Professional Documents
Culture Documents
59 - Misc Provi Full Text
59 - Misc Provi Full Text
(f) received improper payments such as 16. Silangan Investors and Managers, Inc.
bribes, kickbacks or commissions from an
overprice in the purchase of equipment for 17. Masters Assets Corp., Class B
DOMSAT[:]4
18. Gainful Assets Corp., Class B
As alleged in the Complaint, through clever
schemes, the wealth that should go to the
19. Aerocom Investors and Managers, Inc.
coffers of the government, which should be
deemed acquired for the benefit of the
Republic, went to the defendants in their own 20. Luzon Stevedoring Corp.
individual accounts-some, however, through
conduits or corporations. The property 21. Amalgamated Motors (Philippines), Inc.
supposedly acquired illegally was specifically
set out in a list appended to the Complaint as 22. Philippine National Construction Corp.
Annex A. For instance, Jose L. Africa, one of
the defendants, allegedly channelled the ill- 23. Consolidated Tobacco Industries of the
gotten wealth in shares of stock in twenty (20) Philippines.5
corporations, to wit:
Another defendant, Manuel H. Nieto, Jr.,
1. Security Bank and Trust Company allegedly channelled ill-gotten wealth into
shares of stock in fifteen (15) corporations,
2. SBTC Trust, Class A, Account No. 2016 namely:
3. SBTC Trust, Class A, Account No. 2017 1. Ozamis Agricultural Development, Inc.
10. Far East Managers and Investors, Inc. 8. Silangan Investors & Managers, Inc.
The basic tenets of fair play and principles of a. Sequestration is merely provisional
justice dictate that a corporation, as a legal
entity distinct and separate from its To effectively recover all ill-gotten wealth
stockholders, must be impleaded as amassed by former President Marcos and his
defendants, giving it the opportunity to be cronies, the President granted the PCGG,
heard. The failure to properly implead POTC among others, power and authority to
and PHILCOMSAT not only violates the sequester, provisionally take over or freeze
latters' legal personality, but is repugnant on suspected ill-gotten wealth. The subject of the
POTC's and PHILCOMSAT's right to due present case is the extent of PCGG's power to
process. "[F]ailure to implead these sequester.
corporations as defendants and merely
annexing a list of such corporations to the Sequestration is the means to place or cause
complaints is a violation of their right to due to be placed under the PCGG's possession or
process for it would in effect be disregarding control properties, building or office, including
their distinct and separate personality without
business enterprises and entities, for the By the clear terms of the law, the power of the
purpose of preventing the destruction, PCGG to sequester property claimed to be "ill-
concealment or dissipation of, and otherwise gotten" means to place or cause to be placed
conserving and preserving the same until it under its possession or control said property,
can be determined through appropriate or any building or office wherein any such
judicial proceedings, whether the property was property and any records pertaining thereto
in truth "ill-gotten. "28 may be found, including "business enterprises
and entities," - for the purpose of preventing
However, the power of the PCGG to the destruction, concealment or dissipation of,
sequester is merely provisional.29 None other and otherwise conserving and preserving, the
than Executive Order No. 1, Section 3(c) same - until it can be determined, through
expressly provides for the provisional nature appropriate judicial proceedings, whether
of sequestration, to wit: the property was in truth "ill-
gotten," i.e., acquired through or as a result
c) To provisionally take over in the public of improper or illegal use of or the conversion
interest or to prevent its disposal or of funds belonging to the Government or any
dissipation, business enterprises and of its branches, instrumentalities, enterprises,
properties taken over by the government of banks or financial institutions, or by taking
the Marcos Administration or by entities or undue advantage of official position, authority
persons close to former President Marcos, relationship, connection or influence, resulting
until the transactions leading to such in unjust enrichment of the ostensible owner
acquisition by the latter can be disposed of by and grave damage and prejudice to the State.
the appropriate authorities.30 (Emphasis xxx.36 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
supplied).
Sequestration is. a conservatory writ,37 which
In the notable case of Bataan Shipyard & purpose is to preserve properties in custodia
Engineering Co., Inc. (BASECO) legis, lest the dissipation and concealment of
v. PCGG,31 the Court clearly pronounced that the "ill-gotten" wealth the former President
sequestration is provisional, that such Marcos and his allies may resort to, pending
sequestration shall last "until the transactions the final disposition of the properties.38 It is to
leading to such acquisition xxx can be prevent the disappearance or dissipation
disposed of by the appropriate authorities."32 pending adjudgment of whether the
acquisition thereof by the apparent owner was
attended by some vitiating anomaly or
Sequestration is akin to the provisional
attended by some illegal means.39 Thus by no
remedy of preliminary attachment, or
means is it permanent in character. Upon the
receivership.33 Similarly, in attachment, the
final disposition of the sequestered properties,
property of the defendant is seized as a
the sequestration is renderedfunctus officio.
security for the satisfaction of any judgment
that may be obtained, and not disposed of, or
dissipated, or lost intentionally or otherwise, b. Ownership of the sequestered properties
pending litigation.34 In a receivership, the have already been finally adjudged
property is placed in the possession and
control of a receiver appointed by the court, As sequestration is a provisional remedy, a
who shall conserve the property pending final transitional state of affairs, in order to prevent
determination of ownership or right of the disappearance or dissipation of the
possession of the parties.35 In sequestration, property pending the final disposition of the
the same principle holds true. The property, the ultimate purpose of
sequestered properties are placed under the sequestration is to bring an intended
control of the PCGG, subject to the final permanent effect while the PCGG investigates
determination of whether the property was in in pursuit of a judicial proceeding - to dispose
truth ill-gotten. We reiterate the disquisition of of the sequestered properties. Tersely put, the
this Court in BASECO: ultimate purpose of sequestration is to recover
the sequestered properties in favor of the
government in case they tum out to be ill- LML-M-4K10-368.40 The pertinent portion of
gotten. This function to dispose of the property the DOJ Memorandum reads:
is reserved to the Sandiganbayan. Until the
Sandiganbayan determines whether the It bears stressing that the PCGG, which is
property was in truth and in fact "ill- gotten", now under the administrative supervision of
the sequestration shall subsist. In case of a this Department pursuant to Executive Order
finding that the sequestered properties are ill- No. 643 s. 2007, has lost "authority" over the
gotten, the property shall be returned to the shares of the Republic in POTC. This is due to
lawful owner, to the people, through the the fact that in PCGG Resolution No. 2007-
government; otherwise, the sequestered 024 dated 4 September 2007, it was resolved
property shall be returned to the previous that the 4,727 shares of stock of POTC, which
owner. is under the name of the Republic of the
Philippines, be now transferred to the
Clearly, the purpose of sequestration is to Department of Finance (DOF) for disposition.
take control until the property is finally xxx. (Boldface omitted)
disposed of by the proper
authorities. However, when such property
1âwphi1
xxxx
has already been disposed of, such that the
owner has already been adjudged by the In view of the foregoing, you are hereby
Court, must the sequestration still subsist? directed to immediately implement PCGG
Resolution No. 2007-024 by immediately
In the case at bar, the 34.9% ownership of the transferring to the DOF, for its proper
sequestered property has been finally disposition, POTC Stock Certificate No.
adjudged; the ultimate purpose of 131. Corollary to this is the lifting of the
sequestration was already accomplished sequestration orders, if any, that covers
when the ownership thereof was adjudged to the 4,727 shares of stock of the Republic in
the government by this Court in Republic of POTC. xxx.41 (Emphasis supplied)
the Phils. v. Sandiganbayan. Moreover, the
said shares in the ownership of the Quite telling is this Court's unequivocal
sequestered properties have reverted to the pronouncement in a rather recent case
Government. The government now owns of Palm Avenue Holding Co., Inc. v.
4,727 shares or 34.9% of the sequestered Sandiganbayan,42which involved very similar
corporations. factual antecedents to those pertaining to
petitioners POTC and PHILCOMSAT.
As the sequestered property has already been
disposed, the ultimate purpose of "Section 26, Article XVIII of the 1987
sequestration has already been attained; the Constitution provides:
evil sought to be prevented is no longer
present. Evidently, the sequestered property
xxxx
which was already returned to the government
cannot anymore be dissipated or concealed.
Otherwise stated, the sequestered properties A sequestration or freeze order shall be
need no longer be subject of reversion issued only upon showing of a prima
proceedings because they have already facie case. The order and the list of the
reverted back to the government. Thus, as the sequestered of frozen properties shall
sequestration is rendered functus officio, it is forthwith be registered with the proper court.
merely ministerial upon the Sandiganbayan to For orders issued before the ratification of this
lift the same. Constitution, the corresponding judicial action
or proceeding shall be filed within six months
from its ratification. For those issued after
In fact, on 4 November 2010, the Department
such ratification, the judicial action or
of Justice (DOJ), which has supervision over
proceeding shall be commenced within six
the PCGG, acknowledged the need to lift the
months from the issuance thereof.
writ of sequestration in the DOJ Memorandum
The sequestration or freeze order is deemed defendant in Civil Case No. 0035 is indeed the
automatically lifted if no judicial action or beneficial owner of the Palm Companies is a
proceeding is commenced as herein matter which the PCGG merely assumes and
provided.1âwphi1 still has to prove in said case.
The aforesaid provision mandates the The sequestration order issued against the
Republic to file the corresponding judicial Palm Companies is therefore deemed
action or proceedings within a six-month automatically lifted due to the failure of the
period (from its ratification on February 2, Republic to commence the proper judicial
1987) in order to maintain sequestration, non- action or to implead them therein within
compliance with which would result in the the period under the
automatic lifting of the sequestration order. Constitution. However, the lifting of the writ
The Court's ruling in Presidential Commission of sequestration will not necessarily be fatal to
on Good Government v. the main case since the same does not ipso
Sandiganbayan, which remains good law, facto mean that the sequestered properties
reiterates the necessity of the Republic to are, in fact, not illgotten. The effect of the
actually implead corporations as defendants in lifting of the sequestration will merely be the
the complaint, out of recognition for their termination of the government's role as
distinct and separate personalities, failure to conservator. In other words, the PCGG may
do so would necessarily be denying such no longer exercise administrative or
entities their right to due process. Here, the housekeeping powers, and its nominees may
writ of sequestration issued against the assets no longer vote the sequestered shares to
of the Palm Companies is not valid because enable them to sit in the corporate board of
the suit in Civil Case No. 0035 against the subject company.43 (Emphasis supplied,
Benjamin Romualdez as shareholder in the citations omitted)
Palm Companies is not a suit against the
latter. The Court has held, contrary to the The glaring similarity in the circumstances
assailed Sandiganbayan Resolution in G .R. attendant in the case involving Palm
No. 173082, that failure to implead these Companies with the situation of petitioners
corporations as defendants and merely POTC and PHILCOMSAT compels us to rule
annexing a list of such corporations to the in this case as we did in Palm case.
complaints is a violation of their right to due
process for it would be, in effect, disregarding On a final note, while sequestration is the
their distinct and separate personality without means to revert the amassed ill-gotten wealth
a hearing. Here, the Palm Companies were back to the coffers of our government, we
merely mentioned as Item Nos. 47 and 48, must still safeguard the protection of property
Annex A of the Complaint, as among the rights from overzealousness. Sequestration as
corporations where defendant Romualdez statutorily and constitutionally recognized is
owns shares of stocks. Furthermore, while the not permanent. It must be lifted when the law
writ of sequestration was issued on October and proven facts warrant, or when the
27, 1986, the Palm Companies were purpose has been accomplished.
impleaded in the case only in 1997, or already
a decade from the ratification of the
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The
Constitution in 1987, way beyond the
assailed Resolution issued by the
prescribed period.
Sandiganbayan dated 20 October 2005 and 2
August 2006 are REVERSED. The writ of
The argument that the beneficial owner of sequestration issued against petitioner POTC
these corporations was, anyway, impleaded and PHILCOMSA T is hereby
as party-defendant can only be interpreted as declared LIFTED six (6) months after the
a tacit admission of the failure to file the ratification of the 1987 Constitution on 2
corresponding judicial action against said February 1987.
corporations pursuant to the constitutional
mandate. Whether or not the impleaded
August 16, 1977, and on the 16th day of the
next 35 months from September 16, 1977 until
Rule 60- Replevin full payment thereof. There was also
stipulated a penalty of P10.00 for every month
of late installment payment. To secure the
faithful and prompt compliance of the
SECOND DIVISION obligation under the said promissory note, the
Cuady spouses constituted a chattel mortage
G.R. No. 82040 August 27, 1991 on the aforementioned motor vehicle. On July
25, 1977, Supercars, Inc. assigned the
BA FINANCE CORPORATION, petitioner, promissory note, together with the chattel
vs. mortgage, to B.A. Finance Corporation. The
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Hon. Cuadys paid a total of P36,730.15 to the B.A.
Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court of Finance Corporation, thus leaving an unpaid
Manila, Branch 43, MANUEL CUADY and balance of P2,344.65 as of July 18, 1980. In
LILIA CUADY, respondents. addition thereto, the Cuadys owe B.A.
Finance Corporation P460.00 representing
penalties or surcharges for tardy monthly
Valera, Urmeneta & Associates for petitioner.
installments (Rollo, pp. 27-29).
Pompeyo L. Bautista for private respondents.
Parenthetically, the B.A. Finance Corporation,
as the assignee of the mortgage lien obtained
the renewal of the insurance coverage over
the aforementioned motor vehicle for the year
PARAS, J.: 1980 with Zenith Insurance Corporation, when
the Cuadys failed to renew said insurance
This is a petition for review on certiorari which coverage themselves. Under the terms and
seeks to reverse and set aside (1) the conditions of the said insurance coverage, any
decision of the Court of Appeals dated July loss under the policy shall be payable to the
21, 1987 in CA-G.R. No. CV-06522 entitled B.A. Finance Corporation (Memorandum for
"B.A. Finance Corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant, Private Respondents, pp. 3-4).
vs. Manuel Cuady and Lilia Cuady,
Defendants-Appellees," affirming the decision On April 18, 1980, the aforementioned motor
of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch vehicle figured in an accident and was badly
43, which dismissed the complaint in Civil damaged. The unfortunate happening was
Case No. 82-10478, and (2) the resolution reported to the B.A. Finance Corporation and
dated February 9, 1988 denying petitioner's to the insurer, Zenith Insurance Corporation.
motion for reconsideration. The Cuadys asked the B.A. Finance
Corporation to consider the same as a total
As gathered from the records, the facts are as loss, and to claim from the insurer the face
follows: value of the car insurance policy and apply the
same to the payment of their remaining
On July 15, 1977, private respondents Manuel account and give them the surplus thereof, if
Cuady and Lilia Cuady obtained from any. But instead of heeding the request of the
Supercars, Inc. a credit of P39,574.80, which Cuadys, B.A. Finance Corporation prevailed
amount covered the cost of one unit of Ford upon the former to just have the car repaired.
Escort 1300, four-door sedan. Said obligation Not long thereafter, however, the car bogged
was evidenced by a promissory note executed down. The Cuadys wrote B.A. Finance
by private respondents in favor of Supercars, Corporation requesting the latter to pursue
Inc., obligating themselves to pay the latter or their prior instruction of enforcing the total loss
order the sum of P39,574.80, inclusive of provision in the insurance coverage. When
interest at 14% per annum, payable on B.A. Finance Corporation did not respond
monthly installments of P1,098.00 starting favorably to their request, the Cuadys stopped
paying their monthly installments on the IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court
promissory note (Ibid., pp. 45). DISMISSES the complaint without
costs.
On June 29, 1982, in view of the failure of the
Cuadys to pay the remaining installments on SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 143)
the note, B.A. Finance Corporation sued them
in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch On appeal, the respondent appellate court *
43, for the recovery of the said remaining affirmed the decision of the trial court. The
installments (Memorandum for the Petitioner, decretal portion of the said decision reads as
p. 1). follows:
B.A. Finance Corporation was deemed ... Under the established facts and
subrogated to the rights and obligations of circumstances, it is unjust, unfair and
Supercars, Inc. when the latter assigned the inequitable to require the chattel
promissory note, together with the chattel mortgagors, appellees herein, to still
mortgage constituted on the motor vehicle in pay the unpaid balance of their
question in favor of the former. Consequently, mortgage debt on the said car, the
B.A. Finance Corporation is bound by the non-payment of which account was
terms and conditions of the chattel mortgage due to the stubborn refusal and failure
executed between the Cuadys and Supercars, of appellant mortgagee to avail of the
Inc. Under the deed of chattel mortgage, B.A. insurance money which became due
Finance Corporation was constituted attorney- and demandable after the insured
in-fact with full power and authority to file, motor vehicle was badly damaged in a
follow-up, prosecute, compromise or settle vehicular accident covered by the
insurance claims; to sign execute and deliver insurance risk. ... (Ibid.)
the corresponding papers, receipts and
documents to the Insurance Company as may On the allegation that the respondent court's
be necessary to prove the claim, and to collect findings that B.A. Finance Corporation failed
from the latter the proceeds of insurance to to claim for the damage to the car was not
the extent of its interests, in the event that the supported by evidence, the records show that
mortgaged car suffers any loss or damage instead of acting on the instruction of the
(Rollo, p. 89). In granting B.A. Finance Cuadys to enforce the total loss provision in
Corporation the aforementioned powers and the insurance policy, the petitioner insisted on
prerogatives, the Cuady spouses created in just having the motor vehicle repaired, to
the former's favor an agency. Thus, under which private respondents reluctantly
Article 1884 of the Civil Code of the acceded. As heretofore mentioned, the repair
Philippines, B.A. Finance Corporation is shop chosen was not able to restore the
bound by its acceptance to carry out the aforementioned motor vehicle to its condition
agency, and is liable for damages which, prior to the accident. Thus, the said vehicle
bogged down shortly thereafter. The Appeals, 157 SCRA 425 [1988]; Dihiansan, et
subsequent request of the Cuadys for the B.A. al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., 153 SCRA 712
Finance Corporation to file a claim for total [1987]; De la Santa v. Court of Appeals, et al.,
loss with the insurer fell on deaf ears, 140 SCRA 44 [1985]).
prompting the Cuadys to stop paying the
remaining balance on the promissory note PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant
(Memorandum for the Respondents, pp. 4-5). petition is DENIED, and the decision appealed
from is AFFIRMED.
Moreover, B.A. Finance Corporation would
have this Court review and reverse the factual SO ORDERED.
findings of the respondent appellate court.
This, of course, the Court cannot and will not THIRD DIVISION
generally do. It is axiomatic that the judgment
of the Court of Appeals is conclusive as to the
facts and may not ordinarily be reviewed by
the Supreme Court. The doctrine is, to be
sure, subject to certain specific exceptions G.R. No. 79021 May 17, 1993
none of which, however, obtains in the instant
case (Luzon Brokerage Corporation v. Court ROMEO S. CHUA, petitioner,
of Appeals, 176 SCRA 483 [1989]). vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, DENNIS
Finally, B.A. Finance Corporation contends CANOY AND ALEX DE LEON, respondents.
that respondent trial court committed grave
abuses of discretion in two instances: First, Roberto R. Palmares for petitioner.
when it denied the petitioner's motion for
reconsideration praying that the counsel be Josefino B. Remotigue for private
allowed to cross-examine the affiant, and; respondents.
second, when it seriously considered the
evidence adduced ex-parte by the Cuadys,
and heavily relied thereon, when in truth and
in fact, the same was not formally admitted as BIDIN, J.:
part of the evidence for the private
respondents (Memorandum for the Petitioner, This is a petition for review on certiorari under
p. 10). This Court does not have to unduly Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court
dwell on this issue which was only raised by assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals
B.A. Finance Corporation for the first time on dated May 7, 1987 which nullified the orders
appeal. A review of the records of the case dated April 18, 1986 and May 19, 1986 of the
shows that B.A. Finance Corporation failed to Regional Trial Court of Cebu City Branch VIII.
directly raise or ventilate in the trial court nor
in the respondent appellate court the validity The facts of the case are not disputed. On
of the evidence adduced ex-parte by private April 12, 1986, Judge Lauro V. Francisco of
respondents. It was only when the petitioner the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City Branch
filed the instant petition with this Court that it XIII, after examining 2Lt. Dennis P. Canoy and
later raised the aforementioned issue. As two (2) other witnesses, issued a search
ruled by this Court in a long line of cases, warrant directing the immediate search of the
issues not raised and/or ventilated in the trial premises of R.R. Construction located at M.J.
court, let alone in the Court of Appeals, cannot Cuenco Avenue, Cebu City, and the seizure of
be raised for the first time on appeal as it an Isuzu dump truck with plate number GAP-
would be offensive to the basic rules of fair 175. At twelve noon of the same date,
play, justice and due process (Galicia v. Polo, respondent Canoy seized the aforesaid
179 SCRA 375 [1989]; Ramos v. Intermediate vehicle and took custody thereof.
Appellate Court, 175 SCRA 70 [1989]; Dulos
Realty & Development Corporation v. Court of
On April 14, 1986, a civil action for Office of the City Fiscal of Cebu City was
Replevin/Sum of Money for the recovery of provisionally dismissed upon motion of
possession of the same Isuzu dump truck was Romeo Chua with the following reservation:
filed by petitioner against respondent Canoy "without prejudice to its reopening once the
and one "John Doe" in the Regional Trial issue of ownership is resolved", (Rollo, p. 62).
Court of Cebu City Branch VIII, presided by
Judge Leonardo B. Cañares and docketed In a decision dated May 17, 1987, the Court of
thereat as Civil Case No. CEB 4384 alleging Appeals reversed the Regional Trial Court of
among other things, petitioner's lawful Cebu City Branch VIII, and nullified the
ownership and possession of the subject questioned orders. The appellate court
vehicle; that he has not sold the subject ordered the dismissal of the Replevin action,
vehicle to anyone; that he has not stolen nor and directed that possession of the subject
carnapped it, and that he has never been vehicle be restored to Canoy. It applied the
charged of the crime of carnapping or any ruling in the case of Pagkalinawan vs.
other crime for that matter. Further, petitioner Gomez (21 SCRA 1275 [1967]) which held:
questioned the validity of the search warrant
and the subsequent seizure of the subject Once a Court of First Instance
vehicle on the strength of the aforesaid search has been informed that a
warrant. search warrant has been
issued by another court of first
On the same date, April 14, 1986, Judge instance, it cannot require a
Cañares of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu sheriff or any proper officer of
City Branch VIII directed the issuance of a writ the court to take the property
of replevin upon the posting of a bond in the subject of the replevin action,
amount of one hundred thousand pesos if theretofore it came into
(P100,000.00). The writ of replevin was also custody of another public
issued on the same date, and the subject officer by virtue of a search
vehicle was seized on 15 April 1986 by warrant. Only the court of first
Deputy Sheriff Galicano V. Fuentes. instance that issued such a
search warrant may order its
On April 16, 1986, respondent Canoy filed a release.
motion for the dismissal of the complaint and
for the quashal of the writ of replevin. The Furthermore, it was also pointed out in the
motion was opposed by petitioner. The motion same case that the validity of a search
to dismiss and to quash the writ of replevin warrant may only be questioned in the same
was denied in an Order dated April 18, 1986. court that issued it.
A motion for reconsideration of the
aforementioned Order was filed and was Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the
opposed by petitioner. In an order dated May decision, but the respondent court denied the
19, 1986, the Regional Trial Court of Cebu same. Thus, petitioner filed this appeal
Branch VIII denied the motion for by certiorari. The parties submitted their
reconsideration and directed the delivery of respective memoranda, and thereafter the
the subject vehicle to petitioner. Not satisfied, case was deemed submitted for decision.
herein private respondents filed with the Court
of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari and
The issue presented before the Court is
Prohibition praying for the nullification of the
whether or not the validity of a seizure made
orders dated April 18, 1986 and May 19,
pursuant to a search warrant issued by a court
1986.
can be questioned in another branch of the
same court, where the criminal action filed in
Meanwhile, a case for Carnapping docketed connection with which the search warrant was
as I.S. No. 86-185, entitled "Alex De Leon, issued, had been dismissed provisionally.
Complainant, vs. Romeo Chua, Respondent"
pending preliminary investigation before the
At the outset, it must be pointed out that the official custody of a judicial executive officer in
ruling made by the Office of the City Fiscal in pursuance of his execution of a legal writ
the complaint for carnapping was erroneous. It (Bagalihog vs. Fernandez, 198 SCRA 614
held: ". . . the preliminary investigation of that [1991]). The reason posited for this principle is
case is premature until such time that the that if it was otherwise, there would be
issue of ownership will be resolved by the interference with the possession before the
Court of Appeals, so that the instant case is function of the law had been performed as to
hereby dismissed provisionally without the process under which the property was
prejudice to its reopening once the issue of taken. Thus, a defendant in an execution or
ownership is resolved in favor of attachment cannot replevy goods in the
complainant." (emphasis supplied). possession of an officer under a valid process,
although after the levy is discharged, an
A criminal prosecution for carnapping need action to recover possession will lie
not establish the fact that complainant therein (Francisco, Revised Rules of Court in the
is the absolute owner of the motor vehicle. Philippines: Provisional Remedies, p. 402
What is material is the existence of evidence [1985]).
which would show that respondent took the
motor vehicle belonging to another. The Anti- The Court had occasion to rule on this issue in
Carnapping Law or Republic Act No. 6539 the case of Vlasons Enterprises Corporation
punishes as carnapping the taking with intent vs. Court of Appeals (155 SCRA 186 [1987]).
to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to In the aforementioned case, two (2) propeller
another person, without the latter's consent or pieces were seized on the strength of a
by means of violence or intimidation of person search warrant issued by the Court of First
or by using force upon things. Instance of Manila Branch XVIII. After the
seizure, criminal complaints were filed against
Another aspect which needs to be stressed is the alleged thieves. However, the complaints
the fact that since a preliminary investigation were later on dismissed. Five (5) months later,
is not part of the trial, the dismissal of a case a civil action for the recovery of the
by the fiscal will not constitute double jeopardy possession of the propellers were filed in the
and hence there is no bar to the filing of Court of First Instance of Manila Branch XXIX.
another complaint for the same offense The latter court granted the motion for
(People vs. Medted, 68 Phil. 435). repossession of the propellers. On appeal this
Court held:
We find no merit in the main issue presented
before Us. Petitioner seeks a reversal of a The proceeding for the seizure
decision of the Court of Appeals which relied of the property in virtue of a
on the decision in Pagkalinawan vs. Gomez search warrant does not end
(supra). with the actual taking of the
property . . . and its delivery . .
The principle followed among courts in the ., to the court . . . . It is merely
dispensation of justice is that a judge who the first step in the process to
presides in a branch of a court cannot modify determine the character of the
or annul the orders issued by another branch seized property. That
of the same court, since the two (2) courts are determination is done in the
of the same rank, and act independently but criminal action involving the
coordinately (Montesa vs. Manila Cordage crime or crimes in connection
Co., 92 Phil. 25 [1952]). with which the search warrant
was issued. Hence, such a
criminal action should be
It is a basic tenet of civil procedure that
prosecuted, or commenced if
replevin will not lie for property in custodia
not yet instituted, and
legis. A thing is in custodia legis when it is
prosecuted. The outcome of
shown that it has been and is subjected to the
the criminal action will dictate
the disposition of the seized remedy is to question the validity of the search
property. (Vlasons Enterprises warrant in the same court which issued it and
Corp. vs. Court of not in any other branch of the said court.
Appeals, supra.)
Thus, the Regional Trial Court of Cebu Branch
In the Vlasons case, the Court differentiated VIII erred when it ordered the transfer of
the case brought before it therein, from possession of the property seized to petitioner
the Pagkalinawan case. It stated that in when the latter filed the action for replevin. It
the Pagkalinawan case, there was a conflict in should have dismissed the case since by
jurisdiction. On the other hand, in the Vlasons virtue of the "provisional dismissal", of the
case, it was certain that no criminal case carnapping case there is still a probability that
would ensue subsequent to or in connection a criminal case would be filed, hence a conflict
with the search warrant, hence no conflict in in jurisdiction could still arise. The basic
jurisdiction or in the ultimate disposition of the principle that a judge who presides in one
property could arise. Thus, where personal court cannot annul or modify the orders issued
property is seized under a search warrant and by another branch of the same court because
it appears that the seizure will not be followed they are co-equal and independent bodies
by the filing of any criminal action, but there acting coordinately, must always be
are conflicting claims asserted over the seized adhered to.
property, the appropriate remedy is the
institution of an ordinary civil action by any WHEREFORE, the petition is denied. The
interested party, or of an interpleader action decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 7,
by the Government itself, in the proper 1987 is AFFIRMED.
competent court to which the seizing court
shall transfer custody of the articles. Another SO ORDERED.
branch of the same court, in an action to
recover said property and during the
Feliciano, Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.
pendency thereof, cannot order the delivery of
said personal property to therein
plaintiff pendente lite.
We, therefore, find and so hold that private On October 17, 2005, Judge Renato A.
respondent Ricardo P. Cardenas should be Fuentes3 issued an Order of Seizure4 against
held jointly and severally liable with his co- 22 motor vehicles allegedly owned by the
respondent Mobil Philippines, Inc. for having complainant. On the strength of the said
acted in bad faith by impeding and preventing order, Andres was able to seize two of the
the award of the dealership to petitioners subject motor vehicles on October 17, 2005;
through fraudulent means. four on October 18, 2005, and another three
on October 19, 2005, or a total of nine motor
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment appealed from vehicles.5
is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification
that respondents Mobil Philipines, Inc. and In his Affidavit-Complaint6 against Andres
Ricardo P. Cardenas are held jointly and before the Office of the Court Administrator
severally liable to herein petitioners Marino (OCA), Hao alleged that Andres gave undue
and Lina Joel Sapugay. advantage to Zenaida Silver in the
implementation of the order and that Andres
SO ORDERED. seized the nine motor vehicles in an
oppressive manner. Hao also averred that
Andres was accompanied by unidentified
armed personnel on board a military vehicle
which was excessive since there were no
SECOND DIVISION
resistance from them. Hao also discovered
that the compound where the seized motor
A.M. No. P-07-2384 June 18, 2008 vehicles were placed is actually owned by
Silver.7
KENNETH HAO, complainant,
vs. On October 21, 2005, in view of the approval
ABE C. ANDRES, Sheriff IV, Regional Trial of the complainant’s counter-replevin bond,
Court, Branch 16, Davao City, respondent. Judge Emmanuel C. Carpio8 ordered Andres
to immediately cease and desist from further
RESOLUTION implementing the order of seizure, and to
return the seized motor vehicles including its
QUISUMBING, J.: accessories to their lawful owners.9
Before us is an administrative complaint for However, on October 24, 2005, eight of the
gross neglect of duty, grave abuse of authority nine seized motor vehicles were reported
(oppression) and violation of Republic Act No. missing. In his report,10 Andres stated that he
30191 filed by complainant Kenneth Hao was shocked to find that the motor vehicles
were already missing when he inspected it on Andres disputed the allegation that he
October 22, 2005. He narrated that on neglected his duty to safeguard the seized
October 21, 2005, PO3 Rodrigo Despe, one of vehicles by pointing out that he placed all the
the policemen guarding the subject motor motor vehicles under police watch. He added
vehicles, reported to him that a certain that the policemen had control of the
"Nonoy" entered the compound and caused compound where the seized motor vehicles
the duplication of the vehicles’ keys.11 But were kept.
Andres claimed the motor vehicles were still
intact when he inspected it on October 21, Andres likewise contended that after the
2005. unauthorized duplication of the vehicles’ keys
was reported to him, he immediately advised
Subsequently, Hao reported that three of the the policemen on duty to watch the motor
carnapped vehicles were recovered by the vehicles closely.14 He negated the
police.12 He then accused Andres of speculations that he was involved in the
conspiring and conniving with Atty. Oswaldo disappearance of the seized motor vehicles as
Macadangdang (Silver’s counsel) and the he claims to be the one who reported the
policemen in the carnapping of the motor incident to the court and the police.
vehicles. Hao also accused Andres of
concealing the depository receipts from them As to the allegation of undisclosed depository
and pointed out that the depository receipts receipts, Andres maintained that he never
show that Silver and Atty. Macadangdang denied the existence of the depository
were the ones who chose the policemen who receipts. He said the existence of the
will guard the motor vehicles. depository receipts was immediately made
known on the same day that the subject motor
In his Comment13 dated March 3, 2006, vehicles were discovered missing. He even
Andres vehemently denied violating Rep. Act used the same in the filing of the carnapping
No. 3019 and committing gross neglect of case against Silver and her co-conspirators.
duty.
Finally, Andres insisted that the guarding of
Andres denied implementing the Order of properties under custodia legis by policemen
Seizure in an oppressive manner. He said he is not prohibited, but is even adopted by the
took the vehicles because they were the court. Hence, he prays that he be held not
specific vehicles ordered to be seized after liable for the loss of the vehicles and that he
checking their engine and chassis numbers. be relieved of his duty to return the vehicles.15
Andres likewise denied that he was
accompanied by military personnel in the After the OCA recommended that the matter
implementation of the order. He claimed that be investigated, we referred the case to
he was merely escorted by policemen Executive Judge Renato A. Fuentes for
pursuant to the directive of Police Senior Supt. investigation, report and recommendation.16
Catalino S. Cuy, Chief of the Davao City
Police Office. Andres also maintained that no In his Investigation Report17 dated September
form of harassment or oppression was 21, 2006, Judge Fuentes found Andres guilty
committed during the implementation of the of serious negligence in the custody of the
order, claiming that the presence of the nine motor vehicles. He recommended that
policemen was only for the purpose of Andres be suspended from office.
preserving peace and order, considering there
were 22 motor vehicles specified in the Order
Judge Fuentes found numerous irregularities
of Seizure. Andres added that he exercised no
in the implementation of the writ of
discretion in the selection of the policemen
replevin/order of seizure, to wit: (1) at the time
who assisted in the implementation of the
of the implementation of the writ, Andres knew
order, much less of those who will guard the
that the vehicles to be seized were not in the
seized motor vehicles.
names of any of the parties to the case; (2)
one vehicle was taken without the knowledge The OCA disagreed with the observations of
of its owner, a certain Junard Escudero; (3) Judge Fuentes. It recommended that Andres
Andres allowed Atty. Macadangdang to get a be held liable only for simple neglect of duty
keymaster to duplicate the vehicles’ keys in and be suspended for one (1) month and one
order to take one motor vehicle; and (4) (1) day.21
Andres admitted that prior to the
implementation of the writ of seizure, he We adopt the recommendation of the
consulted Silver and Atty. Macadangdang investigating judge.
regarding the implementation of the writ and
was accompanied by the latter in the course Being an officer of the court, Andres must be
of the implementation. Judge Fuentes aware that there are well-defined steps
observed that the motor vehicles were provided in the Rules of Court regarding the
speedily seized without strictly observing proper implementation of a writ of replevin
fairness and regularity in its implementation.18 and/or an order of seizure. The Rules,
likewise, is explicit on the duty of the sheriff in
Anent the safekeeping of the seized motor its implementation. To recapitulate what
vehicles, Judge Fuentes pointed out several should be common knowledge to sheriffs, the
instances where Andres lacked due diligence pertinent provisions of Rule 60, of the Rules of
to wit: (1) the seized motor vehicles were Court are quoted hereunder:
placed in a compound surrounded by an
insufficiently locked see-through fence; (2) SEC. 4. Duty of the sheriff.–Upon
three motor vehicles were left outside the receiving such order, the sheriff must
compound; (3) Andres turned over the key of serve a copy thereof on the adverse
the gate to the policemen guarding the motor party, together with a copy of the
vehicles; (4) Andres does not even know the application, affidavit and bond,
full name of the owner of the compound, who and must forthwith take the
was merely known to him as "Gloria"; (5) property, if it be in the possession
except for PO3 Despe and SPO4 Nelson of the adverse party, or his agent,
Salcedo, the identities of the other policemen and retain it in his custody. If the
tapped to guard the compound were unknown property or any part thereof be
to Andres; (6) Andres also admitted that he concealed in a building or enclosure,
only stayed at least one hour each day from the sheriff must demand its delivery,
October 19-21, 2005 during his visits to the and if it be not delivered, he must
compound; and (7) even after it was reported cause the building or enclosure to be
to him that a certain "Nonoy" entered the broken open and take the property
compound and duplicated the keys of the into his possession. After the sheriff
motor vehicles, he did not exert his best effort has taken possession of the
to look for that "Nonoy" and to confiscate the property as herein provided, he
duplicated keys.19 must keep it in a secure place and
shall be responsible for its delivery
Judge Fuentes also observed that Andres to the party entitled thereto upon
appeared to be more or less accommodating receiving his fees and necessary
to Silver and her counsel but hostile and expenses for taking and keeping
uncooperative to the complainant. He pointed the same. (Emphasis supplied.)
out that Andres depended solely on Silver in
the selection of the policemen who would SEC. 6. Disposition of property by
guard the seized motor vehicles. He added sheriff.–If within five (5) days after
that even the depository receipts were not the taking of the property by the
turned over to the defendants/third-party sheriff, the adverse party does not
claimants in the replevin case but were in fact object to the sufficiency of the bond, or
concealed from them. Andres also gave of the surety or sureties thereon; or if
inconsistent testimonies as to whether he has the adverse party so objects and the
in his possession the depository receipts.20 court affirms its approval of the
applicant’s bond or approves a new …Respondent as an officer of the
bond, or if the adverse party requires Court is charged with certain
the return of the property but his bond ministerial duties which must be
is objected to and found insufficient performed faithfully to the letter. Every
and he does not forthwith file an provision in the Revised Rules of
approved bond, the property shall be Court has a specific reason or
delivered to the applicant. If for any objective. In this case, the purpose
reason the property is not delivered to of the five (5) days is to give a
the applicant, the sheriff must return it chance to the defendant to object
to the adverse party. (Emphasis to the sufficiency of the bond or the
supplied.) surety or sureties thereon or
require the return of the property by
First, the rules provide that property seized filing a counterbond.…25 (Emphasis
under a writ of replevin is not to be delivered supplied.)
immediately to the plaintiff.22 In accordance
with the said rules, Andres should have waited In Sebastian v. Valino,26 this Court reiterated
no less than five days in order to give the that
complainant an opportunity to object to the
sufficiency of the bond or of the surety or Under the Revised Rules of Court, the
sureties thereon, or require the return of the property seized under a writ of
seized motor vehicles by filing a counter-bond. replevin is not to be delivered
This, he failed to do. immediately to the plaintiff. The
sheriff must retain it in his custody
Records show that Andres took possession of for five days and he shall return it to
two of the subject motor vehicles on October the defendant, if the latter, as in the
17, 2005, four on October 18, 2005, and instant case, requires its return and
another three on October 19, 2005. files a counterbond.…27 (Emphasis
Simultaneously, as evidenced by the supplied.)
depository receipts, on October 18, 2005,
Silver received from Andres six of the seized Likewise, Andres’ claim that he had no
motor vehicles, and three more motor vehicles knowledge that the compound is owned by
on October 19, 2005. Consequently, there is Silver fails to convince us. Regardless of who
no question that Silver was already in actually owns the compound, the fact remains
possession of the nine seized vehicles that Andres delivered the vehicles to Silver
immediately after seizure, or no more than prematurely. It violates the rule requiring him
three days after the taking of the vehicles. to safekeep the vehicles in his custody.28 The
Thus, Andres committed a clear violation of alleged lack of facility to store the seized
Section 6, Rule 60 of the Rules of Court with vehicles is unacceptable considering that he
regard to the proper disposal of the property. should have deposited the same in a bonded
warehouse. If this was not feasible, he should
It matters not that Silver was in possession of have sought prior authorization from the court
the seized vehicles merely for safekeeping as issuing the writ before delivering the vehicles
stated in the depository receipts. The rule is to Silver.
clear that the property seized should not be
immediately delivered to the plaintiff, and the Second, it must be stressed that from the
sheriff must retain custody of the seized moment an order of delivery in replevin is
property for at least five days.23 Hence, the act executed by taking possession of the property
of Andres in delivering the seized vehicles specified therein, such property is in custodia
immediately after seizure to Silver for legis. As legal custodian, it is Andres’ duty to
whatever purpose, without observing the five- safekeep the seized motor vehicles. Hence,
day requirement finds no legal justification. when he passed his duty to safeguard the
motor vehicles to Silver, he committed a clear
In Pardo v. Velasco,24 this Court held that neglect of duty.
Third, we are appalled that even after PO3 expected of them.29 Hence, his failure to
Despe reported the unauthorized duplication return the motor vehicles at the time when its
of the vehicles’ keys, Andres failed to take return was still feasible constitutes another
extra precautionary measures to ensure the instance of neglect of duty.
safety of the vehicles. It is obvious that the
vehicles were put at risk by the unauthorized Fifth, as found by the OCA, we agree that
duplication of the keys of the vehicles. Neither Andres also disregarded the provisions of
did he immediately report the incident to the Rule 14130 of the Rules of Court with regard to
police or to the court. The loss of the motor payment of expenses.
vehicles could have been prevented if Andres
immediately asked the court for an order to Under Section 9,31 Rule 141 of the Rules of
transfer the vehicles to another secured place Court, the procedure for the execution of writs
as soon as he discovered the unauthorized and other processes are: First, the sheriff
duplication. Under these circumstances, even must make an estimate of the expenses to be
an ordinary prudent man would have incurred by him; Second, he must obtain court
exercised extra diligence. His warning to the approval for such estimated expenses; Third,
policemen to closely watch the vehicles was the approved estimated expenses shall be
insufficient. Andres cannot toss back to Silver deposited by the interested party with the
or to the policemen the responsibility for the Clerk of Court and ex officio sheriff; Fourth,
loss of the motor vehicles since he remains the Clerk of Court shall disburse the amount
chiefly responsible for their safekeeping as to the executing sheriff; and Fifth, the
legal custodian thereof. Indeed, Andres’ executing sheriff shall liquidate his expenses
failure to take the necessary precaution and within the same period for rendering a return
proper monitoring of the vehicles to ensure its on the writ.
safety constitutes plain negligence.
In this case, no estimate of sheriff’s expenses
Fourth, despite the cease and desist order, was submitted to the court by Andres. Without
Andres failed to return the motor vehicles to approval of the court, he also allowed Silver to
their lawful owners. Instead of returning the pay directly to the policemen the expenses for
motor vehicles immediately as directed, he the safeguarding of the motor vehicles
opted to write Silver and demand that she put including their meals.32 Obviously, this
up an indemnity bond to secure the third-party practice departed from the accepted
claims. Consequently, due to his delay, the procedure provided in the Rules of Court.
eventual loss of the motor vehicles rendered
the order to return the seized vehicles
In view of the foregoing, there is no doubt that
ineffectual to the prejudice of the complaining
Andres failed to live up to the standards
owners.
required of his position. The number of
instances that Andres strayed from the regular
It must be stressed that as court custodian, it course observed in the proper implementation
was Andres’ responsibility to ensure that the of the orders of the court cannot be
motor vehicles were safely kept and that the countenanced. Thus, taking into account the
same were readily available upon order of the numerous times he was found negligent and
court or demand of the parties concerned. careless of his duties coupled with his utter
Specifically, sheriffs, being ranking officers of disregard of legal procedures, he cannot be
the court and agents of the law, must considered guilty merely of simple negligence.
discharge their duties with great care and His acts constitute gross negligence.
diligence. In serving and implementing court
writs, as well as processes and orders of the
As we have previously ruled:
court, they cannot afford to err without
affecting adversely the proper dispensation of
justice. Sheriffs play an important role in the …Gross negligence refers to
administration of justice and as agents of the negligence characterized by the want
law, high standards of performance are of even slight care, acting or
omitting to act in a situation where Andres enforced the order of seizure with
there is a duty to act, not undue haste and without giving the
inadvertently but willfully and complainant prior notice or reasonable time to
intentionally, with a conscious deliver the motor vehicles. Hence, Andres is
indifference to consequences in so guilty of grave abuse of authority (oppression).
far as other persons may be
affected. It is the omission of that When a writ is placed in the hands of a sheriff,
care which even inattentive and it is his duty, in the absence of any
thoughtless men never fail to take instructions to the contrary, to proceed with
on their own reasonable celerity and promptness to
property.…33 (Emphasis supplied.) execute it according to its mandate. However,
the prompt implementation of an order of
…Gross neglect, on the other hand, seizure is called for only in instances where
is such neglect from the gravity of there is no question regarding the right of the
the case, or the frequency of plaintiff to the property.38 Where there is such
instances, becomes so serious in a question, the prudent recourse for Andres is
its character as to endanger or to desist from executing the order and convey
threaten the public welfare. The the information to his judge and to the plaintiff.
term does not necessarily include
willful neglect or intentional official True, sheriffs must comply with their
wrongdoing.34 (Emphasis supplied.) mandated ministerial duty to implement writs
promptly and expeditiously, but equally true is
Good faith on the part of Andres, or lack of it, the principle that sheriffs by the nature of their
in proceeding to properly execute his mandate functions must at all times conduct
would be of no moment, for he is chargeable themselves with propriety and decorum and
with the knowledge that being an officer of the act above suspicion. There must be no room
court tasked therefor, it behooves him to make for anyone to conjecture that sheriffs and
due compliance. He is expected to live up to deputy sheriffs as officers of the court have
the exacting standards of his office and his conspired with any of the parties to a case to
conduct must at all times be characterized by obtain a favorable judgment or immediate
rectitude and forthrightness, and so above execution. The sheriff is at the front line as
suspicion and mistrust as well.35 Thus, an act representative of the judiciary and by his act
of gross neglect resulting in loss of properties he may build or destroy the institution.39
in custodia legis ruins the confidence lodged
by the parties to a suit or the citizenry in our However, as to the charge of graft and
judicial process. Those responsible for such corruption, it must be stressed that the same
act or omission cannot escape the disciplinary is criminal in nature, thus, the resolution
power of this Court. thereof cannot be threshed out in the instant
administrative proceeding. We also take note
Anent the allegation of grave abuse of that there is a pending criminal case for
authority (oppression), we likewise agree with carnapping against Andres;40 hence, with
the observations of the investigating judge. more reason that we cannot rule on the
Records show that Andres started enforcing allegation of graft and corruption as it may
the writ of replevin/order of seizure on the preempt the court in its resolution of the said
same day that the order of seizure was case.
issued. He also admitted that he took the
vehicles of persons who are not parties to the We come to the matter of penalties. The
replevin case.36 He further admitted that he imposable penalty for gross neglect of duty is
took one vehicle belonging to a certain Junard dismissal. While the penalty imposable for
Escudero without the latter’s knowledge and grave abuse of authority (oppression) is
even caused the duplication of its keys in suspension for six (6) months one (1) day to
order that it may be taken by one (1) year.41 Section 55, Rule IV, of the
Andres.37 Certainly, these are indications that Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service provides that if the respondent is This is a petition for review on certiorari
found guilty of two or more charges or counts, assailing the April 30, 2007 Decision1 and May
the penalty to be imposed should be that 19, 2008 Resolution2of the Court of Appeals in
corresponding to the most serious charge or CAG.R. CV No. 86021, which affirmed the
count and the rest shall be considered as August 11, 2005 Decision3 of the Regional
aggravating circumstances. Trial Court, Branch 33, Manila City.
In the instant case, the penalty for the more On February 15, 2001, petitioners spouses
serious offense which is dismissal should be Deo Agner and Maricon Agner executed a
imposed on Andres. However, following Promissory Note with Chattel Mortgage in
Sections 5342 and 54,43 Rule IV of the Uniform favor of Citimotors, Inc. The contract provides,
Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil among others, that: for receiving the amount
Service, we have to consider that Andres is a of Php834, 768.00, petitioners shall pay Php
first-time offender; hence, a lighter penalty 17,391.00 every 15th day of each succeeding
than dismissal from the service would suffice. month until fully paid; the loan is secured by a
Consequently, instead of imposing the penalty 2001 Mitsubishi Adventure Super Sport; and
of dismissal, the penalty of suspension from an interest of 6% per month shall be imposed
office for one (1) year without pay is proper for for failure to pay each installment on or before
gross neglect of duty, and another six (6) the stated due date.4
months should be added for the aggravating
circumstance of grave abuse of authority On the same day, Citimotors, Inc. assigned all
(oppression). its rights, title and interests in the Promissory
Note with Chattel Mortgage to ABN AMRO
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Abe C. Savings Bank, Inc. (ABN AMRO), which, on
Andres, Sheriff IV, RTC of Davao City, Branch May 31, 2002, likewise assigned the same to
16, GUILTY of gross neglect of duty and respondent BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc.5
grave abuse of authority (oppression) and
is SUSPENDED for one (1) year and six (6) For failure to pay four successive installments
months without pay. He is also from May 15, 2002 to August 15, 2002,
hereby WARNED that a repetition of the same respondent, through counsel, sent to
or similar offenses in the future shall be dealt petitioners a demand letter dated August 29,
with more severely. 2002, declaring the entire obligation as due
and demandable and requiring to pay
SO ORDERED. Php576,664.04, or surrender the mortgaged
vehicle immediately upon receiving the
letter.6 As the demand was left unheeded,
respondent filed on October 4, 2002 an action
for Replevin and Damages before the Manila
THIRD DIVISION
Regional Trial Court (RTC).
G.R. No. 182963 June 3, 2013
A writ of replevin was issued.7 Despite this,
the subject vehicle was not seized.8 Trial on
SPOUSES DEO AGNER and MARICON the merits ensued. On August 11, 2005, the
AGNER, Petitioners, Manila RTC Br. 33 ruled for the respondent
vs. and ordered petitioners to jointly and severally
BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK, pay the amount of Php576,664.04 plus
INC., Respondent. interest at the rate of 72% per annum from
August 20, 2002 until fully paid, and the costs
DECISION of suit.
PRAYER COMMON TO ALL CAUSES OF with accessories and equipment." In the event
ACTION the car could not be delivered to petitioner, it
was prayed that private respondent Rolando
1. Ordering the defendant Rolando Lantan be made to pay petitioner the amount
Lantan to pay the plaintiff an amount of ₱60,000.00, the "estimated actual value" of
equivalent to twenty-five percent the car, "plus accrued monthly rentals thereof
(25%) of his outstanding obligation, for with interests at the rate of fourteen percent
and as attorney's fees; (14%) per annum until fully paid." This prayer
of course cannot be granted, even assuming
that private respondents have defaulted in the
2. Ordering defendants to pay the cost
payment of their obligation. This led the trial
or expenses of collection,
court to say that petitioner wanted to eat its
repossession, bonding fees and other
cake and have it too.28
incidental expenses to be proved
during the trial; and
In contrast, respondent in this case prayed:
3. Ordering defendants to pay the
costs of suit. (a) Before trial, and upon filing and
approval of the bond, to forthwith
issue a Writ of Replevin ordering the
Plaintiff also prays for such further reliefs as
seizure of the motor vehicle above-
this Honorable Court may deem just and
described, complete with all its
equitable under the premises.27
accessories and equipments, together
with the Registration Certificate
The Court therein ruled: thereof, and direct the delivery thereof
to plaintiff in accordance with law and
The remedies provided for in Art. 1484 are after due hearing, to confirm the said
alternative, not cumulative. The exercise of seizure;
one bars the exercise of the others. This
limitation applies to contracts purporting to be (b) Or, in the event that manual
leases of personal property with option to buy delivery of the said motor vehicle
by virtue of Art. 1485. The condition that the cannot be effected to render judgment
lessor has deprived the lessee of possession in favor of plaintiff and against
or enjoyment of the thing for the purpose of defendant(s) ordering them to pay to
applying Art. 1485 was fulfilled in this case by plaintiff, jointly and severally, the sum
the filing by petitioner of the complaint for
of ₱576,664.04 plus interest and/or Central Bank Circular No. 905-82, which took
late payment charges thereon at the effect on January 1, 1983, effectively removed
rate of 72% per annum from August the ceiling on interest rates for both secured
20, 2002 until fully paid; and unsecured loans, regardless of maturity,
nothing in the said circular could possibly be
(c) In either case, to order read as granting carte blanche authority to
defendant(s) to pay jointly and lenders to raise interest rates to levels which
severally: would either enslave their borrowers or lead to
a hemorrhaging of their assets.32 Since the
(1) the sum of ₱297,857.54 as stipulation on the interest rate is void for being
attorney’s fees, liquidated contrary to morals, if not against the law, it is
damages, bonding fees and as if there was no express contract on said
other expenses incurred in the interest rate; thus, the interest rate may be
seizure of the said motor reduced as reason and equity demand.33
vehicle; and
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and
(2) the costs of suit. the Court AFFIRMS WITH MODIFICATION
the April 30, 2007 Decision and May 19, 2008
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
Plaintiff further prays for such other relief as
CV No. 86021. Petitioners spouses Deo
this Honorable Court may deem just and
Agner and Maricon Agner are ORDERED to
equitable in the premises.29
pay, jointly and severally, respondent BPI
Family Savings Bank, Inc. ( 1) the remaining
Compared with Elisco, the vehicle subject outstanding balance of their auto loan
matter of this case was never recovered and obligation as of May 15, 2002 with interest at
delivered to respondent despite the issuance one percent ( 1 o/o) per month from May 16,
of a writ of replevin. As there was no seizure 2002 until fully paid; and (2) costs of suit.
that transpired, it cannot be said that
petitioners were deprived of the use and
SO ORDERED.
enjoyment of the mortgaged vehicle or that
respondent pursued, commenced or
concluded its actual foreclosure. The trial SECOND DIVISION
court, therefore, rightfully granted the
alternative prayer for sum of money, which is February 1, 2017
equivalent to the remedy of "exacting
fulfillment of the obligation." Certainly, there is G.R. No. 195450
no double recovery or unjust enrichment30 to
speak of. 1âwphi1
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Petitioner
All the foregoing notwithstanding, We are of vs.
the opinion that the interest of 6% per month HON. EMMANUEL C. CARPIO, in his
should be equitably reduced to one percent capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional
(1%) per month or twelve percent (12%) per Trial Court, Branch 16, Davao City,
annum, to be reckoned from May 16, 2002 COUNTRY BANKERS INSURANCE
until full payment and with the remaining CORPORATION, DABAY ABAD, HATAB
outstanding balance of their car loan as of ABAD, OMAR ABAS, HANAPI ABDULLAH,
May 15, 2002 as the base amount. ROJEA AB ABDULLAH, ABDULLAH
ABEDIN, ALEX ABEDIN, et al., represented
Settled is the principle which this Court has by their Attorney-in-Fact, MR. MANUEL L.
affirmed in a number of cases that stipulated TE, Respondents
interest rates of three percent (3%) per month
and higher are excessive, iniquitous, DECISION
unconscionable, and exorbitant.31 While
MENDOZA, J.: venue, among others. Abad, et al. filed their
Opposition9 and later, their Supplemental
This is a petition for review Opposition,10 to which they attached the
on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside Delivery Receipt11 showing that the court
the July 9, 2008 Decision1 and the January 21, sheriff took possession of 228 certificates of
2011 Resolution2 of the Court of title from GFSME.
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 85719,
which dismissed the petition In its Order,12 dated September 25, 2001, the
for certiorari and mandamus praying for the RTC granted DBP's omnibus motion and
annulment of the May 17, 2004 and July 9, dismissed the case for improper venue.
2004 Orders3 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 16, Davao City (RTC), in Civil Case On December 20, 2001, DBP and GFSME
No. 28,721-01. filed their Joint Motion to Order Plaintiffs to
Return Titles to Defendants DBP and
The Antecedents GFSME.13 After Abad, et al. filed their
opposition, the RTC issued the Order,14 dated
On August 21, 2001, Dabay Abad, Hatab January 27, 2003, directing Abad, et al. to
Abad, Omar Abas, Hanapi Abdullah, Rojea Ab return the 228 certificates of title.
Abdullah, Abdullah Abedin, Alex Abedin, et
al.(Abad, et al.), represented by their attorney- Abad, et al. filed a petition for certiorari and
in-fact, Manuel L. Te, filed a complaint for prohibition with the Court praying, among
delivery of certificates of title, damages, and others, for the nullification and reversal of the
attorney's fees against petitioner Development January 27, 2003 Order of the RTC. The
Bank of the Philippines (DBP) and Guarantee Court, however, in its June 9, 2003
Fund for Small and Medium Resolution,15 dismissed the petition.
Enterprise (GFSME) before the RTC.4
On September 18, 2003, DBP filed its Motion
In their, Complaint,5 Abad, et al. prayed, for Writ of Execution16 of the January 27, 2003
among others, for the issuance of a writ of Order before the RTC. On December 16,
seizure, pending hearing of the case, for 2003, the RTC issued the corresponding Writ
delivery of their certificates of title they of Execution.17 The Sheriffs Return of
claimed to be unlawfully detained by DBP and Service,18 however, indicated that Abad, et
GFSME. They alleged that their certificates of al. failed to deliver the certificates of title.
title were submitted to DBP for safekeeping
pursuant to the loan agreement they entered The Subject Motion against the Bond
into with DBP. The same certificates of title
were turned over by DBP to GFSME because Due to the non-delivery of the certificates of
of its call on GFSME's guarantee on their title by Abad, et al., DBP filed
loan, which became due and demandable, its Motion/Application to Call on Plaintiff's
and pursuant to the guarantee agreement Surety Bond,19 dated February 3, 2004,
between DBP and GFSME. praying for the release of the bond issued by
CBIC to answer for the damages it sustained
As prayed for, the RTC issued the Writ of as a result of the failure to return the 228
Seizure6 on August 24, 2001. The writ was certificates of title.
accompanied by Plaintiffs Bond for Manual
Delivery of Personal Property7 issued by The RTC Ruling
Country Bankers Insurance
Corporation (CBIC).
In its Order, dated May 17, 2004, the RTC
denied the subject motion explaining that the
On September 5, 2001, DBP filed its Omnibus resolution of the motion was no longer part of
Motion to Dismiss Complaint and to Quash its residual power. It pointed out that although
Writ of Seizure8 on the ground of improper there was indeed an order to return the 228
certificates of title to DBP, it was not made as unjustified refusal of respondents to return the
a result of a trial of the case, but as a titles despite the order from the RTC.
consequence of the order of dismissal based
on improper venue. In its Comment,22 dated August 11, 2011,
respondent CBIC averred that Section 20,
DBP moved for reconsideration. Nevertheless, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court specified that an
in its July 9, 2004 Order, the RTC denied the application for damages on account of
motion. improper, irregular or excessive attachment
must be filed before the trial or before appeal
Aggrieved, DBP filed a petition is perfected or before the judgment becomes
for certiorari and mandamus before the CA. executory; that the motion to call on plaintiff's
surety bond was filed more than two (2) years
The CA Ruling after the September 25, 2001 Order of the
RTC, dismissing the case, became final and
executory; that, under Section 10, Rule 60 of
In its July 9, 2008 Decision, the CA dismissed
the Rules of Court, the surety's liability under
the petition for certiorari and mandamus. It
the replevin bond should be included in the
noted that DBP did not move for
final judgment; that, there being no judgment
reconsideration of the September 25, 2001
as to who, between the plaintiffs and the
Order of dismissal. It considered the RTC
defendants, was entitled to the possession of
decision as final and executory. It added that
the certificates of title, the R TC properly
Section 20, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court
denied the motion to call on plaintiff's surety
provided that the claim for damages against
bond; that, any claim for damages against the
the bond must be filed before trial or before
bond was only proper with respect to any loss
appeal was perfected or before the judgment
that DBP might have suffered by being
became executory.20
compelled to surrender the possession of the
certificates of title pending trial of the action;
DBP moved for reconsideration, but its motion that, in this case, the motion to call on
was denied by the CA in its January 21, 2011 plaintiffs surety bond was filed after the trial
Resolution. was already terminated with the issuance of
the order of dismissal; and that, instead of
Hence, this petition. moving to claim for damages, DBP sought to
quash the writ of seizure, even though it might
ISSUE already have some basis to claim for
damages at that time as could be gleaned
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS from the wordings of their motion to dismiss
BLIND ADHERENCE TO AND STRICT the complaint, based on, among others,
APPLICATION OF SECTION 20, RULE 57 improper venue and inapplicability of replevin
OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL as proper remedy.
PROCEDURE.21
Respondents, on the other hand, failed to file
Petitioner DBP argues that it could not have their comment despite several opportunities
anticipated that Abad, et al. granted to them. Thus, their right to file a
(respondents) would not abide by the writ of comment on the petition for review was
execution; hence, prior to such failure of deemed waived.
execution, it would be premature to claim for
damages against the bond because DBP had In its Consolidated Reply,23 dated August 15,
not yet suffered any consequential damages 2016, DPB asserted that Section 20, Rule 57
with the implementation of the writ of seizure; of the Rules of Court did not cover a situation
and that Section 20, Rule 57 of the Rules of where there was an instantaneous dismissal
Court was not applicable as the damages of the case due to improper venue; that the
resulting from the improper issuance of the damages resulting from the improper issuance
writ of seizure occurred only after the of the writ of seizure occurred only after the
unjustified refusal of respondents to return the rendered judgment; and the aggrieved party
titles despite order from the RTC; and, that appealed therefrom.
DBP could not resort to the surety prior to
recovering the titles from respondents at any In this case, there was no trial on the merits
time during the trial or before the judgment as the case was dismissed due to improper
became final and executory. venue and respondents could not have
appealed the order of dismissal as the same
The Court's Ruling was a dismissal, without prejudice. Section 1
(h), Rule 41 of the Rules of Civil Procedure
The petition lacks merit. states that no appeal may be taken from an
order dismissing an action without prejudice.
The trial court did not reach Indeed, there is no residual jurisdiction to
the residual jurisdiction stage speak of where no appeal has even been
filed.27
Residual jurisdiction refers to the authority of
the trial court to issue orders for the protection In Strongworld Construction Corporation, et al.
and preservation of the rights of the parties v. Hon. Perello, et al.,28 the Court elucidated
which do not involve any matter litigated by on the difference between a dismissal with
the appeal; to approve compromises; to prejudice and one without prejudice:
permit appeals by indigent litigants; to order
execution pending appeal in accordance with We distinguish a dismissal with prejudice from
Section 2, Rule 39; and to allow the a dismissal without prejudice. The former
withdrawal of the appeal, provided these are disallows and bars the refiling of the
done prior to the transmittal of the original complaint; whereas, the same cannot be said
record or the record on appeal, even if the of a dismissal without prejudice. Likewise,
appeal has already been perfected or despite where the law permits, a dismissal with
the approval of the record on appeal24 or in prejudice is subject to the right of appeal.1âwphi 1
Petitioner contends that even assuming Replevin is an action for the recovery of
that the indemnity agreement could be personal property.39 It is both a
enforced, she should not have been held principal remedy and a provisional
liable for the full amount of the bond. relief. When utilized as a principal
Citing Rule 60, Section 2 of the Rules of remedy, the objective is to recover
Court, she argues that a judgment on possession of personal property that
replevin is only "either for the delivery may have been wrongfully detained by
of the property or for its value in case another. When sought as a provisional
delivery cannot be made and for such relief, it allows a plaintiff to retain the
damages as either party may prove, contested property during the pendency
with costs."35 of the action. In Tillson v. Court of
Appeals:40
Respondent, on the other hand,
contends that the present action has The term replevin is popularly
already prescribed, considering that understood as "the return to or recovery
Rule 60, Section 10, in relation to Rule by a person of goods or chattels claimed
57, Section 20 of the Rules of Court, to be wrongfully taken or detained upon
mandates that any objection on the the person's giving security to try the
award should be raised in the trial court matter in court and return the goods if
where the complaint for replevin is filed. defeated in the action;" "the writ by or
It argues that since petitioner only the common-law action in which goods
raised the objection before the Court of and chattels are replevied," i.e., taken
Appeals, her action should have been or gotten back by a writ for replevin;"
barred.36 and to replevy, means to recover
possession by an action of replevin; to
Respondent likewise points out that the take possession of goods or chattels
forfeiture of the bond was due to under a replevin order. Bouvier's Law
petitioner's own negligence. It asserts Dictionary defines replevin as "a form of
that in the proceedings before the action which lies to regain the
Regional Trial Court, Enriquez failed to possession of personal chattels which
present her evidence, and it was only have been taken from the plaintiff
when she filed an appeal that she raised unlawfully . . ., (or as) the writ by virtue
her objections.37 It argues that the of which the sheriff proceeds at once to
Guidelines on Corporate Surety Bonds take possession of the property therein
specify that the expiry of the bond shall described and transfer it to the plaintiff
be after the court proceeding is finally upon his giving pledges which are
decided; hence, the bond was still in satisfactory to the sheriff to prove his
effect when respondent paid Asuten.38 title, or return the chattels taken if he
fail so to do;" the same authority states
The sole issue for this Court's resolution that the term, "to replevy" means "to
re-deliver goods which have been but not in possession thereof. Rule 60 of
distrained to the original possessor of the Rules of Court allows an application
them, on his giving pledges in an action for the immediate possession of the
of replevin." The term therefore may property but the plaintiff must show that
refer either to the action itself, for the he has a good legal basis, i.e., a clear
recovery of personality, or the title thereto, for seeking such interim
provisional remedy traditionally possession.43
associated with it, by which possession
of the property may be obtained by the
plaintiff and retained during the As a provisional remedy, a party may
pendency of the action. In this apply for an order for the delivery of the
jurisdiction, the provisional remedy is property before the commencement of
identified in Rule 60 of the Rules of the action or at any time before an
Court as an order for delivery of answer is filed.44 Rule 60 of the Rules of
personal property.41 Court outlines the procedure for the
application of a writ of replevin. Rule 60,
Section 2 requires that the party
Similarly, in BA Finance Corporation v. seeking the issuance of the writ must
Court of Appeals:42 first file the required affidavit and a
bond in an amount that is double the
Replevin, broadly understood, is both a value of the property:
form of principal remedy and of a
provisional relief. It may refer either to Section 2. Affidavit and bond. — The
the action itself, i.e., to regain the applicant must show by his own affidavit
possession of personal chattels being or that of some other person who
wrongfully detained from the plaintiff by personally knows the facts:
another, or to the provisional remedy
that would allow the plaintiff to retain (a) That the applicant is the owner of
the thing during the pendency of the the property claimed, particularly
action and hold it pendente lite. The describing it, or is entitled to the
action is primarily possessory in nature possession thereof;
and generally determines nothing more
than the right of possession. Replevin is (b) That the property is wrongfully
so usually described as a mixed action, detained by the adverse party, alleging
being partly in rem and partly in the cause of detention thereof according
personam-in rem insofar as the to the best of his knowledge,
recovery of specific property is information, and belief;
concerned, and in personam as regards
to damages involved. As an "action in (c) That the property has not been
rem," the gist of the replevin action is distrained or taken for a tax assessment
the right of the plaintiff to obtain or a fine pursuant to law, or seized
possession of specific personal property under a writ of execution or preliminary
by reason of his being the owner or of attachment, or otherwise placed
his having a special interest therein. under custodia legis, or if so seized, that
Consequently, the person in possession it is exempt from such seizure or
of the property sought to be replevied is custody; and
ordinarily the proper and only necessary
party defendant, and the plaintiff is not (d) The actual market value of the
required to so join as defendants other property.
persons claiming a right on the property
The applicant must also give a bond, being merely ancillary to the main
executed to the adverse party in double action, becomes functus oficio. The
the value of the property as stated in parties returned to the status quo as if
the affidavit aforementioned, for the no case for replevin had been filed.
return of the property to the adverse Thus, upon the dismissal of the case, it
party if such return be adjudged, and was imperative for petitioner to return
for the payment to the adverse party of the van to Asuten. In Advent Capital
such sum as he may recover from the and Finance Corporation v. Young:50
applicant in the action.45
We agree with the Court of Appeals in
directing the trial court to return the
seized car to Young since this is the
Once the affidavit is filed and the bond
necessary consequence of the dismissal
is approved by the court, the court
of the replevin case for failure to
issues an order and a writ of seizure
prosecute without prejudice. Upon the
requiring the sheriff to take the property
dismissal of the replevin case for failure
into his or her custody.46 If there is no
to prosecute, the writ of seizure, which
further objection to the bond filed within
is merely ancillary in nature,
five (5) days from the taking of the
became functus officio and should have
property, the sheriff shall deliver it to
been lifted. There was no adjudication
the applicant.47 The contested property
on the merits, which means that there
remains in the applicant's custody until
was no determination of the issue who
the court determines, after a trial on the
has the better right to possess the
Issues, which among the parties has the
subject car. Advent ca mot therefore
right of possession.48
retain possession of the subject car
considering that it was not adjudged as
In Civil Case No. 10846, petitioner
the prevailing party entitled to the
Enriquez filed a replevin case against
remedy of replevin.
Asuten for the recovery of the Toyota
Hi-Ace van valued at
Contrary to Advent's view, Olympia
P300,000.00.49 She applied for a bond
International Inc. v. Court of
in the amount of P600,000.00 with
Appeals applies to this case. The
respondent in Asuten's favor. The
dismissal of the replevin case for failure
Regional Trial Court approved the bond
to prosecute results in the restoration of
and ordered the sheriff to recover the
the parties' status prior to litigation, as
van from Asuten and to deliver it to
if no complaint was filed at all. To let
petitioner. While the van was in
the writ of seizure stand after the
petitioner's custody, the Regional Trial
dismissal of the complaint would be
Court dismissed the case without
adjudging Advent as the prevailing
prejudice for failure to prosecute. Thus,
party, when precisely no decision on the
it ordered the sheriff to restore the van
merits had been rendered. Accordingly,
to Asuten. When petitioner failed to
the parties must be reverted to
produce the van, the Regional Trial
their status quo ante. Since Young
Court directed respondent to pay Asuten
possessed the subject car before the
the amount of the bond.
filing of the replevin case, the same
must be returned to him, as if no
There was no trial on the merits. The
complaint was filed at all.51
Regional Trial Court's dismissal for
failure to prosecute was a dismissal
without prejudice to re-filing. In this
particular instance, any writ of seizure, Petitioner argues that she should not
have been made liable for the bond issued in criminal and civil
despite her failure to return the van, actions/special proceedings, or in any
considering that it was effective only proceeding or incident therein shall be
until February 24, 2004, and that she from its approval by the court, until the
did not renew or post another bond. action or proceeding is finally decided,
resolved or terminated. This condition
De Guia v. Alto Surety & Insurance, must be incorporated in the terms and
Co.52 requires that any application on condition of the bonding contract and
the bond be made after hearing but shall bind the parties notwithstanding
before the entry of judgment. their failure to expressly state the same
Otherwise, the surety can no longer be in the said contract or
made liable under the bond: agreement. (Emphasis supplied)
.... Rule 59
Receivership
(b) Unless exempted by the court, the
applicant files with the court where the ....
action or proceeding is pending, a bond
executed to the party or person Section 2. Bond on appointment of
enjoined, in an amount to be fixed by receiver. — Before issuing the order
the court, to the effect that the appointing a receiver the court shall
applicant will pay to such party or require the applicant to file a bond
person all damages which he may executed to the party against whom the
sustain by reason of the injunction or application is presented, in an amount
temporary restraining order if the court to be fixed by the court, to the effect
should finally decide that the applicant that the applicant will pay such party all
was not entitled thereto. Upon approval damages he may sustain by reason of
of the requisite bond, a writ of the appointment of such receiver in case
preliminary injunction shall be issued. the applicant shall have procured such
.... appointment without sufficient cause;
and the court may, in its discretion, at
Section 6. Grounds for objection to, or any time after the appointment, require
for motion of dissolution of, injunction an additional bond as further security
or restraining order. — The application for such damages.
for injunction or restraining order may
be denied, upon a showing of its Section 3. Denial of application or
insufficiency. The injunction or discharge of receiver. — The application
restraining order may also be denied, may be denied, or the receiver
or, if granted, may be dissolved, on discharged, when the adverse party files
other grounds upon affidavits of the a bond executed to the applicant, in an
party or person enjoined, which may be amount to be fixed by the court, to the
opposed by the applicant also by effect that such party will pay the
affidavits. It may further be denied, or, applicant all damages he may suffer by
if granted, may be dissolved, if it reason of the acts, omissions, or other
appears after hearing that although the matters specified in the application as
applicant is entitled to the injunction or ground for such appointment. The
restraining order, the issuance or receiver may also be discharged if it is
continuance thereof, as the case may shown that his appointment was
be, would cause irreparable damage to obtained without sufficient cause.
the party or person enjoined while the ....
applicant can be fully compensated for
such damages as he may suffer, and the Rule 60
former files a bond in an amount fixed Replevin
by the court conditioned that he will pay
all damages which the applicant may ....
suffer by the denial or the dissolution of
the injunction or restraining order. If it Section 7. Proceedings where property
appears that the extent of the claimed by third person. — If the
preliminary injunction or restraining property taken is claimed by any person
other than the party against whom the replevin was issued and such judgment
writ of replevin had been issued or his includes the return of the property to
agent, and such person makes an him. Thus, the requirement that the
affidavit of his title thereto, or right to bond be double the actual value of the
the possession thereof, stating the properties litigated upon. Such is the
grounds therefor, and serves such case because the bond will answer for
affidavit upon the sheriff while the latter the actual loss to the plaintiff, which
has possession of the property and a corresponds to the value of the
copy thereof upon the applicant, the properties sought to be recovered and
sheriff shall not be bound to keep the for damages, if any.59
property under replevin or deliver it to
the applicant unless the applicant or his
agent, on demand of said sheriff, shall Any application of the bond in a replevin
file a bond approved by the court to case, therefore, is premised on the
indemnify the third-party claimant in a judgment rendered in favor of the
sum not less than the value of the defendant. Thus, the Rules of Court
property under replevin as provided in imply that there must be a prior
section 2 hereof. In case of judgment on the merits before there
disagreement as to such value, the can be any application on the bond:
court shall determine the same. No
claim for damages for the taking or Rule 60
keeping of the property may be Replevin
enforced against the bond unless the
action therefor is filed within one ....
hundred twenty (120) days from the
date of the filing of the Section 9. Judgment. — After trial of the
bond.57 (Emphasis supplied) issues, the court shall determine who
has the right of possession to and the
value of the property and shall render
However, there is a rationale to the judgment in the alternative for the
requirement that the bond for a writ of delivery thereof to the party entitled to
seizure in a replevin be double the value the same, or for its value in case
of the property. The bond functions not delivery cannot be made, and also for
only to indemnify the defendant in case such damages as either party may
the property is lost, but also to answer prove, with costs.
for any damages that may be awarded
by the court if the judgment is rendered Section 10. Judgment to include
in defendant's favor. In Citibank, N.A. v. recovery against sureties. — The
Court of Appeals:58 amount, if any, to be awarded to any
party upon any bond filed in accordance
It should be noted that a replevin bond with the provisions of this Rule, shall be
is intended to indemnify the defendant claimed, ascertained, and granted under
against any loss that he may suffer by the same procedure as prescribed in
reason of its being compelled to section 20 of Rule 57.
surrender the possession of the disputed
property pending trial of the action. The
same may also be answerable for The Rules of Court likewise require that
damages if any when judgment is for the defendant to be granted
rendered in favor of the defendant or the full amount of the bond, he or she
the party against whom a writ of must first apply to the court for
damages. These damages will be therefore, requires first, a judgment on
awarded only after a proper hearing: the merits in the defendant's favor,
and second, an application by the
Rule 57 defendant for damages. Neither
Preliminary Attachment circumstance appears in this case. When
petitioner failed to produce the van,
.... equity demanded that Asuten be
awarded only an amount equal to the
Section 20. Claim for damages on value of the van. The Regional Trial
account of improper, irregular or Court would have erred in ordering the
excessive attachment. — An application forfeiture of the entire bond in Asuten's
for damages on account of improper, favor, considering that there was no
irregular or excessive attachment must trial on the merits or an application by
be filed before the trial or before appeal Asuten for damages. This judgment
is perfected or before the judgment could have been reversed had petitioner
becomes executory, with due notice to appealed the Regional Trial Court's May
the attaching party and his surety or 24, 2004 Order in Civil Case No.
sureties, setting forth the facts showing 10846. Unfortunately, she did not.
his right to damages and the amount Respondent was, thus, constrained to
thereof. Such damages may be awarded follow the Regional Trial Court's
only after proper hearing and shall be directive to pay Asuten the full amount
included in the judgment on the main of the bond.
case.
II
If the judgment on the appellate court
be favorable to the party against whom This is a simple case for collection of a
the attachment was issued, he must sum of money. Petitioner cannot
claim damages sustained during the substitute this case for her lost appeal in
pendency of the appeal by filing an Civil Case No. 10846.
application in the appellate court, with
notice to the party in whose favor the In applying for the replevin bond,
attachment was issued or his surety or petitioner voluntarily undertook with
sureties, before the judgment of the respondent an Indemnity Agreement,
appellate court becomes executory. The which provided:
appellate court may allow the
application to be heard and decided by INDEMNIFICATION – to indemnify the
the trial court. SURETY for all damages, payments,
advances, losses, costs, taxes,
Nothing herein contained shall prevent penalties, charges, attorney's fees and
the party against whom the attachment expenses of whatever kind and nature
was issued from recovering in the same that the SURETY may at any time
action the damages awarded to him sustain or incur as a consequence of
from any property of the attaching party having become a surety upon the
not exempt from execution should the above-mentioned bond, and to pay,
bond or deposit given by the latter be reimburse and make good to the
insufficient or fail to fully satisfy the SURETY, its successors and assigns, all
award. sums or all money which it shall pay or
become liable to pay by virtue of said
bond even if said payment/s or liability
exceeds the amount of the bond. . . .
Forfeiture of the replevin bond,
right to recovery from the insurer. As it
INCONTESTABILITY OF PAYMENTS is also a contract of adhesion, an
MADE BY THE SURETY – any payment or insurance contract should be liberally
disbursement made by the surety on construed in favor of the insured and
account of the above-mentioned bond, strictly against the insurer company
either in the belief that the SURETY was which usually prepares it.65
obligated to make such payment or in
the belief that said payment was
necessary in order to avoid a greater Respondent, however, does not seek to
loss or obligation for which the SURETY recover an amount which exceeds the
might be liable by virtue of the . . . amount of the bond or any "damages,
above-mentioned bond, shall be final, payments, advances, losses, costs,
and will not be contested by the taxes, penalties, charges, attorney's
undersigned, who jointly and severally fees and expenses of whatever kind and
bind themselves to indemnify the nature,"66 all of which it could have
SURETY for any of such payment or sought under the Indemnity Agreement.
disbursement.60 It only seeks to recover from petitioner
the amount of the bond, or
P600,000.00.
Basic is the principle that "a contract is
law between the parties"61 for as long as Respondent paid P600,000.00 to Asuten
it is "not contrary to law, morals, good pursuant to a lawful order of the
customs, public order, or public Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No.
policy."62 Under their Indemnity 10846. If there were any errors in the
Agreement, petitioner held herself liable judgment of the Regional Trial Court, as
for any payment made by respondent discussed above, petitioner could have
by virtue of the replevin bond. appealed this. Petitioner, however,
chose to let Civil Case No. 10846 lapse
Petitioner contends that the Indemnity into finality. This case cannot now be
Agreement was a contract of adhesion used as a substitute for her lost appeal.
since respondent made the extent of
liability "so comprehensive and all- It is clear from the antecedents that any
encompassing to the point of being losses which petitioner has suffered
ambiguous."63 were due to the consequences of her
actions, or more accurately, her
A contract of insurance is, by default, a inactions. Civil Case No. 10846, which
contract of adhesion. It is prepared by she filed, was dismissed due to her
the insurance company and might failure to prosecute. The Regional Trial
contain terms and conditions too vague Court forfeited the replevin bond which
for a layperson to understand; hence, she had filed because she refused to
they are construed liberally in favor of return the property. She is now made
the insured. In Verendia v. Court of liable for the replevin bond because she
Appeals:64 failed to appeal its forfeiture.
IN VIEW OF THE
FOREGOING, pursuant to
Section 5, Rule 61 of the New
Rule 61: SUPPORT PENDENTE LITE Rules of Court and after giving
due regard to the necessities
of the plaintiff Dorotea Mejia
and her children, Rachel San
Juan and Jeffrey San Juan,
SECOND DIVISION the application for support
pendente lite is hereby
G.R. No. L-59906 October 23, 1982 granted, and the same is fixed
at P2,500.00 a month
BUENAVENTURA SAN JUAN, petitioner, commencing from January 1,
vs. 1982 to be paid to the plaintiff
HON. MANUEL E. VALENZUELA, Judge of on or the 5th day of each
the Court of First Instance of Rizal and month until this case is finally
DOROTEA MEJIA, respondents. adjudicated. This is without
prejudice to any judgment for
support in arrears due the
Francisco D. Lozano for petitioner.
plaintiff if the evidence will so
warrant after trial.
Manuel Valenzuela in his own behalf.
SO ORDERED.
It appears that on September 16, 1981, the It appears that pending resolution of this
marriage between respondent Mejia and petition, petitioner filed with the trial court a
petitioner San Juan, solemnized on October 2, manifestation, dated June 17, 1982, proposing
1973, was declared null and void by the Court to settle his obligation of P15,000.00,
of First Instance of Rizal on the ground of a representing the amount of support which
prior and subsisting marriage between accrued from January to June, 1982, and to
petitioner and one Isabel Bandin. On February pay the same in three equal installments, the
25, 1981, respondent Mejia instituted the first to be paid upon approval by the court of
instance action against petitioner, docketed as his scheme of payment, and the balance
Civil Case No. 8874- P, seeking support for within a period of two (2) months thereafter.
herself and her two minor children. This proposal was approved by the court. In
the same manifestation, petitioner sought the
After issues were joined, the respondent reduction of the amount of support pendente
judge, on motion of Mejia, entered the
lite to P1,000.00 a month on the ground that vs.
the sum of P2,500.00 previously fixed by PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL
respondent judge is now beyond his means to ARROYO, EDUARDO ERMITA, AVELINO
pay. According to private respondent, the RAZON, ANGEL ATUTUBO and SPO4
court had not yet acted on petitioner's request ROGER VALEROSO,* Respondents.
for reduction of the monthly support because
the respondent judge left for abroad. 1 DECISION
The writ of amparo is an independent and First issue: Presidential immunity from suit
summary remedy that provides rapid judicial
relief to protect the people’s right to life, liberty
It is settled in jurisprudence that the President
and security.62 Having been originally intended
enjoys immunity from suit during his or her
as a response to the alarming cases of
tenure of office or actual
extrajudicial killings and enforced
incumbency.68 Conversely, this presidential
disappearances in the country, it serves both
privilege of immunity cannot be invoked by a A subpoena is a process directed to a person
non-sitting president even for acts committed requiring him to attend and to testify at the
during his or her tenure.69 hearing or trial of an action or at any
investigation conducted under the laws of the
In the case at bar, the events that gave rise to Philippines, or for the taking of his deposition.
the present action, as well as the filing of the
original Petition and the issuance of the CA In this jurisdiction, there are two (2) kinds of
Decision, occurred during the incumbency of subpoena, to wit: subpoena ad
former President Arroyo. In that respect, it testificandum and subpoena duces
was proper for the court a quo to have tecum. The first is used to compel a person to
dropped her as a respondent on account of testify, while the second is used to compel the
her presidential immunity from suit. production of books, records, things or
documents therein specified. As characterized
It must be underscored, however, that since in H.C. Liebenow vs. The Philippine Vegetable
her tenure of office has already ended, former Oil Company:
President Arroyo can no longer invoke the
privilege of presidential immunity as a defense The subpoena duces tecum is, in all respects,
to evade judicial determination of her like the ordinary subpoena ad
responsibility or accountability for the alleged testificandum with the exception that it
violation or threatened violation of the right to concludes with an injunction that the witness
life, liberty and security of Lozada. shall bring with him and produce at the
examination the books, documents, or things
Nonetheless, examining the merits of the case described in the subpoena.
still results in the denial of the Petition on the
issue of former President Arroyo’s alleged Well-settled is the rule that before a
responsibility or accountability. A thorough subpoena duces tecum may issue, the court
examination of the allegations postulated and must first be satisfied that the following
the evidence adduced by petitioners reveals requisites are present: (1) the books,
their failure to sufficiently establish any documents or other things requested must
unlawful act or omission on her part that appear prima facie relevant to the issue
violated, or threatened with violation, the right subject of the controversy (test of relevancy);
to life, liberty and security of Lozada. Except and (2) such books must be reasonably
for the bare claims that: (a) Sec. Atienza described by the parties to be readily
mentioned a certain "Ma’[a]m,"70 whom Lozada identified (test of definiteness).73 (Emphasis
speculated to have referred to her, and (b) supplied.)
Sec. Defensor told Lozada that "the President
was ‘hurting’ from all the media frenzy,"71 there In the present case, the CA correctly denied
is nothing in the records that would sufficiently petitioners’ Motion for the Issuance of
establish the link of former President Arroyo to Subpoena Ad Testificandum on the ground
the events that transpired on 5-6 February that the testimonies of the witnesses sought to
2010, as well as to the subsequent threats be presented during trial were prima facie
that Lozada and his family purportedly irrelevant to the issues of the case. The court
received. a quo aptly ruled in this manner:
Second issue: Denial of the issuance of a The alleged acts and statements attributed by
subpoena ad testificandum the petitioner to Neri and Abalos are not
relevant to the instant Amparo Petition where
This Court, in Roco v. Contreras,72 ruled that the issue involved is whether or not Lozada’s
for a subpoena to issue, it must first appear right to life, liberty and security was
that the person or documents sought to be threatened or continues to be threatened with
presented are prima facie relevant to the issue violation by the unlawful act/s of the
subject of the controversy, to wit: respondents. Evidence, to be relevant, must
have such a relation to the fact in issue as to threshold reveals the clear intent of the
induce belief in its existence or nonexistence. framers of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo to
Further, Neri, Abalos and a certain driver have the equivalent of an administrative
"Jaime" are not respondents in this Amparo proceeding, albeit judicially conducted, in
Petition and the vague allegations averred in addressing amparo situations.77
the Motion with respect to them do not pass
the test of relevancy. To Our mind, petitioner In cases where the violation of the right to life,
appears to be embarking on a "fishing liberty or security has already ceased, it is
expedition". Petitioner should present the necessary for the petitioner in an amparo
aggrieved party [Lozada], who has been action to prove the existence of a continuing
regularly attending the hearings, to prove the threat.78 Thus, this Court held in its Resolution
allegations in the Amparo Petition, instead of in Razon v. Tagitis:79
dragging the names of other people into the
picture. We have repeatedly reminded the Manalo is different from Tagitis in terms of
parties, in the course of the proceedings, that their factual settings, as enforced
the instant Amparo Petition does not involve disappearance was no longer a problem in
the investigation of the ZTE-[NBN] contract. that case. The enforced disappearance of the
Petitioner should focus on the fact in issue brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo
and not embroil this Court into said ZTE-NBN effectively ended when they escaped from
contract, which is now being investigated by captivity and surfaced, while Tagitis is still
the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee and the nowhere to be found and remains missing
Office of the Ombudsman.74 (Emphasis more than two years after his reported
supplied.) disappearance. An Amparo situation
subsisted in Manalo, however, because of the
All the references of petitioners to either Sec. continuing threat to the brothers’ right to
Neri or Abalos were solely with respect to the security; the brothers claimed that since the
ZTE-NBN deal, and not to the events that persons responsible for their enforced
transpired on 5-6 February 2008, or to the disappearance were still at large and had not
ensuing threats that petitioners purportedly been held accountable, the former were still
received. Although the present action is under the threat of being once again
rooted from the involvement of Lozada in the abducted, kept captive or even killed, which
said government transaction, the testimonies threat constituted a direct violation of their
of Sec. Neri or Abalos are nevertheless not right to security of person.80 (Emphasis
prima facie relevant to the main issue of supplied.)
whether there was an unlawful act or omission
on the part of respondents that violated the In the present case, the totality of the
right to life, liberty and security of Lozada. evidence adduced by petitioners failed to
Thus, the CA did not commit any reversible meet the threshold of substantial evidence.
error in denying the Motion for the Issuance of Sifting through all the evidence and
Subpoena Ad Testificandum. allegations presented, the crux of the case
boils down to assessing the veracity and
Third issue: Grant of the privilege of the writ of credibility of the parties’ diverging claims as to
amparo what actually transpired on 5-6 February
2008. In this regard, this Court is in agreement
A. Alleged violation of or threat to the right to with the factual findings of the CA to the
life, liberty and security of Lozada extent that Lozada was not illegally deprived
of his liberty from the point when he
Sections 17 and 18 of the Rule on the Writ of disembarked from the aircraft up to the time
Amparo requires the parties to establish their he was led to the departure area of the
claims by substantial evidence,75 or such airport,81 as he voluntarily submitted himself to
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might the custody of respondents:
accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.76 The use of this evidentiary
[Lozada] was one of the first few passengers The foregoing statements show that Lozada
to get off the plane because he was instructed personally sought the help of Sec. Atienza to
by Secretary Atienza, th[r]ough a phone call avoid the Senate personnel, and thus knew
on the night of 04 February 2008, while he that the men who met him at the airport were
was still in Hong Kong, to proceed directly to there to aid him in such objective. Surely, the
the Bureau of Immigration so that few people actions of Lozada evinced knowledge and
would notice him and he could be facilitated in voluntariness, uncharacteristic of someone
going out of the airport without any hassle who claims to have been forcibly abducted.
from the people of the Senate Sergeant-at-
Arms. Again, [Lozada] stated that he wanted However, these men’s subsequent acts of
to get away from the Senate people. [Lozada] directing Lozada to board the vehicle and
even went to the men’s room of the airport, driving him around, without disclosing the
after he was allegedly "grabbed", where he exact purpose thereof, appear to be beyond
made a call to his brother Arturo, using his what he had consented to and requested from
Globe phone, and he was not prevented from Sec. Atienza. These men neither informed him
making said call, and was simply advised by of where he was being transported nor
the person who met him at the tube to (sic) provided him complete liberty to contact his
"sir, bilisan mo na". When they proceeded out family members to assure them of his safety.
of the tube and while walking, [Lozada] heard These acts demonstrated that he lacked
from the radio track down, "wag kayo dyan, absolute control over the situation, as well as
sir, nandyan yong mga taga Senado", so they an effective capacity to challenge their
took a detour and went up to the departure instructions.
area, did not go out of the normal arrival area,
and proceeded towards the elevator near the Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that if
Duty Free Shop and then down towards the Lozada had in fact been illegally restrained, so
tarmac. Since [Lozada] was avoiding the much so that his right to liberty and security
people from the Office of the Senate had been violated, the acts that manifested
Sergeant-at-Arms, said detour appears to this restraint had already ceased and has
explain why they did not get out at the arrival consequently rendered the grant of the
area, where [Lozada] could have passed privilege of the writ of amparo moot. Whether
through immigration so that his passport could or not Lozada was deprived of his liberty from
be properly stamped. the point when he was led inside the vehicle
waiting for him at the airport up to the time he
This Court does not find any evidence on was taken to La Salle Green Hills, petitioners’
record that [Lozada] struggled or made an assertions that Lozada and his family continue
outcry for help when he was allegedly to suffer various threats from respondents
"grabbed" or "abducted" at the airport. remain unproven. The CA correctly found as
[Lozada] even testified that nobody held him, follows:
and they were not hostile to him nor shouted
at him. With noon day clarity, this Court finds The supposed announcement of General
that the reason why [Lozada] was fetched at Razon over the radio that [Lozada] was in the
the airport was to help him avoid the Senate custody of the PNP can neither be construed
contingent, who would arrest and detain him as a threat to [Lozada’s] life, liberty and
at the Office of the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms, security. Certainly, no person in his right mind
until such time that he would appear and give would make that kind of media announcement
his testimony, pursuant to the Order of the if his intent was indeed to threaten
Senate on the NBN-ZTE Project. [Lozada] somebody’s life, liberty and security.
clearly knew this because at that time, it was
still his decision not to testify before the
xxx xxx xxx
Senate. He agreed with that plan.82 (Emphases
supplied.)
He claims that he is threatened by the alleged
presence of armed men riding in motorcycle
passing outside the De La Salle premises purported cases are to be determined based
where he and his family are staying and by on their own merits and are clearly beyond the
alleged threats of armed men around him at realm of the instant amparo petition filed
places where he went to. Again, these alleged against the respondents.83 (Emphasis
threats were not proven by any evidence at supplied.)
all, as having originated from any of the
respondents. Finally, petitioners insist that while they were
able to sufficiently establish their case by the
[Lozada] also considers the installation of the required evidentiary standard, respondents
surveillance camera at the De La Salle and at failed to discharge their burden to prove their
St. Scholastica as indirect threat to his right to defenses by substantial evidence and to show
life, liberty and security. He claims that these that respondents exercised extraordinary
are spy cameras. However, save for diligence as required by the Rule on the Writ
[Lozada’s] self-serving claim, he simply failed of Amparo.84 This Court has squarely passed
to prove that they were installed or ordered upon this contention in Yano v. Sanchez,85 to
installed by the respondents for the purpose of wit:
threatening his right to life, liberty and
security. The failure to establish that the public official
observed extraordinary diligence in the
[Lozada] further maintains that there is an performance of duty does not result in the
alleged trend, i.e., wherever he goes, there is automatic grant of the privilege of
a bomb threat. There were bomb threats in the amparo writ. It does not relieve the
the places where he went to like in [the petitioner from establishing his or her claim by
Polytechnic University of the Philippines], substantial evidence.
Dagupan, Cebu and Bohol. However,
[Lozada] himself testified that he did not try to Thus, in amparo actions, petitioners must
ascertain where the bomb threats emanated. establish their claims by substantial evidence,
Plainly, there is no evidence on record that the and they cannot merely rely on the supposed
bomb threats were made by the respondents failure of respondents to prove either their
or done upon their instigation. defenses or their exercise of extraordinary
diligence. In this case, the totality of the
Moreover, [Lozada] views the pronouncement evidence presented by petitioners fails to
of the Secretary of Justice that he was put on meet the requisite evidentiary threshold, and
the watch list of the Bureau of Immigration as the privilege of the writ of amparo has already
a threat to his life, liberty and security. This been rendered moot and academic by the
alleged threat is again unsupported by cessation of the restraint to Lozada’s liberty.
evidence, as in fact, [Lozada] testified that he
did not ascertain from the Bureau of B. Propriety of the privilege of the writ of
Immigration whether his name was actually in amparo and its interim reliefs
the official watch list of the Bureau. At any
rate, the Secretary of Justice is not one of the As previously discussed, there is no basis to
respondents in the amparo petition, and there grant Lozada the privilege of the writ of
is no showing in the record that it was the amparo, considering that the illegal restraint
respondents who ordered the same for the alleged in this case had already ceased and
purpose of threatening him. there is no imminent or continuing restriction
on his liberty. In Castillo v. Cruz,86 this Court
[Lozada] harps on the filing of alleged held as follows:
frivolous cases against him and his family as
threat to his life, liberty and security. xxx Although respondents’ release from
However, [Lozada] himself testified that he confinement does not necessarily hinder
does not know whether the respondents or supplication for the writ of amparo, absent any
any of the respondents ordered the filing of evidence or even an allegation in the petition
these cases against him. In any event, said
that there is undue and continuing restraint on impleaded, in addition, those tasked to
their liberty, and/or that there exists threat or investigate the kidnapping and detention
intimidation that destroys the efficacy of their incidents and their superiors at the top. Yet,
right to be secure in their persons, the the acts and/or omissions subject of the
issuance of the writ cannot be justified. criminal complaint and the amparo petition are
(Emphasis supplied.) 1âwphi1 so linked as to call for the consolidation of
both proceedings to obviate the mischief
Further, it appears that Lozada had already inherent in a multiplicity-of-suits situation.
filed before the Department of Justice (DOJ) a
Complaint charging respondents with Given the above perspective and to fully apply
kidnapping and attempted murder, docketed the beneficial nature of the writ of amparo as
as I.S. No. 2008-467.87 In this regard, this an inexpensive and effective tool to protect
Court’s ruling in Rubrico v. Arroyo88 is worth certain rights violated or threatened to be
considering: violated, the Court hereby adjusts to a degree
the literal application of Secs. 22 and 23 of the
First, a criminal complaint for kidnapping and, Amparo Rule to fittingly address the situation
alternatively, for arbitrary detention rooted in obtaining under the premises. Towards this
the same acts and incidents leading to the end, two things are at once indicated: (1) the
filing of the subject amparo petition has been consolidation of the probe and fact-finding
instituted with the OMB, docketed as OMB-P- aspects of the instant petition with the
C-O7-0602-E. The usual initial steps to investigation of the criminal complaint before
determine the existence of a prima facie case the OMB; and (2) the incorporation in the
against the five (5) impleaded individuals same criminal complaint of the allegations in
suspected to be actually involved in the this petition bearing on the threats to the right
detention of Lourdes have been set in motion. to security. Withal, the OMB should be
It must be pointed out, though, that the filing of furnished copies of the investigation reports to
the OMB complaint came before the effectivity aid that body in its own investigation and
of the Amparo Rule on October 24, 2007. eventual resolution of OMB-P-C-O7-0602-E.
Then, too, the OMB shall be given easy
Second, Sec. 22 of the Amparo Rule access to all pertinent documents and
proscribes the filing of an amparo petition evidence, if any, adduced before the CA.
should a criminal action have, in the Necessarily, Lourdes, as complainant in OMB-
meanwhile, been commenced. The P-C-O7-0602-E, should be allowed, if so
succeeding Sec. 23, on the other hand, minded, to amend her basic criminal
provides that when the criminal suit is filed complaint if the consolidation of cases is to be
subsequent to a petition for amparo, the fully effective. (Emphasis supplied.)
petition shall be consolidated with the criminal
action where the Amparo Rule shall Thus, if the Complaint filed before the DOJ
nonetheless govern the disposition of the had already progressed into a criminal case,
relief under the Rule. Under the terms of said then the latter action can more adequately
Sec. 22, the present petition ought to have dispose of the allegations made by petitioners.
been dismissed at the outset. But as things After all, one of the ultimate objectives of the
stand, the outright dismissal of the petition by writ of amparo as a curative remedy is to
force of that section is no longer technically facilitate the subsequent punishment of
feasible in light of the interplay of the following perpetrators.89 On the other hand, if there is no
factual mix: (1) the Court has, pursuant to actual criminal case lodged before the courts,
Sec. 6 of the Rule, already issued ex parte the then the denial of the Petition is without
writ of amparo; (2) the CA, after a summary prejudice to the filing of the appropriate
hearing, has dismissed the petition, but not on administrative, civil or criminal case, if
the basis of Sec. 22; and (3) the complaint in applicable, against those individuals whom
OMB-P-C-O7-0602-E named as respondents Lozada deems to have unduly restrained his
only those believed to be the actual abductors liberty.
of Lourdes, while the instant petition
Finally, with respect to the interim reliefs Release of Danielle Tan Parker from
sought by petitioners, this Court, in Yano v. Detention) under A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC (The
Sanchez,90 declined to grant the prayer for the Rule on the Writ of Amparo). Petitioner Lorie
issuance of a TPO, as well as Inspection and Marie Tomas Callo (Callo) seeks the
Production Orders, upon a finding that the immediate release of Danielle Tan Parker
implicated public officials were not from the Immigration Detention Facility, Camp
accountable for the disappearance subject of Bagong Diwa in Bicutan, Taguig City.
that case. Analogously, it would be
incongruous to grant herein petitioners’ prayer The Facts
for a TPO and Inspection and Production
Orders and at the same time rule that there no Danielle Tan Parker (Parker) is a holder of
longer exists any imminent or continuing Philippine Passport No. XX5678508 issued by
threat to Lozada’s right to life, liberty and the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) on 5
security. Thus, there is no basis on which a March 2010 and valid until 4 March 2015.
prayer for the issuance of these interim reliefs
can be anchored.
On 15 January 2013, Parker was charged for
deportation for being an undesirable,
WHEREFORE, the instant petition undocumented, and overstaying alien, in
is DENIED for being moot and academic. The violation of Section 3 7 (a)(7) of the Philippine
Court of Appeals’ denial of the privilege of the Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, in
writ of amparo is hereby AFFIRMED. relation to Rule XVI, Office Memorandum No.
ADD-01-004. It was alleged that Danielle
SO ORDERED. Nopuente was a fugitive from justice in the
United States of America with an outstanding
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO arrest warrant issued against her.
Associate Justice Subsequently, on 24 January 2013, a
Summary Deportation Order (SDO) was
WE CONCUR: issued against Danielle Nopuente, also known
as Isabelita Nopuente and Danielle Tan
EN BANC Parker, upon verification that she arrived in
the Philippines on 23 March 2011 under the
Balikbayan Program, with an authorized stay
September 19, 2017
of a period of one year. Parker was not in the
list of approved applications of the DFA for
G.R. No. 230324 dual citizenship and her American Passport
had been revoked by the United States
LORIE MARIE TOMAS CALLO, Petitioner Department of State. Thus, she was
vs. considered an undocumented, undesirable,
COMMISSIONER JAIME H. MORENTE, and overstaying alien, in violation of the
BUREAUS OF IMMIGRATION, OIC Philippine Immigration Act of 1940.
ASSOCIATES COMMISSIONERS BUREAU
OF IMMIGRATION and BRIAN ALAS, On 5 June 2014, pursuant to the SDO issued
BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION , Respondents by the Bureau of Immigration, Parker was
arrested in Tagaytay City on the premise that
DECISION Danielle Nopuente and Danielle Tan Parker
are one and the same person. She was then
CARPIO, Acting C.J.: taken to the Immigration Detention Facility in
Bicutan, Taguig City. She is still currently
The Case detained in the Immigration Detention Facility
as the deportation was not carried out due to
This is a petition for a writ of amparo (with the fact that Parker is charged with
Prayer to Issue Interim Reliefs of Immediate falsification and use of falsified documents
before Branch 4, Municipal Trial Court in Callo seeks the issuance of the writ of amparo
Cities, Davao City. and the interim reliefs available under A.M.
No. 07-9-12-SC for the immediate release of
On 12 September 2014, Parker, as petitioner, Parker. Callo alleges that Parker is a natural-
filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus before born Filipino citizen and thus should not have
Branch 266, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of been detained by the Bureau of Immigration.
Pasig City. The Bureau of Immigration was Moreover, Callo alleges that the kife of Parker
able to produce the body of Parker before the is endangered in the detention center; and
RTC. The Bureau of Immigration then alleged thus a writ of amparo with the interim reliefs
that as the SDO had become final and prayed for should be issued by this Court.
executory, it served as the legal authority to
detain Parker. The Bureau of Immigration also We disagree.
argued that Parker cannot be released or
deported without the final disposition of her We disagree.
pending criminal case in Davao City.
The protective writ of amparo is a judicial
The RTC dismissed the petition, finding that remedy to expeditiously provide relief to
the detention of Parker was legal.1 Parker then violations of a person's constitutional right to
appealed the case to the Court of Appeals life, liberty, and security, and more
(CA). The CA affirmed the RTC and found that specifically, to address the problem of
Parker failed to prove that she was a Filipino extralegal killings and enforced
citizen to warrant judicial intervention through disappearances or threats thereof. Section 1
habeas corpus.2 The CA gave weight to the of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC provides:
Certification dated 20 June 2015 issued by the
Office of the Consular Affairs of the DFA that Sec. 1. Petition. - The petition for a writ of
there is "no available data" regarding any amparo is a remedy available to any person
record/information from the year 1990 whose right to life, liberty and security is
onwards of Philippine Passport No. violated or threatened with violation by an
:XX5678508. Parker no longer appealed the unlawful act or omission of a public official or
denial of the issuance of the writ of habeas employee, or of a private individual or entity.
corpus and the decision of the CA became
final and executory on 5 January 2016.3
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
On 23 March 2017, Callo filed this petition for (Emphasis
a writ of amparo with prayer to issue Interim
Reliefs of Immediate Release of Danielle Tan
supplied)
Parker from Detention. Callo argues that
Parker is a natural-born Filipino citizen and
thus, there is no reason for her to be detained It is clear from the above-quoted provision that
by the Bureau of Immigration. the writ of amparo covers extralegal killings
and enforced disappearances or threats
thereof4 Enforced disappearance is defmed
The Issue
under Republic Act (RA) No. 9851,5 Section
3(g) of which provides:
The only issue in this case is whether or not
the right to life, liberty, and security of Parker
(g) "Enforced or involuntary disappearance of
is threatened by the respondents to warrant
persons" means the arrest, detention, or
the issuance of the writ of amparo and
abduction of persons by, or with the
subsequently the award of the interim reliefs.
authorization, support or acquiescence of a
State or a political organization followed by a
The Ruling of the Court refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of
freedom or to give information on the fate or
The petition has no merit. whereabouts of those persons, with the
intention of removing from the protection of There is also no threat of such enforced
the law for a prolonged period of time. disappearance. While there is indeed a
1âwphi1
It is clear that the elements of enforced Callo has failed to prove that Danielle Tan
disappearance are not attendant in this case. Parker and Danielle Nopuente are two
different persons. In particular, we give weight and successive order of who can file a petition
to the fact that the DFA issued a certificate for a writ of amparo. We held:
verifying that there is no available data on
Passport No. XX5678508, which was the Petitioners finally point out that the parents of
Philippine passport used by Sherlyn and Karen do not have the requisite
Parker.11 Moreover, the Certificate of Live standing to file the amparo petition on behalf
Birth,12 which purportedly shows that Parker of Merino. They call attention to the fact that in
was born in the Philippines on 21 March 1975 the amparo petition, the parents of Sherlyn
of Filipino parents, was only registered on 4 and Karen merely indicated that they were
January 2010. There was no explanation "concerned with Manuel Merino" as basis for
given as to why Parker's birth was registered filing the petition on his behalf.
only after almost 35 years. Moreover, Callo
only alleges facts from the year 2005, Section 2 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo
allegedly for purposes of brevity.13 We do not provides:
see any reason why facts surrounding the
existence of Parker should only be presented
The petition may be filed by the aggrieved
from 2005. In fact, the only period that is
party or by any qualified person or entity in the
thoroughly discussed about her is from 2010
following order:
to 2011. To prove that Parker and Nopuente
are two different persons, the life and
existence of Parker should have been alleged (a) Any member of the immediate family,
and proven since birth. In this case, there is namely: the spouse, children and parents of
no allegation nor any proof as to who Parker the aggrieved party; (b) Any ascendant,
was, or what she had been doing, before descendant or collateral relative of the
2011. Taking all these circumstances into aggrieved party within the fourth civil degree
perspective, Parker had failed to sufficiently of consanguinity or affinity, in default of those
prove that she is a different person from mentioned in the preceding paragraph; or
Danielle Nopuente.
(c) Any concerned citizen, organization,
Callo contends that Parker's life is association or institution, if there is no known
endangered in the Immigration I Detention member of the immediate family or relative of
Facility because of the threats against her by the aggrieved party. 1âwphi 1
SO ORDERED.