ARTICLE X: LOCAL GOVERNMENT
 Legislative bodies of local governments shall have sectoral representation as may be
GENERAL PROVISIONS
Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the
provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim
Mindanao and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided.
Section 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.
Section 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more
responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate
among the different local government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and
provide for the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and
functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and
operation of the local units.
Section 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local
governments. Provinces with respect to component cities and municipalities, and cities and
municipalities with respect to component barangays, shall ensure that the acts of their
component units are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions.
Section 5. Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own sources of
revenues and to levy taxes, fees and charges subject to such guidelines and limitations as the
Congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy. Such taxes, fees,
and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local governments.
Section 6. Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the national
taxes which shall be automatically released to them.
Section 7. Local governments shall be entitled to an equitable share in the proceeds of the
utilization and development of the national wealth within their respective areas, in the manner
provided by law, including sharing the same with the inhabitants by way of direct benefits.
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall
be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was
elected.
Section 9.
prescribed by law.
Section 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged,
abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria
established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast
in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
Section 11. The Congress may, by law, create special metropolitan political subdivisions,
subject to a plebiscite as set forth in Section 10 hereof. The component cities and municipalities
shall retain their basic autonomy and shall be entitled to their own local executive and
legislative assemblies. The jurisdiction of the metropolitan authority that will thereby be
created shall be limited to basic services requiring coordination.
Section 12. Cities that are highly urbanized, as determined by law, and component cities whose
charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective officials, shall be independent
of the province. The voters of component cities within a province, whose charters contain no
such prohibition, shall not be deprived of their right to vote for elective provincial officials.
Section 13. Local government units may group themselves, consolidate or coordinate their
efforts, services, and resources for purposes commonly beneficial to them in accordance with
law.
Section 14. The President shall provide for regional development councils or other similar
bodies composed of local government officials, regional heads of departments and other
government offices, and representatives from non-governmental organizations within the
regions for purposes of administrative decentralization to strengthen the autonomy of the units
therein and to accelerate the economic and social growth and development of the units in the
region.
AUTONOMOUS REGIONS
Section 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the
Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing
common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and
other relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the national
sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.
Section 16. The President shall exercise general supervision over autonomous regions to
ensure that laws are faithfully executed.
Section 17. All powers, functions, and responsibilities not granted by this Constitution or by
law to the autonomous regions shall be vested in the National Government.

Section 18. The Congress shall enact an organic act for each autonomous region with the
assistance and participation of the regional consultative commission composed of
representatives appointed by the President from a list of nominees from multi-sectoral bodies.
The organic act shall define the basic structure of government for the region consisting of the
executive department and legislative assembly, both of which shall be elective and
representative of the constituent political units. The organic acts shall likewise provide for
special courts with personal, family, and property law jurisdiction consistent with the
provisions of this Constitution and national laws.

The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by majority of the
votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only
provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in
the autonomous region.

Section 19. The first Congress elected under this Constitution shall, within eighteen months
from the time of organization of both Houses, pass the organic acts for the autonomous regions
in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras.

Section 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this Constitution
and national laws, the organic act of autonomous regions shall provide for legislative powers
over: 

1. Administrative organization;
2. Creation of sources of revenues;
3. Ancestral domain and natural resources;
4. Personal, family, and property relations;
5. Regional urban and rural planning development;
6. Economic, social, and tourism development;
7. Educational policies;
8. Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and
9. Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general
welfare of the people of the region.

Section 21. The preservation of peace and order within the regions shall be the responsibility
of the local police agencies which shall be organized, maintained, supervised, and utilized in
accordance with applicable laws. The defense and security of the regions shall be the
responsibility of the National Government.
G.R. No. 182574               September 28, 2010
THE PROVINCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, represented by its Governor ISIDRO P.
ZAYCO, Petitioner,  Further, the COA stated that the insurance benefits from Philam Care, a private insurance company, was a
vs.
THE COMMISSIONERS, COMMISSION ON AUDIT; THE DIRECTOR, CLUSTER IV-VISAYAS; THE
REGIONAL CLUSTER DIRECTORS; and THE PROVINCIAL AUDITOR, NEGROS
OCCIDENTAL, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari1 assailing Decision No. 2006-0442 dated 14 July 2006 and Decision No.
2008-0103 dated 30 January 2008 of the Commission on Audit (COA) disallowing premium payment for the
hospitalization and health care insurance benefits of 1,949 officials and employees of the Province of Negros
Occidental.
The Facts
On 21 December 1994, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Negros Occidental passed Resolution No. 720-
A4allocating ₱4,000,000 of its retained earnings for the hospitalization and health care insurance benefits of 1,949
officials and employees of the province. After a public bidding, the Committee on Awards granted the insurance
coverage to Philam Care Health System Incorporated (Philam Care).
Petitioner Province of Negros Occidental, represented by its then Governor Rafael L. Coscolluela, and Philam Care
entered into a Group Health Care Agreement involving a total payment of ₱3,760,000 representing the insurance
premiums of its officials and employees. The total premium amount was paid on 25 January 1996.
On 23 January 1997, after a post-audit investigation, the Provincial Auditor issued Notice of Suspension No. 97-
001-1015 suspending the premium payment because of lack of approval from the Office of the President (OP) as
provided under Administrative Order No. 1036 (AO 103) dated 14 January 1994. The Provincial Auditor explained
that the premium payment for health care benefits violated Republic Act No. 6758 (RA 6758), 7 otherwise known as
the Salary Standardization Law.
Petitioner complied with the directive post-facto and sent a letter-request dated 12 January 1999 to the OP. In a
Memorandum dated 26 January 1999,8 then President Joseph E. Estrada directed the COA to lift the suspension but
only in the amount of ₱100,000. The Provincial Auditor ignored the directive of the President and instead issued
Notice of Disallowance No. 99-005-101(96)9 dated 10 September 1999 stating similar grounds as mentioned in
Notice of Suspension No. 97-001-101.
Petitioner appealed the disallowance to the COA. In a Decision dated 14 July 2006, the COA affirmed the Provincial
Auditor’s Notice of Disallowance dated 10 September 1999.10 The COA ruled that under AO 103, no government
entity, including a local government unit, is exempt from securing prior approval from the President granting
additional benefits to its personnel. This is in conformity with the policy of standardization of compensation laid
down in RA 6758. The COA added that Section 468(a)(1)(viii)11 of Republic Act No. 7160 (RA 7160) or the Local
Government Code of 1991 relied upon by petitioner does not stand on its own but has to be harmonized with Section
1212 of RA 6758.
duplication of the benefits provided to employees under the Medicare program which is mandated by law. Being
merely a creation of a local legislative body, the provincial health care program should not contravene but instead be
consistent with national laws enacted by Congress from where local legislative bodies draw their authority.
The COA held the following persons liable: (1) all the 1,949 officials and employees of the province who benefited
from the hospitalization and health care insurance benefits with regard to their proportionate shares; (2) former
Governor Rafael L. Coscolluela, being the person who signed the contract on behalf of petitioner as well as the
person who approved the disbursement voucher; and (3) the Sangguniang Panlalawigan members who passed
Resolution No. 720-A. The COA did not hold Philam Care and Provincial Accountant Merly P. Fortu liable for the
disallowed disbursement. The COA explained that it was unjust to require Philam Care to refund the amount
received for services it had duly rendered since insurance law prohibits the refund of premiums after risks had
already attached to the policy contract. As for the Provincial Accountant, the COA declared that the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan resolution was sufficient basis for the accountant to sign the disbursement voucher since there were
adequate funds available for the purpose. However, being one of the officials who benefited from the subject
disallowance, the inclusion of the accountant’s name in the persons liable was proper with regard to her
proportionate share of the premium.
The dispositive portion of the COA’s 14 July 2006 decision states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, and finding no substantial ground or cogent reason to disturb the subject
disallowance, the instant appeal is hereby denied for lack of merit. Accordingly, Notice of Disallowance No. 99-
005-101(96) dated 10 September 1999 in the total amount of ₱3,760,000.00 representing the hospitalization and
insurance benefits of the officials and employees of the Province of Negros Occidental is hereby AFFIRMED and
the refund thereof is hereby ordered.
The Cluster Director, Cluster IV-Visayas, COA Regional Office No. VII, Cebu City shall ensure the proper
implementation of this decision.13
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated 23 October 2006 which the COA denied in a Resolution dated 30
January 2008.
Hence, the instant petition.
The Issue
The main issue is whether COA committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the disallowance of ₱3,760,000
for premium paid for the hospitalization and health care insurance benefits granted by the Province of Negros
Occidental to its 1,949 officials and employees.
The Court’s Ruling
Petitioner insists that the payment of the insurance premium for the health benefits of its officers and employees was
not unlawful and improper since it was paid from an allocation of its retained earnings pursuant to a valid
appropriation ordinance. Petitioner states that such enactment was a clear exercise of its express powers under the
principle of local fiscal autonomy which includes the power of Local Government Units (LGUs) to allocate their
resources in accordance with their own priorities. Petitioner adds that while it is true that LGUs are only agents of
the national government and local autonomy simply means decentralization, it is equally true that an LGU has fiscal
control over its own revenues derived solely from its own tax base.
Respondents, on the other hand, maintain that although LGUs are afforded local fiscal autonomy, LGUs are still
bound by RA 6758 and their actions are subject to the scrutiny of the Department of Budget and Management
(DBM) and applicable auditing rules and regulations enforced by the COA. Respondents add that the grant of
additional compensation, like the hospitalization and health care insurance benefits in the present case, must have
prior Presidential approval to conform with the state policy on salary standardization for government workers.
AO 103 took effect on 14 January 1994 or eleven months before the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of
Negros Occidental passed Resolution No. 720-A. The main purpose of AO 103 is to prevent discontentment,
dissatisfaction and demoralization among government personnel, national or local, who do not receive, or who
receive less, productivity incentive benefits or other forms of allowances or benefits. This is clear in the Whereas
Clauses of AO 103 which state:
WHEREAS, the faithful implementation of statutes, including the Administrative Code of 1987 and all laws
governing all forms of additional compensation and personnel benefits is a Constitutional prerogative vested in the
President of the Philippines under Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution;
WHEREAS, the Constitutional prerogative includes the determination of the rates, the timing and schedule of
payment, and final authority to commit limited resources of government for the payment of personal incentives, cash
awards, productivity bonus, and other forms of additional compensation and fringe benefits;
WHEREAS, the unilateral and uncoordinated grant of productivity incentive benefits in the past gave rise to
discontentment, dissatisfaction and demoralization among government personnel who have received less or
have not received at all such benefits;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FIDEL V. RAMOS, President of the Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers
vested in me by law and in order to forestall further demoralization of government personnel do hereby direct:
x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Sections 1 and 2 of AO 103 state:
SECTION 1. All agencies of the National Government including government-owned and/or -controlled
corporations and government financial institutions, and local government units, are hereby authorized to grant
productivity incentive benefit in the maximum amount of TWO THOUSAND PESOS (₱2,000.00) each to their
permanent and full-time temporary and casual employees, including contractual personnel with employment in the
nature of a regular employee, who have rendered at least one (1) year of service in the Government as of December
31, 1993.
SECTION 2. All heads of government offices/agencies, including government owned and/or controlled
corporations, as well as their respective governing boards are hereby enjoined and prohibited from
authorizing/granting Productivity Incentive Benefits or any and all forms of allowances/benefits without prior
approval and authorization via Administrative Order by the Office of the President. Henceforth, anyone found
violating any of the mandates in this Order, including all officials/agency found to have taken part thereof, shall be
accordingly and severely dealt with in accordance with the applicable provisions of existing administrative and penal
laws.
Consequently, all administrative authorizations to grant any form of allowances/benefits and all forms of additional
compensation usually paid outside of the prescribed basic salary under R.A. 6758, the Salary Standardization Law,
that are inconsistent with the legislated policy on the matter or are not covered by any legislative action are hereby
revoked. (Emphasis supplied)
It is clear from Section 1 of AO 103 that the President authorized all agencies of the national government as well as
LGUs to grant the maximum amount of ₱2,000 productivity incentive benefit to each employee who has rendered at
least one year of service as of 31 December 1993. In Section 2, the President enjoined all heads of government
offices and agencies from granting productivity incentive benefits or any and all similar forms of allowances and
benefits without the President’s prior approval.
In the present case, petitioner, through an approved Sangguniang Panlalawigan resolution, granted and released the
disbursement for the hospitalization and health care insurance benefits of the province’s officials and employees
without any prior approval from the President. The COA disallowed the premium payment for such benefits since
petitioner disregarded AO 103 and RA 6758.
We disagree with the COA. From a close reading of the provisions of AO 103, petitioner did not violate the rule of
prior approval from the President since Section 2 states that the prohibition applies only to "government
offices/agencies, including government-owned and/or controlled corporations, as well as their respective governing
boards." Nowhere is it indicated in Section 2 that the prohibition also applies to LGUs. The requirement then of
prior approval from the President under AO 103 is applicable only to departments, bureaus, offices and government-
owned and controlled corporations under the Executive branch. In other words, AO 103 must be observed by
government offices under the President’s control as mandated by Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution which
states:
Section 17. The President shall have control of all executive departments, bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that
the laws be faithfully executed. (Emphasis supplied)1awphi1
Being an LGU, petitioner is merely under the President’s general supervision pursuant to Section 4, Article X of the
Constitution:
Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments.Provinces
with respect to component cities and municipalities, and cities and municipalities with respect to component
barangays shall ensure that the acts of their component units are within the scope of their prescribed powers and
functions. (Emphasis supplied)
The President’s power of general supervision means the power of a superior officer to see to it that subordinates
perform their functions according to law.14 This is distinguished from the President’s power of control which is the
power to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the President over that of the subordinate officer. 15 The power of control gives the
President the power to revise or reverse the acts or decisions of a subordinate officer involving the exercise of
discretion.16
Since LGUs are subject only to the power of general supervision of the President, the President’s authority is limited
to seeing to it that rules are followed and laws are faithfully executed. The President may only point out that rules
have not been followed but the President cannot lay down the rules, neither does he have the discretion to modify or
replace the rules. Thus, the grant of additional compensation like hospitalization and health care insurance benefits
in the present case does not need the approval of the President to be valid.
Also, while it is true that LGUs are still bound by RA 6758, the COA did not clearly establish that the medical care
benefits given by the government at the time under Presidential Decree No. 1519 17 were sufficient to cover the needs
of government employees especially those employed by LGUs.

Petitioner correctly relied on the Civil Service Commission’s (CSC) Memorandum Circular No. 33 (CSC MC No.
33), series of 1997, issued on 22 December 1997 which provided the policy framework for working conditions at the
workplace. In this circular, the CSC pursuant to CSC Resolution No. 97-4684 dated 18 December 1997 took note of
the inadequate policy on basic health and safety conditions of work experienced by government personnel. Thus,
under CSC MC No. 33, all government offices including LGUs were directed to provide a health program for
government employees which included hospitalization services and annual mental, medical-physical examinations.

Later, CSC MC No. 33 was further reiterated in Administrative Order No. 40218 (AO 402) which took effect on 2
June 1998. Sections 1, 2, and 4 of AO 402 state:

Section 1. Establishment of the Annual Medical Check-up Program. – An annual medical check-up for government
of officials and employees is hereby authorized to be established starting this year, in the meantime that this benefit
is not yet integrated under the National Health Insurance Program being administered by the Philippine Health
Insurance Corporation (PHIC).

Section 2. Coverage. – x x x Local Government Units are also encouraged to establish a similar program for
their personnel.

Section 4. Funding. – x x x Local Government Units, which may establish a similar medical program for their
personnel, shall utilize local funds for the purpose. (Emphasis supplied)

The CSC, through CSC MC No. 33, as well as the President, through AO 402, recognized the deficiency of the state
of health care and medical services implemented at the time. Republic Act No. 787519 or the National Health
Insurance Act of 1995 instituting a National Health Insurance Program (NHIP) for all Filipinos was only approved
on 14 February 1995 or about two months after petitioner’s Sangguniang Panlalawigan passed Resolution No. 720-
A. Even with the establishment of the NHIP, AO 402 was still issued three years later addressing a primary concern
that basic health services under the NHIP either are still inadequate or have not reached geographic areas like that of
petitioner.

Thus, consistent with the state policy of local autonomy as guaranteed by the 1987 Constitution, under Section 25,
Article II20 and Section 2, Article X,21 and the Local Government Code of 1991,22 we declare that the grant and
release of the hospitalization and health care insurance benefits given to petitioner’s officials and employees were
validly enacted through an ordinance passed by petitioner’s Sangguniang Panlalawigan.

In sum, since petitioner’s grant and release of the questioned disbursement without the President’s approval did not
violate the President’s directive in AO 103, the COA then gravely abused its discretion in applying AO 103 to
disallow the premium payment for the hospitalization and health care insurance benefits of petitioner’s officials and
employees.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE AND SET ASIDE Decision No. 2006-044 dated 14 July
2006 and Decision No. 2008-010 dated 30 January 2008 of the Commission on Audit.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 175368               April 11, 2013
LEAGUE OF PROVINCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, 
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT and NATURAL RESOURCES and HON. ANGELO T. REYES, in
his capacity as Secretary of DENR, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, 1 praying that this Court order the following: ( 1) declare
as unconstitutional Section 17(b)(3)(iii) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160, otherwise known as The Local
Government Code of 1991 and Section 24 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7076, otherwise known as the People's Small-
Scale Mining Act of 1991; (2) prohibit and bar respondents from exercising control over provinces; and (3) declare
as illegal the respondent Secretary of the Department of Energy and Natural Resources' (DENR) nullification,
voiding and cancellation of the Small-Scale Mining permits issued by the Provincial Governor of Bulacan.
The Facts are as follows:
On March 28, 1996, Golden Falcon Mineral Exploration Corporation (Golden Falcon) filed with the DENR Mines
and Geosciences Bureau Regional Office No. III (MGB R-III) an Application for Financial and Technical
Assistance Agreement (FTAA) covering an area of 61,136 hectares situated in the Municipalities of San Miguel, San
Ildefonso, Norzagaray and San Jose del Monte, Bulacan.2
On April 29, 1998, the MGB R-III issued an Order denying Golden Falcon's Application for Financial and Technical
Assistance Agreement for failure to secure area clearances from the Forest Management Sector and Lands
Management Sector of the DENR Regional Office No. III.3
On November 11, 1998, Golden Falcon filed an appeal with the DENR Mines and Geosciences Bureau Central
Office (MGB-Central Office), and sought reconsideration of the Order dated April 29, 1998.4
On February 10, 2004, while Golden Falcon's appeal was pending, Eduardo D. Mercado, Benedicto S. Cruz,
Gerardo R. Cruz and Liberato Sembrano filed with the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office
(PENRO) of Bulacan their respective Applications for Quarry Permit (AQP), which covered the same area subject of
Golden Falcon's Application for Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement.5
On July 16, 2004, the MGB-Central Office issued an Order denying Golden Falcon's appeal and affirming the MGB
R-III's Order dated April 29, 1998.
On September 13, 2004, Atlantic Mines and Trading Corporation (AMTC) filed with the PENRO of Bulacan an
Application for Exploration Permit (AEP) covering 5,281 hectares of the area covered by Golden Falcon's
Application for Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement.6
On October 19, 2004, DENR-MGB Director Horacio C. Ramos, in response to MGB R-III Director Arnulfo V.
Cabantog's memorandum query dated September 8, 2004, categorically stated that the MGB-Central Office's Order
dated July 16, 2004 became final on August 11, 2004, fifteen (15) days after Golden Falcon received the said Order,
per the Certification dated October 8, 2004 issued by the Postmaster II of the Philippine Postal Corporation of
Cainta, Rizal.7
Through letters dated May 5 and May 10, 2005, AMTC notified the PENRO of Bulacan and the MGB R-III
Director, respectively, that the subject Applications for Quarry Permit fell within its (AMTC's) existing valid and
prior Application for Exploration Permit, and the the former area of Golden Falcon was open to mining location only
on August 11, 2004 per the Memorandum dated October 19, 2004 of the MGB Director, Central Office.8
On June 24, 2005, Ricardo Medina, Jr., PENRO of Bulacan, indorsed AMTC's letter to the Provincial Legal Officer,
Atty. Eugenio F. Resurreccion, for his legal opinion on which date of denial of Golden Falcon's application/appeal –
April 29, 1998 or July 16, 2004 − is to be considered in the deliberation of the Provincial Mining Regulatory Board
(PMRB) for the purpose of determining when the land subject of the Applications for Quarry Permit could be
considered open for application.
On June 28, 2005, Provincial Legal Officer Eugenio Resurreccion issued a legal opinion stating that the Order dated
July 16, 2004 of the MGB-Central Office was a mere reaffirmation of the Order dated April 29, 1998 of the MGB R-
III; hence, the Order dated April 29, 1998 should be the reckoning period of the denial of the application of Golden
Falcon.
On July 22, 2005, AMTC filed with the PMRB of Bulacan a formal protest against the aforesaid Applications for
Quarry Permit on the ground that the subject area was already covered by its Application for Exploration Permit.9
On August 8, 2005, MGB R-III Director Cabantog, who was the concurrent Chairman of the PMRB, endorsed to the
Provincial Governor of Bulacan, Governor Josefina M. dela Cruz, the aforesaid Applications for Quarry Permit that
had apparently been converted to Applications for Small-Scale Mining Permit of Eduardo D. Mercado, Benedicto S.
Cruz, Gerardo R. Cruz and Lucila S. Valdez (formerly Liberato Sembrano).10
On August 9, 2005, the PENRO of Bulacan issued four memoranda recommending to Governor Dela Cruz the
approval of the aforesaid Applications for Small-Scale Mining Permit.11
On August 10, 2005, Governor Dela Cruz issued the corresponding Small-Scale Mining Permits in favor of Eduardo
D. Mercado, Benedicto S. Cruz, Gerardo R. Cruz and Lucila S. Valdez.12
Subsequently, AMTC appealed to respondent DENR Secretary the grant of the aforesaid Small-Scale Mining
Permits, arguing that: (1) The PMRB of Bulacan erred in giving due course to the Applications for Small-Scale
Mining Permit without first resolving its formal protest; (2) The areas covered by the Small-Scale Mining Permits
fall within the area covered by AMTC's valid prior Application for Exploration Permit; (3) The Applications for
Quarry Permit were illegally converted to Applications for Small-Scale Mining Permit; (4) DENR-MGB Director
Horacio C. Ramos' ruling that the subject areas became open for mining location only on August 11, 2004 was
controlling; (5) The Small-Scale Mining Permits were null and void because they covered areas that were never
declared People's Small-Scale Mining Program sites as mandated by Section 4 of the People's Small-Scale Mining
Act of 1991; and (6) Iron ore is not considered as one of the quarry resources, as defined by Section 43 of the
Philippine Mining Act of 1995, which could be subjects of an Application for Quarry Permit.13
On August 8, 2006, respondent DENR Secretary rendered a Decision14 in favor of AMTC. The DENR Secretary
agreed with MGB Director Horacio C. Ramos that the area was open to mining location only on August 11, 2004,
fifteen (15) days after the receipt by Golden Falcon on July 27, 2004 of a copy of the MGB-Central Office's Order
dated July 16, 2004, which Order denied Golden Falcon's appeal. According to the DENR Secretary, the filing by
Golden Falcon of the letter-appeal suspended the finality of the Order of denial issued on April 29, 1998 by the
Regional Director until the resolution of the appeal on July 16, 2004 by the MGB-Central Office. He stated that the
Applications for Quarry Permit were filed on February 10, 2004 when the area was still closed to mining location;
hence, the Small-Scale Mining Permits granted by the PMRB and the Governor were null and void. On the other
hand, the DENR Secretary declared that AMTC filed its Application for Exploration Permit when the area was
already open to other mining applicants; thus, AMTC’s Application for Exploration Permit was valid. Moreover, the
DENR Secretary held that the questioned Small-Scale Mining Permits were issued in violation of Section 4 of R.A.
No. 7076 and beyond the authority of the Provincial Governor pursuant to Section 43 of R.A. No. 7942, because the
area was never proclaimed to be under the People's Small-Scale Mining Program. Further, the DENR Secretary
stated that iron ore mineral is not considered among the quarry resources.
The dispositive portion of the DENR Secretary’s Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Application for Exploration Permit, AEP-III-02-04 of Atlantic Mines and Trading Corp. is
declared valid and may now be given due course. The Small-Scale Mining Permits, SSMP-B-002-05 of Gerardo
Cruz, SSMP-B-003-05 of Eduardo D. Mercado, SSMP-B-004-05 of Benedicto S. Cruz and SSMP-B-005-05 of
Lucila S. Valdez are declared NULL AND VOID. Consequently, the said permits are hereby CANCELLED.15
Hence, petitioner League of Provinces filed this petition.
Petitioner is a duly organized league of local governments incorporated under R.A. No. 7160. Petitioner declares
that it is composed of 81 provincial governments, including the Province of Bulacan. It states that this is not an
action of one province alone, but the collective action of all provinces through the League, as a favorable ruling will
not only benefit one province, but all provinces and all local governments.
Petitioner raises these issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 17(B)(3)(III) OF THE, 1991 LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE AND SECTION
24 OF THE PEOPLE'S SMALL-SCALE MINING ACT OF 1991 ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR
PROVIDING FOR EXECUTIVE CONTROL AND INFRINGING UPON THE LOCAL AUTONOMY OF
PROVINCES.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE ACT OF RESPONDENT [DENR] IN NULLIFYING, VOIDING AND CANCELLING
THE SMALL-SCALE MINING PERMITS AMOUNTS TO EXECUTIVE CONTROL, NOT MERELY
SUPERVISION AND USURPS THE DEVOLVED POWERS OF ALL PROVINCES.16
To start, the Court finds that petitioner has legal standing to file this petition because it is tasked under Section 504
of the Local Government Code of 1991 to promote local autonomy at the provincial level; 17 adopt measures for the
promotion of the welfare of all provinces and its officials and employees;18 and exercise such other powers and
perform such other duties and functions as the league may prescribe for the welfare of the provinces.19
Before this Court determines the validity of an act of a co-equal and coordinate branch of the Government, it bears
emphasis that ingrained in our jurisprudence is the time-honored principle that a statute is presumed to be
valid.20This presumption is rooted in the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins upon the three coordinate
departments of the Government a becoming courtesy for each other's acts. 21 This Court, however, may declare a law,
or portions thereof, unconstitutional where a petitioner has shown a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution,22 leaving no doubt or hesitation in the mind of the Court.23
In this case, petitioner admits that respondent DENR Secretary had the authority to nullify the Small-Scale Mining
Permits issued by the Provincial Governor of Bulacan, as the DENR Secretary has control over the PMRB, and the
implementation of the Small-Scale Mining Program is subject to control by respondent DENR.
Control of the DENR/DENR Secretary over small-scale mining in the provinces is granted by three statutes: (1) R.A.
No. 7061 or The Local Government Code of 1991; (2) R.A. No. 7076 or the People's Small Scale Mining Act of
1991; and (3) R.A. No. 7942, otherwise known as the Philippine Mining Act of 1995. 24 The pertinent provisions of
law sought to be declared as unconstitutional by petitioner are as follows:
R.A. No. 7061 (The Local Government Code of 1991)
SEC. 17. Basic Services and Facilities. - (a) Local government units shall endeavor to be self-reliant and shall
continue exercising the powers and discharging the duties and functions currently vested upon them. They shall also
discharge the functions and responsibilities of national agencies and offices devolved to them pursuant to this Code.
Local government units shall likewise exercise such other powers and discharge such other functions and
responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate, or incidental to efficient and effective provision of the basic services
and facilities enumerated herein.
(b) Such basic services and facilities include, but are not limited to, the following:
xxxx
(3) For a Province:c
xxxx
(iii) Pursuant to national policies and subject to supervision, control and review of the DENR, enforcement of
forestry laws limited to community-based forestry projects, pollution control law, small-scale mining law, and other
laws on the protection of the environment; and mini-hydro electric projects for local purposes; x x x25
R.A. No. 7076 (People's Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991)
Sec. 24. Provincial/City Mining Regulatory Board. - There is hereby created under the direct supervision and control
of the Secretary a provincial/city mining regulatory board, herein called the Board, which shall be the implementing
agency of the Department, and shall exercise the following powers and functions, subject to review by the Secretary:
(a) Declare and segregate existing gold-rush areas for small-scale mining;
(b) Reserve future gold and other mining areas for small-scale mining;
(c) Award contracts to small-scale miners;
(d) Formulate and implement rules and regulations related to small-scale mining;
 (e) Settle disputes, conflicts or litigations over conflicting claims within a people’s small-scale mining
area, an area that is declared a small-mining; and
(f) Perform such other functions as may be necessary to achieve the goals and objectives of this Act.26
Petitioner contends that the aforecited laws and DENR Administrative Order No. 9640 (the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995) did not explicitly confer upon respondents DENR and the DENR
Secretary the power to reverse, abrogate, nullify, void, or cancel the permits issued by the Provincial Governor or
small-scale mining contracts entered into by the PMRB. The statutes are also silent as to the power of respondent
DENR Secretary to substitute his own judgment over that of the Provincial Governor and the PMRB.
Moreover, petitioner contends that Section 17 (b)(3)(iii) of the Local Government Code of 1991 and Section 24 of
R.A. No. 7076, which confer upon respondents DENR and the DENR Secretary the power of control are
unconstitutional, as the Constitution states that the President (and Executive Departments and her alter-egos) has the
power of supervision only, not control, over acts of the local government units, and grants the local government
units autonomy, thus:
The 1987 Constitution:
Article X, Section 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments.
Provinces with respect to component cities and municipalities, and cities and municipalities with respect to
component barangays, shall ensure that the acts of their component units are within the scope of their prescribed
powers and functions.27
Petitioner contends that the policy in the above-cited constitutional provision is mirrored in the Local Government
Code, which states:
SEC. 25. National Supervision over Local Government Units. - (a) Consistent with the basic policy on local
autonomy, the President shall exercise general supervision over local government units to ensure that their acts are
within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions.
The President shall exercise supervisory authority directly over provinces, highly urbanized cities, and independent
component cities; through the province with respect to component cities and municipalities; and through the city and
municipality with respect to barangays.28
Petitioner contends that the foregoing provisions of the Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991 show
that the relationship between the President and the Provinces or respondent DENR, as the alter ego of the President,
and the Province of Bulacan is one of executive supervision, not one of executive control. The term "control" has
been defined as the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his/her duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for the latter, while the term "supervision"
is the power of a superior officer to see to it that lower officers perform their function in accordance with law.29
Petitioner argues that respondent DENR Secretary went beyond mere executive supervision and exercised control
when he nullified the small-scale mining permits granted by the Provincial Governor of Bulacan, as the former
substituted the judgment of the latter.
Petitioner asserts that what is involved here is a devolved power.
Under the Local Government Code of 1991, the power to regulate small-scale mining has been devolved to all
provinces. In the exercise of devolved powers, departmental approval is not necessary.30
Petitioner contends that if the provisions in Section 24 of R.A. No. 7076 and Section 17 (b)(3)(iii) of the Local
Government Code of 1991 granting the power of control to the DENR/DENR Secretary are not nullified, nothing
would stop the DENR Secretary from nullifying, voiding and canceling the small-scale mining permits that have
been issued by a Provincial Governor.
Petitioner submits that the statutory grant of power of control to respondents is unconstitutional, as the Constitution
only allows supervision over local governments and proscribes control by the executive departments.
In its Comment, respondents, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, stated that contrary to the assertion
of petitioner, the power to implement the small-scale mining law is expressly limited in Section 17 (b)(3)(iii) of the
Local Government Code, which provides that it must be carried out "pursuant to national policies and subject to
supervision, control and review of the DENR." Moreover, the fact that the power to implement the small-scale
mining law has not been fully devolved to provinces is further amplified by Section 4 of the People's Small-Scale
Mining Act of 1991, which provides, among others, that the People's Small-Scale Mining Program shall be
implemented by the DENR Secretary.
The petition lacks merit.
Paragraph 1 of Section 2, Article XII (National Economy and Patrimony) of the Constitution31 provides that "the
exploration, development and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the
State."
Moreover, paragraph 3 of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution provides that "the Congress may, by law, allow
small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens x x x."
Pursuant to Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, R.A. No. 7076 or the People's Small-Scale Mining Act of
1991, was enacted, establishing under Section 4 thereof a People's Small-Scale Mining Program to be implemented
by the DENR Secretary in coordination with other concerned government agencies.
The People's Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991 defines "small-scale mining" as "refer[ring] to mining activities,
which rely heavily on manual labor using simple implement and methods and do not use explosives or heavy mining
equipment."32
It should be pointed out that the Administrative Code of 198733 provides that the DENR is, subject to law and
higher authority, in charge of carrying out the State's constitutional mandate, under Section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution, to control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization and conservation of the country's
natural resources. Hence, the enforcement of small-scale mining law in the provinces is made subject to the
supervision, control and review of the DENR under the Local Government Code of 1991, while the People’s Small-
Scale Mining Act of 1991 provides that the People’s Small-Scale Mining Program is to be implemented by the
DENR Secretary in coordination with other concerned local government agencies.
Indeed, Section 4, Article X (Local Government) of the Constitution states that "[t]he President of the Philippines
shall exercise general supervision over local governments," and Section 25 of the Local Government Code reiterates
the same. General supervision by the President means no more than seeing to it that laws are faithfully executed or
that subordinate officers act within the law.34
The Court has clarified that the constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in the Constitution Art. X, Sec. 2 refers to
the administrative autonomy of local government units or, cast in more technical language, the decentralization of
government authority.35 It does not make local governments sovereign within the State. 36 Administrative autonomy
may involve devolution of powers, but subject to limitations like following national policies or standards,37 and those
provided by the Local Government Code, as the structuring of local governments and the allocation of powers,
responsibilities, and resources among the different local government units and local officials have been placed by the
Constitution in the hands of Congress38 under Section 3, Article X of the Constitution.
Section 3, Article X of the Constitution mandated Congress to "enact a local government code which shall provide
for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization
with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local government units
their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the qualifications, election, appointment and removal,
term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization
and operation of the local units."
In connection with the enforcement of the small-scale mining law in the province, Section 17 of the Local
Government Code provides:
SEC. 17. Basic Services and Facilities. - (a) Local government units shall endeavor to be self-reliant and shall
continue exercising the powers and discharging the duties and functions currently vested upon them. They shall also
discharge the functions and responsibilities of national agencies and offices devolved to them pursuant to this Code.
Local government units shall likewise exercise such other powers and discharge such other functions and
responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate, or incidental to efficient and effective provision of the basic services
and facilities enumerated herein.
(b) Such basic services and facilities include, but are not limited to, the following:
xxxx
(3) For a Province:c
xxxx
(iii) Pursuant to national policies and subject to supervision, control and review of the DENR, enforcement of
forestry laws limited to community-based forestry projects, pollution control law, small-scale mining law, and other
laws on the protection of the environment; and mini-hydro electric projects for local purposes;39
Clearly, the Local Government Code did not fully devolve the enforcement of the small-scale mining law to the
provincial government, as its enforcement is subject to the supervision, control and review of the DENR, which is in
charge, subject to law and higher authority, of carrying out the State's constitutional mandate to control and
supervise the exploration, development, utilization of the country's natural resources.40
Section 17 (b)(3)(iii) of the Local Government Code of 1991 is in harmony with R.A. No. 7076 or the People's
Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991,41 which established a People's Small-Scale Mining Program to be implemented by
the Secretary of the DENR, thus:
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. – It is hereby declared of the State to promote, develop, protect and rationalize viable
small-scale mining activities in order to generate more employment opportunities and provide an equitable sharing
of the nation's wealth and natural resources, giving due regard to existing rights as herein provided.
xxxx
Sec. 4. People's Small-Scale Mining Program. - For the purpose of carrying out the declared policy provided in
Section 2 hereof, there is hereby established a People's Small-Scale Mining Program to be implemented by the
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, hereinafter called the Department, in
coordination with other concerned government agencies, designed to achieve an orderly, systematic and rational
scheme for the small-scale development and utilization of mineral resources in certain mineral areas in order to
address the social, economic, technical, and environmental problems connected with small-scale mining activities.
xxxx
Sec. 24. Provincial/City Mining Regulatory Board. – There is hereby created under the direct supervision and
control of the Secretary a provincial/city mining regulatory board, herein called the Board, which shall be the
implementing agency of the Department, and shall exercise the following powers and functions, subject to review by
the Secretary:
(a) Declare and segregate existing gold-rush areas for small-scale mining;
(b) Reserve future gold and other mining areas for small-scale mining;
(c) Award contracts to small-scale miners;
(d) Formulate and implement rules and regulations related to small-scale mining;
(e) Settle disputes, conflicts or litigations over conflicting claims within a people’s small-scale
mining area, an area that is declared a small-mining; and
(f) Perform such other functions as may be necessary to achieve the goals and objectives of this
Act.42
DENR Administrative Order No. 34, series of 1992, containing the Rules and Regulations to implement R.A. No.
7076, provides:
SEC. 21. Administrative Supervision over the People's Small-Scale Mining Program. − The following DENR
officials shall exercise the following supervisory functions in the implementation of the Program:
21.1 DENR Secretrary – direct supervision and control over the program and activities of the
small-scale miners within the people's small-scale mining area;
21.2 Director − the Director shall:
a. Recommend the depth or length of the tunnel or adit taking into account the: (1) size
of membership and capitalization of the cooperative; (2) size of mineralized areas; (3)
quantity of mineral deposits; (4) safety of miners; and (5) environmental impact and
other considerations;
 b. Determine the right of small-scale miners to existing facilities in consultation with
the operator, claimowner, landowner or lessor of an affected area upon declaration of a
small-scale mining area;
c. Recommend to the Secretary the withdrawal of the status of the people's small-scale
mining area when it can no longer be feasibly operated on a small-scale basis; and
d. See to it that the small-scale mining contractors abide by small-scale mines safety
rules and regulations.
xxxx
SEC. 22. Provincial/City Mining Regulatory Board. − The Provincial/City Mining Regulatory Board created under
R.A. 7076 shall exercise the following powers and functions, subject to review by the Secretary:
22.1 Declares and segregates existing gold rush area for small-scale mining;
22.2 Reserves for the future, mineralized areas/mineral lands for people's small-scale mining;
22.3 Awards contracts to small-scale miners’ cooperative;
22.4 Formulates and implements rules and regulations related to R.A. 7076;
22.5 Settles disputes, conflicts or litigations over conflicting claims within ninety (90) days upon
filing of protests or complaints; Provided, That any aggrieved party may appeal within five (5)
days from the Board's decision to the Secretary for final resolution otherwise the same is
considered final and executory; and
22.6 Performs such other functions as may be necessary to achieve the goals and objectives of
R.A. 7076.
SEC. 6. Declaration of People's Small-Scale Mining Areas. – The Board created under R.A. 7076 shall have the
authority to declare and set aside People's Small-Scale Mining Areas in sites onshore suitable for small-scale mining
operations subject to review by the DENR Secretary thru the Director.43
DENR Administrative Order No. 23, otherwise known as the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No.
7942, otherwise known as the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, adopted on August 15, 1995, provides under Section
12344thereof that small-scale mining applications should be filed with the PMRB45 and the corresponding permits
shall be issued by the Provincial Governor, except small-scale mining applications within the mineral reservations.
Thereafter, DENR Administrative Order No. 96-40, otherwise known as the Revised Implementing Rules and
Regulations of R.A. No. 7942, otherwise known as the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, adopted on December 19,
1996, provides that applications for Small-Scale Mining Permits shall be filed with the Provincial Governor/City
Mayor through the concerned Provincial/City Mining Regulatory Board for areas outside the Mineral Reservations
and with the Director though the Bureau for areas within the Mineral Reservations.46 Moreover, it provides that
Local Government Units shall, in coordination with the Bureau/ Regional Offices and subject to valid and existing
mining rights, "approve applications for small-scale mining, sand and gravel, quarry x x x and gravel permits not
exceeding five (5) hectares."47
Petitioner contends that the Local Government Code of 1991, R.A. No. 7076, DENR Administrative Orders Nos.
95-23 and 96-40 granted the DENR Secretary the broad statutory power of control, but did not confer upon the
respondents DENR and DENR Secretary the power to reverse, abrogate, nullify, void, cancel the permits issued by
the Provincial Governor or small-scale mining contracts entered into by the Board.
The contention does not persuade.
The settlement of disputes over conflicting claims in small-scale mining is provided for in Section 24 of R.A. No.
7076, thus:
Sec. 24. Provincial/City Mining Regulatory Board. − There is hereby created under the direct supervision and
control of the Secretary a provincial/city mining regulatory board, herein called the Board, which shall be the
implementing agency of the Department, and shall exercise the following powers and functions, subject to review by
the Secretary:
xxxx
(e) Settle disputes, conflicts or litigations over conflicting claims within a people's small-scale mining area, an area
that is declared a small mining area; x x x
Section 24, paragraph (e) of R.A. No. 7076 cited above is reflected in Section 22, paragraph 22.5 of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 7076, to wit:
SEC. 22. Provincial/City Mining Regulatory Board. – The Provincial/City Mining Regulatory Board created under
R.A. No. 7076 shall exercise the following powers and functions, subject to review by the Secretary:
xxxx
22.5 Settles disputes, conflicts or litigations over conflicting claims within ninety (90) days upon filing of protests or
complaints; Provided, That any aggrieved party may appeal within five (5) days from the Board's decision to the
Secretary for final resolution otherwise the same is considered final and executory; x x x
In this case, in accordance with Section 22, paragraph 22.5 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No.
7076, the AMTC filed on July 22, 2005 with the PMRB of Bulacan a formal protest against the Applications for
Quarry Permits of Eduardo Mercado, Benedicto Cruz, Liberato Sembrano (replaced by Lucila Valdez) and Gerardo
Cruz on the ground that the subject area was already covered by its Application for Exploration Permit. 48 However,
on August 8, 2005, the PMRB issued Resolution Nos. 05-8, 05-9, 05-10 and 05-11, resolving to submit to the
Provincial Governor of Bulacan the Applications for Small-Scale Mining Permits of Eduardo Mercado, Benedicto
Cruz, Lucila Valdez and Gerardo Cruz for the granting/issuance of the said permits. 49 On August 10, 2005, the
Provincial Governor of Bulacan issued the Small-Scale Mining Permits to Eduardo Mercado, Benedicto Cruz,
Lucila Valdez and Gerardo Cruz based on the legal opinion of the Provincial Legal Officer and the Resolutions of
the PMRB of Bulacan.
Hence, AMTC filed an appeal with respondent DENR Secretary, appealing from Letter-Resolution No. 05-1317 and
Resolution Nos. 05-08, 05-09, 05-10 and 05-11, all dated August 8, 2005, of the PMRB of Bulacan, which
resolutions gave due course and granted, on August 10, 2005, Small-Scale Mining Permits to Eduardo D. Mercado,
Benedicto S. Cruz, Lucila Valdez and Gerardo Cruz involving parcels of mineral land situated at Camachin, Doña
Remedios Trinidad, Bulacan.
The PMRB of Bulacan filed its Answer, stating that it is an administrative body, created under R.A. No. 7076, which
cannot be equated with the court wherein a full-blown hearing could be conducted, but it is enough that the parties
were given the opportunity to present evidence. It asserted that the questioned resolutions it issued were in
accordance with the mining laws and that the Small-Scale Mining Permits granted were registered ahead of AMTC's
Application for Exploration Permit. Further, the Board stated that the Governor of Bulacan had the power to approve
the Small-Scale Mining Permits under R.A. No. 7160.
The DENR Secretary found the appeal meritorious, and resolved these pivotal issues: (1) when is the subject mining
area open for mining location by other applicants; and (2) who among the applicants have valid
applications.1âwphi1 The pertinent portion of the decision of the DENR Secretary reads:
rights of the contending parties are, with respect to the matter in controversy and, on the basis thereof and the facts
obtaining, the adjudication of their respective rights.53 The DENR Secretary exercises quasi-judicial function under
R.A. No. 7076 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations to the extent necessary in settling disputes, conflicts or
litigations over conflicting claims. This quasi-judicial function of the DENR Secretary can neither be equated with
"substitution of judgment" of the Provincial Governor in issuing Small-Scale Mining Permits nor "control" over the
said act of the Provincial Governor as it is a determination of the rights of AMTC over conflicting claims based on
the law.
In determining whether Section 17 (b)(3)(iii) of the Local Government Code of 1991 and Section 24 of R.A. No.
7076 are unconstitutional, the Court has been guided by Beltran v. The Secretary of Health, 54 which held:

We agree with the ruling of the MGB Director that the area is open only to mining location on August 11, 2004,
fifteen (15) days after the receipt by Golden Falcon on July 27, 2004 of a copy of the subject Order of July 16,
2004.1âwphi1The filing by Golden Falcon of the letter-appeal suspended the finality of the Order of Denial issued
on April 29, 1998 by the Regional Director until the Resolution thereof on July 16, 2004.
Although the subject AQPs/SSMPs were processed in accordance with the procedures of the PMRB, however, the
AQPs were filed on February 10, 2004 when the area is still closed to mining location. Consequently, the SSMPs
granted by the PMRB and the Governor are null and void making thereby AEP No. III-02-04 of the AMTC valid, it
having been filed when the area is already open to other mining applicants.
The fundamental criterion is that all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a
statute. Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. For a law to be nullified, it must be shown
that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution. The ground for nullity must be clear and beyond
reasonable doubt. Those who petition this Court to declare a law, or parts thereof, unconstitutional must clearly
establish the basis therefor. Otherwise, the petition must fail. 55
In this case, the Court finds that the grounds raised by petitioner to challenge the constitutionality of Section 17 (b )
(3)(iii) of the Local Government Code of 1991 and Section 24 'of R.A. No.7076 failed to overcome the
constitutionality of the said provisions of law.

Records also show that the AQPs were converted into SSMPs. These are two (2) different applications. The WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
questioned SSMPs were issued in violation of Section 4 of RA 7076 and beyond the authority of the Provincial
Governor pursuant to Section 43 of RA 7942 because the area was never proclaimed as "People's Small-Scale No costs.
Mining Program." Moreover, iron ore mineral is not considered among the quarry resources.
SO ORDERED.
xxxx

WHEREFORE, the Application for Exploration Permit, AEP-III-02-04 of Atlantic Mines and Trading Corp. is
declared valid and may now be given due course. The Small-Scale Mining Permits, SSMP-B-002-05 of Gerardo
Cruz, SSMP-B-003-05 of Eduardo D. Mercado, SSMP-B-004-05 of Benedicto S. Cruz and SSMP-B-005-05 of
Lucila S. Valdez are declared NULL AND VOID. Consequently, the said permits are hereby CANCELLED.50

The Court finds that the decision of the DENR Secretary was rendered in accordance with the power of review
granted to the DENR Secretary in the resolution of disputes, which is provided for in Section 24 of R.A. No. 707651
and Section 22 of its Implementing Rules and Regulations. 52 It is noted that although AMTC filed a protest with the
PMRB regarding its superior and prior Application for Exploration Permit over the Applications for Quarry Permit,
which were converted to Small-Scale Mining Permits, the PMRB did not resolve the same, but issued Resolution
Nos. 05-08 to 05-11 on August 8, 2005, resolving to submit to the Provincial Governor of Bulacan the Applications
for Small-Scale Mining Permits of Eduardo Mercado, Benedicto Cruz, Lucila Valdez and Gerardo Cruz for the
granting of the said permits. After the Provincial Governor of Bulacan issued the Small-Scale Mining Permits on
August 10, 2005, AMTC appealed the Resolutions of the PMRB giving due course to the granting of the Small-
Scale Mining Permits by the Provincial Governor.

Hence, the decision of the DENR Secretary, declaring that the Application for Exploration Permit of AMTC was
valid and may be given due course, and canceling the Small-Scale Mining Permits issued by the Provincial
Governor, emanated from the power of review granted to the DENR Secretary under R.A. No. 7076 and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations. The DENR Secretary's power to review and, therefore, decide, in this case, the
issue on the validity of the issuance of the Small-Scale Mining Permits by the Provincial Governor as recommended
by the PMRB, is a quasi-judicial function, which involves the determination of what the law is, and what the legal
G.R. No. L-28113               March 28, 1969
THE MUNICIPALITY OF MALABANG, LANAO DEL SUR, and AMER MACAORAO
BALINDONG, petitioners,    And so the threshold question is whether the municipality of Balabagan is a de facto corporation. As earlier stated,
vs.
PANGANDAPUN BENITO, HADJI NOPODIN MACAPUNUNG, HADJI HASAN MACARAMPAD,
FREDERICK V. DUJERTE MONDACO ONTAL, MARONSONG ANDOY, MACALABA INDAR
LAO. respondents.
L. Amores and R. Gonzales for petitioners.    This has been a litigiously prolific question, sharply dividing courts in the United States. Thus, some hold that a de
Jose W. Diokno for respondents.
CASTRO, J.:
  The petitioner Amer Macaorao Balindong is the mayor of Malabang, Lanao del Sur, while the respondent
Pangandapun Bonito is the mayor, and the rest of the respondents are the councilors, of the municipality of
Balabagan of the same province. Balabagan was formerly a part of the municipality of Malabang, having been
created on March 15, 1960, by Executive Order 386 of the then President Carlos P. Garcia, out of barrios and
sitios1 of the latter municipality.
  The petitioners brought this action for prohibition to nullify Executive Order 386 and to restrain the respondent
municipal officials from performing the functions of their respective office relying on the ruling of this Court
in Pelaez v. Auditor General 2 and Municipality of San Joaquin v. Siva. 3
  In Pelaez this Court, through Mr. Justice (now Chief Justice) Concepcion, ruled: (1) that section 23 of Republic
Act 2370 [Barrio Charter Act, approved January 1, 1960], by vesting the power to create barrios in the provincial
board, is a "statutory denial of the presidential authority to create a new barrio [and] implies a negation of
the bigger power to create municipalities," and (2) that section 68 of the Administrative Code, insofar as it gives the
President the power to create municipalities, is unconstitutional (a) because it constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative power and (b) because it offends against section 10 (1) of article VII of the Constitution, which limits the
President's power over local governments to mere supervision. As this Court summed up its discussion: "In short,
even if it did not entail an undue delegation of legislative powers, as it certainly does, said section 68, as part of the
Revised Administrative Code, approved on March 10, 1917, must be deemed repealed by the subsequent adoption of
the Constitution, in 1935, which is utterly incompatible and inconsistent with said statutory enactment."
  On the other hand, the respondents, while admitting the facts alleged in the petition, nevertheless argue that the rule
announced in Pelaez can have no application in this case because unlike the municipalities involved in Pelaez, the
municipality of Balabagan is at least a de facto corporation, having been organized under color of a statute before
this was declared unconstitutional, its officers having been either elected or appointed, and the municipality itself
having discharged its corporate functions for the past five years preceding the institution of this action. It is
contended that as a de facto corporation, its existence cannot be collaterally attacked, although it may be inquired
into directly in an action for quo warranto at the instance of the State and not of an individual like the petitioner
Balindong.
  It is indeed true that, generally, an inquiry into the legal existence of a municipality is reserved to the State in a
proceeding for quo warranto or other direct proceeding, and that only in a few exceptions may a private person
exercise this function of government. 4 But the rule disallowing collateral attacks applies only where the municipal
corporation is at least a de facto corporations. 5 For where it is neither a corporation de jure nor de facto, but a
nullity, the rule is that its existence may be, questioned collaterally or directly in any action or proceeding by any
one whose rights or interests ate affected thereby, including the citizens of the territory incorporated unless they are
estopped by their conduct from doing so. 6
the claim that it is rests on the fact that it was organized before the promulgation of this Court's decision in Pelaez. 7
  Accordingly, we address ourselves to the question whether a statute can lend color of validity to an attempted
organization of a municipality despite the fact that such statute is subsequently declared unconstitutional.lawphi1.ñet
facto corporation cannot exist where the statute or charter creating it is unconstitutional because there can be no de
facto corporation where there can be no de jure one, 8 while others hold otherwise on the theory that a statute is
binding until it is condemned as unconstitutional. 9
  An early article in the Yale Law Journal offers the following analysis:
  It appears that the true basis for denying to the corporation a de facto status lay in the absence of any
legislative act to give vitality to its creation. An examination of the cases holding, some of them
unreservedly, that a de facto office or municipal corporation can exist under color of an unconstitutional
statute will reveal that in no instance did the invalid act give life to the corporation, but that either in other
valid acts or in the constitution itself the office or the corporation was potentially created....
  The principle that color of title under an unconstitutional statute can exist only where there is some other
valid law under which the organization may be effected, or at least an authority in potentia by the state
constitution, has its counterpart in the negative propositions that there can be no color of authority in an
unconstitutional statute that plainly so appears on its face or that attempts to authorize the ousting of a de
jure or de facto municipal corporation upon the same territory; in the one case the fact would imply the
imputation of bad faith, in the other the new organization must be regarded as a mere usurper....
  As a result of this analysis of the cases the following principles may be deduced which seem to reconcile
the apparently conflicting decisions:
I. The color of authority requisite to the organization of a de facto municipal corporation may
be:
1. A valid law enacted by the legislature.
2. An unconstitutional law, valid on its face, which has either (a) been upheld for a
time by the courts or (b) not yet been declared void; provided that a warrant for its
creation can be found in some other valid law or in the recognition of its potential
existence by the general laws or constitution of the state.
II. There can be no de facto municipal corporation unless either directly or potentially, such a de
jurecorporation is authorized by some legislative fiat.
III. There can be no color of authority in an unconstitutional statute alone, the invalidity of
which is apparent on its face.
   IV. There can be no de facto corporation created to take the place of an existing de jure corporation, as
such organization would clearly be a usurper.10
  In the cases where a de facto municipal corporation was recognized as such despite the fact that the statute creating
it was later invalidated, the decisions could fairly be made to rest on the consideration that there was some other
valid law giving corporate vitality to the organization. Hence, in the case at bar, the mere fact that Balabagan was
organized at a time when the statute had not been invalidated cannot conceivably make it a de factocorporation, as,
independently of the Administrative Code provision in question, there is no other valid statute to give color of
authority to its creation. Indeed, in Municipality of San Joaquin v. Siva, 11 this Court granted a similar petition for
prohibition and nullified an executive order creating the municipality of Lawigan in Iloilo on the basis of
thePelaez ruling, despite the fact that the municipality was created in 1961, before section 68 of the Administrative
Code, under which the President had acted, was invalidated. 'Of course the issue of de facto municipal corporation
did not arise in that case.
  In Norton v. Shelby Count, 12 Mr. Justice Field said: "An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it
imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though
it had never been passed." Accordingly, he held that bonds issued by a board of commissioners created under an
invalid statute were unenforceable.
  Executive Order 386 "created no office." This is not to say, however, that the acts done by the municipality of
Balabagan in the exercise of its corporate powers are a nullity because the executive order "is, in legal
contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed." For the existence of Executive, Order 386 is "an
operative fact which cannot justly be ignored." As Chief Justice Hughes explained in Chicot County Drainage
District v. Baxter State Bank: 13
  The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having been found to be
unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no duties, and
hence affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442; Chicago,
I. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite clear, however, that such broad statements as to
the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The actual existence
of a statute, prior to such a determination, is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot
justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the
subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects — with respect to
particular relations, individual and corporate, and particular conduct, private and official. Questions of
rights claimed to have become vested, of status of prior determinations deemed to have finality and acted
upon accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its previous
application, demand examination. These questions are among the most difficult of those which have
engaged the attention of courts, state and federal, and it is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-
inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.
  There is then no basis for the respondents' apprehension that the invalidation of the executive order creating
Balabagan would have the effect of unsettling many an act done in reliance upon the validity of the creation of that
municipality. 14
  ACCORDINGLY, the petition is granted, Executive Order 386 is declared void, and the respondents are hereby
permanently restrained from performing the duties and functions of their respective offices. No pronouncement as to
costs.
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez and Capistrano, JJ., concur.
Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., took no part.
Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, J., concurring:
  I concur fully with the well-written opinion of Justice Castro. It breaks new ground; it strikes out new paths. It is
precisely because of its impact on the power of judicial review of executive acts that I deem a few additional words
would not be amiss.
1. Insofar as the effect of a declaration of unconstitionality is concerned, the latter and more realistic trend
reflected in Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank 1 had previously elicited our approval.
Thus: "'Rutter vs. Esteban (93 Phil. 68) may be construed to mean that at the time of the decision the
Moratorium law could no longer be validly applied because of the prevailing circumstances. At any rate,
although the general rule is that an unconstitutional statute — 'confers no right, creates no office, affords
no protection and justifies no acts performed under it.' ... there are several instances wherein courts, out of
equity, have relaxed its operation ... or qualified its effects 'since the actual existence of a statute prior to
such declaration is an operative fact, and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored' ... and a
realistic approach is eroding the general doctrine ....'" 2 Also: "We have taken note, of the fact that, on June
30, 1961, Section 25 of Reorganization Plan No. 20-A had been declared unconstitutional by this Court in
the case of Corominas, et al. v. The Labor Standards Commission, et al., .... It appears, however, that the
Plaintiff had filed his claim before Regional Office No. 4 of the Department of Labor on July 26, 1960, or
about one year before said Section 25 had been declared unconstitutional. The circumstance that Section
25 of Reorganization Plan No. 20-A had been declared unconstitutional should not be counted against the
defendant in the present case. In the case of Manila Motor Co., Inc. v. Flores, ..., this Court upheld the
right of a party under the Moratorium Law which had accrued in his favor before said law was declared
unconstitutional by this Court in the case of Rutter v. Esteban, 93 Phil. 68." 3
2. Nothing can be clearer therefore in the light of the two above cases than that a previous declaration of
invalidity of legislative acts would not be bereft of legal results. Would that view hold true of nullification
of executive acts? There might have been doubts as to the correct answer before. There is none now.
  A judicial decision annulling a presidential exercise of authority 4 is not without its effect either. That
much is evident from the holding now reached. The act stricken down, whether proceeding from the
legislature or the Executive, could in the language of the Chicot County case, be considered, prior to the
declaration of invalidity, as "an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be
ignored."
  Thus the frontiers of the law have been extended, a doctrine which to some may come into play when a
statute is voided is now considered equally applicable to a Presidential act that has met a similar fate. Such
a result should not occasion surprise. That is to be expected.
  There would be an unjustified deviation from the doctrine of separation of powers if a consequence
attached to the annulment of a statue is considered as not operative where an executive order is involved.
The doctrine of co-equal or coordinate departments would be meaningless if a discrimination of the above
sort were considered permissible. The cognizance taken of the prior existence of an enactment
subsequently declared unconstitutional applies as well as to a Presidential act thereafter successfully
assailed. There was a time when it too did exist and, as such, a fact to be reckoned with, though an infirm
source of a legal right, if, as subsequently held, considered violative of a constitutional command.
 3. Precisionists may cavil at the above view; they may assert, and with some degree of plausibility, that the
holding in the Pelaez case goes no further than to locate a statutory infirmity in the Presidential act there
challenged, creating municipal corporations under what the then Executive considered a grant of authority
found in the Revised Administrative Code. 5 Such a power having been found not to exist, the decision, so
it may be asserted, did not reach the constitutional issue of non-delegation of legislative power. Tersely
put, there was no finding of nullity based on a violation of the Constitution.
  To such a claim, it suffices to answer that while the challenged Administrative Code provision was in fact held as
not containing within itself the authority conferred on the President to create municipal corporations, the opinion by
the then Justice, now Chief Justice, Concepcion went further. As was pointed out by him: "Although Congress may
delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or
administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law:
(a) be complete in itself — it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the
delegate — and (b) fix a standard — the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable — to which the
delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the
delegate would, in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of every law; and without the
aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has
acted within or beyond the scope of his authority. Hence, he could thereby arrogate upon himself the power, not only
to make the law, but also — and this is worse — to unmake it, by adopting measures inconsistent with the end
sought to be attained by the Act of Congress, thus nullifying the principle of separation of powers and the system of
checks and balances, and, consequently, undermining the very foundation of our Republican system." 6
doom, thus leaving them free to disobey it in the meanwhile. Since, however, the orderly processes of government
not to mention common sense, requires that the presumption of validity be accorded an act of Congress or an order
of the President, it would be less than fair, and it may be productive of injustice, if no notice of its existence as a fact
be paid to it, even if thereafter, it is stricken down as contrary, in the case of Presidential act, either to the
Constitution or a controlling statute.
  The far-reaching import in the above sense of the decision we now render calls, to my mind, for an articulation of
further reflection on its varied implications. We have here an illustration to paraphrase Dean Pound, of the law being
stable and yet far from standing still. That is as it ought to be; that is how law grows. It is in that sense that the
judicial process is impressed with creativity, admittedly within limits rather narrowly confined. That in itself is to
hold fast to the appropriate role of the judiciary, far from insignificant as our decision discloses. Hence, this separate
concurring opinion, which, I trust, will make manifest why my agreement with what Justice Castro had so ably
expressed in the opinion of the Court is wholehearted and entire.
Concepcion, C.J., concurs.

  From which, it would follow, in the language of the opinion: "Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does
not meet these well-settled requirements for a valid delegation of the power to fix the details in the enforcement of a
law. It does not enunciate any policy to be carried out or implemented by the President. Neither does it give a
standard sufficiently precise to avoid the evil effects above referred to." 7

  It is thus clear that while it might not be strictly accurate to advance the view that there was a finding of
unconstitutionality of a challenged statutory norm, there could be no objection to the view that the holding was one
of unconstitutional application.

  Nor is this all. If there be admission of the force of the assertion that the Pelaez opinion went no further than to
locate in the challenged Executive orders creating municipal corporations an act in excess of statutory authority, then
our decision in this case is all the more noteworthy for the more hospitable scope accorded the Chicot doctrine. For
as originally formulated, it would merely recognize that during its existence, prior to its being declared violative of
the constitute, the statute must be deemed an operative fact. Today we decide that such a doctrine extends to a
Presidential act held void not only on the ground of unconstitutional infirmity but also because in excess of the
statutory power conferred. That to me is the more significant aspect of this decision. To repeat, to that point of view
I yield full concurrence.

  I do so because it appears to me a logical corollary to the principle of separation of powers. Once we accept the
basic doctrine that each department as a coordinate agency of government is entitled to the respect of the other two,
it would seem to follow that at the very least, there is a presumption of the validity of the act performed by it, unless
subsequently declared void in accordance with legally accepted principles. The rule of law cannot be satisfied with
anything less.

  Since under our Constitution, judicial review exists precisely to test the validity of executive or legislative acts in
an appropriate legal proceeding, there is always the possibility of their being declared inoperative and void. Realism
compels the acceptance of the thought that there could be a time-lag between the initiation of such Presidential or
congressional exercise of power and the final declaration of nullity. In the meanwhile, it would be productive of
confusion, perhaps at times even of chaos, if the parties affected were left free to speculate as to its fate being one of
G.R. No. 103328 October 19, 1992
HON. ROY A. PADILLA, JR., In his capacity as Governor of the Province of Camarines Norte, petitioner, 
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
RESOLUTION
ROMERO, J.:
Pursuant to Republic Act No. 7155, the Commission on Elections promulgated on November 13, 1991, Resolution
No. 2312 which reads as follows:
WHEREAS, Republic Act No. 7155 approved on September 6, 1991 creates the Municipality of
Tulay-Na-Lupa in the Province of Camarines Norte to be composed of Barangays Tulay-Na-
Lupa, Lugui, San Antonio, Mabilo I, Napaod, Benit, Bayan-Bayan, Matanlang, Pag-Asa, Maot,
and Calabasa, all in the Municipality of Labo, same province.
WHEREAS under Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution 1 the creation of a
municipality shall be subject to approval by a majority of votes cast in a plebiscite in the
political units directly affected, and pursuant to Section 134 of the Local Government Code
(Batas Pambansa Blg. 337) 2 said plebiscite shall be conducted by the Commission on Elections;
WHEREAS, Section 6 of said Republic Act No. 7155 provides that the expenses in holding the
plebiscite shall be take out of the Contingent Fund under the current fiscal year appropriations;
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, as the Commission hereby resolves, to promulgated
(sic) the following guidelines to govern the conduct of said plebiscite:
1. The plebiscite shall be held on December 15, 1991, in the areas or units
affected, namely the barangays comprising he proposed Municipality of
Tulay-Na-Lupa and the remaining areas of the mother Municipality of
Labor, Camarines Norte (Tan vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 73155, July 11,
1986).
x x x           x x x          x x x
In the plebiscite held on December 15, 1991 throughout the Municipality of Labo, only 2,890 votes favored its
creation while 3,439 voters voted against the creation of the Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa. Consequently, the day
after the political exercise, the Plebiscite Board of Canvassers declared the rejection and disapproval of the
independent Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa by a majority of votes. 3
Thus, in this special civil action of certiorari, petitioner as Governor of Camarines Norte, seeks to set aside the
plebiscite conducted on December 15, 1991 throughout the Municipality of Labo and prays that a new plebiscite be
undertaken as provided by RA 7155. It is the contention of petitioner that the plebiscite was a complete failure and
that the results obtained were invalid and illegal because the plebiscite, as mandated by COMELEC Resolution No.
2312 should have been conducted only in the political unit or units affected, i.e. the 12 barangays comprising the
new Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa namely Tulay-Na-Lupa, Lugui, San Antonio, Mabilo I, Napaod, Benit, Bayan-
Bayan, Matanlang, Pag-Asa, Maot, and Calabasa. Petitioner stresses that the plebiscite should not have included the
remaining area of the mother unit of the Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte. 4
In support of his stand, petitioner argues that with the approval and ratification of the 1987 Constitution, particularly
Article X, Section 10, the ruling set forth in Tan v. COMELEC 5 relied upon by respondent COMELEC is now
passe, thus reinstating the case of Paredes v. Executive Secretary 6 which held that where a local unit is to be
segregated from a parent unit, only the voters of the unit to be segrated should be included in the plebiscite. 7
Accordingly, the issue in this case is whether or not respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in
promulgating Resolution No. 2312 and, consequently, whether or not the plebiscite conducted in the areas
comprising the proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa and the remaining areas of the mother Municipality of
Labo is valid.
We rule that respondent COMELEC did not commit grave abuse in promulgating Resolution No. 2312 and that the
plebiscite, which rejected the creation of the proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa, is valid.
Petitioner's contention that our ruling in Tan vs. COMELEC has been superseded with the ratification of the 1987
Constitution, thus reinstating our earlier ruling in Paredes vs. COMELEC is untenable. Petitioner opines that
since Tan vs. COMELEC was based on Section 3 of Article XI of the 1973 Constitution our ruling in said case is no
longer applicable under Section 10 of Article X of the 1987 Constitution, 8 especially since the latter provision
deleted the words "unit or."
We do not agree. The deletion of the phrase "unit or" in Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution from its
precursor, Section 3 of Article XI of the 1973 Constitution not affected our ruling in Tan vs. Comelec as explained
by then CONCOM Commissioner, now my distinguished colleague, Associate Justice Hilario Davide, during the
debates in the 1986 Constitutional Commission, to wit:
Mr. Maambong: While we have already approved the deletion of "unit or," I would like to
inform the Committee that under the formulation in the present Local Government Code, the
words used are actually "political unit or units." However, I do not know the implication of the
use of these words. Maybe there will be no substantial difference, but I just want to inform the
Committee about this.
Mr. Nolledo: Can we not adhere to the original "unit or units"? Will there be no objection on the
part of the two Gentlemen from the floor?
Mr. Davide: I would object. I precisely asked for the deletion of the words "unit or" because in
the plebiscite to be conducted, it must involve all the units affected. If it is the creation of a
barangay plebiscite because it is affected. It would mean a loss of a territory.9 (Emphasis
supplied)
It stands to reason that when the law states that the plebiscite shall be conducted "in the political units directly
affected," it means that residents of the political entity who would be economically dislocated by the separation of a
portion thereof have a right to vote in said plebiscite. Evidently, what is contemplated by the phase "political units
directly affected," is the plurality of political units which would participate in the plebiscite. 10 Logically, those to
be included in such political areas are the inhabitants of the 12 barangays of the proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-
Lupa as well as those living in the parent Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte. Thus, we conclude that
respondent COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Resolution No. 2312.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 105120. September 4, 1992.]
SIMPLICIO C. GRIÑO, ARTURO GADIAN, THE LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO, EVELYN
C. JIZ AND PERLA ZULUETA, Petitioners, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ILOILO PROVINCIAL
BOARD OF CANVASSERS, Respondents.
Jiz, Jiz, Andrada & Gellada and Santos B. Aguadera, for Petitioners.
Juanito M. Acanto for himself and for other intervenors. Leonardo E. Lozano for petitioner-in-intervention.
RESOLUTION
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assails the act of respondent Commission on
Elections (Comelec) of disallowing the voters of the sub-province of Guimaras, to vote for the governor, vice-
governor of the province of Iloilo and the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in the second district of the
province, in the recently conducted May 11, 1992 local and national elections.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad
This petition was filed by the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP), a duly registered and accredited political
party, through its Iloilo Provincial Chairman, co-petitioner, Simplicio Griño. Griño was also the official candidate of
the party for the position of governor of Iloilo. The other co-petitioner, Arturo Gadian, claimed to be a registered
voter of the municipality of Buenavista, sub-province of Guimaras, Iloilo.
The sub-province of Guimaras is composed of three municipalities, namely, Buenavista, Jordan and Nueva
Valencia, with a combined voting population of fifty thousand (50,000), more or less. These three municipalities
also constitute a part of the second district of Iloilo, with the municipalities of Pavia, Leganes, Sta. Barbara, New
Lucena, Zarraga, Alimodian, Leon and San Miguel composing the remaining municipalities constituting the entire
second district. In the previous elections, the voters from the municipalities comprising the sub-province of
Guimaras were allowed to vote for the provincial officials of the entire province of Iloilo.
On January 1, 1992, the 1991 Local Government Code came into effect (Sec. 536, R.A. 7160). Section 462 thereof
called for the conversion of existing subprovinces into regular provinces upon approval by a majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite to be held in the areas directly affected by such conversion. Said section likewise directed the
holding of the said plebiscite simultaneously with the national elections following the effectivity of R.A. 7160.
The first national elections conducted after the effectivity of R.A. 7160 was the recently concluded May 11, 1992
elections which was also held simultaneously with the local elections. Pursuant to Section 462 of R.A. 7160, the
Comelec conducted a plebiscite for the conversion of Guimaras into a regular province simultaneously with the May
11, 1992 elections.
On April 15, 1992, the Comelec issued Resolution No. 2410 providing for the rules and regulations governing the
plebiscite to decide the question on the conversion of the sub-province of Guimaras into a regular province. Section
3 thereof provided that all registered voters of Iloilo, except Iloilo City, and in the sub-province of Guimaras, who
are qualified to vote for the provincial officials thereof in the May 11, 1992 elections, were qualified to vote in the
plebiscite. The ballots used for the three (3) municipalities of the sub-province of Guimaras and the entire province
of Iloilo were provided with appropriate spaces at the bottom for this question:chanrobles law library : red
PLEBISCITE QUESTION
Do you vote for the approval of the conversion of the sub-province pursuant to Section 462 of Republic Act No.
7160?
[ ] Yes [ ] No
It was however, observed by the herein petitioners, that the ballots distributed by the Comelec for use in the three (3)
municipalities of Guimaras did not contain any space or provision for the election of the governor, vice-governor
and the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan representing the second district of Iloilo, of which the sub-
province of Guimaras was a part.
On May 13, 1992, or two (2) days after the election was conducted, herein petitioners filed the instant petition
far certiorari. Petitioners alleged in substance that respondent Comelec acted without jurisdiction and with grave
abuse of discretion when it disallowed the voters of the sub-province of Guimaras from voting for the governor and
vice governor of Iloilo and the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan representing the second district of Iloilo.
Petitioners further alleged that when R.A. 7160 was passed providing specifically for the creation of existing sub-
provinces into a full-fledged province, it do not specifically provide that the voters of the subprovince shall no
longer be allowed to vote for the provincial officials who, in case of a vote against its conversion into a regular
province, would continue to represent said sub-province. Furthermore, respondent Commission on Elections failed
to inform the candidates and the voters of such disenfranchisement.
On May 14, 1992, We issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the Commission on Elections and the
Provincial Board of Canvassers of Iloilo City to cease and desist from canvassing and proclaiming the results of the
election for the office of the governor, vice-governor and members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Iloilo. We
also ordered the public respondents to file their comments.
On May 29, 1992, public respondents filed their comment through the Office of the Solicitor General. On June 9,
1992, the petitioners filed their reply to public respondent’s comment.chanrobles virtualawlibrary
chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
On June 17, 1992, We lifted the temporary restraining order.
On June 22, 1992, Perla S. Zulueta, who claimed to be the official candidate of the Nacionalista Party for the office
of the governor of the Province of Iloilo and who allegedly ranked number two behind the frontrunner Arthur
Defensor, filed a motion for leave to intervene and for admission of her petition in intervention which was attached
to the motion. Zulueta alleged the same allegations as those presented in the main petition and claimed that she has
an interest in the matter of the main petition because the same is crucial and determinative of whether or not she
would win for the office of governor. We admit herein the said petition for intervention and resolve the issue she
raised therein in this decision considering that it is the same issue raised in the main petition.
Still another motion for intervention dated June 25, 1992 was filed by Rodolfo Legaspi and Richard Garin, Juanito
Acanto and Alberto Javellana, Grace Fernandez and Pablito Araneta, and Nerio Salcedo and Antonio Teodeco,
candidates for members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan representing the first, third, fourth and fifth districts of
Iloilo, respectively. Apparently, unaware of the lifting of the restraining order, they alleged in their motion that they
were unduly prejudiced by the temporary restraining order issued by this Court on May 14, 1992 because the issue
presented in the main petition had no direct effect on them or their election and they prayed for the lifting of the said
restraining order.
On July 9, 1992, We issued a resolution denying the motion for intervention filed by Legaspi, Garin, Acanto,
Javellana, Fernandez, Araneta, Salcedo and Tedoco because We had previously lifted the temporary restraining
order and considering that they were not directly affected by the principal issue in the main petition (p. 126, Rollo)
which involved only the positions of governor, vice-governor and members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the
second district of Iloilo.
On July 8, 1992, the petitioners filed another motion to admit Amended Petition with the Amended Petition attached
thereto. The original petition was amended to include as petitioners, Evelyn C. Jiz another candidate for member of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the second district of Iloilo.
The pertinent provision affecting the principal issue in this case is Section 462 of the 1991 Local Government Code
(R.A. 7160). It provides in full:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SEC. 462. Existing Subprovinces. — Existing sub-provinces are hereby converted into regular provinces upon
approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite to be held in the said sub-provinces and the original provinces
directly affected. The plebiscite shall be conducted by the Comelec simultaneously with the national elections
following the effectivity of this Code.
"The new legislative districts created as a result of such conversion shall continue to be represented in Congress by
the duly elected representatives of the original districts out of which said new provinces or districts were created
until their own representatives shall have been elected in the next regular congressional elections and qualified.
"The incumbent elected officials of the said sub-provinces converted into regular provinces shall continue to hold
office until June 30, 1992. Any vacancy occurring in the offices occupied by said incumbent elected officials, or
resulting from expiration of their terms of office in case of a negative vote in the plebiscite results, shall be filled by
appointment by the President. The appointee shall hold office until their successors shall have been elected in the
regular local elections following the plebiscite mentioned herein and qualified. After effectivity of such conversion,
the President shall fill up the position of governor of the newly created province through appointment if none has yet
been appointed to the same as hereinbefore provided, and shall also appoint a vice-governor and the other members
of the sangguniang panlalawigan, all of whom shall likewise hold office until their successors shall have been
elected in the next regular local elections and qualified.
"All qualified appointive officials and employees in the career service of the said sub-provinces at the time of their
conversion into regular provinces shall continue in office in accordance with the civil service law, rules and
regulations."cralaw virtua1aw library
Guimaras were allowed to vote for the provincial officials of Iloilo, their votes shall be taken into consideration. The
Commission on Elections, being the agency directed to conduct the plebiscite decided not to let the voters of
Guimaras vote for the provincial officials. The Commission was under mistaken presumption that under Section 462
of the 1991 Local Government Code, whether or not the conversion of Guimaras into a regular province is ratified
by the people in a plebiscite, the President will fill up the positions of provincial officials through appointment until
their successors shall have been elected and qualified. The law however is clear that in case of a negative vote, the
elected officials of the sub-province only shall be appointed by the President. The law did not provide that the
President shall also appoint provincial officials of the sub-province because, by a negative vote, the people of the
sub-province of Guimaras shall continue to be represented by the provincial officials of the province of Iloilo elected
at large by registered voters of Iloilo province including the sub-province of Guimaras.chanrobles law library
However, it would serve no useful purpose if We undo all that the Commission on Elections had done in that
plebiscite. It is more relevant to deal with the facts actually obtaining in the instant case. In the recently conducted
plebiscite, the voters of the subprovince of Iloilo overwhelmingly voted for the approval of the conversion of
Guimaras into a regular province. The total "Yes" votes was 283,224 as against 42,524 "No" votes (p. 34, Rollo). In
this event, the President shall appoint, as in fact he already did appoint according to newspaper reports, the governor
for the newly created province of Guimaras, and he shall also appoint a vice-governor and the member of the
sangguniang panlalawigan in accordance with the third paragraph of Section 462 of R.A. 6170. The then sub-
province of Guimaras is now a regular province, politically independent from the province of Iloilo. There is no
more legal basis for the calling of a special election for the municipalities of Buenavista, Jordan and Nueva Valencia
for the purpose of electing the governor and vice-governor of Iloilo and the members of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of the second district thereof.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DISMISSED for being moot and academic.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library
SO ORDERED.

We have carefully examined this section of the 1991 Local Government Code and We observed its incompleteness
and inadequacy to govern all or any eventuality. It should be remembered that the law should take into consideration
the decision of the populace to be affected by a change in its political set-up. As it is worded, Section 462
completely addresses an eventuality where the people of both the original district and the people of the new district
to be created agree to the proposed creation of the latter. The law provides that, "After the effectivity of such
conversion, the President shall fill up the position of governor of the newly created province through appointment, if
none has yet been appointed to the same (as hereinafter provided), and shall also appoint a vice-governor and the
other members of the sangguniang panlalawigan . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library

But suppose the proposed-conversion of a subprovince is rejected by those affected by such conversion, what does
the law say? The law states only the following in case of a negative vote: "The incumbent elected officials of said
sub-provinces converted into regular provinces shall continue to hold office until June 30, 1992. Any vacancy
occurring in the offices occupied by said incumbent elected officials, or resulting from expiration of their terms of
office in case a negative vote in the plebiscite results, shall be filled by appointment by the President. The appointee
shall hold office until their successors shall have been elected in the regular local elections following the plebiscite
mentioned herein and qualified. . . ." Whatever incumbent elective positions exist under the present set-up, it appears
that in case of a negative vote, these sub-provincial positions shall be filled by appointment of the President. The
makers of the law however, failed to foresee that in the event the negative vote prevails naturally, the sub-province
shall continue to be a part of the original province and continue to be represented by the provincial officials of the
original province. The law is silent or whether the voters of the sub-province proposed to be converted into a regular
province shall no longer be allowed to vote for the provincial officials in the election held simultaneously with the
plebiscite. If the voters of Guimaras were allowed to vote for the provincial officials of Iloilo and the "Yes" vote in
the plebiscite prevailed, these votes shall not be considered. If however, the "No" vote prevailed and the voters of
G.R. No. 118303             January 31, 1996
SENATOR HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ, SENATOR JOSE D. LINA, JR., MR. NICASIO B. BAUTISTA,
MR. JESUS P. GONZAGA, MR. SOLOMON D. MAYLEM, LEONORA C. MEDINA, CASIANO S.
ALIPON, petitioners, 
vs.
HON. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary, HON. RAFAEL ALUNAN, in
his capacity as Secretary of Local Government, HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, in his capacity as Secretary
of Budget, THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, HON. JOSE MIRANDA, in his capacity as Municipal Mayor of
Santiago and HON. CHARITO MANUFAY, HON. VICTORINO MIRANDA, JR., HON. ARTEMIO
ALVAREZ, HON. DANILO VERGARA, HON. PETER DE JESUS, HON. NELIA NATIVIDAD, HON.
CELSO CALEON and HON. ABEL MUSNGI, in their capacity as SANGGUNIANG BAYAN MEMBERS,
MR. RODRIGO L. SANTOS, in his capacity as Municipal Treasurer, and ATTY. ALFREDO S. DIRIGE, in
his capacity as Municipal Administrator,respondents.
DECISION
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:
Of main concern to the petitioners is whether Republic Act No. 7720, just recently passed by Congress and signed
by the President into law, is constitutionally infirm.
Indeed, in this Petition for Prohibition with prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Prohibitory
Injunction, petitioners assail the validity of Republic Act No. 7720, entitled, "An Act Converting the Municipality of
Santiago, Isabela into an Independent Component City to be known as the City of Santiago," mainly because the Act
allegedly did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as mandated by Section 24, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution.
Also, petitioners claim that the Municipality of Santiago has not met the minimum average annual income required
under Section 450 of the Local Government Code of 1991 in order to be converted into a component city.
Undisputed is the following chronicle of the metamorphosis of House Bill No. 8817 into Republic Act No. 7720:
On April 18, 1993, HB No. 8817, entitled "An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago into an Independent
Component City to be known as the City of Santiago," was filed in the House of Representatives with
Representative Antonio Abaya as principal author. Other sponsors included Representatives Ciriaco Alfelor,
Rodolfo Albano, Santiago Respicio and Faustino Dy. The bill was referred to the House Committee on Local
Government and the House Committee on Appropriations on May 5, 1993.
On May 19, 1993, June 1, 1993, November 28, 1993, and December 1, 1993, public hearings on HB No. 8817 were
conducted by the House Committee on Local Government. The committee submitted to the House a favorable
report, with amendments, on December 9, 1993.
On December 13, 1993, HB No. 8817 was passed by the House of Representatives on Second Reading and was
approved on Third Reading on December 17, 1993. On January 28, 1994, HB No. 8817 was transmitted to the
Senate.
Meanwhile, a counterpart of HB No. 8817, Senate Bill No. 1243, entitled, "An Act Converting the Municipality of
Santiago into an Independent Component City to be Known as the City of Santiago," was filed in the Senate. It was
introduced by Senator Vicente Sotto III, as principal sponsor, on May 19, 1993. This was just after the House of
Representatives had conducted its first public hearing on HB No. 8817.
On February 23, 1994, or a little less than a month after HB No. 8817 was transmitted to the Senate, the Senate
Committee on Local Government conducted public hearings on SB No. 1243. On March 1, 1994, the said committee
submitted Committee Report No. 378 on HB No. 8817, with the recommendation that it be approved without
amendment, taking into consideration the reality that H.B. No. 8817 was on all fours with SB No. 1243. Senator
Heherson T. Alvarez, one of the herein petitioners, indicated his approval thereto by signing said report as member
of the Committee on Local Government.
On March 3, 1994, Committee Report No. 378 was passed by the Senate on Second Reading and was approved on
Third Reading on March 14, 1994. On March 22, 1994, the House of Representatives, upon being apprised of the
action of the Senate, approved the amendments proposed by the Senate.
The enrolled bill, submitted to the President on April 12, 1994, was signed by the Chief Executive on May 5, 1994
as Republic Act No. 7720. When a plebiscite on the Act was held on July 13, 1994, a great majority of the registered
voters of Santiago voted in favor of the conversion of Santiago into a city.
The question as to the validity of Republic Act No. 7720 hinges on the following twin issues: (I) Whether or not the
Internal Revenue Allotments (IRAs) are to be included in the computation of the average annual income of a
municipality for purposes of its conversion into an independent component city, and (II) Whether or not, considering
that the Senate passed SB No. 1243, its own version of HB No. 8817, Republic Act No. 7720 can be said to have
originated in the House of Representatives.
I
The annual income of a local
government unit includes the IRAs
Petitioners claim that Santiago could not qualify into a component city because its average annual income for the
last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices falls below the required annual income of Twenty
Million Pesos (P20,000,000.00) for its conversion into a city, petitioners having computed Santiago's average annual
income in the following manner:
Total income (at 1991 constant prices) for 1991 P 20,379,057.07
Total income (at 1991 constant prices) for 1992 P 21,570,106.87
Total income for 1991 and 1992 P 41,949,163.94
Minus:
IRAs for 1991 and 1992 P 15,730,043.00
Total income for 1991 and 1992 P 26,219,120.94
Average Annual Income P 13,109,560.47
===============
By dividing the total income of Santiago for calendar years 1991 and 1992, after deducting the IRAs, the average
annual income arrived at would only be P13,109,560.47 based on the 1991 constant prices. Thus, petitioners claim
that Santiago's income is far below the aforesaid Twenty Million Pesos average annual income requirement.
The certification issued by the Bureau of Local Government Finance of the Department of Finance, which indicates
Santiago's average annual income to be P20,974,581.97, is allegedly not accurate as the Internal Revenue
Allotments were not excluded from the computation. Petitioners asseverate that the IRAs are not actually income but
transfers and/or budgetary aid from the national government and that they fluctuate, increase or decrease, depending
on factors like population, land and equal sharing.
In this regard, we hold that petitioners asseverations are untenable because Internal Revenue Allotments form part of
the income of Local Government Units.
It is true that for a municipality to be converted into a component city, it must, among others, have an average
annual income of at least Twenty Million Pesos for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant
prices.1 Such income must be duly certified by the Department of Finance.
Resolution of the controversy regarding compliance by the Municipality of Santiago with the aforecited income
requirement hinges on a correlative and contextual explication of the meaning of internal revenue allotments
(IRAs) vis-a-vis the notion of income of a local government unit and the principles of local autonomy and
decentralization underlying the institutionalization and intensified empowerment of the local government system.
A Local Government Unit is a political subdivision of the State which is constituted by law and possessed of
substantial control over its own affairs.3 Remaining to be an intra sovereign subdivision of one sovereign nation, but
not intended, however, to be an imperium in imperio,4 the local government unit is autonomous in the sense that it is
given more powers, authority, responsibilities and resources.5 Power which used to be highly centralized in Manila,
is thereby deconcentrated, enabling especially the peripheral local government units to develop not only at their own
pace and discretion but also with their own resources and assets.
The practical side to development through a decentralized local government system certainly concerns the matter of
financial resources. With its broadened powers and increased responsibilities, a local government unit must now
operate on a much wider scale. More extensive operations, in turn, entail more expenses. Understandably, the
vesting of duty, responsibility and accountability in every local government unit is accompanied with a provision for
reasonably adequate resources to discharge its powers and effectively carry out its functions. 7 Availment of such
resources is effectuated through the vesting in every local government unit of (1) the right to create and broaden its
own source of revenue; (2) the right to be allocated a just share in national taxes, such share being in the form of
internal revenue allotments (IRAs); and (3) the right to be given its equitable share in the proceeds of the utilization
and development of the national wealth, if any, within its territorial boundaries.8
The funds generated from local taxes, IRAs and national wealth utilization proceeds accrue to the general fund of the
local government and are used to finance its operations subject to specified modes of spending the same as provided
for in the Local Government Code and its implementing rules and regulations. For instance, not less than twenty
percent (20%) of the IRAs must be set aside for local development projects. 9 As such, for purposes of budget
preparation, which budget should reflect the estimates of the income of the local government unit, among others, the
IRAs and the share in the national wealth utilization proceeds are considered items of income. This is as it should be,
since income is defined in the Local Government Code to be all revenues and receipts collected or received forming
the gross accretions of funds of the local government unit.10
The IRAs are items of income because they form part of the gross accretion of the funds of the local government
unit. The IRAs regularly and automatically accrue to the local treasury without need of any further action on the part
of the local government unit.11 They thus constitute income which the local government can invariably rely upon as
the source of much needed funds.
For purposes of converting the Municipality of Santiago into a city, the Department of Finance certified, among
others, that the municipality had an average annual income of at least Twenty Million Pesos for the last two (2)
consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices. This, the Department of Finance did after including the IRAs in its
computation of said average annual income.
Furthermore, Section 450 (c) of the Local Government Code provides that "the average annual income shall include
the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, transfers, and non-recurring income." To
reiterate, IRAs are a regular, recurring item of income; nil is there a basis, too, to classify the same as a special fund
or transfer, since IRAs have a technical definition and meaning all its own as used in the Local Government Code
that unequivocally makes it distinct from special funds or transfers referred to when the Code speaks of "funding
support from the national government, its instrumentalities and government-owned-or-controlled corporations".12
Thus, Department of Finance Order No. 35-9313 correctly encapsulizes the full import of the above disquisition when
it defined ANNUAL INCOME to be "revenues and receipts realized by provinces, cities and municipalities from
regular sources of the Local General Fund including the internal revenue allotment and other shares provided for in
Sections 284, 290 and 291 of the Code, but exclusive of non-recurring receipts, such as other national aids, grants,
financial assistance, loan proceeds, sales of fixed assets, and similar others" (Emphasis ours). 14 Such order,
constituting executive or contemporaneous construction of a statute by an administrative agency charged with the
task of interpreting and applying the same, is entitled to full respect and should be accorded great weight by the
courts, unless such construction is clearly shown to be in sharp conflict with the Constitution, the governing statute,
or other laws.15
II
In the enactment of RA No. 7720,
there was compliance with Section 24,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
Although a bill of local application like HB No. 8817 should, by constitutional prescription,16 originate exclusively
in the House of Representatives, the claim of petitioners that Republic Act No. 7720 did not originate exclusively in
the House of Representatives because a bill of the same import, SB No. 1243, was passed in the Senate, is untenable
because it cannot be denied that HB No. 8817 was filed in the House of Representatives first before SB No. 1243
was filed in the Senate. Petitioners themselves cannot disavow their own admission that HB No. 8817 was filed on
April 18, 1993 while SB No. 1243 was filed on May 19, 1993. The filing of HB No. 8817 was thus precursive not
only of the said Act in question but also of SB No. 1243. Thus, HB No. 8817, was the bill that initiated the
legislative process that culminated in the enactment of Republic Act No. 7720. No violation of Section 24, Article
VI, of the 1987 Constitution is perceptible under the circumstances attending the instant controversy.
Furthermore, petitioners themselves acknowledge that HB No. 8817 was already approved on Third Reading and
duly transmitted to the Senate when the Senate Committee on Local Government conducted its public hearing on
HB No. 8817. HB No. 8817 was approved on the Third Reading on December 17, 1993 and transmitted to the
Senate on January 28, 1994; a little less than a month thereafter, or on February 23, 1994, the Senate Committee on
Local Government conducted public hearings on SB No. 1243. Clearly, the Senate held in abeyance any action on
SB No. 1243 until it received HB No. 8817, already approved on the Third Reading, from the House of
Representatives. The filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House,
does not contravene the constitutional requirement that a bill of local application should originate in the House of
Representatives, for as long as the Senate does not act thereupon until it receives the House bill.
We have already addressed this issue in the case of Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance.17 There, on the matter of the SO ORDERED.
Expanded Value Added Tax (EVAT) Law, which, as a revenue bill, is nonetheless constitutionally required to
originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, we explained:

. . . To begin with, it is not the law — but the revenue bill — which is required by the Constitution to
"originate exclusively" in the House of Representatives. It is important to emphasize this, because a bill
originating in the House may undergo such extensive changes in the Senate that the result may be a
rewriting of the whole. . . . as a result of the Senate action, a distinct bill may be produced. To insist that a
revenue statute — and not only the bill which initiated the legislative process culminating in the enactment
of the law — must substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny the Senate's power not
only to "concur with amendments" but also to "propose amendments." It would be to violate the coequality
of legislative power of the two houses of Congress and in fact make the House superior to the Senate.

xxx       xxx       xxx

It is insisted, however, that S. No. 1630 was passed not in substitution of H. No. 11197 but of another
Senate bill (S. No. 1129) earlier filed and that what the Senate did was merely to "take [H. No. 11197] into
consideration" in enacting S. No. 1630. There is really no difference between the Senate preserving H. No.
11197 up to the enacting clause and then writing its own version following the enacting clause (which, it
would seem petitioners admit is an amendment by substitution), and, on the other hand, separately
presenting a bill of its own on the same subject matter. In either case the result are two bills on the same
subject.

Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff, or tax bills, bills
authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come from the
House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of the
House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. On the other hand, the
senators, who are elected at large, are expected to approach the same problems from the national
perspective. Both views are thereby made to bear on the enactment of such laws.

Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of
the bill from the House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House
bill. . . .18

III

Every law, including RA No. 7720,

has in its favor the presumption
of constitutionality

It is a well-entrenched jurisprudential rule that on the side of every law lies the presumption of
constitutionality.19Consequently, for RA No. 7720 to be nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful and equivocal one; in other words, the grounds for
nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt. 20 Those who petition this court to declare a law to be
unconstitutional must clearly and fully establish the basis that will justify such a declaration; otherwise, their petition
must fail. Taking into consideration the justification of our stand on the immediately preceding ground raised by
petitioners to challenge the constitutionality of RA No. 7720, the Court stands on the holding that petitioners have
failed to overcome the presumption. The dismissal of this petition is, therefore, inevitable.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit with costs against petitioners.
 [G.R. No. 133064. September 16, 1999]
JOSE C. MIRANDA, ALFREDO S. DIRIGE, MANUEL H. AFIADO, MARIANO V. BABARAN and
ANDRES R. CABUYADAO, petitioners, vs. HON. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, In his capacity as Executive
Secretary; HON. EPIMACO VELASCO, in his capacity as Secretary of Local Government, HON.
SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget, THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT THE
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS HON. BENJAMIN G. DY, in his capacity as Governor of Isabela, THE
HONORABLE SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF ISABELA, ATTY. BALTAZAR PICIO, in his
capacity as Provincial Administrator, and MR. ANTONIO CHUA, in his capacity as Provincial
Treasurer, respondents,
GIORGIDI B. AGGABAO, intervenor.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
This is a petition for a writ of prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction assailing the constitutionality
of Republic Act No. 8528 converting the city of Santiago, Isabela from an independent component city to a
component city.
On May 5, 1994, Republic Act No. 7720 which converted the municipality of Santiago, Isabela into an
independent component city was signed into law. On July 4, 1994, the people of Santiago ratified R.A. No. 7720 in a
plebiscite.1
On February 14, 1998, Republic Act No. 8528 was enacted. It amended R.A. No. 7720. Among others, it
changed the status of Santiago from an independent component city to a component city, viz:
AN ACT AMENDING CERTAIN SECTIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED 7720 AN ACT
CONVERTING THE MUNICIPALITY OF SANTIAGO INTO AN INDEPENDENT COMPONENT CITY TO BE
KNOWN AS THE CITY OF SANTIAGO.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:
SECTION 1. Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7720 is hereby amended by deleting the words an
independent thereon so that said Section will read as follows:
SEC. 2. The City of Santiago. The Municipality of Santiago shall be converted into a component
city to be known as the City of Santiago, hereinafter referred to as the City, which shall comprise of the
present territory of the Municipality of Santiago, Isabela. The territorial jurisdiction of the City shall be
within the present metes and bounds of the Municipality of Santiago.
Sec. 2. Section 51 of Republic Act No. 7720 is hereby amended deleting the entire section and in its stead
substitute the following:
SEC. 51. Election of Provincial Governor, Vice-Governor, Sangguniang Panlalawigan Members,
and any Elective Provincial Position for the Province of Isabela.- The voters of the City of Santiago
shall be qualified to vote in the elections of the Provincial Governor, Vice-Governor, Sangguniang
Panlalawigan members and other elective provincial positions of the Province of Isabela, and any such
qualified voter can be a candidate for such provincial positions and any elective provincial office.
Sec. 3. Repealing Clause.- All existing laws or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are
hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
Sec. 4. Effectivity.- This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Approved.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8528.2 They alleged as ground the lack of provision in R.A.
No. 8528 submitting the law for ratification by the people of Santiago City in a proper plebiscite. Petitioner Miranda
was the mayor of Santiago at the time of the filing of the petition at bar. Petitioner Afiado is the President of the
Liga ng mga Barangay ng Santiago City. Petitioners Dirige, Cabuyadao and Babaran are residents of Santiago City.
In their Comment, respondent provincial officials of Isabela defended the constitutionality of R.A. No.
8528. They assailed the standing of petitioners to file the petition at bar. They also contend that the petition raises a
political question over which this Court lacks jurisdiction.
Another Comment was filed by the Solicitor General for the respondent public officials. The Solicitor General
also contends that petitioners are not real parties in interest. More importantly, it is contended that R.A. No. 8528
merely reclassified Santiago City from an independent component city to a component city. It allegedly did not
involve any creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units,
hence, a plebiscite of the people of Santiago is unnecessary.
A third Comment similar in tone was submitted by intervenor Giorgidi B. Aggabao, 3 a member of the
provincial board of Isabela.4 He contended that both the Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991 do
not require a plebiscite to approve a law that merely allowed qualified voters of a city to vote in provincial
elections. The rules implementing the Local Government Code cannot require a plebiscite. He also urged that
petitioners lacked locus standi.
Petitioners filed a Reply to meet the arguments of the respondents and the intervenor. They defended their
standing. They also stressed the changes that would visit the city of Santiago as a result of its reclassification.
We find merit in the petition.
First. The challenge to the locus standi of petitioners cannot succeed. It is now an ancient rule that the
constitutionality of law can be challenged by one who will sustain a direct injury as a result of its
enforcement.5 Petitioner Miranda was the mayor of Santiago City when he filed the present petition in his own right
as mayor and not on behalf of the city, hence, he did not need the consent of the city council of Santiago City.  It is
also indubitable that the change of status of the city of Santiago from independent component city to a mere
component city will affect his powers as mayor, as will be shown hereafter. The injury that he would sustain from
the enforcement of R.A. No. 8528 is direct and immediate and not a mere generalized grievance shared with the
people of Santiago City. Similarly, the standing of the other petitioners rests on a firm foundation. They are residents
and voters in the city of Santiago. They have the right to be heard in the conversion of their city thru a plebiscite to
be conducted by the COMELEC. The denial of this right in R.A. No. 8528 gives them proper standing to strike the
law as unconstitutional.
Second. The plea that this court back off from assuming jurisdiction over the petition at bar on the ground that
it involves a political question has to be brushed aside. This plea has long lost its appeal especially in light of Section
1 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution which defines judicial power as including the duty of the courts of justice
to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the government. To be sure, the cut between a political and justiciable issue has
been made by this Court in many cases and need no longer mystify us. In Taada v. Cuenco,6 we held:
xxx
The term political question connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers
to those questions which under the Constitution are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity; or in
regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the
government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
In Casibang v. Aquino,7 we defined a justiciable issue as follows:
A purely justiciable issue implies a given right, legally demandable and enforceable, an act or omission
violative of such right, and a remedy granted and sanctioned by law, for said breach of right.
Clearly, the petition at bar presents a justiciable issue. Petitioners claim that under Section 10, Article X of the 1987
Constitution they have a right to approve or disapprove R.A. No. 8528 in a plebiscite before it can be enforced. It
ought to be self-evident that whether or not petitioners have the said right is a legal not a political question. For
whether or not laws passed by Congress comply with the requirements of the Constitution pose questions that this
Court alone can decide. The proposition that this Court is the ultimate arbiter of the meaning and nuances of the
Constitution need not be the subject of a prolix explanation.
Third. The threshold issue is whether R.A. No. 8528 is unconstitutional for its failure to provide that the
conversion of the city of Santiago from an independent component city to a component city should be submitted to
its people in a proper plebiscite. We hold that the Constitution requires a plebiscite. Section 10, Article X of the
1987 Constitution provides:
No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, or divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary
substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to
approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
This constitutional requirement is reiterated in Section 10, Chapter 2 of the Local Government Code (R.A. No.
7160), thus:
Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its
boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and
subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
The power to create, divide, merge, abolish or substantially alter boundaries of local government units belongs
to Congress.8 This power is part of the larger power to enact laws which the Constitution vested in Congress. 9 The
exercise of the power must be in accord with the mandate of the Constitution. In the case at bar, the issue is whether
the downgrading of Santiago City from an independent component city to a mere component city requires the
approval of the people of Santiago City in a plebiscite. The resolution of the issue depends on whether or not the
downgrading falls within the meaning of creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries
of municipalities per Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. A close analysis of the said constitutional provision
will reveal that the creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government
units involve a common denominator - - - material change in the political and economic rights of the local
government units directly affected as well as the people therein. It is precisely for this reason that the Constitution
requires the approval of the people in the political units directly affected. It is not difficult to appreciate the rationale
of this constitutional requirement. The 1987 Constitution, more than any of our previous Constitutions, gave more
reality to the sovereignty of our people for it was borne out of the people power in the 1986 EDSA revolution. Its
Section 10, Article X addressed the undesirable practice in the past whereby local government units were created,
abolished, merged or divided on the basis of the vagaries of politics and not of the welfare of the people. Thus, the
consent of the people of the local government unit directly affected was required to serve as a checking mechanism
to any exercise of legislative power creating, dividing, abolishing, merging or altering the boundaries of local
government units. It is one instance where the people in their sovereign capacity decide on a matter that affects them
- - - direct democracy of the people as opposed to democracy thru peoples representatives. This plebiscite
requirement is also in accord with the philosophy of the Constitution granting more autonomy to local government
units.
The changes that will result from the downgrading of the city of Santiago from an independent component city
to a component city are many and cannot be characterized as insubstantial. For one, the independence of the city as a
political unit will be diminished. The city mayor will be placed under the administrative supervision of the
provincial governor. The resolutions and ordinances of the city council of Santiago will have to be reviewed by the
Provincial Board of Isabela. Taxes that will be collected by the city will now have to be shared with the
province. Petitioners pointed out these far reaching changes on the life of the people of the city of Santiago, viz:10
Although RESPONDENTS would like to make it appear that R.A. No. 8528 had merely re-
classified Santiago City from an independent component city into a component city, the effect when challenged (sic)
the Act were operational would be, actually, that of conversion. Consequently, there would be substantial
changes in the political culture and administrative responsibilities of Santiago City, and the Province of
Isabela. Santiago City from an independent component city will revert to the Province of Isabela, geographically,
politically and administratively. Thus, the territorial land area of Santiago City will be added to the land area
comprising the province of Isabela. This will be to the benefit or advantage of the Provincial Government of Isabela
on account of the subsequent increase of its share from the internal revenue allotment (IRA) from the National
Government (Section 285, R.A. No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991). The IRA is based on land area
and population of local government units, provinces included.
The nature or kinds, and magnitude of the taxes collected by the City Government, and which taxes shall
accrue solely to the City Government, will be redefined (Section 151, R.A. No. 7160), and may be shared with the
province such as taxes on sand, gravel and other quarry resources (Section 138, R.A. No. 7160), professional taxes
(Section 139, R.A. No. 7160), or amusement taxes (Section 140, R.A. No. 7160). The Provincial Government will
allocate operating funds for the City. Inarguably, there would be a (sic) diminished funds for the local operations of
the City Government because of reduced shares of the IRA in accordance with the schedule set forth by Section 285
of the R.A. No. 7160. The City Governments share in the proceeds in the development and utilization of national
wealth shall be diluted since certain portions shall accrue to the Provincial Government (Section 292, R.A.
No.7160).
The registered voters of Santiago City will vote for and can be voted as provincial officials (Section 451 and
452 [c], R.A. No. 7160).
The City Mayor will now be under the administrative supervision of the Provincial Governor who is tasked by
law to ensure that every component city and municipality within the territorial jurisdiction of the province acts
within the scope of its prescribed powers and functions (Section 29 and 465 (b) (2) (i), R.A. No. 7160), and to
review (Section 30, R.A. No. 7160) all executive orders submitted by the former (Section 455 (b) (1) (xii), R.A. No.
7160) and (R)eportorial requirements with respect to the local governance and state of affairs of the city (Section
455 (b) (1) (xx), R.A. No. 7160). Elective city officials will also be effectively under the control of the Provincial
Governor (Section 63, R.A. No. 7160). Such will be the great change in the state of the political autonomy of what is
now Santiago City where by virtue of R.A. No. 7720, it is the Office of the President which has supervisory
authority over it as an independent component city (Section 25, R.A. No. 7160; Section 4 (ARTICLE X), 1987
Constitution).
The resolutions and ordinances adopted and approved by the Sangguniang Panlungsod will be subject to the
review of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan (Sections 56, 468 (a) (1) (i), 468 (a) (2) (vii), and 469 (c) (4), R.A. No.
7160). Likewise, the decisions in administrative cases by the former could be appealed and acted upon by the latter
(Section 67, R.A. No. 7160).
It is markworthy that when R.A. No. 7720 upgraded the status of Santiago City from a municipality to an
independent component city, it required the approval of its people thru a plebiscite called for the purpose. There is
neither rhyme nor reason why this plebiscite should not be called to determine the will of the people of Santiago
City when R.A. No. 8528 downgrades the status of their city. Indeed, there is more reason to consult the people
when a law substantially diminishes their right. Rule II, Article 6, paragraph (f) (1) of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of the Local Government Code is in accord with the Constitution when it provides that:
(f) Plebiscite - (1) no creation, conversion, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries
of LGUS shall take effect unless approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose in the
LGU or LGUs affected. The plebiscite shall be conducted by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) within one
hundred twenty (120) days from the effectivity of the law or ordinance prescribing such action, unless said law or
ordinance fixes another date.
x x x.
The rules cover all conversions, whether upward or downward in character, so long as they result in a material
change in the local government unit directly affected, especially a change in the political and economic rights of its
people.
 A word on the dissenting opinions of our esteemed brethren. Mr. Justice Buena justifies R.A. No. 8528 on the
ground that Congress has the power to amend the charter of Santiago City. This power of amendment, however, is
limited by Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. Quite clearly, when an amendment of a law involves the
creation, merger, division, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units, a plebiscite in
the political units directly affected is mandatory. He also contends that the amendment merely caused a transition in
the status of Santiago as a city.Allegedly, it is a transition because no new city was created nor was a former city
dissolved by R.A. No. 8528. As discussed above, the spirit of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution calls for the
people of the local government unit directly affected to vote in a plebiscite whenever there is a material change in
their rights and responsibilities. They may call the downgrading of Santiago to a component city as a mere transition
but they cannot blink away from the fact that the transition will radically change its physical and political
configuration as well as the rights and responsibilities of its people.
On the other hand, our esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Mendoza, posits the theory that "only if the
classification involves changes in income, population, and land area of the local government unit is there a need for
such changes to be approved by the people x x x."
With due respect, such an interpretation runs against the letter and spirit of section 10, Article X of the 1987
Constitution which, to repeat, states: "No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged,
abolished, or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the Local
Government Code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly
affected." It is clear that the Constitution imposes two conditions - - - first, the creation, division, merger, abolition
or substantial alteration of boundary of a local government unit must meet the criteria fixed by the Local
Government Code on income, population and land area and second, the law must be approved by the people "by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected."
In accord with the Constitution, sections 7, 8, and 9 of the Local Government Code fixed the said criteria and
they involve requirements on income, population and land area. These requirements, however, are imposed to
help assure the economic viability of the local government unit concerned. They were not imposed to
determine the necessity for a plebiscite of the people. Indeed, the Local Government Code does not state that
there will be no more plebiscite after its requirements on income, population and land area have been satisfied. On
the contrary, section 10, Chapter 2 of the Code provides: "No creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial
alteration of boundaries of local government units shall take effect unless approved by a majority of the votes casts
in a plebiscite called for the purpose in the political unit or units directly affected. Said plebiscite shall be conducted
by the COMELEC within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of the effectivity of the law or ordinance
effecting such action, unless said law or ordinance fixes another date."11 Senator Aquilino Pimentel, the principal
author of the Local Government Code of 1991, opines that the plebiscite is absolute and mandatory. 12
It cannot be overstressed that the said two requirements of the Constitution have different purposes. The
criteria fixed by the Local Government Code on income, population and land area are designed to achieve
an economic purpose. They are to be based on verified indicators, hence, section 7, Chapter 2 of the Local
Government Code requires that these "indicators shall be attested by the Department of Finance, the National
Statistics Office, and the Lands Management Bureau of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources." In
contrast, the people's plebiscite is required to achieve a political purpose --- to use the people's voice as a check
against the pernicious political practice of gerrymandering. There is no better check against this excess committed
by the political representatives of the people themselves than the exercise of direct people power. As well-observed
by one commentator, as the creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries are "xxx
basic to local government, it is also imperative that these acts be done not only by Congress but also be approved by
the inhabitants of the locality concerned. xxx By giving the inhabitants a hand in their approval, the provision will
also eliminate the old practice of gerrymandering and minimize legislative action designed for the benefit of a few
politicians. Hence, it promotes the autonomy of local government units."13
The records show that the downgrading of Santiago City was opposed by certain segments of its people. In the
debates in Congress, it was noted that at the time R.A. No. 8528 was proposed, Santiago City has been converted to
an independent component city barely two and a half (2 1/2) years ago and the conversion was approved by a
majority of 14,000 votes. Some legislators expressed surprise for the sudden move to downgrade the status of
Santiago City as there had been no significant change in its socio-economic-political status. The only reason given
for the downgrading is to enable the people of the city to aspire for the leadership of the province. To say the least,
the alleged reason is unconvincing for it is the essence of an independent component city that its people can no
longer participate or be voted for in the election of officials of the province. The people of Santiago City were aware
that they gave up that privilege when they voted to be independent from the province of Isabela. There was an
attempt on the part of the Committee on Local Government to submit the downgrading of Santiago City to its people
via a plebiscite. The amendment to this effect was about to be voted upon when a recess was called. After the recess,
the chairman of the Committee anounced the withdrawal of the amendment "after a very enlightening conversation
with the elders of the Body." We quote the debates, viz:14
"BILL ON SECOND READING
H.B. No. 8729 - City of Santiago
"Senator Tatad. Mr. President, I move that we consider House Bill No. 8729 as reported out under Committee
Report No. 971.
"The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] there being none, the motion is approved.
"Consideration of House Bill No. 8729 is now in order. With the permission of the Body, the Secretary will
read only the title of the bill without prejudice to inserting in the Record the whole text thereof.
"The Acting Secretary [Atty. Raval]. House Bill No. 8729, entitled
AN ACT AMENDING CERTAIN SECTIONS OF R.A. NO. 7720 ENTITLED "AN ACT
CONVERTING THE MUNICIPALITY OF SANTIAGO INTO AN INDEPENDENT COMPONENT
CITY TO BE KNOWN AS THE CITY OF SANTIAGO
_______________________________________________________
The following is the full text of H.B. No. 8729
Insert
_______________________________________________________
"Senator Tatad. Mr. President, for the sponsorship, I ask that the distinguished Chairman of the Committee on
Local Government be recognized.
"The President. Senator Sotto is recognized.
SPONSORSHIP SPEECH OF SENATOR SOTTO
"Mr. President. House Bill No. 8729, which was introduced in the House by Congressman Antonio M. Abaya as
its principal author, is a simple measure which merely seeks to convert the City of Santiago into a
component city of the Province of Isabela.
"The City of Santiago is geographically located within, and is physically an integral part of the Province of
Isabela. As an independent component city, however, it is completely detached and separate from the said
province as a local political unit. To use the language of the Explanatory Note of the proposed bill, the
City of Santiago is an island in the provincial milieu.
"The residents of the city no longer participate in the elections, nor are they qualified to run for any elective
positions in the Province of Isabela.
"The Province of Isabela, on the other hand, is no longer vested with the power and authority of general
supervision over the city and its officials, which power and authority are now exercised by the Office of
the President, which is very far away from Santiago City.
Being geographically located within the Province of Isabela, the City of Santiago is affected, one way or the
other, by the happenings in the said province, and is benefited by its progress and development. Hence, the
proposed bill to convert the City of Santiago into a component city of Isabela.
"Mr. President, it is my pleasure, therefore, to present for consideration of this august Body Committee Report
No. 971 of the Committee on Local Government , recommending approval, with our proposed committee
amendment, of House Bill No. 8729.
"Thank you, Mr. President.
"The President. The Majority Leader is recognized.
"Senator Tatad. Mr. President, I moved (sic) that we close the period of interpellations.
"The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the period of interpellations is closed.
"Senator Tatad. I move that we now consider the committee amendments.
"Senator Roco. Mr. President.
"The President. What is the pleasure of Senator Roco?
"Senator Roco. Mr. President, may I ask for a reconsideration of the ruling on the motion to close the period of
interpellations just to be able to ask a few questions?
"Senator Tatad. May I move for a reconsideration of my motion, Mr. President.
"The President. Is there any objection to the reconsideration of the closing of the period of
interpellations? [Silence] There being none, the motion is approved.
"Senator Roco is recognized.
"Senator Roco. Will the distinguished gentleman yield for some questions?
"Senator Sotto. Willingly, Mr. President.
"Senator Roco. Mr. President, together with the Chairman of the Committee on Local Government, we
were with the sponsors when we approved this bill to make Santiago a City. That was about two and
a half years ago. At that time, I remember it was the cry of the city that it be independent. Now we
are deleting that word independent.
"Mr. President, only because I was a co-author and a co-sponsor, for the Record, I want some explanation
on what happened between then and now that has made us decide that the City of Santiago should
cease to be independent and should now become a component city.
"Senator Sotto. Mr. President, the officials of the province said during the public hearing that they are no longer
vested with the power and authority of general supervision over the city. The power and authority is now
being exercised by the Office of the President and it is quite far from the City of Santiago.
"In the public hearing, we also gathered that there is a clamor from some sectors that they want to participate in
the provincial elections.
"Senator Roco. Mr. President, I did not mean to delay this. I did want it on record, however. I think there was a
majority of 14,000 who approved the charter, and maybe we owe it to those who voted for that charter
some degree of respect. But if there has been a change of political will, there has been a change of political
will, then so be it.
"Thank you, Mr. President.
"Senator Sotto. Mr. President, to be very frank about it, that was a very important point raised by Senator Roco,
and I will have to place it on the Record of the Senate that the reason why we are proposing a committee
amendment is that, originally, there was an objection on the part of the local officials and those who
oppose it by incorporating a plebiscite in this bill. That was the solution. Because there were some sectors
in the City of Santiago who were opposing the reclassification or reconversion of the city into a
component city.
"Senator Roco. All I wanted to say, Mr. President -- because the two of us had special pictures (sic) in the city
-- is that I thought it should be put on record that we have supported originally the proposal to make it an
independent city. But now if it is their request, then, on the manifestation of the Chairman, let it be so.
"Thank you.
"Senator Drilon. Mr. President.
"Senator Drilon. Will the gentleman yield for a few questions, Mr. President?
"Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President.
"Senator Drilon. Mr. President, further to the interpellation of our good friend, the Senator from Bicol,
on the matter of the opinion of the citizens of Santiago City, there is a resolution passed by the
Sanggunian on January 30, 1997 opposing the conversion of Santiago from an independent city.
"This opposition was placed on records during the committee hearings. And that is the reason why, as
mentioned by the good sponsor, one of the amendments is that a plebiscite be conducted before the
law takes effect.
"The question I would like to raise-- and I would like to recall the statement of our Minority Leader -- is
that, at this time we should not be passing it for a particular politician.
"In this particular case, it is obvious that this bill is being passed in order that the additional territory be
added to the election of the provincial officials of the province of Isabela.
"Now, is this for the benefit of any particular politician, Mr. President.
"Senator Sotto. If it is, I am not aware of it, Mr. President.
"Senator Alvarez. Mr. President.
"The President. With the permission of the two gentlemen on the Floor, Senator Alvarez is recognized.
"Senator Alvarez. As a born inbred citizen of this city, Mr. President, may I share some information.
"Mr. President, if we open up the election of the city to the provincial leadership, it will not be to the benefit of
the provincial leadership, because the provincial leadership will then campaign in a bigger territory.
"As a matter of fact, the ones who will benefit from this are the citizens of Santiago who will now be
enfranchised in the provincial electoral process, and whose children will have the opportunity to grow into
provincial leadership. This is one of the prime reasons why this amendment is being put forward.
"While it is true that there may have been a resolution by the city council, those who signed the resolution were
not the whole of the council. This bill was sponsored by the congressman of that district who represents a
constituency, the voice of the district.
"I think, Mr. President, in considering which interest is paramount, whose voice must be heard, and if we have to
fathom the interest of the people, the law which has been crafted here in accordance with the rules should
be given account, as we do give account to many of the legislations coming from the House on local
issues.
 "Senator Drilon. Mr. President, the reason why I am raising this question is that, as Senator Roco said, PURPOSE WITHIN SIXTY (60) DAYS FROM THE APPROVAL OF THIS ACT. THE COMMISSION ON
just two-and-a-half years ago we passed a bill which indeed disenfranchized--if we want to use that ELECTIONS SHALL CONDUCT AND SUPERVISE SUCH PLEBISCITE.
phrase-- the citizens of the City of Santiago in the matter of the provincial election. Two-and-a-half
years after, we are changing the rule. "The President. Is there any objection?

"In the original charter, the citizens of the City of Santiago participated in a plebiscite in order to approve "Senator Enrile. Mr. President.
the conversion of the city into an independent city. I believe that the only way to resolve this issue "The President. Senator Enrile is recognized.
raised by Senator Roco is again to subject this issue to another plebiscite as part of the provision of
this proposed bill and as will be proposed by the Committee Chairman as an amendment. "Senator Enrile. I object to this committee amendment, Mr. President.
"Thank you very much, Mr. President. "SUSPENSION OF SESSION
"Senator Alvarez. Mr. President, the Constitution does not require that the change from an independent to a "Senator Tatad. May I ask for a one-minute suspension of the session.
component city be subjected to a plebiscite.
"The President. The session is suspended for a few minutes if there is no objection. [There was none]
Sections 10, 11, 12 of Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides as follows:
"It was 7:54 p.m.
Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its
boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government "RESUMPTION OF SESSION
code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly
"At 7:57 p.m., the session was resumed.
affected.
"The President. The session is resumed.
This change from an independent city into a component city is none of those enumerated. So the proposal
coming from the House is in adherence to this constitutional mandate which does not require a plebiscite. "Senator Sotto is recognized.
Senator Sotto. Mr. President, the key word here is conversion. The word conversion appears in that provision "Senator Sotto. Mr. President, after a very enlightening conversation with the elders of the Body, I withdraw
wherein we must call a plebiscite. During the public hearing, the representative of Congressman Abaya my amendment.
was insisting that this is not a conversion; this is merely a reclassification. But it is clear in the bill.
"The President. The amendment is withdrawn.
We are amending a bill that converts, and we are converting it into a component city. That is how the
members of the committee felt. That is why we have proposed an amendment to this, and this is to "Senator Maceda. Mr. President.
incorporate a plebiscite in as much as there is no provision on incorporating a plebiscite. Because we
"The President. Senator Maceda is recognized.
would like not only to give the other people of Santiago a chance or be enfranchised as far as the
leadership of the province is concerned, but also we will give a chance to those who are opposing "Senator Maceda. We wish to thank the sponsor for the withdrawal of the amendment.
it. To them, this is the best compromise. Let the people decide, instead of the political leaders of
Isabela deciding for them. "Mr. President, with due respect to the Senator from Isabela -- I am no great fan of the Senator from
Isabela -- but it so happens that this is a local bill affecting not only his province but his own city
"Senator Tatad. Mr. President. where he is a resident and registered voter.
"The President. The Majority Leader is recognized. "So, unless the issue is really a matter of life and death and of national importance, senatorial courtesy demands
that we, as much as possible, accommodate the request of the Senator from Isabela as we have done on
"Senator Tatad. At this point, Mr. President, I think we can move to close the period of interpellations.
matters affecting the district of other senators. I need not remind them.
"The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the motion is approved.
"Thank you anyway, Mr. President.
"Senator Tatad. I move that we now consider the committee amendments, Mr. President.
"Senator Alvarez. Mr. President.
"The President. Is there any objection? Silence] There being none, the motion is approved.
"The President. Senator Alvarez is recognized.
"Senator Sotto. On page 2, after line 13, insert a new Section 3, as follows:
"Senator Alvarez. Mr. President, may I express my deepest appreciation for the statement of the gentleman
"SEC. 3. SECTION 49 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7720 IS HEREBY AMENDED BY DELETING THE from Ilocos and Laguna. Whatever he may have said, the feeling is not mutual. At least for now, I have
ENTIRE SECTION AND IN ITS STEAD SUBSTITUTE THE FOLLOWING: suddenly become his great fan for the evening.

"SEC. 49. PLEBISCITE. - THE CONVERSION OF THE CITY OF SANTIAGO INTO A COMPONENT "May I put on record, Mr. President, that I campaigned against the cityhood of Santiago not because I do not
CITY OF THE PROVINCE OF ISABELA SHALL TAKE EFFECT UPON THE RATIFICATION OF THIS ACT want it to be a city but because it had disenfranchised the young men of my city from aspiring for the
BY A MAJORITY OF THE PEOPLE OF SAID CITY IN A PLEBISCITE WHICH SHALL BE HELD FOR THE leadership of the province. The town is the gem of the province. How could we extricate the town from the
province?
 "But I would like to thank the gentleman, Mr. President, and also the Chairman of the Committee.
"Senator Tatad. Mr. President.
"The President. The Majority Leader is recognized.
"Senator Tatad. There being no committee amendments, I move that the period of committee amendments be
closed.
"The President. Shall we amend the title of this bill by removing the word independent preceding component
city?
"Senator Sotto. No, Mr. President. We are merely citing the title. The main title of this House Bill No. 8729 is
An Act Amending Certain Sections of Republic Act 7720. The title is the title of Republic Act 7720. So, I
do not think that we should amend that anymore.
"The President. What is the pending motion? Will the gentleman kindly state the motion?
"Senator Tatad. I move that we close the period of committee amendments.
"The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the motion is approved.
"Senator Tatad. Unless there are any individual amendments, I move that we close the period of individual
amendments.
"The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the period of individual amendments is\
closed.
"APPROVAL OF H.B. NO. 8729 ON SECOND READING
"Senator Tatad. Mr. President, I move that we vote on Second Reading on House Bill No. 8729.
"The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, we shall now vote on Second Reading on
House Bill No. 8729.
"As many as are in favor of the bill, say aye.
"Several Members. Aye
As many as are against the bill, say nay. [Silence]
"House Bill No. 8729 is approved on Second Reading."
The debates cannot but raise some quizzical eyebrows on the real purpose for the downgrading of the city of
Santiago. There is all the reason to listen to the voice of the people of the city via a plebiscite.
In the case of Tan, et al. vs. COMELEC,15 BP 885 was enacted partitioning the province of Negros
Occidental without consulting its people in a plebiscite. In his concurring opinion striking down the law as
unconstitutional, Chief Justice Teehankee cited the illicit political purpose behind its enactment, viz:
"The scenario, as petitioners urgently asserted, was to have the creation of the new Province a fait accompli by
the time elections are held on February 7, 1986. The transparent purpose is unmistakably so that the new Governor
and other officials shall by then have been installed in office, ready to function for purposes of the election for
President and Vice-President. Thus, the petitioners reported after the event: With indecent haste, the plebiscite was
held; Negros del Norte was set up and proclaimed by President Marcos as in existence; a new set of government
officials headed by Governor Armando Gustilo was appointed; and, by the time the elections were held on February
7, 1986, the political machinery was in place to deliver the solid North to ex-President Marcos. The rest is
history. What happened in Negros del Norte during the elections - the unashamed use of naked powerand resources -
contributed in no small way to arousing peoples power and steel the ordinary citizen to perform deeds of courage
and patriotism that makes one proud to be a Filipino today.
"The challenged Act is manifestly void and unconstitutional. Consequently, all the implementing acts
complained of, viz. the plebiscite, the proclamation of a new province of Negros del Norte and the appointment of
its officials are equally void. The limited holding of the plebiscite only in the areas of the proposed new province (as
provided by Section 4 of the Act) to the exclusion of the voters of the remaining areas of the integral province of
Negros Occidental (namely, the three cities of Bacolod, Bago and La Carlota and the Municipalities of Las
Castellana, Isabela, Moises Padilla, Pontevedra, Hinigaran, Himamaylan, Kabankalan, Murcia, Valladolid, San
Enrique, Ilog, Cauayan, Hinoba-an and Sipalay and Candoni), grossly contravenes and disregards the mandate of
Article XI, section 3 of the then prevailing 1973 Constitution that no province may be created or divided or its
boundary substantially altered without the approval of a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units
affected. It is plain that all the cities and municipalities of the province of Negros Occidental, not merely those of the
proposed new province, comprise the units affected. It follows that the voters of the whole and entire province of
Negros Occidental have to participate and give their approval in the plebiscite, because the whole province is
affected by its proposed division and substantial alteration of its boundary. To limit the plebiscite to only the voters
of the areas to be partitioned and seceded from the province is as absurd and illogical as allowing only the
secessionists to vote for the secession that they demanded against the wishes of the majority and to nullify the basic
principle of majority rule.
Mr. Justice Mendoza and Mr. Justice Buena also cite two instances when allegedly independent component
cities were downgraded into component cities without need of a plebiscite. They cite the City of Oroquieta,
Misamis Occidental,16 and the City of San Carlos, Pangasinan17 whose charters were amended to allow their people
to vote and be voted upon in the election of officials of the province to which their city belongs without submitting
the amendment to a plebiscite. With due respect, the cities of Oroquieta and San Carlos are not similarly
situated as the city of Santiago. The said two cities then were not independent component cities unlike the city
of Santiago. The two cities were chartered but were not independent component cities for both were not
highly urbanized cities which alone were considered independent cities at that time. Thus, when the case of San
Carlos City was under consideration by the Senate, Senator Pimentel explained:18
"x x x Senator Pimentel. The bill under consideration, Mr. President, merely empowers the voters of San
Carlos to vote in the elections of provincial officials. There is no intention whatsoever to downgrade the status of
the City of San Carlos and there is no showing whatsoever that the enactment of this bill will, in any way, diminish
the powers and prerogatives already enjoyed by the City of San Carlos. In fact, the City of San Carlos as of now, is
a component city. It is not a highly urbanized city. Therefore, this bill merely, as we said earlier, grants the voters
of the city, the power to vote in provincial elections, without in any way changing the character of its being a
component city. It is for this reason that I vote in favor of this bill.
It was Senator Pimentel who also sponsored the bill19 allowing qualified voters of the city of Oroquieta to vote in
provincial elections of the province of Misamis Occidental. In his sponsorship speech, he explained that the right to
vote being given to the people of Oroquieta City was consistent with its status as a component city. 20 Indeed, during
the debates, former Senator Neptali Gonzales pointed out the need to remedy the anomalous situation then
obtaining xxx where voters of one component city can vote in the provincial election while the voters of another
component city cannot vote simply because their charters so provide. 21 Thus, Congress amended other charters of
component cities prohibiting their people from voting in provincial elections.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted. Republic Act No. 8528 is declared unconstitutional and the
writ of prohibition is hereby issued commanding the respondents to desist from implementing said law.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 176951             November 18, 2008
LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) represented by LCP National President JERRY P.
TREÑAS, CITY OF ILOILO represented by MAYOR JERRY P. TREÑAS, CITY OF CALBAYOG
represented by MAYOR MEL SENEN S. SARMIENTO, and JERRY P. TREÑAS in his personal capacity as
taxpayer, petitioners,  CITY OF TARLAC, CITY OF SANTIAGO, CITY OF IRIGA, CITY OF LIGAO, CITY OF LEGAZPI,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; MUNICIPALITY OF BAYBAY, PROVINCE OF LEYTE;
MUNICIPALITY OF BOGO, PROVINCE OF CEBU; MUNICIPALITY OF CATBALOGAN, PROVINCE
OF WESTERN SAMAR; MUNICIPALITY OF TANDAG, PROVINCE OF SURIGAO DEL SUR;
MUNICIPALITY OF BORONGAN, PROVINCE OF EASTERN SAMAR; and MUNICIPALITY OF
TAYABAS, PROVINCE OF QUEZON, respondents.
CITY OF TARLAC, CITY OF SANTIAGO, CITY OF IRIGA, CITY OF LIGAO, CITY OF LEGAZPI,
CITY OF TAGAYTAY, CITY OF SURIGAO, CITY OF BAYAWAN, CITY OF SILAY, CITY OF
GENERAL SANTOS, CITY OF ZAMBOANGA, CITY OF GINGOOG, CITY OF CAUAYAN, CITY OF
PAGADIAN, CITY OF SAN CARLOS, CITY OF SAN FERNANDO, CITY OF TACURONG, CITY OF
TANGUB, CITY OF OROQUIETA, CITY OF URDANETA, CITY OF VICTORIAS, CITY OF CALAPAN,
CITY OF HIMAMAYLAN, CITY OF BATANGAS, CITY OF BAIS, CITY OF CADIZ, and CITY OF
TAGUM, petitioners-in-intervention.
x-----------------------------x
G.R. No. 177499             November 18, 2008
LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) represented by LCP National President JERRY P.
TREÑAS, CITY OF ILOILO represented by MAYOR JERRY P. TREÑAS, CITY OF CALBAYOG
represented by MAYOR MEL SENEN S. SARMIENTO, and JERRY P. TREÑAS in his personal capacity as
taxpayer, petitioners,  During the 11th Congress,3 Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33 municipalities into cities. However,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; MUNICIPALITY OF LAMITAN, PROVINCE OF BASILAN;
MUNICIPALITY OF TABUK, PROVINCE OF KALINGA; MUNICIPALITY OF BAYUGAN, PROVINCE
OF AGUSAN DEL SUR; MUNICIPALITY OF BATAC, PROVINCE OF ILOCOS NORTE;
MUNICIPALITY OF MATI, PROVINCE OF DAVAO ORIENTAL; and MUNICIPALITY OF
GUIHULNGAN, PROVINCE OF NEGROS ORIENTAL, respondents.
CITY OF TARLAC, CITY OF SANTIAGO, CITY OF IRIGA, CITY OF LIGAO, CITY OF LEGAZPI,
CITY OF TAGAYTAY, CITY OF SURIGAO, CITY OF BAYAWAN, CITY OF SILAY, CITY OF
GENERAL SANTOS, CITY OF ZAMBOANGA, CITY OF GINGOOG, CITY OF CAUAYAN, CITY OF
PAGADIAN, CITY OF SAN CARLOS, CITY OF SAN FERNANDO, CITY OF TACURONG, CITY OF
TANGUB, CITY OF OROQUIETA, CITY OF URDANETA, CITY OF VICTORIAS, CITY OF CALAPAN,
CITY OF HIMAMAYLAN, CITY OF BATANGAS, CITY OF BAIS, CITY OF CADIZ, and CITY OF
TAGUM, petitioners-in-intervention.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --x
G.R. No. 178056             November 18, 2008
LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) represented by LCP National President JERRY P.
TREÑAS, CITY OF ILOILO represented by MAYOR JERRY P. TREÑAS, CITY OF CALBAYOG
represented by MAYOR MEL SENEN S. SARMIENTO, and JERRY P. TREÑAS in his personal capacity as
taxpayer, petitioners 
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; MUNICIPALITY OF CABADBARAN, PROVINCE OF AGUSAN DEL
NORTE; MUNICIPALITY OF CARCAR, PROVINCE OF CEBU; and MUNICIPALITY OF EL
SALVADOR, MISAMIS ORIENTAL, respondents.
CITY OF TAGAYTAY, CITY OF SURIGAO, CITY OF BAYAWAN, CITY OF SILAY, CITY OF
GENERAL SANTOS, CITY OF ZAMBOANGA, CITY OF GINGOOG, CITY OF CAUAYAN, CITY OF
PAGADIAN, CITY OF SAN CARLOS, CITY OF SAN FERNANDO, CITY OF TACURONG, CITY OF
TANGUB, CITY OF OROQUIETA, CITY OF URDANETA, CITY OF VICTORIAS, CITY OF CALAPAN,
CITY OF HIMAMAYLAN, CITY OF BATANGAS, CITY OF BAIS, CITY OF CADIZ, and CITY OF
TAGUM, petitioners-in-intervention.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
These are consolidated petitions for prohibition1 with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or
temporary restraining order filed by the League of Cities of the Philippines, City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and
Jerry P. Treñas2 assailing the constitutionality of the subject Cityhood Laws and enjoining the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) and respondent municipalities from conducting plebiscites pursuant to the Cityhood Laws.
The Facts
Congress did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities.
During the 12th Congress,4 Congress enacted into law Republic Act No. 9009 (RA 9009),5 which took effect on 30
June 2001. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the annual income
requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million. The rationale for the
amendment was to restrain, in the words of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, "the mad rush" of municipalities to convert
into cities solely to secure a larger share in the Internal Revenue Allotment despite the fact that they are incapable of
fiscal independence.6
After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the 12th Congress7 adopted Joint Resolution No.
29,8 which sought to exempt from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose
cityhood bills were not approved in the 11th Congress. However, the 12thCongress ended without the Senate
approving Joint Resolution No. 29.
During the 13th Congress,9 the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution No.
1 and forwarded it to the Senate for approval. However, the Senate again failed to approve the Joint Resolution.
Following the advice of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, 16 municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors,
individual cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood bills contained a common provision exempting all the 16 municipalities
from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009.
On 22 December 2006, the House of Representatives approved the cityhood bills. The Senate also approved the
cityhood bills in February 2007, except that of Naga, Cebu which was passed on 7 June 2007. The cityhood bills
lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws10) on various dates from March to July 2007 without the President's signature.11
The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether the voters in each respondent
municipality approve of the conversion of their municipality into a city.
Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of Section 10,
Article X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal protection clause. 12Petitioners also lament that the
wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities will reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue
Allotment because more cities will share the same amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under Section
285 of the Local Government Code.13
The Issues
The petitions raise the following fundamental issues:
1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution; and
2. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.
The Ruling of the Court
We grant the petitions.
The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the Constitution, and are thus unconstitutional.
First, applying the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 to the present case is a prospective, not a
retroactive application, because RA 9009 took effect in 2001 while the cityhood bills became law more than five
years later.
Second, the Constitution requires that Congress shall prescribe all the criteria for the creation of a city in the Local
Government Code and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws.
Third, the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution because they prevent a fair and just
distribution of the national taxes to local government units.
Fourth, the criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, for
converting a municipality into a city are clear, plain and unambiguous, needing no resort to any statutory
construction.
Fifth, the intent of members of the 11th Congress to exempt certain municipalities from the coverage of RA 9009
remained an intent and was never written into Section 450 of the Local Government Code.
Sixth, the deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills or resolutions are not extrinsic aids in
interpreting a law passed in the 13th Congress.
Seventh, even if the exemption in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of the Local Government Code,
the exemption would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause.
Preliminary Matters
Prohibition is the proper action for testing the constitutionality of laws administered by the COMELEC, 14 like the
Cityhood Laws, which direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites in implementation of the Cityhood Laws. Petitioner
League of Cities of the Philippines has legal standing because Section 499 of the Local Government Code tasks the
League with the "primary purpose of ventilating, articulating and crystallizing issues affecting city government
administration and securing, through proper and legal means, solutions thereto." 15 Petitioners-in-
intervention,16 which are existing cities, have legal standing because their Internal Revenue Allotment will be
reduced if the Cityhood Laws are declared constitutional. Mayor Jerry P. Treñas has legal standing because as
Mayor of Iloilo City and as a taxpayer he has sufficient interest to prevent the unlawful expenditure of public funds,
like the release of more Internal Revenue Allotment to political units than what the law allows.
Applying RA 9009 is a Prospective Application of the Law
RA 9009 became effective on 30 June 2001 during the 11th Congress. This law specifically amended Section 450 of
the Local Government Code, which now provides:
Section 450. Requisites for Creation. – (a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into
a component city if it has a locally generated average annual income, as certified by the Department of
Finance, of at least One hundred million pesos (P100,000,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive
years based on 2000 constant prices, and if it has either of the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100) square kilometers, as certified by the Land
Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than one hundred fifty thousand (150,000) inhabitants, as certified by
the National Statistics Office.
The creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population and income of the original unit or units at
the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed herein.
(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly identified by metes and bounds.
The requirement on land area shall not apply where the city proposed to be created is composed of one (1)
or more islands. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands.
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special
funds, transfers, and non-recurring income. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, RA 9009 increased the income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million
to P100 million. Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, does not provide any
exemption from the increased income requirement.
Prior to the enactment of RA 9009, a total of 57 municipalities had cityhood bills pending in Congress. Thirty-three
cityhood bills became law before the enactment of RA 9009. Congress did not act on 24 cityhood bills during the
11th Congress.
During the 12th Congress, the House of Representatives adopted Joint Resolution No. 29, exempting from the
income requirement of P100 million in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not acted upon
during the 11th Congress. This Resolution reached the Senate. However, the 12th Congress adjourned without the
Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29.
During the 13th Congress, 16 of the 24 municipalities mentioned in the unapproved Joint Resolution No. 29 filed
between November and December of 2006, through their respective sponsors in Congress, individual cityhood bills
containing a common provision, as follows:
Exemption from Republic Act No. 9009. - The City of x x x shall be exempted from the income
requirement prescribed under Republic Act No. 9009.
This common provision exempted each of the 16 municipalities from the income requirement of P100 million
prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009. These cityhood bills lapsed
into law on various dates from March to July 2007 after President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo failed to sign them.
Indisputably, Congress passed the Cityhood Laws long after the effectivity of RA 9009. RA 9009 became effective
on 30 June 2001 or during the 11th Congress. The 13th Congress passed in December 2006 the cityhood bills
which became law only in 2007. Thus, respondent municipalities cannot invoke the principle of non-retroactivity of
laws.17 This basic rule has no application because RA 9009, an earlier law to the Cityhood Laws, is not being applied
retroactively but prospectively.
Congress Must Prescribe in the Local Government Code All Criteria
Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides:
No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary
substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government
code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly
affected. (Emphasis supplied)
The Constitution is clear. The creation of local government units must follow the criteria established in the Local
Government Code and not in any other law. There is only one Local Government Code. 18 The Constitution requires
Congress to stipulate in the Local Government Code all the criteria necessary for the creation of a city, including the
conversion of a municipality into a city. Congress cannot write such criteria in any other law, like the Cityhood
Laws.
The criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code govern exclusively the creation of a city. No other law, not
even the charter of the city, can govern such creation. The clear intent of the Constitution is to insure that the
creation of cities and other political units must follow the same uniform, non-discriminatory criteria found solely
in the Local Government Code. Any derogation or deviation from the criteria prescribed in the Local Government
Code violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.
RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code to increase the income requirement from P20 million
to P100 million for the creation of a city. This took effect on 30 June 2001. Hence, from that moment the Local
Government Code required that any municipality desiring to become a city must satisfy the P100 million
income requirement. Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, does not contain any
exemption from this income requirement.
In enacting RA 9009, Congress did not grant any exemption to respondent municipalities, even though their
cityhood bills were pending in Congress when Congress passed RA 9009. The Cityhood Laws, all enacted after the
effectivity of RA 9009, explicitly exempt respondent municipalities from the increased income requirement in
Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009. Such exemption clearly violates Section 10,
Article X of the Constitution and is thus patently unconstitutional. To be valid, such exemption must be
written in the Local Government Code and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws.
Cityhood Laws Violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution
Uniform and non-discriminatory criteria as prescribed in the Local Government Code are essential to implement a
fair and equitable distribution of national taxes to all local government units. Section 6, Article X of the Constitution
provides:
Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the national taxes which shall be
automatically released to them. (Emphasis supplied)
If the criteria in creating local government units are not uniform and discriminatory, there can be no fair and just
distribution of the national taxes to local government units.
A city with an annual income of only P20 million, all other criteria being equal, should not receive the same share in
national taxes as a city with an annual income of P100 million or more. The criteria of land area, population and
income, as prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, must be strictly followed because such criteria,
prescribed by law, are material in determining the "just share" of local government units in national taxes. Since the
Cityhood Laws do not follow the income criterion in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, they prevent the
fair and just distribution of the Internal Revenue Allotment in violation of Section 6, Article X of the Constitution.
Section 450 of the Local Government Code is Clear, 
Plain and Unambiguous
There can be no resort to extrinsic aids – like deliberations of Congress – if the language of the law is plain, clear
and unambiguous. Courts determine the intent of the law from the literal language of the law, within the law's four
corners.19 If the language of the law is plain, clear and unambiguous, courts simply apply the law according to its
express terms. If a literal application of the law results in absurdity, impossibility or injustice, then courts may resort
to extrinsic aids of statutory construction like the legislative history of the law.20
Congress, in enacting RA 9009 to amend Section 450 of the Local Government Code, did not provide any
exemption from the increased income requirement, not even to respondent municipalities whose cityhood bills were
then pending when Congress passed RA 9009. Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA
9009, contains no exemption whatsoever. Since the law is clear, plain and unambiguous that any municipality
desiring to convert into a city must meet the increased income requirement, there is no reason to go beyond the letter
of the law in applying Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009.
The 11th Congress' Intent was not Written into the Local Government Code
True, members of Congress discussed exempting respondent municipalities from RA 9009, as shown by the various
deliberations on the matter during the 11th Congress. However, Congress did not write this intended exemption into
law. Congress could have easily included such exemption in RA 9009 but Congress did not. This is fatal to the cause
of respondent municipalities because such exemption must appear in RA 9009 as an amendment to Section 450 of
the Local Government Code. The Constitution requires that the criteria for the conversion of a municipality into a
city, including any exemption from such criteria, must all be written in the Local Government Code. Congress
cannot prescribe such criteria or exemption from such criteria in any other law. In short, Congress cannot create a
city through a law that does not comply with the criteria or exemption found in the Local Government Code.
Section 10 of Article X is similar to Section 16, Article XII of the Constitution prohibiting Congress from creating
private corporations except by a general law. Section 16 of Article XII provides:
The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation, organization, or regulation
of private corporations. Government-owned or controlled corporations may be created or established by
special charters in the interest of the common good and subject to the test of economic viability.
(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, Congress must prescribe all the criteria for the "formation, organization, or regulation" of private corporations
in a general law applicable to all without discrimination.21 Congress cannot create a private corporation through a
special law or charter.
Deliberations of the 11th Congress on Unapproved Bills Inapplicable
Congress is not a continuing body.22 The unapproved cityhood bills filed during the 11th Congress became mere
scraps of paper upon the adjournment of the 11 th Congress. All the hearings and deliberations conducted during the
11th Congress on unapproved bills also became worthless upon the adjournment of the 11th Congress. These
hearings and deliberations cannot be used to interpret bills enacted into law in the 13 th or subsequent
Congresses.
The members and officers of each Congress are different. All unapproved bills filed in one Congress become functus
officio upon adjournment of that Congress and must be re-filed anew in order to be taken up in the next Congress.
When their respective authors re-filed the cityhood bills in 2006 during the 13th Congress, the bills had to start from
square one again, going through the legislative mill just like bills taken up for the first time, from the filing to the
approval. Section 123, Rule XLIV of the Rules of the Senate, on Unfinished Business, provides:
Sec. 123. x x x
All pending matters and proceedings shall terminate upon the expiration of one (1) Congress, but
may be taken by the succeeding Congress as if presented for the first time. (Emphasis supplied)
Similarly, Section 78 of the Rules of the House of Representatives, on Unfinished Business, states:
Section 78. Calendar of Business. The Calendar of Business shall consist of the following:
a. Unfinished Business. This is business being considered by the House at the time of its last
adjournment. Its consideration shall be resumed until it is disposed of. The Unfinished Business
at the end of a session shall be resumed at the commencement of the next session as if no
adjournment has taken place. At the end of the term of a Congress, all Unfinished Business
are deemed terminated. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the deliberations during the 11th Congress on the unapproved cityhood bills, as well as the deliberations during
the 12th and 13th Congresses on the unapproved resolution exempting from RA 9009 certain municipalities, have no
legal significance. They do not qualify as extrinsic aids in construing laws passed by subsequent Congresses.
Applicability of Equal Protection Clause
If Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, contained an exemption to the P100 million
annual income requirement, the criteria for such exemption could be scrutinized for possible violation of the equal
protection clause. Thus, the criteria for the exemption, if found in the Local Government Code, could be assailed on
the ground of absence of a valid classification. However, Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended
by RA 9009, does not contain any exemption. The exemption is contained in the Cityhood Laws, which are
unconstitutional because such exemption must be prescribed in the Local Government Code as mandated in Section
10, Article X of the Constitution.
Even if the exemption provision in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of the Local Government Code,
as amended by RA 9009, such exemption would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause.
The exemption provision merely states, "Exemption from Republic Act No. 9009 ─ The City of x x x shall be
exempted from the income requirement prescribed under Republic Act No. 9009." This one sentence
exemption provision contains no classification standards or guidelines differentiating the exempted municipalities
from those that are not exempted.
Even if we take into account the deliberations in the 11 th Congress that municipalities with pending cityhood bills
should be exempt from the P100 million income requirement, there is still no valid classification to satisfy the equal
protection clause. The exemption will be based solely on the fact that the 16 municipalities had cityhood bills
pending in the 11th Congress when RA 9009 was enacted. This is not a valid classification between those entitled
and those not entitled to exemption from the P100 million income requirement.
To be valid, the classification in the present case must be based on substantial distinctions, rationally related to a
legitimate government objective which is the purpose of the law, 23 not limited to existing conditions only, and
applicable to all similarly situated. Thus, this Court has ruled:
The equal protection clause of the 1987 Constitution permits a valid classification under the following
conditions:
1. The classification must rest on substantial distinctions;
2. The classification must be germane to the purpose of the law;
3. The classification must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
4. The classification must apply equally to all members of the same class.24
There is no substantial distinction between municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11 thCongress and
municipalities that did not have pending bills. The mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress is not a
material difference to distinguish one municipality from another for the purpose of the income requirement. The
pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress does not affect or determine the level of income of a municipality.
Municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress might even have lower annual income than
municipalities that did not have pending cityhood bills. In short, the classification criterion − mere pendency of a
cityhood bill in the 11th Congress − is not rationally related to the purpose of the law which is to prevent fiscally
non-viable municipalities from converting into cities.
Municipalities that did not have pending cityhood bills were not informed that a pending cityhood bill in the
11th Congress would be a condition for exemption from the increased P100 million income requirement. Had they
been informed, many municipalities would have caused the filing of their own cityhood bills. These municipalities,
even if they have bigger annual income than the 16 respondent municipalities, cannot now convert into cities if their
income is less than P100 million.
The fact of pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11 th Congress limits the exemption to a specific condition existing at
the time of passage of RA 9009. That specific condition will never happen again. This violates the requirement that a
valid classification must not be limited to existing conditions only. This requirement is illustrated in Mayflower
Farms, Inc. v. Ten Eyck,25 where the challenged law allowed milk dealers engaged in business prior to a fixed date to
sell at a price lower than that allowed to newcomers in the same business. In Mayflower, the U.S. Supreme Court
held:

We are referred to a host of decisions to the effect that a regulatory law may be prospective in operation
and may except from its sweep those presently engaged in the calling or activity to which it is directed.
Examples are statutes licensing physicians and dentists, which apply only to those entering the profession
subsequent to the passage of the act and exempt those then in practice, or zoning laws which exempt
existing buildings, or laws forbidding slaughterhouses within certain areas, but excepting existing
establishments. The challenged provision is unlike such laws, since, on its face, it is not a regulation of
a business or an activity in the interest of, or for the protection of, the public, but an attempt to give
an economic advantage to those engaged in a given business at an arbitrary date as against all those
who enter the industry after that date. The appellees do not intimate that the classification bears any
relation to the public health or welfare generally; that the provision will discourage monopoly; or that it
was aimed at any abuse, cognizable by law, in the milk business. In the absence of any such showing, we
have no right to conjure up possible situations which might justify the discrimination. The classification is
arbitrary and unreasonable and denies the appellant the equal protection of the law. (Emphasis supplied)

In the same vein, the exemption provision in the Cityhood Laws gives the 16 municipalities a unique advantage
based on an arbitrary date − the filing of their cityhood bills before the end of the 11 thCongress - as against all other
municipalities that want to convert into cities after the effectivity of RA 9009.

Furthermore, limiting the exemption only to the 16 municipalities violates the requirement that the classification
must apply to all similarly situated. Municipalities with the same income as the 16 respondent municipalities cannot
convert into cities, while the 16 respondent municipalities can. Clearly, as worded the exemption provision found in
the Cityhood Laws, even if it were written in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, would still be
unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petitions and declare UNCONSTITUTIONAL the Cityhood Laws, namely:

Republic Act Nos. 9389, 9390, 9391, 9392, 9393, 9394, 9398, 9404, 9405, 9407, 9408, 9409, 9434, 9435, 9436, and
9491. SO ORDERED. 
  - versus -  
LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE   G.R. No. 176951    
PHILIPPINES (LCP), represented by LCP National     COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; MUNICIPALITY  
President Jerry P. Treas; CITY OF CALBAYOG,     OF CABADBARAN, PROVINCE OF AGUSAN DEL  
represented by Mayor Mel Senen S. Sarmiento;   NORTE; MUNICIPALITY OF CARCAR,  
and JERRY P. TREAS, in his personal capacity as   PROVINCE OF CEBU; MUNICIPALITY OF EL  
Taxpayer,   SALVADOR, PROVINCE OF MISAMIS  
Petitioners,   ORIENTAL; MUNICIPALITY OF NAGA, G.R. No. 178056
    CEBU; and DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND  
- versus -   MANAGEMENT, Present:
    Respondents.  
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; MUNICIPALITY     CORONA, C.J.,
OF BAYBAY, PROVINCE OF LEYTE;   CARPIO,
MUNICIPALITY OF BOGO, PROVINCE OF   CARPIO MORALES,
CEBU; MUNICIPALITY OF CATBALOGAN,   VELASCO, JR.,
PROVINCE OF WESTERN SAMAR;   NACHURA,
MUNICIPALITY OF TANDAG, PROVINCE OF   LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
SURIGAO DEL SUR; MUNICIPALITY OF   BRION,
BORONGAN, PROVINCE OF EASTERN SAMAR;   PERALTA, and
AND MUNICIPALITY OF TAYABAS, PROVINCE   BERSAMIN,
OF QUEZON,   DEL CASTILLO,
Respondents.   ABAD,
x----------------------x   VILLARAMA, JR.,
LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE   PEREZ,
PHILIPPINES (LCP), represented by LCP National   MENDOZA, and
President Jerry P. Treas; CITY OF CALBAYOG,   SERENO, JJ.
represented by Mayor Mel Senen S. Sarmiento;    
and JERRY P. TREAS, in his personal capacity as   Promulgated:
Taxpayer,    
Petitioners,   April 12, 2011
  G.R. No. 177499  
       versus  
    x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; MUNICIPALITY    
OF LAMITAN, PROVINCE OF BASILAN;    
MUNICIPALITY OF TABUK, PROVINCE OF   RESOLUTION
KALINGA; MUNICIPALITY OF BAYUGAN,    
PROVINCE OF AGUSAN DEL SUR;   BERSAMIN, J.:
MUNICIPALITY OF BATAC, PROVINCE OF    
ILOCOS NORTE; MUNICIPALITY OF MATI,    
PROVINCE OF DAVAO ORIENTAL; AND  
MUNICIPALITY OF GUIHULNGAN, PROVINCE We consider and resolve the Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration filed by the petitioners vis--vis the
 
OF NEGROS ORIENTAL,   Resolution promulgated on February 15, 2011.
Respondents.  
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x    
LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE  
PHILIPPINES (LCP), represented by LCP National   To recall, the Resolution promulgated on February 15, 2011 granted the Motion for Reconsideration of the
President Jerry P. Treas; CITY OF CALBAYOG,  
represented by Mayor Mel Senen S. Sarmiento; respondents presented against the Resolution dated August 24, 2010, reversed the Resolution dated August 24, 2010,
 
and JERRY P. TREAS, in his personal capacity as   and declared the 16 Cityhood Laws Republic Acts Nos. 9389, 9390, 9391, 9392, 9393, 9394, 9398, 9404, 9405,
Taxpayer,  
Petitioners,   9407, 9408, 9409, 9434, 9435, 9436, and 9491 constitutional.
   
  
Now, the petitioners anchor their Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration upon the primordial ground
that the Court could no longer modify, alter, or amend its judgment declaring the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional
due to such judgment having long become final and executory. They submit that the Cityhood Laws violated Section
6 and Section 10 of Article X of the Constitution, as well as the Equal Protection Clause.
The petitioners specifically ascribe to the Court the following errors in its promulgation of the
assailed February 15, 2011 Resolution, to wit:
 
I.       THE HONORABLE COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION TO PROMULGATE THE
RESOLUTION OF 15 FEBRUARY 2011 BECAUSE THERE IS NO LONGER ANY
ACTUAL CASE OR CONTROVERSY TO SETTLE.
II.    THE RESOLUTION CONTRAVENES THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
AND RELEVANT SUPREME COURT ISSUANCES.
 
III. THE RESOLUTION UNDERMINES THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM IN ITS DISREGARD OF
THE PRINCIPLES OF RES JUDICATA AND THE DOCTRINE OF IMMUTABILITY
OF FINAL JUDGMENTS.
 
IV. THE RESOLUTION ERRONEOUSLY RULED THAT THE SIXTEEN (16) CITYHOOD
BILLS DO NOT VIOLATE ARTICLE X, SECTIONS 6 AND 10 OF THE 1987
CONSTITUTION.
V.    THE SIXTEEN (16) CITYHOOD LAWS VIOLATE THE EQUAL PROTECTION
CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION AND THE RIGHT OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
TO A JUST SHARE IN THE NATIONAL TAXES.
 
Ruling
 
Upon thorough consideration, we deny the Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration for its lack of merit.
I.
Procedural Issues
With respect to the first, second, and third assignments of errors, supra, it appears that the petitioners assail the
jurisdiction of the Court in promulgating the February 15, 2011Resolution, claiming that the decision herein had
long become final and executory. They state that the Court thereby violated rules of procedure, and the principles
of res judicataand immutability of final judgments.
 
The petitioners posit that the controversy on the Cityhood Laws ended with the April 28, 2009 Resolution denying
the respondents second motion for reconsideration vis--vis the November 18, 2008 Decision for being a prohibited
pleading, and in view of the issuance of the entry of judgment on May 21, 2009.
 
The Court disagrees with the petitioners.
In the April 28, 2009 Resolution, the Court ruled:
 
By a vote of 6-6, the Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of 31 March 2009 is
DENIED for lack of merit. The motion is denied since there is no majority that voted to overturn
the Resolution of 31 March 2009.
 
The Second Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision of 18 November 2008 is
DENIED for being a prohibited pleading, and the Motion for Leave to Admit Attached Petition
in Intervention dated 20 April 2009 and the Petition in Intervention dated 20 April 2009 filed by
counsel for Ludivina T. Mas, et al. are also DENIED in view of the denial of the second motion
for reconsideration. No further pleadings shall be entertained. Let entry of judgment be made in
due course.
 
Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. wrote a Dissenting Opinion, joined by Justices Consuelo
Ynares-Santiago, Renato C. Corona, Minita Chico-Nazario, Teresita Leonardo-De Castro, and
Lucas P. Bersamin. Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno and Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura took
no part. Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing is on leave.[1]
 
Within 15 days from receipt of the April 28, 2009 Resolution, the respondents filed a Motion To Amend
Resolution Of April 28, 2009 By Declaring Instead That Respondents Motion for Reconsideration Of the Resolution
Of March 31, 2009 And Motion For Leave To File, And To Admit Attached Second Motion For Reconsideration Of
The Decision Dated November 18, 2008 Remain Unresolved And To Conduct Further Proceedings Thereon, arguing
therein that a determination of the issue of constitutionality of the 16 Cityhood Laws upon a motion for
reconsideration by an equally divided vote was not binding on the Court as a valid precedent, citing the separate
opinion of then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno in Lambino v. Commission on Elections.[2]
Thus, in its June 2, 2009 Resolution, the Court issued the following clarification of the April 28,
2009 Resolution, viz:
 
As a rule, a second motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading pursuant to
Section 2, Rule 52 of the Rules of Civil Procedure which provides that: No second motion for
reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution by the same party shall be entertained. Thus, a
 decision becomes final and executory after 15 days from receipt of the denial of the first motion
for reconsideration.
However, when a motion for leave to file and admit a second motion for
reconsideration is granted by the Court, the Court therefore allows the filing of the second
motion for reconsideration. In such a case, the second motion for reconsideration is no
longer a prohibited pleading.
In the present case, the Court voted on the second motion for reconsideration filed
by respondent cities. In effect, the Court allowed the filing of the second motion for
reconsideration. Thus, the second motion for reconsideration was no longer a prohibited
pleading. However, for lack of the required number of votes to overturn the 18 November
2008 Decision and 31 March 2009 Resolution, the Court denied the second motion for
reconsideration in its 28 April 2009 Resolution.[3]
 
As the result of the aforecited clarification, the Court resolved to expunge from the records several
pleadings and documents, including respondents Motion To Amend Resolution Of April 28, 2009 etc.
 
The respondents thus filed their Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of June 2, 2009,
asseverating that their Motion To Amend Resolution Of April 28, 2009 etc.was not another motion for
reconsideration of the November 18, 2008 Decision, because it assailed the April 28, 2009 Resolution with respect
to the tie-vote on the respondents Second Motion For Reconsideration. They pointed out that the Motion To Amend
Resolution Of April 28, 2009 etc. was filed on May 14, 2009, which was within the 15-day period from their receipt
of the April 28, 2009 Resolution; thus, the entry of judgment had been prematurely made. They reiterated their
arguments with respect to a tie-vote upon an issue of constitutionality.
In the September 29, 2009 Resolution,[4] the Court required the petitioners to comment on the Motion for
Reconsideration of the Resolution of June 2, 2009 within 10 days from receipt.
As directed, the petitioners filed their Comment Ad Cautelam With Motion to Expunge.
The respondents filed their Motion for Leave to File and to Admit Attached Reply to Petitioners Comment
Ad Cautelam With Motion to Expunge, together with the Reply.
On November 17, 2009, the Court resolved to note the petitioners Comment Ad Cautelam With Motion to
Expunge, to grant the respondents Motion for Leave to File and Admit Reply to Petitioners Comment Ad Cautelam
with Motion to Expunge, and to note the respondents Reply to Petitioners Comment Ad Cautelam with Motion to
Expunge.
 
On December 21, 2009, the Court, resolving the Motion To Amend Resolution Of April 28, 2009 etc. and
voting anew on the Second Motion For Reconsideration in order to reach a concurrence of a majority, promulgated
its Decision granting the motion and declaring the Cityhood Laws as constitutional,[5] disposing thus:
 
WHEREFORE, respondent LGUs Motion for Reconsideration dated June 2, 2009, their
Motion to Amend the Resolution of April 28, 2009 by Declaring Instead that
Respondents Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of March 31, 2009 and Motion for
Leave to File and to Admit Attached Second Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision Dated
November 18, 2008 Remain Unresolved and to Conduct Further Proceedings, dated May 14,
2009, and their second Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision dated November 18, 2008
are GRANTED. The June 2, 2009, the March 31, 2009, and April 31, 2009 Resolutions
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The entry of judgment made on May 21, 2009 must
accordingly be RECALLED.
The instant consolidated petitions and petitions-in-intervention are DISMISSED. The
cityhood laws, namely Republic Act Nos. 9389, 9390, 9391, 9392, 9393, 9394, 9398, 9404,
9405, 9407, 9408, 9409, 9434, 9435, 9436, and 9491 are
declared VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL.
SO ORDERED.
On January 5, 2010, the petitioners filed an Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration against
the December 21, 2009 Decision.[6] On the same date, the petitioners also filed a Motion to Annul Decision of 21
December 2009.[7]
On January 12, 2010, the Court directed the respondents to comment on the motions of the petitioners.[8]
On February 4, 2010, petitioner-intervenors City of Santiago, City of Legazpi, and City of Iriga filed their
separate Manifestations with Supplemental Ad Cautelam Motions for Reconsideration.[9] Similar manifestations with
supplemental motions for reconsideration were filed by other petitioner-intervenors, specifically: City
of Cadiz on February 15, 2010;[10] City of Batangas on February 17, 2010;[11] and City of Oroquieta on February 24,
2010.[12] The Court required the adverse parties to comment on the motions.[13] As directed, the respondents
complied.
 On August 24, 2010, the Court issued its Resolution reinstating the November 18, 2008 Decision.[14] for Reconsideration and ended up with the promulgation of the December 21, 2009 Decision (declaring the

  Cityhood Laws valid and constitutional).

On September 14, 2010, the respondents timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution Dated August  
[15]
24, 2010.  They followed this by filing on September 20, 2010 a Motion to Set Motion for Reconsideration of the It is also inaccurate for the petitioners to insist that the December 21, 2009 Decision overturned the November 18,

Resolution dated August 24, 2010 for Hearing.[16] On November 19, 2010, the petitioners sent in their Opposition 2008 Decision on the basis of the mere Reflections of the Members of the Court. To be sure, the Reflections were the
[17] [18]
[To the Motion for Reconsideration of Resolution dated August 24, 2010].  On November 30, 2010,  the Court legal opinions of the Members and formed part of the deliberations of the Court. The reference in the December 21,

noted, among others, the petitioners Opposition. 2009 Decision to the Reflections pointed out that there was still a pending incident after the April 28, 2009

  Resolution that had been timely filed within 15 days from its receipt, [20] pursuant to Section 10, Rule 51,

On January 18, 2011,[19] the Court denied the respondents Motion to Set Motion for Reconsideration of the [21]
 in relation to Section 1, Rule 52,[22] of the Rules of Court. Again, the Court did act and deliberate upon this

Resolution dated August 24, 2010 for Hearing. pending incident, leading to the issuance of the December 21, 2009 Decision (declaring the Cityhood Laws free

  from constitutional infirmity). It was thereafter that the Court rendered its August 24, 2010Resolution (reinstating

Thereafter, on February 15, 2011, the Court issued the Resolution being now challenged. the November 18, 2008 Decision), to correct which the respondents Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution

  Dated August 24, 2010 was filed. And, finally, the Court issued its February 15, 2011 Resolution, reversing and

It can be gleaned from the foregoing that, as the June 2, 2009 Resolution clarified, the respondents Second Motion setting aside the August 24, 2010 Resolution.

For Reconsideration was not a prohibited pleading in view of the Courts voting and acting on it having the effect  

of allowing the Second Motion For Reconsideration; and that when the respondents filed their Motion for It is worth repeating that the actions taken herein were made by the Court en banc strictly in accordance with

Reconsideration of the Resolution of June 2, 2009 questioning the expunging of their Motion To Amend Resolution the Rules of Court and its internal procedures. There has been no irregularity attending or tainting the proceedings.

Of April 28, 2009 etc. (which had been filed within the 15-day period from receipt of the April 28, 2009 Resolution),  

the Court opted to act on the Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of June 2, 2009 by directing the adverse It also relevant to state that the Court has frequently disencumbered itself under extraordinary circumstances from

parties through its September 29, 2009 Resolution to comment. The same permitting effect occurred when the Court, the shackles of technicality in order to render just and equitable relief.[23]

by its November 17, 2009 Resolution, granted the respondents Motion for Leave to File and Admit Reply to  

Petitioners Comment Ad Cautelam with Motion to Expunge, and noted the attached Reply. On whether the principle of immutability of judgments and bar by res judicata apply herein, suffice it to

  state that the succession of the events recounted herein indicates that the controversy about the 16 Cityhood Laws

Moreover, by issuing the Resolutions dated September 29, 2009 and November 17, 2009, the Court: (a) has not yet been resolved with finality. As such, the operation of the principle of immutability of judgments did not

rendered ineffective the tie-vote under the Resolution of April 28, 2009 and the ensuing denial of the Motion for yet come into play. For the same reason is an adherence to the doctrine of res judicata not yet warranted, especially

Reconsideration of the Resolution of March 31, 2009 for lack of a majority to overturn; (b), re-opened the Decision considering that the precedential ruling for this case needed to be revisited and set with certainty and finality.

of November 18, 2008 for a second look under reconsideration; and (c) lifted the directive that no further pleadings  
II.
would be entertained. The Court in fact entertained and acted on the respondents Motion for Reconsideration of the Substantive Issues
Resolution of June 2, 2009. Thereafter, the Court proceeded to deliberate anew on the respondents Second Motion

The petitioners reiterate their position that the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6 and Section 10 of Article
X of the Constitution, the Equal Protection Clause, and the right of local governments to a just share in the national
taxes.
 
The Court differs.
Congress clearly intended that the local government units covered by the Cityhood Laws be exempted
from the coverage of R.A. No. 9009. The apprehensions of the then Senate President with respect to the considerable
disparity between the income requirement of P20 million under the Local Government Code (LGC) prior to its
amendment, and the P100 million under the amendment introduced by R.A. No. 9009 were definitively articulated
in his interpellation of Senator Pimentel during the deliberations on Senate Bill No. 2157. The then Senate President
was cognizant of the fact that there were municipalities that then had pending conversion bills
during the 11th Congress prior to the adoption of Senate Bill No. 2157 as R.A. No. 9009, [24] including the
municipalities covered by the Cityhood Laws. It is worthy of mention that the pertinent deliberations on Senate Bill
No. 2157 occurred on October 5, 2000 while the 11th Congress was in session, and the conversion bills were then
pending in the Senate. Thus, the responses of Senator Pimentel made it obvious that R.A. No. 9009 would not apply
to the conversion bills then pending deliberation in the Senate during the 11th Congress.
 
R.A. No. 9009 took effect on June 30, 2001, when the 12th Congress was incipient. By reason of the clear
legislative intent to exempt the municipalities covered by theconversion bills pending during the 11th
Congress, the House of Representatives adopted Joint Resolution No. 29, entitled Joint Resolution to Exempt
Certain Municipalities Embodied in Bills Filed in Congress before June 30, 2001 from the coverage of Republic Act
No. 9009. However, the Senate failed to act on Joint Resolution No. 29. Even so, the House of Representatives
readopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as
Joint Resolution No. 1 during the 12th Congress,[25] and forwarded Joint Resolution No. 1 to the Senate for
approval. Again, the Senate failed to approve Joint Resolution No. 1.
 
At this juncture, it is worthwhile to consider the manifestation of Senator Pimentel with respect to Joint
Resolution No. 1, to wit:
MANIFESTATION OF SENATOR PIMENTEL
House Joint Resolution No. 1 seeks to exempt certain municipalities seeking conversion into
cities from the requirement that they must have at least P100 million in income of locally
generated revenue, exclusive of the internal revenue share that they received from the central
government as required under Republic Act No. 9009.
The procedure followed by the House is questionable, to say the least. The House wants the
Senate to do away with the income requirement of P100 million so that, en masse, the
municipalities they want exempted could now file bills specifically converting them into
cities. The reason they want the Senate to do it first is that Cong. Dodo Macias, chair of the
House Committee on Local Governments, I am told, will not entertain any bill for the
conversion of municipalities into cities unless the issue of income requirement is first
hurdled. The House leadership therefore wants to shift the burden of exempting certain
municipalities from the income requirement to the Senate rather than do it itself.
 
That is most unusual because, in effect, the House wants the Senate to pass a blanket resolution
that would qualify the municipalities concerned for conversion into cities on the matter of
income alone. Then, at a later date, the House would pass specific bills converting the
municipalities into cities. However, income is not only the requirement for municipalities to
become cities. There are also the requirements on population and land area.
In effect, the House wants the Senate to tackle the qualification of the municipalities they want
converted into cities piecemeal and separately, first is the income under the joint resolution, then
the other requirements when the bills are file to convert specific municipalities into cities. To
repeat, this is a most unusual manner of creating cities.
 
My respectful suggestion is for the Senate to request the House to do what they want to do
regarding the applications of certain municipalities to become cities pursuant to the requirements
of the Local Government Code. If the House wants to exempt certain municipalities from the
requirements of the Local Government Code to become cities, by all means, let them do their
thing.Specifically, they should act on specific bills to create cities and cite the reasons why the
municipalities concerned are qualified to become cities. Only after the House shall have
completed what they are expected to do under the law would it be proper for the Senate to act on
specific bills creating cities.
In other words, the House should be requested to finish everything that needs to be done in the
matter of converting municipalities into cities and not do it piecemeal as they are now trying to
do under the joint resolution.
In my long years in the Senate, this is the first time that a resort to this subterfuge is being
undertaken to favor the creation of certain cities. I am not saying that they are not qualified.
All I am saying is, if the House wants to pass and create cities out of certain municipalities,
by all means let them do that. But they should do it following the requirements of the Local
Government Code and, if they want to make certain exceptions, they can also do that
too. But they should not use the Senate as a ploy to get things done which they themselves
should do.
Incidentally, I have recommended this mode of action verbally to some leaders of the
House. Had they followed the recommendation, for all I know, the municipalities they had
envisioned to be covered by House Joint Resolution No. 1 would, by now if not all, at least some
have been converted into cities. House Joint Resolution No. 1, the House, in effect, caused the
delay in the approval in the applications for cityhood of the municipalities concerned.
Lastly, I do not have an amendment to House Joint Resolution No. 1. What I am suggesting is
for the Senate to request the House to follow the procedure outlined in the Local Government
Code which has been respected all through the years. By doing so, we uphold the rule of law
 and minimize the possibilities of power play in the approval of bills converting municipalities
into cities.[26]
 
Thereafter, the conversion bills of the respondents were individually
filed in the House of Representatives, and were all unanimously and
 
favorably voted upon by the Members of the House of Representatives. [27] The bills, when forwarded to the Senate,
were likewise unanimously approved by the Senate.[28] The acts of both Chambers of Congress show that the
exemption clauses ultimately incorporated in the Cityhood Laws are but the express articulations of the clear
legislative intent to exempt the respondents, without exception, from the coverage of R.A. No. 9009. Thereby, R.A.
No. 9009, and, by necessity, the LGC, were amended, not by repeal but by way of the express exemptions being
embodied in the exemption clauses.
The petitioners further contend that the new income requirement of P100 million from locally generated sources is
not arbitrary because it is not difficult to comply with; that there are several municipalities that have already
complied with the requirement and have, in fact, been converted into cities, such as Sta. Rosa in Laguna (R.A. No
9264), Navotas (R.A. No. 9387) and San Juan (R.A. No. 9388) in Metro Manila, Dasmarias in Cavite (R.A. No.
9723), and Bian in Laguna (R.A. No. 9740); and that several other municipalities have supposedly reached the
income of P100 million from locally generated sources, such as Bauan in Batangas, Mabalacat in Pampanga, and
Bacoor in Cavite.
 
The contention of the petitioners does not persuade.
 
As indicated in the Resolution of February 15, 2011, fifty-nine (59) existing cities had failed as of 2006 to
post an average annual income of P100 million based on the figures contained in the certification dated December 5,
2008 by the Bureau of Local Government. The large number of existing cities, virtually 50% of them, still unable to
comply with the P100 million threshold income five years after R.A. No. 9009 took effect renders it fallacious and
probably unwarranted for the petitioners to claim that the P100 million income requirement is not difficult to comply
with.
 
In this regard, the deliberations on Senate Bill No. 2157 may prove enlightening, thus:
Senator Osmea III. And could the gentleman help clarify why a municipality would want to be
converted into a city?
Senator Pimentel. There is only one reason, Mr. President, and it is not hidden. It is the fact that
once converted into a city, the municipality will have roughly more than three times the share
that it would be receiving over the internal revenue allotment than it would have if it were to
remain a municipality. So more or less three times or more.
Senator Osmea III. Is it the additional funding that they will be able to enjoy from a larger
share from the internal revenue allocations?
 
Senator Pimentel. Yes, Mr. President.
 
Senator Osmea III. Now, could the gentleman clarify, Mr. President, why in the original
Republic Act No. 7160, known as the Local Government Code of 1991, such a wide gap was
made between a municipalitywhat a municipality would earnand a city? Because essentially, to a
persons mind, even with this new requirement, if approved by Congress, if a municipality is
earning P100 million and has a population of more than 150,000 inhabitants but has less than
100 square kilometers, it would not qualify as a city.
 
Senator Pimentel. Yes.
Senator Osmea III. Now would that not be quite arbitrary on the part of the municipality?
Senator Pimentel. In fact, Mr. President, the House version restores the or. So, this is a matter
that we can very well take up as a policy issue. The chair of the committee does not say that we
should, as we know, not listen to arguments for the restoration of the word or in the population
or territorial requirement.
Senator Osmea III. Mr. President, my point is that, I agree with the gentlemans and, but
perhaps we should bring down the area. There are certainly very crowded places in this country
that are less than 10,000 hectares100 square kilometers is 10,000 hectares. There might only be
9,000 hectares or 8,000 hectares. And it would be unfair if these municipalities already earning
P100,000,000 in locally generated funds and have a population of over 150,000 would not be
qualified because of the simple fact that the physical area does not cover 10,000 hectares.
Senator Pimentel. Mr. President, in fact, in Metro Manila there are any number of
municipalities. San Juan is a specific example which, if we apply the present requirements,
would not qualify: 100 square kilometers and a population of not less than 150,000.
But my reply to that, Mr. President, is that they do not have to become a city?
 
Senator Osmea III. Because of the income.
 
Senator Pimentel. But they are already earning a lot, as the gentleman said. Otherwise, the
danger here, if we become lax in the requirements, is the metropolis-located local
governments would have more priority in terms of funding because they would have more
qualifications to become a city compared to far-flung areas in Mindanao or in the
Cordilleras, or whatever.
Therefore, I think we should not probably ease up on the requirements. Maybe we can restore
the word or so that if they do not have the 100 square kilometers of territory, then if they qualify
in terms of population and income, that would be all right, Mr. President.
   Moreover, the municipalities under consideration are leading localities in their respective
Senator Osmea III. Mr. President, I will not belabor the point at this time. I know that the provinces. Borongan, Catbalogan, Tandag, Batac and Tabuk are ranked number one in terms of
distinguished gentleman is considering several amendments to the Local Government income among all the municipalities in their respective provinces; Baybay and Bayugan are
Code. Perhaps this is something that could be further refined at a later time, with his permission. number two; Bogo and Lamitan are number three; Carcar, number four; and Tayabas, number
  seven.Not only are they pacesetters in their respective provinces, they are also among the
So I would like to thank the gentleman for his graciousness in answering our questions. frontrunners in their regions Baybay, Bayugan and Tabuk are number two income-earners in
  Regions VIII, XIII, and CAR, respectively; Catbalogan and Batac are number three in Regions
Senator Pimentel. I also thank the gentleman, Mr. President.[29] VIII and I, respectively; Bogo, number five in Region VII; Borongan and Carcar are both
  number six in Regions VIII and VII, respectively. This simply shows that these municipalities
are viable.
 
Petitioner League of Cities argues that there exists no issue with respect to the cityhood of its member
The Court takes note of the fact that the municipalities cited by the petitioners as having generated the threshold
cities, considering that they became cities in full compliance with the criteria for conversion at the time of their
income of P100 million from local sources, including those already converted into cities, are either in Metro Manila
creation.
or in provinces close to Metro Manila. In comparison, the municipalities covered by the Cityhood Laws are spread
 
out in the different provinces of the Philippines, including the Cordillera and Mindanao regions, and are
The Court considers the argument too sweeping. What we pointed out was that the previous income
considerably very distant from Metro Manila. This reality underscores the danger the enactment of R.A. No. 9009
requirement of P20 million was definitely not insufficient to provide the essential government facilities, services,
sought to prevent, i.e., that the metropolis-located local governments would have more priority in terms of funding
and special functions vis--vis the population of a component city. We also stressed that the increased income
because they would have more qualifications to become a city compared to the far-flung areas in Mindanao or in the
requirement of P100 million was not the only conclusive indicator for any municipality to survive and
Cordilleras, or whatever, actually resulting from the abrupt increase in the income requirement. Verily, this result is
remain viable as a component city. These observations were unerringly reflected in the respective incomes of the
antithetical to what the Constitution and LGC have nobly envisioned in favor of countryside development and
fifty-nine (59) members of the League of Cities that have still failed, remarkably enough, to be compliant with the
national growth. Besides, this result should be arrested early, to avoid the unwanted divisive effect on the entire
new requirement of the P100 million threshold income five years after R.A. No. 9009 became law.
country due to the local government units closer to the National Capital Region being afforded easier access to the
 
bigger share in the national coffers than other local government units.
Undoubtedly, the imposition of the income requirement of P100 million from local sources under R.A. No. 9009
 
was arbitrary. When the sponsor of the law chose the specific figure of P100 million, no research or empirical data
There should also be no question that the local government units covered by the Cityhood Laws belong to a class of
buttressed the figure. Nor was there proof that the proposal took into account the after-effects that were likely to
their own. They have proven themselves viable and capable to become component cities of their respective
arise. As already mentioned, even the danger the passage of R.A. No. 9009 sought to prevent might soon become a
provinces. They are and have been centers of trade and commerce, points of convergence of transportation, rich
reality. While the Constitution mandates that the creation of local government units must comply with the criteria
havens of agricultural, mineral, and other natural resources, and flourishing tourism spots. In his speech delivered on
laid down in the LGC, it cannot be justified to insist that the Constitution must have to yield to every amendment to
the floor of the Senate to sponsor House Joint Resolution No. 1, Senator Lim recognized such unique traits,[30] viz:
the LGC despite such amendment imminently producing effects contrary to the original thrusts of the LGC to
 
It must be noted that except for Tandag and Lamitan, which are both second-class promote autonomy, decentralization, countryside development, and the concomitant national growth.
municipalities in terms of income, all the rest are categorized by the Department of Finance as
first-class municipalities with gross income of at least P70 million as per Commission of Audit  
Report for 2005. Moreover, Tandag and Lamitan, together with Borongan, Catbalogan, and
Moreover, if we were now to adopt the stringent interpretation of the Constitution the petitioners are espousing, we
Tabuk, are all provincial capitals.
  may have to apply the same restrictive yardstick against the recently converted cities cited by the petitioners, and
The more recent income figures of the 12 municipalities, which would have increased
further by this time, indicate their readiness to take on the responsibilities of cityhood. find two of them whose conversion laws have also to be struck down for being unconstitutional. The two laws are
 
R.A. No. 9387[31] and R.A. No. 9388,[32] respectively converting the municipalities of San Juan and Navotas into
highly urbanized cities. A cursory reading of the laws indicates that there is no indication of compliance with the As elaborated here and in the assailed February 15, 2011 Resolution, the Cityhood Laws were not

requirements imposed by the LGC, for, although the two local government units concerned presumably complied violative of the Constitution and the LGC. The respondents are thus also entitled to their just share in the IRA

with the income requirement of P50 million under Section 452 of the LGC and the income requirement of P100 allocation for cities. They have demonstrated their viability as component cities of their respective provinces and are

million under the amended Section 450 of the LGC, they obviously did not meet the requirements set forth under developing continuously, albeit slowly, because they had previously to share the IRA with about 1,500

Section 453 of the LGC, to wit: municipalities. With their conversion into component cities, they will have to share with only around 120 cities.

   
Section 453. Duty to Declare Highly Urbanized Status.It shall be the duty of the
President to declare a city as highly urbanized within thirty (30) days after it shall have met the Local government units do not subsist only on locally generated income, but also depend on the IRA to
minimum requirements prescribed in the immediately preceding Section, upon proper
support their development. They can spur their own developments and thereby realize their great potential of
application therefor and ratification in a plebiscite by the qualified voters therein.
  encouraging trade and commerce in the far-flung regions of the country. Yet their potential will effectively be
  stunted if those already earning more will still receive a bigger share from the national coffers, and if commercial
Indeed, R.A. No. 9387 and R.A. No. 9388 evidently show that the President had not classified San activity will be more or less concentrated only in and near Metro Manila.
Juan and Navotas as highly urbanized cities upon proper application and ratification in a plebiscite by the qualified  
III.
voters therein. A further perusal of R.A. No. 9387 reveals that San Juan did not qualify as a highly urbanized city
Conclusion
because it had a population of only 125,558, contravening the required minimum population of 200,000 under
 
Section 452 of the LGC. Such non-qualification as a component city was conceded even by Senator Pimentel during
We should not ever lose sight of the fact that the 16 cities covered by the Cityhood Laws not only had
the deliberations on Senate Bill No. 2157.
conversion bills pending during the 11th Congress, but have also complied with the requirements of the LGC
 
prescribed prior to its amendment by R.A. No. 9009. Congress undeniably gave these cities all the considerations
The petitioners contention that the Cityhood Laws violated their right to a just share in the national taxes is
that justice and fair play demanded. Hence, this Court should do no less by stamping its imprimatur to the clear and
not acceptable.
unmistakable legislative intent and by duly recognizing the certain collective wisdom of Congress.
 
 
In this regard, it suffices to state that the share of local government units is a matter of percentage under
WHEREFORE, the Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration (of the Decision dated 15 February 2011)
Section 285 of the LGC, not a specific amount. Specifically, the share of the cities is 23%, determined on the basis
is denied with finality.
of population (50%), land area (25%), and equal sharing (25%). This share is also dependent on the number of
 
existing cities, such that when the number of cities increases, then more will divide and share the allocation for
SO ORDERED.
cities. However, we have to note that the allocation by the National Government is not a constant, and can either

increase or decrease. With every newly converted city becoming entitled to share the allocation for cities, the

percentage of internal revenue allotment (IRA) entitlement of each city will decrease, although the actual amount

received may be more than that received in the preceding year. That is a necessary consequence of Section 285 and

Section 286 of the LGC.

 
APRIL 12, 2011
  To provide a clear perspective of the instant motion, we present hereunder a brief background of the
RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, VICTOR F. BERNAL,   G.R. No. 180050
relevant antecedents
and    
RENE O. MEDINA   Present:  
Petitioners, CORONA, C.J.,
  CARPIO, On October 2, 2006, the President of the Republic approved into law Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9355 (An
- versus - CARPIO MORALES,
  VELASCO, JR., Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands).[2] On December 3, 2006, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, NACHURA, conducted the mandatory plebiscite for the ratification of the creation of the province under the Local Government
representing the President of the Philippines; Senate LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
of the Philippines, represented by the SENATE BRION, Code (LGC).[3] The plebiscite yielded 69,943 affirmative votes and 63,502 negative votes.[4] With
PRESIDENT; House of Representatives, represented PERALTA,
by the HOUSE SPEAKER; GOVERNOR ROBERT BERSAMIN, the approval of the people from both the mother province of Surigao del
ACE S. BARBERS, representing the mother province DEL CASTILLO,
of Surigao del Norte; GOVERNOR GERALDINE ABAD, Norte and the Province of Dinagat Islands (Dinagat), the President appointed the interim set of provincial officials
ECLEO VILLAROMAN, representing the new VILLARAMA, JR., who took their oath of office on January 26, 2007. Later, during the May 14, 2007 synchronized elections, the
Province of Dinagat Islands, PEREZ,
Respondents, MENDOZA, and Dinagatnons elected their new set of provincial officials who assumed office on July 1, 2007.[5]
  SERENO, JJ.
CONGRESSMAN FRANCISCO T. MATUGAS,    
HON. SOL T. MATUGAS, HON. ARTURO  
CARLOS A. EGAY, JR., HON. SIMEON VICENTE   On November 10, 2006, petitioners Rodolfo G. Navarro, Victor F. Bernal and Rene O. Medina, former
G. CASTRENCE, HON. MAMERTO D.   political leaders of Surigao del Norte, filed before this Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition (G.R. No.
GALANIDA, HON. MARGARITO M. LONGOS,  
and HON. CESAR M. BAGUNDOL,   175158) challenging the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9355.[6] The Court dismissed the petition on technical grounds.
Intervenors.  
    Their motion for reconsideration was also denied.[7]
 
 
 
  Undaunted, petitioners, as taxpayers and residents of the Province of Surigao del Norte, filed another
 
  petition for certiorari[8] seeking to nullify R.A. No. 9355 for being unconstitutional. They alleged that the creation of
Promulgated:
  Dinagat as a new province, if uncorrected, would perpetuate an illegal act of Congress, and would unjustly deprive
April 12, 2011
the people of Surigao del Norte of a large chunk of the provincial territory, Internal Revenue Allocation (IRA), and
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
  rich resources from the area. They pointed out that when the law was passed, Dinagat had

a land area of 802.12 square kilometers only and a population of only 106,951, failing to comply with Section 10,

RESOLUTION
NACHURA, J.:
 
For consideration of the Court is the Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment dated October 20, 2010
filed by Movant-Intervenors[1] dated and filed on October 29, 2010, praying that the Court (a) recall the entry of
judgment, and (b) resolve their motion for reconsideration of the July 20, 2010 Resolution.
Article X of the Constitution and of Section 461 of the LGC, on both counts, viz.
 
Constitution, Article X Local Government
Section 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided,
merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria
established in the local government code and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
 
LGC, Title IV, Chapter I

Section 461. Requisites for Creation. (a) A province may be created if it has an
average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of not less than Twenty
million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices and either of the following
requisites:
(i)                 a continuous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square
kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or
(ii)               a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000)
inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics Office:
 
Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population, and
income of the original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the minimum
requirements prescribed herein.
 
(b) The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands or
is separated by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income of the
province.
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund,
exclusive of special funds, trust funds, transfers, and non-recurring income. (Emphasis
supplied.)
 
On February 10, 2010, the Court rendered its Decision[9] granting the petition.[10] The Decision declared
R.A. No. 9355 unconstitutional for failure to comply with the requirements on population and land area in the
creation of a province under the LGC. Consequently, it declared the proclamation of Dinagat and the election of its
officials as null and void. The Decision likewise declared as null and void the provision on Article 9(2) of the Rules
and Regulations Implementing the LGC (LGC-IRR), stating that, [t]he land
area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands for being
beyond the ambit of Article 461 of the LGC, inasmuch as such exemption is not expressly provided in the law.[11]
The Republic, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, and Dinagat filed their respective
motions for reconsideration of the Decision. In its Resolution[12] dated May 12, 2010,[13] the Court denied the said
motions.[14]
 
Unperturbed, the Republic and Dinagat both filed their respective motions for leave of court to admit their
second motions for reconsideration, accompanied by their second motions for reconsideration. These motions were
eventually noted without action by this Court in its June 29, 2010 Resolution.[15]
 
Meanwhile, the movants-intervenors filed on June 18, 2010 a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File
and to Admit Intervenors Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 12, 2010. They alleged that the
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8790, relevant to this case, which provides
RESOLUTION NO. 8790
 
WHEREAS, Dinagat Islands, consisting of seven (7) municipalities, were previously
components of the First Legislative District of the Province of Surigao del Norte. In December
2006 pursuant to Republic Act No. 9355, the Province of Dinagat Island[s] was created and its
creation was ratified on 02 December 2006 in the Plebiscite for this purpose;
 
WHEREAS, as a province, Dinagat Islands was, for purposes of the May 10, 2010 National and
Local Elections, allocated one (1) seat for Governor, one (1) seat for Vice Governor, one (1) for
congressional seat, and ten (10) Sangguniang Panlalawigan seats pursuant to Resolution No.
8670 dated 16 September 2009;
 
 
WHEREAS, the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 180050 entitled Rodolfo Navarro, et al., vs.
Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, as representative of the President of the Philippines, et al.
rendered a Decision, dated 10 February 2010, declaring Republic Act No. 9355 unconstitutional
for failure to comply with the criteria for the creation of a province prescribed in Sec. 461 of the
Local Government Code in relation to Sec. 10, Art. X, of the 1987 Constitution;
 
WHEREAS, respondents intend to file Motion[s] for Reconsideration on the above decision of
the Supreme Court;
WHEREAS, the electoral data relative to the: (1) position for Member, House of
Representatives representing the lone congressional district of Dinagat Islands, (2) names of the
candidates for the aforementioned position, (3) position for Governor, Dinagat Islands, (4)
names of the candidates for the said position, (5) position of the Vice Governor, (6) the names
of the candidates for the said position, (7) positions for the ten (10) Sangguniang Panlalawigan
Members and, [8] all the names of the candidates for Sangguniang Panlalawigan Members,
have already been configured into the system and can no longer be revised within the remaining
period before the elections on May 10, 2010.
NOW, THEREFORE, with the current system configuration, and depending on whether the
Decision of the Supreme Court in Navarro vs. Ermita is reconsidered or not, the Commission
RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to declare that:
 
a.       If the Decision is reversed, there will be no problem since the current system
configuration is in line with the reconsidered Decision, meaning that the
Province of Dinagat Islands and the Province of Surigao del Norte remain as two
(2) separate provinces;
b.      If the Decision becomes final and executory before the election, the Province of
Dinagat Islands will revert to its previous status as part of the First Legislative
District, Surigao del Norte.
But because of the current system configuration, the ballots for the Province of
Dinagat Islands will, for the positions of Member, House of Representatives,
 Governor, Vice Governor and Members, Sangguniang Panlalawigan, bear only
the names of the candidates for the said positions. residents of Surigao del Norte and as public servants representing the interests of their constituents, they have a clear
 
and strong interest in the outcome of this case inasmuch as the reversion of Dinagat as part of the First Legislative
Conversely, the ballots for the First Legislative District of Surigao del Norte,
will, for the position of Governor, Vice Governor, Member, House of District of Surigao del Norte will affect the latter province such that: (1) the whole administrative set-up of the
Representatives, First District of Surigao del Norte and Members, Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, show only candidates for the said position. Likewise, the province will have to be restructured; (2) the services of many employees will have to be terminated; (3) contracts
whole Province of Surigao del Norte, will, for the position of Governor and Vice
Governor, bear only the names of the candidates for the said position[s]. will have to be invalidated; and (4) projects and other developments will have to be discontinued. In addition, they
  claim that their rights cannot be adequately pursued and protected in any other proceeding since their rights would
 
Consequently, the voters of the Province of Dinagat Islands will not be able to be foreclosed if the May 12, 2010 Resolution would attain finality.
vote for the candidates of Members, Sangguniang Panlalawigan, and Member,
House [of] Representatives, First Legislative District, Surigao del Norte, and  
candidates for Governor and Vice Governor for Surigao del Norte. Meanwhile,
voters of the First Legislative District of Surigao del Norte, will not be able to In their motion for reconsideration of the May 12, 2010 Resolution, movants-intervenors raised three (3) main
vote for Members, Sangguniang Panlalawigan and Member, House of arguments to challenge the above Resolution, namely: (1) that the passage of R.A. No. 9355 operates as an act of
Representatives, Dinagat Islands. Also, the voters of the
whole Province of Surigao del Norte, will not be able to vote for the Governor Congress amending Section 461 of the LGC; (2) that the exemption from territorial contiguity, when the intended
and Vice Governor, Dinagat Islands. Given this situation, the Commission will
postpone the elections for Governor, Vice Governor, Member, House of province consists of two or more islands, includes the exemption from the application of the minimum land area
Representatives, First Legislative District, Surigao del Norte, and Members,
Sangguniang Panlalawigan, First Legislative District, Surigao del Norte, because requirement; and (3) that the Operative Fact Doctrine is applicable in the instant case.
the election will result in [a] failure to elect, since, in actuality, there are no  
candidates for Governor, Vice Governor, Members, Sangguniang Panlalawigan,
First Legislative District, and Member, House of Representatives, First In the Resolution dated July 20, 2010,[16] the Court denied the Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File
Legislative District (with Dinagat Islands) of Surigao del Norte.
  and to Admit Intervenors Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 12, 2010 on the ground that the
c.       If the Decision becomes final and executory after the election, the Province of
allowance or disallowance of a motion to intervene is addressed to the sound discretion of the Court, and that the
Dinagat Islands will revert to its previous status as part of the First Legislative
District of Surigao del Norte. The result of the election will have to be nullified appropriate time to file the said motion was before and not after the resolution of this case.
for the same reasons given in Item b above. A special election for Governor,
Vice Governor, Member, House of Representatives, First Legislative District of  
Surigao del Norte, and Members, Sangguniang Panlalawigan, First District,
Surigao del Norte (with Dinagat Islands) will have to be conducted. On September 7, 2010, movants-intervenors filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the July 20, 2010 Resolution,
xxxx
citing several rulings[17] of the Court, allowing intervention as an exception to Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of
 
Court that it should be filed at any time before the rendition of judgment. They alleged that, prior to the May 10,
SO ORDERED.
  2010 elections, their legal interest in this case was not yet existent. They averred that prior to the May 10, 2010
 
elections, they were unaware of the proceedings in this case. Even for the sake of argument that they had notice of
They further alleged that, because they are the duly elected officials of Surigao del Norte whose positions
the pendency of the case, they pointed out that prior to the said elections, Sol T. Matugas was a simple resident of
will be affected by the nullification of the election results in the event that the May 12, 2010 Resolution is not
Surigao del Norte, Arturo Carlos A. Egay, Jr. was a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Second District
reversed, they have a legal interest in the instant case and would be directly affected by the declaration of nullity of
of Surigao del Norte, and Mamerto D. Galanida was the Municipal Mayor of Socorro, Surigao del Norte, and that,
R.A. No. 9355.Simply put, movants-intervenors election to their respective offices would necessarily be annulled
pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 8790, it was only after they were elected as Governor of Surigao del Norte,
since Dinagat Islands will revert to its previous status as part of the First Legislative District of Surigao del Norte
Vice Governor of Surigao del Norte and Sangguniang Panlalawigan Member of the First District of Surigao del
and a special election will have to be conducted for governor, vice governor, and House of Representatives member
Norte, respectively, that they became possessed with legal interest in this controversy.
and Sangguniang Panlalawigan member for the First Legislative District of Surigao del Norte. Moreover, as
 Sangguniang Panlalawigan, First District, Surigao del Norte (with Dinagat Islands) will
  have to be conducted. (Emphasis supplied.)
 
On October 5, 2010, the Court issued an order for Entry of Judgment, stating that the decision in this case had
 
become final and executory on May 18, 2010. Hence, the above motion.
Indeed, COMELEC Resolution No. 8790 spawned the peculiar circumstance of proper party interest for
 
movants-intervenors only with the specter of the decision in the main case becoming final and executory. More
At the outset, it must be clarified that this Resolution delves solely on the instant Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of
importantly, if the intervention be not entertained, the movants-intervenors would be left with no other remedy as
Judgment of movants-intervenors, not on the second motions for reconsideration of the original
regards to the impending nullification of their election to their respective positions. Thus, to the Courts mind, there is
parties, and neither on Dinagats Urgent Omnibus Motion, which our
an imperative to grant the Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment by movants-intervenors.

 
esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Arturo D. Brion considers as Dinagats third motion for reconsideration. Inasmuch as
It should be remembered that this case was initiated upon the filing of the petition for certiorari way back
the motions for leave to admit their respective motions for reconsideration of the May 12, 2010 Resolution and the
on October 30, 2007. At that time, movants-intervenors had nothing at stake in the outcome of this case. While it
aforesaid motions for reconsideration were already noted without action by the Court, there is no reason to treat
may be argued that their interest in this case should have commenced upon the issuance of COMELEC Resolution
Dinagats Urgent Omnibus Motion differently. In relation to this, the Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment of
No. 8790, it is obvious that their interest in this case then was more imaginary than real. This is because COMELEC
movants-intervenors could not be considered as a second motion for reconsideration to warrant the application of
Resolution No. 8790 provides that should the decision in this case attain finality prior to the May 10, 2010 elections,
Section 3, Rule 15 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court.[18] It should be noted that this motion prays for the
the election of the local government officials stated therein would only have to be postponed. Given such a scenario,
recall of the entry of judgment and for the resolution of their motion for reconsideration of the July 20, 2010
movants-intervenors would not have suffered any injury or adverse effect with respect to the reversion of Dinagat as
Resolution which remained unresolved. The denial of their motion for leave to intervene and to admit motion for
part of Surigao del Norte since they would simply have remained candidates for the respective positions they have
reconsideration of the May 12, 2010 Resolution did not rule on the merits of the motion for reconsideration of the
vied for and to which they have been elected.
May 12, 2010 Resolution, but only on the timeliness of the intended intervention. Their motion for reconsideration

of this denial elaborated on movants-intervenors interest in this case which existed only after judgment had been
For a party to have locus standi, one must allege such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure
rendered. As such, their motion for intervention and their motion for reconsideration of the May 12, 2010 Resolution
that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for
merely stand as an initial reconsideration of the said resolution.
illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Because constitutional cases are often public actions in which the
 
relief sought is likely to affect other persons, a preliminary question frequently arises as to this interest in the
With due deference to Mr. Justice Brion, there appears nothing in the records to support the claim that this
constitutional question raised.[19]
was a ploy of respondents legal tactician to reopen the case despite an entry of judgment. To be sure, it is actually
 
COMELEC Resolution No. 8790 that set this controversy into motion anew. To reiterate, the pertinent portion of the
It cannot be denied that movants-intervenors will suffer direct injury in the event their Urgent Motion to Recall
Resolution reads:
Entry of Judgment dated October 29, 2010 is denied and their Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File and to
 
c.       If the Decision becomes final and executory after the election, the Province of Dinagat Admit Intervenors Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 12, 2010 is denied with finality. Indeed,
Islands will revert to its previous status as part of the First Legislative District of Surigao
del Norte. The result of the election will have to be nullified for the same reasons given in they have sufficiently shown that they have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that if the May 12,
Item b above. A special election for Governor, Vice Governor, Member, House of
Representatives, First Legislative District of Surigao del Norte, and Members, 2010 Resolution be not reconsidered, their election to their respective positions during the May 10, 2010 polls and
its concomitant effects would all be nullified and be put to naught. Given their unique circumstances, movants-
intervenors should not be left without any remedy before this Court simply because their interest in this case became
manifest only after the case had already been decided. The consequences of such a decision would definitely work to
their disadvantage, nay, to their utmost prejudice, without even them being parties to the dispute. Such decision
would also violate their right to due process, a right that cries out for protection. Thus, it is imperative that the
movants-intervenors be heard on the merits of their cause. We are not only a court of law, but also of justice and
equity, such that our position and the dire repercussions of this controversy should be weighed on the scales of
justice, rather than dismissed on account of mootness.
The moot and academic principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts from resolving
a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: (1) there is a grave violation of the Constitution;
(2) there is an exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved; (3) the
constitutional issue raised requires formation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public;
and (4) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.[20]The second exception attends this case.
This Court had taken a liberal attitude in the case of David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,[21] where technicalities of
procedure on locus standi were brushed aside, because the constitutional issues raised were of paramount public
interest or of transcendental importance deserving the attention of the Court. Along parallel lines, the motion for
intervention should be given due course since movants-intervenors have shown their substantial legal interest in the
outcome of this case, even much more than petitioners themselves, and because of the novelty, gravity, and weight
of the issues involved.
Undeniably, the motion for intervention and the motion for reconsideration of the May 12, 2010 Resolution of
movants-intervenors is akin to the right to appeal the judgment of a case, which, though merely a statutory right that
must comply with the requirements of the rules, is an essential part of our judicial system, such that courts should
proceed with caution not to deprive a party of the right to question the judgment and its effects, and ensure that
every party-litigant, including those who would be directly affected, would have the amplest opportunity for the
proper and just disposition of their cause, freed from the constraints of technicalities.[22]
 
Verily, the Court had, on several occasions, sanctioned the recall entries of judgment in light of attendant
extraordinary circumstances.[23] The power to suspend or even disregard rules of procedure can be so pervasive and
compelling as to alter even that which this Court itself had already declared final. [24] In this case, the compelling
concern is not only to afford the movants-intervenors the right to be heard since they would be adversely affected by
the judgment in this case despite not being original parties thereto, but also to arrive at the correct interpretation of
the provisions of the LGC with respect to the creation of local government units. In this manner, the thrust of the
Constitution with respect to local autonomy and of the LGC with respect to decentralization and the attainment of
national goals, as hereafter elucidated, will effectively be realized.
On the merits of the motion for intervention, after taking a long and intent look, the Court finds that the
first and second arguments raised by movants-intervenors deserve affirmative consideration.
It must be borne in mind that the central policy considerations in the creation of local government units are
economic viability, efficient administration, and capability to deliver basic services to their constituents. The criteria
prescribed by the LGC, i.e., income, population and land area, are all designed to accomplish these results. In this
light, Congress, in its collective wisdom, has debated on the relative weight of each of these three criteria, placing
emphasis on which of them should enjoy preferential consideration.
Without doubt, the primordial criterion in the creation of local government units, particularly of a province, is
economic viability. This is the clear intent of the framers of the LGC. In this connection, the following excerpts from
congressional debates are quoted hereunder
 
HON. ALFELOR. Income is mandatory. We can even have this doubled because we thought
CHAIRMAN CUENCO. In other words, the primordial consideration here is the economic
viability of the new local government unit, the new province?
 
xxxx
 
HON. LAGUDA. The reason why we are willing to increase the income, double than the House
version, because we also believe that economic viability is really a minimum. Land area and
population are functions really of the viability of the area, because you have an income level
which would be the trigger point for economic development, population will naturally increase
because there will be an immigration. However, if you disallow the particular area from being
converted into a province because of the population problems in the beginning, it will never be
able to reach the point where it could become a province simply because it will never have the
economic take off for it to trigger off that economic development.
 Now, were saying that maybe Fourteen Million Pesos is a floor area where it could pay for
overhead and provide a minimum of basic services to the population. Over and above that, the  
provincial officials should be able to trigger off economic development which will attract
For a Barangay:
immigration, which will attract new investments from the private sector. This is now the
 
concern of the local officials. But if we are going to tie the hands of the proponents, simply by
LGC: SEC. 386. Requisites for Creation. (a) A barangay may be created out of a contiguous
telling them, Sorry, you are now at 150 thousand or 200 thousand, you will never be able to
territory which has a population of at least two thousand (2,000) inhabitants as certified by the
become a province because nobody wants to go to your place. Why? Because you never have
National Statistics Office except in cities and municipalities within Metro Manila and other
any reason for economic viability.
metropolitan political subdivisions or in highly urbanized cities where such territory shall have
 
a certified population of at least five thousand (5,000) inhabitants: Provided, That the creation
xxxx
thereof shall not reduce the population of the original barangay or barangays to less than the
 
minimum requirement prescribed herein.
CHAIRMAN PIMENTEL. Okay, what about land area?
To enhance the delivery of basic services in the indigenous cultural communities, barangays
 
may be created in such communities by an Act of Congress, notwithstanding the above
HON. LUMAUIG. 1,500 square kilometers
requirement.
 
 
HON. ANGARA. Walang problema yon, in fact thats not very critical, yong land area because
(b) The territorial jurisdiction of the new barangay shall be properly identified by metes and
 
bounds or by more or less permanent natural boundaries. The territory need not be contiguous if
CHAIRMAN PIMENTEL. Okay, ya, our, the Senate version is 3.5, 3,500 square meters, ah,
it comprises two (2) or more islands.
square kilometers.
 
 
(c) The governor or city mayor may prepare a consolidation plan for barangays, based on the
HON. LAGUDA. Ne, Ne. A province is constituted for the purpose of administrative efficiency
criteria prescribed in this Section, within his territorial jurisdiction. The plan shall be submitted
and delivery of basic services.
to the sangguniang panlalawigan or sangguniang panlungsod concerned for appropriate
CHAIRMAN PIMENTEL. Right.
action. In the case of municipalities within the Metropolitan Manila area and other metropolitan
 
political subdivisions, the barangay consolidation plan can be prepared and approved by the
HON. LAGUDA. Actually, when you come down to it, when government was instituted, there
sangguniang bayan concerned.
is only one central government and then everybody falls under that. But it was later on
 
subdivided into provinces for purposes of administrative efficiency.
LGC-IRR: ARTICLE 14. Barangays. (a) Creation of barangays by the sangguniang
 
panlalawigan shall require prior recommendation of the sangguniang bayan.
CHAIRMAN PIMENTEL. Okay.
 
 
(b) New barangays in the municipalities within MMA shall be created only by Act of Congress,
HON. LAGUDA. Now, what were seeing now is that the administrative efficiency is no longer
subject to the limitations and requirements prescribed in this Article.
there precisely because the land areas that we are giving to our governors is so wide that no one
 
man can possibly administer all of the complex machineries that are needed.
(c) Notwithstanding the population requirement, a barangay may be created in the indigenous
 
cultural communities by Act of Congress upon recommendation of the LGU or LGUs where the
Secondly, when you say delivery of basic services, as pointed out by Cong. Alfelor, there are
cultural community is located.
sections of the province which have never been visited by public officials, precisely because
 
they dont have the time nor the energy anymore to do that because its so wide. Now, by
(d) A barangay shall not be created unless the following requisites are present:
compressing the land area and by reducing the population requirement, we are, in effect, trying
 
to follow the basic policy of why we are creating provinces, which is to deliver basic services
(1)   Population which shall not be less than two thousand (2,000) inhabitants, except in
and to make it more efficient in administration.
municipalities and cities within MMA and other metropolitan political subdivisions as may
 
be created by law, or in highly-urbanized cities where such territory shall have a
CHAIRMAN PIMENTEL. Yeah, thats correct, but on the assumption that the province is able
population of at least five thousand (5,000) inhabitants, as certified by the NSO. The
to do it without being a burden to the national government. Thats the assumption.
creation of a barangay shall not reduce the population of the original barangay or
 
barangays to less than the prescribed minimum/
HON. LAGUDA. Thats why were going into the minimum income level. As we said, if we go
(2)   Land Area which must be contiguous, unless comprised by two (2) or more islands. The
on a minimum income level, then we say, this is the trigger point at which this administration
territorial jurisdiction of a barangay sought to be created shall be properly identified by
can take place.[25]
metes and bounds or by more or less permanent natural boundaries.
 
   
Municipality:
Also worthy of note are the requisites in the creation of a barangay, a municipality, a city, and a province as  
provided both in the LGC and the LGC-IRR, viz. LGC: SEC. 442. Requisites for Creation. (a) A municipality may be created if it has an average
annual income, as certified by the provincial treasurer, or at least Two million five hundred
 thousand pesos (P2,500,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive years based on the 1991
constant prices; a population of at least twenty-five thousand (25,000) inhabitants as certified by
the National Statistics Office; and a contiguous territory of at least fifty (50) square kilometers
as certified by the Lands
Management Bureau: Provided, That the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area,
population or income of the original municipality or municipalities at the time of said creation
to less than the minimum requirements prescribed herein.
(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created municipality shall be properly identified by
metes and bounds. The requirement on land area shall not apply where the municipality
proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or more islands. The territory need not be
contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands.
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund of the
municipality concerned, exclusive of special funds, transfers and non-recurring income.
(d) Municipalities existing as of the date of effectivity of this Code shall continue to exist and
operate as such. Existing municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or
executive orders and which have their respective set of elective municipal officials holding
office at the time of the effectivity of this Code shall henceforth be considered regular
municipalities.
 
LGC-IRR: ARTICLE 13. Municipalities. (a) Requisites for Creation A municipality shall not
be created unless the following requisites are present:
 
(i)                 Income An average annual income of not less than Two Million Five Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P2,500,000.00), for the immediately preceding two (2) consecutive
years based on 1991 constant prices, as certified by the provincial treasurer. The
average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund,
exclusive of special funds, special accounts, transfers, and nonrecurring income;
(ii)               Population which shall not be less than twenty five thousand (25,000) inhabitants,
as certified by NSO; and
(iii)             Land area which must be contiguous with an area of at least fifty (50) square
kilometers, as certified by LMB. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises
two (2) or more islands. The requirement on land area shall not apply where the
proposed municipality is composed of one (1) or more islands. The territorial
jurisdiction of a municipality sought to be created shall be properly identified by
metes and bounds.
 
The creation of a new municipality shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of the
original LGU or LGUs at the time of said creation to less than the prescribed minimum
requirements. All expenses incidental to the creation shall be borne by the petitioners.
 
 
 
City:
 
LGC: SEC. 450. Requisites for Creation. (a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be  
converted into a component city if it has an average annual income, as certified by the
Department of Finance, of at least Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) for the last two (2)
consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices, and if it has either of the following requisities:
 
(i)                 a contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100) square kilometers, as certified
by the Lands Management Bureau; or,
(ii)               a population of not less than one hundred fifty thousand (150,000) inhabitants, as
certified by the National Statistics Office: Provided, That, the creation thereof shall
not reduce the land area, population, and income of the original unit or units at the
time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed herein.
(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly identified by metes and
bounds. The requirement on land area shall not apply where the city proposed to be
created is composed of one (1) or more islands. The territory need not be contiguous if it
comprises two (2) or more islands.
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive
of special funds, transfers, and non-recurring income.
LGC-IRR: ARTICLE 11. Cities. (a) Requisites for creation A city shall not be created unless
the following requisites on income and either population or land area are present:
 
(1)   Income An average annual income of not less than Twenty Million Pesos
(P20,000,000.00), for the immediately preceding two (2) consecutive years based on 1991
constant prices, as certified by DOF. The average annual income shall include the income
accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, special accounts, transfers, and
nonrecurring income; and
(2)   Population or land area Population which shall not be less than one hundred fifty thousand
(150,000) inhabitants, as certified by the NSO; or land area which must be contiguous with
an area of at least one hundred (100) square kilometers, as certified by LMB. The territory
need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands or is separated by a
chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income of the province. The land
area requirement shall not apply where the proposed city is composed of one (1) or
more islands. The territorial jurisdiction of a city sought to be created shall be properly
identified by metes and bounds.
The creation of a new city shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of the original
LGU or LGUs at the time of said creation to less than the prescribed minimum requirements.All
expenses incidental to the creation shall be borne by the petitioners.
 
 
Provinces:
 
LGC: SEC. 461. Requisites for Creation. (a) A province may be created if it has an average
annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos
(P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 prices and either of the following requisites:
(i)                 a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as
certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or,
(ii)               a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as
certified by the National Statistics Office:
Provided, That the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of the
original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements
prescribed herein.

(b) The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands or is separated
by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income of the province.
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive
of special funds, trust funds, transfers, and non-recurring income.
 
LGC-IRR: ARTICLE 9. Provinces. (a) Requisites for creation A province shall not be created
unless the following requisites on income and either population or land area are present:
 
(1)   Income An average annual income of not less than Twenty Million pesos (P20,000,000.00)
for the immediately preceding two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices, as
certified by DOF. The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the
general fund, exclusive of special funds, special accounts, transfers, and non-recurring
income; and
(2)   Population or land area Population which shall not be less than two hundred fifty thousand
(250,000) inhabitants, as certified by NSO; or land area which must be contiguous with an
area of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by LMB. The territory
need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands or is separated by a
chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income of the province. The land
area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1)
or more islands. The territorial jurisdiction of a province sought to be created shall be
properly identified by metes and bounds.
 
The creation of a new province shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of the
original LGU or LGUs at the time of said creation to less than the prescribed minimum
requirements. All expenses incidental to the creation shall be borne by the petitioners.
(Emphasis supplied.)
 
It bears scrupulous notice that from the above cited provisions, with respect to the creation of barangays, land area is
not a requisite indicator of viability. However, with respect to the creation of municipalities, component cities, and
provinces, the three (3) indicators of viability and projected capacity to provide services, i.e., income, population,
and land area, are provided for.
 
But it must be pointed out that when the local government unit to be created consists of one (1) or more islands, it is
exempt from the land area requirement as expressly provided in Section 442 and Section 450 of the LGC if the local
government unit to be created is a municipality or a component city, respectively. This exemption is absent in the
enumeration of the requisites for the creation of a province under Section 461 of the LGC, although it is expressly
stated under Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR.
There appears neither rhyme nor reason why this exemption should apply to cities and municipalities, but not to
provinces. In fact, considering the physical configuration of the Philippine archipelago, there is a greater likelihood
that islands or group of islands would form part of the land area of a newly-created province than in most cities or
municipalities. It is, therefore, logical to infer that the genuine legislative policy decision was expressed in Section
442 (for municipalities) and Section 450 (for component cities) of the LGC, but was inadvertently omitted in Section
461 (for provinces). Thus, when the exemption was expressly provided in Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR, the
inclusion was intended to correct the congressional oversight in Section 461 of the LGC and to reflect the true
legislative intent. It would, then, be in order for the Court to uphold the validity of Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR.
This interpretation finds merit when we consider the basic policy considerations underpinning the principle of local
autonomy.
 
Section 2 of the LGC, of which paragraph (a) is pertinent to this case, provides
 
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. (a) It is hereby declared the policy of the State that the
territorial and political subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local
autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities and
make them more effective partners in the attainment of national goals. Toward this end, the
State shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted
through a system of decentralization whereby local government units shall be given more
powers, authority, responsibilities, and resources. The process of decentralization shall proceed
from the national government to the local government units.
 
 
This declaration of policy is echoed in Article 3(a) of the LGC-IRR[26] and in the Whereas clauses of Administrative
Order No. 270,[27] which read
 
WHEREAS, Section 25, Article II of the Constitution mandates that the State shall ensure the
autonomy of local governments;
WHEREAS, pursuant to this declared policy, Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the
Local Government Code of 1991, affirms, among others, that the territorial and political
subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to enable them to
attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective
partners in the attainment of national goals;
 
WHEREAS, Section 533 of the Local Government Code of 1991 requires the President to
convene an Oversight Committee for the purpose of formulating and issuing the appropriate
rules and regulations necessary for the efficient and effective implementation of all the
provisions of the said Code; and
WHEREAS, the Oversight Committee, after due deliberations and consultations with all the
concerned sectors of society and consideration of the operative principles of local autonomy as
provided in the Local Government Code of 1991, has completed the formulation of the
implementing rules and regulations; x x x
  
 
Consistent with the declared policy to provide local government units genuine and meaningful local autonomy,
contiguity and minimum land area requirements for prospective local government units should be liberally construed
in order to achieve the desired results. The strict interpretation adopted by the February 10, 2010 Decision could
prove to be counter-productive, if not outright absurd, awkward, and impractical. Picture an intended province that
consists of several municipalities and component cities which, in themselves, also consist of islands. The component
cities and municipalities which consist of islands are exempt from the minimum land area requirement, pursuant to
Sections 450 and 442, respectively, of the LGC. Yet, the province would be made to comply with the minimum land
area criterion of 2,000 square kilometers, even if it consists of several islands. This would mean that Congress has
opted to assign a distinctive preference to create a province with contiguous land area over one composed of islands
and negate the greater imperative of development of self-reliant communities, rural progress, and the delivery of
basic services to the constituency. This preferential option would prove more difficult and burdensome if the 2,000-
square-kilometer territory of a province is scattered because the islands are separated by bodies of water, as
compared to one with a contiguous land mass.
Moreover, such a very restrictive construction could trench on the equal protection clause, as it actually defeats the
purpose of local autonomy and decentralization as enshrined in the Constitution. Hence, the land area requirement
should be read together with territorial contiguity.
Another look at the transcript of the deliberations of Congress should prove enlightening:
CHAIRMAN ALFELOR. Can we give time to Congressman Chiongbian,[28] with respect to his
 
CHAIRMAN LINA. Okay.
 
HON. CHIONGBIAN. At the outset, Chairman Lina, we would like to apprise the distinguished
Senator about the action taken by the House, on House Bill No. 7166. This was passed about
two years ago and has been pending in the Senate for consideration. This is a bill that I am not
the only one involved, including our distinguished Chairman here. But then we did want to
sponsor the bill, being the Chairman then of the Local Government.
So, I took the cudgels for the rest of the Congressmen, who were more or less interested in the
creation of the new provinces, because of the vastness of the areas that were involved.
 
At any rate, this bill was passed by the House unanimously without any objection. And as I have
said a while ago, that this has been pending in the Senate for the last two years. And Sen.
Pimentel himself was just in South Cotabato and he delivered a speech that he will support this
bill, and he says, that he will incorporate this in the Local Government Code, which I have in
writing from him. I showed you the letter that he wrote, and naturally, we in the House got hold
of the Senate version. It becomes an impossibility for the whole Philippines to create a new
province, and that is quite the concern of the respective Congressmen.
Now, insofar as the constitutional provision is concerned, there is nothing to stop the mother
province from voting against the bill, if a province is going to be created.
So, we are talking about devolution of powers here. Why is the province not willing to create
another province, when it can be justified. Even Speaker Mitra says, what will happen
to Palawan?We wont have one million people there, and if you look at Palawan, there will be
about three or four provinces that will comprise that island. So, the development will be
hampered.
 
Now, I would like to read into the record the letter of Sen. Pimentel, dated November 2,
1989. This was practically about a year after 7166 was approved by the House, House Bill 7166.
 
 
 
On November 2, 1989, the Senator wrote me:
Dear Congressman Chiongbian:
We are in receipt of your letter of 17 October. Please be informed that your
House No. 7166 was incorporated in the proposed Local Government Code, Senate
Bill No. 155, which is pending for second reading.
 
Thank you and warm regards.
 
Very truly yours,
That is the very context of the letter of the Senator, and we are quite surprised that the Senate
has adopted another position.
So, we would like because this is a unanimously approved bill in the House, thats the only bill
that is involving the present Local Government Code that we are practically considering; and
this will be a slap on the House, if we do not approve it, as approved by the lower House. This
can be [an] irritant in the approval of the Conference Committee Report. And I just want to
manifest that insofar as the creation of the province, not only in my province, but the other
provinces. That the mother province will participate in the plebiscite, they can defeat the
province, lets say, on the basis of the result, the province cannot be created if they lose in the
plebiscite, and I dont see why, we should put this stringent conditions to the private people of the
devolution that they are seeking.
So, Mr. Senator, I think we should consider the situation seriously, because, this is an approved
version of the House, and I will not be the one to raise up and question the Conference
Committee Report, but the rest of the House that are interested in this bill. And they have been
approaching the Speaker about this. So, the Speaker reminded me to make sure that it takes the
cudgel of the House approved version.
 
So, thats all what I can say, Mr. Senator, and I dont believe that it is not, because its the wish of
the House, but because the mother province will participate anyhow, you vote them down; and
that is provided for in the Constitution. As a matter of fact, I have seen the amendment with
regards to the creation of the city to be urbanized, subject to the plebiscite. And why should we
not allow that to happen in the provinces! In other words, we dont want the people who wants to
create a new province, as if they are left in the devolution of powers, when they feel that they are
far away from civilization.
Now, I am not talking about other provinces, because I am unaware, not aware of their
situation. But the province of South Cotabato has a very unique geographical territorial
conglomerations.One side is in the other side of the Bay, of Sarangani Bay. The capital town is
in the North; while these other municipalities are in the East and in the West. And if they have to
travel from the last town in the eastern part of the province, it is about one hundred forty
kilometers to the capital town. And from the West side, it is the same distance. And from the
North side, it is about one hundred kilometers. So that is the problem there. And besides, they
have enough resources and I feel that, not because I am interested in the province, I am after
their welfare in the future. Who am I to dictate on those people? I have no interest but then I am
looking at the future development of these areas.
 
As a matter of fact, if I am in politics, its incidental; I do not need to be there, but I can foresee
what the creation of a new province will bring to these people. It will bring them prosperity; it
will bring them more income, and it will encourage even foreign investors. Like the PAP now,
they are concentrating in South Cotabato, especially in the City of
General Santos and the neighboring municipalities, and they are quite interested and even the
AID people are asking me, What is holding the creation of a new province when practically you
need it? Its not 20 or 30 kilometers from the capital town; its about 140 kilometers. And imagine
those people have to travel that far and our road is not like Metropolitan Manila. That is as far as
from here to Tarlac. And there are municipalities there that are just one municipality is bigger
than the province of La Union. They have the income. Of course, they dont have the population
because thats a part of the land of promise and people from Luzon are migrating everyday
because they feel that there are more opportunities here.
 
So, by creating the new provinces, not only in my case, in the other cases, it will enhance the
development of the Philippines, not because I am interested in my province. Well, as far as I am
concerned, you know, I am in the twilight years of my life to serve and I would like to serve my
people well. No personal or political interest here. I hope the distinguished Chairman of the
Committee will appreciate the House Bill 7166, which the House has already approved because
we dont want them to throw the Conference Committee Report after we have worked that the
house Bill has been, you know, drawn over board and not even considered by the Senate. And
on top of that, we are considering a bill that has not yet been passed. So I hope the Senator will
take that into account.
 
Thank you for giving me this time to explain.
 
CHAIRMAN LINA. Thank you very much, Congressman James. We will look into the
legislative history of the Senate version on this matter of creation of provinces. I am sure there
was an amendment. As I said, Ill look into it. Maybe the House version was incorporated in toto,
but maybe during the discussion, their amendments were introduced and, therefore, Senator
Pimentel could not hold on to the original version and as a result new criteria were introduced.
 
But because of the manifestation that you just made, we will definitely, when we reach a book,
Title IV, on the matter of provinces, we will look at it sympathetically from your end so that the
objective that you want [to] achieve can be realized. So we will look at it with sympathy. We
will review our position on the matter, how we arrived at the Senate version and we will adopt
an open mind definitely when we come into it.
 
 
CHAIRMAN ALFELOR. Kanino yan?
 
CHAIRMAN LINA. Book III.
CHAIRMAN ALFELOR. Title?
 
CHAIRMAN LINA. Title IV.
 
CHAIRMAN ALFELOR. I have been pondering on the case of James, especially on economic
stimulation of a certain area. Like our case, because I put myself on our province, our province
is quite very big. Its composed of four (4) congressional districts and I feel it should be five
now. But during the Batasan time, four of us talked and conversed proposing to divide the
province into two.
 
There are areas then, when since time immemorial, very few governors ever tread on those
areas. That is, maybe youre acquainted with the Bondoc Peninsula of Quezon, fronting that
is RagayGulf. From Ragay there is a long stretch of coastal area. From Albay going to Ragay,
very few governors ever tread [there] before, even today. That area now is infested with
NPA. That is the area of Congressman Andaya.
 
Now, we thought that in order to stimulate growth, maybe provincial aid can be extended to
these areas. With a big or a large area of a province, a certain administrator or provincial
governor definitely will have no sufficient time. For me, if we really would like to stimulate
growth, I believe that an area where there is physical or geographical impossibilities, where
administrators can penetrate, I think we have to create certain provisions in the law where maybe
we can treat it with special considerations.
 
Now, we went over the graduate scale of the Philipppine Local Government Data as far as
provinces are concerned. It is very surprising that there are provinces here which only composed
of six municipalities, eight municipalities, seven municipalities. Like in Cagayan, Tuguegarao,
there are six municipalities. Ah, excuse me, Batanes.
 
CHAIRMAN LINA. Will you look at the case of --- how many municipalities are there in
Batanes province?
 
CHAIRMAN ALFELOR. Batanes is only six.
 
CHAIRMAN LINA. Six town. Siquijor?
 
CHAIRMAN ALFELOR. Siquijor. It is region?
 
CHAIRMAN LINA. Seven.
 
CHAIRMAN ALFELOR.L Seven. Anim.
 
CHAIRMAN LINA. Six also.
 
CHAIRMAN ALFELOR. Six also.
  
CHAIRMAN LINA. It seems with a minimum number of towns? of the LGC, the IRA is given back to local governments, and the sharing is based on land area, population, and local
CHAIRMAN ALFELOR. The population of Siquijor is only 70 thousand, not even one
revenue.[30]
congressional district. But tumaas in 1982. Camiguin, that is Region 9. Wala dito. Nagtataka nga
ako ngayon.  
 
CHAIRMAN LINA. Camiguin, Camiguin. Elementary is the principle that, if the literal application of the law results in absurdity, impossibility, or injustice,
 
CHAIRMAN ALFELOR. That is region? Camiguin has five municipalities, with a population of then courts may resort to extrinsic aids of statutory construction, such as the legislative history of the law, [31] or may
63 thousand. But we do not hold it against the province because maybe thats one stimulant consider the implementing rules and regulations and pertinent executive issuances in the nature of executive and/or
where growth can grow, can start. The land area for Camiguin is only 229 square kilometers. So
if we hard fast on requirements of, we set a minimum for every province, palagay ko we just legislative construction. Pursuant to this principle, Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR should be deemed incorporated in
leave it to legislation, eh. Anyway, the Constitution is very clear that in case we would like to
divide, we submit it to a plebiscite. Pabayaan natin ang tao. Kung maglalagay tayo ng set ng the basic law, the LGC.
minimum, tila yata mahihirapan tayo, eh. Because what is really the thrust of the Local
Government Code? Growth. To devolve powers in order for the community to have its own idea  
how they will stimulate growth in their respective areas. It is well to remember that the LGC-IRR was formulated by the Oversight Committee consisting of
 
So, in every geographical condition, mayroon sariling id[i]osyncracies eh, we cannot make a members of both the Executive and Legislative departments, pursuant to Section 533 [32] of the LGC. As Section 533
generalization.
  provides, the Oversight Committee shall formulate and issue the appropriate rules and regulations necessary for
CHAIRMAN LINA. Will the creation of a province, carved out of the existing province because
of some geographical id[i]osyncracies, as you called it, stimulate the economic growth in the the efficient and effective implementation of any and all provisions of this Code, thereby ensuring compliance
area or will substantial aid coming from the national government to a particular area, say, to a with the principles of local autonomy as defined under the Constitution. It was also mandated by the
municipality, achieve the same purpose?
  Constitution that a local government code shall be enacted by Congress, to wit
CHAIRMAN ALFELOR. Ano tayo dito sa budget. All right, here is a province. Usually,  
tinitingnan lang yun, provision eh, hindi na yung composition eh. You are entitled to, say, 20%  
of the area. Section 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a
  more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system
Theres a province of Camarines Sur which have the same share with that of Camiguin and of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate
Siquijor, but Camiguin is composed only of five municipalities; in Siquijor, its composed of six, among the different local government units their powers, responsibilities, and
but the share of Siquijor is the same share with that of the province of Camarines Sur, having a resources, and provide for the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries,
bigger area, very much bigger. powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the
  organization and operation of the local units. (Emphasis supplied.)
That is the budget in process.  
 
CHAIRMAN LINA. Well, as I said, we are going to consider this very seriously and even with  
sympathy because of the explanation given and we will study this very carefully.[29]
These State policies are the very reason for the enactment of the LGC, with the view to attain

  decentralization and countryside development. Congress saw that the old LGC, Batas Pambansa Bilang 337, had to

The matters raised during the said Bicameral Conference Committee meeting clearly show the manifest intention of be replaced with a new law, now the LGC of 1991, which is more dynamic and cognizant of the needs of

Congress to promote development in the previously underdeveloped and uninhabited land areas the Philippines as an archipelagic country. This accounts for the exemption from the land area requirement of local

by allowing them to directly share in the allocation of funds under the government units composed of one or more islands, as expressly stated under Sections 442 and 450 of the LGC, with

respect to the creation of municipalities and cities, but inadvertently omitted from Section 461 with respect to the

creation of provinces.Hence, the void or missing detail was filled in by the Oversight Committee in the LGC-IRR.
national budget. It should be remembered that, under Sections 284 and 285
 
 With three (3) members each from both the Senate and the House of Representatives, particularly the
chairpersons of their respective Committees on Local Government, it cannot be gainsaid that the inclusion by the
Oversight Committee of the exemption from the land area requirement with respect to the creation of provinces
consisting of one (1) or more islands was intended by Congress, but unfortunately not expressly stated in Section
461 of the LGC, and this intent was echoed through an express provision in the LGC-IRR. To be sure, the Oversight
Committee did not just arbitrarily and whimsically insert such an exemption in Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR. The
Oversight Committee evidently conducted due deliberation and consultations with all the concerned sectors of
society and considered the operative principles of local autonomy as provided in the LGC when the IRR was
formulated.[33] Undoubtedly, this amounts not only to an executive construction, entitled to great weight and respect
from this Court,[34] but to legislative construction as well, especially with the inclusion of representatives from the
four leagues of local government units as members of the Oversight Committee.
With the formulation of the LGC-IRR, which amounted to both executive and legislative construction of
the LGC, the many details to implement the LGC had already been put in place, which Congress understood to be
impractical and not too urgent to immediately translate into direct amendments to the LGC. But Congress,
recognizing the capacity and viability of Dinagat to become a full-fledged province, enacted R.A. No. 9355,
following the exemption from the land area requirement, which, with respect to the creation of provinces, can only
be found as an express provision in the LGC-IRR. In effect, pursuant to its plenary legislative powers, Congress
breathed flesh and blood into that exemption in Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR and transformed it into law when it
enacted R.A. No. 9355 creating the Island Province of Dinagat.
 
Further, the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 9355 was filed and favorably voted upon in both
Chambers of Congress. Such acts of both Chambers of Congress definitively show the clear legislative intent to
incorporate into the LGC that exemption from the land area requirement, with respect to the creation of a province
when it consists of one or more islands, as expressly provided only in the LGC-IRR. Thereby, and by necessity, the
LGC was amended by way of the enactment of R.A. No. 9355.
 
What is more, the land area, while considered as an indicator of viability of a local government unit, is not
conclusive in showing that Dinagat cannot become a province, taking into account its average annual income
of P82,696,433.23 at the time of its creation, as certified by the Bureau of Local Government Finance, which is four
times more than the minimum requirement of P20,000,000.00 for the creation of a province. The delivery of basic
services to its constituents has been proven possible and sustainable.Rather than looking at the results of the
plebiscite and the May 10, 2010 elections as mere fait accompli circumstances which cannot operate in favor of
Dinagats existence as a province, they must be seen from the perspective that Dinagat is ready and capable of
becoming a province. This Court should not be instrumental in stunting such capacity. As we have held in League of
Cities of the Philippines v. Commission on Elections[35]
Ratio legis est anima. The spirit rather than the letter of the law. A statute must be read
according to its spirit or intent, for what is within the spirit is within the statute although it is not
within its letter, and that which is within the letter but not within the spirit is not within the
statute. Put a bit differently, that which is within the intent of the lawmaker is as much within the
statute as if within the letter, and that which is within the letter of the statute is not within the
statute unless within the intent of the lawmakers. Withal, courts ought not to interpret and should
not accept an interpretation that would defeat the intent of the law and its legislators.
So as it is exhorted to pass on a challenge against the validity of an act of Congress, a co-equal
branch of government, it behooves the Court to have at once one principle in mind: the
presumption of constitutionality of statutes. This presumption finds its roots in the tri-partite
system of government and the corollary separation of powers, which enjoins the three great
departments of the government to accord a becoming courtesy for each others acts, and not to
interfere inordinately with the exercise by one of its official functions. Towards this end, courts
ought to reject assaults against the validity of statutes, barring of course their clear
unconstitutionality. To doubt is to sustain, the theory in context being that the law is the product
of earnest studies by Congress to ensure that no constitutional prescription or concept is
infringed. Consequently, before a law duly challenged is nullified, an unequivocal breach of, or
a clear conflict with, the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative one, must be
demonstrated in such a manner as to leave no doubt in the mind of the Court.
WHEREFORE, the Court resolved to:
1. GRANT the Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment by movants-intervenors, dated and filed on
October 29, 2010;
2. RECONSIDER and SET ASIDE the July 20, 2010 Resolution, and GRANT the Motion for Leave to
Intervene and to File and to Admit Intervenors Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated July 20, 2010;
3. GRANT the Intervenors Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 12, 2010. The May
12, 2010 Resolution is RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE. The provision in Article 9(2) of the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 stating, The land area requirement shall not apply
where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands, is declared VALID. Accordingly, Republic
Act No. 9355 (An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands) is declared as VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL,
and the proclamation of the Province of Dinagat Islands and the election of the officials thereof are
declared VALID; and
4. The petition is DISMISSED.
 No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 180050               May 12, 2010
RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, VICTOR F. BERNAL, and RENE O. MEDINA, Petitioners,  in Section 461 of R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991.
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, representing the President of the Philippines; SENATE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the SENATE PRESIDENT; HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
represented by the HOUSE SPEAKER; GOVERNOR ROBERT ACE S. BARBERS, representing the
Mother Province of Surigao del Norte; GOVERNOR GERALDINE ECLEO VILLAROMAN, representing
the new Province of Dinagat Islands, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
PERALTA, J.:
Before us are two Motions for Reconsideration of the Decision dated February 10, 2010 − one filed by the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG) in behalf of public respondents, and the other filed by respondent Governor Geraldine
Ecleo Villaroman, representing the Province of Dinagat Islands. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Republic Act No. 9355, otherwise known as An Act Creating the
Province of Dinagat Islands, is hereby declared unconstitutional. The proclamation of the Province of Dinagat
Islands and the election of the officials thereof are declared NULL and VOID. The provision in Article 9 (2) of the
Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 stating, "The land area requirement shall
not apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands," is declared NULL and VOID.
The arguments of the movants are similar. The grounds for reconsideration of Governor Villaroman can be
subsumed under the grounds for reconsideration of the OSG, which are as follows:
I.
The Province of Dinagat Islands was created in accordance with the provisions of the 1987 Constitution and the
Local Government Code of 1991. Article 9 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations is merely interpretative of
Section 461 of the Local Government Code.
II.
The power to create a local government unit is vested with the Legislature. The acts of the Legislature and Executive
in enacting into law RA 9355 should be respected as petitioners failed to overcome the presumption of validity or
constitutionality.
III.
Recent and prevailing jurisprudence considers the operative fact doctrine as a reason for upholding the validity and
constitutionality of laws involving the creation of a new local government unit as in the instant case.
As regards the first ground, the movants reiterate the same arguments in their respective Comments that aside from
the undisputed compliance with the income requirement, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9355, creating the Province of
Dinagat Islands, has also complied with the population and land area requirements.
The arguments are unmeritorious and have already been passed upon by the Court in its Decision, ruling that R.A.
No. 9355 is unconstitutional, since it failed to comply with either the territorial or population requirement contained
When the Dinagat Islands was proclaimed a new province on December 3, 2006, it had an official population of only
106,951 based on the 2000 Census of Population conducted by the National Statistics Office (NSO), which
population is short of the statutory requirement of 250,000 inhabitants.
Although the Provincial Government of Surigao del Norte conducted a special census of population in Dinagat
Islands in 2003, which yielded a population count of 371,000, the result was not certified by the NSO as required by
the Local Government Code.1 Moreover, respondents failed to prove that with the population count of 371,000, the
population of the original unit (mother Province of Surigao del Norte) would not be reduced to
less than the minimum requirement prescribed by law at the time of the creation of the new province.2
Less than a year after the proclamation of the new province, the NSO conducted the 2007 Census of Population. The
NSO certified that as of August 1, 2007, Dinagat Islands had a total population of only 120,813, 3 which was still
below the minimum requirement of 250,000 inhabitants.
Based on the foregoing, R.A. No. 9355 failed to comply with the population requirement of 250,000 inhabitants as
certified by the NSO.
Moreover, the land area of the province failed to comply with the statutory requirement of 2,000 square kilometers.
R.A. No. 9355 specifically states that the Province of Dinagat Islands contains an approximate land area of 802.12
square kilometers. This was not disputed by the respondent Governor of the Province of Dinagat Islands in her
Comment. She and the other respondents instead asserted that the province, which is composed of more than one
island, is exempted from the land area requirement based on the provision in the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 (IRR), specifically paragraph 2 of Article 9 which states that
"[t]he land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands."
The certificate of compliance issued by the Lands Management Bureau was also based on the exemption under
paragraph 2, Article 9 of the IRR.
However, the Court held that paragraph 2 of Article 9 of the IRR is null and void, because the exemption is not
found in Section 461 of the Local Government Code. 4 There is no dispute that in case of discrepancy between the
basic law and the rules and regulations implementing the said law, the basic law prevails, because the rules and
regulations cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law.5
The movants now argue that the correct interpretation of Section 461 of the Local Government Code is the one
stated in the Dissenting Opinion of Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura.
In his Dissenting Opinion, Justice Nachura agrees that R.A. No. 9355 failed to comply with the population
requirement. However, he contends that the Province of Dinagat Islands did not fail to comply with the territorial
requirement because it is composed of a group of islands; hence, it is exempt from compliance not only with the
territorial contiguity requirement, but also with the 2,000-square-kilometer land area criterion in Section 461 of the
Local Government Code, which is reproduced for easy reference:
SEC. 461. Requisites for Creation. -- (a) A province may be created if it has an average annual income, as certified
by the Department of Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos (₱20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant
prices and either of the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by the
Lands Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified by
the National Statistics Office:
Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of the original
unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed herein.
(b) The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands or is separated by a
chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income of the province.
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special
funds, trust funds, transfers, and non-recurring income.6
Justice Nachura contends that the stipulation in paragraph (b) qualifies not merely the word "contiguous" in
paragraph (a) (i) in the same provision, but rather the entirety of paragraph (a) (i) that reads:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management
Bureau[.]7
He argues that the whole paragraph on contiguity and land area in paragraph (a) (i) above is the one being referred to
in the exemption from the territorial requirement in paragraph (b). Thus, he contends that if the province to be
created is composed of islands, like the one in this case, then, its territory need not be contiguous and need not have
an area of at least 2,000 square kilometers. He asserts that this is because as the law is worded, contiguity and land
area are not two distinct and separate requirements, but they qualify each other. An exemption from one of the two
component requirements in paragraph (a) (i) allegedly necessitates an exemption from the other component
requirement, because the non-attendance of one results in the absence of a reason for the other component
requirement to effect a qualification.
Similarly, the OSG contends that when paragraph (b) of Section 461 of the Local Government Code provides that
the "territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands," it necessarily dispenses the 2,000-sq.-
km. land area requirement, lest such exemption would not make sense. The OSG argues that in stating that a
"territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands," the law could not have meant to define the
obvious. The land mass of two or more islands will never be contiguous as it is covered by bodies of water. It is then
but logical that the territory of a proposed province that is composed of one or more islands need not be contiguous
or be at least 2,000 sq. kms.
The Court is not persuaded.
Section 7, Chapter 2 (entitled General Powers and Attributes of Local Government Units) of the Local Government
Code provides:
SEC. 7. Creation and Conversion. — As a general rule, the creation of a local government unit or its conversion
from one level to another level shall be based on verifiable indicators  of viability and projected capacity to provide
services, to wit:
(a) Income. — It must be sufficient, based on acceptable standards, to provide for all essential government
facilities and services and special functions commensurate with the size of its population, as expected of
the local government unit concerned;
(b) Population. — It shall be determined as the total number of inhabitants within the territorial
jurisdiction of the local government unit concerned; and
(c) Land area. — It must be contiguous, unless it comprises two (2) or more islands, or is separated by a
local government unit independent of the others; properly identified by metes and bounds with technical
descriptions; and sufficient to provide for such basic services and facilities to meet the requirements of its
populace.
Compliance with the foregoing indicators shall be attested to by the Department of Finance (DOF), the National
Statistics Office (NSO), and the Lands Management Bureau (LMB) of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR).8
It must be emphasized that Section 7 above, which provides for the general rule in the creation of a local government
unit, states in paragraph (c) thereof that the land area must be contiguous and sufficient to provide for such basic
services and facilities to meet the requirements of its populace.
Therefore, there are two requirements for land area: (1) the land area must be contiguous; and (2) the land area must
be sufficient to provide for such basic services and facilities to meet the requirements of its populace. A sufficient
land area in the creation of a province is at least 2,000 square kilometers, as provided by Section 461 of the Local
Government Code .
Thus, Section 461 of the Local Government Code, providing the requisites for the creation of a province,
specifically states the requirement of "a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers."
Hence, contrary to the arguments of both movants, the requirement of a contiguous territory and the requirement of a
land area of at least 2,000 square kilometers are distinct and separate requirements for land
area under paragraph (a) (i) of Section 461 and Section 7 (c) of the Local Government Code.
However, paragraph (b) of Section 461 provides two instances of exemption from the requirement of territorial
contiguity, thus:
(b) The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands, or is separated by a chartered city or
cities which do not contribute to the income of the province.9
Contrary to the contention of the movants, the exemption above pertains only to the requirement of territorial
contiguity. It clearly states that the requirement of territorial contiguity may be dispensed with in the case of a
province comprising two or more islands, or is separated by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the
income of the province.
Nowhere in paragraph (b) is it expressly stated or may it be implied that when a province is composed of two or
more islands, or when the territory of a province is separated by a chartered city or cities, such province need not
comply with the land area requirement of at least 2,000 square kilometers or the requirement in paragraph (a) (i) of
Section 461of the Local Government Code.
Where the law is free from ambiguity, the court may not introduce exceptions or conditions where none is provided
from considerations of convenience, public welfare, or for any laudable purpose;10 neither may it engraft into the law
qualifications not contemplated,11 nor construe its provisions by taking into account questions of expediency, good
faith, practical utility and other similar reasons so as to relax non-compliance therewith. 12 Where the law speaks in
clear and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation, but only for application.13
Moreover, the OSG contends that since the power to create a local government unit is vested with the Legislature,
the acts of the Legislature and the Executive branch in enacting into law R.A. No. 9355 should be respected as
petitioners failed to overcome the presumption of validity or constitutionality.
The contention lacks merit.
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution states:
SEC. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary
substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to
approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected."14
As the law-making branch of the government, indeed, it was the Legislature that imposed the criteria for the creation
of a province as contained in Section 461 of the Local Government Code. No law has yet been passed amending
Section 461 of the Local Government Code, so only the criteria stated therein are the bases for the creation of a
province. The Constitution clearly mandates that the criteria in the Local Government Code must be followed in the
creation of a province; hence, any derogation of or deviation from the criteria prescribed in the Local Government
Code violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.
Contrary to the contention of the movants, the evidence on record proved that R.A. No. 9355 failed to comply with
either the population or territorial requirement prescribed in Section 461 of the Local Government Code for the
creation of the Province of Dinagat Islands; hence, the Court declared R.A. No. 9355 unconstitutional.
In Fariñas v. The Executive Secretary,15 the Court held:
Every statute is presumed valid. The presumption is that the legislature intended to enact a valid, sensible and just
law and one which operates no further than may be necessary to effectuate the specific purpose of the law.
It is equally well-established, however, that the courts, as guardians of the Constitution, have the inherent authority
to determine whether a statute enacted by the legislature transcends the limit imposed by the fundamental law. And
where the acts of the other branches of government run afoul of the Constitution, it is the judiciary’s solemn and
sacred duty to nullify the same.
Citing League of Cities of the Philippines v. Commission on Elections, 16 the movants further contend that under the
operative fact doctrine, the constitutionality of R.A No. 9355, creating the Province of Dinagat Islands, should be
upheld.
The Court is not persuaded.
In League of Cities of the Philippines v. Commission on Elections, the Court held that the 16 cityhood laws, whose
validity were questioned therein, were constitutional mainly because it found that the said cityhood laws merely
carried out the intent of R.A. No. 9009, now Section 450 of the Local Government Code, to exempt therein
respondents local government units (LGUs) from the ₱100 million income requirement, since the said LGUs had
pending cityhood bills long before the enactment of R.A. No. 9009. Each one of the 16 cityhood laws contained a
provision exempting the municipality covered from the ₱100 million income requirement.
In this case, R.A. No. 9355 was declared unconstitutional because there was utter failure to comply with either the
population or territorial requirement for the creation of a province under Section 461 of the Local Government
Code.1avvphi1
The Court, while respecting the doctrine of separation of powers, cannot renege on its duty to determine whether the
other branches of the government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution, and determine whether
illegality attached to the creation of the province in question. To abandon this duty only because the Province of
Dinagat Islands has began its existence is to consent to the passage of a law that is violative of the provisions of the
Constitution and the Local Government Code, rendering the law and the province created null and void. The Court
cannot tolerate such nullity to be in existence. Where the acts of other branches of the government go beyond the
limit imposed by the Constitution, it is the sacred duty of the judiciary to nullify the same.17
Tan v. Comelec18 held:
x x x [T]he fact that such plebiscite had been held and a new province proclaimed and its officials appointed, the
case before Us cannot truly be viewed as already moot and academic. Continuation of the existence of this newly
proclaimed province, which petitioners strongly profess to have been illegally born, deserves to be inquired into by
this Tribunal so that, if indeed, illegality attaches to its creation, the commission of that error should not provide the
very excuse for perpetuation of such wrong. For this court to yield to the respondents’ urging that, as there has been
fait accompli then this Court should passively accept and accede to the prevailing situation, is an unacceptable
suggestion. Dismissal of the instant petition, as respondents so propose, is a proposition fraught with mischief.
Respondents’ submission will create a dangerous precedent. Should this Court decline now to perform its duty of
interpreting and indicating what the law is and should be, this might tempt again those who strut about in the
corridors of power to recklessly and with ulterior motives, create, merge, divide and/or alter the boundaries of
political subdivisions, either brazenly or stealthily, confident that this Court will abstain from entertaining future
challenges to their acts if they manage to bring about a fait accompli.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motions for Reconsideration of the Decision dated February 10, 2010
are hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.