HISTORICAL PURVIEW OF DEMOCRATIC PROCESS IN PAKISTAN:

A QUALITATIVE APPROACH FOR POLICY ANALYSIS

Mahboob Ellahi1
Humaira mahboob2
1 Introduction

Pakistan sought independence as an outcome of the democratic process led by the

Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah. The movement was strongly resisted by the Indian
Nation Congress, its allies and the British Government. However, it succeeded on account of
being logic-based and non-violent and competently led by the Quaid. The basic argument of
this movement was that the Islamic Ideology has its own socio-economic, political and
cultural systems, which are distinguished from those of the Hindus.
Pakistan inherited colonial political set-up, but also a wide variety of constitutional,
geographical, regional, cultural, linguistic and economic problems. Another list of problems
consisted of the influx of refugees, communal riots, disputes over the division of canal waters
and other physical assets, armed forces and public servants, minority issues, Indian military
intervention in Junagarh and Manawadar and concentration of its army around Hyderabad
Dakkan, Kashmir and the Punjab. Over the above all these were the hostility and prejudice of
the Indian Congress and their allies, in the national and international scenario, to oppose the
division of United India “Akhand Bharat” and bitterly opposed the creation of Pakistan
[Rizvi (1987)].
The horizon of Quaid’s competence was far beyond the dimensions of above
problems, but he survived too short after independence. Indeed, the broad spectrum of
problems and flourishing of institutionally enriched democratic environment required
another, but impossible, life span for the Quaid. Thus, the suppressed problems raised their
heads well above the caliber of the Quaid’s left over intellectual and political heritage. As a
result, democratic process, in political history of the country, was frequently interrupted and
over-shadowed by multiplicity of conflicting arguments and self interest of politicians [Khan
(1967), Sarwar and Din (1973), Rizvi (1987) and Khan (1987)].
The party-based democratic process, in the recent past, initiated in 1988 under the
Supreme judicial intervention and got discontinued in October 1999. The existing military-
based, Non-Martial Law, regime has taken an initiative to spread the executive powers under
the control of democratically elected Local Governments to improve overall welfare of the
people. Hence, this study is an attempt to undertake a historical analysis in the qualitative
framework to devise policy measures for stability and uninterrupted continuation of the
system.
A brief history of the democratic process in the British India is given in Section 2.
The evolution of democratic process, in a summarized form, is discussed in Section 3. The
1
Joint Chief Economist, Planning and Development Department, Government of Punjab, Lahore.

2
Assistant Professor, Pakistan Study Centre, University of Peshawar.
 77

role of politicians, a dominant part of the system, during different eras in Pakistan’s
democratic history is elaborated in Section 4. The historical reactions to interventions in the
democratic process are briefly spelt out in Section 5 followed by a synthesized summary and
the research questions emerged therefrom in Section 6. An overview of the new system of
Local Governments is given in Section 7. The information sources and data to be used in this
study are explained in Section 8. Data collected from the resource persons and the key
informants are qualitatively analysed to answer the research questions in Section 9. The
concluding remarks and policy recommendations are given in Section 10 and 11 respectively.
2 Democratic Process in the British India
Democratic process in the British India initiated with the enforcement of the
Government of India Act 1935. The salient features of this act, as quoted by Anwar and Rizvi
(1974), were as follows:
i) Federal system of the Government with a limited Provincial Autonomy,
ii) Provincial Legislative Assemblies elected by a limited number of voters, who
qualified for minimum age, education and financial status,
iii) Federal Assembly (Lower House) and the Council of State (Upper House). More
than one third of the seats were nominated by Nawabs of Royal States and the rest
being indirectly elected by Provincial Legislative Assemblies, and
iv) Administrative and financial powers mainly in the hands of state authorities and
the Provincial and Federal Assemblies not allowed to amend the Act of 1935,
except by the British Parliament.
The owners of fixed properties, such as land, qualified to vote for the elected seats and a
substantial proportion of the voting-age population was excluded from the electoral process. It is
difficult to assess the latter, but it is certain that most of the landless tenants labour class and
artisans commonly known as kammees were not included in the electoral process. This enabled
feudal class to dominate the scene and dictate the democratic process for their vested interests.
The first Provincial elections, in accordance with provisions of the Act of 1935, were
held in 1936-37. The first General Elections to directly elect members of both Provincial and
Federal Assemblies were held in 1945-46 [Shehab (1990)], that led to the partition of British
India for an independent Pakistan.
3 Evolution of Democratic Process in Pakistan
The Indian Independence Act of 1947 led to the creation of Pakistan on 14 th August 1947.
This Act also provided for the adoption of the Act of 1935 as an interim constitution of Pakistan
with some amendments to withdraw discretionary powers of the Governor General and
empowering the (Federal) Constituent Assembly elected in 1945-46 to amend it further till the
preparation of its own constitution [Sarwar and Din (1973)]. Thus, Pakistan remained as a
dominion till its own Constitution was implemented in March 1956 (Chaudhry 1988) and the Act
of 1935 was a guiding force to set the path for political process.
Pakistan inherited the Federal Parliamentary system with Provincial Autonomy in the
administrative, financial and legislative spheres. This continued for about eleven years and
historically known as a weak civilian rule [Shehab (1990)]. The Constituent Assembly failed to
 78

prepare the constitution. It retrenched or amended some powers of the Governor General, but
revived those to dissolve the assembly which he did in October 1954. The leading cause, of the
dismissal of first Constituent Assembly was its failure to prepare the constitution due to drastic
regional, ethnic and linguistic differences. Afresh elections for the Provincial Assemblies were
held to indirectly elect the new Constituent Assembly. It prepared the Constitution of 1956,
which heavily relied on the Act of 1935, and implemented in March 1956 till the system was
dismissed by President Iskandar Mirza in October 1958.
The military regime led by General (later Field Martial) Ayub Khan replaced it with a
Presidential system, under the Constitution of 1962, founded on the pillars of the Basic
Democracies (BD) till March 1969. This comprised electing BD members at the grass-root level,
who later voted for electing, inter alia, the Central and Provincial Assemblies and the President
of Pakistan. This collapsed with a countrywide turmoil and Party-based Federal Parliamentary
system was agreed upon.
The first general elections for the Federal and Provincial Assemblies were held under
Legal Framework order of the military regime of General Yahya Khan in December 1970. The
military-cum-civil regime led by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto took over in December 1971 after the tragic
incidence of the loss of Eastern Wing of the country.
The Bhutto Government gave a historic and unanimously approved Constitution of 1973,
but it badly failed to stop a prolonged, country-wide and bloody turmoil of 1977 leading to a
military regime of General Zia-ul-Haq in July 1977. In view of past happenings, a new
experience of non-party elections was tried and a Federal Parliamentary Government took over.
It passed the most controversial 8th Amendment in the Constitution of 1973 to maintain a
reasonable balance of power between the Prime Minister and the President. This, inter alia,
included revival of the President’s power to dissolve the assembly withdrawn under the
Constitution of 1973. This Government was dismissed before completion of its tenure followed
by the death of General Zia-ul-Haq. Consequently, the party-based elections were held four
times in less than eleven years for a series of Governments. Each was dismissed before the
expiry of its tenure under the provisions of the 8 th Amendment, which was reversed in 1997, but
still the system could not survive and got dismissed in October 1999 and replaced by a Non-
Martial Law military Government.
4 Politicians and the Democratic Process
4.1 The weak civilian rule (1948 to 1958)
The significance of politicians in the democratic process, although ostensibly Quaid’s
naming them as phoney coins, and ascendant role of the Muslim League as a spokesman of the
Indian Muslims is hardly neglected by any school of thought on the political history. However,
after the consecutive deaths of the Quaid and Liaquat Ali Khan, these failed to provide a viable
institutional framework to cope with the prevalent problems and the emerging issues of a
hostility-ridden and newly created country. Rizvi (1987) as rightly remarks this:
“Unlike the Congress Party of India, the Muslim League failed to transform itself
from a nationalist movement to a national party which could lead a nation on the
road to democracy, stability and prosperity. The reason can be traced back to the
 79

pre-independence days. The rise of the Muslim League as a mass party was rather
quick. Although founded by a group of enlightened Muslims in 1906 to protect
the rights and interests of the Muslims, it never became a mass party until 1939-
40. The Congress began its career in 1885 and the long struggle for independence
and Mr. Ghandi’s role after 1920 made it a mass party. It provided an umbrella
for diverse interests and opinion, ranging from those who believed in non-
violence to the Communists and Socialists. The struggle for independence
enabled them to evolve patterns to resolve internal conflicts and aggregate diverse
interests. This threw up a class of leaders who could work together in difficult
times. The Muslim League lacked the procedure of internal discussion and
collective leadership.
The Quaid’s towering personality not only over-shadowed the top brass of both Congress
and the British Government but also had to cover the Muslim League leaders to achieve the goal.
Simultaneously, he commanded loyalty of the people, which could not be transferred to the
Muslim League for want of time after independence. Also the League lacked the institutional set-
up to aggregate the diverse interest of its top leaders. At the same time, there was not a healthy
opposition for a constructive criticism, except those motivated by self-interest or the quarters
hostile to League and Pakistan. This led to factionalism among the Leaguers who were always
quarrelling on the distribution of ministerial offices and political powers [Khan (1967)]. All these
led to seven Prime Ministers and eight Cabinets in eleven years (1947 to 1958) mainly
comprising shift of combinations of political leaders from one power or political set-up to
another merely for ministerial gains. Thus, party loyalties were not based on principles but on the
expected political and tangible gains and personal advantages [Rizvi (1987)].
The National Assembly members had a little time to exercise control over the cabinet and
preparing Constitution, which was a top priority of a newly created country. Rather, they were
strongly ambitious about political gains through frequent floor crossing and even resorted to in-
house scuffles tarnishing image of the Constituent Assembly. Having failed to fulfil the
constitutional and administrative responsibilities, the politicians dragged the disciplined civil and
military services into the political offices (Khan 1967). The next election was scheduled to be
held by the end of 1959, but some of the politicians had established their own para-military type
troops. They threatened for dire consequences if their party members were not elected. This led
to a completely indisciplined political set-up inviting the military, a disciplined force, into power.
As a result, the then President Iskandar Mirza abrogated the Constitution and imposed Martial
Law appointing General (later Field Martial) Ayub Khan as the first Chief Martial Law
Administrator (CMLA). The CMLA in his first address to the nation (as quoted by Rizvi 1987)
stated:
“These chaotic conditions, as you know, have been brought about by self-seekers
who, in the garb of political leaders, have ravaged the country or tried to barter it
away for personal gains. Some have done it as a matter of right because they
professed to have created Pakistan, and others who were against the very idea of
Pakistan openly worked for its dissolution or in any case did all they could to
aggravate its problems. Their aim is nothing but self-aggrandisement or thirst for
power. Meanwhile, weak and irresolute governments looked on with masterly
 80

inactivity and cowardice and allowed things to drift and deteriorate, and discipline
to go to pieces.”
Others [Khan (1967), Sarwar and Din (1973) and Shahab (1987)] also narrate the
situation portrayed by Rizvi (1987). Shahab (1987) still defended the case of politicians and
expressed doubts about the rectifying actions later taken by the Field Martial Ayub Khan. This,
however, seems to be a case of his personal inclination.
4.2 The first military regime (1958 to 1969)
The first military regime took a serious action against the corrupt politicians and those in
the public life. Most of these were either disqualified or they voluntarity opted to go home. This
was followed by a wide range of reforms, inter alia, including those in the democratic process.
The direct adult franchise, to elect representatives of the assemblies, was substituted by an
institution of Basic Democracy (BD) based on the political philosophy of controlled democracy.
This was introduced in 1959 and the country was divided into eighty thousand constituencies
each comprising a population of 1000 to 1200 people. This was a five-tier set-up whereby the
BDs were directly elected and then they elected upper houses, assemblies and the office of the
President of Pakistan.
This system of government did provide a stable political environment leading to
economic stability, industrial and infrastructure development, a big boost to agricultural and
industrial production and overall prosperity [Khan (1967) and Rizvi (1987)]. Shahab (1987), a
close witness of Ayub regime and his system, is a strong critic of the BD system and ascribing it
the main cause of political failure.
The BD system encouraged the development of leadership at the grass-root level and
BDs’ participation in the political process. The tiers at different levels had a participation and
influence of the civil services in the decision making process. The members of Provincial and
National Assemblies were only responsible for legislative and constitutional works only. The
Cabinet was accountable to the President in accordance with provisions of the Presidential
Constitution of 1962. Despite a drastic political straining, the politicians made their way to the
ministerial offices. At the same time, the President felt need for the involvement of politicians in
the political process as pointed out by Rizvi.
“Ayub did compromise on a number of political issues. He was opposed to the
revival of political parties. Soon after the introduction of the 1962 Constitution, he
realized that political parties were inevitable. He agreed to their revival.”
This provided a workable political and democratic process. However, the induction of
certain politicians into the process proved to be fatal for the entire system. A group comprising
political leaders, civil servants and military high ranking officers, belonging to a special interest
group, with the help of some foreign elements tried to convince the Field Martial for interference
in the occupied Jammu and Kashmir [Gauhar (1993)], which ultimately led to the Indo-pak war
of 1965. Gauhar (1993) witnessed the displeasure of the Field Martial on the unwanted
interference of that group, but ultimately agreed to their proposals. They played a vital role in
pushing the Ayub Regime, along with the system, into an uneasy situation.
 81

The Field Martial did realize and culled out those elements, but it was too late to remedy
the situation. Founding of a strong political party, namely Pakistan Peoples’ Party (PPP)
followed this, by ZA Bhutto. The PPP and others contributed so significantly in the turmoil of
1968-69 that the Field Martial yielded to all the political demands, except those leading to
dissolution of the country. In a letter to the than Commander-in-Chief, General Yahya Khan,
Ayub Khan wrote:
“It is with profound regret that I have come to the conclusion that all civil
administration and constitutional authority in the country has become ineffective.
If the situation continues to deteriorate at the present alarming rate, all economic
life, indeed, civilized existence will become impossible…. I am left with no
option but to step aside and leave it to the Defence Forces of Pakistan which
today represent the only effective and legal instrument, to take over full control of
the affairs of this country ….. They alone can restore sanity and put the country
back on the road to progress in a civil and constitutional manner.”
General Yahya Khan took over as president on 25 th March 1969, abrogated the
Constitution of 1962, banned the political activities, but not the political parties, dissolved the
National and Provincial Assemblies and imposed Martial Law in the country ----- marking the
beginning of the second military regime.
4.3 The second military regime (1969-1971)
This regime, after restoring law and order and normalcy in the country, issued Legal
Framework Order (LFO) in March 1970 for the first general elections based on direct adult
franchise. Prior to this, political activity was permitted. For the National Assembly, in totality,
300 seats were allocated, i.e. 138 for West Pakistan and 162 for East Pakistan. Under LFO, the
National Assembly was bound to prepare a federal parliamentary Constitution in 120 days,
failing which it would be automatically dissolved.
The general elections were contested by a large number of parties. In West Pakistan, the
PPP led by ZA Bhutto launched its campaign on the basis of four points, namely Faith (Islam),
Politics (Democracy), Economy (Socialism) and People as a source of all powers. Bhutto
genially judged need of oppressed minds of the electorates of a poverty-ridden society dominated
by the feudal and industrialists and gave a slogan of Roti Kapra and Makan (bread, clothing and
shelter) [Bhutto (1988)] for gathering rallies around him. This provided attraction to minds of
urban labour, rural peasants, workers and the village kammees, comprising a substantial part of
the population. Bhutto’s personality became charismatic for these classes and they returned him
to the National and Provincial Assemblies in the Punjab and Sindh Provinces. It may be
indicated this was the first opportunity in the history provided to these classes as they were
devoid of the right of adult franchise in the Act of 1935 and thereafter also remained under the
feudal interest.
In West Pakistan, other parties mainly based their campaign on the implementation of
Islamic principles in the country. In East Pakistan, Awami League (AL) led by Sheikh Mujib
participated in the election on the basis of the Six Points agenda, mainly based on separatist/
weak federation ideology and anti-West Pakistan slogans.
 82

As a result of general elections held in December 1970, AL swept polls by securing 160
out of 162 seats in East Pakistan. In West Pakistan PPP emerged as a major party with 82 out of
138 seats in the National Assembly defeating the Islami-oriented fundamentalists! As per LFO,
the President convened the elected representatives to the National Assembly session in March
1971 to initiate constitutional preparation. However, the PPP decided not to participate until
features of the new Government were clear and the power distribution formula was agreed upon.
The AL demanded lifting of Martial Law and transfer of power before going to the National
assembly. The Government negotiated with leading politicians and tried to convince them to
attend the National Assembly for constitutional preparation. But none agreed and it was followed
by an army action in East Pakistan. This increased hostility of the people of East Pakistan led by
the politicians. The deteriorating circumstances ultimately led to an internal armed resistance
movement followed by the Indian attack on East Pakistan in November 1971 leading to
separation of East Pakistan. Resultantly, General Yahya Khan resigned and ZA Bhutto took over
as President and CMLA of the residuary Pakistan in December 1971 [Mahmood (1987)]. Soon
after Martial Law was lifted and an Interim Constitution was implemented till a Federal
Parliamentary Constitution was prepared in 1973.
4.4 The second civil regime (1971 to 1977)
The Prime task of the second civil regime was to give a constitutional framework to the
country. The constitution of 1973 was prepared, unanimously approved and implemented on 14
August 1973 in the wake of devastating floods in the country. The constitution of 1973 was
Federal Parliamentary and it had special provision of High Treason against those attempting to
impose Martial Law. A para military type Federal Security Force (FSF) was set up to assist
civilian government in maintaining law and order in stead of calling upon defence forces.
The salient law and order incidences of the civil regime, despite the unanimous approval
of the Constitution of 1973 and other built-in measures, included insurgency in Balochistan
(1973 to 1977), Anti-Qadiani riots in 1974, tribal conflict in the NWFP in 1976 and finally the
historic Anti-Bhutto movement in 1977. Other issues included conflicts between peasants and
landowners, labour class and industrialists, students and transporters, etc. as a part of the socialist
dialectical process.
The Bhutto era is an interlude of the civilian rule, which enjoyed the downscaling of the
military power and his mass appeal bordering on his charismatic personality [Rizvi (1987)]. Also
he, very genially, tried to maintain a reasonable balance of feudal, industrialists, middle class and
bureaucratic interests in his power structure. In this manner, he tried a personalized authoritative
and patrimonial political system.
Having built in the desired system, Bhutto Government went for the second general
elections in March 1977. The opposition contested these elections from the platform of an
alliance, namely, the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA), comprising nine parties. The PPP swept
the polls, which the PNA alleged as an outcome of large scale rigging by the government.
Consequently, the PNA called its street power to demand dissolution of the assemblies and
holding fresh elections under the joint supervision of the armed forces and judiciary. The
movement triggered by the PNA developed into a countrywide agitation against the Bhutto
Government. In addition to the allegation of irregularities in the general election, the PNA
employed the catchall slogan of Nizam-e-Mustafa (The Islamic system of government). This
 83

was, indeed, a heavy vote of no confidence against the Constitution of 1973, which was claimed
to be Federal Parliamentary, Islamic and unanimously approved. If it was so after thirty years of
independence, what is fate of the Federal Parliamentary system in Pakistan.
As per above system, the cabinet was accountable to the Parliament. The role of elected
representatives and their allied functionaries in the civil administration and harming the interests
of the feudal, business and traders, lawyers and journalists belonging to the opposite pole. This
was over and above the policies of the PPP Government to nationalize the business and
industries and intervention in the economic life [Rizvi (1987)].
Thus, these sections of the country were the mainstay of the agitation, which they took as
the last resort to out-throw the political regime led by Bhutto. The agitation of 1977 was more
widespread and bloody than that of 1968-69, actually participated by Bhutto and other
politicians. The crushing defeat received by the Islamic fundamentalists in the first general
elections was seriously noted, although it was not a defeat of the Islamic Ideology, which was the
basis of Pakistan movement. Indeed, the general public was fed up of their conflicting debates on
various religious issues. Thus, they took the heated situation as a rare opportunity to take a
revenge of their defeat in the general elections.
Bhutto arrested the PNA leaders, used police, FSF and civil administration to suppress
the agitation. He went further to incorporate Islamic Ideology in the constitution. Having failed
in all such attempts, he imposed Martial Law in three major cities, namely Karachi, Hyderabad
and Lahore, which was later lifted from the former two cities as a consequence of the decision of
the Sindh High Court. Thereafter, PNA and the Government came to the negotiation table, the
former leaders joined hands with the military commanders for intervention as they believed that
the street power was not enough to out-throw Bhutto and his Government. All these
developments paved the way for the third countrywide Martial Law on 5 th July 1977 by General
Zia-ul-Haq and the military rule extended over eleven years.
4.5 The third military regime (1977 to 1988)
After taking over the Government on 5th of July 1977, General Zia-ul-Haq pledged to
hold general elections within 90 days and then go back to barracks. The Constitution of 1973
was partially held in abeyance and not abrogated. After sometime, the elctions were postponed
till November 1979. Instead thereof non-party Local Bodies polls were held in September-
October 1979 followed by a pledge for Islamization and restructuring of politico-economic
system.
In the meantime, there was invasion of Afghanistan, which provided a strong basis for the
military regime to stay in power to protect the geographical boundaries of Pakistan. In August-
September 1983, non-party Local Bodies polls were again held and the President of Pakistan
announced a programme for general election to be held on non-party basis in February 1985.
These elections were indeed held and Government was transferred to the elected representatives.
General Zia-ul-Haq got elected as President of Pakistan through a referendum held in December
1984 and several amendments in the 1973 Constitution were made through historic 8 th
amendment before lifting Martial Law in December 1985. This, inter alia, provided a
constitutional coverage to the actions taken by the military regime and sharing of powers
between the offices of the President and Prime Minister of Pakistan. The Civilian Government
 84

continued till 29th of May 1988, when the President dissolved the National Assembly followed
by his own tragic death in the C-130 air crash on 17 th of August 1988. The elections already
announced by the deceased President were held as per schedule in November 1988, but on party
basis through a judicial decision of the Supreme Court of Pakistan. As a result, the PPP led by
Benazir Bhutto came into power in December 1988 to mark a new era for a democratic
Government of Federal Parliamentary nature.
4.6 The third civil regime (1988 to 1999)
The third, party-based, civilian rule twice captured turn-wise by the PPP led by Benazir
Bhutto and League headed by Nawaz Sharif. However, there have been caretaker Governments
of varying duration in the intervening periods to conduct general elections. The first and second
general election of this era (1988 to 1999) were held under the Presidentship of Ghulam Ishaq
Khan (GIK). Khan (1997), being a close associate of GIK, is an eye witness and salient character
to observe the working relationship between the GIK and the political governments of the first
round. The later two governments of each political party were mainly during the tenure of
President Farooq Loghari till he resigned in the end of 1997.
Khan’s (1997) description of the events and issues is mainly in the context of working
relationships of GIK with Benazir and Nawaz Governments. The crucial lever of this relationship
was operated through the powers entrusted to the President by virtue of 8 th Amendment in the
Constitution of 1973. This, inter alia, conferred upon the President to dissolve the National
Assembly and Cabinet and appoint the Armed Services’ Chiefs and the Chairman Joint Chiefs of
Staff Committee. The political governments always took it as a sword hanging over their heads,
while the opposition took it as a safety valve to stop the way for Martial Law and avoid a chaotic
situation of 1977, when the President had no such Constitutional powers to remedy the situation.
According to Khan (1997), the major source of conflict between the President GIK and the
political government was this power. Thus, the main cause of the first Nawaz Government
mainly resulted from the secret attempt of the political government to withdraw such power,
while the President GIK was fully committed to protect each clause of the 8 th Amendment as a
constitutional heritage. This led to mistrust and a tense situation ultimately resulting into
stepping down of both GIK and Nawaz from their positions.
This was followed by the PPP coming into power with Farooq Loghari as its own party-
sponsored President. The Presidential powers still remained intact and the PPP Government
pulled on for three years until its own party-sponsored President using the constitutional lever
dismissed it. The League Government succeeded this with an overwhelming majority, both at the
provincial and national levels. They convinced the President to agree with the proposal of
transferring the crucial constitutional powers from the President to the Prime Minister for a
stable political government. This process was completed with the consensus of all concerned, but
it was followed by a judicial crisis which ultimately boiled down to sacking of the Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court of Pakistan and a forced resignation of the President Farooq Loghari.
Sacking of the Army and Naval Chiefs followed this, which was an unhealthy situation for
morale of the Armed Forces. It was also taken as one by one destruction of viable institutions of
the country. Ultimately, the existing Army Chief was sacked when he was on a foreign tour. On
return, his plane ( a commercial flight of the PIA) was dramatically hijacked to strengthen a
control over the entire set-up. This attempt was timely offset by the Army and Political
government was dismissed and parliamentary houses were suspended in October 1999.
 85

Dissolution of different political governments by the respective Presidents has been

alleged as hijacking the democratic process. On the other hands, the Presidents justified their
actions on the corruption, nepotism and failure of the political governments to maintain law and
order and institutional vandalism. Further, the encouragement of “Ghundaism” and its judicial
protection, provided constitutionally in the name of human rights, is a leading factor. In addition,
the party politics played a vital role in protection of self-interests at the expense of national loss.
Despite hanging sword of presidential powers under the 8 th Amendment, politicians succeeded in
decoiting national resources and exporting corrupted wealth to the foreign banks leaving no
traces of record for the future governments to take action against them. Also economic
conditions for the common persons worsened drastically.
5 Reactions to Interventions in Democratic Process
There were mixed public reactions to interventions in the democratic process. For
example, the dissolution of National Assembly by the Governor General in 1954 has been
severely criticized. It was challenged in the Court of Law, which ultimately decided in favour of
the Government. The same action, along with imposition of Martial Law, taken by the President
in 1958 was, however, welcomed by the general public as the people were fed up of corruption,
uncertainly and lack of security to life and property. On the other hand, it is argued that general
elections were going to be held in 1959 and the democratic process was discontinued through
authoritative action. The dissolution of National assembly in 1990 and 1993 to dismiss the
governments of the PPP and League was severely criticized by the press and general public.
However, the dissolution of the same by the Martial Law regime in 1977 and those by the
President in 1996 and 1999 were widely welcomed by the general public to get rid of corruption,
lack of security to life and property encouraged by “Ghunda” elements of the Political set-up.
It is difficult to comment on the public appreciation received by any government. The
self-appointed saviours of the nation included Ayub Khan (1958 to 1969), ZA Bhutto (1971 to
1977), General Zia-ul-Haq (1977 to 1988), and Benazir-Nawaz (1988 to 1999). Their stepping
in, either through authoritative or democratic means was welcome to varying extents. However,
all of them received disgusting farewell.
6 The Concluding Remarks and Research Questions
A historical review of Pakistan’s political history reveals that the political governments
were personalized and lacked the institutional orientation. The only viable institution called upon
in crisis-oriented situation has been the Armed Forces. Although role of military is
unconstitutional to run the government, but it stepped into mainly to clear the mess created by
the politicians. This is not only due to the political immaturity to deal with diverse interest, lack
of tolerance and power lust of the politicians, but also the lack of education and awareness of the
voters to make a judicious use of their franchise.
It is alleged that the military first time stepped in when elections were to be held by the
end of 1958. It is, however, not appropriate that the then politicians had developed their para-
military forces to rig the elections and resort to bloodshed in case of their failure [Khsn (1967)].
Empirical evidence is provided by the bloody agitation of the 1977 against elections held by the
Bhutto regime. This implies that military intervention of 1958 had avoided such a situation,
which was, for sure, likely to be more aggressive than that of 1977.
 86

Commenting on these situations, Khan (1967) remarks that the politicians are a reflection
of systemic weaknesses of a society and the socio-political circumstances prevailing therein.
Thus, unless such problems are removed, the seats vacated by a set of politicians are filled in by
their counterparts. He further stated that real issue is political terrorism, which enters the social
system, gets settled in the nervous fabric of the society and can not be taken away by any means.
Consequently, the system of political government has not been smooth in the temporal
context. Hence, main focus of this study has been to undertake a descriptive and qualitative
analysis of the existing evidence to find out the causes of political instability in Pakistan. It is
planned to dovetail the secondary information with primary data to analyse the circumstances
leading to such a situation.
The question of political instability is of a paramount importance as the government has
assigned a top priority to bring in general welfare by introducing a stable political system. The
ultimate objective of research in this topic is to make policy proposals, which may help to build a
viable institutional mechanism to stabilise democratic system proposed under a new set-up of the
Local Governments.
7 The Local Governments Plan
The policy of institutional framework for new system of Local Governments (LG) is
provided and being implemented phase-wise through the National Reconstruction Bureau (NRB)
under the general Guidence of the Chief Executive Secretariat. The new LG system is based on
five basic points [Government of the Punjab (2001)].
i) Devolution of political power,
ii) Decentralization of administration of administrative authority,
iii) Deconcentration of management functions,
iv) Diffusion of power-authority nexus, and
v) Distribution of resources to the District level.
The NRB has prepared a compact document [Government of Pakistan (2000)]
highlighting main features and operational system of the new set-up. Guidance was also sought
through discussion with Senior Officers of the Department of Local Government and Rural
Development (LRGD), which is the implementing agency for the new system in the Punjab.
Electoral set-up
There is a four-tier system for each district, i.e. one Council for each Zila (district),
Tehsil/Town, Union and Village/Mohalla. Each of these tiers will have one Nazim and one Naib
Nazim. The union Council will have a pivotal role for itself and for the upper two tears. Its
representatives will be elected through a direct vote, which would serve as an Electoral College
for reserved seats the Tehsil/Town and Zila Councils. These elections are non-party and where
the philosophy is to encourage logic and argument, in stead of personalized traditional politics, in
the decision making process.
 87

The Union Council has a total strength of twenty-one members. This consists of twelve
(8 men 4 women) general seats, six reserved seats for peasants and workers (4 men and 2
women), one minority and one each Nazim and Naib Nazim. The Nazim and Naib Nazim will
automatically be members of the Zila and Tehsil Councils, respectively, and represent general
seats and distributed as 33 points for women and 5 points for each peasants plus workers and
minorities. In addition, the offices of Tehsil/Town and Zila Nazim and Naib Nazim are also to be
elected. The Union Councillors would be the Electoral College for reserved seats in the
Tehsil/Town and Zila Councils. If minorities exceed 10 per cent of the population, the Provincial
Governments would determine their allocation of seats. The Tehsil/Town Nazim would arrange
the election to the Village Council within 90 days after six months of assuming the office.
7.2 Administrative and council’s set-up
Each of the upper three tiers will have administrative and managerial functions. On the
legislation side, Zila Nazim would be Leader of the House, while Naib Nazim would be the
Speaker. At the Zila level, administration will also be headed by a Zila Nazim and the District
Coordination Officer (DCO), a civil servant, would report to the former. The District
Administration, depending on the local conditions, would reorganize offices of the nation
building department, such as finance, planning, police, health, education, literacy, law,
agriculture, livestock, revenue, information technology, community development, etc. Each of
these offices would be headed by an Executive District Officer (EDO) who would be from the
civil service.
At the Tehsil/Town leve, the elected Nazim would be head of the administration and
would also be Leader of the House, while Naib Nazim would be the Convenor. Tehsildar would
be replaced by a Tehsil Municipal Officer (TMO), who would control four Tehsil Officers (TO)
looking after finance, co-ordination, land use and rural-urban planning.
The Zila Council would perform the functions of limited legislation, monitoring,
planning for development, controlling finance and budget. More or less similar functions would
be assigned to the Tehsil Council, while the Union Councils would be responsible for the
delivery of services to the end users.
According to [Government of Pakistan (2001a and b)], the removal of Nazim at the
Union, Tehsil/Town and Zila Councils is possible either through in-house or external vote of no
confidence. For the Union Nazim, a two-third majority is necessary either in the Union Council
or in the Tehsil/Town Council. In the case of in-house no-confidence motion against
Tehsil/Town and Zila Nazim, a simple majority is required. The next step is to present the same
motion in all the respective union Councils to approve the motion with a two-third majority for
its ultimate approval. It is, however, not clear as to what would be the fate of Nazim if, at least,
one or more Union Councils do not approve as required or do so with simple majority. The
procefure for external no confidence against Tehsil/Town and Zila Nazim is to be presented and
voted for in the one step higher houses, i.e. Zila Council and Provincial Assembly. This requires
a two-third majority in either case and for Zila Nazim, the approval of the Governor is necessary
to remove him from the office.
The procedure for in-house removal of Tehsil/Town and Zila Nazims is unclear and
complicated. It is a step to build a stable system, but at the same time systemic ambiguity for in-
 88

house removal of Tehsil/Town and Zila Nazims may be fatal and cause an in-house uncertainty
as well. Further, in case of removal of Nazim, the Naib Nazim would neither be Acting Nazim
nor would he qualify to contest for office of Nazim. Thus, it is not clear as to who would take
care of the responsibilities until the Nazim office is occupied through supplementary election.
This creates a temporary vacuum of leadership impacting on decision making and an efficient
functioning of the system. Above all these unresolved systemic issues; it seems difficult for an
ordinary citizen to comprehend intricacies of the system. However, positive aspects include in-
built measures for stability of the system, encouragement of local leadership, grass-root level
participation in the process of economic development, strengthening of democratic institutions
and empowerment of local set-up to help solve problems to promote general welfare
7.3 Training of staff and elected representatives
Government of Punjab arranged training of nine master trainers at the National Centre for
Rural Development, Islamabad under the assistance of NRB. Then two sessions of ten days each
were organized at the LG training Institute, Lalamusa and Regional Co-operative Training
Institutes, Faisalabad and Bahawalpur to train 300 Project Managers and other officers working
at the Union Council Level [Government of Punjab (2001)]. These trainers worked as Instructors
for the delivery of training services to elected Councillors. The NRB has prepared five training
manuals, of which Book No. 2 [[Government of Pakistan (2001b)] is given to each elected
member, while the rest Manuals No. 1,3,4, and 5 [Government of Pakistan (2001a, c, d, e)] are
meant for the trainers.
The training is on practical aspects, mainly including the task of budget preparation,
formulation, implementation and monitoring of the community development projects. The
training is for one week and at the end of each day, the trainees have to answer a set of questions
already included in the manuals provided to the Instructors. The answer sheets are then sent to
the NRB in Islamabad for evaluation. The training for Tehsil and Zila Nazims and reserved seats
in the Tehsil and Zila Councils will follow after elections to these offices are held.
7.4 Limitations of the new system
The policy of decentralization of administrative and managerial powers for service
delivery at the grass-root level and for good governance is being recognized worldwide.
However, several concerns are being expressed at the situation prevailing in Pakistan. Although
various modalities are yet to be settled, it is unclear as to what type of relationships are
visualized of LGs with the Provincial and Federal Governments. Also LG system is being
thought of as an extension of the Provincial Governments with undefined relationships in terms
of administration and management.
The participation of peasantry and working class and women in different tiers of the LGs
is a positive step to encourage mediocre-level leadership and elimination of gender
discrimination. However, illiteracy and lack of general awareness among these classes is a great
barrier to their effective participation in decision-making process. One of its outcomes is
uncertainty about the new system. Although the Government has taken a right step to impart
intensive training to the elected representatives, but this short-term training can not be a
subsititute for the formal education.
 89

The working relationship of the elite civil servants with the elected representatives is still
unclear and a cause of uncertainty among the former class. Some serious concerns are being
expressed about resource generation, departmental integration and accountability at the local
level. In essence, a great deal of conceptual clarity is required on the indicated issues to avoid
inefficiencies at various level of governance. Further, an extensive training programme, through
inter-departmental co-ordination, both for the civil servants and elected representatives seems
necessary for an effective and efficient delivery of services at the grass-root level. Other relevant
aspects include a review of international experience on the subject especially from the
viewpoints of institutional relationships.
8 Data Sources and Methodological Framework
The poverty of democratic process in Pakistan is duly responded by a wealth of
illuminating literature developed by the national and international historians, politicians, social
scientists, journalists, legal experts and enlightened scholars, professionsls and public servants.
The information on political history of the democratic process is based upon this library.
However, the limitation of space and time does not allow to survey and synthesise this wealth of
literature for its optimal utilization. Thus, a selected sub-set of this has been explored and-
accommodated in this study. Information on administrative set-up of the forthcoming LGs is
obtained from Government of Pakistan (2000) and Government of Punjab (2001). The views
expressed by participants on the new LG system as a part of good governance, in a World Bank
sponsored workshop on country assistance programme on May 22, 2001 at Lahore, were a useful
input for analysis.
Another source of information is personal interviews with a purposive sample of political
concersns, legal experts and enlightened public servants having enriched experienced of working
in their respective fields and residing within the Lahore city. In view of diversity of the subject, it
was inappropriate to prepare a structured questionnaire to collect the information. However, a set
of policy-oriented and related questions was prepared for data collection and its qualitative
analysis. In additions, key informants from different localities within Lahore were interviewed.

The significance of LGRD and Planning and Development Departments in the general
and social life is well recognized. The senior civil servants of the Agriculture, Livestock and
Industries Departments were also interviewed. Further, keeping in new leading role of local
leaders in the forthcoming new set-up, they were selected for data collection. To share views
with legal experts, the practicing lawyers belonging to the Lahore High Court Bar were
contacted. The localities selected to ensure community participation included Qila Gujar Singh,
Allama Iqbal Town. Gulshan-e-Ravi, Awan Town, NESPAK Colony and Faisal Town. From
each sample point, one to two interviews were conducted. In addition, an attempt was made to
conduct panel interview with two Instructors and one complete set of Union Council’s members
in District Sargodha. In totality, 24 interviews were conducted. The nature of data collected is of
descriptive type. Hence, statistical analysis could not be performed. However, opinions and
views of the informants are explained in a qualitative manner to answer the research question
specified earlier.
 90

It was generally observed that the respondents were very careful to give requisite
information. Thus, prior to formal interview, rapport was developed and the interviewees were
taken into confidence.

9 Analysis of the Primary Information

In view of highly diversified nature of the subject and breadth of knowledge and
experience of the respondents, a wide variation was observed in views, opinions, comments and
proposals on various issues. A qualitative analysis of these data, along with discussion thereon, is
provided in the subsequent paras.

As mentioned earlier, Pakistan inherited crucial geographical and territorial problems.

The salient ones included a lengthy border with India on the East and Afghanistan bordering on
the North-West. The issue of “Pakhtoonistan”, in North-West region of the country, was raised
to an extent that Afghanistan was the only country to oppose Pakistan’s membership in the
United Nations [Khan (1967)]. Thus, Pakistan had to build and maintain very strong armed
forces.

At the same time, politicians created an indisciplined situation inviting intervention of the
armed forces. On the other hand, resentment of general public with the military regimes was due
to the fact that the politicians do have a capacity to absorb indisciplined shock, while the
disciplined services do not permit so [Arif (1995)] in the interest of law and order. Thus, a clash
between discipline and otherwise has been one of the leading causes of political instability.

A legal expert informed that Article 62 of the 1973 Constitution [Zafar (2000)] provides
for specific criteria, in terms of character and repute, to be fulfilled by the candidates contesting
for election to the National and Provincial Assemblies. Also a code of conduct exists on other
related matters. Articles 63-A provide for disqualification if members of the Parliament who fail
to abide by constitutional provisions. These are, however, hardly adhered to, which gives way to
the corrupt elements entering the system. Thus, the constitution is very clear to stop the entry of
corrupt elements into the system, but its effective implementation is an important policy
question.

Another cause of political instability, narrated by the key informants and local leaders,
was corrupt practices of the ruling politicians and their parties. In addition, most of the
informants were of the opinion that irrespective of the system or regime, the ruling class
concerntrates the power into its own hands in stead of conferring authority to institutions of the
system. Thus, strengthening the institutional mechanism is of prime significance to induct
political stability in the system.

Some highly experienced civil servants were of the opinion that there should be a regular
institution of National Security Council to look after the matters of the prime national
 91

importance. This should be represented by the provinces, armed and civil services, political
leadership from both ruling and opposition, professionals, peasant, workers, women and other
relevant quarters to protect national, regional and other interests. On the contrary, the legal
experts viewed that the Constitution of 1973 provides for provincial representation and that from
other interest groups in the Senate. The only point is to ensure its effective role in the system.

The civil servants were of the strong opinion that the political class should have adequate
academic and professional training to be in harmony with the armed and civil service, which
demand dignity and respect. On this issue, some of the civil servants viewed that highly
developed institutions are concentrated in big cities and remote areas are deficient impacting on
the level and quality of education and training. On the other hand, it was argued that the political
class is generally well off to arrange education and training for their emerging group in the
professional institutions of high repute. Hence, it is a matter of serious concern that the minimum
level of education for Nazim and Naib Nazim is based uniformly on the less developed areas and
applicable for the developed regions as well, implying that political leadership is not based on
quality. As a result, it may face a great deal of hardship, as before, to deal with the highly
qualified and experienced civil servants leading to lack of harmony and instability.

Referring to the question of factionalism as a cause of political instability, the key

informants viewed that it is important to have a majority for getting the decisions approved.
Thus, whether the election is party-based or otherwise, interest groups have to be formed for a
decision making majority. It was informed that General Zia-ul-Haq introduced non-party system
to encourage logic and arguments as a basis for decision making. However, leader of the House
to seek a political support for his decisions formed an interest group, which was contrary to the
philosophy of non-party house. The President showed his displeasure and used it as one of the
arguments to dissolve the National Assembly. Indeed, factionalism is an outcome of self-interest,
lack of education and training and incompetence to argue the case on logical grounds. Also it
contradicts with Quaid’s philosophy, who ran the Pakistan movement on the principles of logic
and arguments.

Referring to the practicality of the new LG system, it was argued by certain key
informants that it should involve the political interest to make it stable as all the previous regimes
had to depend on political quarters to get support for their system. The argument carries a
weight, but an excessive reliance on politicians has always been detrimental and leading to
instability of the system.

Referring to the question of corrupt practices of the political interest, it was argued that it
has become a part of the system. Highlighting on this issue, a senior civil servant, who remained
closely associated with the political governments, informed that they invariably resort to corrupt
practices. However, it requires assistance of brokers, who claim a heavy share of 80 per cent to
make the evil of 20 per cent leads to an additionally of 80 per cent to make the corruption
detection proof.

9 Summary of Issues and Concluding Remarks

 92

A review and analysis presented in this paper shows that the factionalism and majority
requirement in the house is the root cause of political instability. The factionalism emerges from
the motivation for self interest, lack of education, incompetence of the political community to
base their initiatives on logic and argument, lack of awareness of the electorates to make a choice
between short-term benefits and long-term ones with a stable political system.

The main cause of politicians’ dominance over the political scene is their feudal and
socio-economic power giving them a reasonable status in the society. As a result, they succeeded
in curbing the emergence of leadership from the mediocre groups and the decision making
process remained in an overall control of the socio-political lobby.

The system of LG, to some extent, is similar to the BD system in the sense that the latter
was, to a great extent, controlled by the civil services and the philosophy of the LG system is to
put services under the control of democratically elected administrators. Also it has ensured
participation of working class and female population in decision making process. Thus, the BD
system was generally of administrative nature and the LG system is service-oriented.

The NRB and the LGRD Department have given a due consideration to impart
professional training to members of the Union Councils. However, the training is only for one
week and it is yet to be ascertained whether it is enough to cope with practical requirements.
More important than this is specialized training for Nazims at the Tehsil/Town and District levels
as they are going to be entrusted the work of administrative nature. Also it is unclear whether this
is once for all or it would continue as refresher courses in future as well.

The LG system appears to be consistent with the main policy issues of this study. This is
likely to ensure political stability and minimize the predominant role of the conventional politics
to destabilize the system. However, general awareness and comprehension of new system is very
essential for support of the general public. Further, conceptual issues concerning accountability
of the Nazim raised in this study are critical and need to be clarified. The issue of leadership, in
the absence of Nazim, is also critical and need to be addressed to.

The verification of decision of Tehsil/Town and Zila Councils by all Union Councils with
a two-third majority seems to be complicated. This may adversely impact on accountability of
leadership leading to localized conflicts and factionalism among the elcted colleges. At the same
time, a stable working relationship between the elected leadership and the civil servants is of
prime importance.

10 Policy Recommendations

Keeping in view the review and analysis, it is of prime importance that it should be
obligatory for those participating in the election should have adequate education. This should be
 93

complemented with professional training, especially to understand the constitutional provisions

on different issues. Those participating in the elections should be competent enough to undertake
their administrative and constitutional responsibilities. Those, who are going to have
administrative tasks should be well aware of the service structure, rules and regulations and
should have been trained in a manner to ensure respect and dignity for civil servants in stead of
considering them as their subjects.

It is recommended that professional competence, especially that of the candidate for the
offices of Nazim and Naib Nazim in Tehsil/Town and Zila Councils should be evaluated before
approving their candidature. This would encourage not only political leadership, but also
promote professional and administrative competence among the local leaders.

The LG system should be implemented under constitutional protection for its

uninterrupted continuation in the future. In case of administrative offices, such as Tehsil/Town
and Zila Nazim, alternative arrangements should exist in case of vacancy due to unforeseen
reasons.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Anwar, M.R. and Rizvi, H.A. (1974), Tehrik-e-Qiam-e-Pakistan, Published by

Markazi Kutab Khana, Lahore.
2. Arif, K.M. (1995), Working with Zia: Pakistan’s Power Politics 1977-1988,
Published by the Oxford University Press, Karachi.
3. Bhutto, B. (1988), Daughter of the East, Published by the Penguin Group
(Hamish Hamilton Ltd.), London.
4. Chaudhry, M.A.K. (1988), Martial Law Ka Siasi Andaz, Published by the Jang
Publishers, Lahore.
5. Gauhar, A. (1993), Ayub Khan: Pakistan’s First Military Ruler, Published by
Sang-e-Meel Publications, Lahore.
6. Government of Pakistan (2000), Local Government Plan, Chief Executive
Secretariat, National Reconstruction Bureau, Islamabad.
7. Government of Pakistan (2001a), Manual for Trainers: Procedure, Hand out and
Literature Review for Councillors, Book 1, Local Government Plan 2000 for
Councillors, National Reconstruction Bureau, Islamabad (Urdu translation of
title/reference).
8. Government of Pakistan (2001b), Training Manual for Councillors: A Hand out
for Councillors, Book 2, Local Government Plan 2000, National Reconstruction
Bureau, Islamabad (Urdu translation of title/reference).
9. Government of Pakistan (2001c), Manual for Training Evaluation, Book 3, for
Information and Feed back on Training, Local Government Plan 2000, National
Reconstruction Bureau, Islamabad (Urdu translation of title/reference).
 94

10. Government of Pakistan (2001d), Trainers’ Guide, Book 4, Local Government

Plan 2000, National Reconstgruction Bureau, Islamabad (Urdu translation of
title/reference).
11. Government of Pakistan (2001e), Directions for Training, Book 5, Local
Government Plan 2000, National Reconstgruction Bureau, Islamabad (Urdu
translation of title/ reference).
12. Government of Pakistan (2001), Capacity Building and Training of Newly Elected
Union Councillors in the Punjab: Training Plan 2001, Directorate General, Local
Government & Rural Development Department, Lahore.
13. Khan, M.A. (1967), Friends Not Masters, Published by the Oxford University
Press, Karachi.
14. Khan, R. (1997), Pakistan – A Dream Gone Sour, Published by the Oxford
University Press, Karachi.
15. Mahmood, S (1987), Pakistan Keon Toota, Published by Sang-e-Meel
Publications, Lahore.
16. Rizvi, H.A. (1987), The Military and Politics in Pakistan, Published by Sh. Raza
Mehdi, Progressive Publishers, Zaildar Park, Ichhra, Lahore.
17. Sarwar, M. and Din, G.M. (1973), Pakistan Mein Parlimani Jamhooriat
(Parliamentary Democracy in Pakistan), Ilmi Kutab Khan, Urdu Bazar, Lahore.
18. Shahab, Q.U. (1987), Shahab Nama, Published by Maqbool Academy, Sharah-e-
Quaid-e-Azam, Lahore.
19. Shehab, R.U. (1990), Fifty Years of Pakistan, Published by Maqbool Academy,
Sharah-e-Qaid-e-Azam, Lahore.
20. Zafar, M.A. (2000), The Constitution of Pakistan 1973 [Amended up to 2000],
Published by Kausar Brothers, Law Book Publishers, 1-Turner Road, Lahore.