BANGKO SENTRAL NG Herein respondent Legaspi filed a
PILIPINAS, Petitioner, v. FELICIAN
O P. LEGASPI, Respondent.
Petitioner BSP filed a Complaint for
annulment of title, revocation of
certificate and damages (with application
for TRO/writ of preliminary injunction)
against Secretary Jose L. Atienza, et al
Jr., Luningning G. De Leon, Engr.
Ramon C. Angelo, Jr., Ex-Mayor
Matilde A. Legaspi and respondent
Feliciano P. Legaspi before the RTC of
Malolos, Bulacan. Respondent, together
with his fellow defendants, filed their
Answer to the complaint. Thereafter, the
RTC, on May 13, 2008, issued an Order
mandating the issuance of preliminary
injunction, enjoining defendants Engr.
Ramon C. Angelo, Jr. and petitioner
Feliciano P. Legaspi, and persons acting
for and in their behalf, from pursuing the
construction, development and/or
operation of a dumpsite or landfill in
Barangay San Mateo, Norzagaray,
Bulacan, in an area allegedly covered by
OCT No. P858/Free Patent No. 257917,
the property subject of the complaint.
Petitioner BSP further claimed that it is
Motion to Dismiss dated August 15,
2008 alleging that the RTC did not
acquire jurisdiction over the person of
the petitioner BSP because the suit is
unauthorized by petitioner BSP itself and
that the counsel representing petitioner
BSP is not authorized and thus cannot
bind the same petitioner. Respondent
Legaspi also alleged that the RTC did not
acquire jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the action because the
complaint is prima facie void and that an
illegal representation produces no legal
effect. In addition, respondent Legaspi
asserted that the complaint was initiated
without the authority of the Monetary
Board and that the complaint was not
prepared and signed by the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), the statutory
counsel of government agencies.
In opposing the Motion to Dismiss,
petitioner BSP argued that the complaint
was filed pursuant to Monetary Board
Resolution No. 8865, dated June 17,
2004, and that the complaint was verified
by Geraldine Alag, Director of Asset
Management of the BSP, who stated that
she was authorized by Monetary Board
Resolutions No. 805 dated June 17, 2008
and 1005 dated July 29, 2005.
not precluded from being represented by
a private counsel of its own choice.
After respondent Legaspi filed a Reply,
to which petitioner BSP filed a
Rejoinder, and against which, respondent
Legaspi filed a Rejoinder, the RTC
rendered its Order denied respondent
Legaspi's motion to dismiss.
In denying the Motion to Dismiss, the
RTC ruled that it had acquired
jurisdiction over the person of the
petitioner when the latter filed with the
court the Complaint dated April 10,
2008. Furthermore, the RTC adjudged
that in suits involving the BSP, the
Monetary Board may authorize the
Governor to represent it personally or
through counsel, even a private counsel,
and the authority to represent the BSP
may be delegated to any other officer
thereof. It took into account the feet that
the BSP's complaint dated April 10, 2008
was verified by Geraldine C. Alag, an
officer of the BSP being the Director of
its Asset Management Department and
the Secretary's Certificate issued by
Silvina Q. Mamaril-Roxas, Officer-in-
Charge, Office of the Secretary of BSP's
Monetary Board attesting to Monetary
Board Resolution No. 900, adopted and
passed on July 18, 2008 containing the
Board's approval of the recommendation
of the Asset Management Department
(AMD) to engage the services of
Ongkiko Kalaw Manhit and Acorda Law
Offices (OKMA Law).
Respondent Legaspi filed a motion for
reconsideration, adding as its argument
that the RTC failed to acquire
jurisdiction over the action because the
complaint, a real action, failed to allege
the assessed value of the subject
property. As an opposition to respondent
Legaspi's additional contention,
petitioner BSP claimed that since the
subject property contains an area of
4,838,736 square meters, it is
unthinkable that said property would
have an assessed value of less than
P20,000.00 which is within the
jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial
Courts. Petitioner BSP further stated that
a tax declaration showing the assessed
value of P28,538,900.00 and latest zonal
value of P145,162,080.00 was attached
to the complaint.
The RTC, in its Order dated April 3,
2009, denied respondent Legaspi's
motion for reconsideration. Hence,
respondent Legaspi elevated the case to
the CA via a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The CA,
in its assailed Decision, dated August 15,
2012, granted respondent Legaspi's
petition. The dispositive portion of the
said decision reads as follows:
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE RTC
ERRED IN TAKING JUDICIAL
NOTICE OF THE ASSESSED
VALUE OF THE SUBJECT
PROPERTY.
RULING:
NO.
Under Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7691, the
RTC has exclusive original jurisdiction
over civil actions which involve title to
possession of real property, or any
interest therein, where the assessed value
of the property involved exceeds Twenty
Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00).9 Petitioner
BSP insists that the property involved
has an assessed value of more than
P20,000.00, as shown in a Tax
Declaration attached to the complaint.
Incidentally, the complaint,10 on its face,
is devoid of any amount that would
confer jurisdiction over the RTC.
The non-inclusion on the face of the
complaint of the amount of the property,
however, is not fatal because attached in
the complaint is a tax declaration (Annex
"N" in the complaint) of the property in
question showing that it has an assessed
value of P215,320.00. It must be
emphasized that annexes to a complaint
are deemed part of, and should be
considered together with the
11
complaint.  In Fluor Daniel, Inc.-
Philippines v. E.B. Villarosa and
Partners Co., Ltd.,12 this Court ruled that
in determining the sufficiency of a cause
of action, the courts should also consider
the attachments to the complaint, thus:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
We have ruled that a complaint should
not be dismissed for insufficiency of
cause of action if it appears clearly from
the complaint and its attachments that the
plaintiff is entitled to relief. The converse
is also true. The complaint may be
dismissed for lack of cause of action if it
is obvious from the complaint and its
annexes that the plaintiff is not entitled to
any relief.13ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Hence, being an annex to BSP's
complaint, the tax declaration showing
the assessed value of the property is
deemed a part of the complaint and
should be considered together with it in
determining that the RTC has exclusive
original jurisdiction.
In connection therewith, the RTC,
therefore, committed no error in taking
judicial notice of the assessed value of
the subject property.
A court will take judicial notice of its
own acts and records in the same case, of
facts established in prior proceedings in
the same case, of the authenticity of its
own records of another case between the
same parties, of the files of related cases
in the same court, and of public records
on file in the same court.14 Since a copy
of the tax declaration, which is a public
record, was attached to the complaint,
the same document is already considered
as on file with the court, thus, the court
can now take judicial notice of such.
In holding that the courts cannot take
judicial notice of the assessed or market
value of the land, the CA cited this
Court's ruling in Quinagoran v. Court of
Appeals.15  height of absurdity if the assessed value
This Court's ruling though
in Quinagoran is inapplicable in this
case because in the former, the complaint
does not allege that the assessed value of
the land in question is more than
P20,000.00 and that there was no tax
declaration nor any other document
showing the assessed value of the
property attached to the complaint. Thus,
in Quinagoran, the assessed value of the
land was not on record before the trial
court, unlike in the present case.
Moreover, considering that the area of
the subject land is four million eight
hundred thirty-eight thousand seven
hundred and thirty-six (4,838,736)
square meters, the RTC acted properly
when it took judicial notice of the total
area of the property involved and the
prevailing assessed value of the titled
property, and it would also be at the
of the property with such an area is less
than P20,000.00.
 G.R. No. 182356     December 4, 2013
DRA, LEILA A DELA
LLANO, Petitioner,
vs.
REBECCA BIONG, doing business
under the name and style of Pongkay
Trading, Respondent.
Very case essentially turns on two basic
questions: questions of fact and questions
of law. Questions of fact are the parties
and their counsel to respond to, based on
what supporting facts the legal questions
require; the court can only draw
conclusion from the facts or evidence
adduced. When the facts are lacking
because of the deficiency of presented
evidence, then the court can only draw
one conclusion: that the cause must fail
for lack of evidentiary support.
On March 30, 2000, at around 11:00
p.m., Juan dela Llana was driving a 1997
Toyota Corolla car along North Avenue,
Quezon City.4
His sister, Dra. dela Llana, was seated at
the front passenger seat while Calimlim
was at the backseat.5
When the traffic light turned red, Juan
stopped the car across the Veterans
Memorial Hospital. A few seconds after
the car halted, a dump truck containing
gravel and sand suddenly rammed the
car’s rear end, violently pushing the car
forward. Due to the impact, the car’s rear
end collapsed and its rear windshield was
shattered. Glass splinters flew,
puncturing Dra. dela Llana. Apart from
these minor wounds, Dra. dela Llana did
not appear to have suffered from any
other visible physical injuries.6
The traffic investigation report dated
March 30, 2000 identified the truck
driver as Joel Primero, an employee of
Rebecca Biong {doing business under
the name of Pongkay Trading, engaged
in gavel and sand business} which stated
that the latter was recklessly imprudent
in driving the truck.7
After weeks, when Dra. Dela Llana’s
health deteriorated, she consulted with
Dr. Rosalinda Milla, a rehabilitation
medicine specialist, to examine her
condition. Dr. Milla told her that she
suffered from a whiplash injury, an
injury caused by the compression of the
nerve running to her left arm and hand.
Dr. Milla required her to undergo
physical therapy to alleviate her
condition. Dra. dela Llana’s condition
did not improve despite three months of
extensive physical therapy.9
She then consulted other doctors,
namely, Drs. Willie Lopez, Leonor
Cabral-Lim and Eric Flores, in search for
a cure. Dr. Flores, a neuro-surgeon,
finally suggested that she undergo a
cervical spine surgery to release the
compression of her nerve. On October
19, 2000, Dr. Flores operated on her
spine and neck, between the C5 and the
C6 vertebrae.10
The operation released the impingement
of the nerve, but incapacitated Dra. dela
Llana from the practice of her profession
since June 2000 despite the surgery.11
Dra. dela Llana, on October 16, 2000,
demanded from Rebecca compensation
for her injuries, but Rebecca refused to
pay.12
Thus, on May 8, 2001, Dra. dela Llana
sued Rebecca for damages before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
(RTC). She alleged that she lost the
mobility of her arm as a result of the
vehicular accident and claimed
₱150,000.00 for her medical expenses
(as of the filing of the complaint) and an
average monthly income of ₱30,000.00
since June 2000. She further prayed for
actual, moral, and exemplary damages as
well as attorney’s fees.13
In defense, Rebecca maintained that Dra.
dela Llana had no cause of action against
her as no reasonable relation existed
between the vehicular accident and Dra.
dela Llana’s injury. She pointed out that
Dra. dela Llana’s illness became
manifest one month and one week from
the date of the vehicular accident. As a
counterclaim, she demanded the payment
of attorney’s fees and costs of the suit.14
At the trial, Dra. dela Llana presented
herself as an ordinary witness15 and Joel
as a hostile witness.16
Dra. dela Llana reiterated that she lost
the mobility of her arm because of the
vehicular accident. To prove her claim,
she identified and authenticated a
medical certificate dated November 20,
2000 issued by Dr. Milla. The medical
certificate stated that Dra. dela Llana
suffered from a whiplash injury. It also
chronicled her clinical history and
physical examinations.17
Meanwhile, Joel testified that his truck
hit the car because the truck’s brakes got
stuck.18
In defense, Rebecca testified that Dra.
dela Llana was physically fit and strong
when they met several days after the
vehicular accident. She also asserted that
she observed the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and
supervision of Joel. She pointed out that
she required Joel to submit a certification
of good moral character as well as
barangay, police, and NBI clearances
prior to his employment. She also
stressed that she only hired Primero after
he successfully passed the driving skills
test conducted by Alberto Marcelo, a
licensed driver-mechanic.19
Alberto also took the witness stand. He
testified that he checked the truck in the
morning of March 30, 2000. He affirmed
that the truck was in good condition prior
to the vehicular accident. He opined that
the cause of the vehicular accident was a
damaged compressor. According to him,
the absence of air inside the tank
damaged the compressor.20
RTC: ruled in favor of Dra. dela Llana
and held that the proximate cause of Dra.
dela Llana’s whiplash injury to be Joel’s
reckless driving.21
It pointed out that the massive damage
the car suffered only meant that the truck
was over-speeding. It maintained that
Joel should have driven at a slower pace
because road visibility diminishes at
night. He should have blown his horn
and warned the car that his brake was
stuck and could have prevented the
collision by swerving the truck off the
road. It also concluded that Joel was
probably sleeping when the collision
occurred as Joel had been driving for
fifteen hours on that fateful day.
CA: reversed.
It held that Dra. dela Llana failed to
establish a reasonable connection
between the vehicular accident and her
whiplash injury by preponderance of
evidence. Citing Nutrimix Feeds Corp. v.
Court of Appeals,23 it declared that courts
will not hesitate to rule in favor of the
other party if there is no evidence or the
evidence is too slight to warrant an
inference establishing the fact in issue. It
noted that the interval between the date
of the collision and the date when Dra.
dela Llana began to suffer the symptoms
of her illness was lengthy. It concluded
that this interval raised doubts on
whether Joel’s reckless driving and the
resulting collision in fact caused Dra.
dela Llana’s injury. It also declared that
courts cannot take judicial notice that
vehicular accidents cause whiplash
injuries. It observed that Dra. dela Llana
did not immediately visit a hospital to
check if she sustained internal injuries
after the accident. Moreover, her failure
to present expert witnesses was fatal to
her claim. It also gave no weight to the
medical certificate. The medical
certificate did not explain how and why
the vehicular accident caused the
injury.24
The Petition
Dra. dela Llana points out in her petition
before this Court that Nutrimix is
inapplicable in the present case. She
stresses that Nutrimix involved the
application of Article 1561 and 1566 of
the Civil Code, provisions governing
hidden defects. Furthermore, there was
absolutely no evidence in Nutrimix that
showed that poisonous animal feeds were
sold to the respondents in that case. As
opposed to the respondents in Nutrimix,
Dra. dela Llana asserts that she has
established by preponderance of
evidence that Joel’s egligent act was the
proximate cause of her whiplash
injury. First, pictures of her damaged car
show that the collision was strong. She
posits that it can be reasonably inferred
from these pictures that the massive
impact resulted in her whiplash
injury. Second, Dr. Milla categorically
stated in the medical certificate that Dra.
dela Llana suffered from whiplash
injury. Third, her testimony that the
vehicular accident caused the injury is
credible because she was a surgeon.
Dra. dela Llana further asserts that the
medical certificate has probative value.
Citing several cases, she posits that an
uncorroborated medical certificate is
credible if uncontroverted.25
She points out that expert opinion is
unnecessary if the opinion merely relates
to matters of common knowledge. She
maintains that a judge is qualified as an
expert to determine the causation
between Joel’s reckless driving and her
whiplash injury. Trial judges are aware
of the fact that whiplash injuries are
common in vehicular collisions.
The Respondent’s Position
In her Comment,26 Rebecca points out
that Dra. dela Llana raises a factual issue
which is beyond the scope of a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court. She maintains that
the CA’s findings of fact are final and
conclusive. Moreover, she stresses that
Dra. dela Llana’s arguments are not
substantial to merit this Court’s
consideration.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT JOEL’S
RECKLESS DRIVING IS THE
PROXIMATE CAUSE OF DRA.
DELA LLANA’S WHIPLASH
INJURY.
RULING:
NO.
The issue before us involves a question
of fact and this Court is not a trier of
facts. As a general rule, the CA’s
findings of fact are final and conclusive
and this Court will not review them on
appeal. It is not the function of this Court
to examine, review or evaluate the
evidence in a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court. We can only review the
presented evidence, by way of exception,
when the conflict exists in findings of the
RTC and the CA.27
We see this exceptional situation here
and thus accordingly examine the
relevant evidence presented before the
trial court.
Dra. dela Llana failed to establish her
case by preponderance of evidence
Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides
that "[w]hoever by act or omission
causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for
the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties,
is a quasi-delict." Under this provision,
the elements necessary to establish a
quasi-delict case are:
(1) damages to the plaintiff;
(2) negligence, by act or omission,
of the defendant or by some
person for whose acts the
defendant must respond, was
guilty; and
(3) the connection of cause and
effect between such negligence
and the damages.28
These elements show that the source of
obligation in a quasi-delict case is the
breach or omission of mutual duties that
civilized society imposes upon its
members, or which arise from non-
contractual relations of certain members
of society to others.29
Based on these requisites, Dra. dela
Llana must first establish by
preponderance of evidence the three
elements of quasi-delict before we
determine Rebecca’s liability as Joel’s
employer.
She should show the chain of causation
between Joel’s reckless driving and her
whiplash injury.
Only after she has laid this foundation
can the presumption - that Rebecca did
not exercise the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and
supervision of Joel - arise.30
Once negligence, the damages and the
proximate causation are established, this
Court can then proceed with the
application and the interpretation of the
fifth paragraph of Article 2180 of the
Civil Code.31
Under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, in
relation with the fifth paragraph of
Article 2180, "an action predicated on an
employee’s act or omission may be
instituted against the employer who is
held liable for the negligent act or
omission committed by his employee."32
The rationale for these graduated levels
of analyses is that it is essentially the
wrongful or negligent act or omission
itself which creates the vinculum juris in
extra-contractual obligations.33
In civil cases, a party who alleges a fact
has the burden of proving it.
He who alleges has the burden of
proving his allegation by preponderance
of evidence or greater weight of credible
evidence.34
The reason for this rule is that bare
allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence,
are not equivalent to proof.
because mere allegations are not
evidence.35
In the present case, the burden of proving
the proximate causation between Joel’s
negligence and Dra. dela Llana’s
whiplash injury rests on Dra. dela Llana.
She must establish by preponderance of
evidence that Joel’s negligence, in its
natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening
cause, produced her whiplash injury, and
without which her whiplash injury would
not have occurred.36
Notably, Dra. dela Llana anchors her
claim mainly on three pieces of
evidence:
(1) the pictures of her damaged
car,
(2) the medical certificate dated
November 20, 2000, and
(3) her testimonial evidence.
However, none of these pieces of
evidence show the causal relation
between the vehicular accident
and the whiplash injury. In other
words,
Dra. dela Llana, during trial, did not
adduce the factum probans or the
evidentiary facts by which the factum
probandum or the ultimate fact can be
established, as fully discussed below.37
A.
The pictures of the damaged
car only demonstrate the
impact of the collision
Dra. dela Llana contends that the pictures
of the damaged car show that the
massive impact of the collision caused
her whiplash injury. We are not
persuaded by this bare claim. Her
insistence that these pictures show the
causation grossly belies common logic.
These pictures indeed demonstrate the
impact of the collision. However, it is a
far-fetched assumption that the whiplash
injury can also be inferred from these
pictures.
B.
The medical certificate cannot be
considered because it was
not admitted in evidence
Furthermore, the medical certificate,
marked as Exhibit "H" during trial,
should not be considered in resolving
this case for the reason that it was not
admitted in evidence by the RTC in an
order dated September 23, 2004.38
Thus, the CA erred in even considering
this documentary evidence in its
resolution of the case. It is a basic rule
that evidence which has not been
admitted cannot be validly considered
by the courts in arriving at their
judgments.
However, even if we consider the
medical certificate in the disposition of
this case, the medical certificate has no
probative value for being hearsay. It is a
basic rule that evidence, whether oral or
documentary, is hearsay if its probative
value is not based on the personal
knowledge of the witness but on the
knowledge of another person who is not
on the witness stand.39
Hearsay evidence, whether objected to or
not, cannot be given credence40 except in
very unusual circumstance that is not
found in the present case.
Furthermore, admissibility of evidence
should not be equated with weight of
evidence. The admissibility of evidence
depends on its relevance and
competence, while the weight of
evidence pertains to evidence already
admitted and its tendency to convince
and persuade. Thus, a particular item of
evidence may be admissible, but its
evidentiary weight depends on judicial
evaluation within the guidelines provided
by the Rules of Court.41
During trial, Dra. dela Llana testified:
"Q: Did your physician tell you, more or
less, what was the reason why you were
feeling that pain in your left arm?
A: Well, I got a certificate from her and
in that certificate, she stated that my
condition was due to a compression of
the nerve, which supplied my left arm
and my left hand.
Court: By the way, what is the name of
this physician, Dra.?
Witness: Her name is Dra. Rosalinda
Milla. She is a Rehabilitation Medicine
Specialist. Atty. Yusingco: You
mentioned that this Dra. Rosalinda Milla
made or issued a medical certificate.
What relation does this medical
certificate, marked as Exhibit H have to
do with that certificate, you said was
made by Dra. Milla?
Witness: This is the medical certificate
that Dra. Milla made out for me.
Atty. Yusingco: Your Honor, this has
been marked as Exhibit H.
Atty. Yusingco: What other medical
services were done on you, Dra. dela
Llana, as a result of that feeling, that pain
that you felt in your left arm?
Witness: Well, aside from the
medications and physical therapy, a re-
evaluation of my condition after three
months indicated that I needed surgery.
Atty. Yusingco: Did you undergo this
surgery?
Witness: So, on October 19, I underwent
surgery on my neck, on my spine.
Atty. Yusingco: And, what was the result
of that surgical operation?
Witness: Well, the operation was to
relieve the compression on my nerve,
which did not resolve by the extensive
and prolonged physical therapy that I
underwent for more than three
months."42(emphasis ours)
Evidently, it was Dr. Milla who had
personal knowledge of the contents of
the medical
certificate.1âwphi1 However, she was
not presented to testify in court and was
not even able to identify and affirm the
contents of the medical certificate.
Furthermore, Rebecca was deprived of
the opportunity to cross-examine Dr.
Milla on the accuracy and veracity of her
findings. We also point out in this
respect that the medical certificate
nonetheless did not explain the chain of
causation in fact between Joel’s reckless
driving and Dra. dela Llana’s whiplash
injury. It did not categorically state that
the whiplash injury was a result of the
vehicular accident. A perusal of the
medical certificate shows that it only
attested to her medical condition, i.e.,
that she was suffering from whiplash
injury. However, the medical certificate
failed to substantially relate the vehicular
accident to Dra. dela Llana’s whiplash
injury. Rather, the medical certificate
only chronicled her medical history
and physical examinations.
C.
Dra. dela Llana’s opinion that
Joel’s negligence caused her
whiplash injury has no probative value
Interestingly, the present case is peculiar
in the sense that Dra. dela Llana, as the
plaintiff in this quasi-delict case, was the
lone physician-witness during trial.
Significantly, she merely testified as an
ordinary witness before the trial court.
Dra. dela Llana essentially claimed in her
testimony that Joel’s reckless driving
caused her whiplash injury. Despite the
fact that Dra. dela Llana is a physician
and even assuming that she is an expert
in neurology, we cannot give weight to
her opinion that Joel’s reckless driving
caused her whiplash injury without
violating the rules on evidence.
Under the Rules of Court, there is a
substantial difference between an
ordinary witness and an expert witness.
The opinion of an ordinary witness may
be received in evidence regarding:
 (a) the identity of a person about
whom he has adequate
knowledge;
(b) a handwriting with which he
has sufficient familiarity; and
(c) the mental sanity of a person
with whom he is sufficiently
acquainted.1âwphi1 Furthermore,
the witness may also testify on his
impressions of the emotion,
behavior, condition or appearance
of a person.43
On the other hand, the opinion of an
expert witness may be received in
evidence on a matter requiring special
knowledge, skill, experience or training
which he shown to possess.44
However, courts do not immediately
accord probative value to an admitted
expert testimony, much less to an
unobjected ordinary testimony respecting
special knowledge. The reason is that the
probative value of an expert testimony
does not lie in a simple exposition of the
expert's opinion. Rather, its weight lies in
the assistance that the expert witness
may afford the courts by demonstrating
the facts which serve as a basis for his
opinion and the reasons on which the
logic of his conclusions is founded.45
In the present case, Dra. dela Llana’s
medical opinion cannot be given
probative value for the reason that she
was not presented as an expert witness.
As an ordinary witness, she was not
competent to testify on the nature, and
the cause and effects of whiplash injury.
Furthermore, we emphasize that Dra.
dela Llana, during trial, nonetheless did
not provide a medical explanation on the
nature as well as the cause and effects of
whiplash injury in her testimony.
The Supreme Court cannot take
judicial notice that vehicular
accidents cause whiplash injuries.
Indeed, a perusal of the pieces of
evidence presented by the parties before
the trial court shows that Dra. Dela
Llana did not present any testimonial
or documentary evidence that directly
shows the causal relation between the
vehicular accident and Dra. Dela
Llana’s injury. Her claim that Joel’s
negligence causes her whiplash injury
was not established because of the
deficiency of the presented evidence
during trial. We point out in this respect
that courts cannot take judicial notice
that vehicular ccidents cause whiplash
injuries.
This proportion is not public
knowledge, or is capable of
unquestionable demonstration, or
ought to be known to judges because
of their judicial functions.46 We have
no expertise in the field of medicine.
Justices and judges are only tasked to
apply and interpret the law on the basis
of the parties’ pieces of evidence and
their corresponding legal arguments.
In sum, Dra. dela Llana miserably failed
to establish her cause by preponderance
of evidence. While we commiserate with
her, our solemn duty to independently
and impartially assess the merits of the
case binds us to rule against Dra. dela
Llana’s favor. Her claim, unsupported by
prepondernace of evidence, is merely a
bare assertion and has no leg to stand on.
G.R. No. 177809       October 16, 2009
SPOUSES OMAR and MOSHIERA
LATIP, Petitioners,
vs.
ROSALIE PALAÑA
CHUA, Respondent.
The facts parleyed by the MeTC show
that respondent Rosalie Chua (Rosalie) is
the owner of Roferxane Building, a
commercial building, located at No. 158
Quirino Avenue corner Redemptorist
Road, Barangay Baclaran, Parañaque
City.
On July 6, 2001, Rosalie filed a
complaint for unlawful detainer plus
damages against petitioners, Spouses
Omar and Moshiera Latip (Spouses
Latip). Rosalie attached to the complaint
a contract of lease over two cubicles in
Roferxane Bldg., signed by Rosalie, as
lessor, and by Spouses Latip, as lessees
thereof.
A year after the commencement of the
lease and with Spouses Latip already
occupying the leased cubicles, Rosalie,
through counsel, sent the spouses a letter
demanding payment of back rentals and
should they fail to do so, to vacate the
leased cubicles. When Spouses Latip did
not heed Rosalie’s demand, she instituted
the aforesaid complaint.
In their Answer, Spouses Latip refuted
Rosalie’s claims. They averred that the
lease of the two (2) cubicles had already
been paid in full as evidenced by receipts
showing payment to Rosalie of the total
amount of ₱2,570,000.00. The three (3)
receipts, in Rosalie’s handwriting, read:
Spouses Latip asseverated that sometime
in October 1999, Rosalie offered for sale
lease rights over two (2) cubicles in
Roferxane Bldg. Having in mind the
brisk sale of goods during the Christmas
season, they readily accepted Rosalie’s
offer to purchase lease rights in
Roferxane Bldg., which was still under
construction at the time. According to
Spouses Latip, the immediate payment of
₱2,570,000.00 would be used to finish
construction of the building giving them
first priority in the occupation of the
finished cubicles.
Thereafter, in December 1999, as soon as
two (2) cubicles were finished, Spouses
Latip occupied them without waiting for
the completion of five (5) other stalls.
Spouses Latip averred that the contract
of lease they signed had been novated by
their purchase of lease rights of the
subject cubicles. Thus, they were
surprised to receive a demand letter from
Rosalie’s counsel and the subsequent
filing of a complaint against them.
The MeTC ruled in favor of Rosalie
RTC: reversed.
The RTC did not give credence to the
contract of lease, ruling that it was not
notarized and, in all other substantial
aspects, incomplete. Further on this
point, the RTC noted that the contract of
lease lacked: (1) the signature of
Ferdinand Chua, Rosalie’s husband; (2)
the signatures of Spouses Latip on the
first page thereof; (3) the specific dates
for the term of the contract which only
stated that the lease is for "six (6) y[ea]rs
only starting from December 1999 or up
to December 2005"; (4) the exact date of
execution of the document, albeit the
month of December and year 1999 are
indicated therein; and (5) the provision
for payment of deposit or advance rental
which is supposedly uncommon in big
commercial lease contracts.
The RTC believed the claim of Spouses
Latip that the contract of lease was
modified and supplemented; and the
entire lease rentals for the two (2)
cubicles for six (6) years had already
been paid by Spouses Latip in the
amount of ₱2,570,000.00. As to
Rosalie’s claim that her receipt of
₱2,570,000.00 was simply goodwill
payment by prospective lessees to their
lessor, and not payment for the purchase
of lease rights, the RTC shot this down
and pointed out that, apart from her bare
allegations, Rosalie did not adduce
evidence to substantiate this claim. On
the whole, the RTC declared an existent
lease between the parties for a period of
six (6) years, and already fully paid for
by Spouses Latip. Thus, Spouses Latip
could not be ejected from the leased
premises until expiration of the lease
period.
CA: reinstated the METC
The CA ruled that the contract of lease,
albeit lacking the signature of Ferdinand
and not notarized, remained a complete
and valid contract. As the MeTC had, the
CA likewise found that the alleged
defects in the contract of lease did not
render the contract ineffective.
On the issue of whether the amount of
₱2,570,000.00 merely constituted
payment of goodwill money, the CA
took judicial notice of this common
practice in the area of Baclaran,
especially around the Redemptorist
Church. According to the appellate court,
this judicial notice was bolstered by the
Joint Sworn Declaration of the
stallholders at Roferxane Bldg. that they
all had paid goodwill money to Rosalie
prior to occupying the stalls thereat.
Thus, ruling on Rosalie’s appeal, the CA
disposed of the case:
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE
JUDICIAL NOTICE IS PROPER
RULING:
NO.
The SC disagrees with the CA which
ruled in favor of Rosalie and upheld the
ejectment of Spouses Latip, took judicial
notice of the alleged practice of
prospective lessees in the Baclaran area
to pay goodwill money to the lessor.
Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 129 of the Rules
of Court declare when the taking of
judicial notice is mandatory or
discretionary on the courts, thus:
SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when
mandatory. – A court shall take judicial
notice, without the introduction of
evidence, of the existence and territorial
extent of states, their political history,
forms of government and symbols of
nationality, the law of nations, the
admiralty and maritime courts of the
world and their seals, the political
constitution and history of the
Philippines, the official acts of the
legislative, executive and judicial
departments of the Philippines, the laws
of nature, the measure of time, and the
geographical divisions.
SEC. 2. Judicial notice, when
discretionary. – A court may take judicial
notice of matters which are of public
knowledge, or are capable of
unquestionable demonstration or ought
to be known to judges because of their
judicial functions.
On this point, State Prosecutors v.
Muro10 is instructive:
I. The doctrine of judicial notice rests on
the wisdom and discretion of the courts.
The power to take judicial notice is to be
exercised by courts with caution; care
must be taken that the requisite notoriety
exists; and every reasonable doubt on the
subject should be promptly resolved in
the negative.
Generally speaking, matters of judicial
notice have three material requisites: (1)
the matter must be one of common and
general knowledge; (2) it must be well
and authoritatively settled and not
doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be
known to be within the limits of the
jurisdiction of the court.
The principal guide in determining what
facts may be assumed to be judicially
known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can
be said that judicial notice is limited to
facts evidenced by public records and
facts of general notoriety.
To say that a court will take judicial
notice of a fact is merely another way of
saying that the usual form of evidence
will be dispensed with if knowledge of
the fact can be otherwise acquired. This
is because the court assumes that the
matter is so notorious that it will not be
disputed. But judicial notice is not
judicial knowledge. The mere personal
knowledge of the judge is not the judicial
knowledge of the court, and he is not
authorized to make his individual
knowledge of a fact, not generally or
professionally known, the basis of his
action. Judicial cognizance is taken only
of those matters which are "commonly"
known.
Things of "common knowledge," of
which courts take judicial notice, may be
matters coming to the knowledge of men
generally in the course of the ordinary
experiences of life, or they may be
matters which are generally accepted by
mankind as true and are capable of ready
and unquestioned demonstration. Thus,
facts which are universally known, and
which may be found in encyclopedias,
dictionaries or other publications, are
judicially noticed, provided they are of
such universal notoriety and so generally
understood that they may be regarded as
forming part of the common knowledge
of every person.11
We reiterated the requisite of notoriety
for the taking of judicial notice in the
recent case of Expertravel & Tours, Inc.
v. Court of Appeals,12 which cited State
Prosecutors:
In the case at bar, the matter which the
appellate court took judicial notice of
does not meet the requisite of notoriety.
To begin with, only the CA took judicial
notice of this supposed practice to pay
goodwill money to the lessor in the
Baclaran area. Neither the MeTC nor the
RTC, with the former even ruling in
favor of Rosalie, found that the practice
was of "common knowledge" or
notoriously known.
We note that the RTC specifically ruled
that Rosalie, apart from her bare
allegation, adduced no evidence to prove
her claim that the amount of
₱2,570,000.00 simply constituted the
payment of goodwill money.
Subsequently, Rosalie attached an annex
to her petition for review before the CA,
containing a joint declaration under oath
by other stallholders in Roferxane Bldg.
that they had paid goodwill money to
Rosalie as their lessor. On this score, we
emphasize that the reason why our rules
on evidence provide for matters that need
not be proved under Rule 129,
specifically on judicial notice, is to
dispense with the taking of the usual
form of evidence on a certain matter so
notoriously known, it will not be
disputed by the parties.
However, in this case, the requisite of
notoriety is belied by the necessity of
attaching documentary evidence, i.e., the
Joint Affidavit of the stallholders, to
Rosalie’s appeal before the CA. In short,
the alleged practice still had to be proven
by Rosalie; contravening the title itself of
Rule 129 of the Rules of Court – What
need not be proved.
Apparently, only that particular division
of the CA had knowledge of the practice
to pay goodwill money in the Baclaran
area. As was held in State Prosecutors,
justices and judges alike ought to be
reminded that the power to take judicial
notice must be exercised with caution
and every reasonable doubt on the
subject should be ample reason for the
claim of judicial notice to be promptly
resolved in the negative.
Ultimately, on the issue of whether
Spouses Latip ought to be ejected from
the leased cubicles, what remains in
evidence is the documentary evidence
signed by both parties – the contract of
lease and the receipts evidencing
payment of ₱2,570,000.00.
We need not be unduly detained by the
issue of which documents were executed
first or if there was a novation of the
contract of lease. As had been found by
the RTC, the lease contract and the
receipts for the amount of ₱2,570,000.00
can be reconciled or harmonized. The
RTC declared:
Definitely, the parties entered into a lease
agreement over two (2) cubicles of the
1st and 2nd floors of Roferxane
(Roferland) Building, a commercial
building located at 158 Quirino Avenue,
corner Redemptorist Road, Baclaran,
Parañaque City and belonging to
[Rosalie]. The lease agreement is for a
term of six (6) years commencing in
December 1999 up to December 2005.
This agreement was embodied in a
Contract of Lease x x x. The terms of
this lease contract, however, are
modified or supplemented by another
agreement between the parties executed
and or entered into in or about the time
of execution of the lease contract, which
exact date of execution of the latter is
unclear.13
We agree with the RTC’s holding only
up to that point. There exists a lease
agreement between the parties as set
forth in the contract of lease which is a
complete document. It need not be
signed by Ferdinand Chua as he likewise
did not sign the other two receipts for
₱500,000.00 and ₱70,000.00,
respectively, which contained only the
signature of Rosalie. Besides, it is
undisputed that Rosalie owns and leases
the stalls in Roferxane Bldg.; thus, doing
away with the need for her husband’s
consent. The findings of the three lower
courts concur on this fact.
The contract of lease has a period of six
(6) years commencing in December
1999. This fact is again buttressed by
Spouses Latip’s admission that they
occupied the property forthwith in
December 1999, bearing in mind the
brisk sales during the holiday season.
On the conflicting interpretations by the
lower courts of the receipts amounting to
₱2,570,000.00, we hold that the practice
of payment of goodwill money in the
Baclaran area is an inadequate subject of
judicial notice. Neither was Rosalie able
to provide sufficient evidence that, apart
from the belatedly submitted Joint
Affidavit of the stallholders of Roferxane
Bldg., the said amount was simply for
the payment of goodwill money, and not
payment for advance rentals by Spouses
Latip.
In interpreting the evidence before us, we
are guided by the Civil Code provisions
on interpretation of contracts, to wit:
Art. 1371. In order to judge the intention
of the contracting parties, their
contemporaneous and subsequent acts
shall be principally considered.
Art. 1372. However general the terms of
a contract may be, they shall not be
understood to comprehend things that are
distinct and cases that are different from
those which the parties intended to agree.
Art. 1373. If some stipulation of any
contract should admit of several
meanings, it shall be understood as
bearing that import which is most
adequate to render it effectual.
The RTC was already on the right track
when it declared that the receipts for
₱2,570,000.00 modified or supplemented
the contract of lease. However, it made a
quantum leap when it ruled that the
amount was payment for rentals of the
two (2) cubicles for the entire six-year
period. We cannot subscribe to this
finding. To obviate confusion and for
clarity, the contents of the receipts,
already set forth above, are again
reproduced:
There is nothing on the receipts and on
record that the payment and receipt of
₱2,570,000.00 referred to full payment
of rentals for the whole period of the
lease. All three receipts state Rosalie’s
receipt of cash in varying amounts. The
first receipt for ₱2,000,000.00 did state
payment for two (2) cubicles, but this
cannot mean full payment of rentals for
the entire lease period when there are no
words to that effect. Further, two receipts
were subsequently executed pointing to
the obvious fact that the ₱2,000,000.00 is
not for full payment of rentals. Thus,
since the contract of lease remained
operative, we find that Rosalie’s receipt
of the monies should be considered as
advanced rentals on the leased cubicles.
This conclusion is bolstered by the fact
that Rosalie demanded payment of the
lease rentals only in 2000, a full year
after the commencement of the lease.
Finally, we note that the lease ended in
2005. Consequently, Spouses Latip can
be ejected from the leased premises.
They are liable to Rosalie for unpaid
rentals on the lease of the two (2)
cubicles in accordance with the
stipulations on rentals in the Contract of
Lease. However, the amount of
₱2,570,000.00, covering advance rentals,
must be deducted from this liability of
Spouses Latip to Rosalie.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
petition is hereby GRANTED. The
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 89300 is REVERSED. The
petitioners, spouses Omar and Moshiera
Latip, are liable to respondent Rosalie
Chua for unpaid rentals minus the
amount of ₱2,570,000.00 already
received by her as advance rentals. No
costs.
G.R. Nos. 173148               April 6, 2015
ELSA DEGAYO, Petitioner,
vs.
CECILIA MAGBANUA-
DINGLASAN, JOHNNY
DINGLASAN, ASUNCION
MAGBANUA-PORRAS, MARIANO
P ASCUALITO and AMADO JR., all
surnamed MAGBANUA, Respondents.
The present case involves a property
dispute, which gave rise to two civil
cases for ownership and damages
between conflicting claimants over a
parcel of land located on the bank of
Jalaud River. The respondents Cecilia
Magbanua-Dinglasan et al initiated the
first civil case against Nicolas Jarencio et
al, (tenants) of Lot No. 861. Degayo, on
the other hand, initiated the second civil
case, which eventually reached this
Court via the present petition.
Records show that Lot No. 861 in
the Cadastral Survey of Dingle, Iloilo, is
registered in the name of Degayo’s
deceased parents. Lot No. 861 used to
be bounded on the southwest by the
Jalaud River that serves to separate
Dingle from Pototan Iloilo.
On the other side of Jalaud River,
opposite Lot No. 861, lies Lot No. 7328
of the Cadastre of Pototan, Iloilo,
collectively owned by the respondents.
The Jalaud River separates these parcels
of land.
Sometime in the 1970’s, the
Jalauad River steadily changed its course
and moved southwards towards the
banks of Pototan, where Lot No. 7328
lies, leaving its old riverbed dry.
Eventually, the course of the
Jalaud River encroached on Lot No.
7328. As a result, Respondents’ Lot No.
7328 progressively decreased in size
while the banks adjacent to Degayo’s Lot
No. 861 gradually increased in land area.
Degayo and the tenants believed that the
area was an accretion to Lot No. 861. As
a result, her tenants, commenced
cultivating and tilling that disputed area
with corn and tobacco. The area
allegedly added to Lot No. 861 contains
52,528 sqm. The respondents, on the
other hand, argued that the disputed
property was an abandoned riverbed,
which should rightfully belong to them
to compensate for the erstwhile portion
of Lot No. 7328, over which the Jalaud
River presently runs.
Respondents filed a complaint for
ownership and damages against the
tenants, with the RTC of Iloilo (Cecilia
Magbanua Dinglasan, et al. v. Nicolas
Jarencio, et al.,) docketed as Civil Case
No. 16047. Degayo sought to intervene
in Civil Case No. 16047 but her motion
was denied. Notably, Degayo never
bothered to question the interlocutory
order denying her motion for
intervention by filing a petition for
certiorari.
Instead, Degayo initiated the
present suit against the respondents for
declaration of ownership with damages,
also with the RTC of Iloilo, docketed as
Civil Case No. 18328, involving the
disputed parcel of land.
Notwithstanding the previous
denial of her motion to intervene in Civil
Case No. 16047, Degayo was able to
participate in the proceedings therein as a
witness for the defense. In particular,
during her direct examination, Degayo
testified on the same matters and raised
the same arguments she alleged in her
complaint in Civil Case No. 18328, those
are: that she acquired Lot No. 861 by
inheritance by virtue of a Quitclaim
Deed; that she had been in possession of
that land since 1954; and that the area in
dispute was an accretion to Lot No. 861
RTC DECISION: (Civil Case No.
1604) in favor of Magbanua et al. The
tenants promptly filed an appeal but they
failed to file an appeal brief, resulting to
a dismissal of their appeal per resolution
dated June 20, 1999. The decision in
Civil Case No. 16047 became final and
executory on August 6, 1999.
Meanwhile, in Civil Case No.
18328, the court, a quo, found in favor of
Degayo and declared the property in
question as an accretion to Lot No. 861.
The respondents filed a motion for
reconsideration but their motion was
denied. Hence, the respondents filed an
appeal with the CA.
CA DECISION: CA granted the
respondents’ appeal and reversed and set
aside the decision of the RTC Branch 22
in Civil Case No. 18328. In granting the
appeal the CA noted that the disputed
properties are abandoned riverbeds.
Being abandoned riverbeds, the property
in question rightfully belongs to the
respondents as the owners of the land
now occupied by the Jalaud River. The
CA likewise noted that the previous
RTC Branch decision in Civil Case No.
16047 is conclusive to the title of the
thing, being an aspect of the rule on
conclusiveness of judgment.
Degayo sought a reconsideration of the
CA Decision but the CA denied her
motion in its May 19, 2006 Resolution.
Aggrieved, Degayo filed the preset
petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 with this Court.
ISSUES:
1. WON the CA properly took judicial
notice of the RTC decision in Civil
Case No. 16047, which was not even
presented during the hearing of the
present case;
2. WON the RTC decision in Civil Case
No. 16047 is conclusive upon Degayo
when she was not even a party in the said
Civil Case.
RULING:
1. YES. The taking of judicial notice is a
matter of expediency and convenience
for it fulfills the purpose that the
evidence is intended to achieve, and in
this sense, it is equivalent to
proof. Generally, courts are not
authorized to "take judicial notice of the
contents of the records of other cases
even when said cases have been tried or
are pending in the same court or before
the same judge. " While the principle
invoked is considered to be the general
rule, this rule is not absolute. There are
exceptions to this rule. In the case of
Tiburcio v PHHC, this Court, citing
Justice Moran, stated:
"In some instance, courts have
taken judicial notice of
proceedings in other causes,
because of their close connection
with the matter in the
controversy…Courts have also
taken judicial notice of previous
cases to determine whether or not
the case pending is a moot one or
whether or not a previous ruling is
applicable in the case under
consideration."
Degayo’s objection to the action
of CA on this matter is merely technical
because Degayo herself repeatedly
referred to the Civil Case No. 16047 in
her pleadings in Civil Case No. 18328
and even in her appellee’s brief before
the CA and her petition for review before
this Court. In particular, in her
complaint, she stated that her motion to
intervene in Civil Case No. 16047, was
denied by the Court. The existence of
that case was likewise jointly stipulated
by that party in Civil Case No. 18328
and mentioned by the court a quo in its
decision. In her appellee’s brief as well,
Degayo expressly referred to Civil Case
No. 16047.
 There was thus no denial of the
existence and the decision in Civil Case
No. 16047. In fact, Degayo stated on
record her full knowledge of Civil Case
No. 16047 and clearly and frequently
referred to it in her pleadings, and
sufficiently designated it by name,
parties, cause of action and docket
number from the court a quo, to the CA
and even before this Court. Under the
circumstances, the CA could certainly
take judicial notice of the finality of a
judgment in Civil Case No. 16047. There
was no sense in relitigating issues that
have already been passed upon in a
previous civil case. That was all that was
done by the CA in decreeing the
dismissal. Certainly such an order is not
contrary to law. As we aptly stated in
Republic v. CA, citing Justice Edgardo
L. Paras:
"A court will take judicial notice
of its own acts and records in the
same case, of facts established in
prior proceedings in the same
case, of the authenticity of its own
records of another case between
the same parties, of the files of
related cases in the same court,
and of public records on file in the
same court. In addition judicial
notice will be taken of the record,
pleadings or judgment of a case in
another court between the same
parties or involving one of the
same parties, as well as of the
record of another case between
different parties in the same court.
" petition.
Lastly, there is another equally
compelling consideration. Degayo
undoubtedly had recourse to a remedy
which under the law then in force could
be availed of, which is to file a petition
for certiorari with the CA. It would have
served the cause of justice better, not to
mention the avoidance of needless
expense on her part and the vexation to
which the respondents were subjected if
she did reflect a little more on the matter.
2. YES. The Decision in Civil Case No.
16047 constitutes res judicata.
Res judicata to the rule that a final
judgment or decree on the merits by a
court of competent jurisdiction is
conclusive of the rights of the parties
or their privies in all later suits on
points and matters determined in the
former suit.  Conclusiveness of
judgment finds application when a fact
or question has been squarely put in
issue, judicially passed upon, and
adjudged in a former suit by a court of
competent jurisdiction. The fact or
question settled by final judgment or
order binds the parties to that action (and
persons in privity with them or their
successors-in-interest), and continues to
bind them while the judgment or order
remains standing and unreversed by
proper authority on a timely motion or
In the present case, it is beyond
dispute that the judgment in Civil Case
No. 16047 has attained finality in view
of the tenant’s abandonment of their
appeal to the CA. Moreover, records
show that that decision was adjudicated
on the merits, i.e., it was rendered after a
consideration of the evidence or
stipulations submitted by the parties at
the trial of the case by a court which had
jurisdiction over the subject matter and
the parties.
We likewise find that there is an
identity of parties in Civil Case No.
16047 and the present case. It is not
disputed that respondents were the
plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 16047.
Degayo, however insists that she is not
bound by the decision in Civil Case No.
16047 as she was not made a party in
that case. We, however, refuse to
subscribe to this technical interpretation
of the Rules. In Torres v. Caluag, we
held that a real litigant may be held
bound as a party even if not formally
impleaded because he had his day in
court and because her substantial
rights were not prejudiced. In this
case, Degayo had the fullest opportunity
to lay before the court her claim but the
same was overruled. The fact that she
was not formally made a party defendant
in the case would appear therefore to be
a mere technicality that would not serve
the interest of the administration of
justice.
its conclusiveness of judgment concept,
merely requires identity of issues. We
thus agree with the uniform view of the
CA – on the application of
conclusiveness of judgment to the
present case.

Likewise, there exists a Petition denied.

community of interest between Degayo
and her tenants, who were respondents in
Civil Case No. 16047. Their claims
emanate from a singular fundamental
allegation of accretion. Moreover,
Degayo and the respondents are litigating
the same properties subject of the
antecedent cases inasmuch as they claim
better right of ownership. Degayo even
admitted this in her petition wherein she
stated that "the land subject of Civil Case
No. 16047 is the same property subject
of the case at bench. Notably, the
ownership of the disputed parcel of land
has been unequivocally settled in Civil
Case No. 16047. In ruling that the
subject parcels of land belong to the
respondents, the RTC Branch 27 in Civil
Case No. 16047 opined that the claim of
accretion has no valid basis.

The fact that the present cause of

action is based on an accretion claim
does not prevent the application of res
judicata. For, res judicata, under the
concept of conclusiveness of judgment,
operates even if no absolute identity of
causes of action exists. Res judicata, in
 LAND BANK OFTHE
PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
HONEYCOMB FARMS
CORPORATION, Respondent.
Respondent Honeycomb Farms
Corporation (HFC) was the registered
owner of a parcel of agricultural land
under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
2550, with an area of 29.0966 hectares,
situated in "Curvada, Caintagan,
Masbate."5 Through a letter dated
February 5, 1988, HFC voluntarily
offered its land to the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) for coverage
under RA 6657, the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 (CARL),
for P581,932.00 or at P20,000.00 per
hectare.6 Pursuant to the rules and
regulations governing the CARL, the
government, through the DAR and the
LBP, determined an acquirable and
compensable area of 27.5871 hectares,
while 1.5095 hectares were excluded for
being hilly and underdeveloped.7
Subsequently, the LBP, as the agency
with the authority to determine land
valuation and compensation under the
CARL, and using the guidelines set forth
in DAR Administrative Order No. 6,
series of 1992,8 fixed the value of the
land in the amount of P165,739.44 and
sent a Notice of Valuation to HFC.9
However, such valuation was rejected by
the HFC.
HFC rejected the LBP’s valuation and it
filed, on January 15, 1996,10 a petition
with the DAR Adjudication Board
(DARAB) for a summary administrative
determination of just compensation. In
its petition, HFC claiming that the just
compensation for the land should be in
the amount of P25,000.00 per hectare,
considering its location and productivity,
or for an aggregate amount of
P725,000.00.11
While the DARAB proceedings were
still pending, HFC filed a Complaint for
Determination and Payment of Just
Compensation with the RTC, praying for
a just compensation of P725,000.00, plus
attorney’s fees of ten percent (10%) of
the just compensation.12 HFC justified the
direct filing with the SAC by what it saw
as unreasonable delay or official
inaction. HFC claimed that the DARAB
disregarded Section 16 of RA 6657
which mandates that the "DAR shall
decide the case within thirty (30) days
after it is submitted for decision."13  concluded that:
The LBP meanwhile countered that
HFC’s petition was "premature and lacks
a cause of action for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies."14
Meanwhile, on May 14, 1998, the
DARAB issued a Decision15 affirmed the
LBP’s valuation. The dispositive portion
states:
RTC: WHEREFORE, judgment is
hereby rendered by:
1.) Fixing the just compensation
of the parcel of land owned by
plaintiff Honeycomb Farms Corp.
under TCT No. T-2550 which is
covered by agrarian reform for an
area of 27.5871 hectares at
P931,109.20 subject to the lien for
the docket fee of the amount in
excess of P725,000.00 as pleaded
for by herein plaintiff in its
complaint;
2.) Ordering the defendants to pay
jointly and severally the plaintiff
an attorney’s fee equivalent to
10% of the total just
18
compensation.
Because of the conflicting valuations, the
SAC made its own valuation and briefly
A judicious evaluation of the evidence
on record shows that the subject area is
sporadically planted to (sic) coconut and
corn as is not fully develop (sic) when
the government conducted its ocular
inspection and thereafter took over
possession of the same although majority
of it is a fertile grass land and
undisputedly deemed suitable to
agriculture. However, the parcel of land
under consideration is located in the side
of the road. It is likewise of judicial
notice that it is situated near the
commercial district of Curvada,
Cataingan, Masbate. In the light of the
foregoing premises, the Court is of the
opinion and so holds that the just
compensation for the land of herein
plaintiff corporation under TCT No. T-
2550 covered by agrarian reform is
P32,000.00 per hectare or P882,787.20
for the area of 27.58571 hectares plus
consequential damages at the same value
(P32,000.00) per hectare for the
remaining 1.5095 hectares of the
plaintiff’s property left and rendered
useless by the compulsory coverage or
for the total sum of
19 
P931,109.20. (emphasis ours)
Both parties appealed to the CA.
HFC argued that the RTC erred in its
determination of just compensation; the
amount of P931,109.20 is not supported
by the evidence on record while its
presented evidence correctly shows that
the market value of the land at the time
of taking was P113,000.00 per hectare.20
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE RTC
COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR
WHEN IT TOOK JUDICIAL
NOTICE OF THE PROPERTY’S
ROAD SIDE LOCATION (ETC) TO
DETERMINE JUST
COMPENSATION.
RULING:
YES.
The SAC [SPECIAL AGRARIAN
COURT] cannot take judicial notice of
the nature of land in question without the
requisite hearing
Separately from disregarding the basic
formula prescribed by the DAR, it has
also not escaped our notice that the SAC
also erred in concluding that the subject
land consisting of 29.0966 hectares is
commercial in nature, after taking
judicial notice that it is "situated near the
commercial district of Curvada,
Cataingan, Masbate."
In Land Bank of the Philippines
v.Honeycomb Farms Corporation,50 we
categorically ruled that the parties must
be given the opportunity to present
evidence on the nature of the property
before the court a quo can take judicial
notice of the commercial nature of a
portion of the subject landholding, thus:
While the lower court is not precluded
from taking judicial notice of certain
facts, it must exercise this right within
the clear boundary provided by Section
3, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, which
provides:
Section 3. Judicial notice, when hearing
necessary.
– During the trial, the court, on its own
initiative, or on request of a party, may
announce its intention to take judicial
notice of any matter and allow the parties
to be heard thereon.
After the trial, and before judgment or on
appeal, the proper court, on its own
initiative, or on request of a party, may
take judicial notice of any matter and
allow the parties to be heard thereon if
such matter is decisive of a material issue
in the case.
The classification of the land is
obviously essential to the valuation of
the subject property, which is the very
issue in the present case. The parties
should thus have been given the
opportunity to present evidence on the
nature of the property before the lower
court took judicial notice of the
commercial nature of a portion of the
subject landholdings. As we said in Land
Bank of the Phils. v. Wycoco 464 Phil.
83, 97-98 (2004):
To say that a court will take judicial
notice of a fact is merely another way of
saying that the usual form of evidence
will be dispensed with if knowledge of
the fact can be otherwise acquired. This
is because the court assumes that the
matter is so notorious that it will not be
disputed. But judicial notice is not
judicial knowledge. The mere personal
knowledge of the judge is not the judicial
knowledge of the court, and he is not
authorized to make his individual
knowledge of a fact, not generally or
professionally known, the basis of his
action. [Italicization supplied]

The power to take judicial notice is to be

exercised by courts with caution
especially where the case involves a vast
tract of land. Care must be taken that the
requisite notoriety exists; and every
reasonable doubt on the subject should
be promptly resolved in the negative.