1
In its decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 00214, the CA held that (i) the 10- year cargo-
G.R. No. 214864
PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY (PPA), represented by Oscar M. Sevilla,
General Manager, Benjamin B. Cecilio, Assistant Manager for Operations,
and Sisali B. Arap, Port Manager, Petitioner
vs
NASIPIT INTEGRATED ARRASTRE AND STEVEDORING SERVICES, INC.
(NIASSI), represented by Ramon Calo, Respondent
G.R. No. 196864 July 8, 2015
SPOUSES VICTOR P. DULNUAN and JACQUELINE P. DULNUAN, Petitioners,
vs.
METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY, Respondent.
handling contract had already been perfected, and (ii) the HOA and its subsequent
extensions constituted partial fulfillment thereof. For emphasis, the relevant portions
are reproduced:
Verily, the Holdover Authority (HOA) granted by the private respondent and the
series of extensions allowing the petitioner to operate provisionally the arrastre
service confirm the perfection of their contract despite the delay in its consummation
due to acts attributable to the private respondents. But it cannot be gainsaid that the
series of extensions constitute partial fulfillment and execution of the contract of
cargo handling services.
It is therefore Our submission that a perfected contract of cargo handling services
existed when the petitioner won the bidding, given the Notice of Award and
conformed to the conditions set forth in the Notice of Award because the
requirements prescribed in the Notice of Award have no bearing on the perfection
of the contract. On the contrary, it amounted to a qualified acceptance of petitioner's
offer, a clear legal right to continue its operations in the port. Since the respondent
is bound by the contract, the act of taking over the cargo handling service from the
petitioner is violative of its right.58
A writ of preliminary injunction and a TRO are injunctive reliefs and preservative
remedies for the protection of substantive rights and interests. An application for
1âwphi1
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or TRO may be granted upon
the filing of a verified application showing facts entitling the applicant to the relief
demanded.14 The purpose of injunction is to prevent threatened or continuous
irremediable injury to some of the parties before their claims can be thoroughly
studied and educated. Its sole aim is to preserve the status quo until the merits of
the case is heard fully.15
The status quo is the last actual, peaceable and uncontested situation which
precedes a controversy.16 The status quo should be that existing at the time of the
filing of the case. A preliminary injunction should not establish new relations
between the parties, but merely maintain or re-establish the pre-existing
relationship between them.
 2

Thus, to be entitled to the injunctive writ, petitioners must show that (1) there exists
a clear and unmistakable right to be protected; (2) this right is directly threatened
by an act sought to be enjoined; (3) the invasion of the right is material and
substantial; and (4) there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to
prevent serious and irreparable damage.17

As such, a writ of preliminary injunction may be issued only upon clear showing of
an actual existing right to be protected during the pendency of the principal action.
The requisites of a valid injunction are the existence of the right and its actual or
threatened violations. Thus, to be entitled to an injunctive writ, the right to be
protected and the violation against the right must be shown.

A writ of possession is simply an order by which the sheriff is commanded by the

court to place a person in possession of a real or personal property. Under Section
7 of Act No. 3135, as amended, a writ of possession may be issued in favor of a
purchaser in a foreclosure sale either (1) within the one-year redemption period,
upon the filing of a bond; or (2) after the lapse of the redemption period, without
need of a bond. Within the one-year redemption period, the purchaser may apply
for a writ of possession by filing a petition in the form of an ex parte motion under
oath, in the registration or cadastral proceedings of the registered property. The
law requires only that the proper motion be filed, the bond approved and no third
person is involved. After the consolidation of title in the buyer’s name for failure of
the mortgagor to redeem the property, entitlement to the writ of possession
becomes a matter of right. In the latter case, the right of possession becomes
absolute because the basis thereof is the purchaser’s ownership of the property.

It is an established rule that the purchaser in an extra-judicial foreclosure sale is

entitled to the possession of the property and can demand that he be placed in
possession of the same either during (with bond) or after the expiration (without
bond) of the redemption period therefor.20 The non-expiration of the period of
redemption shall not preclude the purchaser from taking possession of the
property provided that the necessary is posted. The buyer can in fact demand
possession of the land even during the redemption period except that he has to
post a bond in accordance with Section 721 of Act No. 3135, as amended. In the
case at bar, Metrobank manifested its willingness to post a bond but its application
for the issuance of the writ of possession was unjustly denied by the RTC.
 3

Second. The pendency of the action assailing the validity of the mortgage should
not bar the issuance of the writ of possession. A pending action for annulment of
1âw phi 1

mortgage or foreclosure does not stay the issuance of a writ of

possession.22 Regardless of the pendency of such suit, the purchaser remains
entitled to a writ of possession, without prejudice, of course, to the eventual
outcome of the pending annulment case. Emphatic to the point is the ruling of the
Court in Spouses Fortaleza v. Spouses Lapitan:23

Indeed, "[t]he judge with whom an application for writ of possession is filed need
not look into the validity of the mortgage or the manner of its foreclosure." The writ
issues as a matter of course. "The rationale for the rule is to allow the purchaser to
have possession of the foreclosed property without delay, such possession being
founded on the right of ownership."

While the grant or denial of the preliminary injunction rests on the sound discretion
of the court taking cognizance of the case, and judicial discretion of the court in
injunctive matters should not be interfered with,24 in the absence of clear and legal
right, however, the issuance of a writ of injunction constitutes a grave abuse of
discretion.25

Grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of writs of preliminary injunction implies

a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction;
or the exercise of power in an arbitrary despotic manner by reason of passion,
prejudice or personal aversion amounting to an evasion of a positive duty or to a
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of
law.26 The burden is thus on petitioner to show in his application that there is
meritorious ground for the issuance of TRO in his favor.27 When the complainant’s
right is doubtful or disputed, he does not have a clear legal right and, therefore, the
issuance of injunctive writ is improper.28 Herein, the Spouses Dulnuan failed to
show that they have clear and unmistakable right to the issuance of writ in
question.

A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an

action prior to the judgment or final order requiring a party or a court,
 4

agency or a person to refrain from a particular act or acts.27 It is the

"strong arm of equity,"28 an extraordinary peremptory remedy that
[G.R. NO. 170038 - July 11, 2012] must be used with extreme caution,29 affecting as it does the respective
rights of the parties.30
ςrν ll

CHINA BANKING CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. SPS. HARRY

CIRIACO and ESTHER CIRIACO, Respondents. Sections 3 and 5, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on
preliminary injunction, pertinent to this case, provide the requirements
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or a TRO: Ï‚rαl Î

From the provisions, it appears clearly that before a writ of preliminary

injunction may be issued, a clear showing must be made that there
exists a right to be protected and that the acts against which the writ is
to be directed are violative of an established right.32 The holding of a
hearing, where both parties can introduce evidence and present their
side, is also required before the courts may issue a TRO or an injunctive
writ.33
ςrνll

Generally, an RTC's decision to grant or to deny injunctive relief will not

be set aside on appeal, unless the trial court abused its discretion. In
granting or denying injunctive relief, a court abuses its discretion when
it lacks jurisdiction; fails to consider and make a record of the factors
relevant to its determination; relies on clearly erroneous factual
findings; considers clearly irrelevant or improper factors; clearly gives
too much weight to one factor; relies on erroneous conclusions of law or
equity; or misapplies its factual or legal conclusions.34
ςrνl l

Every court should remember that an injunction is a limitation upon the

freedom of the defendant s action and should not be granted lightly or
precipitately. It should be granted only when the court is fully satisfied
that the law permits it and the emergency demands it;37 no power
exists whose exercise is more delicate, which requires greater caution
and deliberation, or is more dangerous in a doubtful case, that the
issuance of an injunction.38 ςrνll

G.R. No. 157163 June 25, 2014
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUDGE AGAPITO L. HONTANOSAS, JR., REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH 16, CEBU CITY, SILVERIO BORBON, SPOUSES XERXES AND
ERLINDA FACULTAD, AND XM FACULTAD & DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, Respondents.
5
The determinants of whether an action is of a real or a personal nature have been
fixed by the Rules of Courtand relevant jurisprudence. According to Section 1,
Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, a real action is one that affects title to or possession
of real property, or an interest therein.
Such action is to be commenced and tried in the proper court having jurisdiction
over the area wherein the real property involved, ora portion thereof, is situated,
which explains why the action is also referred to as a localaction. In contrast, the
Rules of Courtdeclares all other actionsas personal actions.15
Such actions may include those brought for the recovery of personal property, or
for the enforcement of some contract or recovery of damages for its breach, or for
the recovery of damages for the commission of an injury to the person or
property.16
The venue of a personal action isthe place where the plaintiff or any of the
principal plaintiffs resides,or where the defendant or any of the principal
defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be
found, at the election of the plaintiff,17 for which reason the action is considered a
transitory one.
Well-settled is the rule that an action to annul a contract of loan and its accessory
real estate mortgageis a personal action. In a personal action, the plaintiff seeks
the recovery of personal property, the enforcement of a contractor the recovery of
damages. In contrast, in a real action, the plaintiff seeks the recovery of real
property, or, as indicated in Section 2 (a), Rule 4 of the then Rules of Court, a real
action is an action affecting title to real property or for the recovery of possession,
or for partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of mortgage on, real property
In the Pascual case, relied upon by petitioner, the contract of sale of the fishpond
was assailed as fictitious for lack of consideration. We held that there being no
contract to begin with, there is nothing to annul. Hence, we deemed the action for
annulment of the said fictitious contract therein as one constituting a real action for
the recovery of the fishpond subject thereof.
 6

We cannot, however, apply the foregoing doctrine to the instant case. Note that in
Pascual, title to and possession of the subject fishpond had already passed to the
vendee. There was, therefore, a need to recover the said fishpond. But in the
instant case, ownership of the parcels of land subject of the questioned real
estatemortgage was never transferred to petitioner, but remained with TOPROS.

Despite well-entrenched jurisprudence and circulars regarding exercise of

judiciousness and care in the issuance of temporary restraining orders (TRO) or
grant of writs ofpreliminary injunction, reports or complaints on abuses committed
by trial judges in connection therewith persist. Some even intimated
thatirregularities, including corruption, might have influenced the issuance ofthe
TRO or the writ of preliminary injunction.

No less than the President of the Philippines has requested this Court to issue a
circular reminding judges to respect P.D. No. 1818, which prohibits the issuance of
TROs in cases involving implementation of government infrastructure projects. The
Office of the President has likewise brought to the attention of this Court orders of
judges releasing imported articles under seizure and forfeiture proceedings by the
Bureau of Customs.

Judges are thus enjoined to observe utmost caution, prudence and judiciousness
in the issuance of TRO and in the grant of writs of preliminary injunction to avoid
any suspicion that its issuance or grant was for considerations other than the strict
merits of the case.

Judges should bear in mind that in Garcia v. Burgos(291 SCRA 546, 571-572
[1998]), this Court explicitly stated:

Sec. 1 of PD 1818 distinctly provides that "[n]o court in the Philippines shall have
jurisdiction to issue any restraining order, preliminary injunction, or preliminary
mandatory injunction in any case, dispute, orcontroversy involvingan infrastructure
project . . . of the government, . . . to prohibit any person or persons, entity or
government official from proceeding with, or continuing the execution or
implementation of any such project . . . or pursuing any lawful activity necessary
for such execution, implementation or operation." At the risk of being repetitious,
we stress that the foregoing statutory provision expressly deprives courts of
 7

jurisdiction to issue injunctive writs against the implementation or execution of an

infrastructure project.

Their attention is further invited to Circular No. 68-94, issued on 3 November 1994
by the OCA OIC Deputy Court Administrator Reynaldo L. Suarez, on the subject
"Strict Observance of Section 1 of P.D. 1818 Envisioned by Circular No. 13-93
dated March 5, 1993, and Circular No. 20-92 dated March 24, 1992.

Finally, judges should never forget what the Court categorically declared in Mison
v. Natividad(213 SCRA 734, 742 [1992] that "[b]y express provision of law, amply
supported by well-settled jurisprudence, the Collector of Customs has exclusive
jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture proceedings, and regular courts cannot
interfere with his exercise thereof or stifleor put it to naught."

The Office of the Court Administrator shall see to it that this circular is immediately
disseminated and shall monitor implementation thereof.

STRICT OBSERVANCE AND COMPLIANCE of this Circular is hereby enjoined.

AC No. 07-99 was irrelevant herein, however, because Civil Case No. CEB-26468
did not involve the implementation of infrastructure projects, or the seizure and
forfeiture proceedings by the Bureau of Customs. Consequently, the petitioner’s
urging that respondent Judge be held administratively liable for violating AC No.
07-99 was misplaced.

However, the RTC’s issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the
petitioner from proceeding withthe foreclosure of the mortgages was plainly
erroneous and unwarranted.

A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action prior to the

judgment or final order requiring a party or a court, agency or a person to refrain
from a particular act or acts.27 It is the "strong arm of equity," an extraordinary
peremptory remedy that must be used with extreme caution, affecting as it does
the respective rights of the parties.28

A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or proceeding

prior to the judgment orfinal order requiring a party or a court, an agency, or a
 8

person to refrain from a particular act or acts. It may also require the performance
of a particular act or acts, in which case it is known as a preliminary mandatory
injunction. Thus, a prohibitory injunction is one that commands a party to refrain
from doing a particular act, while a mandatory injunction commands the
performance of some positive act to correct a wrong in the past.

As with all equitable remedies, injunction must be issued only at the instance of a
party who possesses sufficient interest in or title to the right or the property sought
to be protected. It is proper only when the applicant appears to be entitled to the
relief demanded in the complaint, which must aver the existence of the right and
the violation of the right, or whose averments must in the minimum constitute a
prima facieshowing of a right to the final relief sought. Accordingly, the conditions
for the issuance of the injunctive writ are: (a) that the right to be protected exists
prima facie; (b) that the act sought to be enjoined is violative of that right; and (c)
that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious
damage. An injunction will not issue to protect a right not in esse, or a right which
is merely contingent and may never arise; or to restrain an act which does not give
rise to a cause of action; or to prevent the perpetration of an act prohibited
bystatute. Indeed, a right, to be protected by injunction, means a right clearly
founded on or granted by law or is enforceable as a matter of law

It is true that the trial courts are given generous latitude to act on applications for
the injunctive writ for the reason that conflicting claims in an application for the writ
more often than not involve a factual determination that is not the function of the
appellate courts;31 and that the exercise of sound discretion by the issuing courts in
injunctive matters ought not to be interfered with exceptwhen there is manifest
abuse.32 Nonetheless, the exercise of such discretion must be sound, that is, the
issuance of the writ, though discretionary, should be upon the grounds and in the
manner provided by law.33 Judges should always bear in mind that the writ of
preliminary injunction is issued uponthe satisfaction of two requisite conditions,
namely: (1) the right to be protected exists prima facie; and (2) the acts sought to
be enjoined are violative of that right. According toSaulog v. Court of Appeals,34 the
applicant must have a sufficient interest or right to be protected, but it is enough
that:-

x x x for the court to act, there must be an existing basis of facts affording a
present right which is directly threatened by an act sought to be enjoined. And
while a clear showing ofthe right claimed is necessary, its existence need not be
 9

conclusively established. In fact, the evidence to be submitted to justify preliminary

injunction at the hearing thereon need not be conclusive or complete but need only
be a "sampling" intended merely to give the court an idea of the justification for the
preliminary injunction pending the decision of the case on the merits. This should
really be so since our concern here involves only the propriety of the preliminary
injunction and not the merits of the case still pending with the trial court.

Thus, to be entitled to the writ ofpreliminary injunction, the private respondent

needs only to show that it has the ostensible right to the final relief prayed for in its
complaint x x x.

It is also basic that the power to issue a writ of injunction is to be exercised only
where the reason and necessity therefor are clearly established, and only in cases
reasonably free from doubt.35 For, truly, a preliminary injunction should not
determine the merits of a case,36 or decide controverted facts.37 As a preventive
remedy, injunction only seeks to prevent threatened wrong,38 further injury,39 and
irreparable harm40 or injustice41 until the rights of the parties can be settled. As an
1âwphi1

ancillary and preventive remedy, it may be resorted to by a party to protect or

preserve his rights during the pendency of the principal action, and for no other
purpose.42 Such relief will accordingly protect the ability of the court to render a
meaningful decision;43 it will further serve to guard against a change of
circumstances that will hamper orprevent the granting of proper relief after a trial
on the merits.44 Verily, its essential function is to preserve the status quo between
the parties until the merits of the case can be heard.45

Moreover, the applicant must prove that the violation sought to be prevented would
cause an irreparable injustice.46 But the respondents failed to establish the
irreparable injury they would suffer should the writ of preliminary injunction not be
issued. Theyprincipally feared the loss of their possession and ownership of the
mortgaged properties, and faced the possibility of a criminal prosecution for the
post-dated checks they issued. But such fear of potential loss ofpossession and
ownership, or facing a criminal prosecution did not constitute the requisite
irreparable injury that could have warranted the issuance of the writ of injunction.
"An injury is considered irreparable," according to Philippine National Bank v.
Castalloy Technology Corporation,47

x x x if it is of such constant and frequent recurrence that no fair or reasonable

redress can be had therefor ina court of law, or where there is no standard by
 10

which their amount canbe measured with reasonable accuracy, that is, it is not
susceptible of mathematical computation. The provisional remedy of preliminary
injunction may only be resorted to when there is a pressing necessity to avoid
injurious consequences which cannot be remedied under any standard of
compensation.

As a general rule, the courts will not issue writs of prohibition or injunction –
whether preliminary or final – in order to enjoin or restrain any criminal
prosecution.48 But there are extreme cases in which exceptions to the general rule
have been recognized, including: (1) when the injunction is necessary to afford
adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused; (2) when it is
necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or
multiplicity of actions; (3) when there is a prejudicial question that is sub judice; (4)
when the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority; (5) when the
prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation; (6) when double
jeopardy is clearly apparent; (7) when the court has no jurisdiction over the
offense; (8) when it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution; (9) when the
January 25, 2017 charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance; and (10)
when there is clearly no prima faciecase against the accused and a motion to
G.R. No. 215807 quash on that ground has been denied.49 However, the respondents did not
sufficiently show that Civil Case No. CEB-26468 came under any of the foregoing
ROSARIO E. CAHAMBING, Petitioner exceptions. Hence, the issuance by the RTC of the writ of preliminary injunction to
vs. enjoin the petitioner from instituting criminal complaints for violation of BP No. 22
VICTOR ESPINOSA and JUANA ANG, Respondent against the respondents was unwarranted

In Philippine National Bank v. RJ Ventures Realty and Development Corporation,

et al., 8 this Court exhaustively discussed the nature of a writ of preliminary
injunction, thus:

Foremost, we reiterate that the sole object of a preliminary injunction is to maintain

the status quo until the merits can be heard.9 A preliminary injunction 10 is an order
granted at any stage of an action prior to judgment or final order, requiring a party,
court, agency, or person to refrain from a parti.cular act or acts. It is a preservative
 11

remedy to ensure the protection of a party's substantive rights or interests pending

the final judgment in the principal action. A plea for an injunctive writ lies upon the
existence of a claimed emergency or extraordinary situation which should be
avoided for otherwise, the outcome of a litigation

Otherwise stated, for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction to issue, the following

requisites must be present, to wit: (1) the existence of a clear and unmistakable
right that must be protected, and (2) an urgent and paramount necessity for the
writ to prevent serious damage.12 Indubitably, this Court has likewise stressed that
the very foundation of the jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction rests in the
existence of a cause of action and in the probability of irreparable injury,
inadequacy of pecuniary compensation, and the prevention of multiplicity of
suits. 13

Sine dubio, the grant or denial of a writ of preliminary injunction in a pending case,
rests in the sound discretion of the court taking cognizance of the case since the
assessment and evaluation of evidence towards that end involve findings of facts
left to the said court for its conclusive determination. 14 Hence, the exercise of
judicial discretion by a court in injunctive matters must not be interfered with
except when there is grave abuse of discretion. 15 Grave abuse of discretion in the
issuance of writs of preliminary injunction implies a capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment that is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice or
personal aversion amounting to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all in contemplation of law.

ZUNECA PHARMACEUTICAL, AKRAM ARAIN AND/OR VENUS ARAIN, M.D. DBA ZUNECA We hold that the issues raised in the instant petition have been rendered moot and academic
PHARMACEUTICAL, Petitioners, v. NATRAPHARM, INC., Respondent. given the RTC's December 2, 2011 Decision on the merits of the case.

Rule 58 of the Rules of Court provides for both preliminary and permanent injunction. Section 1,
G.R. No. 197802
Rule 58 provides for the definition of preliminary injunction: A preliminary injunction is an order
granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to the judgment or final order,
November 11, 2015 requiring a party or a court, agency or a person to refrain from a particular act or acts. It
may also require the performance of a particular act or acts, in which case it shall be known as a
VILLARAMA, JR., J.: preliminary mandatory injunction.

A writ of preliminary injunction is generally based solely on initial and incomplete

evidence.30 The evidence submitted during the hearing on an application for a writ
 12

of preliminary injunction is not conclusive or complete for only a sampling is

needed to give the trial court an idea of the justification for the preliminary
injunction pending the decision of the case on the merits.31 As such, the findings of
fact and opinion of a court when issuing the writ of preliminary injunction
are interlocutory in nature and made even before the trial on the merits is
commenced or terminated.32

SEC. 9. When final injunction granted. — If after the trial of the action it appears
that the applicant is entitled to have the act or acts complained of permanently
enjoined, the court shall grant a final injunction perpetually restraining the party or
person enjoined from the commission or continuance of the act or acts or
confirming the preliminary mandatory injunction.

By contrast a permanent injunction, based on Section 9, Rule 58 of the Rules of

Court, forms part of the judgment on the merits and it can only be properly ordered
only on final judgment.

A permanent injunction may thus be granted after a trial or hearing on the merits of
the case and a decree granting or refusing an injunction should not be entered
until after a hearing on the merits where a verified answer containing denials is
filed or where no answer is required, or a rule to show cause is equivalent to an
answer.

As such a preliminary injunction, like any preliminary writ and any interlocutory
order, cannot survive the main case of which it is an incident; because an ancillary
writ of preliminary injunction loses its force and effect after the decision in the main
petition.

We note that the case brought to the CA on a petition for certiorari merely involved
the RTC's denial of respondent's application for a writ of preliminary injunction, a
mere ancillary writ. Since a decision on the merits has already been rendered and
which includes in its disposition a permanent injunction, the proper remedy is an
appeal36 from the decision in the main case.

G.R. No. 217617

 13

The Issuance of a TRO/WPI is not a

prejudgment of the main case
G.R. No. 217617
From the foregoing provision, it is clear that a writ of preliminary injunction is
CARMELITA T. BORLONGAN, Petitioner, warranted where there is a showing that there exists a right to be protected and
vs. that the acts against which the writ is to be directed violate an established right.
BANCO DE ORO (formerly EQUITABLE PCI BANK), Respondent. Otherwise stated, for a court to decide on the propriety of issuing a TRO and/or a
WPI, it must only inquire into the existence of two things: (1) a clear and
RESOLUTION unmistakable right that must be protected; and (2) an urgent and paramount
necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.
VELASCO, JR, J.:
In Levi Strauss (Phils.) Inc. v. Vogue Traders Clothing Company,6 the Court
already explained that the issuance of a TRO is not conclusive of the outcome of
the case as it requires but a sampling of the evidence, viz:

Indeed, a writ of preliminary injunction is generally based solely on initial and

incomplete evidence adduced by the applicant (herein petitioner). The evidence
submitted during the hearing of the incident is not conclusive, for only a
"sampling" is needed to give the trial court an idea of the justification for its
issuance pending the decision of the case on the merits. As such, the findings
of fact and opinion of a court when issuing the writ of preliminary injunction are
interlocutory in nature. Moreover, the sole object of a preliminary injunction is
to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard. Since
Section 4 of Rule 58 of the Rules of Civil Procedure gives the trial courts sufficient
discretion to evaluate the conflicting claims in an application for a provisional writ
which often involves a factual determination, the appellate courts generally will not
interfere in the absence of manifest abuse of such discretion. A writ of
preliminary injunction would become a prejudgment of a case only when it
grants the main prayer in the complaint or responsive pleading, so much so
that there is nothing left for the trial court to try except merely incidental matters.

The appellate court's error is readily apparent given the stark existence of the
grounds for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.

On the first ground, petitioner has a clear and unmistakable right that must be
protected. This right is not just her proprietary rights over the subject property but
 14

her constitutionally protected right to due process before she can be deprived
of her property. No less than Section 1 of the Bill of Rights of the 1987 Constitution
mandates that:

No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of

law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. (emphasis
supplied)

In its classic formulation, due process means that any person with interest to the
thing in litigation must be notified and given an opportunity to def end that
interest. 8 Thus, as the essence of due process lies in the reasonable opportunity
to be heard and to submit any evidence the defendant may have in support of her
defense, she must be properly served the summons of the court. In other
words, the service of summons is a vital and indispensable ingredient of due
process 9 and compliance with the rules regarding the service of the summons is
as much an issue of due process as it is of jurisdiction. 10 Unfortunately, as will be
discussed, it would seem that the Constitutional right of the petitioner to be
properly served the summons and be notified has been disregarded by the officers
of the trial court.

At this very juncture, the existence of the second ground for the issuance of a TRO
and/or WPI is self-evident. Without a TRO and/or WPI enjoining the respondent
bank from continuing in the possession and consolidating the ownership of the
subject property, petitioner's right to be afforded due process will unceasingly
be violated.

It need not be stressed that a continuous violation of constitutional rights is by itself

a grave and irreparable injury that this or any court cannot plausibly tolerate.

Without a doubt, the appellate court should have acted intrepidly and issued the
TRO and/or WPI posthaste to protect the constitutional rights of petitioner, as it is
duty-bound to do
G.R. No. 172909 March 5, 2014 As the lower courts correctly found, Tuazon had no ownership to confer to the
petitioners despite the latter’s reimbursement of Tuazon’s purchase expenses.
SPOUSES SILVESTRE O. PLAZA AND ELENA Y. PLAZA, Petitioners, Because they were never owners of the property, the petitioners failed to establish
vs. entitlement to the writ of preliminary injunction. "[T]o be entitled to an injunctive
writ, the right to be protected and the violation against that right must be shown. A

GUILLERMO LUSTIVA, ELEODORA VDA. DE MARTINEZ AND VICKY
SAYSON GOLOSENO, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
G.R. No. 206808-09, September 07, 2016
LOCAL WATER UTILITIES ADMINISTRATION EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION FOR PROGRESS (LEAP), MELANIO B. CUCHAPIN
II, GREARDO* G. PERU, ROLAND S. CABAHUG, GLORIA P.
VELASQUEZ, ERLINDA G. VILLANUEVA, TEODORO M. REYNOSO,
FERNANDO L. NICANDRO, JOSEPHINE P. SIMENE, LAMBERTO R.
RIVERA, REYNALDO M. VIDA, and RUCTICO** B.
TUTOL, Petitioners, v. LOCAL WATER UTILITIES ADMINISTRATION
(LWUA) and DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
15
writ of preliminary injunction may be issued only upon clear showing of an actual
existing right to be protected during the pendency of the principal action. When the
complainant’s right or title is doubtful or disputed, he does not have a clear legal
right and, therefore, the issuance of injunctive relief is not proper."23
Likewise, upon the dismissal of the main case by the RTC on August 8, 2013, the
question of issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction has become moot and
academic. In Arevalo v. Planters Development Bank,24 the Court ruled that a case
becomes moot and academic when there is no more issue between the parties or
object that can be served in deciding the merits of the case. Upon the dismissal of
the main action, the question of the non-issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
automatically died with it. A writ of preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy; it
is auxiliary, an adjunct of, and subject to the determination of the main action. It is
deemed lifted upon the dismissal of the main case, any appeal therefrom
notwithstanding.25
A writ of preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an
action or proceeding prior to the judgment or final order, requiring a
party or a court, agency or a person to refrain from a particular act or
acts.20 It is merely a provisional remedy, adjunct to the main case
subject to the latter's outcome. It is not a cause of action in itself. The
writ is provisional because it constitutes a temporary measure availed of
during the pendency of the action and it is ancillary because it is a mere
incident in and is dependent upon the result of the main action.21 Being
an ancillary or auxiliary remedy, it is available during the pendency of
the action which may be resorted to by a litigant to preserve and
protect certain rights and interests therein pending rendition, and for
purposes of the ultimate effects, of a final judgment in the case.22
It is well settled that the sole object of a preliminary injunction, whether
prohibitory or mandatory, is to preserve the status quo until the merits
of the case can be heard.23 It is usually granted when it is made to
appear that there is a substantial controversy between the parties and
one of them is committing an act or threatening the immediate
commission of an act that will cause irreparable injury or destroy
 16

the status quo of the controversy before a full hearing can be had on
the merits of the case.24 It persists until it is dissolved or until the
termination of the action without the court issuing a final injunction.25 c

"a dismissal, discontinuance or non-suit of an action in which a

restraining order or temporary injunction has been granted operates as
a dissolution of the restraining order or temporary injunction,"
regardless of whether the period for filing a motion for reconsideration
of the order dismissing the case or appeal therefrom has expired. The
rationale therefor is that even in cases where an appeal is taken from a
judgment dismissing an action on the merits, the appeal does not
suspend the judgment, hence the general rule applies that a temporary
injunction terminates automatically on the dismissal of the action.28
ralawred

SECOND DIVISION "Injunction is a judicial writ, process or proceeding whereby a party is

ordered to do or refrain from doing a certain act. It may be the main
G.R. No. 173036 : September 26, 2012 action or merely a provisional remedy for and as an incident in the main
action."45 For an injunction to issue, the following essential requisites
ςrν ll

AGOO RICE MILL CORPORATION (represented by its President, must be present: (1) there must be a right in esse or the existence of a
Kam Biak Y. Chan, Jr.), Petitioner, v. LAND BANK OF THE right to be protected; and (2) the act against which the injunction is
PHILIPPINES, Respondent. directed to constitute a violation of such right.46
ςrν ll

DECISION Section 2 of the same decree further provides that: chanroblesv irt uallawl ibra ry

BRION, J.: Section 2. No restraining order. temporary or permanent injunction

shall be issued by the court against any government financial institution
in any action taken by such institution in compliance with the
mandatory foreclosure provided in Section 1 hereof whether such
restraining order. temporary or permanent injunction is sought
by the borrower(s) or any third party or parties, except after
due hearing in which it is established by the borrower and
admitted by the government financial institution concerned

G.R. No. 156015. August 11, 2005
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by LT. GEN. JOSE M.
CALIMLIM, in his capacity as former Chief of the Intelligence Service, Armed
Forces of the Philippines (ISAFP), and former Commanding General,
Presidential Security Group (PSG), and MAJ. DAVID B. DICIANO, in his
capacity as an Officer of ISAFP and former member of the PSG, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. VICTORINO EVANGELISTA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 223, Quezon City, and DANTE LEGASPI,
represented by his attorney-in-fact, Paul Gutierrez, Respondent.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
17
that twenty percent (20%) of the outstanding arrearages has
been paid after the filing of foreclosure proceedings.
Injunction Became Moot and Academic
The present petition must also be denied because the act sought to be
enjoined by the ARMC is already a consummated act. The records show
that the foreclosure sale on the ARMC's JTIOligaged properties was held
sometime in June 2005 and the LBP emerged as the winning bidder. An
injunction suit becomes moot and academic after the act sought to be
enjoined had already been consummated.50 ςrνll
On the second issue, we hold that the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction
is justified. A writ of preliminary injunction is an ancilliary or preventive remedy that
is resorted to by a litigant to protect or preserve his rights or interests and for no
other purpose during the pendency of the principal action.18 It is issued by the court
to prevent threatened or continuous irremediable injury to the applicant before his
claim can be thoroughly studied and adjudicated.19 Its aim is to preserve the status
quo ante until the merits of the case can be heard fully, upon the applicant’s
showing of two important conditions, viz.: (1) the right to be protected prima
facie exists; and, (2) the acts sought to be enjoined are violative of that right.20
Section 3, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a writ of
preliminary injunction may be issued when it is established:
(a) that the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, the whole or part of such
relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts
complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited
period or perpetually;
 18

(b) that the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts

complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant;
or

(c) that a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to

do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation
of the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and
tending to render the judgment ineffectual.

It is crystal clear that at the hearing for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction, mere prima facie evidence is needed to establish the applicant’s rights
or interests in the subject matter of the main action.21 It is not required that the
applicant should conclusively show that there was a violation of his rights as this
issue will still be fully litigated in the main case.22 Thus, an applicant for a writ is
required only to show that he has an ostensible right to the final relief
prayed for in his complaint. 23

In the case at bar, we find that respondent judge had sufficient basis to issue the
writ of preliminary injunction. It was established, prima facie, that Legaspi has a
right to peaceful possession of his land, pendente lite. Legaspi had title to the
subject land. It was likewise established that the diggings were conducted by
petitioners in the enclosed area of Legaspi’s land. Whether the land fenced by
Gutierrez and claimed to be included in the land of Legaspi covered an area
beyond that which is included in the title of Legaspi is a factual issue still
subject to litigation and proof by the parties in the main case for damages. It
was necessary for the trial court to issue the writ of preliminary injunction during
the pendency of the main case in order to preserve the rights and interests of
private respondents Legaspi and Gutierrez

THIRD DIVISION Petitioner prays for the issuance of an injunctive writ to prevent grave and
irreparable damage to its reputation as a real estate developer.65 Indeed, injunctive
October 11, 2017 relief could be granted to prevent grave and irreparable damage to a business
entity's goodwill and business reputation.66
G.R. No. 207938
Injury is considered irreparable if "there is no standard by which [its] amount can
be measured with reasonable accuracy."67 The injury must be such that its
 19

EVY CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner pecuniary value cannot be estimated, and thus, cannot fairly compensate for the
vs. loss.68 For this reason, the loss of goodwill and business reputation, being
VALIANT ROLL FORMING SALES CORPORATION, Respondent unquantifiable, would be considered as grave and irreparable damage.

DECISION In Yu v. Court of Appeals,69 this Court granted an exclusive distributor's prayer for
an injunctive writ to prevent a competitor from selling the same product on the
LEONEN, J.: ground that the continued sale would "[render] illusory . . . the very purpose for
which the exclusive distributorship was conceptualized, at the expense of the sole
authorized distributor."70

In Semirara Coal Corporation v. HGL Development Corporation,71 this Court

upheld the issuance of a writ of mandatory injunction to prevent Semirara Coal
Corporation's (Semirara) continued intrusion on HGL Development Corporation's
(HGL) property. It also found that Semirara damaged HGL's business standing
when it prevented HGL from operating its cattle-grazing business on its property,
which ''[was] perceived as an inability by HGL to comply with the demands of its
customers and sow[ed] doubts in HGL's capacity to continue doing business."72

In Philippine National Bank v. RJ Ventures Realty & Development

Corporation, 73 this Court affirmed the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to
enjoin the extrajudicial foreclosure of Rajah Broadcasting Network's radio
equipment pending the resolution of the main case questioning the mortgage. This
Court found that the foreclosure would stop the operations of Rajah Broadcasting
Network's radio stations. The loss of its listenership and the damage to its image
and reputation would not be quantifiable, and thus, would be irreparable.

However, in applications for provisional injunctive writs the applicant must also
prove the urgency of the application. The possibility of a grave and irreparable
1âwphi1

injury must be established, at least tentatively, to justify the restraint of the act
complained of.74 It is "[a]s the term itself suggests ... temporary, subject to the final
disposition of the principal action."75 Its sole objective is "to preserve the status quo
until the merits can be heard."76

Petitioner alleges that the execution sale and the prior annotations on its title
caused "crucial investors and buyers"77 to withdraw, "notwithstanding the
considerable costs and expenses [it] already incurred."78This is the grave and
irreparable damage it sought to be protected from. However, the feared "damage"
 20

was caused by the execution sale and the annotations already made on the title. It
even admits that the annotations were "impairing the progress of [its] housing
development."79 In other words, petitioner failed to establish the urgent and
paramount necessity of preventing further annotations on the title.

In Cortez-Estrada v. Heirs of Samut,80 this Court held:

[T]he grant or denial of a writ of preliminary injunction in a pending case rests in

the sound discretion of the court taking cognizance of the case since the
assessment and evaluation of evidence towards that end involve findings of facts
left to the said court for its conclusive determination.81

The court's discretion is not interfered with unless there is a showing that the grant
or denial was tainted with grave abuse of discretion.82

The trial court, in the exercise of its discretion, denied petitioner's application for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction on
the ground that petitioner would still have sufficient relief in its prayer for damages
in its Complaint.83 In the event that the annotations on petitioner's title are found by
the trial court to be invalid, petitioner would have adequate relief in the removal of
the annotations and in the award of damages. Therefore, the trial court acted
within the bounds of its discretion.

SECOND DIVISION In Republic v. Court of Appeals, it was held that Special Agrarian Courts are
given original and exclusive jurisdiction over two categories of cases, to wit:
G.R. No. 182758 May 30, 2011 (1) all petitions for the determination of just compensation; and (2) the
prosecution of all criminal offenses under R.A. No. 6657. x x x The DAR, as an
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, administrative agency, cannot be granted jurisdiction over cases of eminent
vs. domain and over criminal cases. The valuation of property in eminent
HEIRS OF SEVERINO LISTANA, Respondents. domain is essentially a judicial function which is vested with the Special
Agrarian Courts and cannot be lodged with administrative
agencies.20 (Emphasis supplied)
DECISION
 21

CARPIO, J.: Thus, as a rule, the DARAB’s decision setting the amount of just compensation is
merely preliminary and not executory if challenged before the SAC. Execution
pending "appeal" of the DARAB decision is allowed only on meritorious
grounds.21 Even then, it is the SAC, not the DARAB, that can grant execution
pending "appeal" because the SAC has original and exclusive jurisdiction over just
compensation cases. The determination of the amount of just compensation is a
judicial function that cannot be usurped by administrative agencies. In Apo Fruits
Corporation v. Court of Appeals,22 the Court held that:

It is now settled that the valuation of property in eminent domain is essentially a

judicial function which is vested with the RTC acting as Special Agrarian Court.
The same cannot be lodged with administrative agencies and may not be usurped
by any other branch or official of the government.23 1avvphi1

In the present case, LBP filed with the SAC a petition for determination of the
amount of just compensation on 6 September 1999. The PARAD issued the alias
writ of execution and warrant of arrest on 27 November 2000 and 3 January 2001,
respectively. The writ of execution and warrant of arrest were invalid because the
14 October 1998 Decision of the DARAB setting the amount at ₱10,956,963.25
was merely preliminary and not executory.

In any event, the Court has reinstated the 29 January 2001 Order of the RTC
enjoining the PARAD from implementing the warrant of arrest pending final
determination of the amount of just compensation for the property. Land Bank of
the Philippines v. Listana, Sr. has long become final and executory and can no
longer be disturbed. Consequently, LBP cannot withdraw the ₱5,644,773.02 cash
bond which is a condition for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction.

G.R. No. 190134 July 8, 2015
SPOUSES ROGELIO and SHIRLEY T. LIM, Agusan Institute of Technology,
represented by DR. SHIRLEY T. LIM, President and as Attorney-in-Fact of
FELIX A. CUENCA, MARY ANN M. MALOLOT, and REY ADONIS M.
MEJORADA Petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, TWENTY-SECOND DIVISION, CAGAYAN
Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court provides that a temporary restraining
order my e issued only if it appears from the facts shown by affidavits or by verified
application that great or irreparable injury would be inflicted on the applicant before
the writ of preliminary injunction could be hear
In the event that the application for preliminary injunction is denied or not resolved
within the said period, the temporary restraining order is deemed, automatically
 22

DE ORO CITY, MINDANAO STATION; SHERIFF ARCHIBALD C. VERGA, and vacated. The effectivity of a temporary restraining order is not extendible without
his DEPUTIES, Regional Trial Court, Branch 33, Hall of Justice, Libertad, need of any judicial declaration to that effect and no court shall have authority to
Butuan City; and FIRST CONSOLIDATED BANK, Respondents. extend or renew the same on the same ground for which it was issued.

PERALTA, J.: However, if issued by the Court of Appeals or a member thereof, the temporary
restraining order shall be effective for sixty (60) days from service on the party or
person sought to be enjoined. A restraining order issued by the Supreme Court or
a member thereof shall be effective until further orders.

From the foregoing, it is clear that to be entitled to an injunctive writ, the applicant
must show that there exists a right to be protected which is directly threatened by
an act sought to be enjoined. Furthermore, there must be a showing that the
invasion of the right is material and substantial, and that there is an urgent and
paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.7

In Australian Professional Realty, Inc. v. Municipality of Padre Garcia, Batangas

Province,8 this Court held that a writ of preliminary injunction and a TRO are
injunctive reliefs and preservative remedies for the protection of substantive rights
and interest. Essential to granting the injunctive relief is the existence of an urgent
1âw phi 1

necessity for the writ in order to prevent serious damage. A TRO issues only if the
matter is of such extreme urgency that grave injustice and irreparable injury would
arise unless it is issued immediately.9

Also, the Court, in the case of Pahila-Garrido v. Tortogo,10

Emphasized that-

[I]injunctive relief is resorted to only when there is a pressing necessity to avoid

injurious consequences that cannot be redressed under any standard of
compensation. The controlling reason for the existenece of the judicial power to
issue the writ of injuction is that the court may thereby prevent a threatened or
continuous injury to some of the parties before their claims can be thoroughly
investigated and advisedly adjudicated. A writ of preliminary injunction is an
extraordinary event and is the strong arm of equity or a transcendent remedy. It is
granted only to protect actual and existing substantial rights. Without actual and
existing rights on the part of the applicant, and in the absence of facts bringing the
matter within the conditions for its issuance, the ancillary writ must be struck down
 23

for being issued in grave abuse of discretion. Thus, injunction will not issue to
protect a right not in esse, which is merely contingent, and which may never arise ,
or to restrain an act which does not give rise to a cause of action.11

Worth nothing also is the fact that the grant or denial of a writ of preliminary
injunction in a pending case rests on the sound discretion of the court taking
cognizance of the case, since the assessment and evaluation of evidence towards
that end involves findings of fact left to the said court for its conclusive
determination. Hence, the exercise of judicial discretion by a court injunctive
matters must not be interfered with, except when there is grave abuse of
discretion.12

Grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of writs of preliminary injunction implies

a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment that is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction, or where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by
reason of passion, prejudice or personal aversion amounting to an evasion of
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all in
contemplation of law.
G.R. No. 162716 September 27, 2006 Section 3, Rule 58 of the Revised Rules of Court, provides thus:

Honorable Secretary EMILIA T. BONCODIN of the Department of Budget and "Sec. 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. - A preliminary
Management (DBM), petitioner, injunction may be granted when it is established:
vs.
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION EMPLOYEES CONSOLIDATED UNION '(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the
(NECU), respondent. whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the commission
or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the
DECISION performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or
perpetually;
PANGANIBAN, C.J.:
'(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the
act or acts complained of during the litigation would probably work
injustice to the applicant; or

'(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or

is attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some
act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant
 24

respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to

render the judgment ineffectual.'"

To be entitled to a writ of injunction, a party must establish the following requisites:

(a) the right of the complainant is clear and unmistakable; (b) the invasion of the
right sought to be protected is material and substantial; and (c) there is an urgent
and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.15

The question of whether a writ of preliminary injunction should be issued is

addressed to the sound discretion of the issuing court.16 The grant of the writ is
conditioned on the existence of the movant's clear and positive right, which should
be protected.17 It is an extraordinary peremptory remedy available only on the
grounds expressly provided by law, specifically Section 3 of Rule 58.

A clear legal right means one clearly founded in or granted by law or is

"enforceable as a matter of law."18

Absent any clear and unquestioned legal right, the issuance of an injunctive writ
would constitute grave abuse of discretion.19 Injunction is not designed to protect
contingent, abstract or future rights whose existence is doubtful or disputed.20 It
cannot be grounded on the possibility of irreparable damage without proof of an
actual existing right.21 Sans that proof, equity will not take cognizance of suits to
establish title or lend its preventive aid by injunction.22

Relevantly, Olalia v. Hizon23 held as follows:

"It has been consistently held that there is no power the exercise of which
is more delicate, which requires greater caution, deliberation and sound
discretion, or more dangerous in a doubtful case, than the issuance of an
injunction. It is the strong arm of equity that should never be extended
unless to cases of great injury, where courts of law cannot afford an
adequate or commensurate remedy in damages.

"Every court should remember that an injunction is a limitation upon the

freedom of action of the defendant and should not be granted lightly or
 25

precipitately. It should be granted only when the court is fully satisfied that
the law permits it and the emergency demands it."24

While the grant of a writ of preliminary injunction generally rests on the sound
discretion of the court taking cognizance of the case, extreme caution must be
observed in the exercise of that discretion.42 A court should, as much as possible,
avoid issuing the writ, which would effectively dispose of the main case without
trial and/or due process.43

In the present case, it is evident that the only ground relied upon for injunctive
relief is the alleged nullity of petitioner's May 8, 2002 Memorandum and Auditor
Cabibihan's June 5, 2002 suspension order. Respondent contends that petitioner
and Cabibihan exceeded the limitations of their authority.

By issuing a writ premised on that sole justification, the trial court in effect
sustained respondent's claim that petitioner and Auditor Cabibihan had exceeded
their authority in ordering the suspension of the implementation of the step
increments; and that the suspension was patently invalid or, at the very least, that
the memorandum and circular were of doubtful validity. Thus, the lower court
prejudged the main case and reversed the rule on the burden of proof, because it
assumed to be true the very proposition that respondent-complainant in the RTC
was duty-bound to prove in the first place.

G.R. No. L-11130 October 8, 1917 1. That injunction should not be granted to take property out of the
possession and control of one party and to place it in the hands of another
BENITO GOLDING, plaintiff-appellee, whose title has not been clearly established by law. Another adequate,
vs. summary and speedy remedy exists for almost every case.
HIPOLITO BALATBAT, SERAPIA BALATBAR and ESTEFANIA (Devesa vs. Arbes. 13 Phil. Rep., 273; Palafox vs. Madamba, 19 Phil.
BALATBAT, defendants. Rep., 444; Evangelista vs. Pedrenos, 27 Phil. Rep., 648;
HIPOLITO BALATBAT, appellant. Gilchrist vs. Cuddy, 29 Phil. Rep., 542.)

Marcelino Lontok for appellant. 2. The writ of injunction is one of the special remedies provided by the
No appearance for appellee. Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190). It should not be issued except upon
condition that no other ordinary, speedy and adequate remedy is available
to avoid or repair the damage done, or which may be done by a new
 26

violation of the plaintiff's rights. (Palafox vs. Madamba, 19 Phil. Rep., 444;
JOHNSON, J.: Gilchrist vs. Cuddy, 29 Phil. Rep., 542.)

3. That an injunction for the issuance of which provisions is made in the

Code of Civil Procedure, while it resemble the interdictal actions of the
Spanish procedural law in some respect, is wholly distinct therefrom and,
as a rule, the circumstances under which, in accordance with the Spanish
law, "interdictos de adquirir, de retener, de recobrar, o de despojo" were
property issued would not justify nor sustain the issuance of an injunction
as defined in said Code. (Devesa vs. Arbes, 13 Phil. Rep., 273.)

4. While the writ of injunction may be issued to restrain acts of trespass

and the illegal interference with the possession of land, the cases are very
few when said writ should issue ex parte and before the defendant is given
a hearing; and it should never issue when an action for damages would
adequately compensate the injuries caused. The very foundation of the
jurisdiction to issue the writ rests in the probability of irreparable injury, the
inadequacy of pecuniary compensation, and the prevention of the
multiplicity of suits, and where facts are not shown to bring the case within
these conditions, the relief of injunction should be refused. (Western Union
Telegraph Co., vs. Judkins, 75 Ala., 428; HIgh on Injunctions, section 697;
Clark vs. Jeffersonville R. R. Co., 44 Ind., 248; Poughkeepsie Gas
Co. vs. Citizens' Gas Co., 89 N. Y. 493.) 1awphil.net

5. Injunctions to prevent trespass and the illegal interference with the

possession of land should not be granted, when the plaintiff's title is in
dispute and has not been established at law, until the question of title is
settled in a proper proceeding brought for that purpose. (Maloon vs. White,
57 N. H., 152; Greasap vs. Kemble, 26 W. Va., 603.)

6. There are cases, however, where an injunction may be granted in order

to preserve the statu quo of property until the title can be determined in a
proper action. (Clayton vs. Shoemaker and Newcomenr, 67 Mid., 216.) But
even then it should not be granted ex parte. The defendant should be
given an opportunity to be heard.

G.R. No. L-10572 December 21, 1915
FRANCIS A. CHURCHILL and STEWART TAIT, plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
JAMES J. RAFFERTY, Collector of Internal Revenue, defendant-appellant.
27
7. The remedy by injunction is never the proper remedy to deprive a
person of the possession of property. If the person in possession is in
possession illegally there exist other adequate, speedy and summary
remedies — forcible entry and detainer and ejectment. These remedies
are adequate. (Devesa vs. Arbes. 13 Phil. Rep., 273;
Palafox vs. Madamba, 19 Phil. Rep., 444.)
In the present action had the defendants appeared when they were cited so to do
and alleged and showed that they were in possession of the land in question as
owners thereof, the action would have resolved itself into one of desahucio or
ejectment, and a motion properly presented and properly supported to dissolve the
temporary injunction would have been denied. Of course, upon the theory of the
plaintiff, as presented in the record, that he was the owner of the land in question
and in possession thereof — and that fact not having been denied — and that the
defendants were mere trespassers thereon and were illegally and maliciously
interfering and molesting the plaintiff in his quiet and peaceable enjoyment of the
possession of his property, then injunction was the proper remedy for the purpose
of preventing a repetition of said illegal acts. (Maloon vs. White, 57 N. H., 152.)
The remedy by injunction is the proper remedy to prevent repeated trespass upon
real property. (Merced Mining Co., vs. Fremont, 7 Cal., 130;
Anderson vs. Harvey's Heirs, 10 Grattan [Va.], 386; Jerome vs. Ross, 7 Johnson's
Ch. Rep., 315.) But the trespass which will be enjoined must be of such a nature
that an action for damages will not adequately compensate the loss occasioned
thereby. (Smith vs. Pettingill, 15 Vt. 82; Norton vs. Snyder, 4 Thomp. & C., 330.)
So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Araullo, Street and Malcolm, JJ., concur.
The first question is one of the jurisdiction and is of vital importance to the
Government. The sections of Act No. 2339, which bear directly upon the subject,
are 139 and 140. The first expressly forbids the use of an injunction to stay the
collection of any internal revenue tax; the second provides a remedy for any wrong
in connection with such taxes, and this remedy was intended to be exclusive,
thereby precluding the remedy by injunction, which remedy is claimed to be
constitutional. The two sections, then, involve the right of a dissatisfied taxpayers
 28

to use an exceptional remedy to test the validity of any tax or to determine any
other question connected therewith, and the question whether the remedy by
injunction is exceptional.

Preventive remedies of the courts are extraordinary and are not the usual
remedies. The origin and history of the writ of injunction show that it has always
been regarded as an extraordinary, preventive remedy, as distinguished from the
common course of the law to redress evils after they have been consummated. No
injunction issues as of course, but is granted only upon the oath of a party and
when there is no adequate remedy at law. The Government does, by section 139
and 140, take away the preventive remedy of injunction, if it ever existed, and
leaves the taxpayer, in a contest with it, the same ordinary remedial actions which
prevail between citizen and citizen. The Attorney-General, on behalf of the
defendant, contends that there is no provisions of the paramount law which
prohibits such a course. While, on the other hand, counsel for plaintiffs urge that
the two sections are unconstitutional because (a) they attempt to deprive
aggrieved taxpayers of all substantial remedy for the protection of their property,
thereby, in effect, depriving them of their property without due process of law, and
(b) they attempt to diminish the jurisdiction of the courts, as conferred upon them
by Acts Nos. 136 and 190, which jurisdiction was ratified and confirmed by the Act
of Congress of July 1, 1902.

In the first place, it has been suggested that section 139 does not apply to the tax
in question because the section, in speaking of a "tax," means only legal taxes;
and that an illegal tax (the one complained of) is not a tax, and, therefore, does not
fall within the inhibition of the section, and may be restrained by injunction. There
is no force in this suggestion. The inhibition applies to all internal revenue taxes
imposes, or authorized to be imposed, by Act No. 2339. (Snyder vs. Marks, 109
U.S., 189.) And, furthermore, the mere fact that a tax is illegal, or that the law, by
virtue of which it is imposed, is unconstitutional, does not authorize a court of
equity to restrain its collection by injunction. There must be a further showing that
there are special circumstances which bring the case under some well recognized
head of equity jurisprudence, such as that irreparable injury, multiplicity of suits, or
a cloud upon title to real estate will result, and also that there is, as we have
indicated, no adequate remedy at law. This is the settled law in the United States,
even in the absence of statutory enactments such as sections 139 and 140.
(Hannewinkle vs. Mayor, etc., of Georgetown, 82 U.S., 547; Indiana Mfg.
Co. vs. Koehne, 188 U.S., 681; Ohio Tax cases, 232 U. S., 576, 587; Pittsburgh C.
 29

C. & St. L. R. Co. vs. Board of Public Works, 172 U. S., 32; Shelton vs. Plat, 139
U.S., 591; State Railroad Tax Cases, 92 U. S., 575.) Therefore, this branch of the
case must be controlled by sections 139 and 140, unless the same be held
unconstitutional, and consequently, null and void.

The right and power of judicial tribunals to declare whether enactments of

the legislature exceed the constitutional limitations and are invalid has
always been considered a grave responsibility, as well as a solemn duty.
The courts invariably give the most careful consideration to questions
involving the interpretation and application of the Constitution, and
approach constitutional questions with great deliberation, exercising their
power in this respect with the greatest possible caution and even
reluctance; and they should never declare a statute void, unless its
invalidity is, in their judgment, beyond reasonable doubt. To justify a court
in pronouncing a legislative act unconstitutional, or a provision of a state
constitution to be in contravention of the Constitution of the United States,
the case must be so clear to be free from doubt, and the conflict of the
statute with the constitution must be irreconcilable, because it is but a
decent respect to the wisdom, the integrity, and the patriotism of the
legislative body by which any law is passed to presume in favor of its
validity until the contrary is shown beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore, in
no doubtful case will the judiciary pronounce a legislative act to be contrary
to the constitution. To doubt the constitutionality of a law is to resolve the
doubt in favor of its validity. (6 Ruling Case Law, secs. 71, 72, and 73, and
cases cited therein.)

It is also the settled law in the United States that "due process of law" does not
always require, in respect to the Government, the same process that is required
between citizens, though it generally implies and includes regular allegations,
opportunity to answer, and a trial according to some well settled course of judicial
proceedings. The case with which we are dealing is in point. A citizen's property,
both real and personal, may be taken, and usually is taken, by the government in
payment of its taxes without any judicial proceedings whatever. In this country, as
well as in the United States, the officer charged with the collection of taxes is
authorized to seize and sell the property of delinquent taxpayers without applying
to the courts for assistance, and the constitutionality of the law authorizing this
procedure never has been seriously questioned. (City of Philadelphia vs. [Diehl]
The Collector, 5 Wall., 720; Nicholl vs. U.S., 7 Wall., 122, and cases cited.) This
 30

must necessarily be the course, because it is upon taxation that the Government
chiefly relies to obtain the means to carry on its operations, and it is of the utmost
importance that the modes adopted to enforce the collection of the taxes levied
should be summary and interfered with as little as possible. No government could
exist if every litigious man were permitted to delay the collection of its taxes. This
principle of public policy must be constantly borne in mind in determining cases
such as the one under consideration.

With these principles to guide us, we will proceed to inquire whether there is any
merit in the two propositions insisted upon by counsel for the plaintiffs. Section 5 of
the Philippine Bill provides: "That no law shall be enacted in said Islands which
shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or
deny to any person therein the equal protection of the law."

The origin and history of these provisions are well-known. They are found in
substance in the Constitution of the United States and in that of ever state in the
Union.

Section 3224 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, effective since 1867,
provides that: "No suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection
of any tax shall be maintained in any court."

Section 139, with which we have been dealing, reads: "No court shall have
authority to grant an injunction to restrain the collection of any internal-revenue
tax."

A comparison of these two sections show that they are essentially the same. Both
expressly prohibit the restraining of taxes by injunction. If the Supreme Court of the
United States has clearly and definitely held that the provisions of section 3224 do
not violate the "due process of law" and "equal protection of the law" clauses in the
Constitution, we would be going too far to hold that section 139 violates those
same provisions in the Philippine Bill. That the Supreme Court of the United States
has so held, cannot be doubted.

In Cheatham vs. United States (92 U.S., 85,89) which involved the validity of an
income tax levied by an act of Congress prior to the one in issue in the case of
Pollock vs. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. (157 U.S., 429) the court, through Mr.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 147861 November 18, 2005]
PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY, Petitioner, v. PIER 8 ARRASTRE
& STEVE-DORING SERVICES, INC., Respondents.
[G.R. NO. 155252]
PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY, Petitioner, v. THE COURT OF
APPEALS (FORMER Ninth Division) and PIER 8 ARRASTRE &
STEVEDORING SERVICES, INC., Respondents.
DECISION
31
Justice Miller, said: "If there existed in the courts, state or National, any general
power of impeding or controlling the collection of taxes, or relieving the hardship
incident to taxation, the very existence of the government might be placed in the
power of a hostile judiciary. (Dows vs. The City of Chicago, 11 Wall., 108.) While a
free course of remonstrance and appeal is allowed within the departments before
the money is finally exacted, the General Government has wisely made the
payment of the tax claimed, whether of customs or of internal revenue, a condition
precedent to a resort to the courts by the party against whom the tax is assessed.
In the internal revenue branch it has further prescribed that no such suit shall be
brought until the remedy by appeal has been tried; and, if brought after this, it must
be within six months after the decision on the appeal. We regard this as a
condition on which alone the government consents to litigate the lawfulness of the
original tax. It is not a hard condition. Few governments have conceded such a
right on any condition. If the compliance with this condition requires the party
aggrieved to pay the money, he must do it."
Moreover, we cannot sustain the grant of preliminary injunction as
ordered by the Court of Appeals. As a rule, an application for
preliminary injunction entails a determination of whether the requisites
provided in Rule 58 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure for the
issuance of the provisional remedy are extant. In the instant case,
however, the impact of P.D. No. 1818 the law which proscribes court
injunctions on government projects'must also be taken into account as
said law specifically excludes arrastre and stevedoring contracts along
with other activities from the sphere of the injunctive power of the
courts.23 Consequently, both issues are determinants of the
sustainability of the Court of Appeal's decision and the parameters of its
jurisdiction in the original action on certiorari .
The requisites to justify an injunctive relief are: (a) the existence of a
right in esse or the existence of a right to be protected; and (b) the act
against which injunction is to be directed as a violation of such right.24 A
preliminary injunction is proper only when the plaintiff appears to be
entitled to the relief demanded in his complaint.25
 32

PASSI admits that its contract has expired and that it is merely
occupying and operating at Pier 8 in a holdover capacity.26 Thus,
PASSI's rights over Pier 8 arise not from contractual relations with the
PPA, or a statutory grant of authority, but merely by the tolerance of
the PPA. Tolerance is not the surest footing on which a right in esse can
be established.

In fact, we have already held in Pernito Arrastre Services v.

Mendoza27 that PPA may legally oust arrastre and stevedoring operators
even when the latter had been

conferred with "holdover permits" should the exigencies of public

interest so require. Taking off from the earlier ruling in Anglo-Fil Trading
Corporation v. Lazaro,28 the Court elucidated, thus:

In the case of Anglo-Fil Trading Corporation v. Lazaro (124 SCRA 494,

512, 513 and 519), we have already underscored the fact that the
arrastre operations in the various ports in the Philippines are affected
with public interest. We ruled:

....

"The Manila South Harbor is public property owned by the State. The
operations of the premiere port of the country, including stevedoring
work, are affected with public interest. Stevedoring services are subject
to regulation and control for the public good and in the interest of
general welfare."

Undoubtedly, therefore, the State in the exercise of its police power

through its agency, the PPA, has the power to revoke the temporary
permits of petitioners, assuming the existence of valid temporary
permits, and take over the operations of the port of Tacloban whenever
the need to promote the public interest and welfare both of the
 33

stevedoring industry and the workers therein justifies such take over.
This Court has already ruled that the statute which gives PPA the
authority to implement the take over cannot be assailed on the
constitutional grounds raised by the petitioners. Thus, whatever right, if
any, that the petitioners may have acquired on the basis of the
temporary permits earlier given them must yield to the State's valid
exercise of police power.

....

Furthermore, the records will bear out the fact that only petitioner LIPSI
has a temporary permit issued by PPA. The rest of the petitioners
were either merely allowed or tolerated to operate in the port of
Tacloban. However, even on the assumption that all of them
were able to secure temporary permits from PPA, still, this does
not vest any property right on them and hence, petitioners
cannot allege a violation of their right to non-deprivation of
property without due process of law.

In the case of Anglo-Fil Trading Corporation v. Lazaro, (supra, pp. 502-

521), we ruled:

....

In the first place, the petitioners were operating merely on `hold-over'

permits . . .

Clearly, all hold-over permits were by nature temporary and

subject to subsequent policy guidelines as may be implemented
by PPA. Such should have served as sufficient notice to
petitioners that, at any time, their authorities may be
terminated.

Whether or not the petitioner would be issued a PTO depended on the

sound discretion of PPA and on the policies, rules and regulations that
 34

the latter may implement in accordance with the statutory grant of

power. Petitioners, therefore, cannot be said to have been deprived of
property without due process of law because, in this respect, what was
given them was not a property right but a mere privilege and
they should have taken cognizance of the fact that since they
have no vested right to operate in the South Harbor, their
permits can be withdrawn anytime the public welfare deems it
best to do so.29 (Emphases supplied.)

The diminished nature of any right of possession PASSI may have by

reason of its "holdover capacity" is mandated by precedent. The right of
the PPA to take over port facilities from operators whose contracts have
expired is indubitable. Moreover, PASSI cannot invoke any vested
property rights that may translate into a right in esse.

It is argued that PASSI's contract to operate at Pier 8 is equivalent to a

grant of a license and that such license is continuous in nature pursuant
to Section 18, Chapter 3, Book VII of the Administrative Code, which
provides that "where the licensee has made timely and sufficient
application for the renewal of a license with reference to any activity of
a continuing nature, the existing license shall not expire until the
application shall have been finally determined by the
agency."30 However, this argument is of some consequence only in the
adjudication of the main case still pending before the lower court, if not
downright unconvincing for the present nonce.

PASSI notes that the strike was directed at PPA, not PASSI, and that
PPA knew that the strike had been called off but still pushed through
with the takeover anyway. It observes further that since its workforce
were not members of the Asosasyon ng mga Mangagawa sa Pantalan it
would not have been affected and operations at Pier 8 would have
proceeded without interruption had the strike pushed through. PASSI
also banks on the fact that other piers were not taken over by PPA in a
bid to cast doubts on the underlying reason for the takeover. Finally, it
points out that PPA had no workforce of its own and was thus compelled
to utilize the same workforce that had threatened to stage the strike.
 35

From the foregoing ruminations, PASSI concludes that the "supposed

impending strike was merely used by PPA as a convenient excuse for its
forcible takeover"31 and that "the measures taken by PPA have no
reasonable nexus or connection with the problem it allegedly sought to
solve."32 PASSI also employed the same approach before the Court of
Appeals and the latter fell for it.33

The least that could be said of PASSI's claims comprising its approach is
that they are purely speculative and cannot be the basis for declaring
the official acts of PPA invalid. PASSI cannot be allowed to

second guess PPA's strategy to obviate disruptions in the port if the

strike had pushed through. The fact remains that after the PPA takeover
was effected, the feared strike did not materialize.

As a basic matter, however, PPA does not even need to stage a

complicated ruse merely to effect a valid takeover. Pursuant to its
charter, PPA has the necessary police power to regulate the country's
ports which are vital to the free-flow of goods in and out of the country.
This, coupled with the fact that PASSI did not even have the benefit of a
"holdover permit" but was merely operating Pier 8 in a "holdover
capacity" and thus may be ejected by PPA at any time after notice.

In the light of the foregoing, it cannot be said with a degree of

conviction that PASSI has presented a right in esse that can served as
basis for the issuance of a preliminary injunction in its favor.

More importantly, even if PASSI had been able to establish a basis upon
which a preliminary injunction could be issued under Rule 58 of the
Revised Rules on Civil Procedure, the application of P.D. No. 1818 would
override the right to an injunctive remedy. P.D. No. 1818 deprives the
courts of jurisdiction to issue any preliminary injunction or temporary
retraining order on essential government projects, including arrastre
and stevedoring operations.34
 36

On the other hand, the Court of Appeals was of the view that P.D. No.
1818 does not apply in this instance because, as it explained, PPA's
takeover, "anchored on a bogus strike is the very reason why the
operations in Pier 8 would be disrupted and hampered. By and far, even
if [PASSI] were operating under a holdover capacity, elementary
notions of due process and fair play would dictate a contrary action
from [PPA]." 35

Unfortunately, the Court of Appeals paid no heed to established

jurisprudence that there are only two exceptional circumstances which
warrant the non-observance of P.D. No. 1818, namely: (1) where there
is clear grave abuse of discretion on the part of the government
authority or private person being enjoined, and (2) where the effect of
the non-issuance of an injunction or a restraining order would be to
"stave off implementation of a government project."36

Obviously, the subject situation does not present itself as an instance

where the non-issuance of an injunctive writ would itself inhibit the
implementation of a government project. In fact, the non-issuance of an
injunctive writ would allow PPA to run Pier 8 in the manner it deems fit
instead of having a court-imposed extension of "holdover" operations by
PASSI.

Was there grave abuse of discretion by the PPA which would have
excluded the application of P.D. No. 1818? As earlier observed, the
Court of Appeals has no factual basis to conclude that the strike was
bogus. It engaged in speculation when it concluded that the takeover
would be the reason for disruption in the operations in Pier 8. The
imputed due process violation by the PPA, based on the foregoing
hollow allegations, cannot be affirmed. There is, thus, no basis for any
pronouncement of grave abuse of discretion by the PPA.

The appellate court's intimation of disregard of due process on PPA's

part, if proven, may be the basis for an award for damages but not for
the issuance of an injunctive writ. Factual and legal determinations are
essential for the adjudication of the matter. As such, it must be dealt
 37

with in the main case, if not in a separate action. In the case at bar,
this unsubstantiated claim of non-observance of due process cannot
be equated to a right in esse nor warrant the non-observance of the
proscription injunction against government contracts or projects under
P.D. No. 1818.

The prevailing rule is that the courts should avoid issuing a writ of
preliminary injunction that would in effect dispose of the main case
without trial.37 Otherwise, there would be a prejudgment of the main
case and a reversal of the rule on the burden of proof since it would
assume the proposition which petitioners are inceptively bound to
prove.38 Indeed, a complaint for injunctive relief must be construed
strictly against the pleader,39 especially when the factual grounds relied
upon are mere suppositions which definitely cannot militate against the
exercise of police power by the regulatory body charged with the duty
"to supervise, control, regulate, construct, maintain, operate, and
provide such facilities or services as are necessary in the ports...."40

Moreover, the grant or denial of a preliminary injunction is discretionary

on the part of the trial court. In the resolution of the Rule 65 petition
assailing the RTC's orders, the Court of Appeals should have determined
if the assailed issuances were issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to a lack or excess of jurisdiction.41 It did not. All that it
ascribed to the RTC is "error."42

SECOND DIVISION “To be entitled to a writ of preliminary injunction, x x x the petitioners

must establish the following requisites: (a) the invasion of the right
G.R. No. 207412, August 07, 2013 sought to be protected is material and substantial; (b) the right of the
complainant is clear and unmistakable; and (c) there is an urgent and
FLORD NICSON CALAWAG, Petitioner, v. UNIVERSITY OF THE permanent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.
PHILIPPINES VISAYAS AND DEAN CARLOS C.
BAYLON, Respondents. Since a preliminary mandatory injunction commands the performance of
an act, it does not preserve the status quo and is thus more cautiously
regarded than a mere prohibitive injunction. Accordingly, the issuance
of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction [presents a fourth
 38

G.R. No. 207542 requirement: it] is justified only in a clear case, free from doubt or
dispute. When the complainant’s right is thus doubtful or disputed, he
MICAH P. ESPIA, JOSE MARIE F. NASALGA AND CHE CHE B. does not have a clear legal right and, therefore, the issuance of
SALCEPUEDES, Petitioners, v. DR. CARLOS C. BA YLON, DR. MINDA injunctive relief is improper.”6 cralaw virtua law lib rary

J. FORMACI ON AND DR. EMERLINDA ROMAN (TO BE

SUBSTITUTED BY ALFREDO E.
PRESIDENT), UNIVERSITY OF
REGENTS, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
BRION, J.:
PASCUAL, BEING THE NEW UP
THE PHILIPPINES BOARD OF
Lastly, the right to education invoked by Calawag cannot be made the
basis for issuing a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction.
In Department of Education, Culture and Sports v. San Diego,13 we held
that the right to education is not absolute. Section 5(e), Article XIV of
the Constitution provides that "[e]very citizen has a right to select a
profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable
admission and academic requirements.” The thesis requirement and the
compliance with the procedures leading to it, are part of the reasonable
academic requirements a person desiring to complete a course of study
would have to comply with.

EN BANC We stated in the case of Morales I v. CA Justices Real-Dimagiba, Lopez

and Garcia:22chanroblesv irt uallawl ibra ry

I.P.I. No. 16-241-CA-J, November 29, 2016
CLEMENTE F. ATOC, Complainant, v. EDGARDO A. CAMELLO,
OSCAR V. BADELLES AND PERPETUA T. ATAL-PAÑO, ASSOCIATE
JUSTICES, COURT OF APPEALS, CAGAYAN DE ORO
CITY. Respondents.
To press the point, the present Resolution should not be read as an
allowance carte blanche for the issuance of TROs against the OMB's
decision in criminal and administrative complaints against officials and
employees of the government. Foremost, we did not rule on the validity
of the issuance of the TRO by the respondent associate justices. What
we said is that there is a relevant ruling in the Binay, Jr. case which
removes the issuance by respondent associate justices from the ambit
of gross ignorance of the law. Just as important, the validity of the
issuance of a TRO, owing to the fact that a TRO is merely a provisional
remedy which is an adjunct to a main suit, which in this case is the
main petition of Mayor Gatchalian pending before the CA, is a judicial
issue that cannot be categorically resolved in the instant administrative
matter.

xxxx

The remedy against the issuance of the TRO is unarguably and by its
very nature, resolvable only thru judicial procedures which are, a

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 189026, November 09, 2016
PHILIPPINE TELEGRAPH TELEPHONE CORP., Petitioner, v. SMART
COMMUNICATIONS, INC., Respondent.
JARDELEZA, J.:
39
motion for reconsideration and, if such motion is denied, a special civil
action of certiorari under Rule 65. It is the ruling granting the prayer for
the writ of certiorari that a basis for an administrative action against the
judge issuing the TRO may arise. Such happens when, from the decision
on the validity of the issuance, there is a pronouncement that indicates
gross ignorance of the law of the issuing judge. The instant
administrative complaint cannot be a substitute for the aforesaid judicial
remedies.
Under Rule 58, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the court
where the action is pending may grant the provisional remedy of
preliminary injunction. Generally, trial courts have the ancillary
jurisdiction to issue writs of preliminary injunction in cases falling within
its jurisdiction, including civil actions that are incapable of pecuniary
estimation41 and claims for sum of money exceeding
P400,000.00,42 among others. There are, however, exceptions to this
rule, such as when Congress, in the exercise of its power to apportion
jurisdiction,43 restricts the authority of regular courts to issue injunctive
reliefs. For example, the Labor Code prohibits any court from issuing
injunctions in cases involving or arising from labor disputes.44 Similarly,
Republic Act No. 897545 (RA 8975) provides that no court, other than
the Supreme Court, may issue provisional injunctive reliefs which would
adversely affect the expeditious implementation and completion of
government infrastructure projects.46 Another well-recognized exception
is that courts could not interfere with the judgments, orders, or decrees
of a court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction.47 This rule of non-
interference applies not only to courts of law having equal rank but also
to quasi-judicial agencies statutorily at par with such courts.48
The NTC was created pursuant to Executive Order No. 54649 (EO 546),
promulgated on July 23, 1979. It assumed the functions formerly
assigned to the Board of Communications and the Telecommunications
Control Bureau and was placed under the administrative supervision of
the Ministry of Public Works. Meanwhile, the Board of Communications
previously exercised the authority which originally pertained to the
Public Service Commission (PSC).50 Under Executive Order No.
 40

125,51 issued in January 1987, the NTC became an attached agency of

the Department of Transportation and Communications.

Section 16 of EO 546 provides that, with respect to the NTC's quasi-

judicial functions, its decisions shall be appealable in the same manner
as the decisions of the Board of Communications had been appealed.
The rulings and decisions of the Board were, in turn, appealable in the
same manner as the rulings and decisions of the PSC.52 Under Section
35 of the Public Service Act, the Supreme Court had jurisdiction to
review any order, ruling, or decision of the PSC.53 In Iloilo Commercial
and Ice Company v. Public Service Commission,54 we categorically held
that courts of first instance have no power to issue a restraining order
directed to the PSC.55 In that case, the PSC instructed the city fiscal to
file a criminal action against the owner and manager of Iloilo
Commercial and Ice Company for allegedly operating a public utility
without the required certificate of public convenience. The company
brought a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo for an
injunction to restrain the PSC from proceeding against the company and
its officers. The Court, speaking through Justice Malcolm, said:chanRoblesvirt ualLaw lib rary

The Public Service Law, Act No. 3108, as amended, creates a Public
Service Commission which is vested with the powers and duties therein
specified. The Public Service Commissioners are given the rank,
prerogatives, and privileges of Judges of First Instance. Any order made
by the commission may be reviewed on the application of any person or
public service affected thereby, by certiorari, in appropriate cases or by
petition, to the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court is given
jurisdiction to review any order of the Commission and to modify or set
it aside (sec. 35).

x x x In the absence of a specific delegation of jurisdiction to

Courts of First Instance to grant injunctive relief against orders
of the Public Service Commission, it would appear that no court,
other than the Supreme Court, possesses such jurisdiction. To
hold otherwise would amount to a presumption of power in
favor of one branch of the judiciary, as against another branch
of equal rank. If every Court of First Instance had the right to interfere
 41

with the Public Service Commission in the due performance of its

functions, unutterable confusion would result. The remedy at law is
adequate, and consists either in making the proper defense in the
criminal action or in the Ice Company following the procedure provided
in the Public Service Law. An injunction is not the proper remedy, since
other and exclusive remedies are prescribed by law.56 (Emphasis
supplied.)
The above ruling is deemed to have been modified by Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129, which granted the Court of Appeals exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over "all final judgments, resolutions, orders or awards of
Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities,
boards or commission" except those falling within the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution
and the Labor Code.57 In this regard, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court
provides that an appeal from any award, judgment or resolution of or
authorized by a quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial
functions, including the NTC, shall be through a petition for review with
the Court of Appeals.58

In view of the legislative history of the NTC, it is clear that Congress

intended NTC, in respect of its quasi-judicial or adjudicatory functions,
to be co-equal with regional trial courts. Hence, the RTC cannot
interfere with the NTC's exercise of its quasi-judicial powers without
breaching the rule of non-interference with tribunals of concurrent or
coordinate jurisdiction. In this case, the NTC was already in the process
of resolving the issue of whether the access charges stipulated in the
Agreement were fair and equitable pursuant to its mandate under RA
7925 when the RTC issued the assailed writ of preliminary injunction.
Mediation conferences had been conducted and, failing to arrive at a
settlement, the NTC had ordered the parties to submit their respective
pleadings. Simply put, the NTC had already assumed jurisdiction over
the issue involving access charges. Undeniably, the RTC exceeded its
jurisdiction when it restrained the NTC from exercising its statutory
authority over the dispute.
 42

October 4, 2017 Department of Public Works and Highways v. City Advertising Ventures
Corp.60 defined a writ of preliminary injunction as follows:
G.R. No. 214073
[A] writ of preliminary injunction is an ancillary and interlocutory order issued as a
BICOL MEDICAL CENTER, represented by Dr. Efren SJ. Nerva, and the result of an impartial determination of the context of both parties. It entails a
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, represented by HEALTH SECRETARY ENRIQUE procedure for the judge to assess whether the reliefs prayed for by the
T. ONA, Petitioners complainant will be rendered moot simply as a result of the parties' having to go
vs. through the full requirements of a case being fully heard on its merits. Although a
NOE B. BOTOR, CELJUN F. YAP, ISMAEL A. ALBAO, AUGUSTO S. QUILON, trial court judge is given a latitude of discretion, he or she cannot grant a writ of
EDGAR F. ESPLANA II, and JOSEFINA F. ESPLANA, Respondents injunction if there is no clear legal right materially and substantially breached from
a prima facie evaluation of the evidence of the complainant. Even if this is present,
DECISION the trial court must satisfy itself that the injury to be suffered is irreparable.61

LEONEN, J.: A writ of preliminary injunction is issued to:

[P]reserve the status quo ante, upon the applicant's showing of two important
requisite conditions, namely: (1) the right to be protected exists prima facie, and
(2) the acts sought to be enjoined are violative of that right. It must be proven that
the violation sought to be prevented would cause an irreparable injustice.62

Rule 58, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides the instances when a writ of
preliminary injunction may be issued:

Section 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. - A preliminary injunction

may be granted when it is established:

(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or
part of such relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of
the act or acts complained of: or in requiring the perfonnance of an act or
acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;

(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or

acts complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the
applicant; or

(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is

attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts
 43

probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of

the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.

Jurisprudence has likewise established that the following requisites must be

proven first before a writ of preliminary injunction, whether mandatory or
prohibitory, may be issued:

(1) The applicant must have a clear and unmistakable right to be protected, that is
a right in esse;

(2) There is a material and substantial invasion of such right;

(3) There is an urgent need for the writ to prevent irreparable injury to the
applicant; and (4) No other ordinary, speedy, and adequate remedy exists to
prevent the infliction of irreparable injury.63

In satisfying these requisites, the applicant for the writ need not substantiate his or
her claim with complete and conclusive evidence since only prima
facie evidence64 or a sampling is required "to give the court an idea of the
justification for the preliminary injunction pending the decision of the case on the
merits."65

Tan v. Hosana66 defines prima facie evidence as evidence that is "good and
sufficient on its face. Such evidence as, in the judgment of the law, is sufficient to
establish a given fact, or the group or chain of facts constituting the· party's claim
or defense and which if not rebutted or contradicted, will remain sufficient."67

Spouses Nisce v. Equitable PCI Bank68 then discussed the requisites and the proof
required for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction:

The plaintiff praying for a writ of preliminary injunction must further establish that
he or she has a present and unmistakable right to be protected; that the facts
against which injunction is directed violate such right; and there is a special and
paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damages. In the absence of
proof of a legal right and the injury sustained by the plaintiff, an order for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction will be nullified. Thus, where the
plaintiff's right is doubtful or disputed, a preliminary injunction is not proper. The
 44

possibility of irreparable damage without proof of an actual existing right is not a

ground for a preliminary injunction.

However, to establish the essential requisites for a preliminary injunction, the

evidence to be submitted by the plaintiff need not be conclusive and complete. The
plaintiffs arc only required to show that they have an ostensible right to the final
relief prayed for in their complaint. A writ of preliminary i11iunction is generally
based solely on initial or incomplete evidence. Such evidence need only be a
sampling intended merely to give the court an evidence of justification for a
preliminary injunction pending the decision on the merits of the case, and is not
conclusive of the principal action which has yet to be decided.69

Executive Secretary v. Forerunner Multi Resources, Inc. 77 explained that a clear

legal right which would entitle the applicant to an injunctive writ "contemplates a
right 'clearly founded in or granted by law.' Any hint of doubt or dispute on the
asserted legal right precludes the grant of preliminary injunctive relief."78

Absent a particular law or statute establishing Naga City's ownership or control

over Road Lot No. 3, the Department of Health's title over the BMC compound
must prevail over the unsubstantiated claims of Naga City and respondents.
Department of Health's ownership over Road Lot No. 3, with the concomitant right
to use and enjoy this property, must be respected.

Respondents likewise cannot rely on the supposed customary use of Road Lot No.
3 by the public to support their claimed right of unfettered access to the road
because customary use is not one (1) of the sources of legal obligation;79 hence, it
does not ripen into a right.

Writs of preliminary injunction are granted only upon prior notice to the party
sought to be enjoined and upon their due hearing. Rule 58, Section 5 of the Rules
1âwphi1

of Court provides:

Section 5. Preliminary injunction not granted without notice; exception. - No

preliminary injunction shall be granted without hearing and prior notice to the party
or person sought to be enjoined. If it shall appear from facts shown by affidavits or
by the verified application that great or irreparable injury would result to the
applicant before the matter can be heard on notice, the court to which the
 45

application for preliminary injunction was made, may issue ex parte a temporary
restraining order to be effective only for a period of twenty (20) days from service
on the party or person sought to be enjoined, except as herein provided. Within the
said twenty-day period, the court must order said party or person to show cause,
at a specified time and place, why the injunction should not be granted, determine
within the same period whether or not the preliminary injunction shall be granted,
and accordingly issue the corresponding order.

However, and subject to the provisions of the preceding sections, if the matter is of
extreme urgency and the applicant will suffer grave injustice and irreparable injury,
the executive judge of a multiple-sala court or the presiding judge of a single sala
court may issue ex parte a temporary restraining order effective for only seventy-
two (72) hours from issuance but he shall immediately comply with the provisions
of the next preceding section as to service of summons and the documents to be
served therewith. Thereafter, within the aforesaid seventy-two (72) hours, the
judge before whom the case is pending shall conduct a summary hearing to
detem1ine whether the temporary restraining order shall be extended until the
application for preliminary injunction can be heard. In no case shall the total period
of effectivity of the temporary restraining order extended twenty (20) days,
including the original seventy-two hours (72) hours provided herein.

In the event that the application for preliminary injunction is denied or not resolved
within the said period, the temporary restraining order is deemed, automatically
vacated. The effectivity of a temporary restraining order is not extendible without
need of any judicial declaration to that effect and no court shall have authority to
extend or renew the same on the same ground for which it was issued.

However, if issued by the Court of Appeals or a member thereof, the temporary

restraining order shall be effective for sixty (60) days from service on the party or
person sought to be enjoined. A restraining order issued by the Supreme Court or
a member thereof shall be effective until further orders.

Thus, Rule 58 requires "a full and comprehensive hearing for the determination of
the propriety of the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction,"82 giving the
applicant an opportunity to prove that great or irreparable injury will result if no writ
is issued and allowing the opposing party to comment on the application.
 46

On the other hand, a temporary restraining order that is heard only with the
evidence presented by its applicant is ex parte, but it is issued to preserve the
status quo until the hearing for preliminary injunction can be conducted, Miriam
College Foundation, Inc v. Court of Appeals83 explained the difference between
preliminary injunction and a restraining order as follows:

Preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or proceeding

prior to the judgment or final order, requiring a party or a court, agency or a person
to perform to refrain from performing a particular act or acts. As an extraordinary
remedy, injunction is calculated to preserve or maintain the status quo of things
and is generally availed of to prevent actual or threatened acts, until the merits of
the case can be heard. A preliminary injunction persists until it is dissolved or until
the termination of the action without the court issuing a final injunction.

The basic purpose of restraining order, on the other hand, is to preserve the status
quo until the hearing of the application for preliminary injw1ction. ; Under the
former A§5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A§S, Batas Pambansa
Blg. 224, a judge (or justice) may issue a temporary restraining order with a limited
life of twenty days from date of issue. If before the expiration of the 20-day period
the application for preliminary injunction is denied, the temporary order would
thereby be deemed automatically vacated. If no action is taken by the judge on the
application for preliminary injunction within the said 20 days, the temporary
restraining order would automatically expire on the 20th day by the sheer force of
law, no judicial declaration to that effect being necessary. In the instant case, no
such preliminary injunction was issued; hence, the TRO earlier issued
automatically expired under the aforesaid provision of the Rules of
Court.84 (Citations omitted)

It is true that some issues are better threshed out before the trial court, such as if
the donation to the Department of Health by the Camarines Sur Provincial
Government contained an encumbrance for the public to continue using Road Lot
No. 3, or the validity of this donation.85 The Court of Appeals, however, erred when
it completely disregarded the evidence presented by petitioners, reasoning out that
the question of whether or not Naga City's evidence should prevail over BMC's title
over the property was supposedly a factual matter that should be threshed out in
the trial court.86
 47

By focusing solely on Naga City and respondents' evidence to determine if there

was prima facie evidence to issue the writ of preliminary injunction while the case
was being heard in the lower court, the Court of Appeals misappreciated the
nature of a writ of preliminary injunction. To reiterate, a preliminary injunction is an
ancillary remedy issued after due hearing where both parties are given the
opportunity to present their respective evidence. Thus, both their evidence should
be considered.

As it is, absent a finding of grave abuse of discretion, there was no reason for the
Court of Appeals to reverse the trial court's denial of respondents' application for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. Respondents were unable to
present prima facie evidence of their clear and unmistakable right to use Road Lot
No. 3.

FIRST DIVISION Section 4. Nullity of Writs and Orders. - Any temporary restraining
order, preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory
[G.R. No. 167057 : April 11, 2012] injunction issued in violation of Section 3 hereof is void and of
no force and effect.
NERWIN INDUSTRIES CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. PNOC-
ENERGY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, AND ESTER R. The text and tenor of the provisions being clear and unambiguous,
GUERZON, CHAIRMAN, BIDS AND AWARDS COMMITTEE, nothing was left for the RTC to do except to enforce them and to exact
RESPONDENTS. upon Nerwin obedience to them. The RTC could not have been unaware
of the prohibition under Republic Act No. 8975 considering that the
DECISION Court had itself instructed all judges and justices of the lower courts,
through Administrative Circular No. 11-2000, to comply with and
BERSAMIN, J.: respect the prohibition against the issuance of TROs or writs of
preliminary prohibitory or mandatory injunction involving contracts and
projects of the Government.

It is of great relevance to mention at this juncture that Judge Vicente A.

Hidalgo, the Presiding Judge of Branch 37 of the RTC, the branch to
which Civil Case No. 03106921 had been raffled, was in fact already
found administratively liable for gross misconduct and gross ignorance
of the law as the result of his issuance of the assailed TRO and writ of
preliminary prohibitory injunction. The Court could only fine him in the
 48

amount of P40,000.00 last August 6, 2008 in view of his intervening

retirement from the service. That sanction was meted on him in A.M.
No. RTJ-08-2133 entitled Sinsuat v. Hidalgo,[11] where this Court
stated:

The Court finds that, indeed, respondent is liable for gross misconduct.
As the CA explained in its above-stated Decision in the petition for
certiorari, respondent failed to heed the mandatory ban imposed by
P.D. No. 1818 and R.A. No. 8975 against a government infrastructure
project, which the rural electrification project certainly was. He thereby
likewise obstinately disregarded this Court’s various circulars enjoining
courts from issuing TROs and injunctions against government
infrastructure projects in line with the proscription under R.A. No. 8975.
Apropos are Gov. Garcia v. Hon. Burgos and National Housing Authority
v. Hon. Allarde wherein this Court stressed that P.D. No. 1818 expressly
deprives courts of jurisdiction to issue injunctive writs against the
implementation or execution of a government infrastructure project.

Reiterating the prohibitory mandate of P.D. No. 1818, the Court in Atty.
Caguioa v. Judge Laviña faulted a judge for grave misconduct for
issuing a TRO against a government infrastructure project thus:

xxx It appears that respondent is either feigning a misunderstanding of

the law or openly manifesting a contumacious indifference thereto. In
any case, his disregard of the clear mandate of PD 1818, as well as of
the Supreme Court Circulars enjoining strict compliance therewith,
constitutes grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the proper
administration of justice. His claim that the said statute is inapplicable
to his January 21, 1997 Order extending the dubious TRO is but a
contrived subterfuge to evade administrative liability.

In resolving matters in litigation, judges should endeavor

assiduously to ascertain the facts and the applicable laws.
Moreover, they should exhibit more than just a cursory
acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules. Also, they are
expected to keep abreast of and be conversant with the rules
 49

and the circulars which the Supreme Court has adopted and
which affect the disposition of cases before them.

Although judges have in their favor the presumption of regularity and

good faith in the performance of their judicial functions, a blatant
disregard of the clear and unmistakable terms of the law
obviates this presumption and renders them susceptible to
administrative sanctions. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The pronouncements in Caguioa apply as well to respondent.

As with all equitable remedies, injunction must be issued only at the

instance of a party who possesses sufficient interest in or title to the
right or the property sought to be protected. It is proper only when the
applicant appears to be entitled to the relief demanded in the complaint,
which must aver the existence of the right and the violation of the right,
or whose averments must in the minimum constitute a prima
facie showing of a right to the final relief sought. Accordingly, the
conditions for the issuance of the injunctive writ are: (a) that the right
to be protected exists prima facie; (b) that the act sought to be
enjoined is violative of that right; and (c) that there is an urgent and
paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. An
injunction will not issue to protect a right not in esse, or a right
which is merely contingent and may never arise; or to restrain
an act which does not give rise to a cause of action; or to
prevent the perpetration of an act prohibited by statute. Indeed,
a right, to be protected by injunction, means a right clearly
founded on or granted by law or is enforceable as a matter of
law.[16]

Conclusive proof of the existence of the right to be protected is not

demanded, however, for, as the Court has held in Saulog v. Court of
Appeals,[17] it is enough that:
 50

xxx for the court to act, there must be an existing basis of facts
affording a present right which is directly threatened by an act
sought to be enjoined. And while a clear showing of the right
claimed is necessary, its existence need not be conclusively
established. In fact, the evidence to be submitted to justify
preliminary injunction at the hearing thereon need not be conclusive or
complete but need only be a “sampling” intended merely to give the
court an idea of the justification for the preliminary injunction pending
the decision of the case on the merits. This should really be so since
our concern here involves only the propriety of the preliminary
injunction and not the merits of the case still pending with the
trial court.

Thus, to be entitled to the writ of preliminary injunction, the private

respondent needs only to show that it has the ostensible right to the
final relief prayed for in its complaint xxx.[18]

In this regard, the Rules of Court grants a broad latitude to the trial
courts considering that conflicting claims in an application for a
provisional writ more often than not involve and require a factual
determination that is not the function of the appellate
courts.[19] Nonetheless, the exercise of such discretion must be
sound, that is, the issuance of the writ, though discretionary, should be
upon the grounds and in the manner provided by law.[20] When that is
done, the exercise of sound discretion by the issuing court in injunctive
matters must not be interfered with except when there is manifest
abuse.[21]

Moreover, judges dealing with applications for the injunctive relief ought
to be wary of improvidently or unwarrantedly issuing TROs or writs of
injunction that tend to dispose of the merits without or before trial.
Granting an application for the relief in disregard of that tendency is
judicially impermissible,[22] for it is never the function of a TRO or
preliminary injunction to determine the merits of a case,[23] or to decide
controverted facts.[24] It is but a preventive remedy whose only mission
is to prevent threatened wrong,[25] further injury,[26] and irreparable

Article 218 of the Labor Code
51
harm[27] or injustice[28] until the rights of the parties can be
settled. Judges should thus look at such relief only as a means to
protect the ability of their courts to render a meaningful
decision.[29] Foremost in their minds should be to guard against a
change of circumstances that will hamper or prevent the granting of
proper reliefs after a trial on the merits.[30] It is well worth remembering
that the writ of preliminary injunction should issue only to prevent the
threatened continuous and irremediable injury to the applicant before
the claim can be justly and thoroughly studied and adjudicated.[31] cralaw
To enjoin or restrain any actual or threatened commission of any or all
prohibited or unlawful acts or to require the performance of a particular
act in any labor dispute which, if not restrained or performed forthwith,
may cause grave or irreparable damage to any party or render
ineffectual any decision in favor of such party: Provided, That no
temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out
of a labor dispute as defined in this Code shall be issued except after
hearing the testimony of witnesses, with opportunity for cross-
examination, in support of the allegations of a complaint made under
oath, and testimony in opposition thereto, if offered, and only after a
finding of fact by the Commission, to the effect:
1. That prohibited or unlawful acts have been threatened and will be
committed and will be continued unless restrained, but no
injunction or temporary restraining order shall be issued on
account of any threat, prohibited or unlawful act, except against
the person or persons, association or organization making the
threat or committing the prohibited or unlawful act or actually
authorizing or ratifying the same after actual knowledge thereof;
2. That substantial and irreparable injury to complainant’s property
will follow;
 52

3. That as to each item of relief to be granted, greater injury will be

inflicted upon complainant by the denial of relief than will be
inflicted upon defendants by the granting of relief;

4. That complainant has no adequate remedy at law; and

5. That the public officers charged with the duty to protect

complainant’s property are unable or unwilling to furnish
adequate protection.

Section 1 of Rule X of the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure
SECTION 1. INJUNCTION IN ORDINARY LABOR DISPUTES. – A preliminary
injunction or restraining order may be granted by the Commission through its
Divisions pursuant to the provisions of paragraph (e) of Article 218 (now 225)
of the Labor Code, as amended, when it is established on the basis of the sworn
allegations in the petition that the acts complained of involving or arising from
any labor dispute before the Commission, which, if not restrained or
performed forthwith, may cause grave or irreparable damage to any party or
render ineffectual any decision in favor of such party. A certification of non-
forum shopping shall accompany the petition for injunction. The writ of
preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order shall become effective
only upon posting of the required cash bond in the amount to be determined
by the Commission to answer for any damage that may be suffered by the party
enjoined, if it is finally determined that the petitioner is not entitled thereto.

Revised Corporation Code - Section 179. Powers, Functions, and Jurisdiction of the Commission.

Xxxxxx

In imposing penalties and additional monitoring and supervision requirements, the

Commission shall take into consideration the size, nature of the business, and
capacity of the corporation.

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 1818
PROHIBITING COURTS FROM ISSUING RESTRAINING ORDERS OR
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS IN CASES INVOLVING INFRASTRUCTURE AND
NATURAL RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS OF, AND PUBLIC
UTILITIES OPERATED BY, THE GOVERNMENT
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 385
53
No court below the Court of Appeals shall have jurisdiction to issue a restraining
order, preliminary injunction, or preliminary mandatory injunction in any case,
dispute, or controversy that directly or indirectly interferes with the exercise of the
powers, duties and responsibilities of the Commission that falls exclusively within
its jurisdiction.
WHEREAS, Presidential Decree No. 605 prohibits the issuance by the courts of
restraining orders or injunctions in cases involving concessions, licenses, and
other permits issued by administrative officials or bodies for the exploitation,
development and utilization of natural resources of the country;
WHEREAS, it is in the public interest to adopt a similar prohibition against the
issuance of such restraining orders or injunctions in other areas of activity equally
critical to the economic development effort of the nation, in order not to disrupt or
hamper the pursuit of essential government projects;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by
virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby decree and order
as follows:
Section 1. No court in the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue any
restraining order, preliminary injunction, or preliminary mandatory injunction in any
case, dispute, or controversy involving an infrastructure project, or a mining,
fishery, forest or other natural resource development project of the government, or
any public utility operated by the government, including among others public
utilities for the transport of the goods or commodities, stevedoring and arrastre
contracts, to prohibit any person or persons, entity or governmental official from
proceeding with, or continuing the execution or implementation of any such
project, or the operation of such public utility, or pursuing any lawful activity
necessary for such execution, implementation or operation.
Section 2. This decree shall take effect immediately.
Section 2. No restraining order, temporary or permanent injunction shall be issued
by the court against any government financial institution in any action taken by

January 31, 1974
REQUIRING GOVERNMENT FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS TO FORECLOSE
MANDATORILY ALL LOANS WITH ARREARAGES, INCLUDING INTEREST
AND CHARGES AMOUNTING TO AT LEAST TWENTY (20%) PERCENT OF
THE TOTAL OUTSTANDING OBLIGATION
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9136
AN ACT ORDAINING REFORMS IN THE ELECTRIC POWER
INDUSTRY, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE CERTAIN LAWS AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES
54
such institution in compliance with the mandatory foreclosure provided in Section 1
hereof, whether such restraining order, temporary or permanent injunction is
sought by the borrower(s) or any third party or parties, except after due hearing in
which it is established by the borrower and admitted by the government financial
institution concerned that twenty percent (20%) of the outstanding arrearages has
been paid after the filing of foreclosure proceedings.
In case a restraining order or injunction is issued, the borrower shall nevertheless
be legally obligated to liquidate the remaining balance of the arrearages
outstanding as of the time of foreclosure, plus interest and other charges, on every
succeeding thirtieth (30th) day after the issuance of such restraining order or
injunction until the entire arrearages have been liquidated. These shall be in
addition to the payment of amortization currently maturing. The restraining order or
injunction shall automatically be dissolved should the borrower fail to make any of
the above-mentioned payments on due dates, and no restraining order or
injunction shall be issued thereafter. This shall be without prejudice to the exercise
by the government financial institutions of such rights and/or remedies available to
them under their respective charters and their respective contracts with their
debtors, nor should this provision be construed as restricting the government
financial institutions concerned from approving, solely at its own discretion, any
restructuring, recapitalization, or any other arrangement that would place the entire
account on a current basis, provided, however, that at least twenty percent (20%)
of the arrearages outstanding at the time of the foreclosure is paid.
All restraining orders and injunctions existing as of the date of this Decree on
foreclosure proceedings filed by said government financial institutions shall be
considered lifted unless finally resolved by the court within sixty (60) days from
date hereof.
SEC. 78. Injunction and Restraining Order.
– The implementation of the provisions of the Act shall not be restrained or
enjoined except by an order issued by the Supreme Court of the Philippines.

PD 605- BANNING THE ISSUANCE BY COURTS OF PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTIONS IN CASES INVOLVING CONCESSIONS, LICENSES, AND
OTHER PERMITS ISSUED BY PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICIALS OR
BODIES FOR THE EXPLOITATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES
A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC
RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL CASES
Par-1 Sec.21 BP129
55
Section 1. No court of the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue any
restraining order, preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction in
any case involving or growing out of the issuance, approval or disapproval,
revocation or suspension of, or any action whatsoever by the proper
administrative official or body on concessions, licenses, permits, patents, or
public grants of any kind in connection with the disposition, exploitation,
utilization, exploration, and/or development of the natural resources of the
Philippines.
Section 10. Prohibition against temporary restraining order (TRO) and preliminary
injunction. - Except the Supreme Court, no court can issue a TRO or writ of
preliminary injunction against lawful actions of government agencies that enforce
environmental laws or prevent violations thereof.
Section 21. Original jurisdiction in other cases. – Regional Trial Courts shall
exercise original jurisdiction:
(1) In the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, habeas corpus and injunction which may be enforced in any part
of their respective regions