CASE DIGESTS - LEGITIME (ART 886 AND 887)

1. Manuel vs Ferrer, 247 SCRA 746 (1995) GUINTO

BENIGNO MANUEL, LIBERATO MANUEL, LORENZO MANUEL, PLACIDA MANUEL, MADRONA

MANUEL, ESPERANZA MANUEL, AGAPITA MANUEL, BASILISA MANUEL, EMILIA MANUEL and
NUMERIANA MANUEL, petitioners,

vs.

HON. NICODEMO T. FERRER, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 37, Lingayen,
Pangasinan, MODESTA BALTAZAR and ESTANISLAOA MANUEL, respondents.

G.R. No. 117246 August 21, 1995

Doctrine: The rule in Article 992 has consistently been applied by the Court in several other cases. Thus,
it has ruled that where the illegitimate child had

half-brothers who were legitimate, the latter had no right to the former's inheritance; 6 that the legitimate
collateral relatives of the mother cannot succeed from her illegitimate child; 7 that a natural child cannot
represent his natural father in the succession to the estate of the legitimate grandparent; 8 that the natural
daughter cannot succeed to the estate of her deceased uncle who is a legitimate brother of her natural
father;9 and that an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and
relatives of his father.10 Indeed, the law on succession is animated by a uniform general intent, and thus no
part should be rendered inoperative11 by, but must always be construed in relation to, any other part as to
produce a harmonious whole.12

Facts:

Petitioners, the legitimate children of spouses Antonio Manuel and Beatriz Guiling, initiated this suit. During
his marriage with Beatriz, Antonio had an extra-marital affair with one Ursula Bautista. From this
relationship, Juan Manuel was born.

Juan Manuel, the illegitimate son of Antonio, married Esperanza Gamba. In consideration of the marriage,
a donation propter nuptias over a parcel of land, with an area of 2,700 square meters was executed in favor
of Juan Manuel by Laurenciana Manuel. Two other parcels of land were later bought by Juan and registered
in his name. The couple were not blessed with a child of their own. Their desire to have one impelled the
spouses to take private respondent Modesta Manuel-Baltazar into their fold and so raised her as their own
"daughter.

Juan Manuel executed in favor of Estanislaoa Manuel a Deed of Sale Con Pacto de Retro over a one-half
(1/2) portion of his land Juan Manuel died intestate. Two years later Esperanza Gamba also passed away.

A month after the death of Esperanza, Modesta executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication claiming for
herself the three parcels of land(all still in the name of Juan Manuel). Following the registration of the
document of adjudication with the Office of the Register of Deeds, the three titles in the name of Juan
Manuel were canceled and new titles were issued in the name of Modesta Manuel-Baltazar. Modesta
executed in favor of her co-respondent Estanislaoa Manuel a Deed of Renunciation and Quitclaim over the
unredeemed one-half (1/2) portion of the land that was sold to the latter by Juan Manuel under the 1980
Deed of Sale Con Pacto de Retro. These acts of Modesta apparently did not sit well with petitioners. In a
complaint filed before the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, the petitioners sought the
declaration of nullity of the aforesaid instruments.

RTC – Dismissed the complaint. Petitioners, not being heirs ab intestato of their illegitimate brother Juan
Manuel, were not the real parties-in-interest to institute the suit.

Argument of Petitioner: they are the legal heirs over one-half of Juan's intestate estate (while the other
half would pertain to Juan's surviving spouse) under the provision of the last paragraph of Article 994 of
the Civil Code, providing thusly:

Art. 994. In default of the father or mother, an illegitimate child shall be succeeded by his or her
surviving spouse, who shall be entitled to the entire estate.

If the widow or widower should survive with brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces, she or he
shall inherit one-half of the estate, and the latter the other half. (Emphasis supplied)

Argument of Respondents: Article 994 should be read in conjunction with Article 992 of the Civil Code,
which reads:

Art. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and
relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relative inherit in the same manner from
the illegitimate child. (Emphasis supplied)

Issue: WoN petitioners, half brother/sisters of the deceased, are legal heirs and therefore entitled to inherit.

Ruling: NO

Article 992, a basic postulate, enunciates what is so commonly referred to in the rules on succession as
the "principle of absolute separation between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family." The
doctrine rejects succession ab intestato in the collateral line between legitimate relatives, on the one hand,
and illegitimate relatives, on other hand, although it does not totally disavow such succession in the direct
line. Since the rule is predicated on the presumed will of the decedent, it has no application, however, on
testamentary dispositions.

This "barrier" between the members of the legitimate and illegitimate family in intestacy is explained by a
noted civilist.2 His thesis:

What is meant by the law when it speaks of brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces, as legal or
intestate heirs of an illegitimate child? It must be noted that under Art. 992 of the Code, there is a
barrier dividing members of the illegitimate family from members of the legitimate family. It is clear
that by virtue of this barrier, the legitimate brothers and sisters as well as the children, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, of such brothers and sisters, cannot inherit from the illegitimate child.
Consequently, when the law speaks of "brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces" as legal heirs
of an illegitimate child, it refers to illegitimate brothers and sisters as well as to the children, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, of such brothers and sisters. (Emphasis supplied)

The rule in Article 992 has consistently been applied by the Court in several other cases. Thus, it
has ruled that where the illegitimate child had

half-brothers who were legitimate, the latter had no right to the former's inheritance;6 that the
legitimate collateral relatives of the mother cannot succeed from her illegitimate child; 7 that a natural child
cannot represent his natural father in the succession to the estate of the legitimate grandparent; 8 that the
natural daughter cannot succeed to the estate of her deceased uncle who is a legitimate brother of her
natural father;9 and that an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children
and relatives of his father.10 Indeed, the law on succession is animated by a uniform general intent, and
thus no part should be rendered inoperative11 by, but must always be construed in relation to, any other
part as to produce a harmonious whole.12

Order of preference and concurrence in intestacy expressed in Article 978 through Article 1014, inclusive,
of the Civil Code:

Order of Preference Order of Concurrence

(a) Legitimate Children and Descendants (a) Legitimate Children and Descendants,
Illegitimate Children and Descendants, and
Surviving Spouse

(b) Legitimate Parents and Ascendants (b) Legitimate Parents and Ascendants, Illegitimate
Children and Descendants, and Surviving Spouse

(c) Illegitimate Children and Descendants (in the (c) Illegitimate Children and Descendants and
absence of ICDs and LPAs, the Illegitimate Surviving Spouse
Parents)

(d) Surviving Spouse (Esperanza) (d) Surviving Spouse and Illegitimate Parents

(e) Brothers and Sisters/ Nephews and Nieces (e) Brothers and Sisters/ Nephews and Nieces and
(petitioners) Surviving Spouse (

f) Other Collateral Relatives (within the fifth civil (f) Alone

degree)

(g) State (g) Alone

Modesta candidly admitted that she herself is not an intestate heir of Juan Manuel. She is right. A ward
(ampon), without the benefit of formal (judicial) adoption, is neither a compulsory nor a legal heir.

Nevertheless the complaint of petitioners seeking the nullity of the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed
by Modesta, the three (3) TCT's issued to her favor, as well as the Deed of Renunciation and Quitclaim in
favor of Estanislaoa Manuel, was properly dismissed by the trial court. Petitioners, not being the real
"parties-in-interest"14 in the case, had neither the standing nor the cause of action to initiate the complaint.

2. Manahan vs Manahan, 58 Phil 448 (1933) JOSOL

EN BANC

G.R. No. 38050 September 22, 1933

In the matter of the will of Donata Manahan. TIBURCIA MANAHAN, petitioner-appellee,

vs.
ENGRACIA MANAHAN, opponent-appellant.

IMPERIAL, J.:

FACTS:

Tiburcia Manahan (niece of the testatrix; executrix of the will) instituted special proceedings No. 4162, for
the probate of the will of the deceased Donata Manahan, who died in Bulacan, Province of Bulacan, on
August 3, 1930.

No opposition thereto was filed and, after the evidence was presented, the court entered the decree
admitting the will to probate.

Appellant Engracia Manahan filed a motion for reconsideration and a new trial, praying that the order
admitting the will to probate be vacated and the authenticated will declared null and void ab initio.

The appellant alleged errors as committed by the trial court.

ISSUES & RULING:

(1) Whether or not she was an interested party in the testamentary proceedings and, as such, was
entitled to and should have been notified of the probate of the will.

NO. She was not entitled to notification of the probate of the will and neither had she the right to expect it,
inasmuch as she was not an interested party, not having filed an opposition to the petition for the probate
thereof. Her allegation that she had the status of an heir, being the deceased's sister, did not confer on her
the right to be notified on the ground that the testatrix died leaving a will in which the appellant has not been
instituted heir. Furthermore, not being a forced heir, she did not acquire any successional right.

(2) Whether or not did not really probate the will but limited itself to decreeing its authentication.

YES. The court really decreed the authentication and probate of the will in question, which is the only
pronouncement required of the trial court by the law in order that the will may be considered valid and duly
executed in accordance with the law. In the phraseology of the procedural law, there is no essential
difference between the authentication of a will and the probate thereof. The words authentication and
probate are synonymous in this case. All the law requires is that the competent court declared that in the
execution of the will the essential external formalities have been complied with and that, in view thereof,
the document, as a will, is valid and effective in the eyes of the law.

(3) Whether or not the will is null and void ab initio on the ground that the external formalities prescribed
by the Code of Civil Procedure have not been complied with in the execution thereof.

NO. Once a will has been authenticated and admitted to probate, questions relative to the validity thereof
can no more be raised on appeal. The decree of probate is conclusive with respect to the due execution
thereof and it cannot impugned on any of the grounds authorized by law, except that of fraud, in any
separate or independent action or proceedings. But there is another reason which prevents the appellant
herein from successfully maintaining the present action and it is that inasmuch as the proceedings followed
in a testamentary case are in rem, the trial court's decree admitting the will to probate was effective and
conclusive against her.
After due hearing, the court found that the will in question was valid and effective and the order admitting it
to probate, thus promulgated, should be accepted and respected by all. The probate of the will in question
now constitutes res judicata.

3. Dy Tam vs Espiritu, 100 Phil 819 (1957) JUEVES

G.R. No. L-7846 January 31, 1957

In the matter of the intestate estate of the deceased Rafael Litam. GREGORIO DY TAM, Petitioner-
Appellant, vs. REMEDIOS ESPIRITU, as guardian of the incompetent Marcosa Rivera, and ARMINIO
RIVERA, oppositors-appellees.

Facts: On 21 May 1952 Gregorio Dy Tam filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal a petition dated 24
April 1952 for the administration and settlement of the estate of Rafael Litam who died intestate in Manila
on 10 January 1951 (special proceedings No. 1537), claiming that he and four brothers and three sisters
are the children of the decedent had with Sia Khin, now deceased, by a marriage celebrated in China
sometime in 1911; that after the death of their father the petitioner and his brothers and sisters came to
know that their father had contracted in 1922 in the Philippines, during the subsistence of his previous
marriage with sia Khin, another marriage with Marcosa Rivera out of which marriage here is no issue; and
that the deceased acquired properties during his lifetime and marital union with Marcosa Rivera one-half of
which valued at P65,000 belonged to their father.chanroblesvirtualwlibra

On 12 July 1952 Marcosa Rivera filed a counter-petition denying the alleged marriage of the deceased to
Sia Khin and the filiation of the petition and his brothers and sisters; asserting that the properties claimed
by the petitioners and his brothers and sisters to have been acquired by their father as parapherna; and
praying that Arminio Rivera be appointed administrator of the estate of the deceased. As prayed for, 29
August 1952 letters of administration were issued to Arminio Rivera who upon the filing of a bond took the
oath and entered upon the performance of his duties. On 8 September 1952 the Court entered an order
notifying all persons having claims for money against the decedent to file their claims with the clerk of court
within the statutory period.

On 10 March 1953 Remedios R. Espiritu, guardian of the incompetent Marcosa Rivera (special proceedings
No. 1709 of the same Court), filed a claim against the estate of the deceased Rafael Litam, alleging that
the defendant was indebted to her ward in the sum of P252,658.33, as evidenced by a public instrument
dated 24 February 1946 and a private document dated 28 November 1950, and praying that the
administrator of the estate of the late Rafael Litam be ordered to pay her in her capacity as guardian of the
aforesaid sum together with the stipulated interest at 10% per annum on P62,000 and legal interest in
P190,658.33 from the date of the filing of the claim until fully paid. On 14 March 1953 the administrator filed
an answer admitting that the claim of Remedios R. Espiritu in her capacity as guardian of the incompetent
Marcosa Rivera is "genuine and bona fide."

On 4 January 1954 the Court, "finding the claim to be genuine, valid and legal," ordered the administrator
to pay, in due course of administration, to the claimant, Remedios R. Espiritu, as guardian of the
incompetent Marcosa Rivera, the above--mentioned sum of P252,658.33, together with the stipulated
interest at the rate of 10% per annum on the sum of P62,000.00 and the legal interest on the sum of
P190,658.33 from the date of the filing of said claim until full payment thereof is made.

Issue: WON the Court erred in approving the claim of Marcosa Rivera

Held: The question raised in this appeal - whether or not the Court erred in approving the claim of Marcosa
Rivera - has become moot, in view of the holding of this Court in the case of Henry Litam et al. vs. Remedios
Espiritu et al., supra. p. 364, wherein the appellant Gregorio Dy Tam was also a party, to the effect that
when Rafael Litam contracted marriage with Marcosa Rivera, he was not married to Sia Khin, the alleged
mother of the appellant and his four brothers and three sisters; and that they are not the children of the late
Rafael Litam. By this pronouncement, the basis upon which the appellants and his brothers and sisters
could claim any interest and share in the estate of the deceased Rafael Litam has disappeared. Hence they
have no legal standing to object to the claim of Marcosa Rivera.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library

The appeal dismissed, without pronouncement as to costs.

4. Rocha vs Tuason (GR No. 14254, August 5, 1919) JUNGCO

FACTS:

This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila, dated February 26, 1918,
in re will of Jose Gregorio Rocha, deceased, which declares the petitioner, Maria Eloisa Rocha, the
recognized natural daughter of the said Jose Gregorio Rocha, deceased, has the right to intervene in these
proceedings, and to have a share in the property left at the death of the said Jose Gregorio Rocha, and
which appoints Recaredo Pando as administrator of the same property.
On May 17, 1917, the petitioner, Maria Eloisa Rocha, filed a motion alleging herself to be the recognized
natural daughter of the deceased, Jose Gregorio Rocha, and praying the court to fix a day for the hearing
of the evidence tending to prove her allegation.
The counsel for the opponent Emilia Tuason y Patiño presented an opposition against the claim of the
petitioner on the ground that the motion was premature.
A day having been fixed for the hearing of the appointment of administrator and of the aforesaid motion of
the petitioner, the opponent, Emilia Tuason, reiterated her objections against all the proceedings had and
that might be had, and alleged that the petitioner could no longer ask to be declared the recognized natural
daughter, because her action had already prescribed and was therefore estopped.
Before the aforesaid hearing took place Maria Emilia Rocha de Despujols filed a motion that alleged herself
to be the legitimate daughter of Jose Gregorio Rocha; that the petitioner, Maria Eloisa Rocha, had no longer
any right, interest, or share in the property of the deceased Jose Gregorio Rocha; and that, if there might
have been any interest or share whatever, any action for such claim had already prescribed because the
period fixed by law for the filing of such an action had expired; wherefore she prayed the court to declare
that there was no ground for the appointment of an administrator and to dismiss these proceedings.
ISSUES:

1. Whether or not Maria Eloisa Rocha, had been recognized, during the lifetime of the deceased Jose
Gregorio Rocha, as his natural daughter
2. Whether or not granting that she had been so recognized whether she has a personality and right
to claim a share in the inheritance of her deceased natural father and whether she has the right to
ask for the probate of the will of the said father and the appointment of an administrator of the
property left at his death

RULING:

1. No. In order that a child may be considered as natural, according to the said prior legislation, it is
not enough that the father and the mother could have married lawfully without dispensation at the
time of the conception or of the birth of the child, but it was also necessary, in accordance with the
provision of Law 11 of Toro which became Law 1, Title 5, Book 10 of the Novisima Recopilacion,
that the father should recognize the child as his, a recognition verified by any of the means
prescribed in the laws in force prior to the present Civil Code.

However, from the records it is not possible to infer that Jose Gregorio Rocha during his lifetime
had recognized, in accordance with legislation prior to the Code, Maria Eloisa Rocha as his
supposed natural daughter. She may be really his daughter, had as a bachelor with a woman also
unmarried, but that which is certain is that Jose Gregorio Rocha during his lifetime did not make
 any public and formal declaration of the fact that he recognized Maria Eloisa Rocha as his natural
daughter. In the baptismal certificate of the said Eloisa Rocha it does not appear that Jose Gregorio
Rocha was present during the act of baptism when she was a recently born creature — nor was
there presented any authentic document that would give credit to such a recognition. And it is
surprising that, in executing his will on March 14,1898, and in setting aside the property which he
was leaving as legacy to the plaintiff Eloisa Rocha, the deceased Jose Gregorio Rocha did not
make nor express any declaration that he was leaving her the legacy as his daughter,

2. No. The plaintiff, Maria Eloisa Rocha, as well as the defendant, Maria Emilia Rocha, were born
long before the Civil Code was in force in these islands, and, therefore, their respective rights have
their origin from facts which took place under prior legislation. In accordance with said legislation,
even if it be supposed that Maria Eloisa Rocha is really the natural daughter of Jose Gregorio
Rocha, lawfully recognized by the latter, nevertheless, as such natural daughter she is excluded
from the inheritance of her natural parents as the latter have a legitimate daughter who is Maria
Josefa Casiano de Despujols. Therefore, it is undisputable that the plaintiff, according to former
legislation, lacks the right to inherit from the deceased Rocha.

5. Rosales vs Rosales, 148 SCRA 69 (1987) LAGARTO

G.R. No. L-40789 February 27, 1987

INTESTATE ESTATE OF PETRA V. ROSALES, IRENEA C. ROSALES, petitioner,

vs.

FORTUNATO ROSALES, MAGNA ROSALES ACEBES, MACIKEQUEROX ROSALES and ANTONIO

ROSALES, respondents.

Gancayco, J:

Facts:

Petitioner Irenea C. Rosales is the wife of Carterio Rosales. Carterio Rosales predeceased his mother,
Petra Rosales. When Petra Rosales died, her daughter Magna Rosales Acebes instituted the proceedings
for the settlement of the estate her mother with and estimated gross value of 30,000 pesos.

The Trial Court issued an order declaring the following individuals as the legal heirs and their respective
shares:

1. Fortunato T. Rosales (husband) – ¼

2. Magna Rosales Acebes (Daughter) ¼

3. Antonio Rosales (son) – ¼

 4. Macikequerox Rosales (grandson) (child of the deceased son and petitioner Irenea C. Rosales) -
¼

Petitioner insisted that she was entitled to the share from the estate of his mother-in-law as the widow of
the deceased’s son. She argued that she is an intestate heir of her mother-in-law as provided in Article 887
of the New Civil Code.

Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not a widow whose husband predeceased his mother is an intestate heir of her mother-in-law?

Ruling:

NO. A widow of the predeceased son is not interstate heir of her mother-in-law.

Intestate or legal heirs are classified into two (2) groups, namely, those who inherit by their own right, and
those who inherit by the right of representation.

An intestate heir can only inherit either by his own right, as in the order of intestate succession provided for
in the Civil Code, or by the right of representation provided for in Article 981 of the same law.

There is no provision in the Civil Code which states that a widow is an intestate heir of her mother-in-law.

The argument of that a widow is a compulsory heir in accordance with the provisions of the Article 887,
Paragraph 3 cannot be countenanced.

Art. 887. The following are compulsory heirs:

xxxx

(3) The widow or widower;

Xxxx

The provisions of law refers to the estate of the deceased spouse in which case the surviving spouse is a
compulsory heir. It does not apply to the estate of a parent-in-law. The surviving spouse is considered a
third person as regards the estate of the parent-in-law.

Here, it was the son, Macikequesrox Rosales who is called to succession by law because of his blood
relationship. He does not succeed his father, carterio Rosales who predeceased his grandmother, petra
Rosales, but the latter whom his father would have succeeded. Petitioner cannot assert the same right of
representation as she has no filiation by blood with her mother-in-law.

6. Geronimo(petitioner) vs Santos(respondent), 771 SCRA 508 (2015) LOZANO

FACTS:

Respondent Karen Santos filed an action for annulment of documents and recovery of possession of
properties, alleging that she was the sole heir of her parents Rufino and Caridad Geronimo. She alleged
that the petitioner Eugenio and Emiliano Geronimo who were the siblings of her father adjudicated upon
themselves said property and obtained a title over it. The defendants countered, saying that the spouses
were childless and that the spouses merely took petitioner in, that she was the daughter of Caridad’s sister,
and that the record of birth of Karen was simulated. Petitioner further alleged that it was impossible for the
spouses to have a child so they adopted respondent. Also, believing that in the absence of a direct heir, his
brother Emiliano and he should succeed to the estate of their brother, they executed in 2000 an extra-
judicial settlement called Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman.

Petitioners also presented a copy of the plaintiffs alleged birth certificate. It had irregular features, such as
that it was written in pentel pen, the entry in the box date of birth was erased and the word and figure April
6, 1972 written and the name Emma Daño was superimposed on the entry in the box intended for the
informant's signature. The respondents also claimed that Caridad never filed a maternity leave from work,
thus reinforcing the fact that she never bore a child.

RTC: ruled in favor of respondent Karen and ruled that her filiation was proven by evidence of open and
continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child. It also dismissed the claim that the birth cert was
tampered. It considered the overt acts of the deceased as recognition such as: payment of her school fees;
making her the beneficiary of the burial benefits from the GSIS; filing a petition for guardianship over Karen.
Finally, it was ruled by the RTC that petitioners failed to impugn her filiation and status within the period
under Arts. 170 and 171 of the Family Code.

On appeal, petitioner offered evidence of a mere certification from the Office of the Civil Registry instead
of the birth certificate itself. According to petitioner, respondent's open and continuous possession of the
status of a legitimate child is only secondary evidence to the birth certificate itself. Defendant questioned
if it was legally permissible for petitioner to question her filiation as a legitimate child of the spouses
Rufino and Caridad in the same action for annulment of document and recovery of possession that she
herself filed against petitioner and his then co-defendant. She stressed that her civil status may not be
assailed indirectly or collaterally in this suit-- only in a direct action

CA: filiation can be proven by secondary evidence under Article 172 of the Family Code which allows the
introduction of evidence of filiation by way of open and continuous possession of the status of legitimate
child.
ISSUE(s):

a. WON filiation may be attacked collaterally in the same suit.

b. WON the CA erred in allowing the introduction of secondary evidence based on Art 172 of the
Family Code, and rendering judgement based thereon.

Held:

A. NO. Petitioner is correct that proof of legitimacy under Article 172, or illegitimacy under Article 175,
should only be raised in a direct and separate action instituted to prove the filiation of a child. Under
Art. 170 and 171 of the FC, the action to impugn legitimacy is a different action and must be brought
within the period set by law.
B. No. The case at bar is not one of filiation but rather a question on whether petitioner-appellee is at
all a child of the spouses, hence, not an heir. The bar on the introduction of secondary evidence
only applies to actions where the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child is at issue.

What petitioner alleges by way of defense is that respondent is not an heir to his brother Rufino.
Jurispridence shows that the court does not bar the introduction of such evidence in this case,
even if the evidence is the same as what is mentioned by Art. 172.

In Cabatbat-Lim vs. IAC:

The legal bar refers to an action to impugn legitimacy. It is inapplicable to this case
because this is not an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, but an action of the
private respondents to claim their inheritance as legal heirs of their childless deceased
aunt. They do not claim that petitioner Violeta Cabatbat Lim is an illegitimate child
of the deceased, but that she is not the decedent's child at all. Being neither legally
adopted child, nor an acknowledged natural child, nor a child by legal fiction of
Esperanza Cabatbat, Violeta is not a legal heir of the deceased.

However, the evidence allowed by both lower courts were insufficient to prove that the appellee
was a child of the spouses.

The appellate court itself ruled that the irregularities consisting of the superimposed entries on the
date of birth and the name of the informant made the document questionable. The corroborating
testimony of Arturo Reyes, a representative of the NSO, further confirmed that the entries on the
date of birth and the signature of the informant are alterations on the birth certificate which rendered
the document questionable. To be sure, even the respondent herself did not offer any evidence to
explain such irregularities on her own birth certificate. These irregularities and the totality of the
following circumstances surrounding the alleged birth of respondent are sufficient to overthrow the
presumption of regularity attached to respondent's birth certificate.

Furthermore, the Court has ruled in Benitez and that the presence of a similar set of
circumstances - which were relied upon as secondary proof by both courts a quo in the case at
bar - does not establish that one is,a child of the putative parents.

It is well-settled that a record of birth is merely a prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein.
It is not conclusive evidence of the truthfulness of the statements made there by the interested
parties. Following the logic of Benitez, respondent should have adduced evidence of her adoption,
in view of the contents of her birth certificate. The records, however, are bereft of any such
evidence.
7. Arbolario vs CA, 401 SCRA 360 (2003) MANGUB

The Facts

The original owners of the controverted lot, spouses Anselmo Baloyo and Macaria Lirazan had five (5)
children, namely: (1) Agueda Colinco, (2) Catalina Baloyo, (3) Eduardo Baloyo, Gaudencia Baloyo, and (5)
Julian Baloyo. All of the above-named persons are now dead.

The first child, Agueda Colinco, was survived by her two children, namely, Antonio Colinco and [respondent]
Irene Colinco. Antonio Colinco predeceased his three daughters, herein [respondents], Ruth, Orpha, and
Goldelina, all surnamed Colinco. The second child, Catalina Baloyo, was married to Juan Arbolario. Their
union was blessed with the birth of only one child, Purificacion Arbolario, who, in 1985, died a spinster and
without issue.Juan Arbolario, consorted with another woman by the name of Francisca Malvas and from
this cohabitation [petitioners], viz, Voltaire Arbolario, Lucena Arbolario Taala, Fe Arbolario, Exaltacion
Arbolario, and Carlos Arbolario (refered to hereinafter as ‘Arbolarios’) were born. All the foregoing
[petitioners] were born well before the year 1951.

In 1946, the third child, Eduardo Baloyo, sold his entire interest in Lot 323 to his sister, Agueda Baloyo
Colinco, by virtue of a notarized document . "In 1951, a notarized declaration of heirship was executed by
and between Agueda, Catalina, Gaudencia, and their brothers Eduardo and Julian, who extrajudicially
declared themselves to be the only heirs of the late spouses Anselmo Baloyo and Macaria Lirazan. The
fourth child, Gaudencia Baloyo, conveyed her interest in the said lot in favor of her two nieces, Irene Colinco
to one-half (1/2) and Purificacion Arbolario to the other half. Purificacion Arbolario was then allowed to take
possession of a portion of the disputed parcel until her death sometime in 1984 or 1985.

Respondents] Irene Colinco, Ruth Colinco, Orpha Colinco, and Goldelina Colinco, believing themselves to
be the only surviving heirs of Anselmo Baloyo and Macaria Lirazan, executed a ‘Declaration of Heirship
and Partition Agreement’, dated May 8, 1987 where they adjudicated upon themselves their proportionate
or ideal shares. Irene Colinco, to one-half (1/2); while the surviving daughters of her (Irene’s) late brother
Antonio, namely Ruth, Orpha, and Goldelina Colinco, to share in equal, ideal proportions to the remaining
half (1/2).

On October 2, 1987, the Colincos filed a case against Spouses Rosalita Rodriguez Salhay and Carlito
Salhay, seeking to recover possession of a portion of the aforesaid lot occupied by [respondent] spouses
(‘Salhays’ hereinafter) since 1970. The Salhays alleged in their defense that they have been the lawful
lessees of the late Purificacion Arbolario since 1971 up to 1978; and that said spouses allegedly purchased
the disputed portion of Lot No. 323 from the deceased lessor sometime in [September] 1978.

On May 9, 1988 -- before the case was heard and tried on the merits the Arbolarios and spouses Salhay
filed another case f]or Cancellation of Title with Damages.The Arbolarios, joined by the Salhays, contend
that the ‘Declaration of Heirship and Partition Agreement’ executed by he Colincos was defective and thus
voidable as they (Arbolarios) were excluded therein. The Arbolarios claim that they succeeded intestate to
the inheritance of their alleged half-sister, Purificacion Arbolario; and, as forced heirs, they should be
included in the distribution of the aforesaid lot."6

Ruling of the Trial Court

RTC ruled in favor of the [Arbolarios] and against the [Colincos] .The trial court held that the Arbolarios
were the brothers and the sisters of the deceased Purificacion Arbolario, while the Colincos were her
cousins and nieces. Pursuant to Article 1009 of the Civil Code, the Colincos could not inherit from her,
because she had half-brothers and half-sisters. Their 1987 Declaration of Heirship and Partition Agreement
was made in bad faith, because they knew all along the existence of, and their relationship with, the
Arbolarios. The Salhays, on the other hand, had no document to prove their acquisition and possession of
a portion of the disputed lot.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On appeal, the CA rejected the contention of petitioners that "the cohabitation of their father with their
natural mother, Francisca Malvas, was by virtue of a valid marriage." The appellate court observed that the
Arbolarios had all been born before the death of Catalina Baloyo, as shown by the Deed of Declaration of
Heirship, which she had executed in 1951. No evidence was ever presented showing that her conjugal
union with Juan Arbolario had been judicially annulled or lawfully ended before that year. Because it was
also in 1951 when Juan Arbolario cohabited with Francisca Malvas, their union was presumably
extramarital. Consequently, their children are illegitimate half-brothers and half-sisters of Purificacion, the
daughter of Juan and Catalina. Hence, this Petition.9

Issue

Whether or not The Honorable Court of Appeals committed grave and serious error in considering the
Arbolarios illegitimate children and not entitled to inherit from their half-sister Purificacion Arbolario.

This Court’s Ruling

The Petition has no merit.

Petitioners contend that their illegitimacy is a "far-fetched and scurrilous claim" that is not supported by the
evidence on record. They maintain that the CA declared them illegitimate on the unproven allegation that
Catalina Baloyo had signed the Declaration of Heirship in 1951. They aver that this 1951 Declaration does
not contain her signature, and that she died in 1903:

The Court are not persuaded.

First, a review of the 1951 Declaration reveals that the year of Catalina’s death was intercalated. The first
two numbers (1 and 9) and the last digit (3) are legible; but the third digit has been written over to make it
look like a "0." Further, the paragraph quoted by petitioners should show a chronological progression in the
heirs’ years of death: Agueda died in 1940 and Eduardo in 1947. Hence, if Catalina had indeed died in
1903, why then was her name written after Agueda’s and not before it? Moreover, the document, being in
Spanish, requires an official translation. The Court cannot readily accept the English translation proffered
by petitioners, since respondents did not agree to its correctness. Besides, it consisted of only a paragraph
of the whole document.

Second, there is no solid basis for the argument of petitioners that Juan Arbolario’s marriage to Francisca
Malvas was valid, supposedly because Catalina Baloyo was already dead when they were born. It does
not follow that just because his first wife has died, a man is already conclusively married to the woman who
bore his children. A marriage certificate or other generally accepted proof is necessary to establish the
marriage as an undisputable fact.

Third, clear and substantial evidence is required to support the claim of petitioners that they were preterited
from the 1951 Declaration of Heirship. The RTC Decision merely declared that they were half-brothers and
half-sisters of Purificacion, while respondents were her cousins and nieces (collateral relatives). It made no
pronouncement as to whether they were her legitimate or illegitimate siblings.
Paternity or filiation, or the lack of it, is a relationship that must be judicially established. 15 It stands to reason
that children born within wedlock are legitimate.16 Petitioners, however, failed to prove the fact (or even the
presumption) of marriage between their parents, Juan Arbolario and Francisca Malvas; hence, they cannot
invoke a presumption of legitimacy in their favor.

As held by the appellate court, without proof that Catalina died in 1903, her marriage to Juan is presumed
to have continued. Even where there is actual severance of the filial companionship between spouses, their
marriage subsists, and either spouse’s cohabitation with any third party cannot be presumed to be between
"husband and wife. WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the appealed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioners.

8. Rivera vs Heirs of Villanueva, 496 SCRA 135 (2006) MATURAN

G.R. No. 141501. July 21, 2006.*

ELINO RIVERA, DOMINADOR CLAUREN, SOLEDAD CLAUREN DE RIVERA, TEOFILA RIVERA and
CECILIA RIVERA, petitioners, vs. HEIRS OF ROMUALDO VILLANUEVA** represented by MELCHOR
VILLANUEVA, ANGELINA VILLANUEVA, VICTORIANO DE LUNA, CABANATUAN CITY RURAL
BANK, INC. and REGISTER OF DEEDS OF NUEVA ECIJA, respondents.
CORONA, J.:

FACTS:

Petitioners:
· Elino and Dominador (half-brother of Pacita Gonzales)
· Soledad (Half-sister of Pacita Gonzales)
· Teofila and Cecilia (children of Pacita’s half-brother)

Respondents:(also considered as heirs of R. Villanueva)

· Catalino, Lucia, Purificacion and Melchor (representative or respondents) Villanueva (siblings of

Romualdo Villanueva)
· Arnaldo V. Avendano (half-sibling of Romualdo Villanueva)

· They were allowed to substitute for Villanueva upon his death.

· Angelina Villanueva and husband Victoriano de Luna (alleged daughter and the son-in-law of
Romualdo Villanueva)

Timeline:

1927-1980 – Pacita Gonzales cohabited with Romualdo Villanueva without the benefit of marriage.
Romualdo is married to Amanda Musngi (died Apr. 20, 1963) (kabit si Pacita)

During the cohabitation period, the ff. properties were acquired:

· Lot No. 266-B-1, with an area of 1,787 square meters, more or less, and covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. NT-21446 [in the names of Villanueva and Gonzales], together with the
residential house erected thereon and other improvements;

· Lot No. 266-B-3 [included in the coverage of transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-21446], with
an area of 5,353 square meters, more or less, situated at Poblacion, Talavera, Nueva Ecija;
 · [Lot 801-A covered by] Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-12201 [in the names of Villanueva
and Gonzales], with [an] area of 15.400 hectares, more or less, situated at Llanera, Nueva Ecija;

· [Lot 3-A covered by] Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-51899 [in the names of Villanueva and
Gonzales], with an area of 4.0019 hectares, more or less, situated at Calipahan, Talavera, Nueva
Ecija;

· [Lot No. 838 covered by] Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-17193 [in the names of Villanueva,
Gonzales and one Soledad Alarcon vda. de Rivera], with an area of 3.8718 hectares, more or
less, situated at Talavera, Nueva Ecija;

· [Lot 884-B covered by] Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-26670 [in the name of Gonzales],
with an area of 3.5972 hectares, more or less, situated at Talavera, Nueva Ecija;

· Subdivision lots situated at Talavera, Nueva Ecija, covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos.
106813 to 106931, inclusive, although the land covered by TCT No. NT-106827 … was already
sold to one Pastor Barlaan;

· Shares of stocks, tractor, jewelries and other chattels, with an approximate value of at least
P100,000; and

· Savings deposit with the [Philippine] National Bank, in the amount of P118,722.61.

July 3, 1980 – Pacita Gonzales died intestate.

August 8, 1980 – R. Villanueva & daughter Angelina Villanueva executed a deed of extrajudicial partition
with sale (extrajudicial settlement of Gonzales’ estate). R. Villanueva conveyed his interests in the estate
to Angelina for P30k.

Gonzales’ half-siblings, etc. filed a case for partition of Gonzales’ estate and annulment of titles and
damages, with the Santo Domingo, Nueva Ecija, Branch 37.

RTC Nueva Ecija: dismissed the partition case filed by the half-siblings.

· Gonzales was never married to Villanueva and

· Angelina was her illegitimate child by Villanueva and therefore her sole heir

CA affirmed RTC.

Pacita’s half siblings:

· RTC and CA erred in finding that respondent Angelina was Gonzales’ illegitimate daughter
despite the RTC’s ruling in another case, Special Proceedings No. SD-144 (SD-144), entitled In
the Matter of the Intestate Estate of the late Pacita C. Gonzales, Epifanio C. Rivera, petitioner, v.
Romualdo Villanueva, oppositor, in which the trial court appointed Epifanio Rivera as administrator
of Gonzales’ estate.

· Angelina was neither the adopted nor the illegitimate daughter of Gonzales

ISSUE:
 1. WON Angelina is Pacita’s daughter
2. WON the real properties acquired by Villanueva and Gonzales were equally owned by them

RULING:

1. WON Angelina is Pacita’s daughter: NO

Illegitimate daughter, as proven by her birth certificate (Pacita – mother; Romualdo – father). Both RTC
and CA agree. However, a closer examination of the birth certificate 14 reveals that respondent Angelina
was listed as “adopted” by both Villanueva and Gonzales.

Respondent Angelina and her co-defendants in SD-857 should have adduced evidence of her adoption,
in view of the contents of her birth certificate. The records, however, are bereft of any such evidence.

Respondent Angelina was not Gonzales’ daughter, whether illegitimate or adopted. Gonzales was 44
years old, and on the verge of menopause at the time of the alleged birth. Gonzales had been living childless
with Villanueva for 20 years.

Under the circumstances, we hold that it was not sufficiently established that respondent Angelina was
Gonzales’ biological daughter, nor even her adopted daughter. Thus, she cannot inherit from Gonzales.
Since she could not have validly participated in Gonzales’ estate, the extrajudicial partition which
she executed with Villanueva on August 8, 1980 was invalid.

2. WON the real properties acquired by Villanueva and Gonzales were equally owned by them:
REMAND, NOT CLEAR

While Romualdo Villanueva claimed that he and Pacita C. Gonzales lived as husband and wife and that
they were married, it turned out that he was not legally married to the latter, for then, his marriage in
the year 1927, was still subsisting with one Amanda Musngi.

No co-ownership exists between parties to an adulterous relationship.

Remand the case to the court of origin for the proper determination and identification of Gonzales’ heirs.

Significantly, the trial court in SD-857 did not establish the exact relationship between petitioners and
Gonzales, a relationship defendants therein (now respondents) vigorously denied. In view of this, there is
a need to remand the case to the court of origin for the proper determination and identification of Gonzales’
heirs.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 51449 are reversed and set aside, and a new one entered ANNULLING the deed of
extrajudicial partition with sale and REMANDING the case to the court of origin for the determination and
identification of Pacita Gonzales’ heirs and the corresponding partition of her estate.

RRL:

Benitez-Badua v. Court of Appeals

 The mere registration of a child in his or her birth certificate as the child of the supposed parents is not
a valid adoption, does not confer upon the child the status of an adopted child and the legal rights of such
child, and even amounts to simulation of the child’s birth.

A record of birth is merely a prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein. It is not conclusive
evidence of the truthfulness of the statements made there by the interested parties.

Agapay v. Palang,
By declaring that in such a relationship, it is necessary for each of the partners to prove his or her actual
contribution to the acquisition of property in order to be able to lay claim to any portion of it. Presumptions
of co-ownership and equal contribution do not apply.

9. Perla vs Baring (GR No. 172471, November 12, 2012) MIRANDA

Respondent Mirasol Baring (Mirasol) and her then minor son, Randy (collectively respondents), filed before
the RTC a Complaint6 for support against Antonio.
They alleged in said Complaint that Mirasol and Antonio lived together as common-law spouses for two
years. As a result of said cohabitation, Randy was born on November 11, 1983. However, when Antonio
landed a job as seaman, he abandoned them and failed to give any support to his son. Respondents thus
prayed that Antonio be ordered to support Randy.

In his Answer with Counterclaim,7 Antonio, who is now married and has a family of his own, denied having
fathered Randy. Although he admitted to having known Mirasol, he averred that she never became his
common-law wife nor was she treated as such. And since Mirasol had been intimidating and pestering him
as early as 1992 with various suits by insisting that Randy is his son, Antonio sought moral and exemplary
damages by way of counterclaim from respondents.

Mirasol testified that on November 11, 1983, Mirasol gave birth to Randy. 16 She presented Randy’s
Certificate of Live Birth17 and Baptismal Certificate18 indicating her and Antonio as parents of the child.
Mirasol testified that she and Antonio supplied the information in the said certificates. 19 Antonio supplied his
name and birthplace after Erlinda Balmori (Erlinda), the "hilot" who assisted in Mirasol’s delivery of Randy.

Randy also testified, who at that time was just 15 years old.23 Randy claimed that he knew Antonio to be
the husband of her mother and as his father. During their encounter, Randy called Antonio "Papa" and
kissed his hand while the latter hugged him.26 When Randy asked him for support, Antonio promised that
he would support him.27

Testifying as an adverse witness for the respondents, Antonio admitted having sexual intercourse with
Mirasol in February and August33 of 1981.34 When shown with Randy’s Certificate of Live Birth and asked
whether he had a hand in the preparation of the same, Antonio answered in the negative.35 Antonio denied
having courted Mirasol. Further, he denied having any relationship with Mirasol. 38 He claimed that he had
sexual intercourse with Mirasol only once which happened in the month of September or October of
1981.39Antonio came to know that he was being imputed as the father of Randy only when Mirasol charged
him with abandonment of minor in 1994, which was also the first time he saw Randy. Anent Randy’s
Certificate of Live Birth, Antonio testified as to several inaccuracies in the entries thereon.
Daisy Balmori Rodriguez (Daisy) testified also and claimed that Mirasol later left to her care the then infant
Randy until Mirasol took him away without permission
RTC rendered a Decision49 dated February 26, 2003 ordering Antonio to support Randy.
The CA upheld Randy’s illegitimate filiation based on the certified true copies of his birth certificate and of
his baptismal certificate identifying Antonio as his father. While these documents do not bear the signature
of Antonio, they are proofs that Antonio is the known, imputed and identified father of Randy. Thus, it
affirmed the appealed decision. It also held that Antonio’s vacillation in testimony is a clear badge of his
lack of candor.
ISSUE:
Whether the lower courts correctly ordered Antonio to support Randy. NO
RULING:
Since respondents’ complaint for support is anchored on Randy’s alleged illegitimate filiation to
Antonio, the lower courts should have first made a determination of the same.
Respondents’ Complaint for support is based on Randy’s alleged illegitimate filiation to Antonio. Hence, for
Randy to be entitled for support, his filiation must be established with sufficient certainty.
Respondents failed to establish Randy’s
illegitimate filiation to Antonio.
The rules for establishing filiation are found in Articles 172 and 175 of the Family Code which provide as
follows:
Article 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and
signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

xxxx
Article 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same
evidence as legitimate children.
Respondents presented the Certificate of Live Birth of Randy identifying Antonio as the father. However,
said certificate has no probative value to establish Randy’s filiation to Antonio since the latter had not signed
the same.60 It is settled that "a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not
competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the
preparation of said certificate."61 We also cannot lend credence to Mirasol’s claim that Antonio supplied
certain information through Erlinda. Aside from Antonio’s denial in having any participation in the
preparation of the document as well as the absence of his signature thereon, respondents did not present
Erlinda to confirm that Antonio indeed supplied certain entries in Randy’s birth certificate. Besides, the
several unexplained discrepancies in Antonio’s personal circumstances as reflected in the subject birth
certificate are manifestations of Antonio’s non-participation in its preparation. Most important, it was Mirasol
who signed as informant thereon which she confirmed on the witness stand.
Neither does the testimony of Randy establish his illegitimate filiation. Here, the single instance that Antonio
allegedly hugged Randy and promised to support him cannot be considered as proof of continuous
possession of the status of a child. To emphasize, "[t]he father’s conduct towards his son must be
spontaneous and uninterrupted for this ground to exist."63 Here, except for that singular occasion in which
they met, there are no other acts of Antonio treating Randy as his son. 64 Neither can Antonio’s paternity be
deduced from how his sister Lelita treated Randy. To this Court, Lelita’s actuations could have been done
due to charity or some other reasons.
Anent Randy’s baptismal certificate, we cannot agree with the CA that the same is a good proof of Antonio’s
paternity of Randy. Just like in a birth certificate, the lack of participation of the supposed father in the
preparation of a baptismal certificate renders this document incompetent to prove paternity. 65 And "while a
baptismal certificate may be considered a public document, it can only serve as evidence of the
administration of the sacrament on the date specified but not the veracity of the entries with respect to the
child’s paternity. Thus, x x x baptismal certificates are per se inadmissible in evidence as proof of filiation
and they cannot be admitted indirectly as circumstantial evidence to prove the same." 66
It is well to stress that as plaintiff, Mirasol has the burden of proving her affirmative allegation that Antonio
is the father of her son Randy.67 She must rely on the strength of her evidence and not on the weakness of
the defense.68 As Randy was born on November 11, 1983, it was incumbent upon Mirasol to prove that she
had sexual intercourse with Antonio prior to the usual period of pregnancy or nine months before the birth
of Randy. However, nothing from Mirasol’s testimony indicates that she had sexual intercourse with Antonio
during that time.

10. Arado vs Alcoran, 762 SCRA 372 (2015) MUANA

G.R. No. 163362 July 8, 2015

ALEJANDRA ARADO HEIRS: JESUSA ARADO, VICTORIANO ALCORIZA, PEDRO ARADO, HEIRS:
JUDITHO ARADO, JENNIFER ARADO, BOBBIE ZITO ARADO, SHIRLY ABAD, ANTONIETA ARADO,
NELSON SOMOZA, JUVENIL ARADO, NICETAS VENTULA, and NILA ARADO, PEDRO ARADO,
TOMASA V. ARADO, Petitioners,
vs.
ANACLETO ALCORAN and ELENETTESUNJACO, Respondents.

Raymundo Alcoran (Raymundo) was married to Joaquina Arado (Joaquina), and their marriage produced
a son named Nicolas Alcoran (Nicolas). In turn, Nicolas married Florencia Limpahan (Florencia), but their
union had no offspring. During their marriage, however, Nicolas had an extramarital affair with Francisca
Sarita (Francisca), who gave birth to respondent Anacleto Alcoran (Anacleto) on July 13, 1951 during the
subsistence of Nicolas' marriage to Florencia. In 1972, Anacleto married Elenette Sunjaco.

Petitioners filed in the RTC a complaint for recovery of property and damages (with application for a writ
of preliminary mandatory injunction) against Anacleto and Elenette.

The plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that when Raymundo died in 1939, his properties were inherited by
his son Nicolas alone "as it was during the period of the old Civil Code, where the spouse could not inherit
but only a share of the usufruct, which was extinguished upon the death of the usufructuary;" that when
Nicolas died in 1954 without issue, half of his properties were inherited by his wife, Florencia, and the other
half by his mother, Joaquina; that Florencia was, in turn, succeeded by her siblings Sulpicio, Braulia and
Veronica; that during the marriage of Nicolas and Florencia, the former had an affair with Francisca, from
which affair Anacleto was born, but it was unknown whether he was the spurious son of Nicolas; that Nicolas
did not recognize Anacleto as his spurious child during Nicolas' lifetime; hence, Anacleto was not entitled
to inherit from Nicolas; that nonetheless, Anacleto claimed entitlement to the properties as the heir of
Nicolas and by virtue of the will executed by Joaquina; that the will was void for not having been executed
according to the formalities of the law, and the same did not reflect the true intention of Joaquina; that the
supposed testator did not acknowledge the will, which was not submitted for probate; that they were the
rightful heirs to the properties; that notwithstanding their repeated demands for the return of the properties,
the defendants persistently refused.

In their answer, the defendants (respondents herein) countered that Anacleto was expressly recognized by
Nicolas as the latter's son, a fact evidenced by the certificate of birth of Anacleto; that Anacleto thus had
the right to inherit the properties from Nicolas; that because Anacleto was still too young when Nicolas died,
the administration of the properties passed to Anacleto's grandmother, Joaquina; that Joaquina executed
a last will and testament in Anacleto's favor; that Joaquina's possession of the properties was for and in
behalf of Anacleto, who had been living with her since his birth; that such possession began in 1954 when
Nicolas died and continued until Joaquina' s death in 1981; that Anacleto then took over the possession of
the properties to the exclusion of all others; that granting for the sake of argument that the plaintiffs had
rights in the properties, the same were already lost through laches, estoppel and prescription; and that
Anacleto was the rightful owner of the properties, and his ownership and possession should not be
disturbed.

Issue: Whether or not Anacleto is entitled to inherit from the estate of Joaquina.

Ruling:

IRON CURTAIN RULE

No. Anacleto could not inherit from Joaquina by right of representation of Nicolas, the legitimate son of
Joaquina. Under Article 992 of the Civil Code, an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from
the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; in the same manner, such children or relatives
shall not inherit from the illegitimate child. As certified in Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court, the right of
representation is not available to illegitimate descendants of legitimate children in the inheritance of a
legitimate grandparent. And, secondly, Anacleto could not inherit from the estate of Joaquina by virtue of
the latter's last will and testament, i.e., the Katapusan Tugon (Testamento) (Exhibit K). Article 838 of the
Civil Code dictates that no will shall pass either real or personal property unless the same is proved and
allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court. We have clarified in Gallanosa v. Arcangel that in order that
a will may take effect, "it has to be probated, legalized or allowed in the proper testamentary proceeding.
The probate of the will is mandatory." It appears that such will remained ineffective considering that the
records are silent as to whether it had ever been presented for probate, and had been allowed by a court
of competent jurisdiction. The petitioners alleged this fact in their complaint, and the respondents did not
controvert the allegation. In the absence of proof showing that the supposed will of Joaquina had been duly
approved by the competent court, we hold that it had not been so approved. Hence, we cannot sustain the
CA' s ruling to the effect that Joaquina had bequeathed her properties to Anacleto by will, and that the
properties had been transmitted to him upon her death.
As the petitioners were among the collateral relatives of Joaquina, they are the ones entitled to inherit from
her estate.

11. Salas vs Matusalem, 705 SCRA 560 (2013) RABANES

FACTS:
Annabelle Matusalem (respondent) filed a complaint for Support/Damages against Narciso Salas
(petitioner) in the Regional Trial Court
Respondent claimed that the petitioner is the father of her son Christian Paulo Salas who was born on
December 28, 1994. Petitioner, already 56 years old at the time, enticed her as she was then only 24 years
old, making her believe that he is a widower. Petitioner rented an apartment where respondent stayed and
shouldered all expenses in the delivery of their child, including the cost of caesarian operation and hospital
confinement.

However, when respondent refused the offer of petitioner's family to take the child from her, petitioner
abandoned respondent and her child and left them to the mercy of relatives and friends.
Respondent thus prayed for support pendente lite and monthly support.

Petitioner filed his answer with special and affirmative defenses and counterclaims. He described
respondent as a woman of loose morals

Petitioner denied the paternity of the child Christian Paulo; he was motivated by no other reason except
genuine altruism when he agreed to shoulder the expenses for the delivery of said child, unaware of
respondent's chicanery and deceit designed to "scandalize" him in exchange for financial favor.

Respondent testified that she first met petitioner at the house of his "kumadre" Felicisima de Guzman.
During their subsequent meeting, petitioner told her he is already a widower and he has no more companion
in life because his children are all grown-up. She also learned that petitioner owns a rice mill, a construction
business and a housing subdivision.

Petitioner at the time already knows that she is a single mother as she had a child by her former boyfriend
in Italy. He then brought her to a motel, promising that he will take care of her and marry her. She believed
him and yielded to his advances, with the thought that she and her child will have a better life. Thereafter,
they saw each other weekly and petitioner gave her money for her child. When she became pregnant with
petitioner's child, it was only then she learned that he is in fact not a widower. She wanted to abort the baby
but petitioner opposed it because he wanted to have another child.

On the fourth month of her pregnancy, petitioner rented an apartment where she stayed with a housemaid;
he also provided for all their expenses. She gave birth to their child on December 28, 1994.
Before delivery, petitioner even walked her at the hospital room and massaged her stomach, saying he had
not done this to his wife. She filled out the form for the child's birth certificate and wrote all the information
supplied by petitioner himself. It was also petitioner who paid the hospital bills and drove her baby home.
He was excited and happy to have a son at his advanced age who is his "look-alike," and this was witnessed
by other boarders, visitors and Grace Murillo, the owner of the apartment unit petitioner rented. However,
on the 18th day after the baby's birth, petitioner went to Baguio City for a medical check-up. He confessed
to her daughter and eventually his wife was also informed about his having sired an illegitimate child. His
family then decided to adopt the baby and just give respondent money so she can go abroad. When she
refused this offer, petitioner stopped seeing her and sending money to her. She and her baby survived
through the help of relatives and friends.

Grace Murillo corroborated respondent's testimony as to the payment by petitioner of apartment rental, his
weekly visits to respondent and financial support to her, his presence during and after delivery of
respondent's baby, respondent's attempted suicide through sleeping pills overdose and hospitalization for
which she paid the bill, her complaint before the police authorities and meeting with petitioner's wife at the
headquarters.

On April 5, 1999, the trial court rendered its decision in favor of respondent the CA dismissed petitioner's
appeal.
On the paternity issue, the CA affirmed the trial court's ruling that respondent satisfactorily established the
illegitimate filiation of her son Christian Paulo, and consequently no error was committed by the trial court
in granting respondent's prayer for support.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial and appellate courts erred in ruling that respondent's evidence sufficiently
proved that her son Christian Paulo is the illegitimate child of petitioner.

RULING: YES
Under Article 175 of the Family Code of the Philippines, illegitimate filiation may be established in the same
way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
Article 172 of the Family Code of the Philippines states:
The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed
by the parent concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

Respondent presented the Certificate of Live Birth of Christian Paulo Salas in which the name of petitioner
appears as his father but which is not signed by him. Admittedly, it was only respondent who filled up the
entries and signed the said document though she claims it was petitioner who supplied the information she
wrote therein.

The court have held that a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent
evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of the
certificate. Thus, if the father did not sign in the birth certificate, the placing of his name by the mother,
doctor, registrar, or other person is incompetent evidence of paternity. Neither can such birth certificate be
taken as a recognition in a public instrument and it has no probative value to establish filiation to the alleged
father.

As to the Baptismal Certificate of Christian Paulo Salas also indicating petitioner as the father, we have
ruled that while baptismal certificates may be considered public documents, they can only serve as
evidence of the administration of the sacraments on the dates so specified. They are not necessarily
competent evidence of the veracity of entries therein with respect to the child's paternity.
The rest of respondent's documentary evidence consists of handwritten notes and letters, hospital bill and
photographs taken of petitioner and respondent inside their rented apartment unit.
Pictures taken of the mother and her child together with the alleged father are inconclusive evidence to
prove paternity. These pictures showing petitioner and respondent inside the rented apartment unit thus
have scant evidentiary value.

The Statement of Account from the Good Samaritan General Hospital where respondent herself was
indicated as the payee is likewise incompetent to prove that petitioner is the father of her child
notwithstanding petitioner's admission in his answer that he shouldered the expenses in the delivery of
respondent's child as an act of charity.

As to the handwritten notes of petitioner and respondent showing their exchange of affectionate words and
romantic trysts, these, too, are not sufficient to establish Christian Paulo's filiation to petitioner as they were
not signed by petitioner and contained no statement of admission by petitioner that he is the father of said
child.

Thus, even if these notes were authentic, they do not qualify under Article 172 (2) vis-à- vis Article 175 of
the Family Code which admits as competent evidence of illegitimate filiation an admission of filiation in a
private handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned.

An illegitimate child is now also allowed to establish his claimed filiation by "any other means allowed by
the Rules of Court and special laws," like his baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family Bible in
which his name has been entered, common reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the
testimonies of witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
Reviewing the records, we find the totality of respondent's evidence insufficient to establish that petitioner
is the father of Christian Paulo.

The testimonies of respondent and Murillo as to the circumstances of the birth of Christian Paulo,
petitioner's financial support while respondent lived in Murillo's apartment and his regular visits to her at the
said apartment, though replete with details, do not approximate the "overwhelming evidence, documentary
and testimonial" presented in Ilano.
In sum, we hold that the testimonies of respondent and Murillo, by themselves are not competent proof of
paternity and the totality of respondent's evidence failed to establish Christian Paulo's filiation to petitioner.
Time and again, this Court has ruled that a high standard of proof is required to establish paternity and
filiation. An order for recognition and support may create an unwholesome situation or may be an irritant to
the family or the lives of the parties so that it must be issued... only if paternity or filiation is established by
clear and convincing evidence.