Case Digest: G.R. No. 109975.

February 9, 2001
Republic of the Philippines, petitioner, vs. Erlinda Matias Dagdag, respondent. 
_______________________________________________________________________

Facts: Erlinda Matias married Avelino Parangan Dagdag and begot two children. Avelino would disappear for
months without explanation and attend to drinking sprees with friends and return home drunk when with the
family; forced his wife to have sexual intercourse and if she resisted, would inflict injure to the latter. He left his
family again and never heard of him.  Erlinda was constrained to look for a job to fend for themselves. Erlinda
then learned that Avelino was imprisoned for some crime, and that he escaped from jail who remains at-large at
date.Erlinda filed for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under
Article 36 of the Family Code. The trial court rendered a decision declaring the marriage void under Artcile 36
of the Family Code. The Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals raising that the lower court erred in
declaring the apellee's marriage to Avelino Dagdag null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity of
the latter, pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code, the psychological incapacity of the nature contemplated by
the law not having been proven to exist. However,  the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court

Issue: Whether or not immaturity and irresponsibility, habitual alcoholic, and a fugitive from justice constitutes
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code to declare the marriage null and void.

Ruling: No. The ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina case is reiterated herein in which the Court
laid down the following GUIDELINES in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in
the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the
Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations
and/or symptoms may be physical. 

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of the celebration” of the marriage. 

 (4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability
may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone
of the same sex. 

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and
their children
 
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. 

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel
for the state. 
SANTOS vs. CA AND JULIA ROSARIO BEDIA-SANTOS
G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995
FACTS: Leouel Santos, a First Lieutenant in the Philippine Army, met Julia in Iloilo. The two got married in
1986 before a municipal trial court followed shortly thereafter, by a church wedding. The couple lived with
Julia’s parents at the J. Bedia Compound. Julia gave birth to a baby boy in 1987 and was named as Leouel
Santos Jr. Occasionally, the couple will quarrel over a number of things aside from the interference of Julia’s
parents into their family affairs.
Julia left in 1988 to work in US as a nurse despite Leouel’s pleas to dissuade her. Seven months after her
departure, she called her husband and promised to return home upon the expiration of her contract in July 1989
but she never did. Leouel got a chance to visit US where he underwent a training program under AFP, he
desperately tried to locate or somehow get in touch with Julia but all his efforts were of no avail.
Leouel filed a complaint to have their marriage declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code. He argued
that failure of Julia to return home or to communicate with him for more than 5 years are circumstances that
show her being psychologically incapacitated to enter into married life.
ISSUE: Whether their marriage can be considered void under Article 36 of the Family Code.
HELD:
The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious
cases of personal disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. This condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated.
Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even desperate, in his present situation. Regrettably,
neither law nor society itself can always provide all the specific answers to every individual problem.
Wherefore, his petition was denied.
__________
Notes:
psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.
The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary
duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the
overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise,
the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.
For psychological incapacity to be proven, there must be a real inability to commit oneself to the essential
obligations of marriage. Mere difficulty of assuming these obligations which could be overcome by normal
effort does not constitute incapacity. Dr. Veloso of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal gave 3 characteristics of
psychological incapacity: (1) gravity that would really render one incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties
in marriage (2) juridical antecedence means it should be rooted in history, existing prior to the marriage (3)
incurability including cure that is beyond the party’s means. Circumstances of the case at bar do not amount to
psychological incapacity.
Chi Ming Tsoi v. CA and Gina Lao-Tsoi (CASE DIGEST)
GR No. 119190
16 January 1997
TOPIC: Persons, Persons and Family Relations, Family Code, Psychological Incapacity, Legal Medicine

FACTS:
On 22 May 1988, plaintiff and the defendant got married. Although they slept in the same bed since May 22,
1988 until March 15, 1989, no sexual intercourse took place. Because of this, they submitted themselves for
medical examinations. She was found healthy, normal and still a virgin. Her husband’s examination was kept
confidential.
The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is impotent, a closet homosexual, and that the defendant married her, a
Filipino citizen, to acquire or maintain his residency status here in the country and to publicly maintain the
appearance of a normal man. The plaintiff is not willing to reconcile with her husband.
The defendant claims that should the marriage be annulled, it is his wife’s fault. He claims no defect on his part,
as he was found not to be impotent, and any differences between the two of them can still be reconciled. He
admitted that they have not had intercourse since their marriage until their separation because his wife avoided
him. He added that his wife filed this case against him because she is afraid that she will be forced to return the
pieces of jewellery of his mother, and, that the defendant, will consummate their marriage.
The trial court declared the marriage void. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision.
Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE:
W/N petitioner is psychologically incapacitated?
RULING:
Yes. Senseless and protracted refusal to consummate the marriage is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
Appellant admitted that he did not have sexual relations with his wife after almost ten months of cohabitation,
and it appears that he is not suffering from any physical disability. Such abnormal reluctance or unwillingness
to consummate his marriage is strongly indicative of a serious personality disorder which to the mind of the
Court clearly demonstrates an ‘utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage’
within the meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code.
Petitioner further contends that respondent court erred in holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner
and the private respondent to have sex with each other constitutes psychological incapacity of both. However,
neither the trial court nor the respondent court made a finding on who between petitioner and private respondent
refuses to have sexual contact with the other. But the fact remains that there has never been coitus between
them. At any rate, since the action to declare the marriage void may be filed by either party, the question of
who refuses to have sex with the other becomes immaterial.
One of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is “to procreate children based on the universal
principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage.” In the case at
bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfil the above marital obligation is equivalent
to psychological incapacity.
The petition is DENIED.
Republic v. Molina (Case Digest)
Republic vs. CA
268 SCRA 198, February 13, 1997
Facts:1
Spouses Roridel and Reynaldo Molina were married on April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin Church in Manila;
that a son, Andre O. Molina was born.After a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of immaturity and
irresponsibility as a husband and a father since he preferred to spend more time with his peers and friends on
whom he squandered his money; that he depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and was never honest
with his wife in regard to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between them.
Sometime in February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his job in Manila, and since then Roridel had been the
sole breadwinner of the family; that in October 1986 the couple had a very intense quarrel, as a result of which
their relationship was estranged; that in March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and went to live
with her parents in Baguio City; that a few weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel and their child, and had since then
abandoned them.
Reynaldo had shown that he was psychologically incapable of complying with essential marital obligations and
was a highly immature and habitually quarrelsome individual who thought of himself as a king to be served;
and that it would be to the couples best interest to have their marriage declared null and void in order to free
them from what appeared to be an incompatible marriage from the start.
Panganiban
Facts :2
On April 14, 1985, plaintiff Roridel O Molina married Reynaldo Molina which union bore a son. After a year
of marriage, Reynaldo show signs of immaturity and irresponsibility as a husband and father as he preferred to
spend more time with his friends, depended on his parents for assistance, and was never honest with his wife in
regard to their finances resulting in frequent quarrels between them. The RTC granted Roridel petition for
declaration of nullity of her marriage which was affirmed by CA.

Issue : Do irreconcilable differences and conflicting personality constitute psychological incapacity?

Ruling : There is no clear showing that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to be
more of a “difficulty” if not outright “refusal” or “neglect” in the performance of some marital obligations.
Mere showing of “irreconcilable differences” and “conflicting personalities” in no wise constitute psychological
incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married
persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (not
physical) illness.
The evidence merely adduced that Roridel and her husband could not get along with each other. There had
been no showing of the gravity of the problem, neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability.
The following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed
down for the guidance of the bench and the bar:
The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved
in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family
Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological – not physical, although its manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical.
The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of the celebration” of the marriage.
Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically of clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may
be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of
the same sex.
Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations
of marriage. Thus, “mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts” cannot
be accepted as root causes.
The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Article 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards
the husband and wife as well as Articles 220,221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven be evidence and
included in the text of the decision.
Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines,
while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was
taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from the 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became
effective in 1983.
The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the
state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted
in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the
petition.
Judgment reversed and set aside.
MARCOS V. MARCOS

Facts

Plaintiff Brenda B. Marcos married Wilson Marcos in 1982 and they had five children. Alleging that the
husband failed to provide material support to the family and have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment,
Brenda filed a case for the nullity of the marriage for psychological incapacity. The RTC declared the marriage
null and void under Art. 36 which was however reversed by CA.

Issues

Whether personal medical or psychological examination of the respondent by a physician is a requirement for a
declaration of psychological incapacity.

Whether the totality of evidence presented in this case show psychological incapacity.

Held

Psychological incapacity as a ground for declaring the nullity of a marriage, may be established by the totality
of evidence presented. There is no requirement, however that the respondent be examined by a physician or a
psychologist as a condition sine qua non for such declaration. Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that
respondent failed to provide material support to the family and may have resorted to physical abuse and
abandonment, the totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There
is absolutely no showing that his “defects” were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they are
incurable. Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact that he had lost his job and was not
gainfully employed for a period of more than six years. It was during this period that he became intermittently
drunk, failed to give material and moral support, and even left the family home. Thus, his alleged psychological
illness was traced only to said period and not to the inception of the marriage. Equally important, there is no
evidence showing that his condition is incurable, especially now that he is gainfully employed as a taxi driver.
In sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage for failure of the petitioner to show that the
alleged psychological incapacity is characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurabilty and for her
failure to observe the guidelines as outline in Republic v. CA and Molina.
LEONILO ANTONIO v. MARIE IVONNE F. REYES, GR NO. 155800, 2006-03-10
Facts:
Petitioner and respondent met in August 1989 when petitioner was 26 years old and respondent was 36 years of
age. Barely a year after their first meeting, they got marriedOut of their union, a child was born on 19 April
1991, who sadly died five (5) months later.
On 8 March 1993,[7] petitioner filed a petition to have his marriage to respondent declared null and void. He
anchored his petition for nullity on Article 36 of the Family Code alleging that respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the... essential obligations of marriage. He asserted that respondent's incapacity
existed at the time their marriage was celebrated and still subsists up to the present.[8]
As manifestations of respondent's alleged psychological incapacity, petitioner claimed that respondent
persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income, educational attainment and other
events or things,... (1) She concealed the fact that she previously gave birth to an illegitimate son,[10] and
instead introduced the boy to petitioner as the adopted child of her family.
(2) She fabricated a story that her brother-in-law, Edwin David, attempted to rape and kill her when in fact, no
such incident occurred.
(3) She misrepresented herself as a psychiatrist to her obstetrician... and told some of her friends that she
graduated with a degree in psychology, when she was neither.[13]
(4) She claimed to be a singer or a free-lance voice talent affiliated with Blackgold Recording Company
(Blackgold); yet, not a single member of her family ever witnessed her alleged singing activities with the group.
(5) She invented friends named Babes Santos and Via Marquez, and under those names, sent lengthy letters to
petitioner claiming to be from Blackgold and touting her as the "number one moneymaker" in the commercial
industry worth P2 million.
(6) She represented herself as a person of greater means, thus, she altered her payslip to make it appear that she
earned a higher income.
(7) She exhibited insecurities and jealousies over him to the extent of calling up his officemates to monitor his
whereabouts.
In support of his petition, petitioner presented
, a psychiatrist
, a clinical psychologist, who stated, based on the tests they conducted, that petitioner was essentially a normal,
introspective, shy and... conservative type of person.
On the other hand, they observed that respondent's persistent and constant lying to petitioner was abnormal or
pathological.
They further... asserted that respondent's extreme jealousy was also pathological.
After trial, the lower court gave credence to petitioner's evidence and held that respondent's propensity to lying
about almost anything-her occupation, state of health, singing abilities and her income, among others-had been
duly established. According to the trial court,... respondent's fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories and
personalities enabled her to live in a world of make-believe. This made her psychologically incapacitated as it
rendered her incapable of giving meaning and significance to her marriage.[36]
The trial court thus declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void.
While conceding that respondent may not have been completely honest with petitioner, the Court of Appeals
nevertheless held that the... totality of the evidence presented was insufficient to establish respondent's
psychological incapacity.
Taking exception to the appellate court's pronouncement, petitioner elevated the case to this Court. He contends
herein that the evidence conclusively establish respondent's psychological incapacity.
Issues: petitioner has established his cause of action for declaration of nullity under Article 36 of the Family
Code. The RTC correctly ruled, and the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court.
Ruling:
The factual findings of the RTC are now deemed binding on this Court, owing to the great weight accorded to
the opinion of the primary trier of facts, and the refusal of the Court of Appeals to dispute the veracity of these
facts. As such, it must be considered... that respondent had consistently lied about many material aspects as to
her character and personality. The question remains whether her pattern of fabrication sufficiently establishes
her psychological incapacity, consistent with Article 36 and generally, the Molina... guidelines.
the present case sufficiently satisfies the guidelines in Molina.
First. Petitioner had sufficiently overcome his burden in proving the psychological incapacity of his spouse.
Apart from his own testimony, he presented witnesses who corroborated his allegations on his wife's behavior,
and certifications from Blackgold Records and... the Philippine Village Hotel Pavillon which disputed
respondent's claims pertinent to her alleged singing career.
Second. The root cause of respondent's psychological incapacity has been medically or clinically identified,
alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by experts, and clearly explained in the trial court's decision.
Third. Respondent's psychological incapacity was established to have clearly existed at the time of and even
before the celebration of marriage. She fabricated friends and made up letters from fictitious characters well
before she married petitioner. Likewise, she... kept petitioner in the dark about her natural child's real parentage
as she only confessed when the latter had found out the truth after their marriage.
Fourth. The gravity of respondent's psychological incapacity is sufficient to prove her disability to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. It is immediately discernible that the parties had shared only a little over a
year of cohabitation before the... exasperated petitioner left his wife.
Fifth. Respondent is evidently unable to comply with the essential marital obligations as embraced by Articles
68 to 71 of the Family Code. Article 68, in particular, enjoins the spouses to live together, observe mutual love,
respect and fidelity, and render mutual... help and support. As noted by the trial court, it is difficult to see how
an inveterate pathological liar would be able to commit to the basic tenets of relationship between spouses
based on love, trust and respect.
Sixth. The Court of Appeals clearly erred when it failed to take into consideration the fact that the marriage of
the parties was annulled by the Catholic Church.
Evidently, the conclusion of psychological incapacity was arrived at not only by the trial court, but also by
canonical bodies.
Seventh. The final point of contention is the requirement in Molina that such psychological incapacity be shown
to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Petitioner points out that one month after he and his wife initially separated, he returned to her, desiring to make
their marriage work. However, respondent's aberrant behavior remained unchanged, as she continued to lie,
fabricate stories, and maintained her excessive... jealousy. From this fact, he draws the conclusion that
respondent's condition is incurable.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. 
RENNE ENRIQUE BIER, petitioner,vs.MA. LOURDES A. BIER and THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.FACTS:
Petitioner Renne Enrique E. Bier and respondent

Ma. Lourdes A. Bier gets married after sixmonths of courtship. Back then, petitioner observed
respondent to be a very sweet and thoughtfulperson. Everything went well for the first three
years of their marriage. Respondent was everything petitioner could hope for in a wife — sweet, loving
and caring.
The couple started experiencing marital problems after three years of marriage. Accor
d i n g   t o petitioner, respondent started becoming aloof towards him and began to spend more time
with her friends than with him, refusing even to have sexual relations with him for no apparent
reason. Shebecame an alcoholic and a chain-smoker. She also started neglecting her husband's
needs and theupkeep of their home, and became an absentee wife. After being gone from their
home for days one n d , s h e w o u l d r e t u r n w i t h o u t b o t h e r i n g t o a c c o u n t f o r h e r a b s e n c e .
A s a r e s u l t , t h e y f r e q u e n t l y quarreled. Finally, respondent suddenly left for the United States.
Petitioner has not heard from her  since.Petitioner instituted a petition for the declaration of nullity of
marriage on the ground that respondentwas psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her essential marital
obligations to petitioner.RTC granted the petition but the CA reversed and set aside the decision of RTC.
ISSUE
: W/N the totality of the evidence presented by petitioner
w a s   e n o u g h   t o   e s t a b l i s h   t h a t respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential
marital obligations.
RULING:
The petition is without merit.Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b)
juridical antecedence, and (c)i n c u r a b i l i t y . T h e i n c a p a c i t y m u s t b e g r a v e o r s e r i o u s s u c h
t h a t t h e p a r t y w o u l d b e i n c a p a b l e o f   carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it
must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may
emerge only after the marriage; and itmust be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would
be beyond the means of the partyinvolved.This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage
is celebrated. The court overlookedthe need to show the gravity, root cause and incurability of respondent's
psychological incapacity atthe inception of the marriage.The evidence for petitioner consisted of his own
testimony and that of his brother, Roderico Bier. Healso presented as evidence a psychological report written by
Dr. Nedy Tayag, a clinical
psychologist.P e t i t i o n e r   r e a s o n e d   o u t   t h a t   t h e   p e r s o n a l   e x a m i n a t i o n   o f   r e s p o n d e n t  
w a s   i m p o s s i b l e   a s   h e r   whereabouts were unknown despite diligent efforts on his part to find her.
Consequently, Dr. Tayag'sreport was really hearsay evidence since she had no personal knowledge
of the alleged facts
shew a s   t e s t i f y i n g   o n .   H e r   t e s t i m o n y   s h o u l d   h a v e   t h u s   b e e n   d i s m i s s e d   f o r   b e i n g   u n s c i e
n t i f i c   a n d unreliable.It was not enough that respondent, the party adverted to  as psychologically
incapacitated to complywith her marital obligations, had difficulty or was unwilling to perform
the same. Proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor, an adverse integral element in
respondent's personality structure that
Te vs. Te
GR No. 161793, February 13, 2009
FACTS:
Petitioner Edward Te first met respondent Rowena Te in a gathering organized by the Filipino-Chinese
association in their college. Initially, he was attracted to Rowena’s close friend but, as the latter already had a
boyfriend, the young man decided to court Rowena, which happened in January 1996. It was Rowena who
asked that they elope but Edward refused bickering that he was young and jobless. Her persistence, however,
made him relent. They left Manila and sailed to Cebu that month; he, providing their travel money of P80,000
and she, purchasing the boat ticket.
They decided to go back to Manila in April 1996. Rowena proceeded to her uncle’s house and Edward to his
parents’ home. Eventually they got married but without a marriage license. Edward was prohibited from getting
out of the house unaccompanied and was threatened by Rowena and her uncle. After a month, Edward escaped
from the house, and stayed with his parents. Edward’s parents wanted them to stay at their house but Rowena
refused and demanded that they have a separate abode. In June 1996, she said that it was better for them to live
separate lives and they then parted ways.
After four years in January 2000, Edward filed a petition for the annulment of his marriage to Rowena on the
basis of the latter’s psychological incapacity.

ISSUE: Whether the marriage contracted is void on the ground of psychological incapacity.
HELD:
The parties’ whirlwind relationship lasted more or less six months. They met in January 1996, eloped in March,
exchanged marital vows in May, and parted ways in June. The psychologist who provided expert testimony
found both parties psychologically incapacitated. Petitioner’s behavioral pattern falls under the classification of
dependent personality disorder, and respondent’s, that of the narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder
There is no requirement that the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by
a physician, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity.
Verily, the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological
incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.
The presentation of expert proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the
psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological
incapacity.
Indeed, petitioner, afflicted with dependent personality disorder, cannot assume the essential marital obligations
of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering help and support, for he is unable to make
everyday decisions without advice from others, and allows others to make most of his important decisions (such
as where to live). As clearly shown in this case, petitioner followed everything dictated to him by the persons
around him. He is insecure, weak and gullible, has no sense of his identity as a person, has no cohesive self to
speak of, and has no goals and clear direction in life.
As for the respondent, her being afflicted with antisocial personality disorder makes her unable to assume the
essential marital obligations on account for her disregard in the rights of others, her abuse, mistreatment and
control of others without remorse, and her tendency to blame others. Moreover, as shown in this case,
respondent is impulsive and domineering; she had no qualms in manipulating petitioner with her threats of
blackmail and of committing suicide.
Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable psychological incapacity, the precipitous marriage
that they contracted on April 23, 1996 is thus, declared null and void.
Case Digest: Roehr v. Rodriguez
WOLFGANG O. ROEHR, petitioner, vs. MARIA CARMEN D. RODRIGUEZ, HON. JUDGE JOSEFINA
GUEVARA-SALONGA, Presiding Judge of Makati RTC, Branch 149, respondents.
G.R. No. 142820, June 20, 2003

Facts:
Petitioner Wolfgang O. Roehr, a German citizen, married private respondent Carmen Rodriguez, a Filipina, on
December 11, 1980 in Germany. Their marriage was subsequently ratified on February 14, 1981 in Tayasan,
Negros Oriental. Out of their union were born Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine.
Carmen filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage before the Makati Regional Trial Court (RTC).
Wolfgang filed a motion to dismiss, but it was denied.
Meanwhile, Wolfgang obtained a decree of divorce from the Court of First Instance of Hamburg-Blankenese.
Said decree also provides that the parental custody of the children should be vested to Wolfgang.
Wolfgang filed another motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction as a divorce decree had already been
promulgated, and said motion was granted by Public Respondent RTC Judge Salonga.
Carmen filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, with a prayer that the case proceed for the purpose of
determining the issues of custody of children and the distribution of the properties between her and Wolfgang.
Judge Salonga  partially set aside her previous order for the purpose of tackling the issues of support and
custody of their children.

1st Issue: W/N Judge Salonga was correct in granting a partial motion for reconsideration.
Ruling: Yes.
A judge can order a partial reconsideration of a case that has not yet attained finality, as in the case at bar.
The Supreme Court goes further to say that the court can modify or alter a judgment even after the same has
become executory whenever circumstances transpire rendering its decision unjust and inequitable, as where
certain facts and circumstances justifying or requiring such modification or alteration transpired after the
judgment has become final and executory and when it becomes imperative in the higher interest of justice or
when supervening events warrant it.
2nd issue: W/N Judge Salonga's act was valid when she assumed and retained jurisdiction as regards child
custody and support.
Ruling: Yes.
As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries are recognizable in our jurisdiction.
But the legal effects thereof, e.g. on custody, care and support of the children, must still be determined by our
courts.
Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment, such as the award of custody to
Wolfgang by the German court, it must be shown that the parties opposed to the judgment had been given
ample opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 39,
Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure).
In the present case, it cannot be said that private respondent was given the opportunity to challenge the
judgment of the German court so that there is basis for declaring that judgment as res judicata with regard to the
rights of Wolfgang to have parental custody of their two children. The proceedings in the German court were
summary. As to what was the extent of Carmen’s participation in the proceedings in the German court, the
records remain unclear.
Absent any finding that private respondent is unfit to obtain custody of the children, the trial court was correct
in setting the issue for hearing to determine the issue of parental custody, care, support and education mindful of
the best interests of the children.
Van Dorn v. Hon. Romillo, Jr.
G.R. No. L-68470, 8 October 1985

FACTS:
Alice Reyes Van Dorn (petitioner) is a citizen of the Philippines while Richard Upton (private respondent) is a
citizen of the United States. They were married in Hongkong in 1972 and after the marriage; they established
their residence in the Philippines. They begot two children born on April 4, 1973 and December 18, 1975,
respectively. The parties were divorced in Nevada, United States in 1982 and petitioner has re-married also in
Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.
Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner stating that petitioner’s business in Ermita,
Manila, (the Galleon Shop, for short), is conjugal property of the parties. Respondent asked petitioner is ordered
to render an accounting of that business, and that private respondent be declared with right to manage the
conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by
previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein respondent had acknowledged
that he and petitioner had “no community property” as of June 11, 1982. The Court denied the Motion to
Dismiss in the mentioned case on the ground that the property involved is located in the Philippines so that the
Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the foreign divorce between the petitioner and private respondent in Nevada is binding in the
Philippines where petitioner is a Filipino citizen.

RULING:
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United States. The
decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. Pursuant to his national law, private respondent
is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner’s
husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country’s
Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped
by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.
The Court held that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine
nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept
of public police and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released
private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the
marriage.