MORATA v.
GO (1983)1 law is to restrict its coverage only to cases cognizable by the inferior
FACTS: Spouses Victor and Flora Go filed a complaint against spouses
Julius and Ma. Luisa Morata for recovery of a sum of money plus damages
amounting to P49,400.00 in CFI Cebu. On the basis of the allegation in the
complaint that the parties-litigants are all residents of Cebu City, the
Moratas filed a motion to dismiss, citing as grounds therefor, the failure of
the complaint to allege prior availment by the Gos of the barangay
conciliation process required by P.D. 1508, as well as the absence of a
certification by the Lupon or Pangkat Secretary that no conciliation or
settlement had been reached by the parties. The motion was opposed by
the Gos. The judge denied the motion to dismiss, ruling that the provision
of Sec 6 of the law applies only to cases cognizable by the inferior courts
mentioned in Secs 11 and 12 of the law.
ISSUE: WON the complaint should be dismissed for failure to comply with
PD 1508
HELD/RATIO: YES. The nature of the case at bar does not fall under the
exceptions cited in Sections 2 2 and 63 of P.D. 1508. Since the law does not
distinguish, this case/dispute should have been first settled amicably by
the Lupon. Furthermore, there is no showing that that the intention of the
1 of this objective. Worse, it would make the law a self-defeating one. For
Lou Macabodbod
2 as in the instant case, from bloating up his claim in order to place his case
SECTION 2. Subject matters for amicable settlement.—The Lupon of each barangay shall
have authority to bring together the parties actually residing in the same city or municipality for
amicable settlement of all disputes except:
[1] Where one party is the government ,or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof;
[2] Where one party is a public officer or employee, and the dispute relates to the
performance of his official functions;
[3] Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding 30 days, or a fine exceeding
P200.00;
[4] Offenses where there is no private offended party;
[5] Such other classes of disputes which the Prime Minister may in the interest of
justice determine upon recommendation of the Minister of Justice and the Minister of
Local Government.
3
SECTION 6. Conciliation pre-condition to filing of complaint.— No complaint, petition, action for
proceeding involving any matter within the authority of the Lupon as provided in Section 2 hereof
shall be filed or instituted in court or any other government office for adjudication unless there
has been a confrontation of the parties before the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat and no
conciliation or settlement has been reached as certified by the Lupon Secretary or the Pangkat
Secretary attested by the Lupon or Pangkat Chairman, or unless the settlement has been
repudiated. However, the parties may go directly to court in the following cases:
[1] Where the accused is under detention;
[2] Where a person has otherwise been deprived of personal liberty calling for habeas
corpus proceedings;
[3] Actions coupled with provisional remedies such as preliminary injunction,
attachment, delivery of personal property and support pendente lite; and
[4] Where the action may otherwise be barred by the Statute of Limitations
courts for it would not have included the rule on venue provided in Section
3 (pertaining to land disputes which are traditionally cognizable by
CFIs/RTCs) thereof. This is further supported by Circular No. 22 issued by
then CJ Fernando which gave notice to all CFIs to recognize the
Katarungang Pambarangay Law and desist from acting upon cases falling
within the authority of the Lupons. This circular was noted by President
Marcos. Hence, the Court declared that the conciliation process at the
barangay level, prescribed by P.D. 1508 as a pre-condition for filing a
complaint in court, is compulsory not only for cases falling under the
exclusive competence of the metropolitan and municipal trial courts, but
for actions cognizable by the regional trial courts as well.
Purpose of the Law. By compelling the disputants to settle their
differences through the intervention of the barangay leader and other
respected members of the barangay, the animosity generated by
protracted court litigations between members of the same political unit, a
disruptive factor toward unity and cooperation, is avoided. It must be
borne in mind that the conciliation process at the barangay level is likewise
designed to discourage indiscriminate filing of cases in court in order to
decongest its clogged dockets and, in the process, enhance the quality of
justice dispensed by it. Thus, to say that the authority of the Lupon is
limited to cases exclusively cognizable by the inferior courts is to lose sight
what would stop a party, say in an action for a sum of money or damages,
beyond the jurisdiction of the inferior court and thereby avoid the
mandatory requirement of P.D. 1508? And why, indeed, should the law
seek to ease the congestion of dockets only in inferior courts and not in
the regional trial courts where the log-jam of cases is much more serious?
Indeed, the lawmakers could not have intended such half-measure and
self-defeating legislation.
Spouses Morata vs Spouses Go
125 SCRA 444
GR No. L-62339
FACTS:
On August 25, 1982, the spouses Go filed a complaint eagainst petitioners
Morata for recovery of a sum of money plus damages amounting to
P49,400.
On the basis of the allegation that the parties-litigants are all residents of
Cebu City, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss citing as grounds the failure
of the complaint to allege prior availment by the plaintiffs of the barangay
conciliation process required by PD 1508, as well as the absence of
certification by the Lupon or Pangkat Secretary that no
conciliation/settlement has been reached by the parties.
The motion to dismiss was denied on September 2, 1982. The petitioners'
motion for reconsideration was also denied on October 3, 1982.
ISSUE:
Whether the conciliation process at the barangay level, prescribed by PD
1508 as a precondition for filing a complaint in court, is also compulsory
for actions cognizable by the RTC.
HELD:
Yes. Sec.6, PD 1508 provides that the confrontation of the parties and
conciliation before the Lupon is a precondition for filing a complaint, except
when:
1. The accused is under detention;
2. A person has otherwise been deprived of personal liberty calling
for *habeas corpus* proceedings;
3. Actions coupled with privisional remedies; and
4. Where the action may be barred by the Statute of Limitations.
Sec.2 provides additional exceptions, such as when:
1. One party is the government, or any subdivision or
instrumentality;
2. One party is a public officer/employee and the dispute relates to
the performance of his official functions;
3. Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding 30 days or a fine
exceeding P200;
4. Where there is no private offended party; and
5. Such other classes of disputes which the Prime Minister may, in
the inetrest of justice, determine upon recommendation of the
Minister of Justice and the Minister of Local Government.
Thus, except in the instances enumerated in Secs. 2 and 6 of the law, the
Lupon has the authority to settle amicably all types of disputes involving
parties who actually reside in the same city or municipality.
The law makes no distinction whatsoever with respect to the classes of
civil disputes that should be compromised at the barangay level. Where
the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish.
By compelling the disputants to settle their differences through the
intervention of the barangay leader and other respected members of the
barangay, the animosity generated by protracted court litigations between
members of the same political unit, a disruptive factor toward unity and
cooperation, is avoided. It must be borne in mind that the conciliation
process at the barangay level is also designed to discourage indiscriminate
filing of cases in court in order to decongest its clogged dockets and
enhance the quality of justice dispensed by it.
The law obviously intended to grant the Lupon as broad and
comprehensive authority as possible as would bring about the optimum
realization of the aforesaid objectives. These objectives would only be half-
met and easily thwarted if the Lupon's authority is exercised only in cases
falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts.
Jurisdiction over cases involving real property or any interest therein,
except forcible entry and detainer cases, has always been vested in the
Courts of First Instance.
The authority of the Lupon is clearly established in Sec.2 of the law;
whereas Secs. 11, 12 and 14 deal with the nullification or execution of the
settlement or arbitration awards obtained at the barangay level. These
sections conferred upon the city & municipal courts the jurisdiction to pass
upon and resolve petitions or actions for nullification or enforcement of
settlement/arbitration awards issued by the Lupon, regardless of the
amount involved or the nature of the original dispute. But there is nothing
in the context of said sections to justify the thesis that the mandated
conciliation process in other types of cases applies excluisively to said
inferior courts.
Therefore, the conciliation process at the barangay level, prescribed
by P.D. 1508 as a pre-condition for filing a complaint in court, is
compulsory not only for cases falling under the exclusive
competence of the metropolitan and municipal trial courts, but for
actions cognizable by the regional trial courts as well.
VERCIDE V. HERNANDEZ
April 06, 2000
VALENCIDES VERCIDE, complainant, vs.
JUDGE PRISCILLA T. HERNANDEZ, FIFTH MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT
TRIAL COURT, CLARIN & TUDELA, MISAMIS OCCIDENTAL,
respondent.
Mendoza, J.:
SUMMARY: Spouses Vercide, who resided in Dipolog, filed a case against
Galleros, who resided in Tudela, Misamis Occidental. The case stemmed
from a dispute over real property located in Tudela. Galleros countered
that the case should be dismissed for non-referral to the lupong
tagapamayapa. MCTC Judge Hernandez sided with Galleros, dismissing the
case on the ground of PD1508§3. The Vercides filed an MR on the basis of
LGC 408(f), in relation to LGC 409(c), which was denied on the ground
that they failed to appreciate the requirement in the Katarungang
Pambarangay IRR in their argument. The Vercides then filed an
administrative complaint for grave abuse of authority and ignorance of the
law against Judge Hernandez, arguing that she was mistaken in dismissing
the case. OCA recommended dismissal on the ground that the issue was
purely judicial and should thus be resolved by the courts; and because
there was no allegation of bad faith on the part of Justice Hernandez. SC
held Judge Hernandez administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law
and fined her 2,000 pesos. As a judge, she should exhibit high standards
of legal competence and probity. Ignorantia legis neminem excusat is
especially applicable to judges given the standards of conduct imposed on
them by the Code of Judicial Conduct. Judge Hernandez failed in this
respect, because she obstinately refused to reverse her incorrect order and
even quoted the IRR out of context just to support her ruling. The case
should have been allowed to proceed because the Katarungang
Pambarangay Law as embodied in the LGC does not include within its
jurisdiction disputes between parties who do not reside in the same
municipality or city or in adjoining barangays. The LGC and the
Katarungang Pambarangay IRR are both explicit on the matter. This is the
established rule in jurisprudence interpreting PD 1508 and its successor
law, the LGC. The proviso in PD 1508§3 relied upon by Judge Hernandez is
just an ordinary proviso and should operate as such. The operation of a
proviso, as a rule, should be limited to its normal function, which is to
restrict or vary the operation of the principal clause, rather than expand its
scope, in the absence of a clear indication to the contrary.
DOCTRINE: Recourse to barangay conciliation proceedings is not
necessary where the parties do not reside in the same municipality or city
or in adjoining barangays. A judge who dismisses a case on such ground
will be held liable administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law.
PD1508§2 specifies the conditions under which the Lupon of a barangay
"shall have authority" to bring together the disputants for amicable
settlement of their dispute: The parties must be "actually residing in the
same city or municipality." At the same time, PD 1508§3 while reiterating
that the disputants must be "actually residing in the same barangay" or in
"different barangays within the same city or municipality", unequivocably
declares that the Lupon shall have "no authority" over disputes "involving
parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities or
municipalities," except where such barangays adjoin each other. The
phrase stating that “disputes which involve real property or any interest
therein shall be brought in the barangay where the real property or any
part thereof is situated." is just an ordinary proviso and should operate as
such.
NATURE: Administrative complaint against a Municipal Circuit Court
judge, for grave abuse of authority and ignorance of the law
FACTS:
 Valencides VERCIDE and his wife had filed a case against Daria
Lagas GALLEROS for recovery of possession of a piece of land.
o The land is located in Upper Centro, Tudela, Misamis
Occidental.
o Galleros is a resident of Tudela, while the spouses Vercide
are residents of Dipolog City, Zamboanga del Norte.
o Because of this fact, the case was filed in court without
prior referral to the Lupong Tagapamayapa.
 Galleros raised the non-referral as an affirmative defense
 Jul. 15, 1997 – Municipal Circuit Court JUDGE Priscilla HERNANDEZ
thus dismissed the case without prejudice to the filing of Galleros’
counterclaim, citing PD 1508§3 4.
 The spouses Vercide filed an MR, arguing that barangay
conciliation is not required, claiming that under LGC 408(f), in
relation to LGC 409(c), where the parties to a dispute involving
realty or any interest therein are not actual residents of the same
city/municipality or of adjoining barangays.
 Sep. 9, 1997 – Judge Hernandez denied the motion on the ground
that the Vercides failed to correlate LGC 408 and 409; and to
consider the IRRs of the LGC, specifically Rule VI, §3(c), which
states that: “Dispute involving real property shall be brought for
settlement in the Barangay where the real property or larger
portion thereof is situated”.
 Vercide filed the present complaint against Judge Hernandez,
accusing her of:
o grave abuse of authority for knowingly rendering an unjust
judgment, in dismissing the case;
o gross ignorance of the law
o grave disobedience to the precedent laid down by the
Supreme Court
 The Office of the Court Administrator recommended the dismissal
of the complaint on the ground that the issue is purely judicial and
should be settled by a court of competent jurisdiction. Even of
Judge Hernandez were wrong, she should not be held
administratively liable since there was no allegation of bad faith.
ISSUE (HELD): W/N Judge Hernandez was guilty of grave abuse of
authority and ignorance of the law in dismissing the Vercides’ complaint
(IGNORANCE OF THE LAW, BUT NOT GRAVE ABUSE)
RATIO
TAVORA RULING STILL APPLICABLE
 SC has already ruled in Tavora v. Veloso that submission to the
Lupong Tagapamayapa is not required where the parties to a
dispute involving realty do not live in the same city/municipality or
in adjoining barangays.
 “[PD1508§2] specifies the conditions under which the Lupon of a
barangay "shall have authority" to bring together the disputants
for amicable settlement of their dispute: The parties must be
4
Venue. Disputes between or among persons actually residing in the same barangay shall be brought for
amicable settlement before the Lupon of said barangay. Those involving actual residents of different
barangays within the same city or municipality shall be brought in the barangay where the respondent or any
of the respondents actually resides, at the election of the complainant. However, all disputes which involve
real property or any interest therein shall be brought in the barangay where the real property or any
part thereof is situated. (Emphasis added)
 "actually residing in the same city or municipality." At the same
time, [PD 1508§3] while reiterating that the disputants must be
"actually residing in the same barangay" or in "different barangays
within the same city or municipality" unequivocably declares that
the Lupon shall have "no authority" over disputes "involving
parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities or
municipalities," except where such barangays adjoin each other.”
 The law expressly stated the jurisdiction of the Lupon
Tagapamayapa and this does not include disputes where the
parties are not actual residents of the same city/municipality,
except where they are actual residents of adjoining barangays.
 SC, in Tavora, further stated: “It is true that immediately after
specifying the barangay whose Lupon shall take cognizance of a
given dispute, [PD 1508§3] adds: "However, all disputes which
involve real property or any interest therein shall be brought in the
barangay where the real property or any part thereof is situated."
Actually, however, this added sentence is just an ordinary proviso
and should operate as such. The operation of a proviso, as a rule,
should be limited to its normal function, which is to restrict or vary
the operation of the principal clause, rather than expand its scope,
in the absence of a clear indication to the contrary.”
 Tavora applies to the Vercides’ case because the rules in PD 1508
are now found in LGC 408 and 409.
 The Tavora ruling should be known to lawyers and judges.
Ignorantia legis neminem excusat is especially applicable to judges
who, under Canon 1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, “should be
the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence”.
 Bacar v. de Guzman: When the law violated is basic, the failure to
observe such law is gross ignorance
 Almeron v. Sardido: Disregard of an established legal rule amounts
to gross ignorance of the law and makes the judge subject to
disciplinary action.
KATARUNGANG PAMBARANGAY RULES DEFEAT JUDGE HERNANDEZ’
POSITION
 Contrary to Judge Hernandez’ interpretation, it is clear even from
the Katarungang Pambarangay Rules that recourse to barangay
conciliation proceedings is not necessary where the parties do not
reside in the same municipality or city or in adjoining barangays.
 Rule VI, §2 provides in part: Subject matters for settlement. All
disputes may be the subject of proceedings for amicable
settlement under these rules except the following enumerated
cases:
o (f) Disputes involving parties who actually reside in
barangays of different cities or municipalities, except
where such barangay units adjoin each other and the
parties thereto to agree to submit their differences to
amicable settlement by an appropriate lupon;
JUDGE HERNANDEZ GUILTY OF GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW
 CAB: Judge Hernandez showed patent ignorance of the relevant
jurisprudence on the jurisdiction of the Lupong Tagapamayapa.
o Judges cannot be held administratively accountable for
every erroneous order or decision, but if the mistake is so
gross or patent they should be held administratively liable.
o Judge Hernandez insisted on using PD1508 as basis even
after being notified that it has been repealed by the LGC.
In her obstinate adherence, she quoted the Katarungang
Pambarangay Rules out of context.
o Such misquotation violates Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct which provide that "In every case, a judge shall
endeavor diligently to ascertain the facts and the
applicable law unswayed by partisan interest, public
opinion or fear of criticism."
 The provisions in issue, which are also found in P.D. No. 1508,
have already been authoritatively interpreted by the SC, and the
duty of Judge Hernandez was to follow the rulings of this Court.
 Her insistence on her own interpretation of the law can only be due
either to an ignorance of this Court’s ruling or to an utter disregard
thereof.
 SC choose to believe that her failure to apply the jurisprudence to
case before her was simply due to gross ignorance which,
nevertheless, is inexcusable. (BAKIT HAHAHA)
 Penalty: Fine of P2,000, in accordance with Ting v. Atal
DISPOSITION: Judge Hernandez found guilty of gross ignorance of the
law and ordered to pay a FINE of P2,000.00 with a WARNING that
repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
UY vs CONTRERAS
G.R. Nos. 111416-17. September 26, 1994
FACTS:
Petitioner Uy subleased from respondent Susanna Atayde the other half of
the second floor of a building Makati. The sublease contract expired on 15
April 1993. However, Uy was not able to remove all her movable
properties.
On 17 April 1993, an argument arose between Uy and Atayde when the
former sought to withdraw from the subleased premises her remaining
movable properties. The argument degenerated into a scuffle between Uy,
on the one hand, and Atayde and several of Atayde's employees, including
private respondent Winnie Javier, on the other.
The private respondents then filed a complaint with the barangay captain
of Valenzuela, Makati, however, during their scheduled confrontation
before the barangay captain, only the petitioner appeared. The prosecutor
then filed two informations for slight physical injuries against the petitioner
with the MTC of Makati.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss alleging the prematurity of the filing of
the criminal cases for failure to undergo conciliation proceedings. On the
other hand, private respondents contend that prior referral of the dispute
to the lupon is not applicable since she and petitioner are not residents of
barangays in the same city or municipality or of adjoining barangays in
different cities or municipalities and that referral to the lupon is not
likewise required if the case may otherwise be barred by the statute of
limitations. Moreover, even assuming arguendo that prior referral to the
lupon applies to the case of private respondent, the latter had,
nevertheless, substantially complied with the requirement with the
subsequent certification of the barangay to file the action.
Judge Contreras denied the motion to dismiss. The MR was likewise
denied. Hence, Uy filed a petition for certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the case should be dismissed
HELD:
While P.D. No. 1508 has been repealed by the L GC of 1991, the
jurisprudence built thereon regarding prior referral to the lupon as a pre-
condition to the filing of an action in court remains applicable because its
provisions on prior referral were substantially reproduced in the Code.
In view of the respondents' failure to appear at the scheduled mediation,
no complaint for slight physical injuries could be validly filed with the MTC
of Makati at any time before such date. The filing then of criminal cases
was premature and respondent Judge Contreras should have granted the
motion to dismiss the criminal cases. He cannot justify its denial by taking
refuge under Section 6 of P.D. No. 1508 (more properly, Section 412(b)(4)
of the Local Government Code of 1991) which states that the parties may
go directly to court where the action is about to prescribe. This is because
pursuant to paragraph (c), Section 410 of the Code, the prescriptive
period was automatically suspended for a maximum period of sixty days
from 23 April 1993 when the private respondents filed their complaints
with the lupon of Valenzuela Makati.
Accordingly, since the slight physical injuries charged in Criminal Cases
were allegedly inflicted on 17 April 1993, the prescriptive period therefor
would have expired two months thereafter. Nevertheless, its running was
tolled by the filing of the private respondents' complaints with the lupon of
Valenzuela, Makati, on 23 April 1993 and automatically suspended for a
period of sixty days, or until 22 June 1993. If no mediation or conciliation
could be reached within the said period of suspension and, accordingly, a
certification to file action is issued, the private respondents would still
have fifty-six days within which to file their separate criminal complaints
for such offense. Evidently, there was no basis for the invocation by the
respondent judge of the exception provided for in paragraph (b), Section
412 of the Local Government Code.
Moreover, having brought the dispute before the lupon of barangay
Valenzuela, Makati, the private respondents are estopped from disavowing
the authority of the body which they themselves had sought. Their act of
trifling with the authority of the lupon by unjustifiably failing to attend the
scheduled mediation hearings and instead filing the complaint right away
with the trial court cannot be countenanced for to do so would wreak
havoc on the barangay conciliation system.
Neither is the argument that petitioner "had already waived the right to a
reconciliation proceedings before the barangay, persuasive. The petitioner
did not waive the reconciliation proceedings before the lupon of
Valenzuela, Makati; she submitted to it and attended the scheduled
conciliation and invoked the pre-condition of referral to the lupon in her
counter-affidavit.
Lastly, nor could the Court accept the contention of the respondent that
the parties could not agree on a compromise and that they had to request
the barangay captain to issue a certification to file action. The request was
nearly one and a half months after criminal cases were filed with the court
a quo. Evidently, this was done to support their contention that, in any
event, there was substantial compliance with the requirement of referral to
the lupon. It must be stressed that the private respondents, after failing to
appear at the initial confrontation and long after the criminal cases were
filed, had no right to demand the issuance of a certification to file action.
Petition granted. Respondent judge was ordered to dismiss the case.

[G.R. No. 183623 June 25, 2012]
LETICIA B. AGBAYANI, Petitioner, vs OURT OF APPEALS,
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE and LOIDA MARCELINA J. GENABE,
Respondents.
TOPIC: Compulsory process of Barangay Reconciliation
FACTS:
Agbayani and Genabe were both employees of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 275 of Las Pias City, working as Court Stenographer
and Legal Researcher II, respectively. On December 29, 2006, Agbayani
filed a criminal complaint for grave oral defamation against Genabe before
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Pias City, docketed as I.S. No. 07-
0013, for allegedly uttering against her, in the presence of their fellow
court employees and while she was going about her usual duties at work,
the following statements, to wit:
 
ANG GALING MO LETY, SINABI MO NA TINAPOS MO YUNG
MARVILLA CASE, ANG GALING MO. FEELING LAWYER KA KASI, BAKIT DI
KA MAGDUTY NA LANG, STENOGRAPHER KA MAGSTENO KA NA LANG,
ANG GALING MO, FEELING LAWYER KA TALAGA. NAGBEBENTA KA NG
KASO, TIRADOR KA NG JUDGE. SIGE HIGH BLOOD DIN KA, MAMATAY KA
SANA SA HIGH BLOOD MO
In a resolution rendered on February 12, 2007, the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Las Pias City, found probable cause for the filing of the
information for the grave oral defamation against Genabe. However, upon
petition for review filed by Genabe, the DOJ Undersecretary Ernesto Pineda
found that subject utterances of respondent constitute only slight oral
defamation. The complaint-affidavit, however, failed to show that the
instant case was previously referred to the barangay for conciliation in
compliance with Sections 408 and 409, paragraph (d), of the Local
Government Code, which provides:
 
Section 408. Subject Matter for Amicable
Settlement; Exception Thereto. The lupon of each
barangay shall have authority to bring together the parties
actually residing in the same city or municipality for
amicable settlement of all disputes except: xxx
 Section 409. Venue. x x x (d) Those arising at the
workplace where the contending parties are employed or
xxx shall be brought in the barangay where such
workplace or institution is located.
 
The records of the case likewise show that the instant case is not
one of the exceptions enumerated under Section 408 of the Local
Government Code. Hence, the dismissal of the instant petition is proper.
It is well-noted that the Supreme Court held that where the case is
covered by P.D. 1508 (Katarungang Pambarangay Law), the compulsory
process of arbitration required therein is a pre-condition for filing a
complaint in court. Where the complaint (a) did not state that it is one of
the excepted cases, or (b) it did not allege prior availment of said
conciliation process, or (c) did not have a certification that no conciliation
or settlement had been reached by the parties, the case should be
dismissed x x x. While the foregoing doctrine is handed down in civil cases,
it is submitted that the same should apply to criminal cases covered by,
but filed without complying with, the provisions of P.D. 1508.
The DOJ Undersecretary move for the withdrawal of the
Information. The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was
denied in a Resolution dated June 25, 2007.
Consequently, Agbayani filed a petition for certiorari with the CA
alleging that the DOJ committed grave abuse of discretion in setting aside
the Resolution dated February 12, 2007 of the City Prosecutor of Las Pias
City in I.S. Case No. 07-0013. She averred that the respondents petition
for review filed with the DOJ did not comply with Sections 5 and 6 of DOJ
Circular No. 70, or the 2000 National Prosecution Service (NPS) Rules on
Appeal, and maintained that her evidence supported a finding of probable
cause for grave oral defamation against respondent Genabe. Petition was
denied by CA.
ISSUE:
WON the DOJ Undersecretary committed grave abuse of discretion
when it ruled out the withdrawal of the filing of Information in court for
non-compliance with the Barangay conciliation.
HELD:
NO. Undeniably, both petitioner Agbayani and respondent Genabe
are residents of Las Pias City and both work at the RTC, and the incident
which is the subject matter of the case happened in their workplace.
Agbayani’s complaint should have undergone the mandatory barangay
conciliation for possible amicable settlement with respondent Genabe,
pursuant to Sections 408 and 409 of Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local
Government Code of 1991 which provide:
Sec. 408. Subject Matter for Amicable Settlement; Exception
thereto. The lupon of each barangay shall have authority to bring together
the parties actually residing in the same city or municipality for amicable
settlement of all disputes, except: x x x
Sec. 409. Venue. x x x (d) Those arising at the workplace where
the contending parties are employed or x x x shall be brought in the
barangay where such workplace or institution is located.
Administrative Circular No. 14-93 issued by the Supreme Court on
July 15, 1993 states that:
I. All disputes are subject to Barangay conciliation pursuant to the
Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law [formerly P.D. 1508, repealed and
now replaced by Secs. 399-422, Chapter VII, Title I, Book III, and Sec.
515, Title I, Book IV, R.A. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code of 1991], and prior recourse thereto is a pre-condition
before filing a complaint in court or any government offices, except in the
following disputes:
[1] Where one party is the government, or any subdivision or
instrumentality thereof;
[2] Where one party is a public officer or employee and the dispute
relates to the performance of his official functions.
[3] Where the dispute involves real properties located in different
cities and municipalities, unless the parties thereto agree to submit their
difference to amicable settlement by an appropriate Lupon;
[4] Any complaint by or against corporations, partnerships or
juridical entities, since only individuals shall be parties to Barangay
conciliation proceedings either as complainants or respondents [Sec. 1,
Rule VI, Katarungang Pambarangay Rules];
[5] Disputes involving parties who actually reside in barangays of
different cities or municipalities, except where such barangay units adjoin
each other and the parties thereto agree to submit their differences to
amicable settlement by an appropriate Lupon;
[6] Offenses for which the law prescribes a maximum penalty of
imprisonment exceeding one [1] year or a fine of over five thousand pesos
([P]5,000.00);
[7] Offenses where there is no private offended party;
[8] Disputes where urgent legal action is necessary to prevent
injustice from being committed or further continued, specifically the
following:
[a] Criminal cases where accused is under police custody or
detention [See Sec. 412(b)(1), Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law];
[b] Petitions for habeas corpus by a person illegally deprived of his
rightful custody over another or a person illegally deprived of or on acting
in his behalf;
[c] Actions coupled with provisional remedies such as preliminary
injunction, attachment, delivery of personal property and support during
the pendency of the action; and
[d] Actions which may be barred by the Statute of Limitations.
[9] Any class of disputes which the President may determine in the
interest of justice or upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice;
[10] Where the dispute arises from the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law (CARL) [Secs. 46 & 47, R. A. 6657];
[11] Labor disputes or controversies arising from employer-
employee relations [Montoya vs. Escayo, 171 SCRA 442; Art. 226, Labor
Code, as amended, which grants original and exclusive jurisdiction over
conciliation and mediation of disputes, grievances or problems to certain
offices of the Department of Labor and Employment];
[12] Actions to annul judgment upon a compromise which may be
filed directly in court [See Sanchez vs. [Judge] Tupaz, 158 SCRA 459].
The compulsory process of arbitration is a pre-condition for the
filing of the complaint in court. Where the complaint (a) did not state that
it is one of excepted cases, or (b) it did not allege prior availment of said
conciliation process, or (c) did not have a certification that no conciliation
had been reached by the parties, the case should be dismissed. Here,
petitioner Agbayani failed to show that the instant case is not one of the
exceptions enumerated above. Neither has she shown that the oral
defamation caused on her was so grave as to merit a penalty of more than
one year. Oral defamation under Article 358 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, is penalized as follows:
Article 358. Slander. Oral defamation shall be punished by arresto
mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period
if it is of a serious and insulting nature; otherwise, the penalty shall be
arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos.
We recall that in the morning of December 27, 2006 when the
alleged utterances were made, Genabe was about to punch in her time in
her card when she was informed that she had been suspended for failing
to meet her deadline in a case, and that it was Agbayani who informed the
presiding judge that she had missed her deadline when she left to attend a
convention in Baguio City, leaving Agbayani to finish the task herself.
According to Undersecretary Pineda, the confluence of these circumstances
was the immediate cause of respondent Genabe's emotional and
psychological distress. We rule that his determination that the defamation
was uttered while the respondent was in extreme excitement or in a state
of passion and obfuscation, rendering her offense of lesser gravity than if
it had been made with cold and calculating deliberation, is beyond the
ambit of our review. The CA concurred that the complained utterances
constituted only slight oral defamation, having been said in the heat of
anger and with perceived provocation from Agbayani. Respondent Genabe
was of a highly volatile personality prone to throw fits (sumpongs), who
thus shared a hostile working environment with her co-employees,
particularly with her superiors, Agbayani and Hon. Bonifacio Sanz Maceda,
the Presiding Judge of Branch 275, whom she claimed had committed
against her grievous acts that outrage moral and social conduct. That
there had been a long-standing animosity between Agbayani and Genabe
is not denied.
Sebastian vs Ng (modes of satisfying brgy settlement)
Facts:
 Angelita Lagmay (Angelita), acting as representative and attorney-
in-fact of her daughter Annabel Lagmay Ng (Annabel), filed a
complaint before the Barangay Justice of Siclong, Laur, Nueva
Ecija.
 She sought to collect from Michael the sum of P350,000.00 that
Annabel sent to Michael. She claimed that Annabel and Michael
were once sweethearts, and that they agreed to jointly invest their
financial resources to buy a truck. She alleged that while Annabel
was working in Hongkong, Annabel sent Michael the amount of
P350,000.00 to purchase the truck. However, after Annabel and
Michael’s relationship has ended, Michael allegedly refused to
return the money to Annabel, prompting the latter to bring the
matter before the Barangay Justice.
 Parties entered into an amicable settlement “Kasunduan”, wherein
Michael agreed to pay Annabel the amount of P250,000 on specific
dates
 Angelita alleged that the kasunduan was not repudiated within 10
days from the settlement, in accordance with the Katarungang
Pambaragay Law
 When Michael failed to honor the kasunduan, Angelita brought the
matter back to the Barangay, but the Barangay Captain failed to
enforce the kasunduan, and instead, issued a Certification to File
Action.
 After about one and a half years from the date of the execution of
the kasunduan or on January 15, 1999, Angelita filed with the
MCTC of Laur and Gabaldon, Nueva Ecija, a Motion for Execution of
the kasunduan.
 Michael moved for the dismissal of the Motion for Execution, citing
as a ground Angelita’s alleged violation of Section 15, Rule 13 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
 MCTC ruled in favor of Annabel
 Michael filed an appeal with the RTC that MCTC committed grave
abuse of discretion in prematurely deciding the case. He also
pointed out that a hearing was necessary for the petitioner to
establish the genuineness and due execution of the kasunduan.
 RTC upheld MCTC decision
o Michael failed to assail the validity of the kasunduan
 Michael filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing that:
o (i) an amicable settlement or arbitration award can be
enforced by the Lupon within six (6) months from date of
settlement or after the lapse of six (6) months, by ordinary
civil action in the appropriate City or Municipal Trial Court
and not by a mere Motion for execution; and
o (ii) the MCTC does not have jurisdiction over the case
since the amount of P250,000.00 (as the subject matter of
the kasunduan) is in excess of MCTC’s jurisdictional
amount of P200,000.00.
 RTC granted motion, dismissed Angelita’s motion for execution,
and set aside the MCTC Decision
 She filed a petition for review with the CA
 CA granted petition, and reversed RTC’s decision
o Declared that the “appropriate local trial court” stated in
Section 2, Rule VII of the Implementing Rules of RA No
7160 refers to the municipal trial courts
o Ruled that Michael’s failure to repudiate the kasunduan
rendered the kasunduan final
 In the present petition, Michael alleges that the kasunduan cannot
be given the force and effect of final judgment because it did not
conform to the provisions of the Katarungang Pambarangay Law
o He also points out some irregularities in the kasunduan’s
execution
o Kasunduan is merely in the nature of a private document
o Since the amount of P250,000 is in excess of MCTC’s
jurisdictional amount of P200,000, the kasunduan is
beyond its jurisdiction
Issue: What are the two modes of enforcing barangay settlements?
Ruling:
 Section 417 of the Local Gov’t code discloses two-tiered mode of
enforcement of an amicable settlement.
 Under this provision, an amicable settlement or arbitration award
that is not repudiated within a period of 10 days from the
settlement may be enforced by:
 o first, execution by the Lupon within six (6) months from
the date of the settlement; or
o second, by an action in the appropriate city or municipal
trial court if more than six (6) months from the date of
settlement has already elapsed.
 Under the first mode of enforcement, the execution of an amicable
settlement could be done on mere motion of the party entitled
thereto before the Punong Barangay. The proceedings in this case
are summary in nature and are governed by the Local Government
Code and the Katarungang Pambarangay IRR
 The second mode of enforcement, on the other hand, is judicial in
nature and could only be resorted to through the institution of an
action in a regular form before the proper City/Municipal Trial
Court. The proceedings shall be governed by the provisions of the
Rules of Court.
 Indisputably, Angelita chose to enforce the kasunduan under the
second mode and filed a motion for execution, which was docketed
as Special Proceedings No 45-99.
 It is undisputed that what Angelita filed before the MCTC was
captioned “motion for execution,” rather than a petition/complaint
for execution. A perusal of the motion for execution, however,
shows that it contains the material requirements of an initiatory
action.
o the motion is sufficient in form and substance.
o Thus, the motion for execution that Angelita filed was
intended to be an initiatory pleading or an original action
that is compliant with the requirement under Section 3,
Rule 6 of the Rules of Court that the complaint should
allege the plaintiff’s cause of action and the names and
residences of the plaintiff and the defendant.
o Angelita’s motion could therefore be treated as an original
action, and not merely as a motion/special proceeding. For
this reason, Annabel has filed the proper remedy
prescribed under Section 417 of the Local Government
Code.
 Under Section 416 of the Local Government Code, the amicable
settlement and arbitration award shall have the force and effect of
a final judgment of a court upon the expiration of ten (10) days
from the date of its execution, unless the settlement or award has
been repudiated or a petition to nullify the award has been filed
before the proper city or municipal court.
 In the present case, the records reveal that Michael never
repudiated the kasunduan within the period prescribed by the law.
Hence, the CA correctly ruled that the kasunduan has the force
and effect of a final judgment that is ripe for execution.
 The law, as written, unequivocally speaks of the “appropriate city
or municipal court” as the forum for the execution of the
settlement or arbitration award issued by the Lupon. Notably, in
expressly conferring authority over these courts, Section 417
made no distinction with respect to the amount involved or the
nature of the issue involved.
ZAMORA v HEIRS OF IZQUIERDO
Nov 18 2004 | Sandoval-Gutierrez, J. | Petition for Review on Certiorari |
Katarungang Pambarangay
PETITIONER: Avelina Zamora, Emerita Zamora-Nicol, Sonny Nicol, Teresa
Zamora-Umali, Clarence Umali, Roberto Zamora, Rolando Zamora, Mary Ann
Zamora, Michelle Zamora And Rodrigo Zamora
RESPONDENT: Heirs Of Carmen Izquierdo, Represented By Their Attorney-
In-Fact, Anita F. Punzalan
SUMMARY: The Zamoras, lessees, did not pay the increased rental imposed
by the lessor, Izquierdos. The Zamoras applied for a water installation but was
not given by an owner’s consent by the attorney of the Izquierdos. Zamoras
had several confrontations in the barangay with the Izquierdos but no
conciliation was made. The Izquierdos obtained a Certification to File Action.
The Izquierdos filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against the Zamoras.
The Zamoras filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the Punong Barangay, as
Lupon Chairman, did not constitute the Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo before
whom mediation proceedings should have been conducted as required by the
LGC.
DOCTRINE: Section 412(a) of R.A. No. 7160 requires the parties to undergo a
conciliation process before the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat as a
precondition to filing a complaint in court. In this case, the Punong Barangay,
as Chairman of the Lupong Tagapamayapa, conducted conciliation
proceedings. There were confrontations before the barangay chairman on 9
different dates wherein not only the issue of water installation was discussed
but also the terms of the lease and the proposed execution of a written
contract relative thereto. While it is true that the Sertifikasyon is entitled ‘Ukol
Sa Hindi Pagbibigay Ng Pahintulot Sa Pagpapakabit Ng Tubig’, this title must
not prevail over the actual issues discussed in the proceedings. In Diu vs.
Court of Appeals, the SC held that “while the Pangkat was not constituted,
however, the parties met nine (9) times at the Office of the Barangay
Chairman for conciliation wherein not only the issue of water installation was
discussed but also petitioners’ violation of the lease contract. It is thus
manifest that there was substantial compliance with the law which does not
require strict adherence thereto.
FACTS:
1. Carmen Izquierdo and Pablo Zamora entered into a verbal stipulation
whereby the former leased to the latter 1 of her apartment units in
Caloocan (rental = 3k/month; for residence only; only a single family
is allowed to occupy).
2. After the death of Carmen (lessor), her attorney-in-fact, Punzalan,
representing the heirs, prepared a new contract of lease – rental was
increased to 3 600/month. However, petitioners refused to sign it.
3. Pablo (lessee) died. His wife, Avelina, and their children (2 of whom
have their own families), continued to reside in the apartment unit.
Meanwhile, Avelina applied with the MWSS for a water line installation
in the premises. Since a written consent from the owner is req’d for
such installation, she requested Punzalan to issue it. However, the
latter declined because Ps refused to pay the new rental rate and
violated the restrictions on the use of the premises by using a portion
thereof for photox business and allowing 3 families to reside therein.
4. This prompted Avelina to file with the Office of the Punong Brgy a
complaint against Punzalan. During the brgy conciliation proceedings,
Zamora declared that she refused to sign because she is not agreeable
with the conditions in the contract.
5. The ff day, Punzalan sent Avelina a letter informing her that the lease
is being terminated and demanding that Ps vacate the premises w/in
30d from notice. Despite several brgy conciliation sessions, the
parties failed to settle their dispute amicably. Hence, the Brgy
Chairman issued a Certification to File Action.
6. Rs represented by Punzalan, filed with MTC, a complaint for unlawful
detainer and damages against Ps. Forthwith, Ps filed an MTD on the
ground that the controversy was not referred to the brgy for
conciliation. First, they alleged that the brgyy Cert. to File Action is
fatally defective because it pertains to another dispute, i.e., the refusal
by Punzalan to give her written consent for installation of water
facilities; and second, when the parties failed to reach an amicable
settlement before the Lupong Tagapamayapa,  the Punong Barangay
(as Lupon Chairman), did not constitute the Pangkat ng
Tagapagkasundo before whom mediation or arbitration proceedings
should have been conducted, in violation of Sec 410(b), LGC.
7. Rs opposed the MTD, the same being prohibited under Sec 19 of the
1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. They prayed that
judgment be rendered as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the
complaint, pursuant to Section 6 of the same Rule.
8. MTC: denied MTD. MR by Ps also denied. On appeal, RTC affirmed.
ISSUE: WoN Sec 412 was complied with before Punzalan filed an action
with the Court — YES, there was substanstial compliance.
RULING: Petition denied.
RATIO:
1. The primordial objective of PD 1508 (the Katarungang
Pambarangay Law), now included under the LGC, is to reduce the
number of court litigations and prevent the deterioration of the quality
of justice which has been brought about by the indiscriminate filing of
cases in the courts. To attain this objective, Sec 412(a) LGC requires
the parties to undergo a conciliation process before
the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat  as a precondition to filing a
complaint in court.
2. In this case, the Punong Brgy, as Chairman of the Lupong
Tagapamayapa, conducted conciliation proceedings to resolve the
dispute bet. the parties herein. Contrary to Ps’ contention, the
complaint does not only allege, as a cause of action, the refusal of
Punzalan to give her consent to the installation of water facilities in the
premises, but also Ps’ violation of the terms of the lease, specifically
their use of a portion therein for their photox business and their failure
to pay the increased rental.
3. As correctly found by the RTC, confrontations before the barangay
chairman were held from Jan-Aug, 1997 wherein not only the issue of
water installation was discussed but also the terms of the lease and
the proposed execution of a written contract relative thereto. It
appears, however, that no settlement was reached despite a total of 9
meetings at the brgy level.
4. It is of no moment that the complaint was initially made by Zamora
because Punzalan was given by the Sangguniang Brgy the authority to
bring her grievance to the Court for resolution. While it is true that the
Sertifikasyon is entitled Ukol Sa Hindi Pagbibigay Ng Pahintulot Sa
Pagpapakabit Ng Tubig, this title must not prevail over the actual
issues discussed in the proceedings.
5. Hence, to require another confrontation at the brgy level as a sine qua
non for the filing of the instant case would not serve any useful
purpose anymore since no new issues would be raised therein and the
parties have proven so many times in the past that they cannot get to
settle their differences amicably.
6. SC cannot sustain Ps’ contention that the Lupon conciliation alone, w/o
the proceeding before the Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo, contravenes
the law on Katarungang Pambarangay. Section 412(a) LGC, clearly
provides that, as a precondition to filing a complaint in court, the
parties shall go through the conciliation process either before
the Lupon Chairman (as what happened in the present
case), or the Pangkat.
7. Diu vs. CA: SC held that notwithstanding the mandate in Section
410(b) LGC that the Brgy  Chairman shall constitute a Pangkat if he
fails in his mediation efforts, the same Sec 410(b) should be construed
together with Sec 412(a), as well as the circumstances obtaining in
and peculiar to the case.
8. Here, while the Pangkat  was not constituted, however, the parties
met 9 times at the Office of the Brgy Chairman for conciliation
wherein not only the issue of water installation was discussed but also
 Ps violation of the lease contract. It is thus manifest that there was
substantial compliance with the law.
9. Ps’ MTD the complaint for unlawful detainer is proscribed by Sec 19(a) 5
of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. Sec 19(a) permits
the filing of such pleading only when the ground for dismissal of the
complaint is anchored on lack of jurisdiction over the subj matter,
or failure by the complainant to refer the subj matter of his/her
complaint to the Lupon  for conciliation prior to its filing with the
court. This is clear from the provisions of Section 18 6 of the same Rule.
10. As discussed earlier, the case was referred to the Lupon Chairman for
conciliation. Obviously, the MTD, even if allowed, is bereft of merit.

5
SEC. 19. Prohibited pleadings and motions. The following pleadings, motions, or petitions shall not be
allowed in the cases covered by this Rule:
(a) Motion to dismiss the complaint or to quash the complaint or information except on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, or failure to comply with the preceding section [referring
to Section 18 on referral of the complaint to the Lupon for conciliation]
6
SEC. 18. Referral to Lupon. Cases requiring referral to the Lupon for conciliation under the provisions
of Presidential Decree No. 1508 where there is no showing of compliance with such requirement, shall
be dismissed without prejudice, and may be revived only after such requirement shall have been
complied with. This provision shall not apply to criminal cases where the accused was arrested without a
warrant.