Rule 60: REPLEVIN
no. Case Title (GR no., Facts
Decision made by (en
banc, etc), ponente)
1 BA Finance Corporation v. Spouses Manahan executed a
Hon. Court of Appeals and promissory note binding themselves
Roberto M. Reyes to pay Carmasters, Inc., P83,080.00
G.R. No. 102998, in 36 monthly installments. To secure
VITUG, J. payment, the Manahan spouses
executed a deed of chattel mortgage
over a motor vehicle, a Ford Cortina.
Carmasters later assigned the
promissory note and the chattel
mortgage to petitioner BA Finance
Corporation with the conformity of
the Manahans. When the latter failed
to pay the installments, petitioner
sent demand letters.
The demands not having been
heeded, petitioner filed a complaint
for replevin with damages against the
spouses, as well as against a John
Doe, praying for the recovery of the
vehicle with an alternative prayer for
the payment of a sum of money
should the vehicle not be returned.
The lower court issued a writ of
replevin.
The service of summons upon the
spouses Manahan was caused to be
served by petitioner.
Issue
Whether or not a mortgagee
can maintain an action for
replevin against any
possessor of the object of a
chattel mortgage even if the
latter were not a party to the
mortgage.
No.
Ruling
Replevin is both a form of
principal remedy and of a
provisional relief. It may refer
either to the action itself, i.e., to
regain the possession of
personal chattels being
wrongfully detained from the
plaintiff by another, or to the
provisional remedy that would
allow the plaintiff to retain the
thing during the pendency of
the action and hold it pendente
lite.
The action is primarily
possessory in nature and
generally determines nothing
more than the right of
possession. The person in
possession of the property
sought to be replevied is
ordinarily the proper and only
necessary party defendant, and
the plaintiff is not required to so
join as defendants other
persons claiming a right on the
property but not in possession
thereof.
ProvRem Doctrine
Involved
Replevin is both a form of
principal remedy and of a
provisional relief. It may refer
either to the action itself, i.e.,
to regain the possession of
personal chattels being
wrongfully detained from the
plaintiff by another, or to the
provisional remedy that would
allow the plaintiff to retain the
thing during the pendency of
the action and hold it
pendente lite.
The action is primarily
possessory in nature and
generally determines nothing
more than the right of
possession. The person in
possession of the property
sought to be replevied is
ordinarily the proper and only
necessary party defendant,
and the plaintiff is not required
to so join as defendants other
persons claiming a right on
the property but not in
possession thereof.
The original of the summons had the
name and the signature of private
respondent Roberto M. Reyes
indicating that he received a copy of
the summons and the complaint.
Petitioner, through its Legal
Assistant, issued a certification to the
effect that it had received from Orson
R. Santiago, the deputy sheriff of the
RTC the Ford Cortina seized from
private respondent Roberto M.
Reyes, the John Doe referred to in
the complaint, in Sorsogon,
Sorsogon. Consequently, the lower
court came out with an order of
seizure.
A few months later, the court issued
an order dismissing the caste for
failure to prosecute and further
ordering the plaintiff to return the
property seized with all its
accessories to defendant John Doe
in the person of Roberto M. Reyes.
The order was recalled, but
summons still could not be served on
the Manahans. So, the trial court
dismissed the case and ordered that
the vehicle be returned to
Reyes. The CA affirmed.
On appeal, the CA denied
petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration. Hence this petition
The Rules of Court allows an
application for the immediate
possession of the property but
the plaintiff must show that he
has a good legal basis, i.e., a
clear title thereto, for seeking
such interim possession.
Where the right of the plaintiff to
the possession of the specific
property is so conceded or
evident, the action need only be
maintained against him who so
possesses the property. The
court, in an earlier case held
that persons having a special
right of property in the goods
the recovery of which is sought,
such as a chattel mortgagee,
may maintain an action for
replevin therefor. Where the
mortgage authorizes the
mortgagee to take possession
of the property on default, he
may maintain an action to
recover possession of the
mortgaged chattels from the
mortgagor or from any person
in whose hands he may find
them.
A chattel mortgagee, unlike a
pledgee, need not be in, nor
entitled to, the possession of
the property unless and until
the mortgagor defaults and the
mortgagee thereupon seeks to
foreclose thereon. Since the
mortgagee’s right of possession
is conditioned upon the actual
fact of default which itself may
be controverted, the inclusion of
other parties, like the debtor or
the mortgagor himself, may be
required in order to allow a full
and conclusive determination of
the case.
When the mortgagee seeks a
replevin in order to effect the
eventual foreclosure of the
mortgage, it is not only the
existence of, but also the
mortgagor’s default on, the
chattel mortgage that, among
other things, can properly
uphold the right to replevy the
property.

The burden to establish a valid

justification for that action lies
with the plaintiff. An adverse
possessor, who is not the
mortgagor, cannot just be
deprived of his possession, let
alone be bound by the terms of
the chattel mortgage contract,
simply because the mortgagee
brings up an action for replevin.
2 G.R. No. 79021 May 17, 1993
ROMEO S. CHUA, petitioner, vs.
THE HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, DENNIS CANOY
AND ALEX DE LEON,
respondents
1. Judge Lauro V. Francisco RTC Cebu
branch 8, after examining 2Lt. Dennis P.
Canoy and two (2) other witnesses,
issued a search warrant directing the
immediate search of the premises of R.R.
Construction located at M.J. Cuenco
Avenue, Cebu City, and the seizure of an
Isuzu dump truck with plate number GAP-
175. At twelve noon of the same date,
respondent Canoy seized the aforesaid
vehicle and took custody thereof.
2. RTC cebu branch 13: ACTION FOR
Replevin/Sum of Money for the recovery
of possession of the same Isuzu dump
truck was filed by petitioner against
respondent Canoy and one "John Doe"
3. petitioner questioned the validity of
the search warrant and the subsequent
seizure of the subject vehicle on the
strength of the aforesaid search warrant.
W/N RTC erred when it ordered
the transfer of possession of the
property seized to petitioner
when the latter filed the action for
replevin
It is a basic tenet of civil procedure
that replevin will not lie for
property in custodia legis. A thing is
in custodia legis when it is shown
that it has been and is subjected to
the official custody of a judicial
executive officer in pursuance of his
execution of a legal writ. The reason
posited for this principle is that if it
was otherwise, there would be
interference with the possession
before the function of the law had
been performed as to the process
under which the property was
taken.Thus, a defendant in an
execution or attachment cannot
replevy goods in the possession of an
officer under a valid process,
although after the levy is
discharged, an action to recover
possession will lie.
It is a basic tenet of civil procedure
that replevin will not lie for property in
custodia legis. A thing is in custodia
legis when it is shown that it has been
and is subjected to the official custody
of a judicial executive officer in
pursuance of his execution of a legal
writ. The reason posited for this
principle is that if it was otherwise,
there would be interference with the
possession before the function of the
law had been performed as to the
process under which the property was
taken. Thus, a defendant in an execution
or attachment cannot replevy goods in the
possession of an officer under a valid
process, although after the levy is
discharged, an action to recover
possession will lie.

4. Writ of REPLEVIN – ISSUED Construing the Pagkalinawan case

together with the Vlasons case, we
5. Canoy filed a motion for the dismissal rule that where personal property is
of the complaint and for the quashal of the seized under a search warrant and
writ of replevin – DENIED. MR- there is reason to believe that the
DENIED: CA: Petition for Certiorari and seizure will not anymore be followed
Prohibition praying for the nullification of by the filing of a criminal and there
the orders are conflicting claims over the seized
property, the proper remedy is the
6. Carnapping case was provisionally filing of an action for replevin, or an
dismissed upon motion of Romeo Chua interpleader filed by the Government
with the following reservation: "without in the proper court, not necessarily
prejudice to its reopening once the issue the same one which issued the search
of ownership is resolved" warrant; however, where there is
still a probability that the seizure will
 be followed by the filing of a criminal
7. CA reversed RTC decision - directed action, as in the case at bar where the
that possession of the subject vehicle be case for carnapping was "dismissed
restored to Canoy provisionally, without prejudice to its
reopening once the issue of ownership
8. SC – certiorari. is resolved in favor of complainant"
(emphasis supplied), or the criminal
information has actually been
commenced, or filed, and actually
prosecuted, and there are conflicting
claims over the property seized, the
proper remedy is to question the
validity of the search warrant in the
same court which issued it and not in
any other branch of the said court.

3
G.R. No. 86792 March 21, Plaintiff Mobil Philippines, Inc. filed Whether or not Malayan The surety's liability upon the A replevin bond is simply
1990 SPOUSES MARINO a complaint for replevin with Insurance Co., Inc., be replevin bond, we do not intended to indemnify the
AND LINA JOEL damages against defendant Lina made liable for damages believe that Malayan defendant against any loss
SAPUGAY, petitioners, vs. Joel Sapugay before the Court of suffered by petitioners. Insurance Co., Inc. should be that he may suffer by being
HON. COURT OF First Instance of Rizal, Seventh made liable thereon. As compelled to surrender the
APPEALS, MOBIL Judicial District, Pasig, Metro No correctly observed by possession of the disputed
PHILIPPINES, INC. AND Manila respondent court, "the property pending the trial of
RICARDO CARDENAS, damages awarded by the trial the action.
respondents. Upon the termination of the court were based on Articles
Dealership Agreement between 19 and 20 of the New Civil
REGALADO, J Mobil Oil Philippines, Inc. and Code and not on the
Nemar Marketing Corporation, deprivation of personal
SECOND DIVISION defendant applied to the plaintiff to properties subject of the
become a dealer of the latter's a replevin bond. The lower
preliminary agreement was signed court found that the
constituting defendant as plaintiff's requirement of posting a
authorized dealer, whereupon bond, initially fixed at
plaintiff turned over to the
defendant the equipment to be
used therefor; that plaintiff
instructed defendant to commence
operation whereupon the latter
made the necessary preparations
amounting to P38,000.00; that
defendant commenced operation
on June 26, 1982, pending
execution of the formal dealership
agreement; that on the last week of
July, 1982, they signed the formal
dealership agreement a copy of
which was withheld from them by
the plaintiff pending its
notarization; that as the formal
agreement had already been
signed, defendant and her
husband requested plaintiff that
they be allowed to get gas even on
a cash basis, but plaintiff denied
the request claiming that they still
have to post a surety bond which
was initially fixed at P200,000.00
then later increased to
P700,000.00.
Since defendant failed to secure
and file the required surety bond,
compelling plaintiff to reject
defendant's application and the
return and redelivery of the
aforementioned properties; that
P200,000.00 then raised to
P700,000.00 was a
preplanned scheme of
plaintiff and/or R.. Cardenas
to put every hindrance before
the defendant so that the
latter could not get the
dealership agreement . . .
As found by the trial court, all
these acts of plaintiff and its
manager, R.. Cardenas, are
contrary to Articles 19 and 20
of the New Civil Code, to wit:
Art. 19. Every person must, in
the exercise of his rights and
in the performance of his
duties act with justice, give
everyone his due and
observe honesty and good
faith.
Art. 20. Every person who,
contrary to law, wilfully or
negligently causes damage to
another, shall indemnify the
latter for the same.
for which plaintiff must be
made to recompense the
defendant refused to return said
equipments, and demanded
instead that defendant be paid first
the sum of P15,000.00 daily as
rental and guard's fees from June
8, 1982 up to the day of actual pull-
out. Thus, plaintiff prays for the
return of said properties or its
value including damages,
attorney's fees and costs of suit.
Defendant discovered that plaintiff
and its manager intended all
along, to award said dealership to
Island Air Product Corporation;
that in furtherance of said scheme
plaintiff caused all the LP-Gas
equipment to be publicly pulled out
from defendant's premises. As
counterclaim, defendant prayed
that plaintiff and its manager be
made liable for their pre-operation
expenses rental, storage, and
guarding fees, unrealized profit
including damages and the return
of the LP-Gas equipment to the
premises.
The writ of replevin dated October
22, 1982 issued by Honorable
Eduardo C. Abaya of the Court of
damages the defendant
suffered.
Moreover no judgment was
entered for the return of the
properties subject of the
replevin bond to the
defendant, the latter never
having raised the issue of
rightful possession to the said
properties."
A replevin bond is simply
intended to indemnify the
defendant against any loss
that he may suffer by being
compelled to surrender the
possession of the disputed
property pending the trial of
the action. He cannot
recover on the bond as for a
reconversion when he has
failed to have the judgment
entered for the return of the
property. Nor is the surety
liable for payment of the
judgment for damages
rendered against the plaintiff
on a counterclaim or punitive
damages for fraudulent or
wrongful acts committed by
the plaintiffs and
unconnected with the
First Instance, Rizal, Branch XXIV
was duly executed.
Regional Trial Court rendered
judgment in favor of the defendant,
dismissing the complaint and
ordering plaintiff and its manager
to pay the pre-operation expenses,
rental, storage, and guarding fees
of plaintiff's LPG equipment;
unrealized profits, moral damages
including litigation expenses,
attorney's fees and costs of the
suit.
Court of Appeals rendered a
decision hereby MODIFIED in that
the awards of rental, storage and
guarding fees and the award of
unrealized profits, are hereby
DELETED, and the award of
damages REDUCED. The
decision is AFFIRMED in all other
aspects with Mobil Philippines, lnc.
being solely liable.
Consequently the petitioners filed
motion for reconsideration praying
that the bond posted by Malayan
Insurance Co., Inc. in behalf of
herein private respondents be
made liable for damages suffered
defendant's deprivation of
possession by the plaintiff.
Indeed, even where the
judgment was that the
defendant was entitled to the
property, but no order was
made requiring the plaintiff to
return it or assessing
damages in default of a
return, it was declared that
until judgment was entered
that the property should be
restored, there could be no
liability on the part of the
sureties.
Private respondent Ricardo
P. Cardenas should be held
jointly and severally liable
with his co-respondent Mobil
Philippines, Inc. for having
acted in bad faith by
impeding and preventing the
award of the dealership to
petitioners through fraudulent
means.
 by petitioners, was denied by
respondent court
4 • The rule is clear that the
A.M. No. P-07- Facts:
2384 June 18, 2008
KENNETH HAO, complainant, • This is an Admin case
vs.
against Sheriff Andres of
ABE C. ANDRES, Sheriff IV,
Regional Trial Court, Branch Davao RTC for losing 8 or 9
16, Davao City, respondent. cars he seized in a writ of
RESOLUTION replevin from Hao (the
QUISUMBING, J.: complainant) who is a
defendant in a civil case
“Zenaida Silver vs Loreto Hao
et al”.
• Andres seized
• 2 cars in Oct 17
2005
• 4 cars in Oct 18
• 3 cars in Oct 19
• Oct 21: Hao applied for a
counter-replevin bond and
Andres was ordered to
immediately cease and desist
from further implementing the
seizure
Did he violate any Rules Andres must be aware that property seized should
on the Writ of Replevin? there are well-defined steps not be immediately
provided in the Rules of delivered to the plaintiff,
YES Court regarding the proper and the sheriff must
implementation of a writ of retain custody of the
replevin and/or an order of seized property for at
seizure. least five days.
• The purpose of the five
(5) days is to give a
Section 4, Rule 60: chance to the
defendant to object to
Upon receiving such order, the sufficiency of the
the sheriff must serve a copy bond or the surety or
thereof on the adverse party, sureties thereon or
together with a copy of the require the return of the
application, affidavit and property by filing a
bond, and must forthwith counterbond
take the property, if it be in
the possession of the
adverse party, or his agent,
and retain it in his custody.
x x x After the sheriff has
taken possession of the
property as herein
provided, he must keep it
in a secure place and shall
be responsible for its
• Oct 24: 8 of the 9 vehicles delivery to the party
were missing entitled thereto upon
receiving his fees and
necessary expenses for
taking and keeping the
• PO3 Despe (guarding the same.
cars):
Section 6, Rule 6:
• on Oct 21 someone
entered the compound If within five (5) days after
and duplicated the the taking of the property
keys by the sheriff, the adverse
party does not object to the
• Andres claims: sufficiency of the bond, or of
the surety or sureties
• on Oct 21: the thereon; or if the adverse
vehicles were still there party so objects and the
when he made an court affirms its approval of
inspection the applicantÊs bond or
approves a new bond, or if
• placed the cars in
the adverse party requires
the compound under
the return of the property but
police watch
his bond is objected to and
• after the found insufficient and he
unauthorised does not forthwith file an
duplication, told the approved bond, the property
police to keep a close shall be delivered to the
eye on the cars applicant. If for any reason
the property is not delivered
• Hao claims: to the applicant, the sheriff
must return it to the adverse
• Andres paid off party.
policemen and gave
 undue preference to • Andres should have
Silver in choosing who waited no less than five
will guard the premises days in order to give the
complainant an
• Andres was opportunity to object to the
uncooperative and sufficiency of the bond or
oppressive in the of the surety or sureties
implementation of the thereon, or require the
writ. return of the seized motor
vehicles by filing a
• Judge Fuentes found counter-bond. This, he
numerous irregularities in the failed to do.
implementation of the writ of
replevin/order of seizure • Andres took possession of
two of the subject motor
1. at the time of the vehicles on October 17,
implementation of the 2005, four on October 18,
writ, Andres knew that 2005, and another three
the vehicles to be on October 19, 2005.
seized were not in the • Simultaneously, as
names of any of the evidenced by the
parties to the case depository receipts, on
October 18, 2005, Silver
2. one vehicle was received from Andres six
taken without the of the seized motor
knowledge of its owner, vehicles, and three more
a certain Junard motor vehicles on October
Escudero 19, 2005. Consequently,
there is no question that
1. Andres allowed Silver was already in
Atty. Macadangdang to possession of the nine
get a keymaster to seized vehicles
duplicate the vehicles’ immediately after seizure,
 keys in order to take or no more than three
one motor vehicle days after the taking of the
vehicles. Thus, Andres
2. Andres admitted committed a clear violation
that prior to the of Section 6, Rule 60
implementation of the
• The rule is clear that the
writ of seizure, he
property seized should not
consulted Silver and
be immediately delivered
Atty. Macadangdang
to the plaintiff, and the
regarding the
sheriff must retain custody
implementation of the
of the seized property for
writ and was
at least five days.
accompanied by the
latter in the course of • The purpose of the five
the implementation. (5) days is to give a
chance to the defendant
to object to the
sufficiency of the bond
• Judge Fuentes pointed out or the surety or sureties
several instances where thereon or require the
Andres lacked due diligence: return of the property by
filing a counterbond
1. The seized motor
vehicles were placed in • Andres’ claim that he had
a compound no knowledge that the
surrounded by an compound is owned by
insufficiently locked Silver fails to convince.
see-through fence Regardless of who
actually owns the
2. Three motor compound, the fact
vehicles were left remains that Andres
outside the compound delivered the vehicles to
Silver prematurely. It
3. Andres turned over violates the rule requiring
the key of the gate to him to safekeep the
the policemen guarding vehicles in his custody.
the motor vehicles; • From the moment an
order of delivery in
4. Andres does not
replevin is executed by
even know the full
taking possession of the
name of the owner of
property specified therein,
the compound, who
such property is in
was merely known to
custodia legis. As legal
him as “Gloria”
custodian, it is Andres’
5. Except for PO3 duty to safekeep the
Despe and SPO4 seized motor vehicles.
Nelson Salcedo, the Hence, when he passed
identities of the other his duty to safeguard the
policemen tapped to motor vehicles to Silver,
guard the compound he committed a clear
were unknown to neglect of duty.
Andres • The loss of the motor
vehicles could have been
6. Andres also prevented if Andres
admitted that he only immediately asked the
stayed at least one court for an order to
hour each day from transfer the vehicles to
October 19-21, 2005 another secured place as
during his visits to the soon as he discovered the
compound unauthorized duplication.

7. Even after it was • Despite the cease and

reported to him that a desist order, Andres failed
certain “Nonoy” to return the motor
entered the compound vehicles to their lawful
 and duplicated the owners. Instead of
keys of the motor returning the motor
vehicles, he did not vehicles immediately as
exert his best effort to directed, he opted to write
look for that “Nonoy” Silver and demand that
and to confiscate the she put up an indemnity
duplicated keys. bond to secure the third-
party claims.
8. Andres depended
solely on Silver in the
selection of the
policemen who would
guard the seized motor
vehicles.

5 FACTS: ISSUE: HELD:

SPOUSES DEO AGNER and
MARICON AGNER, Petitioners,
vs. BPI FAMILY SAVINGS
BANK, INC., Respondent.
G.R. No. 182963 June
3, 2013
PERALTA, J.:
Petitioners spouses Agner
executed a Promissory Note with
Chattel Mortgage in favor of
Citimotors, Inc. Thereafter the right
and interest of Citimotors, Inc. in
the Promissory Note with Chattel
Mortgage was assigned the same
to respondent BPI. For failure to
pay four successive installments
from May 15, 2002 to August 15,
2002despite repeated demands,
respondent filed an action for
Replevin and Damages. A writ of
Whether or not the trial
court erred in issuing a writ
of replevin and ordering the
party against whom writ
was issued to pay the
applicant the value of the
obligation considering that
the writ was never
implemented.
The answer is in the negative.
The vehicle subject matter of
this case was never
recovered and delivered to
respondent despite the
issuance of a writ of replevin.
As there was no seizure that
transpired, it cannot be said
that petitioners were deprived
of the use and enjoyment of
the mortgaged vehicle or that
respondent pursued,
commenced or concluded its
 replevin was issued. Despite this, actual foreclosure. The trial
the subject vehicle was not seized. court, therefore, rightfully
After trial on the merits, RTC ruled granted the alternative prayer
for the respondent and ordered for sum of money, which is
petitioners to jointly and severally equivalent to the remedy of
pay the amount of Php 576,664.04 "exacting fulfillment of the
plus interest at the rate of 72% per obligation." Certainly, there is
annum from August 20, 2002 until no double recovery or unjust
fully paid, and the costs of suit. CA enrichment to speak of.
affirmed RTC’s decision. Petitioner
elevated the case before the SC
and argued that respondent’s
remedy of resorting to both actions
of replevin and collection of sum of
money is contrary to the provision
of Article 1484 of the Civil Code.

6 DEVELOPMENT BANK OF Petitioners Dabay Abad, Hatab Abad, WON the CA erred in denying The application for damages In Jao v. Royal Financing
THE PHILIPPINES, Omar Abas, Hanapi Abdullah, Rojea the petitioner’s claim against was belatedly filed. Corporation, “the Court
Petitioner Ab Abdullah, Abdullah Abedin, Alex the replevin bond to answer precluded the defendant therein
vs. HON. EMMANUEL C. Abedin, et al .(Abad, et al.), filed a for the damages in Section 10, Rule 60 of the Rules from claiming damages against
CARPIO, in his capacity as complaint for delivery of certificates of accordance with Section 10, of Court provides that in replevin the surety bond because it failed
Presiding Judge, Regional title, damages, and attorney's fees Rule 60 in relation to Section cases, as in receivership and to file the application for
Trial Court, Branch 16, against petitioner Development Bank 20 of Rule 57 of the Rules of injunction cases, the damages damages before the termination
Davao City, COUNTRY of the Philippines (DBP) and Court long after the judgment to be awarded to either party of the case”.
BANKERS INSURANCE Guarantee Fund for Small and became executory? upon any bond filed by the other
CORPORATION, DABAY Medium Enterprise (GFSME) before shall be claimed, ascertained,
ABAD, HATAB ABAD, OMAR the RTC. No. and granted in accordance with
ABAS, HANAPI ABDULLAH, Section 20 of Rule 57 which
ROJEA AB ABDULLAH, In their, Complaint, Abad, et al. reads:
ABDULLAH ABEDIN, ALEX prayed, among others, for the
ABEDIN, et al., represented issuance of a writ of seizure, pending
by their Attorney-in-Fact, hearing of the case, for delivery of
MR. MANUEL L. TE, their certificates of title they claimed to
Respondents be unlawfully detained by DBP and
G.R. No. GFSME. They alleged that their
195450 February 1, 2017 certificates of title were submitted to
DBP for safekeeping pursuant to the
MENDOZA, J. loan agreement they entered into with
DBP. The same certificates of title
were turned over by DBP to GFSME
because of its call on GFSME's
guarantee on their loan, which
became due and demandable, and
pursuant to the guarantee agreement
between DBP and GFSME.
As prayed for, the RTC issued the
Writ of Seizure. The writ was
accompanied by Plaintiffs Bond for
Manual Delivery of Personal Property
issued by Country Bankers
Insurance Corporation (CBIC).
DBP filed its Omnibus Motion to
Dismiss Complaint and to Quash Writ
of Seizure on the ground of improper
venue, among others. Abad, et al.
filed their Opposition.
In its Order, the RTC granted DBP's
omnibus motion and dismissed the
case for improper venue.
The DBP and GFSME filed their Joint
Motion to Order Plaintiffs to Return
Titles to Defendants DBP and
GFSME. After Abad, et al. filed their
SEC. 20. Claim for damages on
account of illegal attachment. - If
the judgment on the action be in
favor of the party against whom
attachment was issued, he may
recover, upon the bond given or
deposit made by the attaching
creditor, any damages resulting
from the attachment. Such
damages may be awarded only
upon application and after
proper hearing, and shall be
included in the final judgment.
The application must be filed
before the trial or before appeal
is perfected or before the
judgment becomes executory,
with due notice to the attaching
creditor and his surety or
sureties, setting forth the facts
showing his right to damages
and the amount thereof.
If the judgment of the appellate
court be favorable to the party
against whom the attachment
was issued, he must claim
damages sustained during the
pendency of the appeal by filing
an application with notice to the
party in whose favor the
attachment was issued or his
surety or sureties, before the
judgment of the appellate court
becomes executory. The
appellate court may allow the
opposition, the RTC issued the
Order, dated January 27, 2003,
directing Abad, et al. to return the
228 certificates of title.
Abad, et al. filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition with the
Court praying, among others, for the
nullification and reversal of the
January 27, 2003 Order of the RTC.
The Court, however, in dismissed the
petition.
DBP filed its Motion for Writ of
Execution of the January 27, 2003
Order before the RTC. The RTC
issued the corresponding Writ of
Execution. The Sheriffs Return of
Service, however, indicated that
Abad, et al. failed to deliver the
certificates of title.
Due to the non-delivery of the
certificates of title by Abad, et al., DBP
filed its Motion/Application to Call on
Plaintiff's Surety Bond praying for the
release of the bond issued by CBIC to
answer for the damages it sustained
as a result of the failure to return the
228 certificates of title.
RTC denied the subject motion
explaining that the resolution of the
motion was no longer part of its
residual power. It pointed out that
although there was indeed an order to
application to be heard and
decided by the trial court.
[Emphases supplied]
In other words, to recover
damages on a replevin bond (or
on a bond for preliminary
attachment, injunction or
receivership), it is necessary (1)
that the defendant-claimant has
secured a favorable judgment in
the main action, meaning that
the plaintiff has no cause of
action and was not, therefore,
entitled to the provisional
remedy of replevin; (2) that the
application for damages,
showing claimant's right thereto
and the amount thereof, be filed
in the same action before trial or
before appeal is perfected or
before the judgment becomes
executory; (3) that due notice be
given to the other party and his
surety or sureties, notice to the
principal not being sufficient;
and (4) that there should be a
proper hearing and the award for
damages should be included in
the final judgment.34
Likewise, to avoid multiplicity of
suits, all incidents arising from
the same controversy must be
settled in the same court having
jurisdiction of the main action.
return the 228 certificates of title to
DBP, it was not made as a result of a
trial of the case, but as a
consequence of the order of dismissal
based on improper venue.
Aggrieved, DBP filed a petition for
certiorari and mandamus before the
CA. The CA dismissed the petition for
certiorari and mandamus. It added
that Section 20, Rule 57 of the Rules
of Court provided that the claim for
damages against the bond must be
filed before trial or before appeal was
perfected or before the judgment
became executory.
DBP moved for reconsideration, but
its motion was denied by the
CA. Hence, this petition.
Thus, the application for
damages must be filed in the
court which took cognizance of
the case, with due notice to the
other parties.
In this case, DBP filed the
application for damages long
after the order of dismissal had
become final and executory. It
explained that this belated filing
was due to its recourse to other
remedies, such as the
enforcement of the writ of
execution. The Court, however,
finds this reason to be wanting in
persuasiveness. To begin with,
the filing of an application for
damages does not preclude
resort to other remedies.
Nowhere in the Rules of Court is
it stated that an application for
damages bars the filing of a
motion for a writ of seizure, a writ
of execution or any other
applicable remedy. DBP, from
the beginning, had already
perceived the attachment to be
improper; hence, it could have
easily filed an application before
the judgment became
executory.
Note in the case of Jao v. Royal
Financing Corporation, the
Court precluded the defendant

7 G.R. No. 210950. August 15,
2018 ] MILAGROS P. ENRIQUEZ,
PETITIONER, VS. THE
MERCANTILE INSURANCE CO.,
INC., RESPONDENT. DECISION.
LEONEN, J.:
Petitioner Enriquez filed a
replevin case against Asuten for
the recovery of the Toyota Hi-
Ace van valued at
P300,000.00.[49] She applied
for a bond in the amount of
P600,000.00 with respondent
in Asuten's favor.
The Regional Trial Court
approved the bond and ordered February 24, 2004, and
the sheriff to recover the van
from Asuten and to deliver it to post another bond.
petitioner.
While the van was in
petitioner's custody, the
Regional Trial Court dismissed
therein from claiming damages
against the surety bond because
it failed to file the application for
damages before the termination
of the case.
Accordingly, the CA did not
commit any reversible error
when it applied the rules of
procedure in resolving the issue
at hand.
De Guia v. Alto Surety &
Insurance, Co. requires
Petitioner Enriquez that any application on the
argues that she should bond be made after
not have been made hearing but before the
liable for the bond entry of judgment.
despite her failure to Otherwise, the surety can
return the van, no longer be made liable
considering that it was under the bond.
effective only until
For this reason, a surety
that she did not renew or bond remains effective
until the action or
proceeding is finally
decided, resolved, or
terminated. This
condition is deemed
incorporated in the
For this reason, a surety
bond remains
effective until the
action or proceeding
is finally decided,
resolved, or
terminated. This
condition is deemed
incorporated in the
contract between the
applicant and the surety,
regardless of whether
they failed to expressly
state it, as provided
under the Guidelines on
Corporate Surety Bonds.
This is a rare instance
the case without prejudice for
failure to prosecute. Thus, it
ordered the sheriff to restore
the van to Asuten. When
petitioner failed to produce the
van, the Regional Trial Court
directed respondent to pay
Asuten the amount of the bond.
There was no trial on the
merits. The Regional Trial
Court's dismissal for failure to
prosecute was a dismissal
without prejudice to re-filing.
In this particular instance, any
writ of seizure, being merely
ancillary to the main action,
becomes functus oficio.
The parties returned to the
status quo as if no case for
replevin had been filed. Thus,
upon the dismissal of the case,
it was imperative for petitioner
to return the van to Asuten.
contract between the where the writ of seizure
applicant and the surety, is dissolved due to the
regardless of whether they dismissal without
failed to expressly state it, prejudice, but the bond
as provided under the stands because the case
Guidelines on Corporate has yet to be finally
Surety Bonds. terminated by the
Regional Trial Court.
This is a rare instance The peculiar
where the writ of seizure is circumstances in this case
dissolved due to the arose when
dismissal without petitioner failed to return
prejudice, but the bond the van to Asuten, despite
stands because the case the dismissal of her
has yet to be finally action. This is an
terminated by the Regional instance not covered by
Trial Court. the Rules of Court or
The peculiar jurisprudence.
circumstances in this case
arose when
petitioner failed to return
the van to Asuten, despite
the dismissal of her action.
This is an instance not
covered by the Rules of
Court or
jurisprudence. In its
discretion, the Regional
Trial Court proceeded to
rule on the forfeiture of the
bond. As a result,
respondent paid Asuten
twice the value of the van
withheld by petitioner.
Respondent, thus, seeks to
recover this amount from
petitioner, despite the van
only being worth half the
amount of the bond.

Of all the provisional

remedies provided in the
Rules of Court, only Rule
60, Section 2 requires that
the amount of the bond be
double the value of the
property. The other
provisional remedies
provide that the amount be
fixed by court or be merely
equal to the value of the
property.

However, there is a
rationale to the
requirement that the bond
for a writ of seizure in a
replevin be double the
value of the property. The
bond functions not only to
indemnify the defendant in
case the property is lost,
but also to answer for any
damages that may be
awarded by the court if the
judgment is rendered in
defendant's favor.

Any application of the

bond in a replevin case,
therefore, is premised on
the judgment rendered in
favor of the defendant.
Thus, the Rules of Court
imply that there must be
a prior judgment on the
merits before there can be
any application on the
bond.

Forfeiture of the replevin

bond, therefore, requires
first, a judgment on the
merits in the defendant's
favor, and second,
an application by the
defendant for
damages. Neither
circumstance appears in
this case. When petitioner
failed to produce the van,
equity demanded that
Asuten be awarded only an
amount equal to the value
of the van. The Regional
Trial Court would have
erred in ordering the
forfeiture of the entire
bond in Asuten's favor,
considering that there was
no trial on the merits or an
application by Asuten for
damages. This judgment
could have been reversed
had petitioner appealed
the Regional Trial Court's
May 24, 2004 Order in
Civil Case No. 10846.
Unfortunately, she did not.
Respondent was, thus,
constrained to follow the
Regional Trial Court's
directive to pay Asuten the
full amount of the bond.