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CIVIL LAW FAMILY PERSONS

Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals and Santos

GR No. 112019 / 58 SCAD 17

Januray 4, 1995

FACTS:

Lt. Leouel Santos married private respondent Julia Bedia on Sept. 20, 1986 in Illoilo MTC and later by
church wedding. They lived with the latter’s parents and eventually gave birth to Leouel Santos, Jr. on
July 18, 1987. The relationship turned sour when they began quarelling over frequent interferrence of
Julia’s parents and the issue of liveing independently from the in-laws.

On May 18, 1988, Julia left for the United States (US) to work as nurse despite Leouel’s
protestations. Seven months thereafter or on January 1, 1989, she called up from the US with the
promise of returning home soon, but she never did. Given the chance, Leouel went to the US for a
training program sponsored by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) from April to August 1990. He
desperately tried to locate her there but failed.

He then filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for the nullification of their marriage under Article 36 of
the Family Code, on the ground of psychological incapacity. Summons was served by publication in a
newspaper of general circulation in Negros Oriental. In her answer, Julia claimed that it was Leouel who
was irresponsible and incompetent. The RTC in November 1991 dismissed the case for lack of merit. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage may be declared a nullity prusuant to Artcile 36 of the Family Code.

HELD:

Article 36 cannot be taken and construed independently, but must stand in conjunction with existing
precepts of laws on marriage. Thus correlated, “psychological incapacity” should refer no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants
that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so
expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe
love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of
the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is
celebrated. The law does not evidently envision an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with
the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children
conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be legitimate.

The well-considered opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists and persons with expertise in psychological
disciplines might be helpful or even desirable in establishing the parameters of psychological incapacity.

Marriage is not just and adventure but a lifetime commitment. We should continue to be reminded that
innate in our society, then enshrined in the Civil Code, and even now still indelible in Section 1 of the
Family Code…the Constitution is no less emphatic.

BEATRIZ WASSMER vs. FRANCISCO VELEZ

No. L-20089

December 26, 1964

FACTS:

Respondent Francisco Velez and petitioner Beatriz Wassmer were lovers who set their marriage
for Sept. 4, 1954. On Sept. 2, however, Francisco left for Cagayan de Oro, leaving Beatriz with a note
that his mother was approved to the marriage. A day before the supposed wedding, on Sept. 3,
Francisco telegrammed Beatriz that nothing changed and that he assured her of his return and
love. Francisco did not appear after all nor words were heard from him again; despite the fact that
preparations were all made. They applied for a marriage license on Aug. 23, and was issued thereof;
invitations were printed and distributed to friends and relatives; dresses and other apparel were already
bought; the two bought a matrimonial bed; bridal showers were given and gifts received.

Beatriz then filed damages for breach of promise to marry.

ISSUE:

Whether or not breach of promise to marry is an actionable wrong.

HELD:

Mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding
and go through all the preparations and publicity, and to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to
be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to customs for which
Francisco must be held answerable for damages in accordance with Art. 21 of the Civil Code.

Under Art. 2232 of the Civil Code, the conditions precedent is that the defendant acted in a
wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner.
 When a breach of promise to marry is actionable under Article 21, moral damages may be
awarded under Art. 2219 (10) of the Civil Code. Exemplary damages may also be awarded under Art.
2232 of the Code where it is proven that the defendant clearly acted in wanton, reckless and oppressive
manner.

CHI MING TSOI vs. COURT OF APPEALS, GINA LAO-TSOI

GR NO. 119190 January 16, 1997

FACTS: Ching married Gina on May 22, 1988 at the Manila Cathedral, Intramuros,
Manila as evidenced by their marriage contract. After the celebration they had a reception
and then proceeded to the house of the Ching Ming Tsoi’s mother. There they slept
together on the same bed in the same room for the first night of their married life.
Gina’s version: that contrary to her expectations that as newlyweds they were supposed to enjoy
making love that night of their marriage, or having sexual intercourse, with each other, Ching
however just went to bed, slept on one side and then turned his back and went to sleep. There
was no sexual intercourse between them that night. The same thing happened on the second,
third and fourth nights.
In an effort to have their honey moon in a private place where they can enjoy together during
their first week as husband and wife they went to Baguio City. But they did so together with
Ching’s mother, uncle and nephew as they were all invited by her husband. There was no sexual
intercourse between them for four days in Baguio since Ching avoided her by taking a long walk
during siesta time or by just sleeping on a rocking chair located at the living room.
They slept together in the same room and on the same bed since May 22, 1988 (day of their
marriage) until March 15, 1989 (ten months). But during this period there was no attempt of
sexual intercourse between them. Gina claims that she did not even see her husband’s private
parts nor did he see hers.
Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examinations to Dr. Eufemio Macalalag.
Results were that Gina is healthy, normal and still a virgin while Ching’s examination was kept
confidential up to this time.
Then Gina claims that her husband is impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not show his
penis. She said she had observed him using an eyebrow pencil and sometimes the cleansing
cream of his mother. She also said her husband only married her to acquire or maintain his
residency status here in the country and to publicly maintain the appearance of a normal man
Ching’s version: he claims that if their marriage shall be annulled by reason of psychological
incapacity, the fault lies with Gina. He does not want their marriage annulled for reasons of (1)
that he loves her very much (2) that he has no defect on his part and he is physically and
psychologically capable (3) since the relationship is still very young and if there is any
differences between the two of them, it can still be reconciled and that according to him, if either
one of them has some incapabilities, there is no certainty that this will not be cured.
Ching admitted that since his marriage to Gina there was no sexual contact between them. But,
the reason for this, according to the defendant, was that everytime he wants to have sexual
intercourse with his wife, she always avoided him and whenever he caresses her private parts,
she always removed his hands.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ching is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations of marriage
RULING: The Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the trial court and Court of Appeals in
rendering as VOID the marriage entered into by Ching and Gina on May 22, 1988. No costs.

RATIO: The Supreme Court held that the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual
intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity. If a spouse,
although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marriage
obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the
causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is
equivalent to psychological incapacity.
One of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is “to procreate children basedon
the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of
marriage.” Constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or
wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the
parties to fulfill this marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observer
mutual love, respect and fidelity, the sanction therefore is actually the “spontaneous, mutual
affection between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court order (Cuaderno vs.
Cuaderno, 120 Phil. 1298). Love is useless unless it is shared with another. Indeed, no man is an
island, the cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to say “I could not have cared less.” This is so
because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but himself. In the natural
order, it is sexual intimacy that brings spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift
and a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a function which enlivens the hope of
procreation and ensures the continuation of family relations.

IMELDA MARBELLA-BOBIS vs. ISAGANI BOBIS

GR No. 138509

July 31, 2000

FACTS:

On October 21, 1985, respondent Isagani Bobis contracted a first marriage with Ma. Dulce Javier. With
said marriage not yet annulled, nullified nor terminated, he contracted a second marriage with herein
petitioner Imelda Marbella (on Jan. 25, 1996), and a third marriage with certain Julia Hernandez,
thereafter.

Petitioner then filed a case of bigamy against respondent on Feb. 25, 1998, at the RTC of Quezon
City. Thereafter, respondent initiated a civil action for the declaration of absolute nullity of his first
marriage license. He then filed a motion to suspend the criminal proceeding for bigamy invoking the
civil case for nullity of the first marriage as a prejudicial question to the criminal case. The RTC granted
the motion, while petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration of nullity of a previous
marriage constitutes a prejudicial question to a criminal case for bigamy.
HELD:

Any decision in the civil case the fact that respondent entered into a second marriage during
the subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential to the determination
of the criminal charge. It is therefore not a prejudicial question. Respondent cannot be permitted to
use his malfeasance to defeat the criminal action against him.

A prejudicial question is one which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical
antecedent of the issue involved therein. It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the
crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. It
must appear not only that the civil case involves facts upon which the criminal action is based, but also
that the resolution of the issues raised in the civil action would necessarily be determinative of the civil
case. Consequently, the defense must involve an issue similar or intimately related to the same issue
raised in the criminal action and its resolution determinative of whether or not the latter action may
proceed. Its two essential elements are (a) the civil action involves an issue raised in the criminal action;
and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

In the case at bar, the respondent’s clear intent is to obtain a judicial declaration of nullity of
his first marriage and thereafter to invoke that very same judgment to prevent his prosecution for
bigamy. He cannot have his cake and eat it too. Otherwise, all that an adventurous bigamist has to do is
disregard Article 40 of the Family Code, contract a subsequent marriage and escape a bigamy charge by
simply claiming that the first marriage is void and the subsequent marriage is equally void for lack of a
prior judicial declaration of nullity of the first. A party may even enter into a marriage aware of the
absence of a requisite—usually the marriage license—and thereafter contract a subsequent marriage
without obtaining a declaration of nullity of the first on the assumption that the first marriage is
void. Such scenario would render nugatory the provisions on bigamy. As succinctly held in Landicho v.
Relova, 22 SCRA 731(1968):

Parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, [as] only
competent courts have such authority. Prior to such declaration of nullity of the first marriage is beyond
question. A party who contracts a second marriage then assumes the risk of being prosecuted for
bigamy.

A prejudicial question does not conclusively resolve the guilt or innocence of the accused but
simply tests the sufficiency of the allegations in the information in order to sustain the further
prosecution of the criminal case. A party who raises a prejudicial question is deemed to have
hypothetically admitted that all the essential elements of a crime have been adequately alleged in the
information, considering that the prosecution has not yet presented single evidence on the indictment
or may not yet have rested its case. A challenge of the allegations in the information on the ground of
prejudicial question is in effect a question on the merits of the criminal charge through a non-criminal
suit.

Ignorance of the existence of Article 40 of the Family Code cannot be successfully invoked as an
excuse. The contracting of a marriage knowing that the requirements of the law have not been
complied with or that the marriage is in disregard of a legal impediment is an act penalized by the
Revised Penal Code. The legality of a marriage is a matter of law and every person is presumed to know
the law. As respondent did not obtain the judicial declaration of nullity when he entered into the
second marriage, why should he be allowed to belatedly obtain that judicial declaration in order to delay
his criminal prosecution and subsequently defeat it by his own disobedience of the law? If he wants to
raise the nullity of the previous marriage, he can do it as a matter of defense when he presents his
evidence during the trial proper in the criminal case.

The elements of bigamy are (1) the offender has been legally married; (2) that the first
marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse has not
been judicially declared presumptively dead; (3) that he contracts a subsequent marriage; and (4) the
subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been for the existence of the first. The
exceptions to prosecution for bigamy are those covered by Article 41 of the Family Code and by PD 1083
otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws.

BAKSH vs. COURT OF APPEALS

GR No. 97336

February 19, 1993

FACTS:

Petitioner Gashem Shookat Baksh was an Iranian citizen, exchange student taking a
medical course in Dagupan City, who courted private respondent Marilou Gonzales, and
promised to marry her. On the condition that they would get married, she reciprocated his
love. They then set the marriage after the end of the school semester. He visited Marilou’s
parents to secure their approval of marriage. In August 1987, he forced her to live with him,
which she did. However, his attitude toward her changed after a while; he would maltreat and
even threatened to kill her, from which she sustained injuries. Upon confrontation with the
barangay captain, he repudiated their marriage agreement, saying that he was already married to
someone living in Bacolod.

Marilou then filed for damages before the RTC. Baksh denied the accusations but
asserted that he told her not to go to his place since he discovered her stealing his money and
passport. The RTC ruled in favor of Gonzales. The CA affirmed the RTC decision.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not breach of promise to marry is an actionable wrong.

2. Whether or not Art. 21 of the Civil Code applies to this case.
3. Whether or not pari delicto applies in t his case.

HELD:

The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong.
 This, notwithstanding, Art. 21 is designed to expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict
in this jurisdictions by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs
which is impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute
books.

Art. 21 defines quasi-delict:

Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence
is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called quasi-delict and is governed by the (Civil
Code).

It is clear that petitioner harbors a condescending if not sarcastic regard for the private
respondent on account of the latter’s ignoble birth, inferior educational background, poverty and,
as perceived by him, dishonorable employment. From the beginning, obviously, he was not at
all moved by good faith and an honest motive. Thus, his profession of love and promise to
marry were empty words directly intended to fool, dupe, entice, beguile and deceive the poor
woman into believing that indeed, he loved her and would want her to be his life partner. His
was nothing but pure lust which he wanted satisfied by a Filipina who honestly believed that by
accepting his proffer of love and proposal of marriage, she would be able to enjoy a life of ease
and security. Petitioner clearly violated the Filipino concept of morality and so brazenly defied
the traditional respect Filipinos have for their women. It can even be said that the petitioner
committed such deplorable acts in blatant disregard of Article 19 of the Civil Code which directs
every person to act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith in the
exercise of his right and in the performance of his obligations.

No foreigner must be allowed to make a mockery of our laws, customs and traditions.

She is not in pari delicto with the petitioner. Pari delicto means in equal fault. At
most, it could be conceded that she is merely in delicto.

Equity often interfered for the relief of the less guilty of the parties, where his
transgression has been brought about by the imposition of undue influence of the party on whom
the burden of the original wrong principally rests, or where his consent to the transaction was
itself procured by fraud.

Mercado vs. Tan

In the case of Mercado vs. Tan,[1] the accused argued that he already obtained a judicial
declaration of nullity of his first marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, thereby rendering
it void ab initio. He argued that a void marriage is deemed never to have taken place at all and,
hence, there is no first marriage to speak of. The accused also quoted the commentaries of former
Justice Luis Reyes that "it is now settled that if the first marriage is void from the beginning, it is
a defense in a bigamy charge. But if the first marriage is voidable, it is not a defense." The
Supreme Court, in dismissing the argument of the accused, stated:
In the instant case, petitioner contracted a second marriage although there was yet no judicial
declaration of nullity of his first marriage. In fact, he instituted the Petition to have the first
marriage declared void only after complainant had filed a letter-complaint charging him with
bigamy. By contracting a second marriage while the first was still subsisting, he committed the
acts punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.

That he subsequently obtained a judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was
immaterial. To repeat, the crime had already been consummated by then. Moreover, his view
effectively encourages delay in the prosecution of bigamy cases; an accused could simply file a
petition to declare his previous marriage void and invoke the pendency of that action as a
prejudicial question in the criminal case. We cannot allow that.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. COURT OF APPEALS & RORIDEL

OLAVIANO MOLINA

G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997

The respondent preferred to spend more time with his friends than his family on whom he
squandered his
money, depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and was dishonest to his wife regarding
his
finances, and lived with a mistress with whom he has a child. Roridel filed a case for the
declaration of
nullity of their marriage by virtue of her husband’s psychological incapacity.

ISSUE: Whether or not Reynaldo is psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital

obligations to

private respondent, thus a valid ground to render the marriage void.

HELD: NO. Marriage is valid.

RATIO:

They seem to have a difficulty or outright refusal or neglect in performing their obligations.
They’re not

incapable of doing them.

Failure of their expectations is not tantamount to psychological incapacity. Mere showing of

“irreconcilable differences” and “conflicting personalities” in no wise constitutes psychological

incapacity.

SC enumerated the guidelines in invoking the psychological incapacity under Article

36:

1. the burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belong to the plaintiff

2. the root cause of the psychological incapacity must be:

a. medically or clinically identified
b. alleged in the complaint
c. sufficiently proven by experts and
d. clearly explained in the decision.

3. the incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage
4. Psychological Incapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable
5. Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the

essential obligations of marriage.

6. the essential obligations must be those embodied by Art 69 to 71 (husband and wife) of FC as

well as Art 220, 221 and 335 (parents and children)

7. interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church
in the

PI while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts

8.the trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and Solicitor General to appear as

counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the SC issues a certification. (last

sent not anymore needed pursuant to SC resolution A.M. No. 02-11-10)

G.R. No. 112019 January 04, 1995

Plaintiff Leouel Santos married defendant Julia Bedia on September 20, 1986. On May 18 1988,
Julia left
for the U.S to work as a nurse. She only called up Leouel seven months after she left with
promise to
return after her contract expires on July 1989. She didn’t come back. Leouel had a military
training in the
US and he looked for Julia but he never found her. In 1991, Leoul filed a complaint for voiding
the
marriage under Article 36 of FC.

ISSUE: Does the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very least to communicate with him,
for more
than five years constitute psychological incapacity?

HELD:NO. Dismissed.

RATIO:

SC defined psychological incapacity as to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that
causes

a party to be truly cognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed
and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family
Code,
include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render
help
and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of “psychological incapacity” to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage.
This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated.

For psychological incapacity to be proven, there must be a real inability to commit oneself to the

essential obligations of marriage. Mere difficulty of assuming these obligations which could be

overcome by normal effort does not constitute incapacity.

Dr. Veloso of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal gave 3 characteristics of psychological

incapacity:

1.gravity that would really render one incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties in marriage

2. juridical antecedence means it should be rooted in history, existing prior to the marriage

3. incurability including cure that is beyond the party’s means. Circumstances of the case at bar
do

not amount to psychological incapacity.

BRENDA B. MARCOS vs. WILSON G. MARCOS

G.R. No. 136490, 19 October 2000, 343 SCRA 755

Plaintiff Brenda B. Marcos married Wilson Marcos in 1982 and they had five children. Alleging
that the
husband failed to provide material support to the family and have resorted to physical abuse and
abandonment, Brenda filed a case for the nullity of the marriage for psychological incapacity.

ISSUE:

Is there a need for Personal Medical Examination of Respondent to prove psychological

incapacity?

Whether the totality of evidence presented in this case show psychological incapacity

HELD: No. The SC rules in the negative.

RATIO:

Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of a marriage, may be established
by

the totality of evidence presented. There is no requirement, however, that the respondent should
be

examined by a physician or a psychologist as a condition sine qua non for such declaration.

Although SC is sufficienty convinced that respondent failed to provide material support to the
family

and may have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the totality of this acts does not lead
to a
conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his
“defects”
were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable.

Article 36 is NOT to be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted
in

psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil
interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like. At
best the evidence presented by petitioner refers only to grounds for legal separation, not for
declaring a marriage void.

NOEL BUENAVENTURA vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ISABEL LUCIA SINGH

BUENAVENTURA
G.R. Nos. 127358 and G.R. Nos. 127449

March 31, 2005

Noel deceived Isabel into marrying him by professing true love instead of revealing to her that he
was
under heavy parental pressure to marry and that because of pride he married defendant-appellee;
Wife
claimed that she suffer mental anguish, anxiety, besmirched reputation, sleepless nights not only
in those
years the parties were together but also after and throughout their separation. Noel filed a petition
for the
declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground that both he and his wife were psychologically
incapacitated.

ISSUE: Whether or not damages should be awarded by reason of the performance or non-
performance

of marital obligations.

HELD:No. Moral and Exemplary damages are deleted.

RATIO:

The acts or omissions of petitioner constitute psychological incapacity. A marriage contracted by

any

party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the

essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization.

It is contradictory to characterize acts as a product of psychological incapacity, and hence

beyond the

control of the party because of an innate inability, while at the same time considering the same
set of
acts as willful. By declaring the petitioner as psychologically incapacitated, the possibility of
awarding
moral damages on the same set of facts was negated. The award of moral damages should be
predicated, not on the mere act of entering into the marriage, but on specific evidence that it was
done deliberately and with malice by a party who had knowledge of his or her disability and yet
willfully concealed the same. No such evidence appears to have been adduced in this case

Balogbog vs. CA G.R. NO. 83598 March 7, 1997

I. CASE TITLE:
LEONCIA and GAUDIOSO BALOGBOG (Younger siblings of the deceased Gavino Balogbog.
The two questioned the validity of Gavino’s marriage and thus contesting the inheritance claims
posed by Gavino’s sons on a third of their parents’ Basilio and Genoveva Balogbog’s estate) vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, RAMONITO BALOGBOG AND GENERESO BALOGBOG
(legitimate children of Gavino by Catalina Ubas and are defending the validity of their parent’s
marriage and thus be entitled to inherit a third of the estate of their grandparents Basilio and
Genoveva Balogbog)
G.R. NO. 83598 March 7, 1997

II. FAMILY CODE:

ARTICLE 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and woman
entered into in accordance with the law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the
foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequence and
incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements
may fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code.

III. QUOTED:
· However, in the case of Balogbog vs. Court of Appeals where it was contended that a particular
marriage should have been proven in accordance with Articles 53 and 54 of the Spanish Civil
Code of 1889 because this was the law in force at the time of the alleged marriage, the Supreme
Court ruled that Articles 53 and 54 of the Spanish Civil Code never took effect in the Philippines
because they were suspended by the Spanish Governor General of the Philippines shortly after
the extension of the Spanish Civil Code to this country. In such a case the Supreme Court said
that: since this case was brought to the lower court in 1968, the existence of the marriage must be
determined in accordance with the present Civil Code, except as they related to vested rights and
the rules of evidence. (page 108)

IV. FACTS
Nature of the case: Ramonito and Generoso filed action for partition and accounting against their
aunt Leoncia and uncle Gaudioso for partition and accounting of their grandparents’ estate at the
Court of First Instance of Cebu City. This was granted. Leoncia and Gaudioso appealed to the
Court of Appeals but the latter affirmed the lower court’s decision. Thus, they are now at the
Supreme Court for certiorari hopefully over turn the CA and lower court’s decision in favoring
their nephews.
The facts: Leoncia and Gaudioso Balogbog contends are the children of Basilio Balogbog and
Geneveva Arnibal who died in 1951 and 1961 respectively. They had an older brother Gavino
but he died in 1935 pre-deceasing their parents. In 1968 however, Ramonito and Generoso
Balogbog filed an action for partition and accounting against Leoncia and Gaudioso claiming
that they were the legitimate children of Gavino by Catalina Ubas and that, as such they were
entitled to the one-third share in the estate of their grandparents.
But Leoncia and Gaudioso said they don’t know Ramonito and Generoso and proceeded to
question the validity of the marriage between their brother Gavino and Catalina. This despite
how Gaudioso himself admitted during a police investigation proceeding that indeed Ramonito is
his nephew as the latter is the son of his elder brother Gavino.
To prove the validity of their parent’s marriage, Ramonito and Generoso presented Priscilo
Trazo, 81 years old then mayor of Asturias from 1928 to 1934 and Matias Pogoy who both
testified that he knew Gavino and Catalina to be husband and wife and that they have three
children. Catalina herself testified that she was handed a “receipt” presumambly the marriage
certificate by Fr. Jomao-as but it was burned during the war.
Leoncia for part claimed that her brother Gavino died single at the family residence in Asturias.
She obtained a certificate from the local Civil Registrar of Asturias to the effect that the office
did not have a record of the names of Gavino and Catalina. The certificate was prepared by
Assistant Municipal Treasurer Juan Maranga who testified that there was no record of marriage
of Gavino and Catalina in the Book of Marriages between 1925 to 1935/
She and Gaudioso contended that the marriage of Gavino and Catalina should have been proven
in accordance with Arts. 53 and 54 of the Civil Code of 1889 because this was the law in force at
the time of the alleged marriage was celebrated. Art. 53 provides that marriages celebrated under
the Civil Code of 1889 should be proven only by a certified copy of the memorandum in the
Civil Registry, unless the books thereof have not been kept or have been lost, or unless they are
questioned in the courts, in which case any other proof, such as that of the continuous possession
by parents of the status of husband and wife, may be considered, provided that the registration of
the birth of their children as their legitimate children is also submitted in evidence.

V. ISSUE: Whether or not Gavino and Catalina’s marriage is valid.

VI. RULING: The Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the trial court and Court of Appeals
in rendering Gavino and Catalina’s marriage as valid and thus entitle Ramonito and Generoso a
third of their grandparents’ estate.

VII. APPLICATION:
The Supreme Court held that Arts. 42 to 107 of the Civil Code of 889 of Spain did not take
effect, having been suspended by the Governor General of the Philippines shortly after the
extension of that code of this country. Consequently, Arts. 53 and 54 never came into force.
Since this case was brought in the lower court in 1968, the existence of the marriage must be
determined in accordance with the present Civil Code, which repealed the provisions of the
former Civil Code, except as they related to vested rights, and the rules of evidence. Under the
Rules of Court, the presumption is that a man and a woman conducting themselves as husband
and wife are legally married. This presumption may be rebutted only by cogent proof to the
contrary.
Although a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage, the failure to present it
is not proof that no marriage took place – other evidence may be presented to prove marriage. In
this case, Leoncia and Gaudioso claim that the certification presented by Ramonito and Generoso
(to the effect that the record of the marriage had been lost or destroyed during the war) was
belied by the production of the Book of Marriages by the assistant municipal treasurer of
Asturias. Leoncia and Gaudioso argue that this book does not contain any entry pertaining to the
alleged marriage of Gavino and Catalina. This contention has no merit. In Pugeda vs. Trias, the
defendants, who questioned the marriage of the plaintiffs produced a photostatic copy of the
record of marriages of the Municipality of Rosario, Cavite for the month of Jaunary 1916, to
show that there was no record of the alleged marriage. Nonetheless, evidence consisting of the
testimonies of witnesses was held competent to prove the marriage. Indeed, although a marriage
contract is considered primary evidence of marriage, failure to present it is not proof that no
marriage took place. Other evidence may be presented it to proof marriage. Here, Ramonito and
Generoso proved through testimonial evidence, that Gavino and Catalina were married in 1929,
that they have three children, one of whom died in infancy, that their marriage subsisted until
1935 when Gavino died, and that they are recognized by Gavino’s family and by the public as
the legitimate children of Gavino.

Republic v. CA and Molina

GR 108763, 13 February 1997
En Banc, Panganiban (p): 8 concur, 3 concur in result

Facts: Roridel Olaviano was married to Reynaldo Molina on 14 April 1985 in Manila, and gave
birth to a son a year after. Reynaldo showed signs of “immaturity and irresponsibility” on the
early stages of the marriage, observed from his tendency to spend time with his friends and
squandering his money with them, from his dependency from his parents, and his dishonesty on
matters involving his finances. Reynaldo was relieved of his job in 1986, Roridel became the
sole breadwinner thereafter. In March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and
proceeded to Baguio City. Reynaldo left her and their child a week later. The couple are
separated-in-fact for more than three years.

On 16 August 1990, Roridel filed a verified petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to
Reynaldo Molina. Evidence for Roridel consisted of her own testimony, that of two of her
friends, a social worker, and a psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center.
Reynaldo did not present any evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial conference. On
14 May 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. The Solicitor
General appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals denied the appeals and
affirmed in toto the RTC’s decision. Hence, the present recourse.

Issue: Whether opposing or conflicting personalities should be construed as psychological

incapacity

Held: The Court of Appeals erred in its opinion the Civil Code Revision Committee intended to
liberalize the application of Philippine civil laws on personal and family rights, and holding
psychological incapacity as a broad range of mental and behavioral conduct on the part of one
spouse indicative of how he or she regards the marital union, his or her personal relationship
with the other spouse, as well as his or her conduct in the long haul for the attainment of the
principal objectives of marriage; where said conduct, observed and considered as a whole, tends
to cause the union to self-destruct because it defeats the very objectives of marriage, warrants the
dissolution of the marriage.

The Court reiterated its ruling in Santos v. Court of Appeals, where psychological incapacity
should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity, existing at the time the
marriage is celebrated, and that there is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law
has been to confine the meaning of ‘psychological incapacity’ to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage. Psychological incapacity must be characterized
by gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability. In the present case, there is no clear
showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity; but appears to be more of
a “difficulty,” if not outright “refusal” or “neglect” in the performance of some marital
obligations. Mere showing of “irreconcilable differences” and “conflicting personalities” in no
wise constitutes psychological incapacity.

The Court, in this case, promulgated the guidelines in the interpretation and application of
Article 36 of the Family Code, removing any visages of it being the most liberal divorce
procedure in the world: (1) The burden of proof belongs to the plaintiff; (2) the root cause of
psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint,
sufficiently proven by expert, and clearly explained in the decision; (3) The incapacity must be
proven existing at the time of the celebration of marriage; (4) the incapacity must be clinically or
medically permanent or incurable; (5) such illness must be grave enough; (6) the essential
marital obligation must be embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code as regards husband
and wife, and Articles 220 to 225 of the same code as regards parents and their children; (7)
interpretation made by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church, and
(8) the trial must order the fiscal and the Solicitor-General to appeal as counsels for the State.

The Supreme Court granted the petition, and reversed and set aside the assailed decision;
concluding that the marriage of Roridel Olaviano to

SongDiary
Succession
ACAIN VS IAC
GRN 72706
OCTOBER 27, 1987
PARAS, J.:

FACTS:

Constantitno filed for probate of the will of his decased brother Nemesio. The spouse and
adopted child of the decedent opposed the probate of will because of
preterition. RTC dismissed the petition of the wife. CA reversed and the probate thus was
dismissed

ISSUE: Whether or not there was preterition of “compulsory heirs in the direct line” thus their
omission shall not annul the institution of heirs.

RULING:

Preterition consists in the omission of the forced heirs because they are not mentioned there in,
or trough mentioned they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited. As for the
widow there is no preterit ion because she is not in the direct line. However, the same cannot be
said for the adopted child whose legal adoption has not been questioned by the petitioner.
Adoption gives to the adopted person the same rights and duties as if he where a legitimate child
of the adopter and makes the adopted person a legal heir hence, this is a clear case of preterition.

The universal institution of petitioner together with his brothers and sisters to the entire
inheritance of the testator results in totally abrogating the will because the nullification of such
institution of universal heirs without any other testamentary disposition in the will amounts to a
declaration that nothing was written. No legacies and devisees having been provided in the will,
the whole property of the deceased has been left by universal title to petitioner and his brothers
and sisters.

http://favesongdiary.blogspot.com/2010/05/case-digest-succession.html

Civil Law
http://favesongdiary.blogspot.com/2010/05/case-digest-
succession.html
NUGUID VS NUGUID

GRN L-234417 SCRA 449

JUNE 23, 1966

SANCHEZ, J.:

FACTS:

Rosario Nuguid , single, died in December 30, 1962.She was without descendants but was
survived by her parents and siblings. On May 18, 1963, Remedios Nuguid, her sister filed in CFI
a holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario on November 17, 1951 or 11 years ago, said
will instituted Remedios as the universal heir thereby, compulsory heirs, the ascendants of the
decedent, filed their opposition to the probate proceeding. They contend that they were illegally
preterited and as a consequence, the institution is void. The court’s order held that “the will in
question is a complete nullity.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the compulsory heirs were preterited , thereby rendering the holographic will
void.
Whether the court may rule on the intrinsic validity of the will.

RULING:

The statute we are called upon to apply in article 854 of the civil code which states:

“The preterition or omission of one, some or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct time,
whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall
annul the institution of heir; but the d and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not
inofficious

The forced heirs, parents of the deceased, were received nothing by the testament. The one-
sentence will institutes petitioner as the universal heir. No specific legacies or bequest are therein
provided for. It is in this posture that we say that the nullity is complete.

Preterition consists in the omission in the testator’s will of the forced heirs or anyone of them,
either because they are not mentioned therein or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as
heirs nor are expressly disinherited as heirs nor are expressly disinherited. Disinheritance is a
testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heir his/her share in the legitime for a cause
authorized by law.

On the second issue, the case is for the probate of the will and the court’s area of inquiry is
limited to the extrinsic validity of the will comes after the will has been duly authenticated.
However if the case is to be remanded for probate of the will, nothing will be gained. The
practical conditions: time, effort, expenses and added anxiety, induced us to abelief that we
might as well meat head-on the issue of the validity of the provisions of the will in question.

DE PAPA ET AL VS CAMACHO

GRN L-28032

SEPTEMBER 24, 1986

NARVASA, J.:
FACTS:

Plaintiffs and respondents of this case are legitimate relatives, plaintiffs being aunt and uncles of
the respondent.Camacho inherited her property from her mother Trinidad, a descendant of
Dizon, first degree cousin of defendants.

ISSUE:

Whether or not uncles and aunts, together with niece who survived the reservista would be
considered reservatorios.

RULING:

The court ruled that the uncles and aunts shall not share in the reserveable property, since, under
the law of intestate succession a descendant’s uncles and aunts may not succeed ab intestate so
long as nephews and nieces of the decedent survive and are willing and qualified to inherit.The
rule on proximity applies. (The relatives in the direct ascending shall exclude relatives in the
collateral line.)

MANG-OY VS CA

G.R.144 SCRA 35

SEPTEMBER 12, 1986

CRUZ, J.:

FACTS:

Old Tumpao begot 3 children (respondents) with his first wife. Upon her death, he took himself a
second wife but without issues. However she had adopted 2 children according to the practice of
Igorots. On September 4, 1937, Old Tumpao executed what he called “last will and testament
which were read to and thumb mark affixed by all of the beneficiaries who at the time were
already occupying the portions respectively allotted to them. After the death of Old Tumpao, the
parties remained to be in possession of the lots assign to them which was in accordance of the
wishes of old Tumpao which was also agreed upon by the parties in a public document.

On November 4, 1960, respondents executed an extra-judicial partition in which they divided the
property of Old Tumpao among the three of them only. Petitioners sued for reconveyance ,
sustained by trial court but reversed by CA.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the “ will and testament” of Old Tumpao be duly allowed even without being
proved in the court

RULING:

In accordance with the rules of court, no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it
is proved or allowed in court.

However the document maybe sustained by art 1056 of the Old Civil Code which was the law in
force at the time the document was made. The law says: “If the testator should make a partition
of his properties by an act inter vivors, or by will such partition shall stand in so far as it does not
prejudice the legitime of the forced heirs.”

Such partition is not governed by the rules of wills or donation inter vivos, which is a
consequence of its special nature. Thus, the last will and testament of Old Tumpao is sustained
by the provision of Art 1056, Old Civil Code, which became a binding law when the
beneficiaries, parties herein, agreed and confirmed with the disposition made by Old Tumpao.

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