PRACTICE OF LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICIAL officials or employees will focus on their respective
duty and to serve well the public.
Query of Atty. Karen Buffe
Facts:
Atty. Buffe sent a letter of query before the Office of
Court Administrator, about the RA 6713, particularly
Sec. 7, (b) (2), about public officials and employees
prohibition on practice of profession.
Atty. Buffe was formerly a clerk of court of RTC
Romblon, Branch 81, that according to her, the said
provision is unfair to those non-incumbent, those who
are retired, resigned, and separated from public office.
That the said provision allowed incumbent to practice
their profession so long as this does not create a conflict
of interest, while those non-incumbent, who are not in
the position are prohibited for 1 year.
OCAT (Office of Chief of Atty) in their Resolution states
that the premise of the query is erroneous, because
Atty. Buffe interpreted the provision as a blanket
authority for an incumbent clerk of court to practice
law. OCAT also found out that Atty. Buffe had appeared
as counsel during her incumbency and after her
resignation.
This was admitted by Atty. Buffe, but her intention was
to elevate the dismissal of the cases so that the SC will
put to rest about the unfair provision.
Issue: WON Sec. 7, (b) (2) of RA 6713 gives preferential
treatment with regard the practice of law or profession
to incumbent public officials and employees over the
non-incumbent?
Ruling: NO, Atty. Buffe’s interpretation of the law is
wrong, in fact, it was the non-incumbent who can
practice without the 1 year period prohibition provided
he/she will not practice his/her profession with the
office he/she used to work with, while the incumbent
they cannot practice at all, save only where the
Constitution or the law allowed them to, and that there
is no conflict of interest.
The prohibition in the said provision is predicated on
the principle that public office is a public trust, and to
remove any impropriety, real or imagined, which may
occur in government transaction between a former
employee and his/her colleagues, subordinates or
superiors, that this also promotes as way so that public
SC reiterated that Sec. 7 (b) (2) is a general rule that
public officials and employees are prohibited to
practice their profession, the exception is that unless it
is allowed by Constitution or law, but there must be no
conflict of interest between their current duties and
the practice of profession. That there is no chance for
lawyers in Judiciary to practice, considering that Sec. 5,
Canon 3 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel
also bars them to do so.
Atty. Buffe violated first the law before making inquiry,
by appearing before the RTC Romblon Branch 81, where
she used to work, 1 year after resignation. With this she
violated Code of Profession Responsibility (Rule 1.1=01
of Canon 1), upholding the Constitution and obey the
law and not to engage in unlawful conduct.
Although the intention of Atty. Buffe is to elevate the
cases so that the Court can address her concern,
however, presence of evil intent on the part of lawyer is
not essential to discipline him/her with his/her act or
omission.
Atty. Buffe is guilty of professional misconduct for
violation Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Canon 7 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, she is fined by SC
amounting to 10,000 and STERNLY WARNED.
NOTE:
Section 5, Canon 3 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel:
Outside employment may be allowed by the head of office provided it
complies with all of the following requirements:
(a) The outside employment is not with a person or entity that practices law
before the courts or conducts business with the Judiciary;
(b) The outside employment can be performed outside of normal working
hours and is not incompatible with the performance of the court personnel's
duties and responsibilities;
(c) That outside employment does not require the practice of law; Provided,
however, that court personnel may render services as professor, lecturer, or
resource person in law schools, review or continuing education centers or
similar institutions;
(d) The outside employment does not require or induce the court personnel
to disclose confidential information acquired while performing officials
duties;
(e) The outside employment shall not be with the legislative or executive
branch of government, unless specifically authorized by the Supreme Court.
Where a conflict of interest exists, may reasonably appear to exist, or where
the outside employment reflects adversely on the integrity of the Judiciary,
the court personnel shall not accept outside employment.
AUTHORITY TO PRACTICE/ REPRESENTATION OF LOCAL
OR NATIONAL CANDIDATE

Query of Gilbert Castillo

Facts:

Atty. Castilo inquires (before the COMELEC) whether

the act of representing a local or national candidate by
government employee permitted to practice his
profession constitutes a violation of engaging the
practice of law.

That while he was working in the Senate, and when he

worked at the LABORCOM, he was authorized to
practice his profession by the senators.

Issue: WON a civil servant acting as counsel for any

candidate be considered engaging in partisan political
activity or engaging in limited practice of law.

Ruling: YES, a lawyer who is employed in the public

sector for and on behalf of a candidate for national or
local office before, during or after the election
constitute a violation of his limited authority to practice
his profession because such engagement contravenes
the law against partisan political activities, expressly
provided in the Constitution, and Omnibus Code.

That election is a partisan political activity per se, hence,

the engagement of the services of lawyer by a political
candidate, is inevitably ensure the success of the
candidate’s interest, this is in accordance with Legal and
Judicial Ethics, that a lawyer who accepts a client is
bound to represent his client’s interest to the best of his
ability and with zeal. A lawyer who is tasked to
maintain political neutrality would eventually be
actively representing the political interest of a
candidate.
 the member of the bar, this must be construed strictly
for the sake of public policy.

The Court mentioned one exception wherein the law

LAW STUDENT PRACTICE
Bar Matter 730 IN RE: NEED THAT LAW STUDENT
PRACTICING UNDER RULE 138-A BE ACTUALLY
SUPERVISED DURING TRIAL
student may appear validly even without supervising
lawyer, that when he appear before an inferior court as
an agent or friend of a party litigant, as per Rule 138,
Sec. 34.

Facts:

Retired SC Justice Barredo, counsel for the defendant in

a CIVIL CASE questioned the appearance of a law
student Mr. Carmona, intern at UP Legal Aid Clinic, to
represent the plaintiff in the Civil Case, alone and
without the presence of supervising lawyer.

Director of UP Legal Aid Clinic, Atty. Tadiar, contends

that the matter of allowing a law student to appear
unaccompanied should be left to the sound discretion
of the judge, after having made at least one
accompanied appearance.

Issue: WON it is required that a law student appearing

in court should always be accompanied by supervising
lawyer.

Ruling: YES, law student appearing before RTC under

the authority of Rule 138-A must be under the direct
control and supervision of a member of bar duly
accredited by the law school, that LAW STUDENT
MUST BE ACCOMPANIED BY A SUPERVISING LAWYER
IN ALL HIS APPEARANCE.

That the phrase direct supervision and control in Rule

138-A, Sec. 2 require no less than physical presence of
the supervising lawyer during the hearing, this is in
accordance with the threefold rationale behind the Law
Student practice Rule: (1) to ensure that there is no
miscarriage of justice as a result of incompetence or
inexperience of a law student; (2) to protect the school
from potential vicarious liability arising from culpable
action of their law students; and (3) to be consistence
with the fundamental principle that no person is
allowed to practice a profession without possessing the
qualifications.

It cannot be left in the discretion of the judge because

the rule categorically states that the appearance of law
student shall be under direct control and supervision of

REVOLVING THEORY ON REPRESENTATION OF A CLIENT
BY FORMER GOVERNMENT LAWYERS
PCGG vs. Sandiganbayan
Facts:
PCGG filed a petition to disqualify or remove Atty.
Mendoza as counsel of Tan, et al. in the Civil Cases Nos.
0005 and 0096, which involved the reversion,
reconveyance and sequestration of the share of stock of
Tan in the Allied Bank for being an ill-gotten.
PCGG alleged that Atty. Mendoza who was then a
Solicitor General actively intervened in the liquidation of
GENBANK, which was subsequently acquired by Tan and
became Allied Bank. That when the GENBANK was
declared as insolvent and ordered by Central Bank to
liquidate, Atty. Mendoza filed petition requesting the
Court to assist GENBANK in its liquidation.
PCGG invoked Rule 6.03 of CPR, which prohibits former
government lawyers from accepting employment in
connection with any matter in which he had intervened
while in the said service.
Sandiganbayan denies the petition and sustained the
Atty. Mendoza as counsel of Tan, et al.
Issue: WON Atty. Mendoza should be removed as
counsel of Tan in Civil Case 0096 by reason of Rule 6.03
of CPR.
Ruling: NO, the Court affirmed Sandiganbayan’s
Resolution.
The prohibition in Rule 6.03 of Code of Professional
Responsibility was intended to bar the practice of
“revolving door”, wherein a lawyer and others
temporarily enter government service from private
life, then they will exploit or use information, contacts
and influenced they garnered therein, into their
private practice after leaving government. That there
are two aspects of Rule 6.03 to warrant the application
of the rule, the adverse-interest conflict and congruent-
interest conflict.
In this case, the Court ruled that there is no adverse-
interest conflict, when Atty. Mendoza acted as Solicitor
General in Special Proceeding No, 107812 and later as
counsel of Tan, et al. in the Civil Cases.
As to the other aspect, congruent-interest conflict, the
Court uses two test: (1) scope or meaning of ‘matter’,
and (2) metes and bounds of intervention made by
former government lawyer.
First, as to the “matter”, ABA Formal Opinion No. 342
define it as any discrete, isolatable acts, transactions or
conduct involving specific party, but this does not
include the act of merely drafting, enforcing or
interpreting government or agency procedures,
regulations or laws.
In this case, the act of Atty. Mendoza in advising the
Central bank as to the proceed with GENBANK;s
liquidation and asking the Court’s assistance for the said
liquidation is a mere enforcing or interpreting the
procedure, which do not fall within the definition of
matter. Moreover, matter involved in Sp. Proc. 107812
(liquidation) is entirely different from matter involved in
Civil Case 0096 (sequestration of stocks of Tan in Allied
Bank on the alleged ground that they are ill-gotten).
Therefore, not within the scope of ‘matter’ of Rule 6.03.
Second, intervention or participation in the proceeding
must be personal, substantial and significant and there
must be a possibility to influence the subject
proceeding, to qualify within the metes and bounds of
intervention in Rule 6.03.
In the case of Atty. Mendoza, his intervention in Sp.
Proc. No. 107812 is not significant nor substantial
considering that he merely petition the Court to assist
the liquidation of GENBANK, and that the role of
Solicitor General in such proceeding is not that of usual
court litigator protecting the interest of the
government. No showing that Atty. Mendoza influenced
the proceeding because he had nothing to do with the
decision of Central Bank to liquidate GENBANK, nor
participated in the sale of GENBANK to Allied Bank.
Rule 6.03 is not to deprive the former government
lawyer to practice their profession in after leaving the
government, but it is tend to eliminate the possible
appearance of impropriety and loss of public confidence
in the government.
Lastly, when Atty. Mendoza was SolGen, Rule 6.03 has
not yet adopted by the IBP and approved by SC, and the
petition to disqualify Atty. Mendoza was made after
lapse of unreasonable time.

NOTE:
Revolving door – process by which lawyers and others
temporarily enter government service from private life and
then leave it for large fees in private practice, where they
can exploit information, contacts, and influenced garnered
in government service.
Classified as:
Adverse-interest conflicts – exist where the matter in
which the former government lawyer represents a client in
private practice is substantially related to a matter that the
lawyer dealt with while employed by the government and
the interests of the current and former are adverse.
Congruent-interest representation conflict – unique to
government lawyers and apply primarily to former
government lawyers.
History of Rule 6.03:
- Canon 36 was minted – disqualified former
government lawyers for AIC and CIRC: “a lawyer,
having once held public office or having been in
the public employ shout not, after his retirement,
accept employment in connection with any
matter he has investigated or passed upon while
in such office or employ”
- Replaced Canon 36 for being unfair which
resulted to unnecessary disqualification of
lawyers for negligible or small participation in
matters during their employment with the
government.
- Canon 9, DR 9-101(b) – lawyers still unsatisfied
with the standard.
- CPR Rule 6.03 – “a lawyer shall not, after leaving
government service, accept engagement or
employment in connection with any matter which
he had intervened while in said service.”, both
applicable to AIC and CIRC.
 RULE 138 SEC. 34 OF RULES OF COURT

Maderada vs. Judge Medeodia (RECITED ALREADY)

Facts:

Issue:

Ruling:
 More so, Bar Matter No. 730, by virtue of Section 34,
Rule 138, clarified that a law student may appear, as an
agent or a friend of a party litigant, without the
supervision of a lawyer before inferior courts.

CAN A NON LAWYER APPEAR BEFORE A COURT?

Cruz vs. Mina, et al.

(GRAVE THREATS/Law student appear for his father)

Facts:

Cruz, a third year law student, filed before the MeTC a

formal Entry of Appearance as private prosecutor of his
father (complaining witness) in the Criminal Case for
Grave Threats. He justifies his appearance as private
prosecutor on the bases of Sec. 34 of Rule 138 and
ruling in Cantimbuhan Case, where non-lawyer may
appear before the inferior court as an agent or friend of
a party litigant, that his appearance was with
conformity with public prosecutor and with written
authority from his father appointing him as agent in the
said case.

MeTC - denied permission on the ground that Circular

no. 19 governing limited law student practice in
conjunction with Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court (ROC),
which states that appearance must be with supervision
of an attorney of duly accredited by the law school.

Issue: WON the petitioner, a non-lawyer, may appear

before a court.

Ruling: YES, SC directed MeTC to admit the Entry of

Appearance of petitioner.

The petitioner anchored his appearance on Sec. 34 of

Rule 138 which states that a party may conduct his
litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or fried
appointed by him for that purpose in the Municipal
Courts, and in Sec. 6 Rule 5 of ROC made no distinctions
as to the term municipal trial court, it includes
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in
Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts, therefore, petitioner, a non-lawyer may appear
before the MeTC.

Section 34, Rule 138 is clear that appearance before

the inferior courts by a non-lawyer is allowed,
irrespective of whether or not he is a law student.
 made upon the request of the client, in this case,
petitioner claims that he had instructed his Atty. Rivera,
PAO lawyer to file an appeal. However, the RTC instead
of determining whether the PAO counsel was negligent
in filing the appeal by requiring the said counsel to
comment, the lower court outright dismissed the
petition.

Moreover, the CA should have alerted when Hilario filed

PRACTICE OF LAW OF NON-LAWYERS/ FILING OF
APPEAL WITHOUT LAWYER
Hilario vs. People
(Detained/Convicted filed an appeal without counsel)
Facts:
Hilario was charged of 2 counts of murder in RTC, he
pleaded not guilty. Thatt during trial, he was
represented by Atty. Rivera of PAO. RTC convicted
Hilario of homicide.
his petition without the assistance of counsel, they
should have required Hilario to cause the entry of
appearance of his counsel, because right to counsel
exists not only in trial courts and ceases in the pursuit of
appeal. Right of an accused to be assisted by lawyer is
immutable, otherwise, there would be grave abuse of
denial of due process.
In addition, there is no showing that Hilario was
motivated by a desire to delay the proceeding or
obstruct the administration of justice, this warrants the
suspension of procedural rules.

Unassited by counsel, Hilario filed with RTC Petition for

Relief from the Decision, that he was already detained
when the decision was promulgated but he instructed
his lawyer to file notice of appeal, however, he found
out that there was no appeal was filed.

RTC dismissed the petition due to failure to perfect an

appeal and CA also dismissed Hilario’s petition.

On appeal, Hilario contends that failure of his counsel to

timely file a notice of appeal of his conviction despite
his explicit instruction constitutes an excusable
negligence, hence, his petition should have been
granted.

Issue: WON the delay to file on time Notice of Appeal

due to defiance of Hilario’s counsel is an excusable
negligence.

Ruling: YES, SC granted Hilario’s petition and set aside

the decision of lower courts, SC also ordered Atty.
Rivera to file his comment.

General rule, negligence of counsel binds the client,

but subject to exception when the negligence of
counsel is so gross, reckless and inexcusable that the
client is deprived of his day in court.

In this case, there was grave abuse of discretion when

RTC dismissed Hilario’s petition or appeal. PAO
Memorandum Circular provides that all appeals must be
 Bearing in mind, that the duties of Rada as messenger
are ministerial which do not require his entire day to be
at the Government, it would be unfair to suppress his
willingness to apply himself to a productive endeavour
to augment his income.

PRIVATE PRACTICE PRACTICE OF LAW BY PUBLIC

OFFICIALS

Ramos vs. Rada (messenger)

(Messenger of CFI also appointed as administrator of

AVESCO-private comp)

Facts:

Administrative complaint was filed by Ramos against

Rada before the DOJ, charging Rada with violation of
Sec. 12 of Civil Service Rule 18, which prohibits officer or
employee to engage directly in any private business,
vocation, or profession, without a written permission
from the head of Department.

That Rada, a messenger in the CFI of Camarines Norte

then, was also appointed by Avesco Marketing Corp. as
administrator, who supervises and manages real
properties in Camarines Norte which were foreclose by
the corporation. However, it was not indicated that his
acceptance and discharge of duties of the said position
in Avesco impaired his efficiency as messenger.

Issue: WON Rada is guilty of violation Sec. 12 of Civil

Service Rule.

Ruling: YES, Rada is guilty however of technical violation

of Sec. 12 only, for which he is reprimanded.

Rada violated the civil service rule that prohibits

government employee from engaging directly in
private business, vocation or profession or being
connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural or
industrial undertaking without written permission
from the head of Department, nonetheless, Rada’s
business connection has not resulted in any prejudice to
the government service. Rada’s only violation is the
lack of prior written permission from the theExecutive
Judge of CFI of Camarines Norte, a mere technical
violation, and the imposable penalty is reprimand.
 No evidence to prove that Atty. Sison committed an act
constituting deceit, immoral conduct, violation of
lawyers oath, wilful disobedience of any law or
corruptly and wilfully appear as an attorney without
authority to do so, to warrant his disbarment.

PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND THE PRACTICE OF LAW
Noriega vs. Atty. Sison
(EE of SEC appeared as counsel in JDRC / used of other
name)
Facts:
A disbarment case was filed by Noriega against Atty.
Emmanuel Sison on the ground of malpractice through
gross misrepresentation and falsification.
Noriega alleges that Atty. Sison who is a Hearing Officer
at Securities and Exchange Commission uses different
name, particularly Atty. Manuel Sison to handle private
cases, which under the said name, Atty. Sison,
represented Sacquing, defendant in a case before the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court in Manila, and to
support his claim, he presented documents and
pleadings and orders.
First, Atty. Sison does not violate Civil Service Rule and
Regulation when he appear as counsel of Sacquing in
JDRC because it was done with the authority given by
Assoc. Commissioner of SEC. Moreover, this is the only
case where Atty. Sison appeared as counsel, being an
isolated case it does not constitute practice of law,
more so, Atty. Sison did not derive any monetary gain
from this case.
Second, as to the use of Atty. Manuel Sison, there was
no showing that Atty. Sison was motivated with bad
faith or malice when he did not corrected his name
when the court staff misspelled it, considering that
when he appear as counsel in JDRC there was an
express authority given by his superior.
Lastly, the Court found out that filing of this and other
charges by Noriega against Atty. Sison was due to his
resentment and bitterness in losing the SEC case,
wherein Noriega was the defendant, and Atty. Sison was
the Hearing Officer who handled the case.

Atty. Sison denied all the allegations and argued that he

did not violate any law, he even attached the written
authorization from his Associate Commissioner Sulit,
allowing him to appear as counsel of Sacquing. That he
represented and provided legal services to Sacquing for
free and that Sacquing is a close family friend. He
further state that he never represented himself
deliberately or intentionally as Atty. Manuel Sison, but
he admitted that there was once instance when court
staff of JDRC made a mistake and wrote his name as
Atty. Manuel, but he did not bother to correct it since it
was not done fraudulently nor it was not to
misrepresent, but a mere error.

Issue: WON Atty. Sison should be disbarred.

Ruling: NO, the Court dismissed the petition for lack of

merit.
 public and demanding payment for such services. The
appearance of counsel in one occasion is not conclusive
as determinative of engagement in the private practice
of law. Moreover, the appearance of City Atty. Fule is
with permission of his intermediate superior.

Second, SC also agreed to CFI when it ruled that the

PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND THE PRACTICE OF LAW
People vs. Villanueva
(Atty. Fule, assistant city atty of san Pablo appeared in
case before the alaminos)
Facts:
Villanueva was charged by Chief of Police of Alaminos,
Laguna with the crime of Malicious Mischief before
Justice of Peace of Alaminos.
appearance of City Atty. Fule as private prosecutor is
pursuant to Sec. 31, Rule 127 of ROC, wherein it allows
party litigant to conduct the litigation with the aid of
an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose,
or the aid of an attorney, that Atty. Fule appeared
before Justice of Peace Court as agent or friend of
complainant, there is no showing that his appearance
was in professional capacity nor he was being paid for
his services.
Lastly, there is no possible conflict in the duties of
Assistant City Attorney Fule as Assistant City Attorney of
San Pablo and as private prosecutor in this criminal
case, bearing in mind that the case is litigated in
Alaminos, Laguna.

That Villanueva was represented by counsel de officio

but later replaced by counsel de parte, while the
complainant was represented by City Atty. Fule of San
Pablo City, after Atty. Fule secured permission from
Secretary of Justice.

Counsel of Villanueva questioned the appearance of

City Atty. Fule as private prosecutor that such
appearance is a violation of jurisprudence (Aquino vs.
Blanco), wherein the said case made pronouncement
that attorney who has been appointed as Assistant
Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal are prohibited to engage
in private practice of law.

JP sustained the legality of appearance of City Atty. Fule,

and this was affirmed by CFI of Laguna.

Issue: WON City Atty. Fule appearance is valid.

Ruling: YES, SC affirmed the decision of the lower

courts.

First, the appearance of City Atty. Fule is an isolated

appearance, hence, it does not constitute practice of
law as contemplated in Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules.
That to constitute practice of law, it must be
customarily or habitually holding one’s self out to the
 public officials and employees, RA 7160 governs elective
local official.

Punong barangay is not included in the prohibition to

practice their profession under RA 7160, but Civil
Service Rules (Sec. 12, Rule XVIII, Revised Civil Service
Rules) provides that a lawyer in government service
who is not prohibited must secure prior authorization
from their head of department. Failure of Atty. Rellosa
to obtain an authorization from Secretary of DILG
before practicing and appearing as counsel of Elizabeth
constitute a violation of lawyer’s oath and CPR,
particularly Canon 1, Rule 1.01, Canon 7. A lawyer shall
obey the laws (C1) and shall uphold at all time the
integrity of legal profession (C7) and not to engage in
unlawful conduct (R1.01), but Atty. Rellosa committed a
PUBLIC OFFICIALS/ELECTED LOCAL OFFICIALS AND THE professional misconduct. Public confidence in the law
PRACTICE OF LAW and in lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and
improper conduct of a member of the bar.
Catu vs. Atty. Rellosa

(Punong barangay appeared as counsel)

NOTE:
Facts:
PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES
Complainant Catu filed administrative complaint against
(Sec. 7(b)(2), RA 6713)
Atty. Rellosa for committing an act of impropriety as a
prohibited to engage in unless authorized by
lawyer and public officer when he stood as counsel of private practice of their Constitution or law,
Elizabeth and Pastor (defendant) in an ejectment case, profession provided that such
despite the fact that he presided the conciliation practice will not conflict
between the litigants as punong barangay. or tend to conflict with
their official functions
Atty. Rellosa, admitted that he heard the complaints of
ELECTIVE LOCAL OFFICIALS
the Catus against Elizabeth and Pastor, however, he
(Sec. 90 of RA 7160)
only accepted Elizabeth’s request for legal assistance, governors, prohibited from practicing their
when the parties failed to settle amicably, and that he city mayors profession or engaging in any
handled it for free because she was financially and occupation other than the exercise of
distressed and wanted to prevent commission of municipal their functions as local chief
injustice against her. mayors executives
members of may except no prior
IBP – Atty. Rellosa violated Rule 6.03 of CPR and Sec.
sangguniang: practice during permission
7(b)(2) of RA 6713, and suspended him for 1 month. panlalawigan their session required
Issue: WON Atty. Rellosa should be suspended. , professions, hours
panlungsod engage in
Ruling: YES, Atty. Rellosa is guilty of professional or any
misconduct and he is suspended for 6 months. bayan occupation,
or teach in
SC clarified that Atty. Rellosa did not violate Rule 6.03 of schools
CPR and Sec. 7(b)(2) of RA 6713, because the rule punong allowed to practice prior
applies only to lawyers who already left the government barangay and their profession, not permission
service, Atty. Rellosa is still in the service, and the members of included in or
particular provision of RA 6713 is a prohibition for sangguniang prohibition authorization
baranggay from the
 head of their
Department
is required
(Sec. 12, Rule
XVIII, Revised
Civil Service
Rules)

PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND THE PRACTICE OF LAW

Ramos vs. Judge Manalac

Facts:

Issue:

Ruling:

he word “appearance” includes not only arguing a case

before any such body but also filing a pleading in behalf
of a client as “by simply filing a formal motion, plea or
answer”
 Issue: WON Atty. David is practicing law despite of being
suspended.

Ruling: YES, Atty. David is disqualified from practicing

the profession of law, because he intentionally
disobeyed the decision of the Court in suspending him.

Atty. David knowing that he was suspended should have

discontinued serving his client, he should not have
presented either as agent or lawyer of his client, and he
should not appear before the CA for his client. He
should know that a person who is not practicing lawyer
cannot appear for a litigant before a court except
before justice of peace.

Exercising the profession of lawyer is practicing the

acts typical to said profession such as preparing and
filing motions. The act of Atty. David of filing motions to
request execution of order, order of demolition, asking
the court to order the Sheriff, presenting a plea and
PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND THE PRACTICE OF LAW memorandum before the CA and collecting of rents
from defendants and signing the receipt as plaintiffs’
In Re: Atty. David
attorney are acts constitutes practice of law.
(suspended atty)
Hiding and pretending that he was only an agent but
Facts: the truth he was acting as his client’s lawyer worsened
Atty. David’s situation.
Atty. David despite of his suspension from practicing law
for 5 years due to bad practices, continued to practice
the profession.

That Atty. David while suspended made the following

acts:

- Filed a plea in Tan Tek Sy vs. Malinawag case,

not as a lawyer but as agent of Tan Tek Sy;
- He presented a motion in CFI requesting for
issuance of execution order;
- He requested an order to demolish houses of
defendants in Malayan Saw Mill Inc. vs
Tolentino;
- He filed a motion requesting to order Sheriff of
Manila to deliver the amount collected; and
- Signing the receipt for payment of rentals as
counsel of his client.

On his defense, Atty. David argued that he was a mere

agent of Tan Tek Sy and not a lawyer, that he advised
his client to find another lawyer and prepare the case
considering that he was suspended, but due to time
constraint and Tan Tek Sy was not able to hire another
lawyer, he prepared the appeal and even presented a
memorandum before the CA.
 LAWMAKER MAY APPEAR FOR HIMSELF OR HERSELF

Pangilinan vs. Cayetano

(CANNOT FOUND COPY OF CASE)

Facts:

Issue:

Ruling:
 Issue: WON Malinao as court interpreter allowed to
practice law.

Ruling: NO, Malinao not member of bar, is not allowed

to practice law, the number of times he acted as
counsel indicate that he was doing it in regular practice
obviously for consideration and not for the love of
justice.

His defense that he merely helping other and to avoid

miscarriage of justice is of no moment, considering that
he appeared as counsel in court without written
permission from his superiors. Civil Service Law Sec. 12,
Rule XVIII provides that officer or employees of
government are required to acquire written permission
from the head of Department when they will engage
directly in any private business, vocation or profession.
Much worse, he falsified his time record to conceal his
absences during the time he appeared as counsel in
court.

SC ordered the dismissal of Malinao from his position as

WRITTEN PERMIT NECESSARY FOR PUBLIC OFFICIALS
court interpreter due to the gravity of his offense.
Zeta vs. Malinao (court interpreter)

(Court interpreter appear as counsel, falsified his time

record and instigated other to commit crime)

Facts:

Administrative complaint was filed by Zeta against

Malinao, court interpreter of CFI Catbalogan, Samar,
charging him of illegally appearing in court as counsel.

The complainant alleged that Malinao, not a lawyer,

appeared in different civil and criminal cases, that he
make it as his livelihood since he collect fees from his
clients; that he also instigated other person to commit
crime in their barrio, specially, to rob, and telling them
that he has influences over the judges; he is also charge
of falsifying his time record especially when he was
appearing as counsel in court, to make it appear that he
was present; and lastly for violation of Executive Order
and Civil Service Law by engaging in private practice of
profession without permission from his Department
Head.

Malinao argued that he was only helping the

defendants in their cases and that it was for free since
the defendants could not engage the services of counsel
by reason of poverty and absence of one in there
locality; and that he never violated any law particularly
Civil Service Law.