Mariategui vs. CA GR NO. 57062, January 24, 1992
 CA
FACTS:
Lupo Mariategui died without a will on June 26, 1953 and contracted 3
marriages during his lifetime.  He acquired the Muntinlupa Estate while
he was still a bachelor.  He had 4 children with his first wife Eusebia
Montellano, who died in 1904 namely Baldomera, Maria del Rosario,
Urbano and Ireneo.  Baldomera had 7 children namely Antero, Rufina,
Catalino, Maria, Gerardo, Virginia and Federico, all surnamed Espina.  over the saidestate.
Ireneo on the other hand had a son named Ruperto.  On the other hand,
Lupo’s second wife is Flaviana Montellano where they had a daughter
named Cresenciana.  Lupo got married for the third time in 1930 with
Felipa Velasco and had 3 children namely Jacinto, Julian and Paulina. 
Jacinto testified that his parents got married before a Justice of the
Peace of Taguig Rizal. The spouses deported themselves as husband
and wife, and were known in the community to be such.
Lupo’s descendants by his first and second marriages executed a deed
of extrajudicial partition whereby they adjudicated themselves Lot NO.
163 of the Muntinlupa Estate and was subjected to a voluntary
registration proceedings and a decree ordering the registration of the lot
was issued.  The siblings in the third marriage prayed for inclusion in
the partition of the estate of their deceased father and annulment of the
deed of extrajudicial partition dated Dec. 1967.
ISSUE: Whether the marriage of Lupo with Felipa is valid in the
absence of a marriage license.
HELD: Although no marriage certificate was introduced to prove Lupo
and Felipa’s marriage, no evidence was likewise offered to controvert
these facts. Moreover, the mere fact that no record of the marriage
exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its
validity are present.
Under these circumstances, a marriage may be presumed to have taken
place between Lupo and Felipa. The laws presume that a man and a
woman, deporting themselves as husband and wife, have entered into a
lawful contract of marriage; that a child born in lawful wedlock, there
being no divorce, absolute or from bed and board is legitimate; and that
things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the
ordinary habits of life.
Hence, Felipa’s children are legitimate and therefore have successional
rights.
Mariategui vs. CAG.R. No. L-57062 January 24, 1992
Facts:
Lupo Mariategui contracted three marriages during his lifetime. On his
first wife, EusebiaMontellano, who died on November 8, 1904, he
begot four children, Baldomera, Maria delRosario, Urbana and Ireneo.
With his second wife, Flaviana Montellano, he begot a daughter named
Cresenciana. And his third wife, Felipa Velasco, he begot three
children, namely Jacinto,Julian and Paulina. At the time of Lupo’s
death he left certain properties with which he acquired when he was
stillunmarried. Lupo died without a will. Upon his death, descendants
from his first and secondmarriages executed a deed of extrajudicial
partition on Lot No. 163. However, the children onLupo’s third
marriage filed with the lower court an amended complaint claiming that
they weredeprive on the partition of Lot No. 163 which were owned by
their common father. Thepetitioners, children on first and second
marriage, filed a counterclaim to dismiss the saidcomplaint. Trial court
denied the motion to dismiss and also the complaint by the
respondents,children on third marriage.Respondents elevated the case
on CA on the ground that the trial court committed an error for
notfinding the third marriage to be lawfully married and also in holding
respondents are notlegitimate children of their said parents.
rendered a decision declaring all the children anddescendants of Lupo,
including the respondents, are entitled to equal shares of estate of
their father. However, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of
said decision.
Issue:
Whether or not respondents were able to prove their succession rights
Ruling:
With respect to the legal basis of private respondents' demand for
partition of the estateof Lupo Mariategui, the Court of Appeals aptly
held that the private respondents are legitimatechildren of the
deceased.Lupo Mariategui and Felipa Velasco were alleged to have
been lawfully married in or about1930. This fact is based on the
declaration communicated by Lupo Mariategui to Jacinto whotestified
that "when his father was still living, he was able to mention to him that
he and hismother were able to get married before a Justice of the Peace
of Taguig, Rizal." The spousesdeported themselves as husband and
wife, and were known in the community to be such. Although no
marriage certificate was introduced to this effect, no evidence was
likewise offeredto controvert
these facts. Moreover, the mere fact that no record of the marriage
exists does notinvalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its
validity are present.
Panganiban v. Borromeo, 58 PHIL 367
FACTS: Husband and wife Alejandro Pabro and Juana Mappala signed
a contract before the notary public of Elias Borromeo. The contract had
been prepared by the municipal secretary of Naguilian, Isabela. Atty.
Borromeo cooperated in the execution of the document. He was quite
knowledgeable about its contents although he did not know it fully
because of a difference in dialect. The contract is an agreement between
the husband and the wife which permitted the husband to take unto
himself a concubine and the wife to live in adulterous relationship with
another man, without opposition from either one of them.
ISSUE: Whether or not the contract is valid
HELD: No. Although RPC allowed the offended party to give pardon
to his or her offender spouse, this doesn’t mean that the purpose of the
legislature is to legalize adultery and concubinage. A notarized contract
that permits concubinage and adultery is not judicially recognizable.
Although the consent of a party is a bar to the prosecution of the said
crimes, the acts are still contrary to customs, good morals and against
the sanctity of marriage which is constitutionally provided for.
Selanova v Mendoza May 19,1975
Administrative Complaint in the Supreme Court.
Gross Ignorance of the Law.
Facts:
Saturino Selanova charged Judge Alejandro  Mendoza with
gross ignorance of the law for preparing and ratifying
a document  (November 21, 1972) extrajudicially liquidating
the conjugal partnership of the complainant and his wife,
Avelina Ceniza.
The conditions of the liquidation were 
1.  Either spouse would withdraw the complaint for adultery or
concubinage which each had filed against the other and
2. Waiver of the right to prosecute each other for whatever acts of
infidelity either one would commit against the other
In his judgment, respondent relied on Par. 4, Art 191 of the old Civil
Code that states:
“the husband and wife may agree upon the dissolution of
the conjugal partnership during the marriage, subject to judicial
approval.”
While the judge claimed that he asked the CFI of Negros (where the
couple resided) for judicial approval, the Judicial Consultant confirmed
that there was no affirmation from the same court. He still ratified
the document.
Issue:
WON the extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership without
judicial approval is void.
Held:
Yes, it is void.
Precedents (Quintana vs. Lerma, De Luna vs. Linatoc, De La Rosa vs.
Barruga)
Under Art. 221 of the Civil Code, the following shall be void:
1. Any contract for personal separation between husband and wife;
2. Every extrajudicial agreement during marriage, for the dissolution of
the conjugal partnership of gains or of the absolute community property
between husband and wife.
Moreover, while adultery and concubinage are private crimes, they are
crimes punishable by the RPC, and a contract legalizing their
commission is “contrary to law, morals and public order”, and as a
consequence not judicially recognizable.
Decision:
Respondent  severely censured. 
Dicta:
A. Respondent Judge claimed that prohibition of the extrajudicial
liquidation of the conjugal partnership during the marriage made article
191 of the Civil Code nugatory. He cited Lacson vs. San Jose-Lacson
case to show that subsequent approval of the court can render the
marriage dissolved.
The SC argued that the judicial sanction should be secured before the
separation.
 B. Disciplinary action had been taken against notaries
who authenticated agreements for the personal separation of spouses
wherein either spouse was permitted to commit acts of infidelity.
For instance, in Panganiban vs. Borromeo, the notary was rebuked for
authorizing a document that permitted both spouses to take in
concubines without opposition from either spouse.
 In Biton vs. Momongon, a document entitled “Legal Separation” was
executed by a notary. The husband and wife were separated mutually
and voluntarily, renouncing their rights and obligations in the process,
and given the authorization to remarry while not being witnesses
against one another. The lawyer was also rebuked.
In In re Santiago, a lawyer/ respondent prepared a document that gave a
married couple the authorization to marry again while giving them
assurance of renouncement of rights one would have against the other.
He was suspended from practice.
C. The judge was truly unaware of the legal prohibition in contracts for
the personal separation of spouses.
De Leon v CA  GR No. 80965 June 6, 1990  
FREEDOM OF STIPULATION OF CONTRACTS  
FACTS: 
(1) On October 18, 1969, private respondent Jose Vicente De Leon and
petitioner Sylvia Lichauco De Leon were united in wedlock before the
Municipal Mayor of Binangonan, Rizal. On August 28, 1971, a child
named Susana L. De Leon was born from this union. 
(2) Sometime in October, 1972, a de facto separation between the
spouses occured due to irreconcilable marital differences, with Sylvia
leaving the conjugal home. 
(3) Sometime in March, 1973, Sylvia went to the United States where
she obtained American citizenship. 
(4) On November 23, 1973, Sylvia filed with the Superior Court of
California, County of San Francisco, a petition for dissolution of
marriage against Jose Vicente. In the said divorce proceedings, Sylvia
also filed claims for support and distribution of properties. It appears,
however, that since Jose Vicente was then a Philippine resident and did
not have any assets in the United States, Sylvia chose to hold in
abeyance the divorce proceedings, and in the meantime, concentrated
her efforts to obtain some sort of property settlements with Jose Vicente
in the Philippines. 
(5) On March 16, 1977, Sylvia succeeded in entering into a Letter-
Agreement with her mother-in-law, private respondent Macaria De
Leon, 
(6) On the same date, Macaria made cash payments to Sylvia in the
amount of P100,000 and US$35,000.00 or P280,000.00, in compliance
with her obligations as stipulated in the aforestated Letter-Agreement. 
(7) On March 30, 1977, Sylvia and Jose Vicente filed before the then
Court of First Instance of Rizal a joint petition for judicial approval of
dissolution of their conjugal partnership  
Applicable Laws:  
(1) Article 1306. The contracting parties may establish such
stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem
convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order, or public policy. (1255a)  
(2) Article 1409. The following contracts are inexistent and void from
the beginning:  
(1) Those whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order or public policy; 
(2) Those which are absolutely simulated or fictitious; 
(3) Those whose cause or object did not exist at the time of the
transaction; 
(4) Those whose object is outside the commerce of men; 

(5) Those which contemplate an impossible service;  (6) Article 1330. A contract where consent is given through mistake,
violence, intimidation, undue influence, or fraud is voidable. (1265a)  
(6) Those where the intention of the parties relative to the principal
object of the contract cannot be ascertained; 

(7) Those expressly prohibited or declared void by law.   (7) Article 1331. In order that mistake may invalidate consent, it should
refer to the substance of the thing which is the object of the contract, or
to those conditions which have principally moved one or both parties to
enter into the contract. Mistake as to the identity or qualifications of
These contracts cannot be ratified. Neither can the right to set up the
one of the parties will vitiate consent only when such identity or
defense of illegality be waived.  
qualifications have been the principal cause of the contract.  

(3) Article 52. Marriage is not a mere contract but an inviolable social
A simple mistake of account shall give rise to its correction. (1266a)  
institution. Its nature, consequences and incidents are governed by law
and not subject to stipulation, except that the marriage settlements may
to a certain extent fix the property relations during the marriage. (n)  
(8) Article 1414. When money is paid or property delivered for an
illegal purpose, the contract may be repudiated by one of the parties
before the purpose has been accomplished, or before any damage has
(4) Article 191. The husband or the wife may ask for the separation of
been caused to a third person. In such case, the courts may, if the public
property, and it shall be decreed when the spouse of the petitioner has
interest will thus be subserved, allow the party repudiating the contract
been sentenced to a penalty which carries with it civil interdiction, or
to recover the money or property.  
has been declared absent, or when legal separation has been granted.  

(9) Article 1377. The interpretation of obscure words or stipulations in

In case of abuse of powers of administration of the conjugal partnership
a contract shall not favor the party who caused the obscurity. (1288)  
property by the husband, or in case of abandonment by the husband,
separation of property may also be ordered by the court, according to
the provisions of articles 167 and 178, No. 3.   
(10)  Article 1335. There is violence when in order to wrest consent,
serious or irresistible force is employed.   
In all these cases, it is sufficient to present the final judgment which has
been entered against the guilty or absent spouse. (1433a)  The husband
and the wife may agree upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership There is intimidation when one of the contracting parties is compelled
during the marriage, subject to judicial approval. All the creditors of the by a reasonable and well-grounded fear of an imminent and grave evil
husband and of the wife, as we l as of the conjugal partnership shall be upon his person or property, or upon the person or property of his
notified of any petition for judicial approval or the voluntary dissolution spouse, descendants or ascendants, to give his consent.  
of the conjugal partnership, so that any such creditors may appear at the
hearing to safeguard his interests. Upon approval of the petition for
dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the court shall take such
To determine the degree of intimidation, the age, sex and condition of
measures as may protect the creditors and other third persons.  
the person shall be borne in mind.  

After dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the provisions of articles

A threat to enforce one's claim through competent authority, if t he
214 and 215 shall apply. The provisions of this Code concerning the
claim is just or legal, does not vitiate consent. (1267a) 
effect of partition stated in articles 498 to 501 shall be applicable.
(1433a)  

RTC:  WHEREFORE, it is hereby declared that the conjugal

partnership of the Spouses is DISSOLVED  
(5) Article 221.The following shall be void and of no effect:  
ISSUE: Whether or not the Letter-Agreement is valid  

HELD: The letter-agreement is invalid.  

(1) Any contract for personal separation between husband and wife; 

(2) Every extra-judicial agreement, during marriage, for the dissolution

of the conjugal partnership of gains or of the absolute community of The cause or consideration for the intervenor Macaria De Leon in
property between husband and wife;  having executed Exhibits 'E' to 'E-2' was the termination of the marital
relationship between her son Jose Vicente De Leon and Sylvia
(3) Every collusion to obtain a decree of legal separation, or of Lichauco de Leon. 
annulment of marriage; 
Intervenor's undertaking under Exhibit 'E' premised on the termination
(4) Any simulated alienation of property with intent to deprive the of marital relationship is not only contrary to law but contrary to
compulsory heirs of their legitime.   Filipino morals and public Policy. As such, any agreement or
obligations based on such unlawful consideration and which is contrary Arquero claimed that Acebedo himself had been cohabitating with
to public policy should be deemed null and void.   another woman. Based on Arquero’s testimony, he justified his having
a relationship with Irader solely on the written document purportedly a
―Kasunduan‖ or agreement entered into by Acebedo and Irader,
... the agreement nevertheless is void because it contravenes the consenting to and giving freedom to either of them to seek any partner
following provisions of the Civil Code:  and to live with him or her.
Art. 221. The following shall be void and of no effect: 
(1) Any contract for personal separation between husband and wife;  ISSUE:
(2) Every extra-judicial agreement, during marriage, for the dissolution Whether or not Arquero should be held guilty of immorality
of the conjugal partnership of gains or of the absolute community of
property between husband and wife;  HELD:

Arquero’s justification fails. Being an employee of the judiciary,

Article 1414 of the Civil Code, which is an exception to the pari delicto
rule, is the proper law to be applied. It provides:  force and effect on the validity of the marriage between Acebedo and
When money is paid or property delivered for an illegal purpose, the
contract may be repudiated by one of the parties before the purpose has
been accomplished, or before any damage has been caused to a third
person. In such case, the courts may, if the public interest wig thus be
subserved, allow the party repudiating the contract to recover the
money or property. 
Since the Letter-Agreement was repudiated before the purpose has been
accomplished and to adhere to the pari delicto rule in this case is to put
a premium to the circumvention of the laws, positive relief should be
granted to Macaria. Justice would be served by allowing her to be
placed in the position in which she was before the transaction was
entered into.  Their conduct, not to mention behavior, is circumscribed with the heavy
OTHER NOTES: 
(1) Applying the foregoing to the present case, the claim of Macaria
that Sylvia threatened her to bring Jose Vicente to court for support, to
scandalize their family by baseless suits and that Sylvia would pardon
Jose Vicente for possible crimes of adultery and/or concubinage subject
to the transfer of certain properties to her, is obviously not the
intimidation referred to by law.    
In order that intimidation may vitiate consent and render the contract
invalid, the following requisites must concur:   Estrada vs. Escritor
Arquero ought to have known that the Kasunduan had absolutely no
Irader. Article 1 of the Family Code provides that marriage is ―an
inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences,
and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation.‖ It is
an institution of public order or policy, governed by rules established by
law which cannot be made inoperative by the stipulation of the parties.
Although every office in the government service is a public trust, no
position exacts a greater demand for moral righteousness and
uprightness from an individual than in the judiciary. That is why the
Court has firmly laid down exacting standards of morality and decency
expected of those in the service of the judiciary.
burden of responsibility, characterized by, among other things,
propriety and decorum so as to earn and keep the public’s respect and
confidence in the judicial service. It must be free from any whiff of
impropriety, not only with respect to their duties in the
judicial branch but also to their behavior outside the court as
private individuals
Arquero’s act of having illicit relations with Irader is, within the
purview of Section 46 (5) of Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of Executive
Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, a
disgraceful and immoral conduct.

AM P-02-1651, August 4, 2003

(1) that the intimidation must be the  determining cause of the contract, FACTS:
or must have caused the consent to be given; 
Soledad Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las
(2) that the threatened act be unjust or unlawful;   Pinas City.  Alejandro Estrada, the complainant, wrote to Judge Jose F.
Caoibes, presiding judge of Branch 253, RTC of Las Pinas City,
(3) that the threat be real and serious, there being an evident requesting for an investigation of rumors that Escritor has been living
disproportion between the evil and the resistance which all men can with Luciano Quilapio Jr., a man not her husband, and had eventually
offer, leading to the choice of the contract as the lesser evil; and   begotten a son. Escritor’s husband, who had lived with another woman,
died a year before she entered into the judiciary.  On the other hand,
(4) that it produces a reasonable and well-grounded fear from the fact Quilapio is still legally married to another woman.  Estrada is not
that the person from whom it comes has the necessary means or ability related to either Escritor or Quilapio and is not a resident of Las Pinas
to inflict the threatened injury.    but of Bacoor, Cavite.   According to the complainant, respondent
EDWIN A. ACEBEDO v. EDDIE P. ARQUERO should not be allowed to remain employed in the judiciary for it will
appear as if the court allows such act.
399 SCRA 10 (2003)
Escritor is a member of the religious sect known as the Jehovah’s
Position in the judiciary requires greater moral righteousness and Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society where her
uprightness. conjugal arrangement with Quilapio is in conformity with their
religious beliefs.  After ten years of living together, she executed on
Edwin A. Acebedo charged Eddie P. Arquero, Process Server of the July 28, 1991 a “Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness” which was
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Brooke’s Point, Palawan for approved by the congregation.  Such declaration is effective when legal
immorality, alleging that his wife, Dedje Irader Acebedo, a former impediments render it impossible for a couple to legalize their union. 
stenographer of the MTC Brooke’s Point, and Arquero unlawfully and Gregorio, Salazar, a member of the Jehovah’s Witnesses since 1985 and
scandalously cohabited as husband and wife. has been a presiding minister since 1991, testified and explained the
import of and procedures for executing the declaration which was
completely executed by Escritor and Quilapio’s in Atimonan, Quezon
and was signed by three witnesses and recorded in Watch Tower
Central Office.        causedtherescue operation of Mecaral. Thus, Mecaral filed a disbarment
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent should be found guilty of the administrative
charge of “gross and immoral conduct” and be penalized by the State
for such conjugal arrangement.
HELD:
A distinction between public and secular morality and religious
morality should be kept in mind. The jurisdiction of the Court extends
only to public and secular morality.
The Court states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality
approach that gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as
required by the Free Exercise Clause. This benevolent neutrality could
allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it
does not offend compelling state interests.
The state’s interest is the preservation of the integrity of the judiciary
by maintaining among its ranks a high standard of morality and
decency.  “There is nothing in the OCA’s (Office of the Court
Administrator) memorandum to the Court that demonstrates how this
interest is so compelling that it should override respondent’s plea of
religious freedom.  Indeed, it is inappropriate for the complainant, a
private person, to present evidence on the compelling interest of the
state. The burden of evidence should be discharged by the proper
agency of the government which is the Office of the Solicitor General”.
In order to properly settle the case at bar, it is essential that the
government be given an opportunity to demonstrate the compelling
state interest it seeks to uphold in opposing the respondent’s position
that her conjugal arrangement is not immoral and punishable as it is
within the scope of free exercise protection.  The Court could not
prohibit and punish her conduct where the Free Exercise Clause
protects it, since this would be an unconstitutional encroachment of her
right to religious freedom.  Furthermore, the court cannot simply take a
passing look at respondent’s claim of religious freedom but must also
apply the “compelling state interest” test.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the case is REMANDED to the Office of the
Court Administrator. The Solicitor General is ordered to intervene in
the case where it will be given the opportunity (a) to examine the
sincerity and centrality of respondent's claimed religious belief and
practice; (b) to present evidence on the state's "compelling interest" to
override respondent's religious belief and practice; and (c) to show that
the means the state adopts in pursuing its interest is the least restrictive
to respondent's religious freedom. The rehearing should be concluded
thirty (30) days from the Office of the Court Administrator's receipt of
this Decision.      Ruling: Article 376 of the Civil Code provides that no person can
 
MECARAL V. VELASQUEZ (April 23, 2010, A.C. No. 8392
[ Formerly CBD Case No. 08-2175], Per Curiam,June 29, 2010)
Complainant was hired as a secretary by the atty.Velasquez who later
became hiscommon-law wife.Mecaral was later brought toUpper San
Agustin in Caibiran,Biliran where he left her with a religiousgroup
known as theFaith HealersAssociation of the Philippines. Later,
Mecaral returned home
anduponknowing,Velasquez brought her back to San Agustin where, on  those corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct. Hence,
his instruction,hisfollowerstortured, brainwashed and injected her with  no correction is necessary. Article 413 of the Civil Code provides that
drugs. Her mother,Delia Tambis Vda. De Mecaral (Delia),having receiv
ed information that she wasweak,pale and walking barefoot along the i
the mountainousarea of Caibiran
complaintagainstrespondent and charged the latter with bigamy for
contracting asecond marriage toLeny H.Azur on August 2, 1996,
despite the subsistence of his marriage tohis firstwife, Ma. Shirley G.
Yunzal.Issue: whether respondent is guilty of grossly immoral and acts 
whichconstitutegross
misconductHeld: WHEREFORE, respondent, Atty. Danilo S. Velasque
z, is DISBARRED, andhisname ORDEREDSTRICKEN from the Roll 
of Attorneys. This Decision isimmediatelyexecutory and ordered to be
part of the records of respondent in theOffice of theBar Confidant,
Supreme Court of the Philippines.Ruling:
InvestigatingCommissioner of the CBD found that [respondents] acts of 
converting hissecretaryinto a mistress; contracting two marriages with 
Shirley andLeny, aregrossly immoral which no civilizedsociety in the w
orld can countenance. Thesubsequent detention and torture of the compl
ainant is grossmisconduct[which]only a beast may be able to do.
Certainly, the respondent had violatedCanon 1 of theCode of
Professional Responsibility.
The practice of law is not a right but a privilegebestowed by the state
upon thosewho show that theypossess, and continue to possess,
thequalifications required
bylaw for the conferment of such privilege.When a lawyersmoral
character isassailed, such that his right to continue practicing his
cherishedprofessionisimperiled, it behooves him to meet the charges
squarely and present evidence,tothesatisfaction of the investigating
body and this Court, that he is morally fit
tokeephis name in the Roll of Attorneys.Respondent has not discharged
the burden. Henever attended the hearings beforethe IBP to rebut
thecharges brought against him, suggestingthat they are true.Despite his
letter dated March 28, 2008manifesting that he wouldcome up with
hisdefense in a verified pleading,he never did
Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio, petitioner, vs. Republic of the
Philippines, respondent.
Facts: Petitioner was born and registered as male. He admitted that he
is a male transsexual, that is, “anatomically male but feels, thinks and
acts as a “female” and that he had always identified himself with girls
since childhood. He underwent psychological examination, hormone
treatment, breast augmentation and sex reassignment surgery. From
then on, petitioner lived as female and was in fact engaged to be
married. He then sought to have his name in his birth certificate
changed from Rommel Jacinto to Mely, and his sex from male to
female. The trial court rendered a decision in favor of the petitioner.
Republic of the Philippines thru the OSG filed a petition for certiorari
in the Court of Appeals. CA rendered a decision in favor of the
Republic.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to change his name and sex
in his birth certificate.
change his name or surname without judicial authority which was
amended by RA 9048 – Clerical Error Law which does not sanction a
change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Before a
person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or
reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such change. In
addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true
and official name. In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any
prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true and official
name. Article 412 of the Civil Code provides that no entry in the civil
register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order. The birth
certificate of petitioner contained no error. All entries therein, including
all other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be
governed by special laws. However, there is no such special law in the
Philippines governing sex reassignment and its effects. Under the Civil
Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they
existed at the time of birth. Thus, the sex of a person is determined at
birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by
examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law
legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a person’s
sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error  is
immutable
For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his
body and appearance through the intervention of modern surgery, no
law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that
reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or
change of the entries in his birth certificate. The remedies petitioner
seeks involve questions of public policy to be addressed solely by the
legislature, not by the courts. Hence, petition is denied.
SILVERIO VS REPUBLIC
Posted by kaye lee on 3:00 AM
G.R. No. 174689 October 22 2007 [Change of name or sex]
FACTS:
Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio having undergone a sex reassignment
surgery, sought to have his first name changed from Rommel to Mely,
and his sex from male to female. Trial court granted his petition. CA,
however, upon appeal filed by the Republic of the Philippines thru the
OSG, reversed the trial court decision, holding that there is no law
allowing the change of entries of either name or sex in the birth
certificate by reason of sex alteration.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Rommel's first name and sex be changed on the ground
of sex reassignment.
RULING: No.  There is no law authorizes the change of entry as of sex
and first name through the intervention of sex reassignment surgery.
Article 376 of the Civil Code as amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error
Law), together with Article 412 of the same Code, change of name or
sex in the birth certificate is allowed by the courts so long as clerical or
typographical errors are involved.
Changes sought by Silverio will have serious legal and public policy
consequences. To grant this petition filed by Silverio will greatly alter
the laws on marriage and family relations. Second, there will be major
changes in statutes that underscore the public policy in relation to
women.
Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio vs. Republic of the Philippines
October 22, 2007 537 SCRA 473
Ponente: Justice Corona
Facts: Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of
his first name and sex in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court
of Manila. Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City
of Manila to the spouses Melecio Petines Silverio and Anita Aquino
Dantes on April 4, 1962. His name was registered as "Rommel Jacinto
Dantes Silverio" in his certificate of live birth (birth certificate). His sex
was registered as "male." He further alleged that he is a male
transsexual. He underwent psychological examination, hormone
treatment and breast augmentation. His attempts to transform himself to
a "woman" culminated on January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex
reassignment surgery2 in Bangkok, Thailand. Petitioner lived as a
female and was in fact engaged to be married. An order setting the case
for initial hearing. On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a
decision4 in favor of petitioner. On August 18, 2003, the Republic of
the Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari
in the Court of Appeals.6 It alleged that there is no law allowing the
change of entries in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration.
February 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals 7 rendered a decision in favor
of the Republic. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied.
Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his name and sex in his
birth certificate is allowed under Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code,
Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court and RA 9048.
Issues:
(Issue in the RTC and CA) sole issue here is whether or not petitioner is
entitled to the relief asked for.
Whether or not a person’s first name be change because of sex
reassignment?
Whether or not entries in the B.C. be change on the basis of equity?
Held: Where the RTC affirms the petition filed by the herein petitioner,
through the OSG, the republic appealed the case in the Court of
Appeals, whereby the decision was set aside because there is no law
that provides for the change of first name because of a sex
reassignment. The SC rules out that the petition lacks merit where it
was denied. The SC held that a person’s first name cannot be change
because of sex reassignment and RA 9048 deliberately expounded on
how a name can be change and sex reassignment is not one of them. 
Furthermore, the SC held No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The
Birth Certificate As To Sex On the Ground of Sex Reassignment. It is
but clear to state that a person’s status is determined at birth and not by
reassignment. "Status" refers to the circumstances affecting the legal
situation (that is, the sum total of capacities and incapacities) of a
person in view of his age, nationality and his family membership. 
ENGRACE NIÑAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the
minors BABYLINE NIÑAL, INGRID NIÑAL, ARCHIE NIÑAL &
PEPITO NIÑAL, JR., petitioners, v. NORMA BAYADOG,
respondent.
G.R. No. 133778. March 14, 2000
Facts:
Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974.
She was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One
year and 8 monthsthereafter, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog
got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and
Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they
had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and were
thus exempt from securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997,
Pepito died in a car accident
After their father’s death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of
nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said
marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The case was filed
under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second
marriage would affect petitioner’s successional rights.
Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no
cause of action since they are not among the persons who could file an
action for annulment of marriage under Article 47 of the Family Code.
Issues:
(a) Whether or not Pepito and Norma’ living together as husband and
wife for at least five years exempts them from obtaining a marriage
license under Article 34 of the Family Code of the Philippines.
(b) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in
asking for the declaration of the nullity of marriage of their deceased
father, Pepito G. Niñal, with her specially so when at the time of the
filing of this instant suit, their father Pepito G. Niñal is already dead
Ruling:
(a) On the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as
husband and wife for five years without the benefit of marriage, that
five-year period should be computed on the basis of cohabitation as
“husband and wife” where the only missing factor is the special
contract of marriage to validate the union. In other words, the five-
year common law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the
date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it
not been for the absence of the marriage. The five-year period should
be the years immediately before the day the marriage and it should be a
period of cohabitationcharacterized by exclusivity—meaning no third
party was involved at any time within the five years, and continuity—
that is, unbroken. Otherwise, if that five-year cohabitation period
is computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were
capacitated to marry each other during the entire five years, then the
law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to
have common law relationships and placing them on the same footing
with those who lived faithfullywith their spouse.
(b) The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity
of a marriage. Voidable and void marriages are not identical.
Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of
either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only during the
lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in which case the
parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been
perfectly valid.
ENGRACE NIÑAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors
BABYLINE NIÑAL,INGRID NIÑAL, ARCHIE NIÑAL & PEPITO
NIÑAL, JR.,
petitioners, vs  September 2, 1994236 SCRA 257FACTS
. NORMA BAYADOG,
respondent  a civil ceremony without the knowledge of the former’s
 G.R. No. 133778, March 14, 2000FACTS:Pepito Niñal was married to
Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage were
bornherein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her
death on April 24, 1985. One year and8 months thereafter or on
December 11, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog
got marriedwithout any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and
Norma executed an affidavit dated December11, 1986 stating that they
had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and were
thusexempt from securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997,
Pepito died in a car accident. After
their father’s death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of
Pepito to
Norma alleging that the said
marriage was void for lack of a marriage license  nomarriage license issued prior to the celebration of hermarriage with
. The case was filed underthe assumption that the
validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect petitioner’s
successional rights  rt denied her petition. It ruled that “inability of
. The defendant contends that petitioners
have no cause of action since they are notamong the persons who could file an action for
"annulment of marriage".
ISSUES:(1)
 
Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs’ deceased father with defendant is null
and
void ab initio;(2)
 
Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in
asking for the declarationof the nullity of marriage of their deceased
father, Pepito G. Niñal, with her specially so when atthe time of the
filing of this instant suit, their father Pepito G. Niñal is already dead;(3)
 
Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from assailing the validity of the
second marriage after it
was dissolved due to their father’s death.
 HELD: As to the first issue, YES. The two marriages involved herein
having been solemnized prior to theeffectivity of the Family Code (FC),
the applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code
whichwas the law in effect at the time of their celebration. A valid
marriage license is a requisite of marriageunder Article 53 of the Civil
Code, the absence of which renders the marriage
void ab initio 
 pursuant to Article 80(3) in relation to Article 58. However, a marriage
license is dispensed with, as provided in Article 76 of the Civil Code,
referring to the marriage of a man and a woman who have
lived togetherand exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a
continuous and unbroken period of at leastfive years before
the marriage..In this case, at the time of Pepito
and respondent’s marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived
with each other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to
their wedding day. From the time
Pepito’s first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only
 about twentymonths had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his
first wife had separated in fact, and thereafterboth Pepito and
respondent had started living with each other that has already lasted for
five years,the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was
not the cohabitation contemplated by law.It should be in the nature of a
perfect union that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect only
bythe absence of the marriage contract. Pepito had a
subsisting marriage at the time when he startedcohabiting with
respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito
had alreadybeen separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The
subsistence of the marriage even where there wasactual severance of
the filial companionship between the spouses cannot make any
cohabitation byeither spouse with any third party as being one as
"husband and wife".
REPUBLIC vs. COURT OF APPEALSG.R. No. 103047,
:Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were married in
parents. All the documents required for the celebration of the marriage
which includes procurement of marriagelicense, was attended by
Cardenas. It was stated in themarriage contract that marriage license no.
3196182 wasissued. The cohabitation of Castro and Cardenas
lastedonly for four (4) months after which they parted ways.Castro
sought the advice of a lawyer for a possibleannulment of her marriage
with Cardenas before leavingfor the States to follow her daughter who
was adopted byher brother with the consent of Cardenas. The
CivilRegistrar of Pasig issued a certification stating that Castroand
Cardenas were allegedly married in the Pasay Court onJune 21, 1970
under an alleged marriage license no.3196182 which was allegedly
issued on June 20, 1970 butsuch cannot be located since it does not
appear in theirrecords. It was then that she found out that there was
Cardenas.Castro filed a petition seeking a judicial declaration of nullity
of her marriage with Edwin Cardenas. The RegionalTrial Cou
 
the certifying official to locate the marriage license is notconclusive to
show that there was no marriage license
issued.”
 Castro appealed to respondent appellate court contendingthat the
certification from the local civil registrarsufficiently established the
absence of a marriage license.The respondent appellate court reversed
the ruling of thetrial court declaring that the marriage between
thecontracting parties is null and void and directed the CivilRegistrar of
Pasig to cancel the marriage contract.However, the Republic of the
Philippines, the petitionerherein, brought a petition for review on
certiorari whichalleged that the certification and the
uncorroboratedtestimony of Castro are not sufficient to overthrow
thelegal presumption regarding the validity of a marriage.
ISSUE
:Whether or not the documentary and testimonialevidence presented by
private respondent are sufficient toestablish that no marriage license
was issued prior to thecelebration of marriage.
RULING:
Yes. The Court ruled that the certification of "due searchand inability to
find" issued by the civil registrar of Pasigenjoys probative value, he
being the officer charged underthe law to keep a record of all data
relative to the issuanceof a marriage license.Unaccompanied by any
circumstance of suspicion andpursuant to Section 29, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court, acertificate of "due search and inability to find"
sufficientlyproved that his office did not issue marriage license
no.3196182 to the contracting parties.The fact that private respondent
Castro offered only hertestimony in support of her petition is, in itself,
not aground to deny her petition. The failure to offer any otherwitness
to corroborate her testimony is mainly due to thepeculiar circumstances
of the case.The finding of the appellate court that the marriagebetween
the contracting parties is null and void for lack of a marriage license
does not discount the fact that indeed,a spurious marriage license,
purporting to be issued by thecivil registrar of Pasig, may have been
presented byCardenas to the solemnizing officer.It was held that under
the circumstances of the case, thedocumentary and testimonial evidence
presented byprivate respondent Castro sufficiently established
theabsence of the subject marriage license.Therefore, the petition is
DENIED there being no showingof any reversible error committed by
respondent appellatecourt
nullity prescribes as the case here where Jose
filed a complaint after seven years from contracting marriage.
Held:
(1)Yes.The intendment of law or fact leans towards the
validity of marriage, willnot salvage the parties’ marriage, and extricate
them from the effect of a violation of thelaw. The Court protects the
fabric of the institution of marriage and at the same time waryof
deceptive schemes that violate the legal measures set forth in the law.
The case cannotfall under irregularity of the marriage license, what
happens here is an absence ofmarriage license which makes their
marriage void for lack of one of the essentialrequirement of a valid
marriage.
(2) No. An action for nullity is imprescriptible. Jose and
Felisa’s marriage wascelebrated san a marriage license. The right to
impugn a void marriage does not prescribe.
G.R. No. 175581               March 28, 2008
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
JOSE A. DAYOT, Respondent.
Chico-Nazario, J.:
FACTS:   On November 24, 1986, Jose and Felisa were married in
Pasay City through the execution of a sworn affidavit attesting that both
of them had attained the age of maturity and that being unmarried, they
had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years. Then Jose
contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual on August 31,
1990. On June 3, 1993 Felisa filed an action for bigamy against Jose. 
Then on July 7, 1993, Jose filed a Complaint for Annulment and/or
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Biñan, Laguna. He contended that his marriage with Felisa was
a sham, as no marriage ceremony was celebrated between the parties;
that he did not execute the sworn affidavit stating that he and Felisa had
lived as husband and wife for at least five years; and that his consent to
the marriage was secured through fraud. The RTC rendered a Decision
dismissing the complaint for the ground that the testimonies and
evidence presented, the marriage celebrated between Jose and Felisa
was valid. Jose filed an appeal from the foregoing RTC Decision to the
Court of Appeals the Court of Appeals did not accept Jose assertion that
his marriage to Felisa was void ab initio for lack of a marriage license. 
Jose filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereof. His central opposition
was that the requisites for the proper application of the exemption from
a marriage license under Article 34 of the New Civil Code were not
fully attendant in the case at bar he cited the legal condition that the
man and the woman must have been living together as husband and
wife for at least five years before the marriage. Essentially, he
maintained that the affidavit of marital cohabitation executed by him
and Felisa was false.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage between Jose and Felisa is void ab
initio?
RULING: Yes, it is void ab initio (void from the beginning) for
lacking the requirements of valid marriage in which the sworn affidavit
that Felisa executed is merely a scrap of paper because they started
living together five months before the celebration of their marriage.
That according to the five-year common-law cohabitation period under
Article 34 “No license shall be necessary for the marriage for a man
and a woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least
five years and without any legal impediments to marry each other… “ it
means that a five years period computed back from the date of
celebration of marriage, and refers to a period of legal union had it not
been for the absence of a marriage. It covers the years immediately
preceding the day of the marriage, characterized by exclusivity,
meaning no third party was involved at any time within the five years
and continuity that is unbroken.
The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear
violation of the law and would lead or could be used, at least, for the
perpetration of fraud against innocent and unwary parties. 
The Court of Appeals granted Joses Motion for Reconsideration and
reversed itself. Accordingly, it rendered an Amended Decision that the
marriage between Jose A. Dayot and Felisa C. Tecson is void ab initio.