CHARACTERISTICS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY
or her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and
CHI MING TSOI vs. COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI
G.R. No. 119190 January 16,
1997
Facts:
Sometime on May 22, 1988, the plaintiff married the defendant at the
Manila Cathedral, Intramuros Manila, as evidenced by their Marriage
Contract. After the celebration of their marriage and wedding reception at
the South Villa, Makati, they went and proceeded to the house of
defendant's mother. In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private
place where they can enjoy together during their first week as husband
and wife, they went to Baguio City. But, they did so together with her
mother, an uncle, his mother and his nephew. They were all invited by the
defendant to join them. They stayed in Baguio City for four (4) days. But,
during this period, there was no sexual intercourse between them, since
the defendant avoided her by taking a long walk during siesta time or by
just sleeping on a rocking chair located at the living room. They slept
together in the same room and on the same bed since May 22, 1988 until
March 15, 1989. But during this period, there was no attempt of sexual
intercourse between them.
She claims, that she did not: even see her husband's private parts nor did
he see hers. Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical
examinations to Dr. Eufemio Macalalag, a urologist at the Chinese
General Hospital, on January 20, 1989. The results of their physical
examinations were that she is healthy, normal and still a virgin, while that
of her husband's examination was kept confidential up to this time. While
no medicine was prescribed for her, the doctor prescribed medications for
her husband which was also kept confidential. No treatment was given to
her. For her husband, he was asked by the doctor to return but he never
did.
The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is impotent, a closet homosexual
as he did not show his penis. She said, that she had observed the
defendant using an eyebrow pencil and sometimes the cleansing cream of
his mother. And that, according to her, the defendant married her, a
Filipino citizen, to acquire or maintain his residency status here in the
country and to publicly maintain the appearance of a normal man.
In open Court, the Trial Prosecutor manifested that there is no collusion
between the parties and that the evidence is not fabricated." After trial, the
court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered declaring as void. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. Hence, the
instant petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in holding that the refusal of private
respondent to have sexual communion with petitioner is a psychological
incapacity inasmuch as proof thereof is totally absent.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court finds the petition to be bereft of merit. The case has
reached this Court because petitioner does not want their marriage to be
annulled. This only shows that there is no collusion between the parties.
When petitioner admitted that he and his wife (private respondent) have
never had sexual contact with each other, he must have been only telling
the truth. Appellant admitted that he did not have sexual relations with his
wife after almost ten months of cohabitation, and it appears that he is not
suffering from any physical disability. Such abnormal reluctance or
unwillingness to consummate his marriage is strongly indicative of a
serious personality disorder which to the mind of this Court clearly
demonstrates an 'utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage' within the meaning of Article 36 of the Family
Code.
First, it must be stated that neither the trial court nor the respondent court
made a finding on who between petitioner and private respondent refuses
to have sexual contact with the other. The fact remains, however, that
there has never been coitus between them. At any rate, since the action to
declare the marriage void may be filed by either party, i.e., even the
psychologically incapacitated, the question of who refuses to have sex
with the other becomes immaterial.
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his
constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological
incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is
equivalent to psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a
spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a
sign of psychological incapacity.
Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code
is "To procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation
of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage."
Constant non- fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity
or wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and
protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation
is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live
together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity (Art. 68, Family Code),
the sanction therefor is actually the "spontaneous, mutual affection
between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court order"
(Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno 120 Phil. 1298).
Love is useless unless it is shared with another. Indeed, no man is an
island, the cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to say "I could not have
cared less." This is so because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. The
egoist has nothing but himself. In the natural order, it is sexual intimacy
which brings spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift
and a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a function which
enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the continuation of family
relations.
It appears that there is absence of empathy between petitioner and private
respondent. That is — a shared feeling which between husband and wife
must be experienced not only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy but
a deep sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way process.
An expressive interest in each other's feelings at a time it is needed by the
other can go a long way in deepening the marital relationship.
Marriage is definitely not for children but for two consenting adults who
view the relationship with love amor gignit amorem, respect, sacrifice and
a continuing commitment to compromise, conscious of its value as a
sublime social institution.
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties
found themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and
unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but sustain the
studied judgment of respondent appellate court.
LEOUEL SANTOS vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND
JULIA ROSARIO BEDIA-SANTOS
G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995
Facts:
Leouel, who then held the rank of First Lieutenant in the Philippine Army,
first met Julia. The meeting later proved to be an eventful day for Leouel
and Julia. On 20 September 1986, the two exchanged vows before
Municipal Trial Court Judge Cornelio G. Lazaro of Iloilo City, followed,
shortly thereafter, by a church wedding. Leouel and Julia lived with the
latter's parents at the J. Bedia Compound, La Paz, Iloilo City. On 18 July
1987, Julia gave birth to a baby boy, and he was christened Leouel
Santos,Jr. The ecstasy, however, did not last long. It was bound to
happen, Leouel averred, because of the frequent interference by Julia's
parents into the young spouses family affairs. Occasionally, the couple
would also start a "quarrel" over a number of other things, like when and
where the coupleshould start living independently from Julia's parents or
whenever Julia would express resentment on Leouel's spending a few
days with his own parents.
On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for the United Sates of America to work
as a nurse despite Leouel's pleas to so dissuade her. Seven months after
her departure, or on 01 January 1989, Julia called up Leouel for the first
time by long distance telephone. She promised to return home upon the
expiration of her contract in July 1989. She never did. When Leouel got a
chance to visit the United States, where he underwent a training program
under the auspices of the Armed Forces of the Philippines from 01 April
up to 25 August 1990, he desperately tried to locate, or to somehow get in
touch with, Julia but all his efforts were of no avail.
A possible collusion between the parties to obtain a decree of nullity of
their marriage was ruled out by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor (in
its report to the court).
Issue:
Whether or not Leouel’s marriage with Julia can be declared invalid.
Ruling:
It could well be that, in sum, the Family Code Revision Committee in
ultimately deciding to adopt the provision with less specificity than
expected, has in fact, so designed the law as to allow some resiliency in
its application. Mme. Justice Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, a member of the Code
Committee, has been quoted by Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo in Salita
vs. Hon. Magtolis (G.R. No. 106429, 13 June 1994); thus:The Committee
did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for fear that the
giving of examples would limit the applicability of the provision under the
principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the Committee would like the judge
to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience,
the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and
by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil
courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from
Canon Law.
A part of the provision is similar to Canon 1095 of the New Code of
Canon Law, which reads: Canon 1095. They are incapable of contracting
marriage:
1. who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment concerning
essentila matrimonial rights and duties, to be given and accepted
mutually;
3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Accordingly, although neither decisive
nor even perhaps all that persuasive for having no juridical or secular
effect, the jurisprudence under Canon Law prevailing at the time of the
code's enactment, nevertheless, cannot be dismissed as impertinent for
its value as an aid, at least, to the interpretation or construction of the
codal provision. So the progress was from psycho-sexual to psychological
anomaly, then the term anomaly was altogether eliminated. it would be,
however, incorrect to draw the conclusion that the cause of the incapacity
need not be some kind of psychological disorder; after all, normal and
healthy person should be able to assume the ordinary obligations of
marriage.
This incapacity consists of the following:
(a) a true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of marriage. Some
psychosexual disorders and other disorders of personality can be the
psychic cause of this defect, which is here described in legal terms. This
particular type of incapacity consists of a real inability to render what is
due by the contract. This could be compared to the incapacity of a farmer
to enter a binding contract to deliver the crops which he cannot possibly
reap
(b) this inability to commit oneself must refer to the essential obligations
of marriage: the conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering
of mutual help, the procreation and education of offspring;
(c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality. The
mere difficulty of assuming these obligations, which could be overcome by
normal effort, obviously does not constitute incapacity. The canon
contemplates a true psychological disorder which incapacitates a person
from giving what is due (cf. John Paul II, Address to R. Rota, Feb. 5,
1987). However, if the marriage is to be declared invalid under this
incapacity, it must be proved not only that the person is afflicted by a
psychological defect, but that the defect did in fact deprive the person, at
the moment of giving consent, of the ability to assume the essential duties
of marriage and consequently of the possibility of being bound by these
duties.
Marriage is not an adventure but a lifetime commitment. We should
continue to be reminded that innate in our society, then enshrined in our
Civil Code, and even now still indelible in Article 1 of the Family Code. The
above provisions express so well and so distinctly the basic nucleus of our
laws on marriage and the family, and they are doubt the tenets we still
hold on to.
The factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure at all, can come
close to the standards required to decree a nullity of marriage. Undeniably
and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even desperate, in his
present situation. Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can always
provide all the specific answers to every individual problem.
The petition is denied.
GUIDELINES IN DETERMINING PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
MOLINA
G.R. No. 108763
February 13, 1997
Facts:
On April 14, 1985, Roridel Olaviano Molina, respondent was married to
Reynaldo Molina at the Church of Saint Augustine, Manila. From their
marriage was borne a child named Albert Andre Olaviano Molina. After a
year of marriage, Reynaldo started exhibiting signs of “immaturity and
irresponsibility”. He preferred to spend more time with the company of his
friends and peers on whom he squandered money, he depended on his
parents for aid and assistance, ;and he was never honest with the family
finances. These circumstances led to frequent quarrels between the
petitioner and respondent.
In February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his job in Manila, making
Roridel the sole breadwinner. On October 1986, they were both estranged
from each other. In February 1986, Roridel moved back to Baguio with her
parents and a few weeks later Reynaldo abandoned Roridel and left
Albert in her custody.
Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel could no longer live together as
husband and wife because of Roridel’s strange behavior and insistence to
leave his group of friends eve after their marriage, Roridel’s refusal to
perform some of her marital duties like cooking meals, and Roridel’s
failure to run the household and handle their finances. On May, 1991, the
Regional Trial Court of Baguio rendered judgment and declared the
marriage void.
The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the Regional Trial Court’s decision.
Issue:
Whether or not “opposing and conflicting personalities” is equivalent to
psychological incapacity.
Ruling:
No. Psychological incapacity must be judged according to: (a) gravity, (b)
juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. In this case, there was no clear
showing of the psychological incapacity but the mere showing of difficulty,
refusal, neglect and irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities
which do not constitute psychological incapacity. In this case, it is not
enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and
duties as married persons. Essentially, it must be shown that they are
incapable of doing so due to some psychological, not physical, illness.
Although there was evidence that the couple could not get along or are
incompatible with each other, there was no evidence of the gravity of the
psychological incapacity; neither its juridical antecedence nor incurability.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be
psychological, not physical.
The following guidelines must be proved in invoking psychological
incapacity:
(1) The burden of proof to show nullity of the marriage lies in the plaintiff;
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be
a. Medically or clinically identified,
b. Alleged in the complaint,
c. Sufficiently proven by experts, and
d. Clearly explained in the decision.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of the
celebration” of the marriage.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
party to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles
68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well
as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and
their children.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of
the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state.
TE vs. YU- TE
G.R. No. 161793 February 13, 2009
Facts:
In January 1996, Petitioner Edward Kenneth Ngo Te decided to court
Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te after seeing her in a Filipino-Chinese
association in their college. He decided to court Rowena after learning
that her close friend had a boyfriend. They shared the same angst
towards their families and developed a closeness with each other. In
March 1996, Rowena asked Edward that they elope despite being
bickering about being young and jobless. Edward eventually gave in to
Rowena’s plans, left Manila, and sailed for Cebu that month with P80,000
pension. He provided the traveling money and she purchased their boat
ticket. Because of their house accommodation, daily sustenance and
joblessness, their pension lasted for only a month. After Edward
proceeded to his parents’ home, Rowena kept on telephoning him and
threatening him that she would commit suicide.
Edward agreed to stay with Rowena at her uncle’s place. On April 23,
1996, Rowena’s uncle brought the two to court to get married. He was 25
years old and she was 20. They continued to stay at her uncle’s place but
he Edward was being treated like a prisoner. In one instance, Rowena
insisted Edward to claim his inheritance so they could live independently
but this request was angrily denied by his father who insisted that Edward
go home else, he would be disinherited. After a month, Edward escaped
from the house of Rowena’s uncle and stayed with his parents. His family
hid him from Rowena when she called. In June 1996, Edward was able to
talk to Rowena but, unmoved by Edward’s persistence that they live
together, she decided that they should separate ways. On January 18,
2000,
Edward filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for
the annulment of his marriage with Rowena on the ground of
psychological incapacity.
On August 23, 2000, the Office of the City Prosecutor submitted an
investigation report stating that it could not determine if there was
collusion between the parties and therefore, recommended trial on the
merits. Upon the findings of the clinical psychologist of psychological
incapacity of Edward (dependent personality disorder) and Rowena
(narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder), the Regional Trial Court
declared the marriage null and void. However, the Appellate Court
reversed and set aside the Trial Court’s decision on the ground that the
clinical psychologist did not examine the respondent and merely banked
on the testimony of the petitioner.
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage is null and void on the ground of
psychological incapacity given the petitioner’s totality of evidence.
Ruling:
Yes. The courts must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive
evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and mental
temperaments of the parties. The psychological assessment adequately,
sufficiently and decisively points to Edward’s dependent personality
disorder and Rowena’s narcissistic and anti-social personality disorder.
Also, the Regional Trial Court viewed, at first-hand, the witnesses’
deportment. With Edward’s affliction of dependent personality disorder, he
cannot assume the essential marital obligations of living together,
observing love and respect and rendering help and support because he is
unable to make everyday decisions without advice from others, allows
others to make most of his important decisions, tends to agree with people
even when he believes they are wrong, has difficulty doing things on his
own, volunteers to do things that are demeaning in order to get approval
from other people, feels uncomfortable or helpless when alone and is
often preoccupied with fears of being abandoned. The petitioner followed
everything dictated to him by the persons around him. He is insecure,
weak and gullible, has no sense of his identity as a person, has no
cohesive self to speak of, and has no goals and clear direction in life.
Rowena’s affliction with antisocial personality disorder makes her unable
to assume the essential marital obligations.
This finding takes into account her disregard for the rights of others, her
abuse, mistreatment and control of others without remorse, her tendency
to blame others, and her intolerance of the conventional behavioral
limitations imposed by society. Moreover, as shown in this case,
respondent is impulsive and domineering; she had no qualms in
manipulating petitioner with her threats of blackmail and of committing
suicide. Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable
psychological incapacity, the precipitous marriage they contracted on April
23, 1996 is thus, declared null and void, reversing and setting aside the
decision of the appellate court.
AZCUETA VS REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND COURT OF
APPEALS
DOCTRINE/PRINCIPLE ARTICLE:
Article 36 . A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
Molina Doctrine . Set guidelines for the interpretation and application of
Art 36.
FACTS:
Petitioner Marietta C. Azcueta and Rodolfo Azcueta got married on July
24, 1993 after less than two months of acquaintance, who were 23 and 28
years of age respectively. They separated in 1997 after four years of
marriage rearing no children.
On March 2, 2002, petitioner filed with the RTC-Antipolo City Branch 72 a
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage under Article 36 of
the Family Code. Petitioner claimed that her husband Rodolfo was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage. He is said to be emotionally immature, irresponsible,
unemployed, dependent on his mother for financial assistance, would
become violent when drunk, and did not even want to have a child. Florida
de Ramos, a first cousin on Rodolfo corroborated the testimony with
regards to the latter’s unemployment and dependence to his mother. An
expert witness, psychiatrist Dr. Cecilia Villegas was likewise presented
concluding that Rodolfo was suffering from Dependent Personality
Disorder associated with severe inadequacy related to masculine
strivings. Dr. Villegas further stressed the incurability of such a disorder as
it started in early development and is deeply ingrained into Rodolfo’s
personality.
RTC decided in favor of the petitioner, declaring their marriage as null and
void ab initio. The Solicitor General appealed the decision objecting on (a)
the psychiatric report basing solely on the information provided by
petitioner and not based on an examination of Rodolfo, and (b) there was
no showing that the alleged psychological defects were present at the
inception of marriage. The CA reversed the RTC decision. Thus, this
petition for review on certiorari .
ISSUE(S):
W/n the totality of the evidence presented is adequate to sustain a finding
that Rodolfo is psychologically incapacitated to comply with his essential
marital obligations as provided for in Article 36 of the Family Code.
RULING:
Yes. Petitioner has adequately presented evidence that Rodolfo is
psychologically incapacitated to carry out his marital obligations. Thus, the
Court laid down in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals and
Molina stringent guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article
36 of the Family Code, to wit:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically
or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven
by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the
celebration" of the marriage.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable and must be relevant to the assumption of
marriage obligations.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
party to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles
68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of
the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts.
In Santos v. Court of Appeals , the Court declared that psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity , (b) juridical antecedence ,
and (c) incurability. Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori
assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own
facts.
First, petitioner successfully discharged her burden to prove the
psychological incapacity of her husband. In Marcos v. Marcos, 17 it was
held that there is no requirement that the defendant/ respondent spouse
should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a
condition sine qua non.
Second, the root cause of Rodolfo's psychological incapacity has been
medically or clinically identified, alleged in the petition, sufficiently proven
by expert testimony, and clearly explained in the trial court's decision.
Third, Rodolfo’s psychological incapacity was established to have clearly
existed at the time of and even before the celebration of marriage. The
manifestations of Rodolfo's dependent personality disorder must have
existed even prior to the marriage being rooted in his early development
and a by-product of his upbringing and family life.
Fourth, Rodolfo’s psychological incapacity has been shown to be
sufficiently grave, so as to render him unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage.
Fifth, Rodolfo is evidently unable to comply with the essential marital
obligations embodied in Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code.
Sixth, the incurability of Rodolfo's condition which has been deeply
ingrained in his system since his early years was supported by evidence
and duly explained by the expert witness.
Wherefore, the petition is GRANTED reinstating the declaration of nullity
of marriage.
SO V. VALERA
G.R. No. 150677, June 5, 2009
Petitioner: Renato Reyes
Respondent: Lorna Valera
Facts:
Renato and Lorna first met in 1973 and lived together as husband and
wife, without the benefit of marriage, before they got married in 1991. In
the course of their relationship, they had 3 children and established a
communications business. In 1996, Renato filed with RTC a petition for
the declaration of the nullity of his marriage with Lorna. He alleged that
their marriage was null and void for want of the essential and formal
requisites. He also claimed that Lorna was psychologically incapacitated
to exercise the essential obligations of marriage, as shown by the
following circumstances: Lorna failed and refused to cohabit and make
love to him; did not love and respect him; did not remain faithful to him; did
not give him emotional, spiritual, physical, and psychological help and
support; failed and refused to have a family domicile; and failed and
refused to enter into a permanent union and establish conjugal and family
life with him.
RTC: It nullified the marriage, concluding that Lorna was PI to comply with
her martial obligations.
CA: The Republic through the OSG, appealed to the CA, which reversed
and set aside the RTC decision and dismissed the petition for lack of
merit. It ruled that Renato failed to prove Lorna’s PI because her
character, faults, and defects did not constitute PI warranting the nullity of
the parties’ marriage. The CA reasoned out that while Lorna “appears to
be a less than ideal mother to her children, and loving wife to her
husband,” these flaws were not physical manifestations of psychological
illness. The CA further added that although Lorna’s condition was clinically
identified by an expert witness to be an “Adjustment Disorder,” it was not
established that such disorder was the root cause of her incapacity to fulfill
the essential marital obligations. The prosecution also failed to establish
that Lorna’s disorder was incurable and permanent in such a way as to
disable and/or incapacitate Lorna from complying with obligations
essential to marriage. The CA likewise held that her subsequent refusal to
cohabit with him was not due to any psychological condition, but due to
the fact that she no longer loved him. Finally, the CA concluded that the
declaration of nullity of a marriage was not proper when the psychological
disorder does not meet the guidelines set forth by the Supreme Court in
the case of Molina. Renato filed a MR but was denied.
Issue: W/N the marriage is null and void due to psychological incapacity?
Held: NO.
Ratio: The Supreme Court agreed with the CA and ruled that the totality of
evidence presented by Ramon failed to establish Lorna’s psychological
incapacity to perform the essential marital obligations. The Supreme Court
did not give much credence to the testimony and report of Renato’s expert
witness. The report of the psychologist was not sufficiently in-depth and
comprehensive to warrant the conclusion that PI existed that prevented
Valera from complying with marital obligations. In the first place, the facts
on which the psychologist based her conclusions were all derived from
statements by the petitioner whose bias in favor of his cause cannot be
doubted. Her reading may not at all be completely fair in its assessment.
We say this while fully aware that the psychologist appeared at the
petitioner’s bidding and the arrangement between them was not pro bono.
The “Particulars” and the “Psychological Conclusions” disproportionate
with one another; the conclusions appear to be exaggerated
extrapolations, derived as they are from isolated incidents, rather than
from continuing patterns. The “particulars” are, as it were, snapshots,
rather than a running account of the respondent’s life from which her
whole life is totally judged. Thus, we do not see her psychological
assessment to be comprehensive enough to be reliable.
As against the negatives in viewing the respondent, we note that she lived
with the petitioner for 18 years and begot children with him born in 1975,
1978 and 1984 – developments that show a fair level of stability in the
relationship and a healthy degree of intimacy between the parties for
some eleven (11) years. She finished her Dentistry and joined her
husband in the communications business – traits that do not at all indicate
an irresponsible attitude, especially when read with the comment that she
had been strict with employees and in business affairs. The petitioner’s
Memorandum itself is very revealing when, in arguing that the Marriage
Contract was a sham, the petitioner interestingly alleged that (referring to
1987) “[S]ince at that time, the relationship between the petitioner and
respondent was going well, and future marriage between the two was not
an impossibility, the petitioner signed these documents.”
The Supreme Court also noted that there was no proof that Lorna’s
psychological disorder was incurable. The psychologist’s testimony itself
glaringly failed to show that the respondent’s behavioral disorder was
medically or clinically permanent or incurable as established jurisprudence
requires. Neither did the psychologist testify that the disorder was grave
enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage.
In Molina, SC ruled that “mild characterological peculiarities, mood
changes and occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as
indicative of psychological incapacity. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less ill will. In other words, the root cause should be a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in
the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from
really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to
marriage.” In the present case, the psychologist simply narrated adverse
“snapshots” of the respondent’s life showing her alleged failure to meet
her marital duties, but did not convincingly prove her permanent incapacity
to meet her marital duties and responsibilities; the root or psychological
illness that gave rise to this incapacity; and that this psychological illness
and consequent incapacity existed at the time the marriage was
celebrated.
Given the foreoging, the Supreme Court ruled that based on the evidence,
psychological incapacity was not proved:
Shorn of any reference to psychology, we conclude that we have a case
here of parties who have very human faults and frailties; who have been
together for some time; and who are now tired of each other. If in fact the
respondent does not want to provide the support expected of a wife, the
cause is not necessarily a grave and incurable psychological malady
whose effects go as far as to affect her capacity to provide marital support
promised and expected when the marital knot was tied. To be tired and to
give up on one’s situation and on one’s husband are not necessarily signs
of psychological illness; neither can falling out of love be so labeled. When
these happen, the remedy for some is to cut the marital knot to allow the
parties to go their separate ways. This simple remedy, however, is not
available to us under our laws. Ours is still a limited remedy that
addresses only a very specific situation – a relationship where no
marriage could have validly been concluded because the parties, or one
of them, by reason of a grave and incurable psychological illness existing
when the marriage was celebrated, did not appreciate the obligations of
marital life and, thus, could not have validly entered into a marriage.
Outside of this situation, this Court is powerless to provide any permanent
remedy.
NAJERA VS NAJERA
G.R. No. 164817 July 3, 2009
Facts:
On January 27, 1997, petitioner filed with the RTC a verified Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with Alternative Prayer for Legal
Separation, with Application for Designation as Administrator Pendente
Lite of the Conjugal Partnership of Gains .Petitioner alleged that she and
respondent are residents of Bugallon, Pangasinan, but respondent is
presently living in the United States of America (U.S.A). They were
married on January 31, 1988. They are childless. Petitioner claimed that
at the time of the celebration of marriage, respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of the
marriage, and such incapacity became manifest only after marriage.
On June 29, 1998, the RTC issued an Order terminating the pre-trial
conference after the parties signed a Formal Manifestation/Motion, which
stated that they had agreed to dissolve their conjugal partnership of gains
and divide equally their conjugal properties. Psychologist Cristina Gates
testified that the chances of curability of respondent’s psychological
disorder were nil. Its curability depended on whether the established
organic damage was minimal -- referring to the malfunction of the
composites of the brain brought about by habitual drinking and marijuana,
which possibly afflicted respondent with borderline personality disorder
and uncontrollable impulses.
Further, SPO1 Sonny Dela Cruz, a member of the PNP, Bugallon,
Pangasinan, testified that on July 3, 1994, he received a complaint from
petitioner that respondent arrived at their house under the influence of
liquor and mauled petitioner without provocation on her part, and that
respondent tried to kill her. The complaint was entered in the police
blotter.
Issue:
Whether or not the totality of petitioner’s evidence was able to prove that
respondent is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage warranting the annulment of their marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that the totality of
the evidence submitted by petitioner failed to satisfactorily prove that
respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage .The root cause of respondent’s alleged
psychological incapacity was not sufficiently proven by experts or shown
to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
YAMBAO vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 184063 January 24. 2011
Facts:
Petitioner Cynthia E. Yambao and respondent Patricio E. Yambao married
on December 21, 1968. On July 11, 2003, after 35 years of marriage and
three children raised into adulthood, petitioner filed a petition before the
Regional Trial Court, Makati City, praying the marriage be declared null
and void due to her husband’s psychological incapacity pursuant to Article
36 of the Family Code. Petitioner claims that her marriage is marred by
bickering, quarrels and recrimination because of the respondent’s difficulty
to find a stable job, failure in the family business, refusal to change
children’s diapers while petitioner was still recovering from her Caesarean
operation, insecurity and jealousy towards acquaintances and relatives,
eating and sleeping all day, gambling, and threats to kill her. She then
consulted with a psychiatrist who concluded that the respondent suffered
from Dependent Personality Disorder.
On February 9, 2007, the Regional Trial Court dismissed the petition for
lack of merit. On April 16, 2008, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
Regional Trial Court’s Decision; hence, this petition for review before the
Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or not the totality of petitioner’s evidence establishes the
respondent’s psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations
of marriage.
Ruling:
No. Though there are existing antecedents, assumptions, predilections, or
generalizations, this case must be treated uniquely, given its facts and
idiosyncrasies. For marriage to be annulled under Article 36 of the Family
Code, it must be proven that the incapacitated spouse manifested mental,
not physical, incapacity causing him or her to be truly incognitive of the
basic marital covenants. The spouse must suffer from a mental incapacity
so severe that he is and becomes unaware of his marital and familial
obligations. Psychological incapacity must be judged according to:
(a)gravity,
(b)juridical antecedence, and
(c) incurability.
Article 36 considers incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to
assume basic marital obligations as totally different from mere difficulty,
refusal, neglect or ill will in the performance of marital obligations.
Incapacity is defined as:
(a)true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of marriage;
(b)this inability to commit oneself must refer to the essential obligations of
marriage: the conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of
mutual help, the procreation and education of offspring; and
(c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality. All
marriages go through “bickerings, quarrels and recrimination” and rough
patches. In this case, the respondent may not be the ideal husband for
petitioner’s exacting standards but they have gone through 35 years of
marriage and have raised 3 children into adulthood “without any major
parenting problems”. Moreover, respondent never committed infidelity or
physically abused the petitioner or their children. These facts do not prove
psychological incapacity.