologist is necessary
FACTS: In 1996, Jordan Paz and Jeanice Pavon met. Jordan was then
27 years old while Jeanice was 19. In 1997, they got married. In 1998,
they had a child.
In 1999, after a big fight, Jeanice filed a petition to have their marriage
be declared void on the ground of psychological incapacity. In court,
Jeanice presented as expert witness Dr. Cristina Gates. Gates testified
that based on her interview with Jeanice, she concluded that Jordan is
psychologically incapacitated and that his mental status can be
designated as “Borderline Personality Disorder as manifested in his
impulsive behavior, delinquency and instability.” Gates concluded that
Jordan’s psychological maladies antedate their marriage and are rooted
in his family background. Gates added that with no indication of
reformation, Jordan’s personality disorder appears to be grave and
incorrigible. This was based on Jeanice’s description of Jordan as being
a mama’s boy who depended on his mom for support; by his
uncontrollable tendency to be self-preoccupied and self-indulgent, as
well as his predisposition to become violent and abusive whenever his
whims and caprices were not satisfied; by his resentment of his own
child; by his failure to provide any financial support.
ISSUE: Whether or not Jordan Paz is psychologically incapacitated.
HELD: No. It is true that there is no requirement that a party to be
declared psychologically incapacitated should be personally examined
by a physician or a psychologist, there is nevertheless a need to prove
the psychological incapacity through independent evidence adduced by
the person alleging said disorder. In this case, the only basis upon
which Dr. Gates made her conclusion were the information fed to her
by Jeanice. Consequently, Gates’ report and testimony were hearsay
evidence since she had no personal knowledge of the alleged facts she
was testifying on. Gates’ testimony should have thus been dismissed for
being unscientific and unreliable.

Psychological incapacity required by Art. 36 must be characterized by

(a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. In this case,
the foregoing were not met. Dr. Maaba failed to reveal that these
personality traits or psychological conditions were grave or serious
enough to bring about an incapacity to assume the essential obligations
of marriage.

Mere difficulty is not synonymous to incapacity. Moreover, there is no

evidence to prove that each party’s condition is so grave or is of such
nature as to render said party incapable of carrying out the ordinary
duties required in marriage. There is likewise no evidence that the
claimed incapacity is incurable and permanent. Note also that they
actually had a good marriage at first and their quarrel only began when
Rodolfo cheated on her with her cousin, hence, the allege psychological
incapacity was not proven to have existed at the time of their marriage.
SUAZO VS SUAZO
FACTS: In 1985, Jocelyn and Angelito Suazo met each other. They
were just 16 years old at that time. In 1986, they got married before the
Mayor of Biñan, Laguna. But their marriage did not turn out to be ideal.
It was Jocelyn who had to work while Angelito was lazy. When
confronted by Jocelyn, Angelito would beat her. Angelito was also
constantly drunk. And in 1987, Angelito left Jocelyn for another
woman.
In 1997, Jocelyn filed a petition to have their marriage be declared void
on the ground that Angelito was psychologically incapacitated.
In court, Jocelyn presented Dr. Nedy Tayag who testified that based on
her interview with Jocelyn and the description fed to her by Jocelyn,
she concluded that Angelito is psychologically incapacitated to perform
the essential marital obligations.
The RTC voided the marriage but the Court of Appeals reversed the
decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage should be annulled on the ground
of psychological incapacity.
HELD: No. The psychologist, using meager information coming from
a directly interested party (Jocelyn), could not have secured a complete
personality profile and could not have conclusively formed an objective
opinion or diagnosis of Angelito’s psychological condition.
Further, habitual drunkenness, gambling and refusal to find a job, while
indicative of psychological incapacity, do not, by themselves, show
psychological incapacity. All these simply indicate difficulty, neglect or
mere refusal to perform marital obligations that cannot be considered to
be constitutive of psychological incapacity in the absence of proof that
these are manifestations of an incapacity rooted in some debilitating
psychological condition or illness.
Anent Angelito’s violent tendencies, physical violence on women
indicates abnormal behavioral or personality patterns, however, such
violence, standing alone, does not constitute psychological incapacity.
Jurisprudence holds that there must be evidence showing a link,
medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological
incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. In this case, the
psychologist failed to link the violence to psychological incapacity.
Even assuming, therefore, that Jocelyn’s account of the physical
beatings she received from Angelito were true, this evidence does not
satisfy the requirement of Article 36 and its related jurisprudence,
specifically the requisites provided for in the case of Santos vs CA.
OCHOSA VS ALANO AND REPUBLIC, G.R. 167459
Facts: Bona’s illicit affairs with other men started at the onset of their
marriage on October 27, 1973, when Jose was assigned in various parts
of the country as an officer in the AFP. She continued her infidelity
even when they lived together at Fort Bonifacio, Makati City sometime
in 1985, whenever Jose was out of their living quarters.
In 1987, Jose was incarcerated in Camp Crame for rebellion for the alleged
participation of the failed coup d’etat. He heard circulation of rumors of Bona
getting caught having sex with his driver, Corporal Gagarin.
He got a military pass from his jail warden and confronted Bona about the
rumors, which she and Gagarin admitted. Since then they were separated, and
their foundling, Ramona Celeste, stayed with Bona in Basilan until 1994 to live
with Jose.
Jose Reynaldo B. Ochosa filed a Petition for the declaration of nullity of
marriage between him and Bona J. Alano, based on the ground of the latter’s
psychological incapacity to fulfill the essential marital obligations of marriage.
Elizabeth E. Rondain, a psychiatrist, one of the witnesses, testified and
submitted a psychological evaluation report on Bona’s mental state. The
interviews she had with Jose and two of his witnesses brought her to the
conclusion that respondent was suffering from histrionic personality disorder,
and it was traceable to her family history.
On January 11, 1999, the dispositive portion of the trial court declared
the marriage of Jose and Bona void ab initio on the ground of
psychological incapacity of the respondent under Article 36 of the
Family Code. The Court finds that Bona’s illness exhibited gravity,
antecedence, and incurability.
OSG appealed the said ruling to the CA, and the CA subsequently
granted the appeal and reversed the ruling of the trial court decision.
Issue: Whether or not Bona should be deemed psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations.
Ruling: No. There is inadequate credible evidence that her defects were
already present at the inception of, or prior to, the marriage. Bona’s
alleged psychological incapacity did not satisfy the jurisprudential
requisite of “juridical antecedence”. Her persistent sexual infidelity and
abandonment are not badges of psychological incapacity nor can’t it be
traced to the inception of their marriage.
The psychiatrist’s conclusion about Bona’s HPD which made her prone
to promiscuity and sexual infidelity existed before her marriage to Jose,
cannot be taken as credible proof of antecedence since the method by
which such an inference was reached leaves much to be desired in
terms of meeting the standard of evidence required in determining
psychological incapacity.
Dr. Rondain’s conclusion was based solely on the assumed truthful knowledge
of Jose. No other witness testified to Bona’s family history or her behavior prior
to or at the beginning of their marriage. The two witnesses only started to live
with them in 1980 and 1986, respectively.
Verily, Dr. Rondain evaluated Bona’s psychological condition directly from the
information gathered solely from Jose and his witnesses. These factual
circumstances evoke the possibility that the information fed to the psychiatrists
is tainted with bias for Jose’s cause, in the absence of sufficient corroboration.
Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be confused with a divorce law
that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifest
themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party
even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and
so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. These
marital obligations are those provided under Article 68 to 71, 220, 221
and 225 of the Family Code.
ALAIN M. DIÑO v. MA. CARIDAD L. DIÑO
FACTS: January 1998 petitioner and respondent got married. On May 2001,
petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Niullity of Marriagw against
respondent citing psychological incapacity under article 36. Petitioner alleged
that respondent failed in her marital obligation to give love and support to him,
and had abandoned her responsibility to the family, choosing instead to go on
shopping sprees and gallivanting with her friends that depleted the family assets.
Petitioner further alleged that respondent was not faithful, and would at times
become violent and hurt him. The trial court declared their marriage void ab
initio.
The court ruled that A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE
shall only be issued upon compliance with Article[s] 50 and 51 of the Family
Code. It later altered it to” A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF
MARRIAGE shall be issued after liquidation, partition and distribution of the
parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code”
ISSUE: WON the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of
absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued after liquidation,
partition, and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of
the Family Code
HELD: The court erred. The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC, Branch
102, Quezon City that in a void marriage, regardless of its cause, the
property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is
governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.7
Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union of parties who are
legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract
marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void, such as petitioner
and respondent in the case before the Court.
For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements
must be present:
1. The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other;
2. They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and
3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is
void
All these elements are present in this case and there is no question that
Article 147 of the Family Code applies to the property relations
between petitioner and respondent.
In this case, petitioner’s marriage to respondent was declared void
under Article 3615 of the Family Code and not under Article 40 or 45.
Thus, what governs the liquidation of properties owned in common by
petitioner and respondent are the rules on co-ownership. In Valdes, the
Court ruled that the property relations of parties in a void marriage
during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or
Article 148 of the Family Code. The rules on co-ownership apply and
the properties of the spouses should be liquidated in accordance with
the Civil Code provisions on co-ownership. Under Article 496 of the
Civil Code, “[p]artition may be made by agreement between the parties
or by judicial proceedings. x x x.” It is not necessary to liquidate the
properties of the spouses in the same proceeding for declaration of
nullity of marriage.
Republic v. De Gracia
G.R. No. 171557; February 12, 2014
FACTS: Rodolfo and Natividad were married on February 15, 1969 at
a church in Zamboanga Del Norte. On December 25, 1998, Rodolfo
filed a verified complaint for the declaration of nullity of marriage
alleging that Natividad was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with her essential marital obligations. Petitioner furthered that he was
forced to marry her barely 3 months into their courtship in light of her
accidental pregnancy. He was 21, she was 18. Natividad left their
conjugal abode and sold their house without his consent. Thereafter, she
lived with a certain Engineer Terez. After cohabiting with Terez, she
contracted a second marriage with another man. Dr. Zalsos stated that
both Rodolfo and Natividad were psychologically incapacitated finding
that both parties suffered from “utter emotional immaturity”.
ISSUE: Did the Court of Appeals err in sustaining the RTC’s finding of
psychological incapacity?
HELD: The petition is meritorious. There exists insufficient factual or
legal basis to conclude that Natividad’s emotional immaturity,
irresponsibility, or even sexual promiscuity, can be equated with
psychological incapacity. The RTC relied heavily on Dr. Zalsos
testimony which does not explain in reasonable detail how Natividad’s
condition could be characterized as grave, deeply-rooted and incurable
within the parameters of psychological incapacity jurisprudence. The
petition is, therefore, granted and the decision of CA reversed and set
aside.

It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the
Rule applies only to marriages which are declared void ab initio or
annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45 of the Family
Code. In short, Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to
marriages which are declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the
Family Code, which should be declared void without waiting for the
liquidation of the properties of the parties.

Since the property relations of the parties in art 40 and 45 are governed
by absolute community of property or conjugal partnership of gains,
there is a need to liquidate, partition and distribute the properties before
a decree of annulment could be issued. That is not the case for
annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code because the
marriage is governed by the ordinary rules on co-ownership.

KALAW VS FERNANDEZ (G.R. No. 166357)
Testimonies of Expert Witnesses as Evaluated by the Trial Court Must
Be Given Due Consideration
Burden of Proof in Proving Psychological Incapacity Does Not Solely
Lie on Plaintiff
FACTS: In 1994, Valerio “Tyrone” Kalaw filed a petition to have his
marriage with Ma. Elena Fernandez be annulled on the ground that
Elena is psychologically incapacitated. The RTC, after hearing the
expert witnesses testify in court, eventually granted the petition, but on
appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the said decision. Tyrone
appealed to the Supreme Court. In September 2011, the Supreme Court
affirmed the decision of the CA. Tyrone filed a motion for
reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether or not the September 2011 decision (657 SCRA 822)
should be reversed.
HELD: Yes. Trial court’s findings of facts should be given due weight
The SC ruled that it misappreciated the findings made by the RTC when the
SC reviewed the case in September 2011. The SC ruled that the findings and
evaluation by the RTC as the trial court deserved credence because it was in the
better position to view and examine the demeanor of the witnesses while they
were testifying. The position and role of the trial judge in the appreciation of the
evidence showing the psychological incapacity were not to be downplayed but
should be accorded due importance and respect. Therefore, it was not proper for
the SC to brush aside the opinions tendered by Dr. Cristina Gates, a
psychologist, and Fr. Gerard Healy on the ground that their conclusions were
solely based on the Tyrone’s version of the events. The conclusions reached by
the two expert witnesses because they were largely drawn from the case records
and affidavits, and should not anymore be disputed after the RTC itself had
accepted the veracity of the Tyrone’s factual premises.
Respondent could also establish the psychological incapacity of the
plaintiff spouse
The plaintiff in an annulment case under Article 36  carries the burden to prove
the nullity of the marriage, however, the respondent, as the defendant spouse,
could also establish the psychological incapacity of the plaintiff spouse if the
respondent raised the matter in her/his answer. The courts are justified in
declaring a marriage null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code
regardless of whether it is the petitioner or the respondent who imputes the
psychological incapacity to the other as long as the imputation is fully
substantiated with proof. Indeed, psychological incapacity may exist in one party
alone or in both of them, and if psychological incapacity of either or both is
established, the marriage has to be deemed null and void.
Elena’s excessive mahjong sessions is indicative of her psychological incapacity
In the September 2011 ruling, the SC noted that all the children of Tyrone and
Elena testified that although their parents have differences, both took good care
of them. However, upon closer look at the testimonies of the children, it was
shown that Elena was too addicted to mahjong that she would even bring her
children to her mahjong sessions which were so frequent and would last from
early in the afternoon to past midnight. The fact that the Elena brought her
children with her to her mahjong sessions did not only point to her neglect of
parental duties, but also manifested her tendency to expose them to a culture of
gambling. Her willfully exposing her children to the culture of gambling on
every occasion of her mahjong sessions was a very grave and serious act of
subordinating their needs for parenting to the gratification of her own personal
and escapist desires. This revealed her wanton disregard for her children’s moral
and mental development.
NOTE: This case is controversial as many would point that this ruling
significantly relaxed the application of Article 36 of the Family Code
and would thus make annulment of marriages easier. However, SC
Spokesperson Atty. Ted Te explained that the ruling in this Kalaw Case
is exclusive to this case only. He said, “The SC did not ‘relax’ in all
cases the guidelines set forth in its precedents—all of which remain and
have not been overturned.”
MOR-CATALAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 167109, February 6, 2007
FACTS:FelicitasAmorCatalan married Orlando Catalan on June 4, 195
0 in Mabini,Pangasinan. Thereafter, they migrated to the United States
of America and allegedly became naturalizedcitizens thereof. After 38
years of marriage, Felicitas and Orlando divorced in April 1988.On
June 16, 1988, Orlando married Merope in Calasiao, Pangasinan.
Felicitas filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with
damages in the RTC of Dagupan City against Orlando and
Meropecontending that said marriage was bigamous since Merope had
a prior subsisting marriage with EusebioBristol.
ISSUE: Whether or not Felicitas has the personality to file a petition
for the declaration of nullity of marriageof the respondents on
the ground of bigamy.
HELD:Without the divorce decree and foreign law as part of the
evidence, we cannot rule on the issue of whether petitioner has the
personality to file the petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage. After all, shemay have the personality to file the petition if
the divorce decree obtained was a limited divorce or a mensaet thoro; or
the foreign law may restrict remarriage even after the divorce decree
becomes absolute. Insuch case, the RTC would be correct to declare the
marriage of the respondents void for being bigamous,there being
already in evidence two existing marriage certificates, which were both
obtained in thePhilippines, one in Mabini, Pangasinan dated December
21, 1959 between Eusebio Bristol and respondentMerope, and the
other, in Calasiao, Pangasinan dated June 16, 1988 between the
respondentsTrue, under the New Civil Code which is the law in force at
the time the respondents were married,or even in the Family Code,
there is no specific provision as to who can file a petition to declare the
nullityof marriage; however, only a party who can demonstrate
“proper interest” can file the same. A petition todeclare the nullity of
marriage, like any other actions, must be prosecuted or defended in the
name of thereal party in interest and must be based on a cause of action.
In fine, petitioner’s personality to file the petition to declare the nullity
of marriage cannot beascertained because of the absence of the divorce
decree and the foreign law allowing it. Hence, aremand of the case to
the trial court for reception of additional evidence is necessary to
determine whether respondent Orlando was granted a divorce decree
and whether the foreign law which granted the sameallows or restricts
remarriage. If it is proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained and
the same did not allow respondent Orlando’s remarriage, then the trial
court should declare respondents’ marriage as bigamous and void ab
initio but reduce the amount of moral damages from P300,000.00
toP50,000.00 andexemplary damages from P200,000.00 to
P25,000.00. On the contrary, if it is proved that a valid divorcedecree
was obtained which allowed Orlando to remarry, then the trial court
must dismiss the instant petitionto declare nullity of marriage on the
ground that petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan lacks legal personality
tofile the same.