TOPIC CASE SYLLABUS

D. RA No. 7160 Mendoza vs. Court of Appeals,

Action; Suit between members of the same family; Requisite before suit is filed; Article
(Sections 399- 19 SCRA 756, 222, New Civil Code construed.—Article 222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines requires
422) No. L-23102 that before a suit between members of the same family (in this case between husband
CIRCULAR No. April 24, 1967 and wife) is filed or maintained, it must appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise
14-93 have
THE REVISED been made. The only way to make it so appear is by a proper averment to that effect in
KATARUNGANG the complaint. Since the law forbids a suit being filed or maintained unless such efforts at
PAMBARANGA compromise appear, the showing that such efforts had been exerted is a condition
Y LAW precedent to the existence of the cause of action. Hence, the failure of the complaint to
plead that the plaintiff previously tried in earnest to reach a settlement out of court
renders it assailable for lack of cause of action. It may be so attacked at any stage of the
case on appeal. Mendoza vs. Court of Appeals, 19 SCRA 756, No. L-23102 April 24, 1967
SAME TOPIC G.R. No. 70261 Civil Procedure; PD 1508; Referral of a case to the Lupon Tagapayapa, is not a
February 28, 1990 jurisdictional requirement; Non-compliance with such requirement cannot divest a court
MAURO BLARDONY, JR, vs. of jurisdiction which it has already acquired over the subject matter or over the person of
HON. JOSE L. COSCOLLUELA, the defendant. The petition has no merit. Our jurisprudence is replete with decisions of
JR. this Court to the effect that while the referral of a case to the Lupon Tagapayapa is a
condition precedent for filing a complaint in court, it is not a jurisdictional requirement,
“its non- Blardony, Jr. vs. Coscolluela, Jr., 182 SCRA 825, G.R. No. 70261 February 28, 1990
compliance cannot affect the jurisdiction which the court has already acquired over the
subject matter or over the person of the defendant.” (Fernandez vs. Militante, May 31,
1988; Gonzales vs. Court of Ap-peals, 151 SCRA 287; Royales vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 127 SCRA 470.) Petitioner waived the pre-litigation conciliation procedure
prescribed in P.D. No. 1508 when he did not file a motion to dismiss the complaint on that
score, but filed his answer thereto wherein he prayed the court to make an equitable
partition of the conjugal properties.
Same; Same; Barangay Conciliation; Provisional Remedies; Actions coupled with
 provisional remedies like support pendente lite and delivery of personal properties may
be filed directly to court even without passing the Lupon Tagapayapa.—Furthermore,
under Section 6 of P.D. 1508, the complaint may be filed directly in a competent court
without passing the Lupon Tagapayapa in the following cases: x x x “(3) Actions coupled
with provisional remedies such as preliminary injunction, attachment, delivery of
personal property and support pendente lite: and “xxx xxx xxx.” (Italics ours.).
Respondent Judge correctly observed that: “x. x x the issues of support pendente lite and
delivery of personal properties belonging to the conjugal partnership, although not
‘coupled’ in the strict sense of the word with the instant petition, are essentially involved
in this petition because of the minority of the daughter, Patricia Araneta Blardony who, as
of this date, is not yet 8 years old, and because the resolution or decision of this court on
the pending petition would be incomplete without a clear cut disposition on the partition
of the personal and real properties of the conjugal partnership and consequent delivery
thereof to the proper parties.” (p. 20, Rolo.) Blardony, Jr. vs. Coscolluela, Jr., 182 SCRA
825, G.R. No. 70261 February 28, 1990

SAME TOPIC G.R. No. 153567 Actions; Barangay Justice System; Katarungang Pambarangay Law (P.D. 1508); The
February 18, 2008 barangay justice system was established primarily as a means of easing up the congestion
LIBRADA M. AQUINO, of cases in the judicial courts; The primordial objective of Presidential Decree No. 1508 is
vs. to reduce the number of court litigations and prevent the deterioration of the quality of
ERNEST S. AURE justice which has been brought by the indiscriminate filing of cases in the courts; P.D. No.
1508 is now incorporated in R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known as The Local Government
Code, which took effect on 1 January 1992.—The barangay justice system was
established primarily as a means of easing up the congestion of cases in the judicial
courts. This could be accomplished through a proceeding before the barangay courts
which, according to the conceptor of the system, the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, is
essentially arbitration in character, and to make it truly effective, it should also be
compulsory. With this primary objective of the barangay justice system in mind, it would
be wholly in keeping with the underlying philosophy of Presidential Decree No. 1508,
otherwise known as the Katarungang Pambarangay Law, and the policy behind it would
be better served if an out-of-court settlement of the case is reached voluntarily by the
parties. The primordial objective of Presidential Decree No. 1508 is to reduce the number
of court litigations and prevent the deterioration of the quality of justice which has been
brought by the indiscriminate filing of cases in the courts. To ensure this objective,
Section 6 of Presidential Decree No. 1508 requires the parties to undergo a conciliation
process before the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo as a precondition
to filing a complaint in court subject to certain exceptions which are inapplicable to this
case. The said section has been declared compulsory in nature. Presidential Decree No.
1508 is now incorporated in Repub lic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as The Local
Government Code, which took effect on 1 January 1992.

Same; Same; Jurisdictions; Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies; While it is true that

the precise technical effect of failure to comply with the requirement of Section 412 of the
Local Government Code on barangay conciliation is much the same effect produced by
non-exhaustion of administrative remedies—the complaint becomes afflicted with the
vice of pre-maturity—the conciliation process is not a jurisdictional requirement, so that
non-compliance therewith cannot affect the jurisdiction which the court has otherwise
acquired over the subject matter or over the person of the defendant.—It is true that the
precise technical effect of failure to comply with the requirement of Section 412 of the
Local Government Code on barangay conciliation (previously contained in Section 5 of
Presidential Decree No. 1508) is much the same effect produced by non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies—the complaint becomes afflicted with the vice of pre-maturity;
and the controversy there alleged is not ripe for judicial determination. The complaint
becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss. Nevertheless, the conciliation process is not a
jurisdictional requirement, so that non-compliance therewith cannot affect the
jurisdiction which the court has otherwise acquired over the subject matter or over the
 person of the defendant.

Same; Same; Same; Pleadings and Practice; The fact that the defendant raised the issue of
non-recourse to barangay mediation proceedings during the pre-trial and in her Position
Paper is of no moment, for the same should be impleaded in her Answer.—By Aquino’s
failure to seasonably object to the deficiency in the Complaint, she is deemed to have
already acquiesced or waived any defect attendant thereto. Consequently, Aquino cannot
thereafter move for the dismissal of the ejectment suit for Aure and Aure Lending’s
failure to resort to the barangay conciliation process, since she is already precluded from
doing so. The fact that Aquino raised such objection during the pre-trial and in her
Position Paper is of no moment, for the issue of non-recourse to barangay mediation
proceedings should be impleaded in her Answer Aquino vs. Aure, 546 SCRA 71, G.R. No.
153567 February 18, 2008
SAME TOPIC G.R. No. L-65072 January 31, Municipal Corporations; Barangay Law: General rule that noncompliance with the
1984 - APOLINAR R. barangay conciliation process for disputes covered by PD 1508 as a pre-condition for
ROYALES, ET AL. v. filing of action in court, could affect sufficiency of plaintiffs cause of action and make
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE complaint vulnerable to dismissal on ground of lack of cause of action or prematurity;
COURT, ET AL Exception is where defendants failed to object to exercise of jurisdiction by the court over
the case in their answer and even during the entire proceedings below.—Ordinarily,
noncompliance with the condition precedent prescribed by P.D. 1508 could affect the
sufficiency of the plaintiff’s cause of action and make his complaint vulnerable to
dismissal on ground of lack of cause of action or prematurity; but the same would not
prevent a court of competent jurisdiction from exercising its power of adjudication over
the case before it, where the defendants, as in this case, failed to object to such exercise of
jurisdiction in their answer and even during the entire proceedings a quo. Royales vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 127 SCRA 470, No. L-65072 January 31, 1984
SAME TOPIC DANTE M. PASCUAL, VS. Actions; Katarungang Pambarangay; Where the parties are not actual residents in the
MARILOU M. PASCUAL same city or municipality or adjoining barangays, there is no requirement for them to
 G.R. No. 157830 submit their dispute to the lupon.—In the 1982 case of Tavora v. Veloso, this Court held
that where the parties are not actual residents in the same city or municipality or
adjoining barangays, there is no requirement for them to submit their dispute to the
lupon as provided for in Section 6 vis-à -vis Sections 2 and 3 of P.D. 1508 (Katarungang
Pambarangay Law). [B]y express statutory inclusion and exclusion, the Lupon shall have
no jurisdiction over disputes where the parties are not actual residents of the same city
or municipality, except where the barangays in which they actually reside adjoin each
other. Pascual vs. Pascual, 475 SCRA 268, G.R. No. 157830 November 17, 2005
SAME TOPIC G.R. No. 211966, August 07, Local Government Code; Barangay Conciliation; The Local Government Code (LGC)
2017 further provides that “the lupon of each barangay shall have authority to bring together
ABAGATNAN, v. CLARITO, the parties actually residing in the same city or municipality for amicable settlement of all
disputes,” subject to certain exceptions. One such exception is in cases where the dispute
involves parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities or municipalities,
unless said barangay units adjoin each other and the parties thereto agree to submit their
differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate lupon.—The LGC further provides
that “the lupon of each barangay shall have authority to bring together the parties
actually residing in the same city or municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes,”
subject to certain exceptions enumerated in the law. One such exception is in cases where
the dispute involves parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities or
municipalities, unless said barangay units adjoin each other and the parties thereto agree
to submit their differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate lupon. Thus, parties
who do not actually reside in the same city or municipality or adjoining barangays are not
required to submit their dispute to the lupon as a precondition to the filing of a complaint
in court. In Pascual v. Pascual, 475 SCRA 268 (2005), the Court ruled that the express
statutory requirement of actual residency in the LGC pertains specifically to the real
parties-in-interest in the case. It further explained that said requirement cannot be
construed to apply to the attorney-in-fact of the party-plaintiff, as doing so would
abrogate the meaning of a “real party-in-interest” as defined in Section 2, in relation to
 Section 3, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. The same ruling was reiterated in Banting v.
Spouses Maglapuz, 499 SCRA 505 (2006), where the Court held that “the requirement
under Section 412 of the [LGC] that a case be referred for conciliation before the Lupon as
a precondition to its filing in court applies only to those cases where the real parties-in-
interest actually reside in the same city or municipality.” In the present case, the
Complaint filed before the MTCC specifically alleged that not all the real parties-in-
interest in the case actually reside in Roxas City: Jimmy resided in Poblacion, Siniloan,
Laguna, while Jenalyn resided in Brgy. de La Paz, Pasig City. As such, the lupon has no
jurisdiction over their dispute, and prior referral of the case for barangay conciliation is
not a precondition to its filing in court. Abagatnan vs. Clarito, 834 SCRA 534, G.R. No.
211966 August 7, 2017
SAME TOPIC G.R. No. 158867 Barangay Conciliation; The requirement under Section 412 of the Local Government Code
August 22, 2006 that a case be referred for conciliation before the Lupon as a precondition to its filing in
JIMMY BANTING, ALFRED court applies only to those cases where the real parties-in-interest reside in the same city
REYES and MAXIMA ARCENO or municipality.—It is settled that the requirement under Section 412 of the Local
REYES, Petitioners, Government Code that a case be referred for conciliation before the Lupon as a
vs. precondition to its filing in court applies only to those cases where the real parties-in-
SPS. JOSE MAGLAPUZ interest actually reside in the same city or municipality. Here, the complaint filed with the
MeTC specifically alleged that the parties reside in different baran-gays and cities.
Banting vs. Maglapuz, 499 SCRA 505, G.R. No. 158867 August 22, 2006
SAME TOPIC G.R. No. 85475. June 30, MEDIATION PROCEEDING SHOULD NOT END BEFORE THE PUNONG BARANGAY;
1989.] CERTIFICATION ISSUED WITHOUT CONVERTING THE PANGKAT, PREMATURE. — It is
clear from the above rules that the dispute should not have ended with the mediation
MANUEL A. proceedings before the Punong Barangay because of his failure to effect a settlement
RAMOS, Petitioner, v. THE between the brothers. It was not for the Punong Barangay to say that referral to the
HONORABLE COURT OF Pangkat was no longer necessary merely because he himself had failed to work out an
APPEALS and DOMINGO agreement between the petitioner and the private Respondent. Indeed, it is possible that
RAMOS the Pangkat could have exerted more efforts and succeeded (where he had not) in
 resolving the dispute. The Punong Barangay could in fact have even issued summons to
compel the attendance of Domingo Ramos, who was the complainant himself, in the
mediation hearing. It seems the Punong Barangay had not tried hard enough. In any
event, the certification he issued was certainly premature and did not authorize
immediate recourse to judicial action.

FAILURE OF COMPLAINANT TO APPEAR BEFORE THE PUNONG BARANGAY, BARS HIM

FROM SEEKING JUDICIAL RECOURSE FORM THE SAME CAUSE OF ACTION. — Manuel
Ramos, the respondent in the barangay proceedings, who actually appeared therein and
is now invoking the non-appearance of Domingo Ramos, the complainant himself.
Domingo, the herein private respondent, is the party who did not appear to support his
own complaint before the Punong Barangay. He invoked the Punong Barangay’s
jurisdiction and then disregarded it. Under Section 4(d), he is now barred, as complainant
in the barangay proceedings, "from seeking judicial recourse for the same cause of action.

MERE REFUSAL OF COMPLAINANT TO APPEAR AT THE CONFRONTATION DOES NOT

SUFFICE THE NON-CONVENTION OF THE PANGKAT. — In Alinsugay, the Court said that
"where one party fails to appear for no justifiable reason, convening the Pangkat as a
necessary second step will serve no useful purpose." True, but we must stress the word
justifiable. Mere refusal to appear at the confrontation as required by the law, when the
party invoking P.D. 1508 is the one who disregarded it, is not a justifiable reason.
SAME TOPIC G.R. No. 96914. July 23, REMEDIAL LAW; PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1508; PERSONAL CONFRONTATION
1992.] BETWEEN PARTIES MANDATED BY SECTION 9 THEREOF; RATIONALE; EXCEPTIONS TO
PERSONAL CONFRONTATION; CASE AT BAR. — As stated earlier, Section 9 of P.D 1508
CECILIA U. mandates personal confrontation of the parties because: ". . . a personal confrontation
LEDESMA, Petitioner, v. THE between the parties without the intervention of a counsel or representative would
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, generate spontaneity and a favorable disposition to amicable settlement on the part of
and JOSE T. the disputants. In other words, the said procedure is deemed conducive to the successful
DIZON, Respondents. resolution of the dispute at the barangay level." Petitioner tries to show that her failure to
personally appear before the Barangay Chairman was because of her recurring
Edgar V. Mendoza and psychological ailments. But for the entire year of 1988 — specifically September to
Epifania N. Mendoza December 6 -- there is no indication at all that petitioner went to see her psychiatrist for
for Petitioner. consultation. The only conclusion is that 1988 was a lucid interval for petitioner. There
was, therefore, no excuse then for her non-appearance at the Lupon Chairman’s office.
Gaudioso C. de Lunas Petitioner, not having shown that she is incompetent, cannot be represented by counsel
for Private Respondent or even by attorney-in-fact who is next of kin. As explained by the Minister of Justice with
whom We agree: "To ensure compliance with the requirement of personal confrontation
between the parties, and thereby, the effectiveness of the barangay conciliation
proceedings as a mode of dispute resolution, the above-quoted provision is couched in
mandatory language. Moreover, pursuant to the familiar maxim in statutory construction
dictating that ‘expressio unius est exclusio alterius,’ the express exceptions made
regarding minors and incompetents must be construed as exclusive of all others not
mentioned. Petitioner’s non-compliance with Secs. 6 and 9 of P.D. 1508 legally barred her
from pursuing the ejectment case in the MTC of Manila. Having arrived at this conclusion,
there is no need for Us to discuss the other issues involved.

IN CASE AT BAR, ISSUE OF NON-COMPLIANCE WITH SECTIONS 6 AND 9 OF P.D. 1508

RAISED IN TRIAL COURT BY ALLEGATIONS IN THE ANSWER. — We do not agree with
petitioner that the issue of non-compliance with Sections 6 and 9 of P.D. 1508 was raised
only for the first time in the Court of Appeals. When private respondent stated that he
was never summoned or subpoenaed by the Barangay Chairman, he, in effect, was stating
that since he was never summoned, he could not appear in person for the needed
confrontation of the parties before the Lupon Chairman for conciliation and/or amicable
settlement. Without the mandatory personal confrontation, no complaint could be filed
with the MTC. Private respondent’s allegation in paragraph 4 of his Answer that he was
never summoned or subpoenaed by the Barangay Chairman; that plaintiff has no cause of
 action against him as alleged in paragraph 7 of the Answer; and that the certification to
file action was improperly issued in view of the foregoing allegations thereby resulting in
non-compliance with the mandatory requirements of P.D. No. 1508, as stated in
paragraph 8 of the Answer are in substantial compliance with the raising of said issues
and/or objections in the court below.
SAME TOPIC G.R. No. 200612, April 05, Remedial Law; Summary Procedure; Section 5 of the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary
2017 Procedure provides that affirmative and negative defenses not pleaded in the answer
shall be deemed waived, except lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.—Rafael’s
RAFAEL C. UY claim that the complaint below should have been dismissed since Grace Joy has no
(CABANGBANG authority to represent the Estate of Vipa and that there was lack of prior barangay
STORE), Petitioner, v. ESTAT conciliation is untenable. Unlawful de Remedial Law; Summary Procedure; Section 5 of
E OF VIPA the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure provides that affirmative and negative
FERNANDEZ, Respondents. defenses not pleaded in the answer shall be deemed waived, except lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter.—Rafael’s claim that the complaint below should have been
dismissed since Grace Joy has no authority to represent the Estate of Vipa and that there
was lack of prior barangay conciliation is untenable. Unlawful de Uy vs. Estate of Vipa
Fernandez, 822 SCRA 382, G.R. No. 200612 April 5, 2017
SAME TOPIC G.R. No. 191336               Civil Law; Compromise Agreements; Amicable Settlements; Barangay Conciliation; An
January 25, 2012 amicable settlement reached at the barangay conciliation proceedings, is binding
between the contracting parties and, upon its perfection, is immediately executory
CRISANTA ALCARAZ insofar as it is not contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public order and public
MIGUEL, Petitioner, policy.—It is true that an amicable settlement reached at the barangay conciliation
vs. proceedings, like the Kasunduang Pag-aayos in this case, is binding between the
JERRY D. MONTANEZ contracting parties and, upon its perfection, is immediately executory insofar as it is not
contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public order and public policy. This is in
accord with the broad precept of Article 2037 of the Civil Code, viz.: A compromise has
upon the parties the effect and authority of res judicata; but there shall be no execution
except in compliance with a judicial compromise. Being a by-product of mutual
 concessions and good faith of the parties, an amicable settlement has the force and effect
of res judicata even if not judicially approved. It transcends being a mere contract binding
only upon the parties thereto, and is akin to a judgment that is subject to execution in
accordance with the Rules. Thus, under Section 417 of the Local Government Code, such
amicable settlement or arbitration award may be enforced by execution by the Barangay
Lupon within six (6) months from the date of settlement, or by filing an action to enforce
such settlement in the appropriate city or municipal court, if beyond the six-month
period.

Same; Same; Same; Same; If the amicable settlement is repudiated by one party, either
expressly or impliedly, the other party has two options, namely, to enforce the
compromise in accordance with the Local Government Code or Rules of Court as the case
may be, or to consider it rescinded and insist upon his original demand.—It must be
emphasized, however, that enforcement by execution of the amicable settlement, either
under the first or the second remedy, is only applicable if the contracting parties have not
repudiated such settlement within ten (10) days from the date thereof in accordance with
Section 416 of the Local Government Code. If the amicable settlement is repudiated by
one party, either expressly or impliedly, the other party has two options, namely, to
enforce the compromise in accordance with the Local Government Code or Rules of Court
as the case may be, or to consider it rescinded and insist upon his original demand. This is
in accord with Article 2041 of the Civil Code, which qualifies the broad application of
Article 2037, viz.: If one of the parties fails or refuses to abide by the compromise, the
other party may either enforce the compromise or regard it as rescinded and insist upon
his original demand. Miguel vs. Montanez, 664 SCRA 345, G.R. No. 191336 January 25,
2012
SAME TOPIC [G.R. NO. 159411. March 18, Remedial Law; Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law; Settlements; An amicable
2005] settlement reached after barangay conciliation proceedings has the force and effect of a
TEODORO I. final judgment of a court if not repudiated or a petition to nullify the same is filed before
CHAVEZ, Petitioners, v. HON.
COURT OF APPEALS and
JACINTO S.
TRILLANA, Respondents.
the proper city or municipal court within ten (10) days from its date; Settlement may be
enforced by execution by the lupong tagapamayapa within six (6) months from its date,
or by action in the appropriate city or municipal court, if beyond the six-month period.—
The Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law provides that an amicable settlement
reached after barangay conciliation proceedings has the force and effect of a final
judgment of a court if not repudiated or a petition to nullify the same is filed before the
proper city or municipal court within ten (10) days from its date. It further provides that
the settlement may be enforced by execution by the lupong tagapamayapa within six (6)
months from its date, or by action in the appropriate city or municipal court, if beyond
the six-month period. This special provision follows the general precept enunciated in
Article 2037 of the Civil Code.
The Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law provides for a two-tiered mode of
enforcement of an amicable settlement, to wit: (a) by execution by the Punong Barangay
which is quasi-judicial and summary in nature on mere motion of the party entitled
thereto; and (b) an action in regular form, which remedy is judicial; The mode of
enforcement does not rule out the right of rescis-sion under Art. 2041 of the Civil Code.—
In the case at bar, the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law provides for a two-tiered
mode of enforcement of an amicable settlement, to wit: (a) by execution by the Punong
Barangay which is quasi-judicial and summary in nature on mere motion of the party
entitled thereto; and (b) an action in regular form, which remedy is judicial. However, the
mode of enforcement does not rule out the right of rescission under Art. 2041 of the Civil
Code. The availability of the right of rescission is apparent from the wording of Sec. 417
itself which provides that the amicable settlement “may” be enforced by execution by the
lupon within six (6) months from its date or by action in the appropriate city or
municipal court, if beyond that period. The use of the word “may” clearly makes the
procedure provided in the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law directory or merely
optional in nature.

SAME TOPIC G.R. No. 164594, April 22,
2015
MICHAEL
SEBASTIAN, Petitioner, v. AN
NABEL LAGMAY NG,
REPRESENTED BY HER
ATTORNEY-IN-FACT,
ANGELITA LAGMAY
Same; Same; Same; It is axiomatic that a compromise settlement is not an admission of
liability but merely a recognition that there is a dispute and an impending litigation.—
Although the “Kasunduan” executed by petitioner and respondent before the Office of the
Barangay Captain had the force and effect of a final judgment of a court, petitioner’s non-
compliance paved the way for the application of Art. 2041 under which respondent may
either enforce the compromise, following the procedure laid out in the Revised
Katarungang Pambarangay Law, or regard it as rescinded and insist upon his original
demand. Respondent chose the latter option when he instituted Civil Case No. 5139-V-97
for recovery of unrealized profits and reimbursement of advance rentals, moral and
exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees. Respondent was not limited to claiming
P150,000.00 because although he agreed to the amount in the “Kasunduan,” it is
axiomatic that a compromise settlement is not an admission of liability but merely a
recognition that there is a dispute and an impending litigation which the parties hope to
prevent by making reciprocal concessions, adjusting their respective positions in the
hope of gaining balanced by the danger of losing. Under the “Kasunduan,” respondent
was only required to execute a waiver of all possible claims arising from the lease
contract if petitioner fully complies with his obligations thereunder. It is undisputed that
herein petitioner did not. Chavez vs. Court of Appeals, 453 SCRA 843, G.R. No. 159411
March 18, 2005
Local Government Code; Amicable Settlement; An amicable settlement or arbitration
award that is not repudiated within a period of ten (10) days from the settlement may be
enforced by: first, execution by the Lupon within six (6) months from the date of the
settlement; or second, by an action in the appropriate city or municipal trial court (MTC)
if more than six (6) months from the date of settlement has already elapsed.—A simple
reading of Section 417 of the Local Government Code readily discloses the two-tiered
mode of enforcement of an amicable settlement. The provision reads: Section 417.
Execution.—The amicable settlement or arbitration award may be enforced by execution
by the lupon within six (6) months from the date of the settlement. After the lapse of such
time, the settlement may be enforced by action in the appropriate city or municipal court.
[Emphasis ours] Under this provision, an amicable settlement or arbitration award that is
not repudiated within a period of ten (10) days from the settlement may be enforced by:
first, execution by the Lupon within six (6) months from the date of the settlement; or
second, by an action in the appropriate city or municipal trial court if more than six (6)
months from the date of settlement has already elapsed.

Same; Same; Under Section 416 of the Local Government Code (LGC), the amicable
settlement and arbitration award shall have the force and effect of a final judgment of a
court upon the expiration of ten (10) days from the date of its execution, unless the
settlement or award has been repudiated or a petition to nullify the award has been filed
before the proper city or municipal court.—Under Section 416 of the Local Government
Code, the amicable settlement and arbitration award shall have the force and effect of a
final judgment of a court upon the expiration of ten (10) days from the date of its
execution, unless the settlement or award has been repudiated or a petition to nullify the
award has been filed before the proper city or municipal court. Moreover, Section 14,
Rule VI of the Katarungang Pambarangay Implementing Rules states that the party’s
failure to repudiate the settlement within the period of ten (10) days shall be deemed a
waiver of the right to challenge the settlement on the ground that his/her consent was
vitiated by fraud, violence or intimidation.

Statutory Construction; A basic principle of interpretation is that words must be given

their literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation where the words of a
statute are clear, plain and free from ambiguity.—The law, as written, unequivocally
speaks of the “appropriate city or municipal court” as the forum for the execution of the
settlement or arbitration award issued by the Lupon. Notably, in expressly conferring
authority over these courts, Section 417 made no distinction with respect to the amount
involved or the nature of the issue involved. Thus, there can be no question that the law’s
 intendment was to grant jurisdiction over the enforcement of settlement/arbitration
awards to the city or municipal courts the regardless of the amount. A basic principle of
interpretation is that words must be given their literal meaning and applied without
attempted interpretation where the words of a statute are clear, plain and free from
ambiguity. Sebastian vs. Ng, 757 SCRA 58, G.R. No. 164594 April 22, 2015

II. ACTION

A. RULE 2 – G.R. No. 114331. May 27, Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Bill of Particulars; As long as the complaint contains
CAUSE OF 1997] these three elements—(1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under
ACTION whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant
CESAR E. A. to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such
VIRATA, Petitioner, v. THE defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of
HONORABLE the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of
SANDIGANBAYAN and THE damages—a cause of action exists even though the allegations therein are vague.—The
REPUBLIC OF THE rule is that a complaint must contain the ultimate facts constituting plaintiff’s cause of
PHILIPPINES, Respondents action. A cause of action has the following elements, to wit: (1) a right in favor of the
plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an
obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and
(3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff
or constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the
latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages. As long as the complaint contains
these three elements, a cause of action exists even though the allegations therein are
vague, and dismissal of the action is not the proper remedy when the pleading is
ambiguous because the defendant may ask for more particulars. Virata vs.
Sandiganbayan, 272 SCRA 661, G.R. No. 114331 May 27, 1997
SAME TOPIC G.R. No. 89114 December 2, Remedial Law; Pleadings and Practices; Nature of a complaint.—A complaint is defined as
1991 a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff ‘s cause or causes of

FRANCISCO S. TANTUICO, JR.,
petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, PRESIDENTIAL
COMMISSION ON GOOD
GOVERNMENT, MATEO A. T.
CAPARAS, AND THE
SANDIGANBAYAN,
respondents.
action. Like all other pleadings allowed by the Rules of Court, the complaint shall contain
in a methodical and logical form a plain, concise and direct statement of the ultimate facts
on which the plaintiff relies for his claim, omitting the statement of mere evidentiary
facts. Its office, purpose or function is to inform the defendant clearly and definitely of the
claims made against him so that he may be prepared to meet the issues at the trial. The
complaint should inform the defendant of all the material facts on which the plaintiff
relies to support his demand; it should state the theory of a cause of action which forms
the bases of the plaintiffs claim of liability.
Same; Same; Same; Rules on pleading speak of two kinds of facts, the ultimate facts and
the evidentiary facts.—The rules on pleading speak of two (2) kinds of facts: the first, the
“ultimate facts”, and the second, the “evidentiary facts.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Ultimate facts and evidentiary facts defined.—"The term
‘ultimate facts’ as used in Sec. 3, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, means the essential facts
constituting the plaintiffs cause of action. A fact is essential if it cannot be stricken out,
without leaving the statement of the cause of action insufficient, x x x”, (Moran, Rules of
Court, Vol. 1,1963 ed., p. 213). “Ultimate facts are important and substantial facts which
either directly form the basis of the primary right and duty, or which directly make up the
wrongful acts or omissions of the defendant. The term does not refer to the details of
probative matter or particulars of evidence by which these material elements are to be
established. It refers to principal, determinate, constitutive facts, upon the existence of
which, the entire cause of action rests.” while the term “evidentiary fact” has been denned
in the following tenor: “Those facts which are necessary for determination of the ultimate
facts; they are the premises upon which conclusions of ultimate facts are based. Womack
v. Industrial Comm., 168 Colo. 364, 451 P.2d 761, 764. Facts which furnish evidence of
existence of some other fact.” Tantuico, Jr. vs. Republic, 204 SCRA 428, G.R. No. 89114
December 2, 1991
SAME TOPIC G.R. No. L-19751             ACTIONS DISMISSAL; LACK OF CAUSE OF ACTION MUST APPEAR ON FACE OF
February 28, 1966 COMPLAINT. — The lack of cause of action as a ground for dismissal must appear on the
face of the complaint, and to determine whether the complaint states a cause of action
ALFREDO REMITERE, ET only the facts alleged therein, and no other, should be considered.
AL., plaintiff-appellants,
vs.
REMEDIOS MONTINOLA
VDA. DE YULO, ET AL

SAME TOPIC G.R. No. 129227. May 30, Actions; Pleadings and Practice; It is the material allegations in the complaint, not the
2000.] legal conclusions made therein or the prayer that determines the relief to which the
plaintiff is entitled.—Anent the second issue as to whether the respondents are entitled
BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS to recover the alleged overpayments of interest, we find that they are despite the absence
AND MORTGAGE of any prayer therefore. This Court has ruled that it is the material allegations of fact in
BANK, Petitioners, v. THE the complaint, not the legal conclusion made therein or the prayer that determines the
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, relief to which the plaintiff is entitled. It is the allegations of the pleading which
and CALVIN & ELSA determine the nature of the action and the Court shall grant relief warranted by the
ARCILLA allegations and the proof even if no such relief is prayed for. Thus, even if the complaint
seeks the declaration of nullity of the contract, the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that
the factual allegations contained therein ultimately seek the return of the excess interests
paid. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank vs. Court of Appeals, 332 SCRA 241, G.R.
No. 129227 May 30, 2000
SAME TOPIC G.R. No. 81123 February 28, Cause of Action; A cause of action is an act or omission of one party in violation of the
1989 legal rights of the other.—The petitioners had a valid cause of action for damages against
Pepsi Cola. A cause of action is defined as “an act or omission of one party in violation of
CRISOSTOMO REBOLLIDO, the legal right or rights of the other; and its essential elements are a legal right of the
FERNANDO VALENCIA and plaintiff, correlative obligation of the defendants and an act or omission of the defendant
 in violation of said legal right.” (Santos v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 145 SCRA 248
EDWIN [1986] citing Ma-ao Sugar Central Co. v. Barrios, et al., 79 Phil. 666 [1947]; See also
REBOLLIDO, petitioners Republic Planters Bank v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 131 SCRA 631 [1984]). Rebollido
vs. vs. Court of Appeals, 170 SCRA 800, G.R. No. 81123 February 28, 1989
HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS

SAME TOPIC Santos vs. Intermediate Actions; Insistence of petitioner that there was no identity of parties between the two
Appellate Court, 145 SCRA cases because she joined her husband merely as a formalparty in the other case is not
248, No. L-66671 October 28, credible as she could have opted to exclude him if in fact they had been long separated
1986 before the transaction in question took place.—Anent the fourth requisite, the petitioner
argues that there is no identity of parties and causes of action in AOG.R. NO. SP-01251
and AOG.R. NO, SP01234. On the claim that there is absence of identity of the parties, the
petitioner asserts that in the latter case, she joined her husband merely as a formal party
because she and her husband had in fact been separated even before the jeweiry
transactions were entered into so that whatever obligations she incurred as a result were
personal in nature and did not involve the conjugal partnership. She further states that
when her husband filed the second petition, she was not bound by it since he was then
acting alone for his sole interest. We find no merit in the above claim of the petitioner. If
her husband was merely a formal party, she could have opted to exclude him because
formal parties are those who may be made parties or not at the option of the
complainant. Art. 113 of the New Civil Code gives her liberality of choice. Santos vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 145 SCRA 248, No. L-66671 October 28, 1986
SAME TOPIC Ma-ao Sugar Central Co. vs. ACTIONS; CAUSE OF ACTION, DEFINITION AND ELEMENTS OF.—A cause of action is an
Barrios, 79 Phil. 666, No. L- act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the other; and its
1539 December 3, 1947 essential elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of the defendant,
and act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right. Ma-ao Sugar Central
 Co. vs. Barrios, 79 Phil. 666, No. L-1539 December 3, 1947
SAME TOPIC Planters Bank vs . Action; Pleadings and Practice; An amended complaint should also be dismissed where it
Intermediate Appellate does not state a cause of action.—As regards the amended complaint, although it was still
Court , No. L-63805, August a matter of right on the part of the private respondents to file the same and no grave
31, 1984, 131 SCRA 631 abuse of discretion can be imputed on the respondent Court of First Instance in admitting
such complaint, the latter should have dismissed the amended complaint just the same
because on its face the reason for its earlier dismissal still existed. It still did not state a
cause of action against the petitioner Bank. The only change that was effected in the
refiled complaint was one additional allegation that the petitioner Bank was “guilty of
negligence amounting to fraud by not making the plaintiffs aware of the approval and
release of the loan so that in effect (sic) cooperated in the perpetration of a fraud Percival
Briñ as committed against the plaintiffs.”

Same; Same; Elements of a cause of action.—It is thus clear that the private respondents’
cause of action lies only against defendant Percival Briñ as and not against the petitioner
Bank because in their own words, said respondents have admitted that they authorized
Briñ as, through a special power of attorney, to obtain a loan from petitioner Bank. A
cause of action has three elements, namely: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by
whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the
part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or
omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting
a breach is only when the last element occurs or takes place that it can be said in law that
a cause of action has arisen. (Cole v. Vda. de Gregorio, 116 SCRA 680-681). Republic
Planters Bank vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 131 SCRA 631, No. L-63805 August 31,
1984
SAME TOPIC Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr., 224 Remedial Law; Actions; Class Suit; The subject matter of the complaint is of common and
SCRA 792, G.R. No. 101083 general interest not just to several, but to all citizens of the Philippines; All the requisites
July 30, 1993 for the filing of a valid class suit under Section 12 Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are
present.—Petitioners instituted Civil Case No. 90-777 as a class suit. The original
defendant and the present respondents did not take issue with this matter. Nevertheless,
We hereby rule that the said civil case is indeed a class suit. The subject matter of the
complaint is of common and general interest not just to several, but to all citizens of the
Philippines. Consequently, since the parties are so numerous, it becomes impracticable, if
not totally impossible, to bring all of them before the court. We likewise declare that the
plaintiffs therein are numerous and representative enough to ensure the full protection
of all concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for the filing of a valid class suit under
Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are present both in the said civil case and
in the instant petition, the latter being but an incident to the former.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Petitioners’ personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding
generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar
as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.—This case, however, has a
special and novel element. Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation
as well as generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for
themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class
suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on
the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers the
“rhythm and harmony of nature.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The minors’ assertion of their right to a sound
environment constitutes at the same time the performance of their obligation to ensure
the protection of that right for the generation to come.—Needless to say, every
generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the
full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors’
assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the
performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations
 to come. Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr., 224 SCRA 792, G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993
SAME TOPIC Community Investment and OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS; MORATORIUM ORDER; ACTIONS; JUDGMENT; EFFECT
Finance Corp. vs. Garcia, 88 OF MORATORIUM ORDERS.—Executive Order No. 25 as amended by Executive Order No.
Phil. 215, No. L-2338 32, not only suspends the execution of the judgment that the court may render to enforce
February 27, 1951 the payment of debts and other monetary obligations, but also the filing of suit in the
courts of justice if timely objection is set up by the debtor. And having the defendant set
up the defense of moratorium in due time, the lower court has no other alternative than
to dismiss the complaint. Community Investment and Finance Corp. vs. Garcia, 88 Phil.
215, No. L-2338 February 27, 1951
SAME TOPIC Caseñ as vs. Rosales, et al., 19 Actions; Parties; Legal representative takes place of deceased party.—When the trial
SCRA 462, No. L-18707 court is apprised of the death of a party, it should order, not the amendment of the
February 28, 1967 complaint, but the appearance of the legal representative of the deceased as provided in
section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. An order to amend the complaint, before the
proper substitution of the deceased parties has been effected, is void. In such a case the
order of the court, dismissing the complaint, for plaintiff’s noncompliance with the order.
to amend it, is likewise void.
Same; Cause of action defined.—A cause of action is an act or omission of one party in
violation of the legal right or rights of the other. Caseñ as vs. Rosales, et al., 19 SCRA 462,
No. L-18707 February 28, 1967
SAME TOPIC Madrona, Sr. vs. Rosal, 204 Civil Procedure; Motion to dismiss based on failure to state cause of action; Test of
SCRA 1, G.R. No. 39120 sufficiency of facts alleged to constitute cause of action.—The essential elements of a
November 21, 1991 cause of action are a legal right of the plaintiff, a correlative obligation of the defendant,
and an act or omission of the defendant violative of that right. The test of sufficiency of
the facts to constitute a cause of action is whether or not, admitting the facts alleged, the
court could render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer. As
stated in Adamos vs. J.M. Tuazon and Co., Inc., “It is a well-settled rule that in a motion to
dismiss based on the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action, the
question submitted to the court for determination is the sufficiency of the allegations in
 the complaint itself. Whether these allegations are true or not is beside the point, for the
truth is hypothetically admitted. The issue rather is: admitting them to be true, may the
court render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer in the complaint? x x x So
rigid is the norm prescribed that if the court should doubt the truth of the fact averred, it
must not dismiss the complaint but require an answer and proceed to hear the case on
the merits,” In Militante vs. Edrosolano, et al., We laid down the rule that the judiciary
should “exercise utmost care and circumspection in passing upon a motion to dismiss on
the ground of the absence thereof [cause of action] lest, by its failure to manifest a correct
appreciation of the facts alleged and deemed hypothetically admitted, what the law
grants or recognizes is effectively nullified; if that happens, there is a blot in the legal
order and the law itself stands in disrepute.” Madrona, Sr. vs. Rosal, 204 SCRA 1, G.R. No.
39120 November 21, 1991
SAME TOPIC Philippine National Actions; Words and Phrases; A cause of action is the fact or combination of facts which
Construction Corporation vs. affords a party a right to judicial interference in his behalf.—As stated in the case of
Court of Appeals, 514 SCRA Navoa v. Court of Appeals, 251 SCRA 545 (1995): A cause of action is the fact or
569, G.R. No. 165433 combination of facts which affords a party a right to judicial interference in his behalf.
February 6, 2007 The requisites for a cause of action are: (a) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever
means and under whatever law it arises or is created, (b) an obligation on the part of the
defendant to respect and not to violate such right; and, (c) an act or omission on the part
of the defendant constituting a violation of the plaintiff’s right or breach of the obligation
of the defendant to the plaintiff. Briefly stated, it is the reason why the litigation has come
about, it is the act or omission of defendant resulting in the violation of someone’s rights.
Philippine National Construction Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 514 SCRA 569, G.R.
No. 165433 February 6, 2007
SAME TOPIC Navoa vs. Court of Appeals, , Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Courts; Jurisdiction; Estoppel; A party, after having
G.R. No. 59255 December 29, participated actively in proceedings before the Court of Appeals, is estopped from later
1995 questioning the jurisdiction of said appellate court.—We cannot sustain the petition.
Petitioners are now estopped from assailing the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals after receiving an adverse judgment therefrom. Having participated actively in
the proceedings before the appellate court, petitioners can no longer question its
authority.

Same; Same; Complaints; Words and Phrases; “Cause of Action,” Defined; Requisites.—A
cause of action is the fact or combination of facts which affords a party a right to judicial
interference in his behalf. The requisites for a cause of action are: (a) a right in favor of
the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created, (b) an
obligation on the part of the defendant to respect and not to violate such right; and, (c) an
act or omission on the part of the defendant constituting a violation of the plaintiff’s right
or breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff. Briefly stated, it is the reason
why the litigation has come about; it is the act or omission of defendant resulting in the
violation of someone’s right.

Same; Same; Same; In determining the existence of a cause of action, only the statements
in the complaint may properly be considered—lack of cause of action must appear on the
face of the complaint.—In determining the existence of a cause of action, only the
statements in the complaint may properly be considered. Lack of cause of action must
appear on the face of the complaint and its existence may be determined only by the
allegations of the complaint, consideration of other facts being proscribed and any
attempt to prove extraneous circumstances not being allowed.

Same; Same; Same; The test of sufficiency of the facts found in a complaint as constituting
a cause of action is whether or not admitting the facts alleged the court can render a valid
judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer thereof.—If a defendant moves to
dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of cause of action, such as what petitioners
did in the case at bar, he is regarded as having hypothetically admitted all the averments
thereof. The test of Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation vs. John Bordman Ltd. of Iloilo,

SAME TOPIC Pilipinas Shell Petroleum
Corporation vs. John
Bordman Ltd. of Iloilo, Inc.,
473 SCRA 151, G.R. No.
159831 October 14, 2005
Inc., 473 SCRA 151, G.R. No. 159831 October 14, 2005sufficiency of the facts found in a
complaint as constituting a cause of action is whether or not admitting the facts alleged
the court can render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer
thereof. The hypothetical admission extends to the relevant and material facts well
pleaded in the complaint and inferences fairly deducible therefrom. Hence, if the
allegations in a complaint furnish sufficient basis by which the complaint can be
maintained, the same should not be dismissed regardless of the defense that may be
assessed by the defendants. Navoa vs. Court of Appeals, , G.R. No. 59255 December 29,
1995
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Actions; Forum Shopping; The power to institute actions
necessarily included the power to execute the verification and certification against forum
shopping.—The records, however, show that petitioner’s president conferred upon its
vice-president the power to institute actions. As certified by the Pilipinas Shell Petroleum
Corporation vs. John Bordman Ltd. of Iloilo, Inc., 473 SCRA 151, G.R. No. 159831 October
14, 2005
Same; Same; Actions; Prescription; Actions based upon a written contract should be
brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues.—Actions based upon a
written contract should be brought within ten years from the time the right of action
accrues. This accrual refers to the cause of action, which is defined as the act or the
omission by which a party violates the right of another.
Same; Same; Same; Elements of a cause of action.—Jurisprudence is replete with the
elements of a cause of action: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and
under whatever law Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation vs. John Bordman Ltd. of Iloilo,
Inc., 473 SCRA 151, G.R. No. 159831 October 14, 2005
it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or
not to violate the right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of the defendant violative
 of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of an obligation to the latter. It is only
when the last element occurs that a cause of action arises. Applying the foregoing
elements, it can readily be determined that a cause of action in a contract arises upon its
breach or violation. Therefore, the period of prescription commences, not from the date
of the execution of the contract, but from the occurrence of the breach.

Same; Same; Same; The cause of action in the present case arose on July 24, 1974, when
respondent discovered the short deliveries with certainty.—To the mind of this Court, the
cause of action in the present case arose on July 24, 1974, when respondent discovered
the short deliveries with certainty. Prior to the discovery, the latter had no indication that
it was not getting what it was paying for. There was yet no issue to speak of; thus, it could
not have brought an action against petitioner. It was only after the discovery of the short
deliveries that respondent got into a position to bring an action for specific performance.
Evidently then, that action was brought within the prescriptive period when it was filed
on August 20, 1980. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation vs. John Bordman Ltd. of Iloilo,
Inc., 473 SCRA 151, G.R. No. 159831 October 14, 2005
SAME TOPIC De Guzman, Jr. vs. Court of Civil Procedure; Actions; Right of Action; Cause of Action; Right of action is a remedial
Appeals, 192 SCRA 507, G.R. right belonging to some persons, while cause of action is a formal statement of the
Nos. 92029-30 December 20, operative facts that give rise to such remedial right.—The term right of action is the right
1990 to commence and maintain an action. In the law on pleadings, right of action is
distinguished from cause of action in that the former is a remedial right belonging to
some persons, while the latter is a formal statement of the operative facts that give rise to
such remedial right. The former is a matter of right and depends on the substantive law,
while the latter is a matter of statement and is governed by the law of procedure. The
right of action springs from the cause of action, but does not accrue until all the facts
which constitute the cause of action have occurred. When there is an invasion of primary
rights, then and not until then does the adjective or remedial law become operative, and
under it arise rights of action. There can be no right of action until there has been a wrong

SAME TOPIC . Manalo vs. PAIC Savings
Bank, 453 SCRA 747, G.R. No.
146531 March 18, 2005
SAME TOPIC Philippine Daily Inquirer vs.
Alameda, 550 SCRA 199, G.R.
No. 160604 March 28, 2008
—a violation of a legal right—and it is then given by the adjective law. De Guzman, Jr. vs.
Court of Appeals, 192 SCRA 507, G.R. Nos. 92029-30 December 20, 1990
Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Mandamus; Mandamus applies as a remedy only where
petitioner’s right is founded clearly in law and not when it is doubtful.—We hold that
mandamus is not the proper recourse to enforce petitioner’s alleged right of redemption.
To begin with, mandamus applies as a remedy only where petitioner’s right is founded
clearly in law and not when it is doubtful. In varying language, the principle echoed and
reechoed is that legal rights may be enforced by mandamus only if those rights are well-
defined, clear and certain. Manalo vs. PAIC Savings Bank, 453 SCRA 747, G.R. No. 146531
March 18, 2005
Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Cause of Action; Elements; Words and Phrases; A cause
of action is the act or omission by which a party violates the right of another, and in
relation to a complaint, it is a formal statement of the operative facts that give rise to a
remedial right.—As defined in Section 2, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court, a cause of action is
the act or omission by which a party violates the right of another. In relation to a
complaint, it is a formal statement of the operative facts that give rise to a remedial right.
The question of whether the complaint states a cause of action is determined by its
averments regarding the acts committed by the defendant. Thus, it must contain a concise
statement of the ultimate or essential facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of action. As
such, the failure to make a sufficient allegation of a cause of action in the complaint
warrants its dismissal. Its essential elements are as follows: 1. A right in favor of the
plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; 2. An
obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and
3. Act or omission on the part of such defendant in violation of the right of the plaintiff or
constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter
may maintain an action for recovery of damages or other appropriate relief. Philippine
Daily Inquirer vs. Alameda, 550 SCRA 199, G.R. No. 160604 March 28, 2008
Same; Same; Same; Due Process; The issue of whether or not the complaint failed to state
 a cause of action, warranting its dismissal, must be passed upon on the basis of the
allegations stated therein assuming them to be true and the court cannot inquire into the
truth of the allegations and declare them to be false, otherwise, it would be a procedural
error and a denial of due process to the plaintiff.—Of the three, the most important is the
last element since it is only upon the occurrence of the last element that a cause of action
arises, giving the plaintiff the right to maintain an action in court for recovery of damages
or other appropriate relief. In determining whether an initiatory pleading states a cause
of action, “the test is as follows: admitting the truth of the facts alleged, can the court
render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer?” To be taken into account are
only the material allegations in the complaint; extraneous facts and circumstances or
other matters aliunde are not considered. The court may however consider, in addition to
the complaint, the appended annexes or documents, other pleadings of the plaintiff, or
admissions in the records. When a defendant seeks the dismissal of the complaint
through a motion to dismiss, the sufficiency of the motion should be tested on the
strength of the allegations of facts contained in the complaint and on no other basis. The
issue of whether or not the complaint failed to state a cause of action, warranting its
dismissal, must be passed upon on the basis of the allegations stated therein assuming
them to be true and the court cannot inquire into the truth of the allegations and declare
them to be false; otherwise, it would be a procedural error and a denial of due process to
the plaintiff.
Philippine Daily Inquirer vs. Alameda, 550 SCRA 199, G.R. No. 160604 March 28, 2008
SAME TOPIC Goodyear Philippines, Inc. vs. Actions; Causes of Action; Words and Phrases; A cause of action is a formal statement of
Sy, 474 SCRA 427, G.R. No. the operative facts that give rise to a remedial right.—A cause of action is a formal
154554 November 9, 2005 statement of the operative facts that give rise to a remedial right. The question of
whether the complaint states a cause of action is determined by its averments regarding
the acts committed by the defendant. Thus, it “must contain a concise statement of the
ultimate or essential facts constituting the plaintiff’s cause of action.” Failure to make a
sufficient allegation of a cause of action in the complaint “warrants its dismissal.”

SAME TOPIC G.R. No. 152526 - RAMON R.
JIMENEZ JR., ET AL. v. JUAN
JOSE JORDANA
Same; Same; Elements.—A cause of action, which is an act or omission by which a party
violates the right of another, has these elements: “1) the legal right of the plaintiff; “2) the
correlative obligation of the defendant to respect that legal right; and “3) an act or
omission of the defendant that violates such right.”
Same; Same; In determining whether an initiatory pleading states a cause of action, “the
test is as follows—admitting the truth of the facts alleged, can the court render a valid
judgment in accordance with the prayer?” The court may consider—in addition to the
complaint—the appended annexes and documents, other pleadings of the plaintiff or
admissions in the records.—In determining whether an initiatory pleading states a cause
of action, “the test is as follows: admitting the truth of the facts alleged, can the court
render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer?” To be taken into account are
only the material allegations in the complaint; extraneous facts and circumstances or
other matters aliunde are not considered. The court may consider—in addition to the
complaint—the appended annexes or documents, other pleadings of the plaintiff, or
admissions in the records Goodyear Philippines, Inc. vs. Sy, 474 SCRA 427, G.R. No.
154554 November 9, 2005
Remedial Law; Actions; Definition and Elements of a Cause of Action; The nature of action
is determined by the material averments in the complaint and the character of the relief
sought not by the defenses asserted in the answer or motion to dismiss.-
Cause of action is defined as “the act or omission by which a party violates a right of
another.” It has the following elements: 1) the legal right of the plaintiff; 2) the correlative
obligation of the defendant to respect that legal right; and 3) an act or omission of the
defendant that violates such right. The nature of an action is determined by the material
averments in the complaint and the character of the relief sought, not by the defenses
asserted in the answer or motion to dismiss. Thus, the complaint must contain a concise
statement of the ultimate or essential facts constituting the plaintiff’s cause of action.
 2. Remedial Law; Actions; Test to determine whether the sufficiency of the facts alleged in
the complaint constitutes a cause of action; Hypothetical admission extends to the
relevant and material facts pleaded in, and the inferences fairly deducible from, the
complaint.-
In a motion to dismiss, a defendant hypothetically admits the truth of the material
allegations of the plaintiff’s complaint. This hypothetical admission extends to the
relevant and material facts pleaded in, and the inferences fairly deducible from, the
complaint. Hence, to determine whether the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the
complaint constitutes a cause of action, the test is as follows: admitting the truth of the
facts alleged, can the court render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer?
3. Remedial Law; Actions; Where a party makes a claim contrary to ownership, and the
relief prayed for cannot be granted without the court deciding on who has a better right
to the property, the suit is a real action.-
We agree with the appellate court. Indeed, what respondent instituted against petitioners
was a real action for the recovery of property. It has been held that where a party makes
a claim contrary to ownership, and the relief prayed for cannot be granted without the
court deciding on who has a better right to the property, the suit is a real action.
4. Remedial Law; Actions; Participation in a contract is not necessarily an element that
determines the existence of a cause of action.-
Respondent is not suing petitioners for contractual breach but for a recovery of property.
It is not relevant, therefore, even to argue that the parties have no privity of contract. We
stress that participation in a contract is not necessarily an element that determines the
existence of a cause of action
SAME TOPIC Vda. de Daffon vs. Court of Actions; Pleadings and Practice; The test of sufficiency of the facts found in a complaint as
Appeals, 387 SCRA 427, G.R. constituting a cause of action is whether or not admitting the facts alleged the court can
No. 129017 August 20, 2002 render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer thereof.—It should
be stressed that in the determination of whether a complaint fails to state a cause of
action, only the statements in the complaint may be properly considered. Moreover, a
 defendant who moves to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of cause of action
hypothetically admits all the averments thereof. The test of sufficiency of the facts found
in a complaint as constituting a cause of action is whether or not admitting the facts
alleged the court can render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the
prayer thereof. The hypothetical admission extends to the relevant and material facts
well pleaded in the complaint and inferences fairly deducible therefrom. Hence, if the
allegations in the complaint furnish sufficient basis by which the complaint can be
maintained, the same should not be dismissed regardless of the defense that may be
assessed by the defendants.

Same; Same; Cause of Action; Elements; The rules of procedure require that the
complaint must make a concise statement of the ultimate facts or the essential facts
constituting the plaintiff’s cause of action; A fact is essential if it cannot be stricken out
without leaving the statement of the cause of action inadequate.—In the same vein, there
is no need for the complaint to specifically allege respondents’ claim of co-ownership of
the properties. The complaint needs only to allege the ultimate facts on which the
plaintiffs rely for their claim. The rules of procedure require that the complaint must
make a concise statement of the ultimate facts or the essential facts constituting the
plaintiff’s cause of action. A fact is essential if it cannot be stricken out without leaving the
statement of the cause of action inadequate. A complaint states a cause of action only
when it has its three indispensable elements, namely: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff
by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on
the part of the named defendant to respect or not to vio late such right; and (3) an act or
omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of plaintiff or constituting a
breach of the obligation of defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an
action for recovery of damages. Vda. de Daffon vs. Court of Appeals, 387 SCRA 427, G.R.
No. 129017 August 20, 2002
SAME TOPIC .China Banking Corporation Actions; Causes of Actions; Elements; Contracts; A cause of action on a written contract
 vs. Court of Appeals, 461 accrues only when an actual breach or violation thereof occurs.—Well-settled is the rule
SCRA 162, G.R. No. 153267 that since a cause of action requires, as essential elements, not only a legal right of the
June 23, 2005 plaintiff and a correlative duty of the defendant but also “an act or omission of the
defendant in violation of said legal right,” the cause of action does not accrue until the
party obligated refuses, expressly or impliedly, to comply with its duty. Otherwise stated,
a cause of action has three elements, to wit, (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by
whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the
part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or
omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting
a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff. It bears stressing that it is only
when the last element occurs that a cause of action arises. Accordingly, a cause of action
on a written contract accrues only when an actual breach or violation thereof occurs.
China Banking Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 461 SCRA 162, G.R. No. 153267 June 23,
2005
SAME TOPIC Swagman Hotels and Travel, Remedial Law; Words and Phrases; Causes of Action; Essential Elements of a Cause of
Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 455 Action; It is, thus, only upon the occurrence of the last element that a cause of action
SCRA 175, G.R. No. 161135 arises, giving the plaintiff the right to maintain an action in court for recovery of damages
April 8, 2005 or other appropriate relief.—Cause of action, as defined in Section 2, Rule 2 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, is the act or omission by which a party violates the right of
another. Its essential elements are as follows: 1. A right in favor of the plaintiff by
whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; 2. An obligation on the
part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and 3. Act or omission
on the part of such defendant in violation of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a
breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain
an action for recovery of damages or other appropriate relief. It is, thus, only upon the
occurrence of the last element that a cause of action arises, giving the plaintiff the right to
maintain an action in court for recovery of damages or other appropriate relief. Swagman
Hotels and Travel, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 455 SCRA 175, G.R. No. 161135 April 8, 2005
 Same; Same; Same; Without a cause of action, the private respondent had no right to
maintain an action in court, and the trial court should have therefore dismissed his
complaint.—With these findings of facts, it has become glaringly obvious that when the
complaint for a sum of money and damages was filed with the trial court on 2 February
1999, no cause of action has as yet existed because the petitioner had not committed any
act in violation of the terms of the three promissory notes as modified by the
renegotiation in December 1997. Without a cause of action, the private respondent had
no right to maintain an action in court, and the trial court should have therefore
dismissed his complaint. Swagman Hotels and Travel, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 455 SCRA
175, G.R. No. 161135 April 8, 2005
SAME TOPIC Nabus vs. Court of Appeals, Remedial Law; Judgment; Res judicata; Action; Prescription; The principle of res judicata;
193 SCRA 732, G.R. No. 91670 Case barred by a former judgment; Joinder of Cause of Action; Prescription of the
February 7, 1991 petitioner’s action for rescission; Elements of a Cause of Action.—The foundation
principle upon which the doctrine of res judicata rests is that parties ought not to be
permitted to litigate the same issue more than once; that, when a right or fact has been
judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, or an opportunity for
suclYtrial has been given, the judgment of the court, so long as it remains unreversed
should be conclusive upon the parties and these in privity with them in law or estate. The
principle of res-judicata actually embraces two different concepts: (1) bar by former
judgment and (2) conclusiveness of judgment. There is “bar by former judgment” when,
between the first case where the judgment was rendered, and the second case where
such judgment is invoked, there is identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action.
When the three identities are present, the judgment on the merits rendered in the first
constitutes an absolute bar to the subsequent action. But where between the first case
wherein judgment is rendered and the second case wherein such judgment is invoked,
there is identity of parties, but there is no identity of cause of action, the judgment is
conclusive in the second case, only as to those matters actually and directly controverted
and determined, and not as to matters merely involved therein. This is what is termed
 conclusiveness of judgment. Nabus vs. Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA 732, G.R. No. 91670
February 7, 1991
SAME TOPIC Cole vs. Vda. de Gregorio, 116 The prescriptive period for filing action must be computed from the date the cause of
SCRA 670, No. L-55315 action accrues and should not be made to retroact to the date of execution of a
September 21, 1982 conditional contract when the suspensive condition occurs.—Needless to state,
prescription of actions run with the mere lapse of time (Art. 1139, Civil Code). But it is
elementary that the computation of the period of prescription of any cause of action,
which is the same as saying prescription of the action, should start from the date the
cause of action accrues or from the day the right of the plaintiff is violated. In the
language of Article 1144 of the Civil Code which is the one pertinently applicable to this
case, “the action must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action
accrues: (1) upon a written contract.”

Same; Same.—This is as it should be. A cause of action has three elements, namely: (1) a
right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is
created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate
such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right
of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff. It
is only when the last element occurs or takes place that it can be said in law that a cause
of action has arisen. Translated in terms of a hypothetical situation regarding a written
contract, no cause of action arises until there is a breach or violation thereof by either
party. It is not, therefore, from the date of the instrument but from the date of the breach
that the period of prescription of the action starts. Cole vs. Vda. de Gregorio, 116 SCRA
670, No. L-55315 September 21, 1982
SAME TOPIC Vitangcol vs. New Vista Actions; Lack of cause of action is, however, not a ground for a dismissal of the complaint
Properties, Inc., 600 SCRA 82, through a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules of  Court, for the determination of
G.R. No. 176014 September a lack of cause of action can only be made during or after trial.—Lack of cause of action is,
17, 2009 however, not a ground for a dismissal of the complaint through a motion to dismiss under
 Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, for the determination of a lack of cause of action can only be
made during and/or after trial. What is dismissible via that mode is failure of the
complaint to state a cause of action. Sec. 1(g) of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court provides
that a motion may be made on the ground “that the pleading asserting the claim states no
cause of action.” The rule is that in a motion to dismiss, a defendant hypothetically admits
the truth of the material allegations of the ultimate facts contained in the plaintiff’s
complaint. When a motion to dismiss is grounded on the failure to state a cause of action,
a ruling thereon should, as rule, be based only on the facts alleged in the complaint.
However, this principle of hypothetical admission admits of exceptions. Among others,
there is no hypothetical admission of conclusions or interpretations of law which are
false; legally impossible facts; facts inadmissible in evidence; facts which appear by
record or document included in the pleadings to be unfounded; allegations which the
court will take judicial notice are not true; and where the motion to dismiss was heard
with submission of evidence which discloses facts sufficient to defeat the claim.

Same; Pleadings and Practice; In a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action,
the focus is on the sufficiency, not the veracity, of the material allegations.—In a motion
to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the focus is on the sufficiency, not the
veracity, of the material allegations. The test of sufficiency of facts alleged in the
complaint constituting a cause of action lies on whether or not the court, admitting the
facts alleged, could render a valid verdict in accordance with the prayer of the complaint.
And to sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, it must be shown that the
claim for relief in the complaint does not exist, rather than that a claim has been
defectively stated, or is ambiguous, indefinite, or uncertain. Vitangcol vs. New Vista
Properties, Inc., 600 SCRA 82, G.R. No. 176014 September 17, 2009
SAME TOPIC Macaslang vs. Zamora, 649 Cause of Action; In resolving whether the complaint states a cause of action or not, only
SCRA 92, G.R. No. 156375 the facts alleged in the complaint are considered.—In resolving whether the complaint
May 30, 2011 states a cause of action or not, only the facts alleged in the complaint are considered. The
 test is whether the court can render a valid judgment on the complaint based on the facts
alleged and the prayer asked for. Only ultimate facts, not legal conclusions or evidentiary
facts, are considered for purposes of applying the test.

Same; Same; Failure to state a cause of action and lack of cause of action are really
different from each other.—Failure to state a cause of action and lack of cause of action
are really different from each other. On the one hand, failure to state a cause of action
refers to the insufficiency of the pleading, and is a ground for dismissal under Rule 16 of
the Rules of Court. On the other hand, lack of cause action refers to a situation where the
evidence does not prove the cause of action alleged in the pleading.

Same; Same; Ejectment; Where the cause of action in an ejectment suit is based on
ownership of the property, the defense that the defendant retained title or ownership is a
proper subject for determination by the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) but only for the
purpose of adjudicating the rightful possessor of the property.—Where the cause of
action in an ejectment suit is based on ownership of the property, the defense that the
defendant retained title or ownership is a proper subject for determination by the MTC
but only for the purpose of adjudicating the rightful possessor of the property. This is
based on Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, viz.: Section 16. Resolving defense of ownership.
—When the defendant raises the defense of ownership in his pleadings and the question
of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of
ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession. Macaslang vs.
Zamora, 649 SCRA 92, G.R. No. 156375 May 30, 2011
SAME TOPIC Misamis Occidental II Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Answers; Affirmative Defenses; Preliminary Hearing;
Cooperative, Inc. vs. David, Words and Phrases; Statutory Construction; A preliminary hearing undeniably is subject
468 SCRA 63, G.R. No. 129928 to the discretion of the trial court and such order may not be corrected by certiorari; The
August 25, 2005 use of the word “may” shows that a preliminary hearing is not mandatory but
discretionary—it is an auxiliary verb indicating liberty, opportunity, permission and
possibility.—The use of the word “may” in the aforequoted provision shows that such a
hearing is not mandatory but discretionary. It is an auxiliary verb indicating liberty,
opportunity, permission and possibility. Such interpretation is now specifically expressed
in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 6, Rule 16 provides that a grant of
preliminary hearing rests on the sound discretion of the court, to wit—SEC. 6. Pleading
grounds as affirmative defenses.—If no motion to dismiss has been filed, any of the
grounds for dismissal provided for in this Rule may be pleaded as an affirmative defense
in the answer and, in the discretion of the court, a preliminary hearing may be had
thereon as if a motion to dismiss had been filed . . . Based on the foregoing, a preliminary
hearing undeniably is subject to the discretion of the trial court. Absent any showing that
the trial court had acted without jurisdiction or in excess thereof or with such grave
abuse of discretion as would amount to lack of jurisdiction, as in the present case, the
trial court’s order granting or dispensing with the need for a preliminary hearing may not
be corrected by certiorari.

Same; Same; Motions to Dismiss; It is a well-settled rule that in a motion to dismiss based
on the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action, the question submitted to
the court for determination is the sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint, and to
determine the sufficiency of the cause of action, only the facts alleged in the complaint,
and no others should be considered.—Consistent with our ruling in The Heirs of Juliana
Clavano v. Genato,as MOELCI II’s Motion is anchored on the ground that the Complaint
allegedly stated no cause of action, a preliminary hearing thereon is more than
unnecessary as it constitutes an erroneous and improvident move. No error therefore
could be ascribed to the trial court in the denial of such Motion. The Court ruled in the
cited case, thus: . . . . respondent Judge committed an error in conducting a preliminary
hearing on the private respondent’s affirmative defenses. It is a well-settled rule that in a
motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action,
the question submitted to the court for determination is the sufficiency of the allegations
in the complaint itself. Whether those allegations are true or not is beside the point, for
their truth is hypothetically admitted by the motion. The issue rather is: admitting them
to be true, may the court render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer of the
complaint? Stated otherwise, the sufficiency of the cause of action must appear on the
face of the complaint in order to sustain a dismissal on this ground. No extraneous matter
may be considered nor facts not alleged, which would require evidence and therefore
must be raised as defenses and await the trial. In other words, to determine the
sufficiency of the cause of action, only the facts alleged in the complaint, and no other
should be considered. The respondent Judge departed from this rule in conducting a
hearing and in receiving evidence in support of the private respondent’s affirmative
defense, that is, lack of cause of action.
Same; Same; Same; Causes of Action; The test of sufficiency of the facts alleged in the
complaint as constituting a cause of action is whether or not admitting the facts alleged,
the court could render a valid verdict in accordance with the prayer of complaint.—To
determine the existence of a cause of action, only the statements in the complaint may be
properly considered. It is error for the court to take cognizance of external facts or hold
preliminary hearings to determine their existence. If the allegations in a complaint
furnish sufficient basis by which the complaint can be maintained, the same should not be
dismissed regardless of the defenses that may be averred by the defendants. The test of
sufficiency of facts alleged in the complaint as constituting a cause of action is whether or
not admitting the facts alleged, the court could render a valid verdict in accordance with
the prayer of said complaint.
Same; Same; Contracts; The interpretation of a document requires introduction of
evidence which is precisely disallowed in determining whether or not a complaint states
a cause of action.—In fact, the ambiguity of the import and nature of Annex “A” which
necessitates a resort to its proper interpretation, fortifies the propriety of the trial court’s
denial of MOELCI II’s Motion. The interpretation of a document requires introduction of
evidence which is precisely disallowed in determining whether or not a complaint states
 a cause of action. The Court of Appeals therefore correctly dismissed MOELCI II’s petition
and upheld the trial court’s ruling. Misamis Occidental II Cooperative, Inc. vs. David, 468
SCRA 63, G.R. No. 129928 August 25, 2005

SAME TOPIC A. U. Valencia & Co. vs. Layug, PLEADING AND PRACTICE; CAUSE OF ACTION; TEST OF SUFFICIENCY OF FACTS; CASE
103 Phil. 747, No. L-11060 AT BAR.—Appellant brought action against appellee spouses to recover commission for
May 23, 1958 the sale of the property of appellee wife in accordance with an exclusive agency contract
between the latter and appellant. The complaint was dismissed f or failure to state a
cause of action in that the property sold, being conjugal, said appellee had no authority to
enter into the agency contract, and consequently, the contract was null and void. Held:
The dismissal is unjustified. Nowhere in the complaint does it appear that the property in
question is conjugal property. On the contrary, the agency contract attached to the
complaint wherein appellee authorized the plaintiff to find a buyer, referred to said
property as her own. Also, the deed of absolute sale of the said property referred to said
appellee as the vendor and her husband signed the deed only to show its marital consent.
If the property really belonged to the conjugal partnership, that would be a matter of
defense for the appellees to prove in a regular trial. The test of the sufficiency of facts
alleged in the complaint to constitute a cause of action is, whether or not, admitting the
facts alleged, the court could render a valid verdict in accordance with the prayer of said
complaint. A. U. Valencia & Co. vs. Layug, 103 Phil. 747, No. L-11060 May 23, 1958
SAME TOPIC Rovels Enterprises, Inc. vs. Actions; Cause of Action; Elements; Words and Phrases; A cause of action is defined as the
Ocampo, 391 SCRA 176, G.R. delict or wrongful act or omission committed by a person in violation of the right of
No. 136821, G.R. No. 123780 another.—A cause of action is defined as the delict or wrongful act or omission
October 17, 2002 committed by a person in violation of the right of another. A cause of action exists if the
following elements are present: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff, (2) the correlative
obligation of the defendant to respect such right, and (3) the act or omission of the
defendant in violation of plaintiffs right. The test is whether the material allegations of
the complaint, assuming them to be true, state ultimate facts which constitute plaintiffs
 cause of action, such that plaintiff is entitled to a favorable judgment as a matter of law.
Rovels Enterprises, Inc. vs. Ocampo, 391 SCRA 176, G.R. No. 136821, G.R. No. 123780
October 17, 2002
SAME TOPIC Dabuco vs. Court of Appeals, Civil Procedure; Actions; Distinctions between failure to state a cause of action and lack
322 SCRA 853, G.R. No. of cause of action.—As a preliminary matter, we wish to stress the distinction between
133775 January 20, 2000 the two grounds for dismissal of an action: failure to state a cause of action, on the one
hand, and lack of cause of action, on the other hand. The former refers to the insufficiency
of allegation in the pleading, the latter to the insufficiency of factual basis for the action.
Failure to state a cause may be raised in a Motion to Dismiss under Rule 16, while lack of
cause may be raised any time. Dismissal for failure to state a cause can be made at the
earliest stages of an action. Dismissal for lack of cause is usually made after questions of
fact have been resolved on the basis of stipulations, admissions or evidence presented.

Same; Same; In dismissal for lack of cause of action, the court in effect declared that
plaintiff is not entitled to a favorable judgment inasmuch as one or more elements of his
cause of action do not exist in fact.—It appears that the trial court dismissed the case on
the ground that GABI was not the owner of the lands or one entitled to the possession
thereof, and thus had no cause of action. In dismissal for lack of cause of action, the court
in effect declared that plaintiff is not entitled to a favorable judgment inasmuch as one or
more elements of his cause of action do not exist in fact.

Same; Same; In dismissal for failure to state a cause, the inquiry is into the sufficiency, not
the veracity, of the material allegations.—In dismissal for failure to state a cause, the
inquiry is into the sufficiency, not the veracity, of the material allegations. The test is
whether the material allegations, assuming these to be true, state ultimate facts which
constitute plaintiff’s cause of action, such that plaintiff is entitled to a favorable judgment
as a matter of law. The general rule is that inquiry is confined to the four corners of the
complaint, and no other. Dabuco vs. Court of Appeals, 322 SCRA 853, G.R. No. 133775

SAME TOPIC Suyom vs. Collantes, 69 SCRA
514, No. L-40337 February
27, 1976
SAME TOPIC Naga Telephone Co., Inc. vs.
Court of Appeals, 230 SCRA
351, G.R. No. 107112
February 24, 1994
SAME TOPIC Serrano vs. Court of Appeals,
363 SCRA 223, G.R. No.
139420 August 15, 2001
January 20, 2000
Pleadings and practice; Motions to dismiss; Where motion to dismiss based on ground
that complaint states no cause of action, sufficiency of allegations of facts the question
submitted to court far resolution.—Well settled is the rule that in a motion to dismiss a
complaint based on lack of cause of action, the question thus submitted for determination
and resolution by the trial court is the sufficiency of the allegations of facts made in the
complaint to constitute a cause of action, and not whether these allegations of fact are
true and correct, for said motion must hypothetically admit the truth of the facts alleged
in the complaint. Suyom vs. Collantes, 69 SCRA 514, No. L-40337 February 27, 1976
Art. 1144; Action upon a written contract must be brought within ten (10) years from the
time the right of action accrues.—Article 1144 of the New Civil Code provides, inter alia,
that an action upon a written contract must be brought within ten (10) years from the
time the right of action accrues. Clearly, the ten (10) year period is to be reckoned from
the time the right of action accrues which is not necessarily the date of execution of the
contract. As correctly ruled by respondent court, private respondent’s right of action
arose “sometime during the latter part of 1982 or in 1983 when according to Atty. Luis
General, Jr. x x x, he was asked by (private respondent’s) Board of Directors to study said
contract as it already appeared disadvantageous to (private respondent) (p. 31, tsn, May
8, 1989). (Private respondent’s) cause of action to ask for reformation of said contract
should thus be considered to have arisen only in 1982 or 1983, and from 1982 to January
2, 1989 when the complaint in this case was filed, ten (10) years had not yet elapsed.”
Naga Telephone Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 230 SCRA 351, G.R. No. 107112 February
24, 1994
Labor Law; Prescription; Money Claims; An employee’s cause of action for money claims
is deemed to have accrued only after the local agent of the foreign employer made a
definite denial of said money claim.—Petitioner contends that his cause of action accrued
only in 1993 when respondent A.P. Moller wrote to him that its accounting records
showed it had no outstanding money orders and that his case was considered outdated.
 Thus, the three (3) year prescriptive period should be counted from 1993 and not 1978
and since his complaint was filed in 1994, he claims that it has not prescribed. We agree.
Petitioner’s cause of action accrued in November 1993 upon respondent Maersk’s
definite denial of his money claims following this Court’s ruling in the similar case of
Baliwag Transit, Inc. v. Ople. Serrano vs. Court of Appeals, 363 SCRA 223, G.R. No. 139420
August 15, 2001
SAME TOPIC Banco Filipino Savings and Banks and Banking; Loans; Interest Rates; Prescription; Under Article 1150 of the Civil
Mortgage Bank vs. Court of Code, the time for prescription of all kinds of actions, when there is no special provision
Appeals, 332 SCRA 241, G.R. which ordains otherwise, shall be counted from the day they may be brought.—
No. 129227 May 30, 2000 Petitioner’s claim that the action of the private respondents has prescribed is bereft of
merit. Under Article 1150 of the Civil Code, the time for prescription of all kinds of
actions, when there is no special provision which ordains otherwise, shall be counted
from the day they may be brought. Thus, the period of prescription of any cause of action
is reckoned only from the date the cause of action accrued. And a cause of action arises
when that which should have been done is not done, or that which should not have been
done is done. The period should not be made to retroact to the date of the execution of
that time, there would be no way for the respondents to know of the violation of their
rights.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The cause of action for annulment of loan contract based on
unilateral increased rate of interest accrues only from date of receipt of the statement of
account showing such increased rate of interest.—The Court of Appeals therefore
correctly found that respondents’ cause of action accrued on October 30, 1978, the date
they received the statement of account showing the increased rate of interest, for it was
only from that moment that they discovered the petitioner’s unilateral increase thereof.

Actions; Pleadings and Practice; It is the material allegations in the complaint, not the
legal conclusions made therein or the prayer that determines the relief to which the
 plaintiff is entitled.—Anent the second issue as to whether the respondents are entitled
to recover the alleged overpayments of interest, we find that they are despite the absence
of any prayer therefore. This Court has ruled that it is the material allegations of fact in
the complaint, not the legal conclusion made therein or the prayer that determines the
relief to which the plaintiff is entitled. It is the allegations of the pleading which
determine the nature of the action and the Court shall grant relief warranted by the
allegations and the proof even if no such relief is prayed for. Thus, even if the complaint
seeks the declaration of nullity of the contract, the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that
the factual allegations contained therein ultimately seek the return of the excess interests
paid. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank vs. Court of Appeals, 332 SCRA 241, G.R.
No. 129227 May 30, 2000
SAME TOPIC Elido, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals, Remedial Law; Action; Essential elements of a cause of action.—“A cause of action has
216 SCRA 637, G.R. No. 95441 three elements, namely: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under
December 16, 1992 whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant
to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such
defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of
the defendant to the plaintiff. It is only when the last element occurs or takes place that it
can be said in law that a cause of action has arisen. Translated in terms of hypothetical
situation regarding a written contract, no cause of action arises until there is breach or
violation thereof by either party. It is not, therefore, from the date of the instrument but
from the date of the breach that the period of prescription of the action starts.”

Same; Same; Same; Prescription; It is only from the judicial demand that the cause of
action accrued and not from 11 January 1966, the date the Overdraft Agreement and the
Continuing Surety Agreement were executed.—For, even if We disregard the various
demands (anyway, no evidence was adduced as to when they were received), this could
only mean that the prescriptive period never commenced to run since there was no point
in time when petitioner could have refused to pay, or committed a breach, until the
 judicial demand on 23 July 1976 which, incidentally, also suspended the running of the
period. This must be so as the Overdraft Agreement stipulates that the obligation shall be
payable upon demand, while the Continuing Surety Agreement, being a supplemental
agreement, merely provides that the obligation shall become due upon maturity, with or
without demand. Hence, it is only from this judicial demand that the cause of action
accrued, and not from 11 January 1966, the date the Overdraft Agreement and the
Continuing Surety Agreement were executed. Besides, even assuming that the action on
the debt is already barred by the statute of limitations, this cannot prevent the debtor
from recognizing the confessing judgment upon it, which was what petitioner did in fact.
Elido, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals, 216 SCRA 637, G.R. No. 95441 December 16, 1992
SAME TOPIC Rural Bank of Calinog (Iloilo), Actions; Causes of Action; Elements; Pleadings and Practice; If the allegations in a
Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 463 complaint can furnish a sufficient basis by which the complaint can be maintained, the
SCRA 79, G.R. No. 146519 July same should not be dismissed regardless of the defenses that may be assessed by the
8, 2005 defendants; To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the complaint must
show that the claim for relief does not exist rather than that a claim has been defectively
stated or is ambiguous, indefinite or uncertain.—A cause of action exists if the following
elements are present: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under
whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant
to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such
defendant violative of the right of plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of
defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of
damages. In determining whether the allegations of a complaint are sufficient to support
a cause of action, it must be borne in mind that the complaint does not have to establish
or allege the facts proving the existence of a cause of action at the outset; this will have to
be done at the trial on the merits of the case. If the allegations in a complaint can furnish a
sufficient basis by which the complaint can be maintained, the same should not be
dismissed regardless of the defenses that may be assessed by the defendants. To sustain a
motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the complaint must show that the claim for
 relief does not exist rather than that a claim has been defectively stated or is ambiguous,
indefinite or uncertain. Moreover, a defendant moving to dismiss a complaint on the
ground of lack of cause of action is regarded as having hypothetically admitted all the
averments thereof. Rural Bank of Calinog (Iloilo), Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 463 SCRA 79,
G.R. No. 146519 July 8, 2005
SAME TOPIC Heirs of Valeriano S. Concha, Actions; Jurisdictions; Words and Phrases; Jurisdiction over the subject matter is the
Sr. vs. Lumocso, 540 SCRA 1, power to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in
G.R. No. 158121 December question belong.—Jurisdiction over the subject matter is the power to hear and
12, 2007 determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong. It is
conferred by law and an objection based on this ground cannot be waived by the parties.
To determine whether a court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case, it is
important to determine the nature of the cause of action and of the relief sought. Heirs of
Valeriano S. Concha, Sr. vs. Lumocso, 540 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 158121 December 12, 2007
SAME TOPIC Chu, Sr. vs. Benelda Estate Remedial Law; Action; Cause of Action Defined.—A cause of action is defined as an act or
Development Corporation, omission by which a party violates a right of another. The test of the sufficiency of the
353 SCRA 424, G.R. No. facts found in a petition as constituting a cause of action is whether or not, admitting the
142313 March 1, 2001 facts alleged, the court can render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the
prayer thereof. Chu, Sr. vs. Benelda Estate Development Corporation, 353 SCRA 424, G.R.
No. 142313 March 1, 2001
SAME TOPIC Philrock, Inc. vs. Construction Actions; Arbitration; Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC); Jurisdiction;
Industry Arbitration Section 4 of Executive Order (EO) 1008 expressly vests in the CIAC original and exclusive
Commission, 359 SCRA 632, jurisdiction over disputes arising from or connected with construction contracts entered
G.R. Nos. 132848-49 June 26, into by parties that have agreed to submit their dispute to voluntary arbitration.—
2001 Petitioner avers that the CIAC lost jurisdiction over the arbitration case after both parties
had withdrawn their consent to arbitrate. The June 13, 1995 RTC Order remanding the
case to the CIAC for arbitration was allegedly an invalid mode of referring a case for
arbitration. We disagree. Section 4 of Executive Order 1008 expressly vests in the CIAC
original and exclusive jurisdiction over disputes arising from or connected with
 construction contracts entered into by parties that have agreed to submit their dispute to
voluntary arbitration.
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; “Cause of Action” Defined.—Cause of action is
defined as an act or omission by which a party violates the right of another. A complaint
is deemed to have stated a cause of action provided it has indicated the following: (1) the
legal right of the plaintiff, (2) the correlative obligation of the defendant, and (3) the act
or the omission of the defendant in violation of the said legal right. The cause of action
against petitioner was clearly established. Respondents were purchasers of ready-mix
concrete from petitioner. The concrete delivered by the latter turned out to be of
substandard quality. As a result, respondents sustained damages when the structures
they built using such cement developed cracks and honeycombs. Consequently, the
construction of their residence had to be stopped. Philrock, Inc. vs. Construction Industry
Arbitration Commission, 359 SCRA 632, G.R. Nos. 132848-49 June 26, 2001
Limos vs. Odones, 628 SCRA A request for admission is not intended to merely reproduce or reiterate the allegations
288, G.R. No. 186979 August of the requesting party’s pleading but should set forth relevant evidentiary matters of fact
11, 2010 described in the cause of action or defense.—A request for admission is not intended to
merely reproduce or reiterate the allegations of the requesting party’s pleading but
should set forth relevant evidentiary matters of fact described in the request, whose
purpose is to establish said party’s cause of action or defense. Unless it serves that
purpose, it is pointless, useless, and a mere redundancy.

Same; Same; Same; When the affirmative defense raised is failure to state a cause of
action, a preliminary hearing thereon is unnecessary, erroneous and improvident.—
Jurisprudence has always been firm and constant in declaring that when the affirmative
defense raised is failure to state a cause of action, a preliminary hearing thereon is
unnecessary, erroneous and improvident.

Same; Actions; Annulment of Title; Requisites of an Action for Annulment of Title.—In an


SAME TOPIC Katon vs. Palanca, Jr., 437
SCRA 565, G.R. No. 151149
September 7, 2004
SAME TOPIC Heirs of Ambrocio Kionisala
vs. Heirs of Honorio Dacut,
378 SCRA 206, G.R. No.
147379 February 27, 2002
SAME TOPIC Goco vs. Court of Appeals, 617
SCRA 397, G.R. No.
157449<br/> April 6, 2010
action for annulment of title, the complaint must contain the following allegations: (1)
that the contested land was privately owned by the plaintiff prior to the issuance of the
assailed certificate of title to the defendant; and (2) that the defen dant perpetuated a
fraud or committed a mistake in obtaining a document of title over the parcel of land
claimed by the plaintiff. Limos vs. Odones, 628 SCRA 288, G.R. No. 186979 August 11,
2010
Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Appeals; Certiorari; Settled is the doctrine that the sole
office of a writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction.—Settled is the
doctrine that the sole office of a writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of
jurisdiction. Such writ does not include a review of the evidence, more so when no
determination of the merits has yet been made by the trial court, as in this case. Katon vs.
Palanca, Jr., 437 SCRA 565, G.R. No. 151149 September 7, 2004
Actions; Pleadings and Practice; The test of the sufficiency of the facts to constitute a
cause of action is whether admitting the facts alleged the court could render a valid
judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer of the complaint.—The test of the
sufficiency of the facts to constitute a cause of action is whether admitting the facts
alleged the court could render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the
prayer of the complaint. In answering this query, only the facts asserted in the complaint
must be taken into account without modification although with reasonable inferences
therefrom. Heirs of Ambrocio Kionisala vs. Heirs of Honorio Dacut, 378 SCRA 206, G.R.
No. 147379 February 27, 2002
Parties; Cause of Action; One having no material interest to protect cannot invoke the
jurisdiction of the court as the plaintiff in an action, in which case, it is dismissible on the
ground of lack of cause of action.—Interest within the meaning of the Rules of Court
means material interest or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of
the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about the question involved. One having no
material interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as the plaintiff in
an action. When the plaintiff is not the real party in interest, the case is dismissible on the
 ground of lack of cause of action. Goco vs. Court of Appeals, 617 SCRA 397, G.R. No.
157449<br/> April 6, 2010
SAME TOPIC Heirs of Rolando N. Abadilla Judgments; Res Judicata; Elements for Res Judicata to Ap-ply.—Res judicata, which is
vs. Galarosa, 494 SCRA 675, being invoked by petitioner, presupposes the existence of the following: (1) the judgment
G.R. No. 149041 July 12, 2006 sought to bar the new action must be final; (2) the decision must have been rendered by a
court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the disposition of
the case must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be as between the first and
second action, identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action.

Same; Same; Under the principle of bar by prior judgment, the judgment in the first case
constitutes an absolute bar to the second action.—There is “bar by prior judgment” when
there is identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action, between the first case
where the judgment was rendered, and the second case which is sought to be barred.
Under this principle, the judgment in the first case constitutes an absolute bar to the
second action, i.e., the judgment or decree of the court of competent jurisdiction on the
merits concludes the litigation between the parties, as well as their privies and
constitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving the same cause of action before the
same or any other tribunal.

Same; Same; Under the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment, identity of causes of

action is not required but merely identity of issues; It bars the relitigation of particular
facts or issues in another litigation between the same parties on a different claim or cause
of action.—On the other hand, the doctrine of “conclusiveness of judgment” provides that
issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised in any future
case between the same parties involving a different cause of action. Under this doctrine,
identity of causes of action is not required but merely identity of issues. Otherwise stated,
conclusiveness of judgment bars the relitigation of particular facts or issues in another
litigation between the same parties on a different claim or cause of action.

SAME TOPIC Cabrera vs. Getaruela, 586
SCRA 129, G.R. No. 164213
April 21, 2009
SAME TOPIC Ross Rica Sales Center, Inc. vs.
Ong, 467 SCRA 35, G.R. No.
132197 August 16, 2005
Remedial Law; Res Judicata; The test to determine if there is identity of causes of action is
to consider whether the same evidence would sustain both causes of action, i.e., whether
the same evidence which is necessary to sustain the second action would have been
sufficient to authorize a recovery in the first, even if the forms or nature of the two
actions be different.—A cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates a
right of another. It is determined by the facts alleged in the complaint and not by the
prayer therein. The test to determine if there is identity of causes of action is to consider
whether the same evidence would sustain both causes of action, i.e., whether the same
evidence which is necessary to sustain the second action would have been sufficient to
authorize a recovery in the first, even if the forms or nature of the two actions be
different. When evidence to sustain the respective causes of action in the two cases is not
exactly the same, there is no identity between the causes of action. Heirs of Rolando N.
Abadilla vs. Galarosa, 494 SCRA 675, G.R. No. 149041 July 12, 2006
Actions; Ejectment; Unlawful Detainer; Pleadings and Practice; Requisites for a complaint
to sufficiently allege a cause of action for unlawful detainer.—It is settled that a complaint
sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it recites the following: 1.
initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of
the plaintiff; 2. eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to
defendant of the termination of the latter’s right of possession; 3. thereafter, the
defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of the
enjoyment thereof; and 4. within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate
the property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment. Cabrera vs. Getaruela,
586 SCRA 129, G.R. No. 164213 April 21, 2009
Actions; Courts; Jurisdictions; Well settled is the rule that what determines the nature of
an action as well as which court has jurisdiction over it are the allegations of the
complaint and the character of the relief sought.—Well-settled is the rule that what
determines the nature of an action as well as which court has jurisdiction over it are the
allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought. Respondents contend
 that the complaint did not allege that petitioners’ possession was originally lawful but
had ceased to be so due to the expiration of the right to possess by virtue of any express
or implied contract. Ross Rica Sales Center, Inc. vs. Ong, 467 SCRA 35, G.R. No. 132197
August 16, 2005
Note: Asia Brewery, Inc. vs. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Failure to State Cause of Action; Lack of Cause of Action;
LATEST Equitable PCI Bank (now Failure to state a cause of action is not the same as lack of cause of action; the terms are
JURISPRUDENCE Banco de Oro-EPCI, Inc.), 824 not interchangeable.—Failure to state a cause of action is not the same as lack of cause of
SCRA 136, G.R. No. 190432 action; the terms are not interchangeable. It may be observed that lack of cause of action
April 25, 2017 is not among the grounds that may be raised in a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the
Rules of Court. The dismissal of a Complaint for lack of cause of action is based on Section
1 of Rule 33, which provides: Section 1. Demurrer to evidence.—After the plaintiff has
completed the presentation of his evidence, the defendant may move for dismissal on the
ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. If his
motion is denied he shall have the right to present evidence. If the motion is granted but
on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he shall be deemed to have waived the right
to present evidence. (Emphasis supplied) If the Complaint fails to state a cause of action,
a motion to dismiss must be made before a responsive pleading is filed; and the issue can
be resolved only on the basis of the allegations in the initiatory pleading. On the other
hand, if the Complaint lacks a cause of action, the motion to dismiss must be filed after
the plaintiff has rested its case.

Same; Same; Same; The test to determine whether a complaint states a cause of action
against the defendants is this: admitting hypothetically the truth of the allegations of fact
made in the complaint, may a judge validly grant the relief demanded in the complaint?—
The test to determine whether a complaint states a cause of action against the defendants
is this: admitting hypothetically the truth of the allegations of fact made in the complaint,
may a judge validly grant the relief demanded in the complaint? We believe that
petitioner met this test. A cause of action has three elements: 1) the legal right of the
 plaintiff; 2) the correlative obligation of the defendant not to violate the right; and 3) the
act or omission of the defendant in violation of that legal right. Asia Brewery, Inc. vs.
Equitable PCI Bank (now Banco de Oro-EPCI, Inc.), 824 SCRA 136, G.R. No. 190432 April
25, 2017
Note: Butuan Development Actions; Dismissal of Actions; One of the grounds for the dismissal of a complaint is the
LATEST Corporation (BDC) vs. failure of the pleading asserting the claim to state a cause of action.—One of the grounds
JURISPRUDENCE Twenty-First Division of the for the dismissal of a complaint is the failure of the pleading asserting the claim to state a
Honorable Court of Appeals cause of action. The elements of a cause of action are: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff
(Mindanao Station), 822 SCRA by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on
352, G.R. No. 197358 April 5, the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) act or
2017 omission on the part of such defendant in violation of the right of the plaintiff or
constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter
may maintain an action for recovery of damages or other appropriate relief.

Same; Same; “Failure to State a Cause of Action” and “Lack of Cause of Action,”
Distinguished.—The respondents’ affirmative defense that BDC, at the time of the
execution of the REM, had no right to hold the subject property in its name being merely
an unincorporated association, if at all, amounts to an allegation that BDC has no cause of
action against the respondents. However, failure to state a cause of action is different
from lack of cause of action. Failure to state a cause of action refers to the insufficiency of
the pleading, and is a ground for dismissal under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. On the
other hand, lack of cause action refers to a situation where the evidence does not prove
the cause of action alleged in the pleading. The remedy in the first is to move for the
dismissal of the pleading, while the remedy in the second is to demur to the evidence.
Butuan Development Corporation (BDC) vs. Twenty-First Division of the Honorable Court
of Appeals (Mindanao Station), 822 SCRA 352, G.R. No. 197358 April 5, 2017
Note: Juana Complex I Homeowners Civil Procedure; “Cause of Action,” Defined; Words and Phrases; Elements of Cause of
LATEST Association, Inc. vs. Fil-Estate Action.—Section 2, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court defines a cause of action as an act or
JURISPRUDENCE Land, Inc., 667 SCRA 440, G.R. omission by which a party violates the right of another. A complaint states a cause of
No. 152272 March 5, 2012 action when it contains three (3) essential elements of a cause of action, namely: (1) the
legal right of the plaintiff, (2) the correlative obligation of the defendant, and (3) the act
or omission of the defen dant in violation of said legal right. The question of whether the
complaint states a cause of action is determined by its averments regarding the acts
committed by the defendant. Thus, it must contain a concise statement of the ultimate or
essential facts constituting the plaintiff’s cause of action. To be taken into account are
only the material allegations in the complaint; extraneous facts and circumstances or
other matters aliunde are not considered. Juana Complex I Homeowners Association, Inc.
vs. Fil-Estate Land, Inc., 667 SCRA 440, G.R. No. 152272 March 5, 2012
Note: BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc. Actions; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; The general rule is that an order denying a
LATEST vs. Vda. de Coscolluela, 493 motion to dismiss or demurrer to evidence is interlocutory and is not appealable.—On
JURISPRUDENCE SCRA 472, G.R. No. 167724 the first issue, we agree with petitioner’s contention that the general rule is that an order
June 27, 2006 denying a motion to dismiss or demurrer to evidence is interlocutory and is not
appealable. Consequently, defendant must go to trial and adduce its evidence, and appeal,
in due course, from an adverse decision of the trial court. However, the rule admits of
exceptions.
Same; Civil Procedure; Splitting of Causes of Actions; A party may not institute more than
one suit for a single cause of action and, if two or more suits are instituted on the basis of
the same cause of action, the filing of one on a judgment upon the merits in any one is
available as ground for the dismissal of the other or others.—Section 3, Rule 2 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a party may not institute more than one suit
for a single cause of action and, if two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same
cause of action, the filing of one on a judgment upon the merits in any one is available as
ground for the dismissal of the other or others. A party will not be permitted to split up a
single cause of action and make it a basis for several suits. A party seeking to enforce a
claim must present to the court by the pleadings or proofs or both, all the grounds upon
which he expects a judgment in his favor. He is not at liberty to split up his demands and
prosecute it by piecemeal, or present only a portion of the grounds upon which special
relief is sought, and leave the rest to be presented in a second suit if the first fails. The law
does not permit the owner of a single or entire cause of action or an entire or indivisible
demand to divide and split the cause or demand so as to make it the subject of several
actions. The whole cause must be determined in one action.

Same; Same; Same; The true rule which determines whether a party has only a single and
entire cause of action, or has a severable demand for which he may maintain separate
suits, is whether the entire amount arises from one and the same act or contract or the
several parts arise from distinct and different acts or contracts.—The true rule which
determines whether a party has only a single and entire cause of action for all that is due
him, and which must be sued for in one action, or has a severable demand for which he
may maintain separate suits, is whether the entire amount arises from one and the same
act or contract or the several parts arise from distinct and different acts or contracts.

Same; Same; Same; Where there are entirely distinct and separate contracts, they give
rise to separate causes of action for which separate actions may be instituted and
presented.—Where there are entirely distinct and separate contracts, they give rise to
separate causes of action for which separate actions may be instituted and presented.
When money is payable by installments, a distinct cause of action assails upon the
following due by each installment and they may be recovered in successive action. On the
other hand, where several claims payable at different times arise out of the same
transactions, separate actions may be brought as each liability accounts. But where no
action is brought until more than one is due, all that are due must be included in one
action; and that if an action is brought to recover upon one or more that are due but not
upon all that are due, a recovery in such action will be a bar to a several or other actions
brought to recover one or more claims of the other claims that were due at the time the
first action was brought. BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc. vs. Vda. de Coscolluela, 493 SCRA
 472, G.R. No. 167724 June 27, 2006
B. RIGHT OF ACTION v. CAUSE OF ACTION
C. REAL ACTION v. PERSONAL ACTION
D. ACTION INCAPABLE OF PERCUNIARY ESTIMATION
v. ACTION CAPABLE OF PERCUNIARY ESTIMATION
E. ACTION IN REM v. ACTION IN PERSONAM

III. PARTIES

RULE 3 – Ventura vs. Militante, 316 Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Actions; Parties; The plaintiff in an action is the party
PARTIES TO SCRA 226, G.R. No. 63145 complaining, and a proper party plaintiff is essential to confer jurisdiction on the court.—
CIVIL ACTION October 5, 1999 Parties may be either plaintiffs or defendants. The plaintiff in an action is the party
complaining, and a proper party plaintiff is essential to confer jurisdiction on the court. In
order to maintain an action in a court of justice, the plaintiff must have an actual legal
existence, that is, he, she or it must be a person in law and possessed of a legal entity as
either a natural or an artificial person, and no suit can be lawfully prosecuted save in the
name of such a person.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The question of the legal personality of a party defendant is a
question of substance going to the jurisdiction of the court and not one of procedure.—
The rule is no different as regards party defendants. It is incumbent upon a plaintiff,
when he institutes a judicial proceeding, to name the proper party defendant to his cause
of action. In a suit or proceeding in personam of an adversary character, the court can
acquire no jurisdiction for the purpose of trial or judgment until a party defendant who
actually or legally exists and is legally capable of being sued, is brought before it. It has
even been held that the question of the legal personality of a party defendant is a
question of substance going to the jurisdiction of the court and not one of procedure.
Same; Same; Same; Same; A deceased person does not have such legal entity as is
necessary to bring action so much so that a motion to substitute cannot lie and should be
denied by the court.— Neither a dead person nor his estate may be a party plaintiff in a
court action. A deceased person does not have such legal entity as is necessary to bring
action so much so that a motion to substitute cannot lie and should be denied by the
court. An action begun by a decedent’s estate cannot be said to have been begun by a
legal per son, since an estate is not a legal entity; such an action is a nullity and a motion
to amend the party plaintiff will not likewise lie, there being nothing before the court to
amend. Considering that capacity to be sued is a correlative of the capacity to sue, to the
same extent, a decedent does not have the capacity to be sued and may not be named a
party defendant in a court action.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Where a complaint is brought against the surviving spouse for
the recovery of an indebtedness chargeable against said conjugal property, any judgment
obtained thereby is void; The proper action should be in the form of a claim to be filed in
the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse.—As correctly argued by
petitioner, the conjugal partnership terminates upon the death of either spouse. After the
death of one of the spouses, in case it is necessary to sell any portion of the conjugal
property in order to pay outstanding obligations of the partnership, such sale must be
made in the manner and with the formalities established by the Rules of Court for the sale
of the property of deceased persons. Where a complaint is brought against the surviving
spouse for the recovery of an indebtedness chargeable against said conjugal property,
any judgment obtained thereby is void. The proper action should be in the form of a claim
to be filed in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse. Ventura vs.
Militante, 316 SCRA 226, G.R. No. 63145 October 5, 1999