G.R. No.

L-25246 September 12, 1974

ISSUE/S:
BENJAMIN VICTORIANO, plaintiff-appellee, 
vs. WON RA 3350 introducing an amendment to paragraph (4) subsection (a) of
ELIZALDE ROPE WORKERS' UNION and ELIZALDE ROPE
section 4 of Republic Act No. 875, as follows: ... "but such agreement shall not
FACTORY, INC., defendants, ELIZALDE ROPE WORKERS'
cover members of any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members
UNION, defendant-appellant.
in any such labor organization" is unconstitutional

ZALDIVAR, J.:p

WON RA 3350 infringes on the fundamental right to form lawful associations

FACTS:
when it "prohibits all the members of a given religious sect from joining any
Benjamin Victoriano (hereinafter referred to as Appellee), a member of the labor union if such sect prohibits affiliations of their members thereto" 5 ; and,
religious sect known as the "Iglesia ni Cristo", had been in the employ of the consequently, deprives said members of their constitutional right to form or join
Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as Company) since 1958.  lawful associations or organizations guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and thus
becomes obnoxious to Article III, Section 1 (6) of the 1935 Constitution
As such employee, he was a member of the Elizalde Rope Workers' Union
(hereinafter referred to as Union) which had with the Company a collective
bargaining agreement containing a closed shop provision which reads as RULING:
follows: 
1. NO. R.A. No. 3350 is constitutional on all counts. It must be pointed out that
Membership in the Union shall be required as a condition of employment for all the free exercise of religious profession or belief is superior to contract rights. In
permanent employees workers covered by this Agreement.  case of conflict, the latter must, therefore, yield to the former.

The collective bargaining agreement expired on March 3, 1964 but was renewed 2. No. What the exception provides, therefore, is that members of said religious
the following day, March 4, 1964.  sects cannot be compelled or coerced to join labor unions even when said unions
have closed shop agreements with the employers; that in spite of any closed shop
Under Section 4(a), paragraph 4, of Republic Act No. 875, prior to its agreement, members of said religious sects cannot be refused employment or
amendment by Republic Act No. 3350, the employer was not precluded "from dismissed from their jobs on the sole ground that they are not members of the
making an agreement with a labor organization to require as a condition of collective bargaining union. 
employment membership therein, if such labor organization is the representative
of the employees." On June 18, 1961, however, Republic Act No. 3350 was If, notwithstanding their religious beliefs, the members of said religious sects
enacted, introducing an amendment to — paragraph (4) subsection (a) of section prefer to sign up with the labor union, they can do so. If in deference and fealty
4 of Republic Act No. 875, as follows: ... "but such agreement shall not cover to their religious faith, they refuse to sign up, they can do so; the law does not
members of any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members in coerce them to join; neither does the law prohibit them from joining; and neither
any such labor organization".  may the employer or labor union compel them to join. Republic Act No. 3350,
therefore, does not violate the constitutional provision on freedom of
Being a member of a religious sect that prohibits the affiliation of its members association. 
with any labor organization, Appellee presented his resignation to appellant
Union in 1962, and when no action was taken thereon, he reiterated his Appeal is dismissed.
resignation on September 3, 1974. Thereupon, the Union wrote a formal letter to
the Company asking the latter to separate Appellee from the service in view of
the fact that he was resigning from the Union as a member. 

The management of the Company in turn notified Appellee and his counsel that
unless the Appellee could achieve a satisfactory arrangement with the Union, the
Company would be constrained to dismiss him from the service. This prompted
Appellee to file an action for injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. 58894 in the
Court of First Instance of Manila to enjoin the Company and the Union from
dismissing Appellee. 1 In its answer, the Union invoked the "union security
clause" of the collective bargaining agreement; assailed the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 3350; and contended that the Court had no jurisdiction over
the case, pursuant to Republic Act No. 875, Sections 24 and 9 (d) and (e). 

CFI MANILA: enjoining the defendant Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc. from
dismissing the plaintiff from his present employment and sentencing the
defendant Elizalde Rope Workers' Union to pay the plaintiff P500 for attorney's
fees and the costs of this action 

Appeal to this Court on purely questions of law. 

UNION CONTENTION: that Republic Act No. 3350 discriminatorily favors

those religious sects which ban their members from joining labor unions, in
violation of Article Ill, Section 1 (7) of the 1935 Constitution; and while said Act
unduly protects certain religious sects, it leaves no rights or protection to labor
organizations.

APPELLEE CONTENTION: contended that Republic Act No. 3350 does not
violate the right to form lawful associations, for the right to join associations
includes the right not to join or to resign from a labor organization, if one's
conscience does not allow his membership therein, and the Act has given
substance to such right by prohibiting the compulsion of workers to join labor
organizations
ABARIA VS NLRC However, MCCHI returned the CBA proposal for NAVA to secure first the

***(NET DIGEST)*** endorsement of the legal counsel of NFL as the official bargaining representative

Facts: of MCCHI employees.

LOCAL CHAPTER - Nagkahiusang Mamumuo sa MCCH (NAMA-MCCH- Atty. Alforque of the NFL (National federation) informed MCCHI that the

NFL), NOT INDEPENDENTLY REGISTEREDNATIONAL FEDERATION - proposed CBA submitted by NAVA was never referred to NFL and that NFL

NFL has not authorized any other legal counsel or any person for collective

Note: Metro Cebu Community Hospital, Inc. (MCCHI) later changed its name to bargaining negotiations.

Visayas Community Medical Center (VCMC), By January 1996, the collection of union fees (check-off) was temporarily

The 4 consolidated petitions before us involve the legality of mass termination suspended by MCCHI in view of the existing conflict between the federation

of hospital employees who participated in strike and picketing activities. and its local affiliate.

Metro Cebu Community Hospital, Inc. (MCCHI), presently known as the Thereafter, MCCHI attempted to take over the room being used as union office

Visayas Community Medical Center (VCMC), is a non-stock, non-profit but was prevented to do so by NAVA and her group who protested these actions

corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines. It operates the Metro and insisted that management directly negotiate with them for a new CBA.

Cebu Community Hospital (MCCH), a tertiary medical institution located at MCCHI referred the matter to Atty. Alforque, NFLs Regional Director, and

Osmea Boulevard, Cebu City. advised NAVA that their group is not recognized by NFL.

MCCH is owned by the United Church of Christ in the Philippines (UCCP) and Thereafter, Atty. Alforque suspended the union membership of the following

Rev. Gregorio P. Iyoy (REV. IYOY) is the Hospital Administrator. UNION officers for serious violation of the Constitution and By-Laws of NFL:

The National Federation of Labor (NFL) is the exclusive bargaining NAVA, Canen, Jr., Gerona, Bongcaras, Remocaldo, Alsado and Baez.

representative of the rank-and-file employees of MCCHI. SALIENT points of the letter:

The 1987, 1991 Collective Bargaining Agreements (CBAs) were negotiated by It appears that the abovementioned UNION officers openly declared during the

NFL, with Atty. Armando Alforque as NFL Legal Counsel and Lumapguid as General Membership Meeting of the Union that said the former (UNON

President of NFL-MCCH Chapter. officers) recognized the officers of the KMU not those of the NFL submit to the

In the CBA effective from January 1994 until December 31, 1995, this was authority of the KMU not of the NFL and that they are loyal only to the KMU

again negotiated by NFL together with Perla NAVA (NAVA), President of not to the NFL.

Nagkahiusang Mamumuo sa MCCH (NAMA-MCCH-NFL) signed the Proof of Said UNION officers appear to have sent a letter to REV. IYOY saying that they

Posting. do not need any endorsement from NFL to negotiate their CBA with MCCHI

December 6, 1995: Since the CBA was about to expire, NAVA (as President of Such actuations constitute the following offenses in the UNIONS Constitution

the local chapter) wrote REV. IYOY as administrator of MCCHI expressing the and By-Laws (CBL):

UNIONs desire to renew the CBA, attaching to her letter a statement of 1. Willful violation of the CBL of the Federation

proposals signed/endorsed by 153 union members. a) Defying NFL in the latters instruction for NAVA to disaffiliate from the

KMU; and
b) disregarding the powers of the Regional Director to negotiate and sign the invoked the grievance procedure provided in the CBA to settle the dispute

CBA together with the local negotiating panel subject to prior ratification by the between management and the union.

general membership; On March 13 and 19, 1996, the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE)

2. Joining or assisting another labor organization (KMU is deemed an Regional Office No. 7 issued certifications stating that there is nothing in their

organization that seeks to defeat the objective of establishing independent and records which shows that NAMA-MCCH-NFL is a registered labor

democratic unions and seeks to replace the Federation as exclusive organization, and that said union submitted only a copy of its Charter Certificate

representative of its members) on January 31, 1995.

UNION officers were directed to submit written explanation on the above MCCHI then sent individual notices to all union members asking them to submit

charges within 5 days BUT considering the gravity of the charges the UNION within 72 hours a written explanation why they should not be terminated for

officers were placed under temporary suspension from their office and having supported the illegal concerted activities of NAMA-MCCH-NFL which

membership in the union immediately pending investigation and final has no legal personality as per DOLE records.

disposition of their case in accordance with the unions CBL. On March 13, 1996, NAMA-MCCH-NFL (Local Chapter) filed a Notice of

The next day, several union members led by NAVA and her group launched a Strike with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) Region 7

series of mass actions such as wearing black and red armbands/headbands, but the same was deemed not filed for want of legal personality on the part of

marching around the hospital premises and putting up placards, posters and the filer.

streamers. NCMB likewise denied their motion for reconsideration on March 25, 1996.

Atty. Alforque immediately disowned the concerted activities being carried out Despite such denial, NAVA and her group still conducted a strike vote on April

by union members which are not sanctioned by NFL. 2, 1996 during which an overwhelming majority of union members approved the

MCCHI directed the union officers led by NAVA to submit within 48 hours a strike.

written explanation why they should not be terminated for having engaged in Meanwhile, the scheduled investigations did not push through because the

illegal concerted activities amounting to strike, and placed them under striking union members insisted on attending the same only as a group.

immediate preventive suspension. MCCHI again sent notices informing them that their refusal to submit to

Responding to this directive, NAVA and her group denied there was a temporary investigation is deemed a waiver of their right to explain their side and

stoppage of work, explaining that employees wore their armbands only as a sign management shall proceed to impose proper disciplinary action under the

of protest and reiterating their demand for MCCHI to comply with its duty to circumstances.

bargain collectively. On March 30, 1996, MCCHI sent termination letters to union leaders and other

REV. IYOY, having been informed that NAVA and her group have also been members who participated in the strike and picketing activities.

suspended by NFL, directed said officers to appear before his office for On April 8, 1996, it also issued a cease-and-desist order to the rest of the striking

investigation in connection with the illegal strike wherein they reportedly uttered employees.

slanderous and scurrilous words against the officers of the hospital, threatening For their continued picketing activities despite the said warning, more than 100

other workers and forcing them to join the strike. Said union officers, however, striking employees were dismissed effective April 12 and 19, 1996.
Unfazed, the striking union members held more mass actions. The means of LABOR ARBITER: NO basis for ULP charges. Termination valid.

ingress to and egress from the hospital were blocked so that vehicles carrying NLRC: DISMISSED the complaint for ULP and illegal dismissal and affirming

patients and employees were barred from entering the premises. Placards were LAs decision declaring all complainants to have been validly dismissed. MR

placed at the hospitals entrance gate stating: Please proceed to another hospital denied.

and we are on protest. Employees and patients reported acts of intimidation and CA REVERSED. Petition for certiorari is granted, ordering Private respondent

harassment perpetrated by union leaders and members. MCCHI to reinstate petitioners Yballe, et al. without loss of seniority rights and

With the intensified atmosphere of violence and animosity within the hospital other privileges; to pay them their full backwages inclusive of their allowances

premises as a result of continued protest activities by union members, MCCHI and other benefits computed from the time of their dismissal up to the time of

suffered heavy losses due to low patient admission rates. The hospitals suppliers their actual reinstatement.

also refused to make further deliveries on credit. MCCHI, et al. filed MR but the CA denied.

With the volatile situation adversely affecting hospital operations and the Both petitioners and private respondents in CA-G.R. SP No. 66540 appealed to

condition of confined patients, MCCHI filed a petition for injunction in the this Court. Private respondent MCCHI in CA-G.R. SP No. 84998, under its new

NLRC (Cebu City) on July 9, 1996 (Injunction Case No. V-0006-96). name Visayas Community Medical Center (VCMC), filed a petition for

A TRO was issued on July 16, 1996. certiorari in this Court.

MCCHI presented 12 witnesses (hospital employees and patients), including a CASE 2&3

security guard who was stabbed by an identified sympathizer while in the LABOR ARBITER: NO basis for ULP charges. Termination valid. Executive

company of NAVAs group. LA Belarmino rendered his decision dismissing the complaints for unfair labor

MCCHIs petition was granted and a permanent injunction was issued on practice in 3 NLRC Cases (CASES 1,2,3) filed by NAVA and 90 other

September 18, 1996 enjoining the NAVA group from committing illegal acts complainants. The charge of ULP and the strike and picketing activities were

mentioned in Art. 264 of the Labor Code held illegal having been conducted by NAMA-MCCH-NFL which is not a

On August 27, 1996, the City Government of Cebu ordered the demolition of the legitimate labor organization. Complainants appealed to NLRC.

structures and obstructions put up by the picketing employees of MCCHI along NLRC: AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS (about the pay), declaring the

the sidewalk, having determined the same as a public nuisance or nuisance per dismissal of all the complainants in CASE 2 & 3 valid and legal. NLRC denied

se. complainants MR. Hence appeal to CA.

Thereafter, several complaints for illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice CA Dismissed on the ground of forum shopping + AFFIRMS NLRC decision

were filed by the terminated employees against MCCHI, REV. IYOY, UCCP but modifies as to the awards of separation pay. Out of 88 petitioners only 47

and members of the Board of Trustees of MCCHI. have signed the certification against forum shopping. 18 Petitioners filed MR

There were around 90 complainants/ dismissed employees. 3 complaints were arguing that the 47 signatories more than constitute the principal parties as the

lodged with LA. petition involves a matter of common concern to all the petitioning employees.

CASE 1 RAB-VII-02-0309-98 - pertaining to complainants Yballe, Ong, Angel By resolution, the CA reinstated the case only insofar as the 47 petitioners who

and Cortez CASE 2 RAB-VII-02-0394-98 CASE 3 RAB-VII-03-0596-98 signed the petition are concerned.

CASE 1:
Petitioners challenged the validity of CA order/resolution before SC in a petition Art. 248 (g) of the Labor Code, as amended, makes it an unfair labor practice for

for review on certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 154113. an employer [t]o violate the duty to bargain collectively as prescribed by the

Petitioners Employees filed a MR, while private respondents MCCH filed a Code.

motion for partial reconsideration questioning the award of separation pay. CA The applicable provision in this case is Art. 253 which provides:

denied both motions. ART. 253. Duty to bargain collectively when there exists a CBA.When there is a

All of the above cases were consolidated as they involve similar factual CBA, the duty to bargain collectively shall also mean that neither party shall

circumstances and identical or related issues. terminate nor modify such agreement during its lifetime. However, either party

ISSUES: can serve a written notice to terminate or modify the agreement at least sixty

1. WON the CA erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No. (60) days prior to its expiration date. It shall be the duty of both parties to keep

66540) with respect to the petitioners in G.R. No. 154113 for their failure to sign the status quo and to continue in full force and effect the terms and conditions of

the certification against forum shopping; the existing agreement during the 60-day period and/or until a new agreement is

2. WON MCCHI is guilty of unfair labor practice? NO ULP reached by the parties.

3. WON petitioning employees were illegally dismissed? Union officers legal, NAMA-MCCH-NFL charged MCCHI with refusal to bargain collectively when

Union members illegal the latter refused to meet and convene for purposes of collective bargaining.

4. If their termination was illegal, WON petitioning employees are entitled to MCCHI, on its part, deferred any negotiations until the local unions dispute with

separation pay, backwages, damages and attorneys fees? Dismissed union the national union federation (NFL) is resolved considering that the latter is the

members not entitled to backwages but should be awarded separation pay in lieu exclusive bargaining agent which represented the rank-and-file hospital

of reinstatement employees in CBA negotiations since 1987.

HELD: Records of the NCMB and DOLE Region 7 confirmed that NAMA-MCCH-NFL

PART 1: Dropping of petitioners who did not sign the certification against had not registered as a labor organization, having submitted only its charter

forum shopping improper certificate as an affiliate or local chapter of NFL.

The certification against forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs or Not being a legitimate labor organization, NAMA-MCCH-NFL is not entitled to

petitioners in a case; otherwise, those who did not sign will be dropped as parties those rights granted to a legitimate labor organization under Art. 242,

to the case. Under reasonable or justifiable circumstances, however, as when all specifically:

the plaintiffs or petitioners share a common interest and invoke a common cause (a) To act as the representative of its members for the purpose of collective

of action or defense, the signature of only one of them in the certification against bargaining;

forum shopping substantially complies with the Rule. Clearly, the CA erred in (b) To be certified as the exclusive representative of all the employees in an

dropping as parties-petitioners those who did not sign the certification against appropriate collective bargaining unit for purposes of collective bargaining;

forum shopping. Aside from the registration requirement, is only the labor organization

PART 2: MCCHI not guilty of unfair labor practice designated or selected by the majority of the employees in an appropriate

collective bargaining unit which is the exclusive representative of the employees

in such unit for the purpose of collective bargaining, as provided in Art. 255.
NAMA-MCCH-NFL is not the labor organization certified or designated by the instance of either or both the federation and the local union or a rival labor

majority of the rank-and-file hospital employees to represent them in the CBA organization, not the employer.

negotiations but the NFL, as evidenced by CBAs concluded in 1987, 1991 and Not being a legitimate labor organization nor the certified exclusive bargaining

1994. representative of MCCHIs rank-and-file employees, NAMA-MCCH-NFL

While it is true that a local union has the right to disaffiliate from the national cannot demand from MCCHI the right to bargain collectively in their behalf.

federation, NAMA-MCCH-NFL has not done so as there was no effort on its Hence, MCCHIs refusal to bargain then with NAMA-MCCH-NFL cannot be

part to comply with the legal requisites for a valid disaffiliation during the considered an unfair labor practice to justify the staging of the strike.

freedom period or the last 60 days of the last year of the CBA, through a Art. 255. Exclusive bargaining representation and workers participation in policy

majority vote in a secret balloting in accordance with Art. 241 (d). and decision-making.The labor organization designated or selected by the

NAVA and her group simply demanded that MCCHI directly negotiate with the majority of the employees in an appropriate collective bargaining unit shall be

local union which has not even registered as one. the exclusive representative of the employees in such unit for the purpose of

To prove majority support of the employees, NAMA-MCCH-NFL presented the collective bargaining. x x x

CBA proposal allegedly signed by 153 union members. However, the petition Art. 243 An intra-union dispute refers to any conflict between and among union

signed by said members showed that the signatories endorsed the proposed terms members, including grievances arising from any violation of the rights and

and conditions without stating that they were likewise voting for or designating conditions of membership, violation of or disagreement over any provision of

the NAMA-MCCH-NFL as their exclusive bargaining representative.1 the unions constitution and by-laws, or disputes arising from chartering or

In any case, NAMA-MCCH-NFL at the time of submission of said proposals disaffiliation of the union. Sections 1 and 2, Rule XI of Department Order No.

was not a duly registered labor organization, hence it cannot legally represent 40-03, Series of 2003 of the DOLE enumerate the following circumstances as

MCCHIs rank-and-file employees for purposes of collective bargaining. inter/intra-union disputes, viz.: x x x x (e) validity/invalidity of union affiliation

Hence, even assuming that NAMA-MCCH-NFL had validly disaffiliated from or disaffiliation;

its mother union, NFL, it still did not possess the legal personality to enter into PART 3: Strike and picketing activities conducted by union officers and

CBA negotiations. members were illegal\

A local union which is not independently registered cannot, upon disaffiliation ART. 263. Strikes, picketing and lockouts.x x x

from the federation, exercise the rights and privileges granted by law to o. o (b) Workers shall have the right to engage in concerted activities for

legitimate labor organizations; thus, it cannot file a petition for certification purposes of collective bargaining or for their mutual benefit and protection. The

election. Besides, the NFL as the mother union has the right to investigate right of legitimate labor organizations to strike and picket and of employers to

members of its local chapter under the federations Constitution and By-Laws, lockout, consistent with the national interest, shall continue to be recognized and

and if found guilty to expel such members. respected. However, no labor union may strike and no employer may declare a

MCCHI therefore cannot be faulted for deferring action on the CBA proposal lockout on grounds involving inter-union and intra-union disputes.

submitted by NAMA-MCCH-NFL in view of the union leaderships conflict with As borne by the records, NAMA-MCCH-NFL was not a duly registered or an

the national federation. We have held that the issue of disaffiliation is an intra- independently registered union at the time it filed the notice of strike on March

union dispute2 which must be resolved in a different forum in an action at the 13, 1996 and when it conducted the strike vote on April 2, 1996.
It could not then legally represent the union members. Consequently, the meetings or referenda called for that purpose. A decision to declare a lockout

mandatory notice of strike and the conduct of the strike vote report were must be approved by a majority of the board of directors of the corporation or

ineffective for having been filed and conducted by NAMA-MCCH-NFL which association or of the partners in a partnership, obtained by secret ballot in a

has no legal personality as a legitimate labor organization, in violation of Art. meeting called for that purpose. The decision shall be valid for the duration of

263 (c), (d) and (f) of the Labor Code and Rule XXII, Book V of the Omnibus the dispute based on substantially the same grounds considered when the strike

Rules Implementing the Labor Code.3 or lockout vote was taken. The Department may, at its own initiative or upon the

Furthermore, the strike was illegal due to the commission of the following request of any affected party, supervise the conduct of the secret balloting. In

prohibited activities:4 every case, the union or the employer shall furnish the Ministry the voting at

(1) violence, coercion, intimidation and harassment against non-participating least seven days before the intended strike or lockout, subject to the cooling-off

employees; and period herein provided. (As amended by Batas Pambansa Bilang 130, August

(2) blocking of free ingress to and egress from the hospital, including preventing 21, 1981 and further amended by Executive Order No. 111, December 24,

patients and their vehicles from entering the hospital and other employees from 1986.)

reporting to work, the putting up of placards with a statement advising incoming Rule XXII, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code reads:

patients to proceed to another hospital because MCCHI employees are on SEC. 6. Who may declare a strike or lockout.Any certified or duly recognized

strike/protest. bargaining representative may declare a strike in cases of bargaining deadlocks

ART. 263. Strikes, picketing and lockouts. xxxx and unfair labor practices. The employer may declare a lockout in the same

c. In cases of bargaining deadlocks, the duly certified or recognized bargaining cases. In the absence of a certified or duly recognized bargaining representative,

agent may file a notice of strike or the employer may file a notice of lockout any legitimate labor organization in the establishment may declare a strike but

with the Department at least 30 days before the intended date thereof. In cases of only on grounds of unfair labor practice. (Emphasis supplied.)

unfair labor practice, the period of notice shall be 15 days and in the absence of a 4264 (e) of the Labor Code provides: No person engaged in picketing shall

duly certified or recognized bargaining agent, the notice of strike may be filed by commit any act of violence, coercion or intimidation or obstruct the free ingress

any legitimate labor organization in behalf of its members . However, in case of to or egress from the employers premises for lawful purposes, or obstruct public

dismissal from employment of union officers duly elected in accordance with the thoroughfares.

union constitution and by-laws, which may constitute union busting, where the As shown by photographs submitted by MCCHI, as well as the findings of the

existence of the union is threatened, the 15-day cooling-off period shall not NCMB and Cebu City Government, the hospital premises and sidewalk within

apply and the union may take action immediately. (As amended by Executive its vicinity were full of placards, streamers and makeshift structures that

Order No. 111, December 24, 1986.) obstructed its use by the public who were likewise barraged by the noise coming

d. The notice must be in accordance with such implementing rules and from strikers using megaphones. On the other hand, the affidavits51 executed by

regulations as the Department of Labor and Employment may promulgate. x x x several hospital employees and patients narrated in detail the incidents of

x harassment, intimidation, violence and coercion, some of these witnesses have

f. A decision to declare a strike must be approved by a majority of the total positively identified the perpetrators. The prolonged work stoppage and

union membership in the bargaining unit concerned, obtained by secret ballot in

picketing activities of the striking employees severely disrupted hospital acts constitute disloyalty to the national federation, and their filing of the notice

operations that MCCHI suffered heavy financial losses. of strike and conducting a strike vote notwithstanding that their union has no

The findings of the Executive Labor Arbiter and NLRC, as sustained by the legal personality to negotiate with MCCHI for collective bargaining purposes,

appellate court, clearly established that the striking union members created so there is no question that NAMA-MCCH-NFL officers knowingly participated in

much noise, disturbance and obstruction that the local government authorities the illegal strike.

eventually ordered their removal for being a public nuisance. This was followed The termination of union officers NAVA, Alsado, Baez, Bongcaras, Canen,

by an injunction from the NCMB enjoining the union leaders from further Gerona and Remocaldo was valid and justified.

blocking the free ingress to and egress from the hospital, and from committing With respect to the dismissed union members, although MCCHI submitted

threats, coercion and intimidation against non-striking employees and photographs taken at the picket line, it did not individually name those striking

patients/vehicles desiring to enter for the purpose of seeking medical employees and specify the illegal act committed by each of them. Hence, the

treatment/confinement. By then, the illegal strike had lasted for almost five dismissal of union members who merely participated in the illegal strike was

months. illegal.

PART 4: Consequences of illegal strike to union officers and members PART 5: Dismissed union members not entitled to backwages but should be

Art. 264 (a) of the Labor Code, as amended, provides for the consequences of an awarded separation pay in lieu of reinstatement

illegal strike to the participating workers: Since there is no clear proof that union members actually participated in the

x x x Any union officer who knowingly participates in illegal strike and any commission of illegal acts during the strike, they are not deemed to have lost

worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal their employment status as a consequence of a declaration of illegality of the

acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment status: strike.

Provided, That mere participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall not Petitioners assail the CA in not ordering their reinstatement with back wages.

constitute sufficient ground for termination of his employment, even if a Invoking stare decisis, they cited the case of Bascon v. CA decided by this Court

replacement had been hired by the employer during such lawful strike. in 2004 and which involved two former hospital employees who likewise sued

The above provision makes a distinction between workers and union officers MCCHI after the latter terminated their employment due to their participation in

who participate in an illegal strike: the same illegal strike led by NAMA-MCCH-NFL. However, the SC said that

An ordinary striking worker cannot be terminated for mere participation in an the doctrine of stare decisis would not be applied in this case. Said doctrine is

illegal strike. There must be proof that he or she committed illegal acts during a not cast in stone upon a showing that circumstances attendant in a particular case

strike. override the great benefits derived by our judicial system from the doctrine of

A union officer, on the other hand, may be terminated from work when he stare decisis. Thus, the Court, especially with a new membership, is not obliged

knowingly participates in an illegal strike, and like other workers, when he to follow blindly a particular decision that it determines, after re-examination, to

commits an illegal act during a strike. call for a rectification.

Considering their persistence in holding picketing activities despite the Separation pay is made an alternative relief in lieu of reinstatement in certain

declaration by the NCMB that their union was not duly registered as a legitimate circumstances, like:

labor organization and the letter from NFLs legal counsel informing that their
(a) when reinstatement can no longer be effected in view of the passage of a long

period of time or because of the realities of the situation;

(b) reinstatement is inimical to the employers interest;

(c) reinstatement is no longer feasible;

(d) reinstatement does not serve the best interests of the parties involved;

(e) the employer is prejudiced by the workers continued employment;

(f) facts that make execution unjust or inequitable have supervened; or

(g) strained relations between the employer and employee.

Considering that 15 years had lapsed from the onset of this labor dispute, and in

view of strained relations that ensued, in addition to the reality of replacements

already hired by the hospital which had apparently recovered from its huge

losses, and with many of the petitioners either employed elsewhere, already old

and sickly, or otherwise incapacitated, separation pay without back wages is the

appropriate relief.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 187861 is

DENIED while the petitions in G.R. Nos. 154113, 187778 and 196156 are

PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated October 17, 2008 of the Court of

Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 66540 is hereby AFFIRMED with

MODIFICATIONS in that MCCHI is ordered to pay the petitioners in G.R. Nos.

154113 and 187778, except the petitioners who are union officers, separation

pay equivalent to one month pay for every year of service, and reasonable

attorneys fees in the amount of P50,000.00. The Decision dated November 7,

2008 is likewise AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS in that MCCHI is

ordered to pay the private respondents in G.R. No. 196156 separation pay

equivalent to one month pay for every year of service, and that the award of back

wages is DELETED.

The case is hereby remanded to the Executive Labor Arbiter for the

recomputation of separation pay due to each of the petitioners union members in

G.R. Nos. 154113, 187778 and 196156 except those who have executed

compromise agreements approved by this Court.

G.R. No. L-54334 January 22, 1986 desire to negotiate.  A Company’s refusal to make counter proposal if considered
in relation to the entire bargaining process, may indicate bad faith and this is
specially true where the Union’s request for a counter proposal is left
KIOK LOY, doing business under the name and style SWEDEN ICE
unanswered.  Even during the period of compulsory arbitration before the
CREAM PLANT, petitioner, 
NLRC, petitioner Company’s approach and attitude-stalling the negotiation by a
vs.
series of postponements, non-appearance at the hearing conducted, and undue
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC) and
delay in submitting its financial statements, lead to no other conclusion except
PAMBANSANG KILUSAN NG PAGGAWA (KILUSAN), respondents.
that it is unwilling to negotiate and reach an agreement with the Union.

CUEVAS, J.:
FACTS: In a certification election, KILUSAN, a legitimate late labor
federation, won and was subsequently certified in a resolution by the BLR as the
sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of Sweden
Ice Cream Plant (Company).
Thereafter, the Union furnished  the Company with copies of its proposed CBA.
At the same time, it requested the Company for its counter proposals. The
request were ignored and remained unacted upon by the Company.
Left with no other alternative in its attempt to bring the Company to the
bargaining table, the Union filed a “Notice of Strike”, with the BLR on ground
of unresolved economic issues in collective bargaining.
Conciliation proceedings then followed during the thirty-day statutory cooling-
off period. But all attempts towards an amicable settlement failed, prompting the
Bureau of Labor Relations to certify the case to the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) for compulsory arbitration.
From the over-all conduct of petitioner company in relation to the task of
negotiation, there can be no doubt that the Union has a valid cause to complain
against its (Company’s) attitude, the totality of which is indicative of the latter’s
disregard of, and failure to live up to, what is enjoined by the Labor Code — to
bargain in good faith.
While it is a mutual obligation of the parties to bargain, the employer, however,
is not under any legal duty to initiate contract negotiation.  The mechanics of
collective bargaining is set in motion only when the following jurisdictional
preconditions are present, namely,
(1) possession of the status of majority representation of the employees’
representative in accordance with any of the means of selection or designation
provided for by the Labor Code;
(2) proof of majority representation; and
(3) a demand to bargain under Article 251, par. (a) of the New Labor Code . …
all of which preconditions are undisputedly present in the instant case.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The temporary restraining
order issued on August 27, 1980, is LIFTED and SET ASIDE. 

The case was reset multiple times until it was denied by the LA. The LA then
submitted its report to NLRC.

NLRC: the respondent [company] is hereby declared guilty of unjustified

refusal to bargain, in violation of Section (g) Article 248 (now Article 249), of
P.D. 442, as amended. Further, the draft proposal for a collective bargaining
agreement (Exh. "E ") hereto attached and made an integral part of this decision,
sent by the Union (Private respondent) to the respondent (petitioner herein) and
which is hereby found to be reasonable under the premises, is hereby declared to
be the collective agreement which should govern the relationship between the
parties herein. 

PETITIONER CONTENTION: National Labor Relations Commission acted

without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in rendering the challenged decision.

- National Labor Relations Commission's finding of unfair labor

practice for refusal to bargain is not supported by law and the
evidence considering that it was only on May 24, 1979 when the
Union furnished them with a copy of the proposed Collective
Bargaining Agreement and it was only then that they came to know
of the Union's demands; and finally, that the Collective Bargaining
Agreement approved and adopted by the National Labor Relations
Commission is unreasonable and lacks legal basis. 

ISSUE: WON NLRC COMMITTED GAD?

HELD: NO! Collective bargaining which is defined as negotiations towards a

collective agreement, is one of the democratic frameworks under the New Labor
Code, designed to stabilize the relation between labor and management and to
create a climate of sound and stable industrial peace. It is a mutual responsibility
of the employer and the Union and is characterized as a legal obligation. So
much so that Article 249, par. (g) of the Labor Code makes it an unfair labor
practice for an employer to refuse “to meet and convene promptly and
expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of negotiating an agreement with
respect to wages, hours of work, and all other terms and conditions of
employment including proposals for adjusting any grievance or question arising
under such an agreement and executing a contract incorporating such agreement,
if requested by either party.
We are in total conformity with respondent NLRC’s pronouncement that
petitioner Company is GUILTY of unfair labor practice.

It has been indubitably established that (1) respondent Union was a duly
certified bargaining agent; (2) it made a definite request to bargain, accompanied
with a copy of the proposed CBA, to the Company not only once but twice
which were left unanswered and unacted upon; and (3) the Company made no
counter proposal whatsoever all of which conclusively indicate lack of a sincere
G.R. No. 114974             June 16, 2004 HELD: Surface bargaining is defined as “going through the motions of
negotiating” without any legal intent to reach an agreement. The resolution of
surface bargaining allegations never presents an easy issue. The determination of
STANDARD CHARTERED BANK EMPLOYEES UNION whether a party has engaged in unlawful surface bargaining is usually a difficult
(NUBE), petitioner,  one because it involves, at bottom, a question of the intent of the party in
vs. question, and usually such intent can only be inferred from the totality of the
The Honorable MA. NIEVES R. CONFESOR, in her capacity as challenged party’s conduct both at and away from the bargaining table. It
SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT; and the STANDARD involves the question of whether an employer’s conduct demonstrates an
CHARTERED BANK, respondents. unwillingness to bargain in good faith or is merely hard bargaining.

DECISION The Union has not been able to show that the Bank had done acts, both at and
away from the bargaining table, which tend to show that it did not want to reach
CALLEJO, SR., J.: an agreement with the Union or to settle the differences between it and the
Union. Admittedly, the parties were not able to agree and reached a deadlock.
However, it is herein emphasized that the duty to bargain “does not compel
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession.” Hence,
FACTS: Standard Chartered is foreign banking corporation doing business in the the parties’ failure to agree did not amount to ULP under Article 248(g) for
Philippines. The exclusive bargaining agent is the Standard Chartered Bank violation of the duty to bargain.
Employees Union.
IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the October 29, 1993 Order and
December 16, 1993 and February 10, 1994 Resolutions of then Secretary of
In August of 1990, the Bank and the Union signed a five-year collective
Labor Nieves R. Confesor are AFFIRMED. The Petition is
bargaining agreement (CBA) with a provision to renegotiate the terms thereof on
hereby DISMISSED.
the third year. Prior to the expiration of the three-year period2 but within the
sixty-day freedom period, the Union initiated the negotiations. On February 18,
1993, the Union, through its President, Eddie L. Divinagracia, sent a
letter3 containing its proposals4 covering political provisions5 and thirty-four (34)
economic provisions.6 Included therein was a list of the names of the members
of the Union’s negotiating panel.7

In a Letter dated February 24, 1993, the Bank, through its Country Manager
Peter H. Harris, took note of the Union’s proposals. The Bank attached its
counter-proposal to the non-economic provisions proposed by the Union. The
parties agreed to set meetings to settle their differences on the proposed CBA.

On March 12, 1993, the parties met and set the ground rules for the negotiation.
Diokno suggested that the negotiation be kept a "family affair." The proposed
non-economic provisions of the CBA were discussed first. 13 Even during the
final reading of the non-economic provisions on May 4, 1993, there were still
provisions on which the Union and the Bank could not agree. Temporarily, the
notation "DEFERRED" was placed therein. Towards the end of the meeting, the
Union manifested that the same should be changed to "DEADLOCKED" to
indicate that such items remained unresolved. Both parties agreed to place the
notation "DEFERRED/DEADLOCKED."14

The union insisted the economic provisions however, the union proposed that
the bank make a revision of itemized proposal. On June 15, 1993 the union said
that is would be best if they seek third party assistance if the counter proposal
was not revised. Afterwards, the bank presented a counterproposal.

The union, then declared deadlock and filed a notice of strike before NCMB.
The bank filed a complaint for ULP alleging that the union did not bargain in
good faith, violated the no strike-no lockout clause, and that the bank suffered
nominal and actual damages and was forced to litigate and hire the services of a
lawyer.

The Secretary of Labor assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute and ordered
the parties to execute a CBA incorporating the dispositions: CBA shall be
retroactive to April 1, 1993; effective for two years; the provisions which are not
expressly repealed or modified are retained and without prejudice to the
agreements as as the parties may arrive at in the meantime. The bank’s
complaint for ULP was dismissed for lack of merit. Both parties filed for MR to
no avail.

On March 22, 1994, the parties signed the CBA.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Bank violated its duty to bargain by committing
surface bargaining
G.R. No. 127598           February 22, 2000

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner, 

vs.
Hon. SECRETARY OF LABOR LEONARDO QUISUMBING and
MERALCO EMPLOYEES and WORKERS ASSOCIATION
(MEWA), respondent. 

RESOLUTION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

SEE FACTS: https://www.scribd.com/document/344472397/27-Manila-

Electric-Co-v-Quisumbing-January-27-1999

RULING: Article 253-A serves as the guide in determining when the effectivity
of the CBA at bar is to take effect. It provides that the representation aspect of
the CBA is to be for a term of 5 years, while “x x x [A]ll other provisions of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement shall be re-negotiated not later than 3 years
after its execution. Any agreement on such other provision of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement entered into within 6 months from the date of expiry of
the term of such other provisions as fixed in such Collective Bargaining
Agreement shall retroact to the day immediately following such date. If such
agreement is entered into beyond 6 months, the parties shall agree on the
duration of the effectivity thereof. x x x.”

Under these terms, it is clear that the 5-year term requirement is specific to the
representation aspect. What the law additionally requires is that a CBA must be
re-negotiated within 3 years “after its execution.” It is in this re-negotiation that
gives rise to the present CBA deadlock. If no agreement is reached within 6
months from the expiry date of the 3 years that follow the CBA execution, the
law expressly gives the parties—not anybody else—the discretion to fix the
effectivity of the agreement.

Significantly, the law does not specifically cover the situation where 6 months
have elapsed but no agreement has been reached with respect to effectivity. In
this eventuality, we hold that any provision of law should then apply for the law
abhors a vacuum. One such provision is the principle of hold over, i.e., that in
the absence of a new CBA, the parties must maintain the status quo and must
continue in full force and effect the terms and conditions of the existing
agreement until a new agreement is reached. In this manner, the law prevents the
existence of a gap in the relationship between the collective bargaining parties.
Another legal principle that should apply is that in the absence of an agreement
between the parties, then, an arbitrated CBA takes on the nature of any judicial
or quasi-judicial award; it operates and may be executed only respectively unless
there are legal justifications for its retroactive application.
G.R. No. 111262 September 19, 1996
SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION EMPLOYEES UNION-PTGWO,
represented by its President RAYMUNDO HIPOLITO, JR., petitioner,  petition with the Secretary of Labor praying that the latter assume jurisdiction
vs.
HON. MA. NIEVES D. CONFESOR, Secretary of Labor, Dept. of Labor &
Employment, SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION, MAGNOLIA
CORPORATION (Formerly, Magnolia Plant) and SAN MIGUEL FOODS,
INC. (Formerly, B-Meg Plant), respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
FACTS: On June 28, 1990, petitioner-union San Miguel Corporation Employees
Union — PTGWO entered into a CBA with private respondent San Miguel
Corporation (SMC) to take effect upon the expiration of the previous CBA or on
June 30, 1989.
This CBA provided, among others, that:
ARTICLE XIV
DURATION OF AGREEMENT
Sec. 1. This Agreement which shall be binding upon the parties hereto and their
respective successors-in-interest, shall become effective and shall remain in
force and effect until June 30, 1992.
Sec. 2. In accordance with Article 253-A of the Labor Code as amended, the
term of this Agreement insofar as the representation aspect is concerned, shall
be for five (5) years from July 1, 1989 to June 30, 1994. Hence, the freedom
period for purposes of such representation shall be sixty (60) days prior to June
30, 1994.
Sec. 3.  Sixty (60) days prior to June 30, 1992 either party may initiate
negotiations of all provisions of this Agreement, except insofar as the
representation aspect is concerned. If no agreement is reached in such
negotiations, this Agreement shall nevertheless remain in force up to the time a
subsequent agreement is reached by the parties.
Meanwhile, effective October 1, 1991, Magnolia and Feeds and Livestock
Division were spun-off and became two separate and distinct corporations:
Magnolia Corporation (Magnolia) and San Miguel Foods, Inc. (SMFI).
Notwithstanding the spin-offs, the CBA remained in force and effect.
After June 30, 1992, the CBA was renegotiated in accordance with the terms of
the CBA and Article 253-A of the Labor Code. Negotiations started sometime in
July, 1992 with the two parties submitting their respective proposals and
counterproposals.
During the negotiations, the petitioner-union insisted that the bargaining unit of
SMC should still include the employees of the spun-off corporations: Magnolia
and SMFI; and that the renegotiated terms of the CBA shall be effective only for
the remaining period of two years or until June 30, 1994.
SMC, on the other hand, contended that the members/employees who had
moved to Magnolia and SMFI, automatically ceased to be part of the bargaining
unit at the SMC. Furthermore, the CBA should be effective for three years in
accordance with Art. 253-A of the Labor Code.
Unable to agree on these issues with respect to the bargaining unit and duration
of the CBA, petitioner-union declared a deadlock on September 29, 1990.
On October 2, 1992, a Notice of Strike was filed against SMC.
On November 4, 1992, private respondents SMC, Magnolia and SMFI filed a
over the labor dispute in a vital industry.
Secretary’s decision: the CBA shall be effective for the period of 3 years from
June 30, 1992; and that such CBA shall cover only the employees of SMC and
not of Magnolia and SMFI.
ISSUE: ) Whether or not the duration of the renegotiated terms of the CBA is to
be effective for three years of for only two years
RULING: We agree with the Secretary of Labor.
Art. 253-A of the Labor Code as amended which reads:
Art. 253-A. Terms of a CBA. — Any CBA that the parties may enter into shall,
insofar as the representation aspect is concerned, be for a term of 5 years . No
petition questioning the majority status of the incumbent bargaining agent shall
be entertained and no certification election shall be conducted by the Department
of Labor and Employment outside of the sixty-day period immediately before
the date of expiry of such five year term of the CBA. All other provisions of the
CBA shall be renegotiated not later than 3 years after its execution. Any
agreement on such other provisions of the CBA entered into within 6 months
from the date of expiry of the term of such other provisions as fixed in such
CBA, shall retroact to the day immediately following such date. If any such
agreement is entered into beyond six months, the parties shall agree on the
duration of retroactivity thereof. In case of a deadlock in the renegotiation of the
CBA, the parties may exercise their rights under this Code. (Emphasis supplied.)
The “representation aspect” refers to the identity and majority status of the union
that negotiated the CBA as the exclusive bargaining representative of the
appropriate bargaining unit concerned. “All other provisions” simply refers to
the rest of the CBA, economic as well as non-economic provisions, except
representation.
The law is clear and definite on the duration of the CBA insofar as the
representation aspect is concerned, but is quite ambiguous with the terms of the
other provisions of the CBA. It is a cardinal principle of statutory construction
that the Court must ascertain the legislative intent for the purpose of giving
effect to any statute.
Obviously, the framers of the law wanted to maintain industrial peace and
stability by having both management and labor work harmoniously together
without any disturbance. Thus, no outside union can enter the establishment
within 5 years and challenge the status of the incumbent union as the exclusive
bargaining agent. Likewise, the terms and conditions of employment (economic
and non-economic) can not be questioned by the employers or employees during
the period of effectivity of the CBA. The CBA is a contract between the parties
and the parties must respect the terms and conditions of the
agreement.  Notably, the framers of the law did not give a fixed term as to
the effectivity of the terms and conditions of employment. It can be gleaned
from their discussions that it was left to the parties to fix the period.
The issue as to the term of the non-representation provisions of the CBA need
not belaboured. The parties, by mutual agreement, enter into a renegotiated
contract with a term of three (3) years or one which does not coincide with
the said 5-year term, and said agreement is ratified by majority of the
members in the bargaining unit, the subject contract is valid and legal and
therefore, binds the contracting parties.
Thus, we do not find any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Secretary of
Labor in ruling that the effectivity of the renegotiated terms of the CBA shall be
for 3 years.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Temporary
Restraining Order issued on March 29, 1995 is lifted.
G.R. No. 135547               January 23, 2002 There is no conflict between said agreement and Article 253-A of the Labor
Code.  CBA under Article 253-A of the Labor Code has a two-fold purpose. One
is to promote industrial stability and predictability. Inasmuch as the agreement
GERARDO F. RIVERA, ALFRED A. RAMISO, AMBROCIO PALAD,
sought to promote industrial peace, at the PAL during its rehabilitation, said
DENNIS R. ARANAS, DAVID SORIMA, JR., JORGE P. DELA ROSA,
agreement satisfied the first purpose of said article. The other purpose is to
and ISAGANI ALDEA, Petitioners, 
assign specific timetable, wherein negotiations become a matter of right and
vs.
requirement. Nothing in Article 253-A prohibits the parties from waiving or
HON. EDGARDO ESPIRITU in his capacity as Chairman of the PAL
suspending the mandatory timetable and agreeing on the remedies to enforce the
Inter-Agency Task Force created under Administrative Order No. 16;
same.
HON. BIENVENIDO LAGUESMA in his capacity as Secretary of Labor
and Employment; PHILIPPINE AIRLINES (PAL), LUCIO TAN, HENRY
SO UY, ANTONIO V. OCAMPO, MANOLO E. AQUINO, JAIME J.
BAUTISTA, and ALEXANDER O. BARRIENTOS, Respondents. In the instant case, it was PALEA, as the exclusive bargaining agent of PAL’s
ground employees, that voluntarily entered into the CBA with PAL. It was also
PALEA that voluntarily opted for the 10-year suspension of the CBA. Either
DECISION case was the union’s exercise of its right to collective bargaining. The right to
free collective bargaining, after all, includes the right to suspend it.
QUISUMBING, J.:

The acts of public respondents in sanctioning the 10-year suspension of the

FACTS: On June 5, 1998, PAL pilots affiliated with the Airline Pilots
Association of the Philippines (ALPAP) went on a three-week strike, causing
serious losses to the financially beleaguered flag carrier. As a result, PAL’s
financial situation went from bad to worse. Faced with bankruptcy, PAL adopted
a rehabilitation plan and downsized its labor force by more than one-third.
PAL-PALEA CBA did not contravene the “protection to labor” policy of the
Constitution. The agreement afforded full protection to labor; promoted the
shared responsibility between workers and employers; and the exercised
voluntary modes in settling disputes, including conciliation to foster industrial
peace.

On July 22, 1998, PALEA went on strike to protest the retrenchment measures
adopted by the airline, which affected 1,899 union members. The strike ended WHEREFORE, there being no grave abuse of discretion shown, the instant
four days later, when PAL and PALEA agreed to a more systematic reduction in petition is DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.
PAL’s work force and the payment of separation benefits to all retrenched
employees.

On September 4, 1998, PAL management submitted to the Task Force an offer

by private respondent Lucio Tan, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of
PAL, of a plan to transfer shares of stock to its employees.

On September 10, 1998, the Board of Directors of PALEA voted to accept Tan’s
offer and requested the Task Force’s assistance in implementing the same.
Union members, however, rejected Tan’s offer. Under intense pressure from
PALEA members, the union’s directors subsequently resolved to reject Tan’s
offer.

On September 17, 1998, PAL informed the Task Force that it was shutting down
its operations effective September 23, 1998, preparatory to liquidating its assets
and paying off its creditors.

PALEA board again wrote the President on Sep 28, 1998. Among others, it
proposed the suspension of the PAL-PALEA CBA for a period of ten years,
subject to certain conditions.

PALEA board again wrote the President on Sep 28, 1998. Among others, it
proposed the suspension of the PAL-PALEA CBA for a period of ten years,
subject to certain conditions.

On October 2, 1998, 5,324 PALEA members cast their votes in a DOLE-

supervised referendum. Of the votes cast, 61% were in favor of accepting the
PAL-PALEA agreement, while 34% rejected it. 

On October 7, 1998, PAL resumed domestic operations. On the same date, seven
officers and members of PALEA filed this instant petition to annul the
September 27, 1998 agreement entered into between PAL and PALEA

ISSUE: WON negotiations may be suspended for 10 years.

HELD: YES.  CBA negotiations may be suspended for 10 years.

The assailed PAL-PALEA agreement was the result of voluntary collective

bargaining negotiations undertaken in the light of the severe financial situation
faced by the employer, with the peculiar and unique intention of not merely
promoting industrial peace at PAL, but preventing the latter’s closure.
G.R. No. 162355               August 14, 2009
STA. LUCIA EAST COMMERCIAL CORPORATION, Petitioner, 
vs.
HON. SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT and STA. LUCIA
EAST COMMERCIAL CORPORATION WORKERS ASSOCIATION
(CLUP LOCAL CHAPTER), Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
FACTS: On 27 February 2001, Confederated Labor Union of the Philippines
(CLUP), in behalf of its chartered local, instituted a petition for certification
election among the regular rank-and-file employees of Sta. Lucia East
Commercial Corporation and its Affiliates.
The affiliate companies included in the petition were SLE Commercial, SLE
Department Store, SLE Cinema, Robsan East Trading, Bowling Center, Planet
Toys, Home Gallery and Essentials.
On 21 August 2001, Med-Arbiter Bactin ordered the dismissal of the petition
due to inappropriateness of the bargaining unit.
In the meantime, on 10 October 2001, [CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates Workers
Union] reorganized itself and re-registered as CLUP-Sta. Lucia East Commercial
Corporation Workers Association (herein appellant CLUP-SLECCWA), limiting
its membership to the rank-and-file employees of Sta. Lucia East Commercial
Corporation. It was issued Certificate of Creation of a Local Chapter No.
RO400-0110-CC-004.  history; and (4) similarity of employment status. Contrary to petitioner’s
On the same date, [CLUP-SLECCWA] filed the instant petition. It alleged that
[SLECC] employs about 115 employees and that more than 20% of employees
belonging to the rank-and-file category are its members. [CLUP-SLECCWA]
claimed that no certification election has been held among them within the last
12 months prior to the filing of the petition, and while there is another union
registered with DOLE-Regional Office No. IV on 22 June 2001 covering the
same employees, namely [SMSLEC], it has not been recognized as the exclusive
bargaining agent of [SLECC’s] employees.
On 22 November 2001, SLECC filed a motion to dismiss the petition. It averred
that it has voluntarily recognized [SMSLEC] on 20 July 2001 as the exclusive
bargaining agent of its regular rank-and-file employees, and that collective
bargaining negotiations already commenced between them. SLECC argued
that the petition should be dismissed for violating the one year and negotiation
bar rules under pars. (c) and (d), Section 11, Rule XI, Book V of the Omnibus
Rules Implementing the Labor Code.
On 29 November 2001, a CBA between [SMSLEC] and [SLECC] was ratified
by its rank-and-file employees and registered with DOLE-Regional Office No.
IV on 9 January 2002.
In the meantime, on 19 December 2001, [CLUP-SLECCWA] filed its
Opposition and Comment to [SLECC’S] Motion to Dismiss. It assailed the
validity of the voluntary recognition of [SMSLEC] by [SLECC] and their
consequent negotiations and execution of a CBA. According to [CLUP-
SLECCWA], the same were tainted with malice, collusion and conspiracy
involving some officials of the Regional Office.
Med-Arbiter Bactin dismissed THE UNION’spetition for direct certification on
the ground of contract bar rule. The prior voluntaryrecognition of SMSLEC and
the CBA betweenTHE CORPORATION and SMSLEC bars the filingof THE
UNION’s petition for direct certification
THE UNION raised the matter to the Secretary.
The Secretary held that the subsequentnegotiations and registration of a CBA
executedby THE CORPORATION with SMSLEC could notbar THE UNION’s
petition. THE UNIONconstituted a registered labor organization atthe time of
THE CORPORATION’s voluntaryrecognition of SMSLEC.
THE CORPORATION then filed a petition for certiorari before the appellate court.
THE CORPORATION then filed a petition for certiorari before the appellate court
The appellate court affirmed the ruling of theSecretary
ISSUE: Whether THE CORPORATION’s voluntaryrecognition of SMSLEC
was done while alegitimate labor organization was in existence inthe bargaining
unit.
Held:
The petition has no merit. Article 212(g) of the Labor Code defines a labor
organization as “any union or association of employees which exists in whole or
in part for the purpose of collective bargaining or of dealing with employers
concerning terms and conditions of employment.” Upon compliance with all the
documentary requirements, the Regional Office or Bureau shall issue in favor of
the applicant labor organization a certificate indicating that it is included in the
roster of legitimate labor organizations. Any applicant labor organization shall
acquire legal personality and shall be entitled to the rights and privileges granted
by law to legitimate labor organizations upon issuance of the certificate of
registration.
The concepts of a union and of a legitimate labor organization are different from,
but related to, the concept of a bargaining unit. We explained the concept of a
bargaining unit in San Miguel Corporation v. Laguesma (236 SCRA 595
[1994]), where we stated that: A bargaining unit is a “group of employees of a
given employer, comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of
employees, consistent with equity to the employer, indicated to be the best suited
to serve the reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the collective
bargaining provisions of the law.” The fundamental factors in determining the
appropriate collective bargaining unit are: (1) the will of the employees (Globe
Doctrine); (2) affinity and unity of the employees’ interest, such as substantial
similarity of work and duties, or similarity of compensation and working
conditions (Substantial Mutual Interests Rule); (3) prior collective bargaining
assertion, this Court has categorically ruled that the existence of a prior
collective bargaining history is neither decisive nor conclusive in the
determination of what constitutes an appropriate bargaining unit. However,
employees in two corporations cannot be treated as a single bargaining unit even
if the businesses of the two corporations are related.
The UNION’S initialproblem was that they constituted a legitimatelabor
organization representing a non-appropriate bargaining unit. However, Theunion
subsequently re-registered as THEUNION, limiting its members to the rank-and-
file of THE CORPORATION. THE CORPORATIONcannot ignore the union
was a legitimate labororganization at the time of THE
CORPORATION’svoluntary recognition of SMSLEC. THECORPORATION
and SMSLEC cannot, bythemselves, decide whether CLUP-
THECORPORATION and its Affiliates Workers Unionrepresented an
appropriate bargaining unit.
The inclusion in the union of disqualified employees is not among the grounds
for cancellation of registration, unless such inclusion is due to misrepresentation,
false statement or fraud under the circumstances enumerated in Sections (a) to
(c) of Article 239 of the Labor Code. Thus, CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates
Workers Union, having been validly issued a certificate of registration, should
be considered as having acquired juridical personality which may not be
attacked collaterally. The proper procedure for SLECC is to file a petition for
cancellation of certificate of registration of CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates
Workers Union and not to immediately commence voluntary recognition
proceedings with SMSLEC.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision promulgated
on 14 August 2003 as well as the Resolution promulgated on 24 February 2004
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 77015.
G.R. No. 168406               January 14, 2015 HELD: YES! The NLRC’s Decision on the illegal
dismissal case was not res judicata on the
illegal strike case.
CLUB FILIPINO, INC. and ATTY. ROBERTO F. DE LEON, Petitioners, 
vs.
BENJAMIN BAUTISTA, RONIE SUALOG, JOEL CALIDA, JOHNNY In petitioner Club Filipino, Inc.’s action for declaration of illegal strike, the
ARINTO, CARLITO PRESENTACION, and ROBERTO DE Labor Arbiter’s finding that respondents conducted an illegal strike resulted in
GUZMAN, Respondents. their dismissal. Respondents were ordered to receive separation pay "similar in
terms with those offered to the employees affected by the retrenchment program
of the club."95 The Court of Appeals, however, found that the Labor Arbiter
RESOLUTION
gravely abused his discretion in declaring the strike illegal. It then reversed the
Labor Arbiter’s Decision and awarded some of the respondents full backwages,
LEONEN, J.: benefits, and separation pay.

FACTS: Club Filipino Employees Association (CLUFEA) is a union
representing the employees of Club Filipino, Inc. CLUFEA and Club Filipino,
Inc. entered into previous collective bargaining agreements, the last of which
expired on May 31, 2000.1
Before CLUFEA and Club Filipino, Inc.’s last collective bargaining agreement
expired and within the 60-day freedom period, 2 CLUFEA had made several
demands on Club Filipino, Inc. to negotiate a new agreement. Club Filipino,
Inc., however, replied that its Board of Directors could not muster a quorum to
negotiate with CLUFEA.3
CLUFEA then formally submitted its proposals to Club Filipino Inc.’s
negotiating panel sometime in June 2000. Still, Club Filipino, Inc. failed to
negotiate, citing as reason the illness of the chairperson of its negotiating panel.4
To compel Club Filipino, Inc. to negotiate with it, CLUFEA filed before the
National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) a request for preventive
mediation. The negotiating panels of CLUFEA and Club Filipino, Inc. finally
met on April 5, 2001. However, the meeting ended with the parties’ respective
panels declaring a deadlock in negotiation.5
Because of the cases’ similar subject matter, it was possible that an employee
who had already availed of the benefits under the retrenchment program would
be declared entitled to separation benefits under the illegal strike case. This is
true especially if the retrenched employee did not execute a valid quitclaim upon
receiving the benefits under the retrenchment program.
Thus, to prevent double compensation, the Court of Appeals ordered that those
who already retired and received their benefits may no longer claim full
backwages, benefits, and separation pay under the decision in the illegal strike
case. This is with respect to respondents Benjamin Bautista and Laureno
Fegalquin who already executed their quitclaims.
All told, the Decision in the illegal dismissal case was not res judicata on the
illegal strike case. The NLRC correctly executed the Court of Appeals' Decision
in the illegal strike case. WHEREFORE, the Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration is DENIED. No further pleadings shall be entertained in this
case. The Entry of Judgment issued in this case is AFFIRMED.

Thus, on April 6, 2001, CLUFEA filed with the NCMB a Notice of Strike on the
ground of bargaining deadlock. Club Filipino, Inc. submitted the first part of its
counterproposal on April 22, 2001.6

On May 4, 2001, CLUFEA conducted a strike vote under the Department of

Labor and Employment’s supervision with the majority of CLUFEA’s total
union membership voting to strike.7

On May 11, 2001, Club Filipino, Inc. submitted to CLUFEA the second part of
its counterproposal, which CLUFEA countered with an improved offer. Club
Filipino, Inc., however, refused CLUFEA’s improved offer.8

On May 26, 2001, CLUFEA staged a strike on the ground of bargaining

deadlock.9

On May 31, 2001, Club Filipino, Inc. filed before the National Capital Regional
Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) a
Petition to Declare [CLUFEA’s] Strike Illegal

LA: He found that CLUFEA’s Notice of Strike did not contain CLUFEA’s
written proposals and Club Filipino, Inc.’s counterproposals, in violation of then
Rule XXII, Section 4 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code.

Club Filipino, Inc. alleged that pending its Petition for declaration of illegal
strike with the NLRC, it implemented a retrenchment program to minimize its
"mounting losses."72 Among the 76 retrenched employees were respondents.

Respondents, together with other retrenched employees, filed a Complaint for

illegal dismissal with the NLRC, questioning the validity of the retrenchment
program. In the Decision73 dated October 2, 2002, Labor Arbiter Natividad M.
Roma dismissed the Complaint and found the retrenchment program valid. She
ordered that the retrenched employees, which included respondents, be paid their
separation pay.

ISSUE: SEPARATION PAY? BENEFITS? SOME

G.R. No. 142399             June 19, 2007 removed the salary ceiling, generally making all employees entitled to the 13th
month pay regardless of the amount of their basic salary, designation or
employment status, and irrespective of the method by which their wages are
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INCORPORATED, petitioner, 
paid, provided that they have worked for at least one (1) month during a calendar
vs.
year. Presidential Decree No. 851, as amended, does admit of certain exceptions
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION
or exclusions from its coverage, among which is: Sec. 3(c). Employers already
(PALEA), respondent.
paying their employees 13-month pay or more in a calendar year or its
equivalent at the time of this issuance.
RESOLUTION
A collective bargaining agreement refers to a negotiated contract between a
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: legitimate labor organization and the employer concerning wages, hours of work
and all other terms and conditions of employment in a bargaining unit. As in all
other contracts, the parties to a CBA may establish such stipulations, clauses,
FACTS: On 6 February 1987, herein parties, PAL and PALEA, the collective terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided these are not
bargaining agent of the rank and file employees of PAL, entered into a CBA that contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy. Thus,
was to cover the period of 1986 – 1989. Part of said agreement required PAL to where the CBA is clear and unambiguous, it becomes the law between the
pay its rank and file employees the following bonuses: parties, and compliance therewith is mandated by the express policy of the law.

Section 4 – 13th Month Pay (Mid-year Bonus)
Section 5 – Christmas Bonus
Prior to the payment of the 13th month pay (mid – year bonus), PAL released an
implementing guideline9 on 22 April 1988.
PALEA assailed the implementation of the foregoing guideline. It is of the view
that all employees of PAL, whether regular or non-regular, should be paid their
13th month pay. In response to the above, PAL informed PALEA that rank and
file employees who were regularized after 30 April 1988 were not entitled to the
13th month pay as they were already given the Christmas bonus in December of
1988, per the Implementing Rules of Presidential Decree No. 851.11
All told, this Court is constrained to suspend the progress, development and
other proceedings in the present petition.
IN CONCURRENCE WITH THE ABOVE, NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT
RESOLVED, as it is hereby resolved, that in view of the ongoing rehabilitation
of petitioner Philippine Airlines, Inc., herein proceedings are
heretofore SUSPENDED until further notice from this Court. Accordingly,
petitioner Philippine Airlines, Inc. is hereby ORDERED to quarterly update the
Court as to the status of its ongoing rehabilitation within ten (10) days from the
beginning of every quarter, with a WARNING that non-compliance therewith
will merit disciplinary sanctions. No costs.

PALEA, disagreeing with PAL, filed a Complaint12 for unfair labor practice

before the NLRC on 1 March 1989.

LA: PALEA, disagreeing with PAL, filed a Complaint12 for unfair labor practice
before the NLRC on 1 March 1989

NLRC: reversed LA.

CA: in favor of PALEA.

Issue: can a court or quasi-judicial agency amend or alter a Collective

Bargaining Agreement by expanding its coverage to non-regular employees who
are not covered by the bargaining unit?"

Held: A cursory reading of the 1986-1989 CBA of the parties herein will
instantly reveal that Art. I, Sec. 3 of said agreement made its provision
applicable to all employees in the bargaining unit. The particular section
specifically defined the scope of application of the CBA, x x x without
distinguishing between regular and non-regular employees. As succinctly put by
respondent PALEA in its Memorandum: All employees in (sic) PAL are entitled
to the same benefit as they are within the same collective bargaining unit and the
entitlement to such benefit spills over to even non-union members. It is a well-
settled doctrine that the benefits of a CBA extend to the laborers and employees
in the collective bargaining unit, including those who do not belong to the
chosen bargaining labor organization. Otherwise, it would be a clear case of
discrimination.

To be entitled to the benefits under the CBA, the employees must be members of
the bargaining unit, but not necessarily of the labor organization designated as
the bargaining agent. A “bargaining unit” has been defined as a group of
employees of a given employer, comprised of all or less than all of the entire
body of employees, which the collective interest of all the employees, consistent
with equity to the employer, indicates to be the best suited to serve the reciprocal
rights and duties of the parties under the collective bargaining provisions of the
law.

Presidential Decree No. 851 mandates that all employers must pay all their
employees receiving a basic salary of not more than P1,000.00 a month,
regardless of the nature of the employment, a 13th month pay not later than 24
December of every year. Memorandum Order No. 28, dated 13 August 1986,
G.R. No. 177594               July 23, 2009 negotiations, hence, it can not now renege on its commitment under
Sec. 3. Art. VIII of the CBA.
UNIVERSITY OF SAN AGUSTIN, INC. Petitioners, 
vs. ISSUE: Whether or not the provisions of the CBA should be applied
UNIVERSITY OF SAN AGUSTIN EMPLOYEES UNION-
FFW, Respondent.
Held: It is a familiar and fundamental doctrine in labor law that the CBA is the
law between the parties and they are obliged to comply with its provisions. If the
DECISION terms of a contract, in this case the CBA, are clear and leave no doubt upon the
intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of their stipulations shall
control.
CARPIO MORALES, J.:

A reading of the provisions of the CBA shows that the parties agreed that 80%
FACTS: A collective bargaining agreement, when voluntarily entered into by the
of the TIP or at the least the amount of P1,500 is to be allocated for individual
parties, becomes the law between them.
salary increases.

On July 27, 2000, petitioner forged with the University of San Agustin
Employees Union-FFW (respondent) a Collective Bargaining
Agreement5 (CBA) effective for five (5) years or from July, 2000 to July, 2005.
Among other things, the parties agreed to include a provision on salary increases
based on the incremental tuition fee increases or tuition incremental proceeds
(TIP) and pursuant to Republic Act No. 6728, The Tuition Fee Law.
It appears that for the School Year 2001-2002, the parties disagreed on the
computation of the salary increases.  should be taken to mean as covering ALL increases and not merely the salary
Respondent argued that the provision in question referred to "salary increases"
alone, hence, the phrase "P1,500.00 or 80% of the TIP, whichever is higher,"
should apply only to salary increases and should not include the other increases
in benefits received by employees.
Resort to the existing grievance machinery having failed, the parties agreed to
submit the case to voluntary arbitration.
The Voluntary Arbiter held that the salary increase shall be paid out of 80% of
the TIP, should it be higher than P1,500. Moreover, scholarship grants and
tuition fee discounts given by the university should not be deducted from the
TIP.
The appellate court sustained the interpretation of the CBA but revised TIP
computation.
Hence, the present petition which seeks only the review of the appellate court’s
interpretation of the questioned provision of the CBA.
Petitioner: appellate court erred in interpreting the questioned provision of the
above-quoted Sec. 3, Art. VIIII of the CBA, since Sec. 5(2) of R.A. 6728 only
mandates that 70% of the TIP of academic institutions is to be set aside for
employees’ salaries, allowances and other benefits, while at least 20% thereof is
to go to the improvement, modernization of buildings, equipment, libraries and
other school facilities.  WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 28, 2006 and
- the interpretation of the provision that 80% of the TIP should go to
salary increases alone, to the exclusion of other benefits, is contrary
to R.A. 6728
The CBA does not speak of any other benefits or increases which would be
covered by the employees’ share in the TIP, except salary increases. The CBA
reflects the incorporation of different provisions to cover other benefits such as
Christmas bonus (Art. VIII, Sec. 1), service award (Art. VIII, Sec.5), leaves
(Article IX), educational benefits (Sec.2, Art. X), medical and hospitalization
benefits (Secs. 3, 4 and 5, Art. 10), bereavement assistance (Sec. 6, Art. X), and
signing bonus (Sec. 8, Art. VIII), without mentioning that these will likewise be
sourced from the TIP. Thus, the university’s belated claim that the 80% TIP
increases as categorically stated in Sec. 3, Art. VIII of the CBA does not lie.
In the present case, the university could have, during the CBA negotiations,
opposed the inclusion of or renegotiated the provision allotting 80% of the TIP
to salary increases alone, as it was and is not under any obligation to accept
respondent’s demands hook, line and sinker. Art. 252 of the Labor Code is clear
on the matter.
The records are thus bereft of any showing that the university had made it clear
during the CBA negotiations that it intended to source not only the salary
increases but also the increases in other employee benefits from the 80% of the
TIP. Absent any proof that the university’s consent was vitiated by fraud,
mistake or duress, it is presumed that it entered into the CBA voluntarily, had
full knowledge of the contents thereof, and was aware of its commitments under
the contract.
It is axiomatic that labor laws setting employee benefits only mandate the
minimum that an employer must comply with, but the latter is not proscribed
from granting higher or additional benefits if it so desires, whether as an act of
generosity or by virtue of company policy or a CBA, as it would appear in this
case. While, in following to the letter the subject CBA provision the petitioner
will, in effect, be giving more than 80% of the TIP as its personnel’s share in the
tuition fee increase, the university’s remedy lies not in the Court’s invalidating
the provision, but in the parties’ clarifying the same in their subsequent CBA
negotiations.
the Resolution dated April 18, 2007, which modified the Decision and
Resolution dated July 17, 2003 of the Voluntary Arbitrator in VA Case No. 139-
06-03-2003, are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

- thus concludes that the general principle that the CBA is the law
between the parties is unavailing as it is the law, not the stipulations
of the parties, which should prevail.

respondent, in its Comment7, maintains that the questioned provision speaks of

salary increases alone and was not intended to include other benefits. It asserts
that petitioner, in refusing to utilize the 80% of the TIP for salary increases
alone, does not want to honor what it voluntarily and knowingly agreed upon in
the CBA. 

- petitioner never claimed that its consent to the CBA was vitiated with
fraud, mistake or intimidation, and that petitioner has always been
aware of the provisions of R.A. 6728 and was even assisted by its
accountants, internal and external legal counsels during the CBA
G.R. No. 174316               June 23, 2009
TEODORICO S. MIRANDA, JR., Petitioner, 
vs.
ASIAN TERMINALS, INC. (ATI) and COURT OF
APPEALS, Respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, C.J.:
FACTS: Petitioner Teodorico S. Miranda, Jr. was employed by respondent ATI
in 1991 as Checker I. He also became a member of the Associated Port Checkers
and Workers Union (APCWU or the union).4 On April 10, 1992, the petitioner,
who was then the Vice President of the union, was appointed to the position of
Shop Steward which is a union position under the payroll of the company. 5 The
Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between the union and ATI provided
for the appointment of a Shop Steward from among the union members, upon
the recommendation of the union president. The Shop Steward is a field
representative of both the company and the union and acts as an independent
arbiter of all complaints brought to his attention.6
On December 28, 1993, Roger P. Silva, the President of APCWU, wrote a
letter7 to the petitioner regarding the recall of his designation as the union Shop
Steward. The union president explained that the petitioner was recalled as union
Shop Steward due to loss of trust and confidence in him, pursuant to the
"Agreement Amending the MPSI (Marina Port Services, Inc.) - APCWU CBA."
A rift then developed between the union leadership and certain union members,
including the petitioner. This led to the formation of a grievance committee to
investigate the complaints against the union officers, including the petitioner.
The petitioner, however, refused to participate in the investigation.11
Upon the conclusion of the investigation, the grievance committee issued its
report recommending to ATI the recall of the petitioner as Shop Steward
and for his reversion to his former position of Checker I, in accordance with
the CBA.
The petitioner questioned his recall as union Shop Steward, and the union
president, Roger P. Silva, issued a letter which reasoned that the petitioner’s
recall as Shop Steward was pursuant to Section 13 of the Agreement Amending
the MPSI-APCWU CBA, amending Section 2, Article V of the MPSI-APCWU
CBA which required that the term of office of the Shop Steward shall be based
on trust and confidence and favorable recommendation of the duly elected
president of the Union.  union president and this time including respondent company and the president of
The petitioner first filed a complaint against Roger Silva as the President of
APCWU, Marina Local Chapter with the Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE), National Capital Region, docketed as Case No. NCR-OD-M-0403-005,
praying for his reinstatement as Shop Steward.
Med-Arbiter found that the union president did not have the authority to recall
the petitioner as Shop Steward for lack of approval of the Board of Directors of
the union. The Order of the Med-Arbiter was affirmed by the Secretary of Labor
in a Resolution15 VIZ: It is noted that appellant Roger P. Silva relied heavily on
the provisions of Article V, Section 2 of its CBA
HELD: Union Shop Steward: A position within the union
The premise that the union Shop Steward is a position within the respondent
company provides a faulty foundation to an already convoluted case. A cursory
look at the responsibilities of a shop steward leads to the conclusion that it is a
position within the union, and not within the company. A shop steward is
appointed by the union in a shop, department, or plant and serves as
representative of the union, charged with negotiating and adjustment of
grievances of employees with the supervisor of the employer.55 He is the
representative of the union members in a building or other workplace. 56 Black's
Law Dictionary defines a shop steward as a union official elected to represent
members in a plant or particular department. His duties include collection of
dues, recruitment of new members and initial negotiations for the settlement of
grievances.57
The position of the shop steward has been acknowledged to be a position within
the union; and even in Section 2 of Rule XIX of the Implementing Rules of
Book V of the Labor Code, as amended by DOLE Order 40-03,58 the shop
steward is understood to be a union officer who plays an important role in the
grievance procedure. The shop steward is responsible for receiving complaints
and grievances of the employees and for bringing these complaints to the
immediate supervisor of the employee concerned. If the grievance is not settled
through the efforts of the shop steward, it is referred to the grievance
committee. 
It is quite clear that the jurisdiction of shop stewards and the supervisors
includes the determination of the issues arising from the interpretation or even
implementation of a provision of the CBA, or from any order or memorandum,
circular or assignments issued by the appropriate authority in the establishment.
In fine, they are part and parcel of the continuous process of grievance resolution
designed to preserve and maintain peace among the employees and their
employer. They occupy positions of trust and laden with awesome
responsibilities.63
In the case at bar, the duties and responsibilities of the Shop Steward stated
in the CBA between the union and the respondent company, as well as the
manner of the appointment and designation of the Shop Steward show that
the shop steward is a union position and not a position within the company. 
The records show that sometime after the appointment of the petitioner to union
Shop Steward, the petitioner, along with other union members, had complaints
with the manner in which the union leadership was handling the affairs of the
union. At the same time, there were also complaints about the petitioner’s
habitual absenteeism and his inability to perform his duties as union Shop
Steward. When a grievance committee was created to investigate these
complaints, the petitioner refused to participate. This led to the recall of
petitioner as the union Shop Steward. 
The actions of the petitioner bolster the conclusion that his grievances were
directed against the union and not the respondent company, making the dispute
an intra-union dispute. The first Complaints filed by the petitioner were against
the union and the Union President for illegal recall of his designation as Shop
Steward. A Complaint was then filed before the DOLE Med-Arbiter praying for
reinstatement to union Shop Steward and for the award of the salary differential
while he was allegedly illegally demoted. But the money claims could not be
brought before the union since the salaries of the petitioner were paid by the
respondent company; thus, a Complaint for illegal demotion amounting to
constructive dismissal was filed before the Labor Arbiter, against the union,
the company. 
So also in the case at bar, a judgment of reinstatement of the petitioner to the
position of union Shop Steward would have no practical legal effect since it
cannot be enforced. Based on the requirements imposed by law and the
APCWU-ATI CBA, and in the nature of things, the subsequent separation of the
petitioner from employment with respondent ATI has made his reinstatement to
union Shop Steward incapable of being enforced. 
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DISMISSED for being MOOT and
ACADEMIC. No costs.