Rule 60- Replevin

1. BA Finance Corporation vs. Court of Appeals 258 SCRA  Replevin, broadly understood, is both a form of principal remedy and of a provisional
relief. It may refer either to the action itself, i.e., to regain the possession of personal
chattels being wrongfully detained from the plaintiff by another, or to the provisional
remedy that would allow the plaintiff to retain the thing during the pendency of the
action and hold it pendente lite.

 The action is primarily possessory in nature and generally determines nothing more
than the right of possession.

 Replevin is so usually described as a mixed action, being partly in rem and partly in
personam-in rem insofar as the recovery of specific property is concerned, and in
personam as regards to damages involved. As an "action in rem, the gist of the
replevin action is the right of the plaintiff to obtain possession of specific personal
property by reason of his being the owner or of his having a special interest therein.

 Consequently, the person in possession of the property sought to be replevied is

ordinarily the proper and only necessary party defendant, and the plaintiff is not
required to so join as defendants other persons claiming a right on the property but
not in possession thereof. Rule 60 of the Rules of Court allows an application for the
immediate possession of the property but the plaintiff must show that he has a good
legal basis, i.e., a clear title thereto, for seeking such interim possession.

 Where the right of the plaintiff to the possession of the specific property is so
conceded or evident, the action need only be maintained against him who so
possesses the property. In rem actio est per quam rem nostram quae ab alio
possidetur petimus et semper adversus eum est qui rem possidet.

 In Northern Motors, Inc. v. Herrera, 22 the Court has said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"There can be no question that persons having a special right of property in the goods
the recovery of which is sought, such as a chattel mortgagee, may maintain an action
for replevin therefor. Where the mortgage authorizes the mortgagee to take
possession of the property on default, he may maintain an action to recover
possession of the mortgaged chattels from the mortgagor or from any person in
whose hands he may find them." 23

 In effect then, the mortgagee, upon the mortgagor’s default, is constituted an

attorney-in-fact of the mortgagor enabling such mortgagee to act for and in behalf of
the owner. Accordingly, that the defendant is not privy to the chattel mortgage should
be inconsequential. By the fact that the object of replevin is traced to his possession,
one properly can be a defendant in an action for replevin. It is here assumed that the
plaintiffs right to possess the thing is not or cannot be disputed.

 In case the right of possession on the part of the plaintiff, or his authority to claim
such possession or that of his principal, is put to great doubt (a contending party
might contest the legal bases for plaintiffs cause of action or an adverse and
 independent claim of ownership or right of possession is raised by that party), it could
become essential to have other persons involved and accordingly impleaded for a
complete determination and resolution of the controversy. For instance, in
Servicewide Specialists, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, Et Al., G.R. No. 103301, 08
December 1995 this Court ruled:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

 "While, in its present petition for review on certiorari, Servicewide has raised a
number of points, the crucial issue still remains, however, to be whether or not an
action filed by the mortgagee for replevin to effect a foreclosure of the property
covered by the chattel mortgage would require that the mortgagor be so impleaded
as an indispensable party thereto.

"Rule 60 of the Rules of Court allows a plaintiff, in an action for the recovery of
possession of personal property, to apply for a writ of replevin if it can be shown that
he is the owner of the property claimed . . . or is entitled to the possession thereof.’
The plaintiff need not be the owner so long as he is able to specify his right to the
possession of the property and his legal basis therefor. The question then, insofar as
the matter finds relation to the instant case, is whether or not the plaintiff (herein
petitioner) who has predicated his right on being the mortgagee of a chattel mortgage
should implead the mortgagor in his complaint that seeks to recover possession of the
encumbered property in order to effect its foreclosure.

 "The answer has to be in the affirmative. In a suit for replevin, a clear right of
possession must be established. A foreclosure under a chattel mortgage may properly
be commenced only once there is default on the part of the mortgagor of his
obligation secured by the mortgage.

 The replevin in the instant case has been sought to pave the way for the foreclosure
of the object covered by the chattel mortgage. The conditions essential for that
foreclosure would be to show, firstly, the existence of the chattel mortgage and,
secondly, the default of the mortgagor. These requirements must be established since
the validity of the plaintiff’s exercise of the right of foreclosure are inevitably
dependent thereon. It would thus seem, considering particularly an adverse and
independent claim of ownership by private respondent that the lower court acted
improvidently when it granted the dismissal of the complaint against Dollente, albeit
on petitioner’s (then plaintiff) plea, on the ground that the ‘non-service of summons
upon Ernesto Dollente (would) only delay the determination of the merits of the case,
to the prejudice of the parties.’ In Imson v. Court of Appeals, we have
explained:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected by the court’s
action in the litigation, and without whom no final determination of the case can be
had. The party’s interest in the subject matter of the suit and in the relief sought are
so inextricably intertwined with the other parties’ that his legal presence as a party to
the proceeding is an absolute necessity. In his absence there cannot be a resolution
of the dispute of the parties before the court which is effective, complete, or
equitable.
 "Conversely, a party is not indispensable to the suit if his interest in the controversy
or subject matter is distinct and divisible from the interest of the other parties and
will not necessarily be prejudiced by a judgment which does complete justice to the
parties in court. He is not indispensable if his presence would merely permit complete
relief between him and those already parties to the action or will simply avoid
multiple litigation."cralaw virtua1aw library

"Without the presence of indispensable parties to a suit or proceeding, a judgment of

a court cannot attain real finality" (Footnotes omitted.)

 A chattel mortgagee, unlike a pledgee, need not be in, nor entitled to the possession
of the property unless and until the mortgagor defaults and the mortgagee thereupon
seeks to foreclose thereon. Since the mortgagee’s right of possession is conditioned
upon the actual fact of default which itself may be controverted, the inclusion of other
parties, like the debtor or the mortgagor himself, may be required in order to allow a
full and conclusive determination of the case. When the mortgagee seeks a replevin in
order to effect the eventual foreclosure of the mortgage, it is not only the existence
of, but also the mortgagor’s default on, the chattel mortgage that, among other
things, can properly uphold the right to replevy the property. The burden to establish
a valid justification for that action lies with the plaintiff. An adverse possessor, who is
not the mortgagor, cannot just be deprived of his possession, let alone be bound by
the terms of the chattel mortgage contract, simply because the mortgagee brings up
an action for replevin.

2. Chua vs. Court of Appeals 222 SCRA 85  It is a basic tenet of civil procedure that replevin will not lie for property in custodia legis. A thing is
in custodia legis when it is shown that it has been and is subjected to the official custody of a
judicial executive officer in pursuance of his execution of a legal writ (Bagalihog vs. Fernandez,
198 SCRA 614 [1991]). The reason posited for this principle is that if it was otherwise, there would
be interference with the possession before the function of the law had been performed as to the
process under which the property was taken. Thus, a defendant in an execution or attachment
cannot replevy goods in the possession of an officer under a valid process, although after the levy
is discharged, an action to recover possession will lie (Francisco, Revised Rules of Court in the
Philippines: Provisional Remedies, p. 402 [1985]).

 The Court had occasion to rule on this issue in the case of Vlasons Enterprises Corporation vs.
Court of Appeals (155 SCRA 186 [1987]). In the aforementioned case, two (2) propeller pieces
were seized on the strength of a search warrant issued by the Court of First Instance of Manila
Branch XVIII. After the seizure, criminal complaints were filed against the alleged thieves.
However, the complaints were later on dismissed. Five (5) months later, a civil action for the
recovery of the possession of the propellers were filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila
Branch XXIX. The latter court granted the motion for repossession of the propellers. On appeal
this Court held:

The proceeding for the seizure of the property in virtue of a search warrant does not end
with the actual taking of the property . . . and its delivery . . ., to the court . . . . It is
merely the first step in the process to determine the character of the seized property.
 That determination is done in the criminal action involving the crime or crimes in
connection with which the search warrant was issued. Hence, such a criminal action
should be prosecuted, or commenced if not yet instituted, and prosecuted. The outcome
of the criminal action will dictate the disposition of the seized property. (Vlasons
Enterprises Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, supra.)

 In the Vlasons case, the Court differentiated the case brought before it therein, from
the Pagkalinawan case. It stated that in the Pagkalinawan case, there was a conflict in jurisdiction.
On the other hand, in the Vlasons case, it was certain that no criminal case would ensue
subsequent to or in connection with the search warrant, hence no conflict in jurisdiction or in the
ultimate disposition of the property could arise. Thus, where personal property is seized under a
search warrant and it appears that the seizure will not be followed by the filing of any criminal
action, but there are conflicting claims asserted over the seized property, the appropriate remedy
is the institution of an ordinary civil action by any interested party, or of an interpleader action by
the Government itself, in the proper competent court to which the seizing court shall transfer
custody of the articles. Another branch of the same court, in an action to recover said property and
during the pendency thereof, cannot order the delivery of said personal property to therein
plaintiff pendente lite.

 Construing the Pagkalinawan case together with the Vlasons case, we rule that where personal
property is seized under a search warrant and there is reason to believe that the seizure will not
anymore be followed by the filing of a criminal and there are conflicting claims over the seized
property, the proper remedy is the filing of an action for replevin, or an interpleader filed by the
Government in the proper court, not necessarily the same one which issued the search warrant;
however, where there is still a probability that the seizure will be followed by the filing of a criminal
action, as in the case at bar where the case for carnapping was "dismissed provisionally, without
prejudice to its reopening once the issue of ownership is resolved in favor of complainant"
(emphasis supplied), or the criminal information has actually been commenced, or filed, and
actually prosecuted, and there are conflicting claims over the property seized, the proper remedy
is to question the validity of the search warrant in the same court which issued it and not in any
other branch of the said court.

Thus, the Regional Trial Court of Cebu Branch VIII erred when it ordered the transfer of possession of the
property seized to petitioner when the latter filed the action for replevin. It should have dismissed the case
since by virtue of the "provisional dismissal", of the carnapping case there is still a probability that a criminal
case would be filed, hence a conflict in jurisdiction could still arise. The basic principle that a judge who
presides in one court cannot annul or modify the orders issued by another branch of the same court because
they are co-equal and independent bodies acting coordinately, must always be
adhered to.

3. Sapugay vs. CA 183 SCRA 464  A counterclaim is defined as any claim for money or other relief which a defending party may have
against an opposing party. 6 However, the general rule that a defendant cannot by a counterclaim
bring into the action any claim against persons other than the plaintiff admits of an exception under
 Section 14, Rule 6 which provides that "when the presence of parties other than those to the
original action is required for the granting of complete relief in the determination of a counterclaim
or cross-claim, the court shall order them to be brought in as defendants, if jurisdiction over them
can be obtained." The inclusion, therefore, of Cardenas in petioners' counterclaim is sanctioned by
the rules.

 Anent the issue on the surety's liability upon the replevin bond, we do not believe that Malayan
Insurance Co., Inc. should be made liable thereon. As correctly observed by respondent court,
"the damages awarded by the trial court were based on Articles 19 and 20 of the New Civil Code
and not on the deprivation of personal properties subject of the replevin bond. Moreover, no
judgment was entered for the return of the properties subject of the replevin bond to the
defendant, the latter never having raised the issue of rightful possession to the said properties." 

 16
A replevin bond is simply intended to indemnify the defendant against any loss that he may suffer
by being compelled to surrender the possession of the disputed property pending the trial of the
action. He cannot recover on the bond as for a reconversion when he has failed to have the
judgment entered for the return of the property. Nor is the surety liable for payment of the
judgment for damages rendered against the plaintiff on a counterclaim or punitive damages for
fraudulent or wrongful acts committed by the plaintiffs and unconnected with the defendant's
deprivation of possession by the plaintiff. Indeed, even where the judgment was that the defendant
was entitled to the property, but no order was made requiring the plaintiff to return it or assessing
damages in default of a return, it was declared that until judgment was entered that the property
should be restored, there could be no liability on the part of the sureties. 17

4. Hao vs. Andres A.M. No. P-07-2384 June 18, 2008  Being an officer of the court, Andres must be aware that there are well-defined steps provided in
the Rules of Court regarding the proper implementation of a writ of replevin and/or an order of
seizure. The Rules, likewise, is explicit on the duty of the sheriff in its implementation. 

o SEC. 4. Duty of the sheriff.–Upon receiving such order, the sheriff must serve a copy
thereof on the adverse party, together with a copy of the application, affidavit and bond,
and must forthwith take the property, if it be in the possession of the adverse
party, or his agent, and retain it in his custody. If the property or any part thereof be
concealed in a building or enclosure, the sheriff must demand its delivery, and if it be not
delivered, he must cause the building or enclosure to be broken open and take the
property into his possession. After the sheriff has taken possession of the property
as herein provided, he must keep it in a secure place and shall be responsible for
its delivery to the party entitled thereto upon receiving his fees and necessary
expenses for taking and keeping the same. (Emphasis supplied.)

SEC. 6. Disposition of property by sheriff.–If within five (5) days after the taking of the
property by the sheriff, the adverse party does not object to the sufficiency of the
bond, or of the surety or sureties thereon; or if the adverse party so objects and the
court affirms its approval of the applicant’s bond or approves a new bond, or if the
adverse party requires the return of the property but his bond is objected to and found
insufficient and he does not forthwith file an approved bond, the property shall be
delivered to the applicant. If for any reason the property is not delivered to the applicant,
the sheriff must return it to the adverse party. (Emphasis supplied.)
  First, the rules provide that property seized under a writ of replevin is not to be delivered
immediately to the plaintiff.22 In accordance with the said rules, Andres should have waited no less
than five days in order to give the complainant an opportunity to object to the sufficiency of the
bond or of the surety or sureties thereon, or require the return of the seized motor vehicles by filing
a counter-bond. This, he failed to do.

 Records show that Andres took possession of two of the subject motor vehicles on October 17,
2005, four on October 18, 2005, and another three on October 19, 2005. Simultaneously, as
evidenced by the depository receipts, on October 18, 2005, Silver received from Andres six of the
seized motor vehicles, and three more motor vehicles on October 19, 2005. Consequently, there is
no question that Silver was already in possession of the nine seized vehicles immediately after
seizure, or no more than three days after the taking of the vehicles. Thus, Andres committed a
clear violation of Section 6, Rule 60 of the Rules of Court with regard to the proper disposal of the
property.

 It matters not that Silver was in possession of the seized vehicles merely for safekeeping as stated
in the depository receipts. The rule is clear that the property seized should not be immediately
delivered to the plaintiff, and the sheriff must retain custody of the seized property for at least five
days.23 Hence, the act of Andres in delivering the seized vehicles immediately after seizure to
Silver for whatever purpose, without observing the five-day requirement finds no legal justification.

In Pardo v. Velasco,24 this Court held that

…Respondent as an officer of the Court is charged with certain ministerial duties which must be
performed faithfully to the letter. Every provision in the Revised Rules of Court has a specific
reason or objective. In this case, the purpose of the five (5) days is to give a chance to the
defendant to object to the sufficiency of the bond or the surety or sureties thereon or
require the return of the property by filing a counterbond.…25 (Emphasis supplied.)

In Sebastian v. Valino,26 this Court reiterated that

Under the Revised Rules of Court, the property seized under a writ of replevin is not to be
delivered immediately to the plaintiff. The sheriff must retain it in his custody for five
days and he shall return it to the defendant, if the latter, as in the instant case, requires its return
and files a counterbond.… 27 (Emphasis supplied.)

5. SPOUSES DEO AGNER and MARICON AGNER vs. BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK, INC. G.R.  Further, the Court even ruled in Navarro v. Escobido15 that prior demand is not a condition
No. 182963, June 3, 2013 precedent to an action for a writ of replevin, since there is nothing in Section 2, Rule 60 of the

6. DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. HON. EMMANUEL C. CARPIO, in his
capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Davao City, COUNTRY BANKERS
INSURANCE CORPORATION, DABAY ABAD, HATAB ABAD, OMAR ABAS, HANAPI
ABDULLAH, ROJEA AB ABDULLAH, ABDULLAH ABEDIN, ALEX ABEDIN, et al.,
represented by their Attorney-in-Fact, MR. MANUEL L. TE, G.R. No. 195450 February 1, 2017
Rules of Court that requires the applicant to make a demand on the possessor of the property
before an action for a writ of replevin could be filed.
Also, petitioners' representation that they have not received a demand letter is completely
inconsequential as the mere act of sending it would suffice. 
 Residual jurisdiction refers to the authority of the trial court to issue orders for the protection and
preservation of the rights of the parties which do not involve any matter litigated by the appeal; to
approve compromises; to permit appeals by indigent litigants; to order execution pending appeal in
accordance with Section 2, Rule 39; and to allow the withdrawal of the appeal, provided these are
done prior to the transmittal of the original record or the record on appeal, even if the appeal has
already been perfected or despite the approval of the record on appeal 24 or in case of a petition for
review under Rule 42, before the CA gives due course to the petition.25
 The "residual jurisdiction" of the trial court is available at a stage in which the court is normally
deemed to have lost jurisdiction over the case or the subject matter involved in the appeal. This
stage is reached upon the perfection of the appeals by the parties or upon the approval of the
records on appeal, but prior to the transmittal of the original records or the records on appeal. In
either instance, the trial court still retains its so-called residual jurisdiction to issue protective
orders, approve compromises, permit appeals of indigent litigants, order execution pending
appeal, and allow the withdrawal of the appeal.26
 From the foregoing, it is clear that before the trial court can be said to have residual jurisdiction
over a case, a trial on the merits must have been conducted; the court rendered judgment; and the
aggrieved party appealed therefrom.
 Section 10, Rule 60 of the Rules of Court provides that in replevin cases, as in receivership and
injunction cases, the damages to be awarded to either party upon any bond filed by the other shall
be claimed, ascertained, and granted in accordance with Section 20 of Rule 57 which reads:
SEC. 20. Claimfor damages on account of illegal attachment. - If the judgment
on the action be in favor of the party against whom attachment was issued, he
may recover, upon the bond given or deposit made by the attaching creditor,
any damages resulting from the attachment. Such damages may be
awarded only upon application and after proper hearing, and shall be
included in the final judgment. The application must be filed before the trial
or before appeal is perfected or before the judgment becomes executory, with
due notice to the attaching creditor and his surety or sureties, setting forth the
facts showing his right to damages and the amount thereof.
 If the judgment of the appellate court be favorable to the party against whom the attachment was
issued, he must claim damages sustained during the pendency of the appeal by filing an
application with notice to the party in whose favor the attachment was issued or his surety or
sureties, before the judgment of the appellate court becomes executory. The appellate court may
allow the application to be heard and decided by the trial court. [Emphases supplied]
 In other words, to recover damages on a replevin bond (or on a bond for preliminary attachment,
injunction or receivership), it is necessary (1) that the defendant-claimant has secured a favorable
 judgment in the main action, meaning that the plaintiff has no cause of action and was not,
therefore, entitled to the provisional remedy of replevin; (2) that the application for damages,
showing claimant's right thereto and the amount thereof, be filed in the same action before trial or
before appeal is perfected or before the judgment becomes executory; (3) that due notice be given
to the other party and his surety or sureties, notice to the principal not being sufficient; and (4) that
there should be a proper hearing and the award for damages should be included in the final
judgment.34

Likewise, to avoid multiplicity of suits, all incidents arising from the same controversy must be settled in the
same court having jurisdiction of the main action. Thus, the application for damages must be filed in the
court which took cognizance of the case, with due notice to the other parties. 35

In this case, DBP filed the application for damages long after the order of dismissal had become final and
executory. It explained that this belated filing was due to its recourse to other remedies, such as the
enforcement of the writ of execution. The Court, however, finds this reason to be wanting in persuasiveness.
To begin with, the filing of an application for damages does not preclude resort to other remedies. Nowhere
in the Rules of Court is it stated that an application for damages bars the filing of a motion for a writ of
seizure, a writ of execution or any other applicable remedy. DBP, from the beginning, had already perceived
the attachment to be improper; hence, it could have easily filed an application before the judgment became
executory.

In Jao v. Royal Financing Corporation,36 the Court precluded the defendant therein from claiming damages
against the surety bond because it failed to file the application for damages before the termination of the
case, thus:

xxx The dismissal of the case filed by the plaintiffs-appellees on July 11, 1959, had become final and
executory before the defendant-appellee corporation filed its motion for judgment on the bond on
September 7, 1959. In the order of the trial court, dismissing the complaint, there appears no
pronouncement whatsoever against the surety bond. The appellee-corporation failed to file its proper
application for damages prior to the termination of the case against it. It is barred to do so now. The
prevailing party, if such would be the proper term for the appellee-corporation, having failed to file its
application for damages against the bond prior to the entry of final judgment, the bondsman-appellant is
relieved of further liability thereunder. [Emphases supplied]37

Thus, the RTC has indeed no residual jurisdiction on DBP's claim for damages.

7. MILAGROS P. ENRIQUEZ, vs THE MERCANTILE INSURANCE CO., INC., G.R. No.  Replevin is an action for the recovery of personal property. 39 It is both a principal remedy and a
210950, August 15, 2018 provisional relief. When utilized as a principal remedy, the objective is to recover possession of
personal property that may have been wrongfully detained by another. When sought as a
provisional relief, it allows a plaintiff to retain the contested property during the pendency of the
action. In Tillson v. Court of Appeals:40
 The term replevin is popularly understood as "the return to or recovery by a person of goods or
chattels claimed to be wrongfully taken or detained upon the person's giving security to try the
matter in court and return the goods if defeated in the action;" "the writ by or the common-law
action in which goods and chattels are replevied," i.e., taken or gotten back by a writ for replevin;"
and to replevy, means to recover possession by an action of replevin; to take possession of goods
or chattels under a replevin order.

 Bouvier's Law Dictionary defines replevin as "a form of action which lies to regain the possession
of personal chattels which have been taken from the plaintiff unlawfully . . ., (or as) the writ by
virtue of which the sheriff proceeds at once to take possession of the property therein described
and transfer it to the plaintiff upon his giving pledges which are satisfactory to the sheriff to prove
his title, or return the chattels taken if he fail so to do;" the same authority states that the term, "to
replevy" means "to re-deliver goods which have been distrained to the original possessor of them,
on his giving pledges in an action of replevin."

 The term therefore may refer either to the action itself, for the recovery of personality, or the
provisional remedy traditionally associated with it, by which possession of the property may be
obtained by the plaintiff and retained during the pendency of the action. In this jurisdiction, the
provisional remedy is identified in Rule 60 of the Rules of Court as an order for delivery of personal
property.41

 Similarly, in BA Finance Corporation v. Court of Appeals:42

Replevin, broadly understood, is both a form of principal remedy and of a provisional

relief. It may refer either to the action itself, i.e., to regain the possession of personal
chattels being wrongfully detained from the plaintiff by another, or to the provisional
remedy that would allow the plaintiff to retain the thing during the pendency of the action
and hold it pendente lite. The action is primarily possessory in nature and generally
determines nothing more than the right of possession. Replevin is so usually described
as a mixed action, being partly in rem and partly in personam-in rem insofar as the
recovery of specific property is concerned, and in personam as regards to damages
involved. As an "action in rem," the gist of the replevin action is the right of the plaintiff to
obtain possession of specific personal property by reason of his being the owner or of
his having a special interest therein. Consequently, the person in possession of the
property sought to be replevied is ordinarily the proper and only necessary party
defendant, and the plaintiff is not required to so join as defendants other persons
claiming a right on the property but not in possession thereof. Rule 60 of the Rules of
Court allows an application for the immediate possession of the property but the plaintiff
must show that he has a good legal basis, i.e., a clear title thereto, for seeking such
interim possession.43

 As a provisional remedy, a party may apply for an order for the delivery of the property before the
commencement of the action or at any time before an answer is filed.44 Rule 60 of the Rules of
 Court outlines the procedure for the application of a writ of replevin. Rule 60, Section 2 requires
that the party seeking the issuance of the writ must first file the required affidavit and a bond in an
amount that is double the value of the property:

Section 2. Affidavit and bond. — The applicant must show by his own affidavit or that of
some other person who personally knows the facts:

(a) That the applicant is the owner of the property claimed, particularly describing it, or is
entitled to the possession thereof;

(b) That the property is wrongfully detained by the adverse party, alleging the cause of
detention thereof according to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief;

(c) That the property has not been distrained or taken for a tax assessment or a fine
pursuant to law, or seized under a writ of execution or preliminary attachment, or
otherwise placed under custodia legis, or if so seized, that it is exempt from such
seizure or custody; and

(d) The actual market value of the property.

The applicant must also give a bond, executed to the adverse party in double the value
of the property as stated in the affidavit aforementioned, for the return of the property to
the adverse party if such return be adjudged, and for the payment to the adverse party
of such sum as he may recover from the applicant in the action.45

Once the affidavit is filed and the bond is approved by the court, the court issues an order and a writ of
seizure requiring the sheriff to take the property into his or her custody.46 If there is no further objection to the
bond filed within five (5) days from the taking of the property, the sheriff shall deliver it to the applicant. 47 The
contested property remains in the applicant's custody until the court determines, after a trial on the Issues,
which among the parties has the right of possession. 48

 De Guia v. Alto Surety & Insurance, Co.52 requires that any application on the bond be made after
hearing but before the entry of judgment. Otherwise, the surety can no longer be made liable
under the bond:

Construing and applying these provisions of the Rules, we have held in a long
line of cases that said provisions are mandatory and require the application
upon the bond against the surety or bondsmen and the award thereof to be
made after hearing and before the entry of final judgment in the case; that if
the judgment under execution contains no directive for the surety to pay, and
the proper party fails to make any claim for such directive before such
judgment had become final and executory, the surety or bondsman cannot be
later made liable under the bond. The purpose of the aforementioned rules is
to avoid multiplicity of suits.53
For this reason, a surety bond remains effective until the action or proceeding is finally decided, resolved, or
terminated. This condition is deemed incorporated in the contract between the applicant and the surety,
regardless of whether they failed to expressly state it. Under the Guidelines on Corporate Surety Bonds: 54

 VII. LIFETIME OF BONDS IN CRIMINAL AND CIVIL ACTIONS/SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS

Unless and until the Supreme Court directs otherwise,55 the lifetime or duration of the effectivity of
any bond issued in criminal and civil actions/special proceedings, or in any proceeding or incident
therein shall be from its approval by the court, until the action or proceeding is finally decided,
resolved or terminated. This condition must be incorporated in the terms and condition of the
bonding contract and shall bind the parties notwithstanding their failure to expressly state the
same in the said contract or agreement. (Emphasis supplied)

Civil Case No. 10846 is a rare instance where the writ of seizure is dissolved due to the dismissal
without prejudice, but the bond stands because the case has yet to be finally terminated by the
Regional Trial Court.

The peculiar circumstances in this case arose when petitioner failed to return the van to Asuten,
despite the dismissal of her action. This is an instance not covered by the Rules of Court or
jurisprudence. In its discretion, the Regional Trial Court proceeded to rule on the forfeiture of the
bond. As a result, respondent paid Asuten twice the value of the van withheld by petitioner.
Respondent, thus, seeks to recover this amount from petitioner, despite the van only being worth
half the amount of the bond.

Of all the provisional remedies provided in the Rules of Court, only Rule 60, Section 256 requires
that the amount of the bond be double the value of the property. The other provisional remedies
provide that the amount be fixed by court or be merely equal to the value of the property:

However, there is a rationale to the requirement that the bond for a writ of seizure in a replevin be double the
value of the property. The bond functions not only to indemnify the defendant in case the property is lost, but
also to answer for any damages that may be awarded by the court if the judgment is rendered in defendant's
favor. In Citibank, N.A. v. Court of Appeals:58

It should be noted that a replevin bond is intended to indemnify the defendant against any loss that he may
suffer by reason of its being compelled to surrender the possession of the disputed property pending trial of
the action. The same may also be answerable for damages if any when judgment is rendered in favor of the
defendant or the party against whom a writ of replevin was issued and such judgment includes the return of
the property to him. Thus, the requirement that the bond be double the actual value of the properties litigated
upon. Such is the case because the bond will answer for the actual loss to the plaintiff, which corresponds to
the value of the properties sought to be recovered and for damages, if any.59

Any application of the bond in a replevin case, therefore, is premised on the judgment rendered in
favor of the defendant. Thus, the Rules of Court imply that there must be a prior judgment on the
merits before there can be any application on the bond:
RULE 61- Support Pendente Lite
1. San Juan vs. Valenzuela 117 SCRA 926 It appears that pending resolution of this petition, petitioner filed with the trial court a manifestation, dated
June 17, 1982, proposing to settle his obligation of P15,000.00, representing the amount of support which
accrued from January to June, 1982, and to pay the same in three equal installments, the first to be paid
upon approval by the court of his scheme of payment, and the balance within a period of two (2) months
thereafter. This proposal was approved by the court. In the same manifestation, petitioner sought the
reduction of the amount of support pendente lite to P1,000.00 a month on the ground that the sum of
P2,500.00 previously fixed by respondent judge is now beyond his means to pay. According to private
respondent, the court had not yet acted on petitioner's request for reduction of the monthly support because
the respondent judge left for abroad. 1

Unquestionably, the petitioner's willingness to pay the amount of support pendente lite in the mariner
indicated in his manifestation, and the approval thereof by the respondent Judge have rendered this petition
moot and academic.

As to the factual issue of whether the amount of P2,500.00 previously fixed by respondent judge is now
beyond the means of petitioner, the same should be resolved by the lower court on the basis of the evidence
to be presented at the proper hearing. The order of December 24 fixing the amount of support pendente
lite is not final in character in the sense that it can be the subject of modification, depending on the changing
conditions affecting the ability of the obligor to pay the amount fixed for support.  2

MISCELLANEOUS PROVISONAL REMEDIES

SEC. 14. Interim Reliefs. — Upon filing of the petition or at anytime before final judgment, the court, justice
or judge may grant any of the following reliefs:

(a) Temporary Protection Order. – The court, justice or judge, upon motion or motu proprio, may
order that the petitioner or the aggrieved party and any member of the immediate family be
protected in a government agency or by an accredited person or private institution capable of
keeping and securing their safety. If the petitioner is an organization, association or institution
referred to in Section 3(c) of this Rule, the protection may be extended to the officers involved.

The Supreme Court shall accredit the persons and private institutions that shall extend temporary
protection to the petitioner or the aggrieved party and any member of the immediate family, in
accordance with guidelines which it shall issue.

The accredited persons and private institutions shall comply with the rules and conditions that may
be imposed by the court, justice or judge.

(b) Inspection Order. — The court, justice or judge, upon verified motion and after due hearing,
may order any person in possession or control of a designated land or other property, to permit
entry for the purpose of inspecting, measuring, surveying, or photographing the property or any
relevant object or operation thereon.

The motion shall state in detail the place or places to be inspected. It shall be supported by
affidavits or testimonies of witnesses having personal knowledge of the enforced disappearance or
whereabouts of the aggrieved party.

If the motion is opposed on the ground of national security or of the privileged nature of the
information, the court, justice or judge may conduct a hearing in chambers to determine the merit
of the opposition.

The movant must show that the inspection order is necessary to establish the right of the
aggrieved party alleged to be threatened or violated.

The inspection order shall specify the person or persons authorized to make the inspection and
the date, time, place and manner of making the inspection and may prescribe other conditions to
protect the constitutional rights of all parties. The order shall expire five (5) days after the date of
its issuance, unless extended for justifiable reasons.

(c) Production Order. – The court, justice or judge, upon verified motion and after due hearing,
may order any person in possession, custody or control of any designated documents, papers,
books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things, or objects in digitized or
electronic form, which constitute or contain evidence relevant to the petition or the return, to
produce and permit their inspection, copying or photographing by or on behalf of the movant.

The motion may be opposed on the ground of national security or of the privileged nature of the
information, in which case the court, justice or judge may conduct a hearing in chambers to
determine the merit of the opposition.

The court, justice or judge shall prescribe other conditions to protect the constitutional rights of all
the parties.

(d) Witness Protection Order. – The court, justice or judge, upon motion or motu proprio, may refer
the witnesses to the Department of Justice for admission to the Witness Protection, Security and
Benefit Program, pursuant to Republic Act No. 6981.
 The court, justice or judge may also refer the witnesses to other government agencies, or to
accredited persons or private institutions capable of keeping and securing their safety.

SEC. 15. Availability of Interim Reliefs to Respondent. – Upon verified motion of the respondent and after
due hearing, the court, justice or judge may issue an inspection order or production order under paragraphs
(b) and (c) of the preceding section.

A motion for inspection order under this section shall be supported by affidavits or testimonies of witnesses
having personal knowledge of the defenses of the respondent.

1. RODOLFO NOEL LOZADA, JR., VIOLETA LOZADA and ARTURO LOZADA, vs.
PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO, EDUARDO ERMITA, AVELINO
 The writ of amparo is an independent and summary remedy that provides rapid judicial relief to
protect the people’s right to life, liberty and security.62 Having been originally intended as a
RAZON, ANGEL ATUTUBO and SPO4 ROGER VALEROSO,* G.R. Nos. 184379-80, April
response to the alarming cases of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances in the
24, 2012
country, it serves both preventive and curative roles to address the said human rights violations. It
is preventive in that it breaks the expectation of impunity in the commission of these offenses, and
it is curative in that it facilitates the subsequent punishment of perpetrators by inevitably leading to
subsequent investigation and action.63

 As it stands, the writ of amparo is confined only to cases of extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances, or to threats thereof.64 Considering that this remedy is aimed at addressing these
serious violations of or threats to the right to life, liberty and security, it cannot be issued on
amorphous and uncertain grounds,65 or in cases where the alleged threat has ceased and is no
longer imminent or continuing. 66 Instead, it must be granted judiciously so as not to dilute the
extraordinary and remedial character of the writ, thus:

 The privilege of the writ of amparo is envisioned basically to protect and guarantee the rights to
life, liberty, and security of persons, free from fears and threats that vitiate the quality of this life. It
is an extraordinary writ conceptualized and adopted in light of and in response to the prevalence of
extra-legal killings and enforced disappearances. Accordingly, the remedy ought to be resorted to
and granted judiciously, lest the ideal sought by the Amparo Rule be diluted and undermined by
the indiscriminate filing of amparo petitions for purposes less than the desire to secure amparo
reliefs and protection and/or on the basis of unsubstantiated allegations. 67 (Emphasis supplied.)

 Using this perspective as the working framework for evaluating the assailed CA decision and the
 evidence adduced by the parties, this Court denies the Petition.

 First issue: Presidential immunity from suit

It is settled in jurisprudence that the President enjoys immunity from suit during his or
her tenure of office or actual incumbency. 68 Conversely, this presidential privilege of
immunity cannot be invoked by a non-sitting president even for acts committed during
his or her tenure.69

In the case at bar, the events that gave rise to the present action, as well as the filing of
the original Petition and the issuance of the CA Decision, occurred during the
incumbency of former President Arroyo. In that respect, it was proper for the court a quo
to have dropped her as a respondent on account of her presidential immunity from suit.

It must be underscored, however, that since her tenure of office has already ended,
former President Arroyo can no longer invoke the privilege of presidential immunity as a
defense to evade judicial determination of her responsibility or accountability for the
alleged violation or threatened violation of the right to life, liberty and security of Lozada.

Nonetheless, examining the merits of the case still results in the denial of the Petition on
the issue of former President Arroyo’s alleged responsibility or accountability. A
thorough examination of the allegations postulated and the evidence adduced by
petitioners reveals their failure to sufficiently establish any unlawful act or omission on
her part that violated, or threatened with violation, the right to life, liberty and security of
Lozada. Except for the bare claims that: (a) Sec. Atienza mentioned a certain
"Ma’[a]m,"70 whom Lozada speculated to have referred to her, and (b) Sec. Defensor told
Lozada that "the President was ‘hurting’ from all the media frenzy,"71 there is nothing in
the records that would sufficiently establish the link of former President Arroyo to the
events that transpired on 5-6 February 2010, as well as to the subsequent threats that
Lozada and his family purportedly receive

 Third issue: Grant of the privilege of the writ of amparo

A. Alleged violation of or threat to the right to life, liberty and security of Lozada

Sections 17 and 18 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo requires the parties to establish their claims
by substantial evidence,75 or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.76 The use of this evidentiary threshold reveals the clear intent of
the framers of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo to have the equivalent of an administrative
proceeding, albeit judicially conducted, in addressing amparo situations. 77
 In cases where the violation of the right to life, liberty or security has already ceased, it is
necessary for the petitioner in an amparo action to prove the existence of a continuing
threat.78 Thus, this Court held in its Resolution in Razon v. Tagitis:79

Manalo is different from Tagitis in terms of their factual settings, as enforced disappearance was
no longer a problem in that case. The enforced disappearance of the brothers Raymond and
Reynaldo Manalo effectively ended when they escaped from captivity and surfaced, while Tagitis
is still nowhere to be found and remains missing more than two years after his reported
disappearance. An Amparo situation subsisted in Manalo, however, because of the continuing
threat to the brothers’ right to security; the brothers claimed that since the persons responsible for
their enforced disappearance were still at large and had not been held accountable, the former
were still under the threat of being once again abducted, kept captive or even killed, which threat
constituted a direct violation of their right to security of person.80 (Emphasis supplied.)

In the present case, the totality of the evidence adduced by petitioners failed to meet the threshold
of substantial evidence. Sifting through all the evidence and allegations presented, the crux of the
case boils down to assessing the veracity and credibility of the parties’ diverging claims as to what
actually transpired on 5-6 February 2008. In this regard, this Court is in agreement with the factual
findings of the CA to the extent that Lozada was not illegally deprived of his liberty from the point
when he disembarked from the aircraft up to the time he was led to the departure area of the
airport,81 as he voluntarily submitted himself to the custody of respondents

The failure to establish that the public official observed extraordinary diligence in the performance
of duty does not result in the automatic grant of the privilege of the amparo writ. It does not relieve
the petitioner from establishing his or her claim by substantial evidence.

Thus, in amparo actions, petitioners must establish their claims by substantial evidence, and they cannot
merely rely on the supposed failure of respondents to prove either their defenses or their exercise of
extraordinary diligence. In this case, the totality of the evidence presented by petitioners fails to meet the
requisite evidentiary threshold, and the privilege of the writ of amparo has already been rendered moot and
academic by the cessation of the restraint to Lozada’s liberty.

Second, Sec. 22 of the Amparo Rule proscribes the filing of an amparo petition should a criminal action
have, in the meanwhile, been commenced. The succeeding Sec. 23, on the other hand, provides that when
the criminal suit is filed subsequent to a petition for amparo, the petition shall be consolidated with the
criminal action where the Amparo Rule shall nonetheless govern the disposition of the relief under the Rule.
Under the terms of said Sec. 22, the present petition ought to have been dismissed at the outset. But as
things stand, the outright dismissal of the petition by force of that section is no longer technically feasible in
light of the interplay of the following factual mix: (1) the Court has, pursuant to Sec. 6 of the Rule, already
issued ex parte the writ of amparo; (2) the CA, after a summary hearing, has dismissed the petition, but not
on the basis of Sec. 22; and (3) the complaint in OMB-P-C-O7-0602-E named as respondents only those
believed to be the actual abductors of Lourdes, while the instant petition impleaded, in addition, those tasked
to investigate the kidnapping and detention incidents and their superiors at the top. Yet, the acts and/or
omissions subject of the criminal complaint and the amparo petition are so linked as to call for the
consolidation of both proceedings to obviate the mischief inherent in a multiplicity-of-suits situation.
 Given the above perspective and to fully apply the beneficial nature of the writ of amparo as an inexpensive
and effective tool to protect certain rights violated or threatened to be violated, the Court hereby adjusts to a
degree the literal application of Secs. 22 and 23 of the Amparo Rule to fittingly address the situation
obtaining under the premises. Towards this end, two things are at once indicated: (1) the consolidation of the
probe and fact-finding aspects of the instant petition with the investigation of the criminal complaint before
the OMB; and (2) the incorporation in the same criminal complaint of the allegations in this petition bearing
on the threats to the right to security. Withal, the OMB should be furnished copies of the investigation reports
to aid that body in its own investigation and eventual resolution of OMB-P-C-O7-0602-E. Then, too, the OMB
shall be given easy access to all pertinent documents and evidence, if any, adduced before the CA.
Necessarily, Lourdes, as complainant in OMB-P-C-O7-0602-E, should be allowed, if so minded, to amend
her basic criminal complaint if the consolidation of cases is to be fully effective. (Emphasis supplied.)

Thus, if the Complaint filed before the DOJ had already progressed into a criminal case, then the latter
action can more adequately dispose of the allegations made by petitioners. After all, one of the ultimate
objectives of the writ of amparo as a curative remedy is to facilitate the subsequent punishment of
perpetrators.89 On the other hand, if there is no actual criminal case lodged before the courts, then the denial
of the Petition is without prejudice to the filing of the appropriate administrative, civil or criminal case, if
applicable, against those individuals whom Lozada deems to have unduly restrained his liberty.

2. LORIE MARIE TOMAS CALLO, VS COMMISSIONER JAIME H. MORENTE, BUREAU The protective writ of amparo is a judicial remedy to expeditiously provide relief to violations of a person's
OF IMMIGRATION, OIC ASSOCIATES COMMISSIONERS, BUREAU OF constitutional right to life, liberty, and security, and more specifically, to address the problem of extralegal
IMMIGRATION, and BRIAN ALAS, BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION G.R. No. 230324 killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC provides:
SEPTEMBER 19, 2017
Sec. 1. Petition. - The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life,
liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee, or of a private individual or entity.

The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. (Emphasis

supplied)
It is clear from the above-quoted provision that the writ of amparo covers extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances or threats thereof.4 Enforced disappearance is defined under Republic Act (RA) No.
9851,5 Section 3(g) of which provides:

(g) "Enforced or involuntary disappearance of persons" means the arrest, detention, or abduction of
persons by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, a State or a political organization
followed by a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to give information on the fate or
whereabouts of those persons, with the intention of removing from the protection of the law for a
prolonged period of time.
This Court also had the opportunity to define extralegal killings and enforced disappearance:

Extralegal killings are killings committed without due process of law, without legal safeguards or judicial
 proceedings. On the other hand, enforced disappearance has been defined by the Court as the arrest,
detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups
of persons acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to
acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared
person, which place such a person outside the protection of the law.6
In Navia v. Pardico,7 this Court clarified that with the enactment of RA No. 9851, the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo is now a procedural law anchored, not only on the constitutional right to life, liberty, and security, but
also on a concrete statutory definition of"enforced or involuntary disappearance." Further, elements
constituting enforced disappearance as defined under RA No. 9851 were clearly laid down by this Court, viz:

(A) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;

(b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a political
organization;
(c) that it be followed by the State or political organization's refusal to acknowledge or give information on the
fute or whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo petition; and

(d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the protection of the law for a
prolonged period of time.8
It is clear that the elements of enforced disappearance are not attendant in this case. There is also no threat
of such enforced disappearance. While there is indeed a detention carried out by the State through the
Bureau of Immigration, the third and fourth elements are not present. There is no refusal to acknowledge the
deprivation of freedom or refusal to give information on the whereabouts of Parker because as Callo admits,
Parker is detained in the Immigration Detention Facility of the Bureau of Immigration. The Bureau of
Immigration also does not deny this. In fact, the Bureau of Immigration had produced the body of Parker
before the RTC in the proceedings for the writ of habeas corpus previously initiated by Parker
herself.9 Similarly, there is no intention to remove Parker from the protection of the law for a prolonged
period of time. As the Bureau of Immigration explained, Parker has a pending criminal case against her in
Davao City, which prevents the Bureau of Immigration from deporting her from the country.

Simply put, we see no enforced or involuntary disappearance, or any threats thereof, that would warrant the
issuance of the writ of amparo. For the issuance of the writ, it is not sufficient that a person's life is
endangered. It is even not sufficient to allege and prove that a person has disappeared. It has to be shown
by the required quantum of proof that the disappearance was carried out by, or with the authorization,
support or acquiescence of the government or a political organization, and that there is a refusal to
acknowledge the same or to give information on the fate or whereabouts of the missing persons. 10 In this
case, Parker lias not disappeared. Her detention has been sufficiently justified by the Bureau of Immigration,
given that there is an SDO and a pending criminal case against her.

Callo contends that there is no cause to detain Parker because Parker, a natural-born Filipino citizen, is a
different person from Danielle Nopuente, the person against whom the SDO was issued.
*FOR THE REMAINING NOTES, PLS REFER TO THE BOOK OF RIANO.

RULE 62- INTERPLEADER

1.  Plaintiffs entirely miss the vital element of an action of interpleader. Rule 63, section 1 of the
Revised Rules of Court (formerly Rule 14) requires as an indispensable element that "conflicting
claims upon the same subject matter are or may be made" against the plaintiff-in-interpleader
 "who claims no interest whatever in the subject matter or an interest which in whole or in part is
not disputed by the claimants."
Beltran v. People’s Homesite & Housing Corp G.R. No. L-25138 , August 28, 1969
 While the two defendant corporations may have conflicting claims between themselves with regard
to the management, administration and ownership of Project 4, such conflicting claims are not
against the plaintiffs nor do they involve or affect the plaintiffs. No allegation is made in their
complaint that any corporation other than the PHHC which was the only entity privy to their lease-
purchase agreement, ever made on them any claim or demand for payment of the rentals or
amortization payments. The questions of fact raised in their complaint concerning the
enforceability, and recognition or non-enforceability and non-recognition of the turnover agreement
of December 27, 1961 between the two defendant corporations are irrelevant to their action of
interpleader, for these conflicting claims, loosely so-called, are between the two corporations and
not against plaintiffs. Both defendant corporations were in conformity and had no dispute, as
pointed out by the trial court that the monthly payments and amortizations should be made directly
to the PHHC alone.
2.

 There is no question in this case that plaintiff may compel the defendants to interplead among
themselves, concerning the aforementioned sum of P5,198.75. The only issue is who among the
defendants is entitled to collect the same. This is the object of the action, which is not within the
jurisdiction of the lower court. As a matter of fact, on May 25, 1966 the Supplier sued Tanjuatco, in
Civil Case No. 149173 of the Municipal Court of Manila, for the recovery of said amount of
P5,198.75, and the decision therein will settle the question as to who has a right to the sum
withheld by plaintiff

 The latter relies upon Rule 63 of the present Rules of Court, prescribing the procedure in cases of
interpleading, and section 19 of Rule 5 of said Rules of Court, which, unlike section 19 of Rule 4 of
the Old Rules, omits the Rules on Interpleading among those made applicable to inferior courts.
This fact does not warrant, however, the conclusion drawn therefrom by plaintiff herein. To begin
with, the jurisdiction of our courts over the subject-matter of justiciable controversies is governed
Makati Development Corp. v. Tanjuatco G.R. No. L-26443, March 25, 1969 by Rep. Act No. 296, as amended, pursuant to which 2 municipal courts shall have exclusive
original jurisdiction in all civil cases "in which the demand, exclusive of interest, or the value of the
property in controversy", amounts to not more than "ten thousand pesos."

 Secondly, "the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts"
belongs to Congress 3 and is beyond the rule-making power of the Supreme Court, which is limited
to matters concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the
practice of law. 4 

 Thirdly, the failure of said section 19 of Rule 5 of the present Rules of Court to make its Rule 63,
on interpleading, applicable to inferior courts, merely implies that the same are not bound to follow
Rule 63 in dealing with cases of interpleading, but may apply thereto the general rules on
procedure applicable to ordinary civil action in said courts.

 It was held that where the conflicting claims involve the right to receive a particular sum, the
amount of the sum claimed determines the jurisdiction. The issue is who between or among the
defendants is entitled to collect the same and the amount is the object of the action. There is no
 merit in the contention that the subject matter of the litigation is not the sum, but the right “to
compel the defendants to litigate among themselves.”

3.
Lui Enterprises, Inc. Vs. Zuellig Pharma Corporation and the Philippine Bank of
Communications, G.R. No. 193494. March 12, 2014
 “At any rate, an adverse claimant in an interpleader case may be declared in default. Under Rule
62, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a claimant who fails to answer within the
required period may, on motion, be declared in default. The consequence of the default is that the
court may "render judgment barring [the defaulted claimant] from any claim in respect to the
subject matter." The Rules would not have allowed claimants in interpleader cases to be declared
in default if it would "ironically defeat the very purpose of the suit."”

4.  Besides, a successful litigant cannot later be impleaded by his defeated adversary in an

interpleader suit and compelled to prove his claim anew against other adverse claimants, as that
Wack-Wack Golf v. Won 70 SCRA 165 would in effect be a collateral attack upon the judgment. In fine, the instant interpleader suit cannot
prosper because the Corporation had already been made independently liable in civil case 26044
and, therefore, its present application for interpleader would in effect be a collateral attack upon
the final judgment in the said civil case; the appellee Lee had already established his rights to
membership fee certificate 201 in the aforesaid civil case and, therefore, this interpleader suit
would compel him to establish his rights anew, and thereby increase instead of diminish litigations,
which is one of the purposes of an interpleader suit, with the possibility that the benefits of the final
judgment in the said civil case might eventually be taken away from him; and because the
Corporation allowed itself to be sued to final judgment in the said case, its action of interpleader
was filed inexcusably late, for which reason it is barred by laches or unreasonable delay.

RULE 63- DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES

1. Reyes vs. Dizon 628 SCRA 1,13 August 11, 2010 Thus, the Court declared that a petition for declaratory relief cannot properly have a court decision as its
subject matter. A court decision cannot be interpreted as included within the purview of the words “other
written instrument” for the simple reason that the provisions of the Rules of Court already provide for the
ways by which an ambiguous or doubtful decision may be corrected or clarified without need of resorting to a
petition for declaratory relief.

Citing Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, the Supreme Court held that the same section of the
provision can be dissected into two parts.

The first paragraph concerns declaratory relief, which has been defined as a special civil action by any
person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument or whose rights are affected by a
statute, ordinance, executive order or regulation to determine any question of construction or validity arising
under the instrument, executive order or regulation, or statute and for a declaration of his rights and duties
thereunder.

The second paragraph pertains to (1) an action for the reformation of an instrument; (2) an action to quiet
title; and (3) an action to consolidate ownership in a sale with a right to repurchase. (CITED IN THE BOOK)
The first paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 63 enumerates the subject matter to be inquired upon in a
declaratory relief namely, deed, will, contract or other written instrument, a statute, executive order or
regulation, or any government regulation.

2. Province of Camarines Sur vs. CA 600 SCRA 569
3. Almeda vs. Bathala Marketing 543 SCRA 470
This Court, in Lerum v. Cruz,44 declared that the subject matters to be tested in a petition for declaratory
relief are exclusive, viz:
Under this rule, only a person who is interested "under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, and
whose rights are affected by a statute or ordinance, may bring an action to determine any question of
construction or validity arising under the instrument or statute and for a declaration of his rights or duties
thereunder." This means that the subject matter must refer to a deed, will, contract or other written
instrument, or to a statute or ordinance, to warrant declaratory relief. Any other matter not mentioned therein
is deemed excluded. This is under the principle of expressio unius est exclussio alterius. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Declaratory relief is defined as an action by any person interested in a deed, will, contract or other written
instrument, executive order or resolution, to determine any question of construction or validity arising from
the instrument, executive order or regulation, or statute; and for a declaration of his rights and duties
thereunder. The only issue that may be raised in such a petition is the question of construction or validity of
provisions in an instrument or statute. (mentioned in RIANO)
The requisites of an action for declaratory relief are:
(1) there must be a justiciable controversy between persons whose interests are adverse;
(2) the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and
(3) the issue is ripe for judicial determination
Miscellaneous:
 Discussed also are concepts about certiorari
Corollary is the general rule that such an action must be justified, as no other adequate relief or remedy is
available under the circumstances. (Mentioned in RIANO) As a rule, the petition for declaratory relief should
be dismissed in view of the pendency of a separate action for unlawful detainer. In this case, however, the
trial court had not yet resolved the rescission/ejectment case during the pendency of the declaratory relief
petition. In fact, the trial court, where the rescission case was on appeal, initiated the suspension of the
proceedings pending the resolution of the action for declaratory relief. Decisional law enumerates the
requisites of an action for declaratory relief, as follows:
1) the subject matter of the controversy must be a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, statute,
executive order or regulation, or ordinance;
2) the terms of said documents and the validity thereof are doubtful and require judicial construction;
3) there must have been no breach of the documents in question; 2 RULE 63-DECLARATORY RELIEF AND
SIMILAR REMEDIES MERAKI LEX 2
4) there must be an actual justiciable controversy or the "ripening seeds" of one between persons whose
interests are adverse;
5) the issue must be ripe for judicial determination; and 6) adequate relief is not available through other
means or other forms of action or proceeding. (Mentioned in RIANO)

4. ANTONIO P. TAMBUNTING, JR. and COMMERCIAL HOUSE OF FINANCE, INC., vs.
SPOUSES EMILIO SUMABAT and ESPERANZA BAELLO,  G.R. No. 144101 September 16,
2005
It is true that in Panganiban v. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation 17 we held that the petition for
declaratory relief should be dismissed in view of the pendency of a separate action for unlawful detainer.
However, we cannot apply the same ruling to the instant case.
In Panganiban, the unlawful detainer case had already been resolved by the trial court before the dismissal
of the declaratory relief case; and it was petitioner in that case who insisted that the action for declaratory
relief be preferred over the action for unlawful detainer. Conversely, in the case at bench, the trial court had
not yet resolved the rescission/ejectment case during the pendency of the declaratory relief petition. In fact,
the trial court, where the rescission case was on appeal, itself initiated the suspension of the proceedings
pending the resolution of the action for declaratory relief.
We are not unmindful of the doctrine enunciated in Teodoro, Jr. v. Mirasol18 where the declaratory relief
action was dismissed because the issue therein could be threshed out in the unlawful detainer suit. Yet,
again, in that case, there was already a breach of contract at the time of the filing of the declaratory relief
petition. This dissimilar factual milieu proscribes the Court from applying Teodoro to the instant case.
Petitioners claim that the trial court erred when it affirmed the validity of the consignation. They insist that the
CFI was barred from taking cognizance of the action for declaratory relief since, petitioners being already in
default in their loan amortizations, there existed a violation of the mortgage deed even before the institution
of the action. Hence, the CFI could not have rendered a valid judgment in Civil Case No. C-7496 and the
consignation made pursuant to a void judgment was likewise void. Respondents also fault the trial court for
holding that their right to foreclose the property had already prescribed.
True, the trial court erred when it ruled that the 1981 CFI decision in Civil Case No. C-7496 was already final
and executory.
An action for declaratory relief should be filed by a person interested under a deed, will, contract or
other written instrument, and whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order, regulation or
ordinance before breach or violation thereof. 1 
The purpose of the action is to secure an authoritative statement of the rights and obligations of
the parties under a statute, deed, contract, etc. for their guidance in its enforcement or compliance
and not to settle issues arising from its alleged breach. 2 It may be entertained only before the
breach or violation of the statute, deed, contract, etc. to which it refers.3
 Where the law or contract has already been contravened prior to the filing of an action for
declaratory relief, the court can no longer assume jurisdiction over the action. 4 
In other words, a court has no more jurisdiction over an action for declaratory relief if its
subject, i.e., the statute, deed, contract, etc., has already been infringed or transgressed before
the institution of the action. Under such circumstances, inasmuch as a cause of action has already
accrued in favor of one or the other party, there is nothing more for the court to explain or clarify
 short of a judgment or final order.

Here, an infraction of the mortgage terms had already taken place before the filing of Civil Case No. C-7496.
Thus, the CFI lacked jurisdiction when it took cognizance of the case in 1979. And in the absence of
jurisdiction, its decision was void and without legal effect. As this Court held in Arevalo v. Benedicto:5

Furthermore, the want of jurisdiction by a court over the subject-matter renders its judgment void and a mere
nullity, and considering that a void judgment is in legal effect no judgment, by which no rights are divested,
from which no rights can be obtained, which neither binds nor bars any one, and under which all acts
performed and all claims flowing out of are void, and considering further, that the decision, for want of
jurisdiction of the court, is not a decision in contemplation of law, and, hence, can never become executory,
it follows that such a void judgment cannot constitute a bar to another case by reason of res judicata.

5. THE LIGA NG MGA BARANGAY NATIONAL, vs. THE CITY MAYOR OF MANILA, HON. JOSE Although the instant petition is styled as a petition for certiorari, in essence, it seeks the declaration by this
ATIENZA, JR., and THE CITY COUNCIL OF MANILA,  G.R. No. 154599,    January 21, 2004 Court of the unconstitutionality or illegality of the questioned ordinance and executive order. It, thus, partakes
of the nature of a petition for declaratory relief over which this Court has only appellate, not original,
jurisdiction.14 Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution provides:

Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, and habeas corpus.

(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari as the law or the
Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:

(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international
or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order,
instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question. (Italics supplied).

As such, this petition must necessary fail, as this Court does not have original jurisdiction over a
petition for declaratory relief even if only questions of law are involved. 15

Even granting arguendo that the present petition is ripe for the extraordinary writ of certiorari, there is here a
clear disregard of the hierarchy of courts. No special and important reason or exceptional and compelling
circumstance has been adduced by the petitioner or the intervenor why direct recourse to this Court should
be allowed.

We have held that this Court’s original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari (as well as of prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction) is not exclusive, but is concurrent with the

6. Commission of Customs v. Cloribel G.R. No. L-21036 June 30, 1977
7. Visayan Packing v. Reparations Commission G.R. No. L-29673 November 12, 1987
Regional Trial Courts and the Court of Appeals in certain cases. As aptly stated in People v. Cuaresma: 16
This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according to parties seeking any of
the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor0
will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the
venue of appeals, and also serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions
for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard of that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates
that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level ("inferior") courts should be
filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct
invocation of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only
when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the
petition. This is [an] established policy. It is a policy necessary to prevent inordinate demands
upon the Court’s time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive
jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Court’s docket.
As we have said in Santiago v. Vasquez,17 the propensity of litigants and lawyers to disregard the hierarchy
of courts in our judicial system by seeking relief directly from this Court must be put to a halt for two reasons:
(1) it would be an imposition upon the precious time of this Court; and (2) it would cause an inevitable and
resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of cases, which in some instances had to be
remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as better
equipped to resolve the issues because this Court is not a trier of facts.
Thus, we shall reaffirm the judicial policy that this Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress
desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts, and exceptional and compelling circumstances justify
the availment of the extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari, calling for the exercise of its primary
jurisdiction.18
Petitioner’s reliance on Pimentel v. Aguirre19 is misplaced because the non-observance of the hierarchy-of-
courts rule was not an issue therein. Besides, what was sought to be nullified in the petition for certiorari and
prohibition therein was an act of the President of the Philippines, which would have greatly affected all local
government units. We reiterated therein that when an act of the legislative department is seriously alleged to
have infringed the Constitution, settling the controversy becomes the duty of this Court. The same is true
when what is seriously alleged to be unconstitutional is an act of the President, who in our constitutional
scheme is coequal with Congress.
Because of the absence of allegations seeking material or affirmative reliefs in a petition for declaratory
relief, it has been held that when the main case is for declaratory relief, a third-party complaint is
inconceivable. The relief sought in this kind of pleading is contribution, indemnity, subrogation or other relief
from the third-party defendant in respect of the claim of the plaintiff against him. Accordingly, this relief
cannot be granted because, in a declaratory relief, the court is merely interpreting the terms of the contract.
There is nothing in the nature of a special civil action for declaratory relief that proscribes the filing of a
counterclaim based on the same transaction, deed or contract subject of the complaint. A special civil action
is after all not essentially different from an ordinary civil action, which is generally governed by Rules 1 to 56
of the Rules of Court, except that the former deals with a special subject matter which makes necessary
some special regulation. But the identity between their fundamental nature is such that the same rules
 governing ordinary civil suits may and do apply to special civil actions if not inconsistent with or if they may
serve to supplement the provisions of the peculiar rules governing special civil actions.

RULING: There is nothing in the nature of a special civil action for declaratory relief that proscribes the filing
of a counterclaim based on the same transaction, deed or contract subject of the complaint. A special civil
action is after all not essentially different from all ordinary civil action, which is generally governed by Rules 1
to 56 of the Rules of Court, except that the former deals with a special subject matter which makes
necessary some special regulation. But the Identity between their fundamental nature is such that the same
rules governing ordinary civil suits may and do apply to special civil actions if not inconsistent with or if they
may serve to supplement the provisions of the peculiar rules governing special civil actions.
8.
G.R. No. 137794 While a petition for declaratory relief may be treated as one for prohibition if it has far reaching implications
August 11, 2010 and raises questions that need to be resolved, there is no allegation of facts by petitioner tending to show
ERLINDA REYES and ROSEMARIE MATIENZO vs HON. JUDGE BELEN B. ORTIZ that she is entitled to such a writ. The judicial policy must thus remain that this Court will not entertain direct
resort to it, except when the redress sought cannot be obtained in the proper courts or when exceptional and
compelling circumstances warrant availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of this Court's
primary jurisdiction.

If the petition relates to an act or an omission of a municipal trial court x x x, it shall be filed with the Regional
Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be
filed with the Court of Appeals or with the Sandiganbayan, whether or not the same is in aid of the court’s
appellate jurisdiction.

Despite this procedural remedy available to them, petitioners, under the pretext that they were in a quandary
as to their rights under the Injunction order of the Quezon City RTC, directly filed the instant case here.
Petitioners did not bother to proffer a compelling reason for their direct resort to this Court. This procedural
faux pas proves fatal. The Court’s exhortation against taking a procedural shortcut cannot be
overemphasized. In Ortega v. The Quezon City Government, 49 the Court accentuated:

At all events, even if this petition delves on questions of law, there is no statutory or jurisprudential basis for
according to this Court original and exclusive jurisdiction over declaratory relief which advances only
questions of law.

Finally, while a petition for declaratory relief may be treated as one for prohibition if it has far reaching
implications and raises questions that need to be resolved, there is no allegation of facts by petitioner
tending to show that she is entitled to such a writ. The judicial policy must thus remain that this Court will not
entertain direct resort to it, except when the redress sought cannot be obtained in the proper courts or when
exceptional and compelling circumstances warrant availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise
of this Court's primary jurisdiction. (Emphasis supplied.)

To make matters worse, petitioner Matienzo obviously availed of the instant declaratory relief to substitute
for a petition for certiorari, a remedy which she sadly lost by inaction. It must be recalled that on December
8, 1997, the Caloocan City RTC, Branch 124 denied Matienzo’s motion to suspend proceedings. 50 She
moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied on May 14, 1998.51 She received the Order denying her
motion for reconsideration on June 9, 1998. 52 She had 60 days therefrom to question the same before the
Quezon City RTC. It was only on March 25, 1999 that petitioner Matienzo assailed the order denying her
motion for reconsideration, albeit wrongly before this Court.53 From this, it can be inferred that petitioner
 Matienzo’s recourse is a belated attempt designed to salvage her lost opportunity to assail the order denying
her motion to suspend proceedings.

While a petition for declaratory relief may be treated as one for prohibition if it has far reaching implications
and raises questions that need to be resolved, there is no allegation of facts by petitioner tending to show
9.
that she is entitled to such a writ. The judicial policy must thus remain that this Court will not entertain direct
Galicto vs. Aquino 667 SCRA 150 resort to it, except when the redress sought cannot be obtained in the proper courts or when exceptional and
compelling circumstances warrant availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of this Court's
primary jurisdiction. GALICTO CASE
10. Yes. “Petition for declaratory relief treated as petition for mandamus” At the outset, petitioner is faced with a
procedural barrier.

Gamboa vs. Finance Secretary Teves 652 SCRA 690 Among the remedies petitioner seeks, only the petition for prohibition is within the original jurisdiction of this
court, which however is not exclusive but is concurrent with the Regional Trial Court and the Court of
Appeals.

The actions for declaratory relief, injunction, and annulment of sale are not embraced within the original
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. On this ground alone, the petition could have been dismissed outright.
While direct resort to this Court may be justified in a petition for prohibition, the Court shall nevertheless
refrain from discussing the grounds in support of the petition for prohibition since on 28 February 2007, the
questioned sale was consummated when MPAH paid IPC P25,217,556,000 and the government delivered
the certificates for the 111,415 PTIC shares. However, since the threshold and purely legal issue on the
definition of the term capital in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution has far-reaching implications to the
national economy, the Court treats the petition for declaratory relief as one for mandamus. In Salvacion v.
Central Bank of the Philippines, the Court treated the petition for declaratory relief as one for mandamus
considering the grave injustice that would result in the interpretation of a banking law.

11. G.R. No. 167391 June 8, 2011 PHIL-VILLE DEVELOPMENT AND HOUSING CORPORATION, Petitioner, - versus -
MAXIMO BONIFACIO, CEFERINO R. BONIFACIO, APOLONIO B. TAN, BENITA B. CAINA, CRISPINA B. PASCUAL,
ROSALIA B. DE GRACIA, TERESITA S. DORONIA, CHRISTINA GOCO AND ARSENIO C. BONIFACIO, in their
capacity as the surviving heirs of the late ELEUTERIA RIVERA VDA. DE BONIFACIO, Respondents. MARTIN S.
VILLARAMA, JR.
In Alliance of Government Workers v. Minister of Labor, the Court similarly brushed aside the procedural
infirmity of the petition for declaratory relief and treated the same as one for mandamus. In short, it is well-
settled that this Court may treat a petition for declaratory relief as one for mandamus if the issue involved
has far-reaching implications (XPN). As this Court held in Salvacion: The Court has no original and exclusive
jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory relief. However, exceptions to this rule have been recognized.
Thus, where the petition has far-reaching implications and raises questions that should be resolved, it may
be treated as one for mandamus. (Riano)
No executory process as in ordinary civil actions It was ruled that the judgment in a petition for declaratory
relief can be carried into effect without requiring the parties to pay damages or perform any act as when the
petitioner’s complaint is captioned as Quieting of Title and Damages, but all that the petitioner prayed for is
for the court to uphold the validity of its titles as against that of respondent Quieting of title is a common law
remedy for the removal of any cloud upon, doubt, or uncertainty affecting title to real property.

Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest in real property by reason of any
instrument, record, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding that is apparently valid or effective, but is, in truth
and in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may
 be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title. In such action, the competent court is tasked to
determine the respective rights of the complainant and the other claimants, not only to place things in their
proper places, and make the claimant, who has no rights to said immovable, respect and not disturb the one
so entitled, but also for the benefit of both, so that whoever has the right will see every cloud of doubt over
the property dissipated, and he can thereafter fearlessly introduce any desired improvements, as well as
use, and even abuse the property.

An action for declaratory relief presupposes that there has been no actual breach of the instruments involved
or of the rights arising thereunder. Since the purpose of an action for declaratory relief is to secure an
authoritative statement of the rights and obligations of the parties under a statute, deed, or contract for their
guidance in the enforcement thereof, or compliance therewith, and not to settle issues arising from an
alleged breach thereof, it may be entertained before the breach or violation of the statute, deed or contract to
which it refers.

A petition for declaratory relief gives a practical remedy for ending controversies that have not reached the
state where another relief is immediately available; and supplies the need for a form of action that will set
controversies at rest before they lead to a repudiation of obligations, an invasion of rights, and a commission
of wrongs.

12, THE METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY and BAYANI FERNANDO as Chairman of the In bringing their petitions before the trial court, both respondents pleaded the existence of the essential
. Metropolitan Manila Development Authority, petitioners, vs. VIRON TRANSPORTATION CO., INC., respondent requisites for their respective petitions for declaratory relief, and refuted petitioners’ contention that a
justiciable controversy was lacking.

The following are the essential requisites for a declaratory relief petition:
(a) there must be a justiciable controversy;

(b) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse;

(c) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy; and

(d) the issue invoked must be ripe for judicial determination.

13.
The requisites for entitlement to declaratory relief were not complied. An action for declaratory relief is
governed by Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court. 16 It is predicated on the attendance of several
requisites, specifically:

(1) the subject matter of the controversy must be a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, statute,
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs STANDARD INSURANCE CO., INC., G.R. No. executive order or regulation, or ordinance;
219340, November 7, 2018
(2) the terms of said documents and the validity thereof are doubtful and require judicial construction;

(3) there must have been no breach of the documents in question;

(4) there must be an actual justiciable controversy or the "ripening seeds" of one between persons whose
interests are adverse;

(5) the issue must be ripe for judicial determination; and

(6) adequate relief is not available through other means or other forms of action or proceeding
 CHAPTER 4
Reformation of Instruments (n)

Article 1359. When, there having been a meeting of the minds of the parties to a contract, their true
intention is not expressed in the instrument purporting to embody the agreement, by reason of mistake,
fraud, inequitable conduct or accident, one of the parties may ask for the reformation of the instrument to the
end that such true intention may be expressed.

If mistake, fraud, inequitable conduct, or accident has prevented a meeting of the minds of the parties, the
proper remedy is not reformation of the instrument but annulment of the contract.
Reformation of an instrument [Arts. 1359-1369 Civil Code]

Article 1360. The principles of the general law on the reformation of instruments are hereby adopted insofar
as they are not in conflict with the provisions of this Code.

Article 1361. When a mutual mistake of the parties causes the failure of the instrument to disclose their real
agreement, said instrument may be reformed.

Article 1362. If one party was mistaken and the other acted fraudulently or inequitably in such a way that the
instrument does not show their true intention, the former may ask for the reformation of the instrument.

Article 1363. When one party was mistaken and the other knew or believed that the instrument did not state
their real agreement, but concealed that fact from the former, the instrument may be reformed.

Article 1364. When through the ignorance, lack of skill, negligence or bad faith on the part of the person
drafting the instrument or of the clerk or typist, the instrument does not express the true intention of the
parties, the courts may order that the instrument be reformed.

Article 1365. If two parties agree upon the mortgage or pledge of real or personal property, but the
instrument states that the property is sold absolutely or with a right of repurchase, reformation of the
instrument is proper.

Article 1366. There shall be no reformation in the following cases:

(1) Simple donations inter vivos wherein no condition is imposed;

(2) Wills;

(3) When the real agreement is void.

Article 1367. When one of the parties has brought an action to enforce the instrument, he cannot
subsequently ask for its reformation.

Article 1368. Reformation may be ordered at the instance of either party or his successors in interest, if the
 mistake was mutual; otherwise, upon petition of the injured party, or his heirs and assigns.

Article 1369. The procedure for the reformation of instrument shall be governed by rules of court to be
promulgated by the Supreme Court.

Article 1607. In case of real property, the consolidation of ownership in the vendee by virtue of the failure of
the vendor to comply with the provisions of article 1616 shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property
without a judicial order, after the vendor has been duly heard. (n)

Consolidation of ownership [Art. 1607 Civil Code] [Rule 63, Sec. 1(2)] Rule 63, Sec. 1(2)

An action for the reformation of an instrument, to quiet title to real property or remove clouds therefrom, or to
consolidate ownership under Article 1607 of the Civil Code, may be brought under this Rule.

Quieting of title to real property [Arts. 476-481 Civil Code] CHAPTER 3

Quieting of Title (n)

Article 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by reason of any
instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth
and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may
be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title.

An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to real property or any interest
therein.

Article 477. The plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to, or interest in the real property which is the
subject matter of the action. He need not be in possession of said property.

Article 478. There may also be an action to quiet title or remove a cloud therefrom when the contract,
instrument or other obligation has been extinguished or has terminated, or has been barred by extinctive
prescription.

Article 479. The plaintiff must return to the defendant all benefits he may have received from the latter, or
reimburse him for expenses that may have redounded to the plaintiff's benefit.

Article 480. The principles of the general law on the quieting of title are hereby adopted insofar as they are
 not in conflict with this Code.

Article 481. The procedure for the quieting of title or the removal of a cloud therefrom shall be governed by
such rules of court as the Supreme Court shall promulgated.

Rule 64- Review of Judgments and Final Orders or Resolutions of the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit
1. Lokin, Jr. vs. COMELEC 621 SCRA 385 The controversy involving Lokin is neither an election protest nor an action for quo warranto, for it
concerns a very peculiar situation in which Lokin is seeking to be seated as the second nominee of CIBAC.
Although an election protest may properly be available to one party-list organization seeking to unseat
another party-list organization to determine which between the defeated and the winning party-list
organizations actually obtained the majority of the legal votes, Lokin’s case is not one in which a nominee of
a particular party-list organization thereby wants to unseat another nominee of the same party-list
organization. Neither does an action for quo warranto lie, considering that the case does not involve the
ineligibility and disloyalty of Cruz-Gonzales to the Republic of the Philippines, or some other cause of
disqualification for her.

Lokin has correctly brought this special civil action for certiorari against the COMELEC to seek the
review of the September 14, 2007 resolution of the COMELEC in accordance with Section 7 of Article IX-A
of the 1987 Constitution, notwithstanding the oath and assumption of office by Cruz-Gonzales.

The constitutional mandate is now implemented by Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which
provides for the review of the judgments, final orders or resolutions of the COMELEC and the Commission
on Audit. As Rule 64 states, the mode of review is by a petition for certiorari in accordance with Rule 65 to
be filed in the Supreme Court within a limited period of 30 days. Undoubtedly, the Court has original and
exclusive jurisdiction over Lokin’s petitions for certiorari and for mandamus against the COMELEC.

2. Maritime Industry Authority vs. COA It is only when the COA has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, that this Court entertains a petition questioning its rulings. There
is grave abuse of discretion when there is an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law or to act in contemplation of law as when the judgment rendered is not based on law and
evidence but on caprice, whim and despotism. We find that no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction may be attributed to the Commission on Audit in this case.
3. Fortune Life Insurance Company, INc vs. COA G.R. No. 213525 There is no parity between the petition for review under Rule 42 and the petition for certiorari under
Rule 64.

4. The Law Firm of Laguesma Magsalin Consulta and Gastardo vs. COA G.R. No. 185544, January 13,
2015
As to the nature of the procedures, Rule 42 governs an appeal from the judgment or final order
rendered by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. Such appeal is on a question
of fact, or of law, or of mixed question of fact and law, and is given due course only upon a prima
facie showing that the Regional Trial Court committed an error of fact or law warranting the reversal or
modification of the challenged judgment or final order.17 In contrast, the petition for certiorari under Rule 64 is
similar to the petition for certiorari under Rule 65, and assails a judgment or final order of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC), or the Commission on Audit (COA). The petition is not designed to correct only
errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. 18 Questions of fact cannot be raised except to determine
whether the COMELEC or the COA were guilty of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
The reglementary periods under Rule 42 and Rule 64 are different. In the former, the aggrieved party is
allowed 15 days to file the petition for review from receipt of the assailed decision or final order, or from
receipt of the denial of a motion for new trial or reconsideration.19 In the latter, the petition is filed within 30
days from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution sought to be reviewed. The filing of a motion for
new trial or reconsideration, if allowed under the procedural rules of the Commission concerned, interrupts
the period; hence, should the motion be denied, the aggrieved party may file the petition within the remaining
period, which shall not be less than five days in any event, reckoned from the notice of
denial.20chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The petitioner filed its motion for reconsideration on January 14, 2013, which was 31 days after
receiving the assailed decision of the COA on December 14, 2012. 21  Pursuant to Section 3 of  Rule 64, it
had only five days from receipt of the denial of its motion for reconsideration to file the petition. Considering
that it received the notice of the denial on July 14, 2014, it had only until July 19, 2014 to file the petition.
However, it filed the petition on August 13, 2014, which was 25 days too late.
We ruled in Pates v. Commission on Elections 22 that the belated filing of the petition
for certiorari under Rule 64 on the belief that the fresh period rule should apply was fatal to the recourse. As
such, the petitioner herein should suffer the same fate for having wrongly assumed that the fresh period
rule under Neypes23 applied. Rules of procedure may be relaxed only to relieve a litigant of an injustice that
is not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the prescribed
procedure.24 Absent this reason for liberality, the petition cannot be allowed to prosper.
Ordinarily, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court has a reglementary period of 60 days
from receipt of denial of the motion for reconsideration. The Constitution, however, specifies that the
reglementary period for assailing the decisions, orders, or rulings of the constitutional commissions is thirty
(30) days from receipt of the decision, order, or ruling. For this reason, a separate rule was enacted in the
Rules of Court. If the motion is denied, the aggrieved party may file the petition within the remaining period,
but which shall not be less than five (5) days in any event, reckoned from notice of denial. (Riano) Rule 64 of
the Rules of Civil Procedure provides the guidelines for filing a petition for certiorari under this rule. Section 2
of the rule specifies that "[a] judgment or final order or resolution of the Commission on Elections and the
Commission on Audit may be brought by the aggrieved party to the Supreme Court on certiorari under Rule
65, except as hereinafter provided."
Section 3 of Rule 64 of the Rules of Civil Procedure states: SEC. 3. Time to file petition. — The petition shall
be filed within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution sought to be reviewed.
The filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration of said judgment or final order or resolution, if allowed
under the procedural rules of the Commission concerned, shall interrupt the period herein fixed. If the motion
is denied, the aggrieved party may file the petition within the remaining period, but which shall not be less
than five (5) days in any event, reckoned from notice of denial. Under this rule, a party may file a petition for
review on certiorari within 30 days from notice of the judgment being assailed. The reglementary period
includes the time taken to file the motion for reconsideration and is only interrupted once the motion is filed.
If the motion is denied, the party may file the petition only within the period remaining from the notice of
judgment. The difference between Rule 64 and Rule 65 has already been exhaustively discussed by this
court in Pates v. Commission on Elections:52 Rule 64, however, cannot simply be equated to Rule 65 even
if it expressly refers to the latter rule. They exist as separate rules for substantive reasons as discussed
below. Procedurally, the most patent difference between the two – i.e., the exception that Section 2, Rule 64
refers to – is Section 3 which provides for a special period for the filing of petitions for certiorari from
decisions or rulings of the COMELEC en banc. The period is 30 days from notice of the decision or ruling
(instead of the 60 days that Rule 65 provides), with the intervening period used for the filing of any motion for
reconsideration deductible from the originally granted 30 days (instead of the fresh period of 60 days that
Rule 65 provides).53 (Emphasis supplied)