CHAPTER IV

Political, Social and Economic Determinants of Radicalization in Punjab

4.1 Introduction
4.2 Identifying & Segregating Determinants of Radicalization in Punjab
4.2. (a) Political Determinants of Radicalization in Punjab
4.2. (b) Social Determinants of Radicalization in Punjab
4.2. (c) Economic Determinants of Radicalization in Punjab
 CHAPTER IV

4. Political, Social and Economic Determinants of Radicalization in

Punjab

4.1 Introduction

Though there is a general impression endorsed especially by the West that radicalization is

exclusively connected with religion; in actual, that is not true. Religion is an element that may or

may not cause radicalization. Rather, the problems that Pakistan is facing arise from fundamental

political and socio-economic injustice. According to the recent United Nations (UN) report 77 on

human development, 49.4% of Pakistan’s population is living in multi-dimensional poverty, &

53.4 % is going through intense deprivation.

Gurr’s Why men Rebel (1970) is a well-renowned publication in which he explains relative

deprivation as "perceived discrepancy between value expectations and value capabilities" (p.

25)78 Thus, relative deprivation implies a subjective perception of being unfairly underprivileged

with respect to reference groups. The privileged chunk of population in Pakistan is susceptible to

violent steps from those who are disadvantaged. The entrenched cases of robberies, thefts, and

kidnapping for ransom, violence, hatred and terror are a sign of the real possibility of increase in

blatant violence in the future days of Pakistan.

4.2 Identifying & Segregating Determinants of Radicalization in Punjab

The province of Punjab is no exception to radicalization. This phenomenon is increasingly

gripping this sub-region of the country and there seems to be no end in sight. Before getting rid

of radicalization it is essential to study its true nature and the determinants which are commonly

termed as instigating elements for radicalization. Hence in this study, an attempt is made to
identify and segregate causes of radicalization based on Political, Social & Economic arenas.

These causes are at times intermingled, have very thin distinguishing borders, vague and acting

as a trigger for each other. Moreover, sometimes these causes are hidden under the veil of

religion which needed to be unveiled so that an appropriate root cause can be located. In this

chapter, different instances, events, facts, figures, historical trends, extracts of interviews

regarding the topic under study are presented and based on their nature, they are segregated into

3 broad categories i.e. Political, Social & Economic determinants.

4.2. (a) Political Determinants of Radicalization in Punjab

Radicalization is not only a countrywide phenomenon but a global problem. A number of

countries across the world are trying to coup with the menace of militants & radical groups. The

consequences of these anti-social activities are more visible in the under-developed countries like

Pakistan. In fact, the blazing effect of radicalization and militant activities are more obvious in

context of Pakistan. Along with economic, social, & various other factors, the political factors

are noticeable behind these radical undertakings.

It is apparent from empirical research of various studies [ CITATION AKG02 \l 1033 ]79 that the link

between the government suppression and the resultant violence is shaped like an inverted U—

suppression at the lower levels leads to refusal to accept rules, political laws, & structure on

moral grounds. On the other hand, political compulsion after a certain limit results in making of

radical groups thus leading to radicalization [ CITATION WMo98 \l 1033 ].80 Same is the case with

Pakistan.

There is a tug of war between military & government in Pakistan. In their own turmoil they often

overlook the needs of public at large thus igniting the flames of abhorrence among them which

consequently have resulted in radicalization. The economic condition of Pakistan is not

encouraging as the government is not able to generate ample employment for the masses. Which

is then transformed into frustration and lack of belief on the government & people seek recourse

from anti-government forces working in the country whether they be internal or external. Slowly

but surely this piles up in the form of anger, suicidal behavior, frustration, hopelessness, lack of

trust, which eventually blows in the form of radicalization. This is akin to chain the one caused

during atomic explosion—one action leads to another & another leading to a terrible blast. This

is the scenario in the society of Pakistan. Decades of political coercion resulted in the

establishment of a radical society. Political elements are crucial part of this chain reaction

leading to an insecure and instable radical society of Pakistan.

Militancy and Radicalization in Punjab can be narrowed down into 3 geographical regions of

Punjab. The Potohari region, the Punjabi region, & the Saraiki regions. When we say Potohar

region, the administrative divisions that fall in this region include Rawalpindi, Attock, the federal

territory Islamabad, Jhelum & Chakwal. Few Arab militant organizations still has some footings

in the region as its spokesman lived in the capital territory Islamabad and sources have reported

the existence of its well-wishers in some districts like Attock.81

This potohar sub-region has both Ahl-e-Hadith & Deobandi outfits functioning in pockets and in

cooperation with the old & new local elite – the business-trading community, traditional

religious leaders, and state bureaucracy. According to the journalist Mujahid Hussain, Lashkar-e-

Taiba & Jesh-e-Muhammad run over a hundred madrassas in the Islamabad-Rawalpindi areas. 82

In this area a noticeable trend is that of Barelvi mosques being occupied forcibly by Deobandis.

This act is taking place with the assistance of the local land mafia. Some important political

authorities like the ruling party PML-N Member National Assembly Nawaz Khokhar or Member

Provincial Assembly Aqeel Anjum are engaged in helping the Deobandi outfits to forcibly
occupy mosques. This, it is thought, to be a part of a quid pro quo between the militants and the

political influentials. The two powers have entered a partnership in which they help each other.

While the big land occupiers, which include the real estate mogul like Malik Riaz, seek for the

help of these radical groups to grab land or get people forcibly expelled, as the former provides

them legitimacy and political cover to expand their influence. The land occupying business and

real-estate in all of Province is closely linked with militant and radical groups. The Lal Masjid

clergy after the military operation was forcibly ejected from the mosque in 2007, was

rehabilitated by Malik Riaz. The real-estate tycoon spent Pak Rs. 15 million on the

reconstruction & renovation of the mosque & also housed Maulana Abdul Aziz, his wife and the

madrassa girls in his famous housing scheme located at Rawalpindi and also provided for about

30 madrassas connected with Lal Masjid that were located all over Islamabad.83

There are constant accusations of centrally controlled and even active assistance for militant

extremists – a policy mostly argued to be adopted by the Pakistani intelligence agencies – even

though little contemporary information exists to validate such claims. During recent years the

appearance of the somewhat vague anti-Western coalition Difa-e-Pakistan Council (DPC),

comprising of former military officers, different religious parties, banned extremist groups,

policemen & others, suggested that such connections are plausible. It can be a possibility that

DPC may be backed by (some segments of) the Pakistani military – or at least is given more

leverage compared with other social movements in Pakistan. DPC has had significant success in

luring supporters by the hundreds of thousands in Punjab to its assemblies. Moreover, in spite of

bans on many of the key organizations in the coalition, the DPC has been allowed to hold its

rallies without much impediment from the authorities.84 The DPC’s appeal among the masses,

besides its role in playing the “nationalist agenda card”, is likely linked to a reorientation of
religion from a conventional (so-called Sufi) Barelvi-inspired Islam towards orthodox forms of

Islam in general, setting few parts of Pakistan (Punjab in particular) most suitable for its

campaign.

There are other cases that highlight the nexus between radicalization and political power. A

noteworthy politician of Rawalpindi was of the view that he himself was compelled to join the

DPC in order to ‘buy security’. Likewise, the pirs (spiritual leaders) of Golra have business deals

with local area politicians, who are Deobandi or support Deobandi outfits. The process of the

rising power of radical elements is very natural & could not be halted by the Barelvis or the Sufi

shrines due to their inherent weaknesses. The added problem is that instead of stemming the tide

of radicalization the pirs of the area have even consciously entered into partnership with

Deobandi-supporting land mafia gangsters for financial reasons. These militant outfits are one of

the major sources of radicalism in this area.85

In past Chakwal became well-known during the 1990s for Maulana Akram Awan of Tanzeem-

ul-Ikhwan (The brotherhood organization) & his threat to start a million-march towards

Islamabad to demand immediate implementation of Sharia law in Pakistan. The Nawaz Sharif

government at that time managed to strike a deal with Awan. But what is even more concerning

is the fact that such radicalization occurred in a district like Chakwal which is also one of the few

crucial areas for military recruitment. Maulana Akram Awan himself was an ex-army officer.

Such ideologues provide a linkage for understanding radical penetration into the military.86

Now, heading towards radicalism and militancy in Punjabi region of Punjab, This sub-region

embraces all divisions and districts that fall between the left bank of the river Jhelum to the right

bank of river Sutlej – Sheikupura, Gujranwala, Sialkot, Gujrat, Lahore, Kasur, Narowal,

Sargodha, Bhakkar, Faisalabad, Toba Tek Singh, Sahiwal, and Okara. A brief summary on the
socioeconomic conditions is important to understand the nature of growth of radicalism in this

part of the province. Increased migration & poor urban planning and in the urban centers mean

pressure to grasp resources. Consequently, it is not surprising that various militant outfits are

involved in extortion and are part of the land mafia in cities like Gujranwala, Lahore, Faisalabad,

Gujrat and other urban centers. It is believed that JuD is part of the land mafia popularly known

as the qabza mafia. JuD madrassa & mosque in this area had encroached on valuable government

land and the small roads around it. 87 Such activity is not confined to radical militant outfits only.

Rather, even Barelvi mullahs engage in similar activities such as the well-known Barelvi scholar

Tahir ul-Qadri. His madrassa and mosque has encroached on public land in a posh neighborhood

of Model Town, Lahore. They also participate in facilitating occupation or re-occupation of

disputed land on behalf of others. The land mafia business provides a window into Politico-

Religious-Militancy. It is also believed that JuD has connections with the prominent politician

Chaudhry Pervez Elahi. It was claimed that one of Elahi’s sons and other close supporters,

regularly contributed money to JuD. Besides, a former PML-N MPA was also associated with

JuD and was even interrogated for his connection in one of the attacks on former President

Musharraf. Reportedly, this particular member is also integral part of the land mafia. In this way,

having connection with radical outfit may help especially in Gujrat that suffers from the issue of

an overload of mercantile capital which hardly has capacity to transform into industrial capital.

Immovable assets with high financial worth are in plentiful. Given the fact that majority of it is

absentee-landlord possessions, illegal occupation of land has great potential. Sources also talked

about some villages that were ruled by JuD supporters. These villages were situated near the area

close to Bhimber, Pakistani held Kashmir which is understandable and logical for the LeT/JuD

network operating in the Kashmir conflict since the early 1990s. The support from the elite is a
critical issue because it would progressively help in building the base and anchoring the network

in Gujrat and adjacent areas.

Furthermore, the militants also settle disagreements and intervene in land disputes for others.

The ex-Chairman National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA), who is reputed for his

information on the issue of radicalization, Tariq Pervez talked about several jihadis from the

Deobandi and Ahle- Hadith groups who were engaged in dispute settlement or land-grabbing in

Lahore and other cities. According to him, “all you need is a small pickup truck, a few

commandoes and weapons and you are in business”. The experienced political analyst of Punjab

& prominent television anchor, Suhail Warraich is of the view that the militant outfits have

replaced the practice of pehelwans (old families of wrestlers) in some of the Punjab cities who

used to resolve disputes with the help of their natural muscle power.88

Ali Cheema, who is professor at the Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS) & an

economist, has worked on issues of inequality & land settlement in Sargodha, was of the opinion

that one of the key problems is the exodus of the local elite and their absence from their

respective areas. In the old-style colonial administrative system the local feudal held an

important authority as a negotiator between the people and state. With the erosion of the

traditional feudal system, which seems to be occurring all over the Pakistan, and is in its advance

phases in Punjab, the traditional feudal is no longer influential. Mentioning Sargodha’s example

Cheema talked about smaller landowners rising during the 1970s. The electoral system in itself

has played a vital role in attenuating old power structures. Nevertheless, there is nothing to

bridge the gap which creates space to maneuver for militants, who can be reckoned as the ‘neo-

feudal’. But even more important, they use this political space as local arbiters to draw masses
into their fold. This gives the militants justification to exist in an area which they at later stages

use for other more nefarious activities.89

The city of Gujranwala as a society falls in the category of latent-radicalization. Historically, it

was very ferocious on religious matters and the society generally tends to adhere to pre-modern

norms. Some people like Iqbal Butt, who work on de-radicalization, do not think Gujranwala as

latent-radical or radical. He and his family members, who run a local Non Governmental

Organization (NGO) called ‘Burgad’ were not even impressed by the fact that a PML-Q Member

Provincial Assembly Zille Huma was killed by a religious fanatic in Gujranwala in February

2007. Her assassin Mohammad Sarwar objected to her dress code and the fact that she was

organizing a marathon in the city that involved women as well. The ‘Burgad’ team was of the

view that there were other elements connected to local politics that were to be blamed for the

killing.

While old-fashioned feudalism as expressed in the form of large landholdings and authoritarian

behavior of the local feudal lords has almost vanished in other parts of Punjab, such a structure is

still prevailing in Saraiki Punjab. There are large landowners and some of the noteworthy ones

are pirs as well linked with Sufi shrines. In fact, this sub-region of Punjab is a peculiar case also

because it is reckoned as a hub of Sufi Islam. The spiritual powers of the shrine together with

political & economic powers bestow the feudal & his family an almost hegemonic control over

masses. This arrangement, however, underwent strain, especially after the decades of 1970s and

the 1980s. While Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto challenged the might of the feudal and tribal leaders by

bringing some re-engineering in the political structure, though superficial, Zia’s sponsorship to

jihad and religious right further augmented peoples’ space. Relatively better education and
religious education permitted people to challenge the power of the religious landowner, a title

labelled to the landowning pirs by Sarah Ansari in her seminal work on the pirs of Sindh.90

A lot of the jihadi leadership belonging from South Punjab fought wars in neighboring

Afghanistan and have been fighting since then. This region is one of the major suppliers to

jihadis in other areas including Afghanistan. These jihadis attain a sense of power and self-

awareness that is empowering as far as the political-socio system in their own area is concerned.

In some ways, the jihadis have altered the political culture of the area and challenged the

authority, if not the influence, of the pir who have started to deal with jihadi organizations &

individual militants as well. One of the conspicuous examples was in the form of the funeral

prayers of Maulana Abdul Rasheed Ghazi, the cleric of the Lal Masjid. Even though from a

humble background in Rajanpur, the fact that all the big pirs of Saraiki Punjab were keen to

participate in his funeral point out a state of surrender.91

There are previous examples of political linkages with radicalization as well such as the story of

the establishment of the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) in Jhang. The French political scientist

Mariam Abou Zahab observes the development as a sign of class war in that area. Although

Abou Zahab does wrote about Sunni groups aiding SSP, her major emphasis is Sunni-Shia

conflict as a class issue. Her opinion is that poor Sunni peasants challenged authority of rich

Shiite landowners.92 People incline to apply this formula on other regions as well such as

Bahawalpur which is another flash point of sectarian terrorism. Tahir Kamran’s analysis on the

topic, conversely, raises the local power political perspective in Jhang strongly. Kamran

concludes group rivalry as more of an issue than class differences. Kamran also analyzed that big

entrepreneurs like the owner of Hussnain Construction Company (known for building roads &

big projects) & the Sunni pirs of the Sultan Bahu shrine also supported SSP.93
For radicalization, historical trends or the location, nevertheless, are secondary factors. The most

crucial factor is the patronage given by the state and its agencies to nurture jihadis in this area.

Since Saraiki Punjab was culturally more religious, as compared to the other parts of Punjab, the

state assisted the transformation of the thought process from softer to more rigid forms. Though

it has not prevailed all over the region & there is still huge following of Sufi shrines, pockets of

Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith pockets have appeared which also possess greater power. The

contemporary militant outfits are the neo-feudals in this part of Punjab. They increasingly use

their authority to hold councils (jirgas) and give speedy justice. There is considerable support

from the trader-merchants and emerging middle class of the area who support these

organizations to build their own influence and power in relation to the traditional powerhouses or

the landowners and pirs.

Members of militant groups have pierced political parties like the PML-N and are now integral

part of their mid-tier leadership. This observation may not be too off the mark as radical

leadership now has greater approval in the political system and society at large. For instance, the

leader of SSP Bahawalpur is a mid-sized businessperson who is keen to contest the elections.

Rao Javed had also participated in bi-elections for NA-184 during which he had displayed his

men in guns. Though, no violence was used. More crucially, the collusion between national

parties like the PML-N & SSP will further legitimize these outfits and make these more tolerable

than the past.94 PML-N has also decided to do a seat adjustment with the SSP in about 10 to 15

constituencies. The SSP aims to secure few seats in South Punjab at the cost of supporting PML-

N in certain constituencies in South and Central Punjab.

4.2. (b) Social Determinants of Radicalization in Punjab

In the socio-cultural set up of Pakistan there are all fundamental elements present that provide

ideal conditions for the creation of radical groups and activities. Undoubtedly, Pakistan was

created in the name of Islam but at no point of independence movement it was declared and

decided that it would become theocratic state. In the early post-independence time no serious and

reconciliatory steps were taken for the establishment of a unanimously agreed constitution. This

delay formed short-cuts for military and bureaucracy intervention in the executive. With little

rate of public participation there formed an authoritarian culture. This authoritarian culture

wreaked havoc in parochial social set up of Pakistan. People remained at a distance from a viable

democratic political participation. Their political socialization could not materialize properly

which could guide and prepare them for a sustainable democracy. The plight of rural and tribal

regions was more pathetic than the urban society. (Yusuf, 2012, pp. 86-90)95

The contemporary political situation in Pakistan is adversely influenced by the authorities’

incapacity – or, worse, unwillingness – to fight violent extremism, organized crime, and

terrorism in their various forms. A corrupt judiciary and police force, and Pakistan’s

powerlessness to provide a predictable, sustainable, and stable economy are also issues. For quite

long time the Pakistani authorities have been incapable to maintain sufficient amounts of energy

for businesses and private households dependent on it for continuous production. Therefore, in

recent years little domestic investments have been made and even worst is the fact that less

foreign direct investment (FDI) was directed to Pakistan. Truly, some analysts believe that both

FDI & domestic investment are at a 40- year low. 96 Moreover, the petrol and gas supply situation

remained an all-time low during the spring of 2012, causing social anxieties, deep resentment,

demonstrations, and even occasional skirmishes between the populace and government. During

the last few summers the poor energy situation meant that for few areas in Punjab drastic load-
shedding programs with power cuts of as much as 20 hours per day were the norm. This has

certainly caused further bitterness among the people, severely disturbed local businesses’

capacities to operate and, not least, further diminishes faith in and the legitimacy of the federal

government in Islamabad. Adding to this, Punjab has underwent a fast-track process of religious

radicalization since 9/11 and has been influenced by Pakistan’s debatable role in the so-called

“war on terror” during the last couple of years in specific. In the middle of this, radical and

extremist Islamist movements have gained roots in Punjab, and while terrorist attacks have

weakened, crime and violent sectarianism are on the rise. The human security conditions in south

Punjab is terrible and among the worst in the country, consequently leading to massive

recruitment into the extremists’ squads. However, the situation in central Punjab, has largely

been overlooked, as it has been considered stable, secure, & under control because educational

levels and other human security gauges have been more promising there than in most other parts

of the country. Yet in the last few years parts of central Punjab, (e.g. Lala Musa, Mandi

Bahuddin, Sargodha, Sialkot, Faisalabad, Gujranwala, Gujrat, Jhelum, Kharian, etc.), have

experienced a significant shift towards violent and non-violent extremism alike. Religious

minorities and Sufi shrines are under constant bashing, Deobandi and Barelvi factions clash with

each other, Shia and Sunni groups are engaged in sectarian violence, and jihadi organizations are

recruiting for their bands. These areas are increasingly experiencing extremist and radical

interpretations of Islam and may thus be latent hotbeds of the further radicalization of Punjab and

neighboring provinces. However, the Pakistani authorities seem to do nothing but negate the

presence of extremists in Punjab. The time and situation is thus ripe to promote social discontent

and crisis in the area that may lead to security threat. In some parts of Punjab these jihadi groups

have attained political power, exert a great deal of impact in local politics and can even shake
judicial proceedings. The radical – often militant – Islamists are challenging the federally

endorsed power vested with the provincial authorities and thus also dare the concept of “good

governance”. Islamists have accepted the challenge and have provided relief for people, who are

seeking resort in religion to find solutions for their practical problems. Thus, as such, Islamism

presents itself as a non-state actor for social change and has filled the gap caused by the

authorities’ inability to construct a strong state and provide for the people for whom they are

answerable.

Skewed education is one of the elements that lead to radicalization in Pakistan. Furthermore, the

access to right education is also one of the reasons that lead to fundamentalism in the social

order. There is contrast in the quality & provision of education at various levels of the society.

The society of Pakistan is segregated in to elite, high, middle, and low classes. Same is the case

with delivery of education. Those having sound financial backgrounds are able to achieve higher

education of superior quality. Though, the quality of the education is only in terms of richly

qualified professors and facilities being delivered to the students. [ CITATION Soh95 \l 1033 ]97.

While, the education at the lower levels could be considered as in more literal term “Damsel in

Distress.” Majority of the people are ill-informed to the actual Islamic teachings rather they have

faith in the sayings of so-called Mullas and religious leaders. The only purpose of these leaders is

to indoctrinate unconstructive attitude in masses towards the society. This is one of the most

dangerous tools of instilling radical behavior in people [ CITATION Muh05 \l 1033 ].98 Therefore,

the whole education could be rightly labeled as skewed. Besides, the quantum of illiteracy is in

development in Pakistan which is also assisting the horrendous process of radicalization in

Pakistan. In Punjab the education sector is in awful condition. There are private schools serving

elite of the province and public sector schools which are catering the needs of masses. Both have
different curriculum, students, policies and fee structure. The Punjab text board designs the

syllabus of public school and it is often criticized for including chapters of Jehad, conservatism

and similar topics which lead to violence. On the other hand, private sector schools adopt

international syllabus which altogether ignores the socio-cultural realities of the country resulting

in alienating the youth of the country. The youth from these two education system later on arrive

at verge of clash due to ideological and cultural differences as inculcated in their respective

education institutions.

In this perspective, Hasan Askari Rizvi99 has drawn a clear picture as to how State policies upset

society as a whole. He observes that when the State education system is incapable to offer a

balanced education with an emphasis on social, political, cultural, and religious pluralism, a large

number of young people are exposed to narrow and extremist appeals. Some of them may seek

recourse in terrorism as a strategy for advancing their causes.

Great numbers of the Pakistanis are residing in the small villages and towns. They have to face

poverty, feudalism, lacking of the awareness and illiteracy problem. These issues have left

people with two conditions. First is to abandon the education of their kids and second is to send

them to religious schools. Majority of the madrassa teach and preach the students for free, they

also provide boarding and lodging services for their students, (Singer, 2001). 100 That is the

simple reason for influencing the young minds & hypnotizing it with the extremism. It is quite

important that government must carefully articulate the education presented and taught in these

madrassas so to avert the hate and war in the religion, (Nasr, 2004).101 It is also observed that in

the usual schools of Pakistan Jihad-Bis-Saif or fighting with the sword is being stressed instead

of preaching of Islam about peace, purity, & submission to Allah and His people. The wars

fought in the history have been given suitable context in the text books, (Woodward,
Rohmaniyah, Amin, & Coleman, 2010).102 It is analyzed from the study conducted by Roy,

(2002),103 that most of the sectarian schools are getting their back and support from Saudi Arabia

& Iran and they have resulted in separating the society of Pakistan in to many sects. This has

resulted in swelling the sectarian violence in Pakistan and has also augmented the killing of

thousands of citizens in the name of Sunni & Shia conflicts. The reason for this blood shed is

again due to madrassas and their teaching that only they follow the right path and they are only

having right religious ways & beliefs (Haider, 2005). 104 These madrassa split the society on the

basis of the religious lines and also breaks the philosophy over which the society is being formed

& held together. The most of the jobless, poor, uneducated and frustrated youths fell prey of

these madrassas and make their lives turn in to hate and disrespect in society. There are almost

thousands of unlawful unregistered madrassas in Pakistan. The numbers of unregistered

madrassas in Islamabad alone is roughly 83. The minds of these young mudrassa students are

like wet clay, thus it can be easily formed in to the shapes as wanted by the extremists. Punjab,

being the largest province, is seen as having its portion of radicalization spread by these

madrassas. Presently, madrassas in Punjab are under the jurisdiction of the provincial

government. In the National Action Plan, points 10 & 18 mention the state’s determination to

regulate madrassas and exterminate sectarian terrorism. There are conflicting statistics about the

number of madrassas in Punjab, between 14,000 & 16,000, says Umair Khalil, lead researcher of

the non-governmental research entity, HIVE,105 in a report named, “The Madrassa Conundrum

— The state of religious education in Pakistan.”

Madrassas have played a substantial role in dispersion of radicalization in Punjab or in other

provinces of the country for that matter. But madrassas have not done that as an organization but

through an environment that they generate and the way they impart studies their students. It is
difficult to point out a madrassa or madrassas in Punjab because no one has so far been

sentenced or apprehended from a madrassa for spreading radicalization or committing terrorism.

Punjab has been labelled by experts as being a sanctuary for terrorists and many madrassas being

their breeding ground. It is widely believed that government representatives once considered

their electoral strength in the extremist factors, predominantly in Punjab which had given

sustenance to madrassas in the 1980s. After partition, many madrassas, like Jamia-i-Rashidia

Khair ul Madaris, or Tajweed ul Quran, were relocated to the Punjab. The number of madrassas

grew exponentially during and after the regime of Zia-ul-Haq. After 9/11, Gen. Musharraf tried

to standardize madrassas by introducing madrassa reforms, which is still an on-going

procedure.106

Youth of Punjab is highly susceptible towards religious and radical organizations, which is really

worrying. Youth is major chunk of the population of Pakistan. For the bright future of the

country, it is vital to use this potential efficiently and positively. Unless a practical and logical

line of thought and action is suggested to the youth, no peace can be certified. With that, it is

equally important to distance youth from the undesirable activities of the self-motivated Jihadi

outfits. South Punjab is hotbed of radical activities of these groups. These groups are

manipulating the developmental & economic plight of the region for their strategic political

motives.

South Punjab too like other parts of Punjab is flooded with Madrassas. Although these

Madrassahs were established with the foreign funds and agenda but for the last three decades

they are manipulating the worse conditions of this sub-region for their power politics (Anzar,

2003)107 They are handling foreign funds and utilizing them on the targeted population which can

surely accomplish the agendas sent along with money. Each sect is maintaining its own
education system and implements of radicalization. Each school of thought has its specific youth

volunteers & supporters. They are so entrenched in the education system that practically no way

out is left for the South Punjab’s rural youth than to join them. This is the only choice that can

offer them some reward and slot of recruitment while in contrast to these Madrassahs there are so

many government run schools but either they are dysfunctional or they are impractical for any

type of financial improvement (Kamran, 2012, p.42)108

As compare to Madrassahs if the trouble of government’s educational struggles is analyzed they

fell short of the public aspirations & demands. Generally, primary education is crucially required

sector in the education schemes. This sector also raises a big question mark on the performance

of the government. Other than primary education, the plight of higher & secondary education is

even worse. These are the elements that are now a challenge for the government. This number is

further justified when education facilities are further analyzed in various districts of Southern

Punjab. Likewise the number of children who are not going to school at all further explains the

gravity of the condition (Ijaz Ahmad, 2010, Kamran, 2010, p.45)109 In such a deplorable

scenario, the opportunity is wide open for all types of exploiters to come and utilize the wayward

potential of the youth in accordance with their nefarious plans.

The issue of youth radicalization is not limited to poverty stricken South Punjab region only but

it has crept into very heart of provincial capital as well. Some surveys on Lahore youth revealed

that 88% of elite school students specified that religion is their primary identity. Youngsters

depicted high level of association with their religious beliefs 50% said that their national identity

is even above their religious identity. 15% identified themselves as Pakistani whereas remaining

75% identified them as Muslims. 33% of them said that their religion is far more crucial than
their country. This kind of extreme & homogenized point of view can lead to violence in the

name of Islam (Kalra, & Butt, 2013)110 & (Hashmi, 2010).111

As indicated earlier, marginalized and oppressed communities that undergo relative deprivation

are exposed to exploitation leading to radicalization. Joblessness/unemployment can become a

facilitator to encouraging radical behavior leading to violence. In contrast, the greater the

availability of services, the less susceptible a community would be to radicalization. The youth

that forms a majority in Pakistan’s demographic structure, is at risk and if this class is not

brought into the mainstream of the country through sustainable investments of political,

educational, social, & economic outlays, it can turn into a human liability.

In a pulsating free market today, there exist 232 religious groups & militant organizations within

the country having their head offices in Lahore and Punjab with 71 in Lahore and 100 in Punjab

alone. Setting up parallel educational or training institutes, some militant groups work openly in

the country, dispensing published materials and media collecting or extracting financial

donations, (Rashid, 2011)112 & (Kalra, & Butt, 2013).113 By low levels of public education

delivery the state’s education system also enables these groups, who are often able to fill a gap

left. To lure youth from lower levels of the radicalization ”pyramid” upward toward active

violence the power of these organizations leads to better recruitment & marketing

(Subramaniam, Spear, Vucetic, Chadha, Bhaskar, Gupta, & Subrahmanyam, 2013).114

In central Punjab, there are 3 vital factors worth bearing in mind about this part of Punjab

regarding radicalization. First, the strategic position of some of its districts – Narowal, Kasur,

Sialkot, & Sheikhupura– in proximity with Indian border which makes these a transit route for

jihadi groups especially those working in Indian Kashmir or India at large. Second, some of

these areas are fairly uncontrollable and have a great crime rate, for instance, Sheikhupura. It is
reckoned as culturally more violent, well-known for cattle-stealing type of crimes and has a

bigger rural base. Additionally, a general impression is that Sheikhupura has more cases of

manslaughter than other area of Central Punjab. Third, this area, which is generally considered as

Central Punjab, also has a past of communal violence & suspicion of India, which in itself, is a

vital element in effective jihadi propaganda. Ilyas Chattha and Ishtiaq Ahmed’s seminal work on

violence at the time of partition of India in 1947 throws light on how communalism is entrenched

in the psyche of the local public. It is not only about memory but also about how people made

their fortunes. The violence in 1947 is in fact also a story of the post-independence elite

establishment in this part of Punjab.115

Gujranwala, a city in Central Punjab has some history of violence against minorities. But if a

close observation is made, it will be revealed that what people call conservatism, was getting

reflected in inter-communal relations. The Christians in Gujranwala were less happy than they

were before as there had been a few occurrences of people being accused of committing

blasphemy. But ironically, behind the scenes there were business, social and communal concerns

that were veiled under the disguise of religion.

Looking at Lahore it becomes understandable that radicalization process has many takers. It is a

problem that has begun to creep into elite circles. While older type madrassas are plentiful, there

are newer forms developing some in the shape of dars for upper class & upper-middle class

women and men. These are study circles which provide interpretation of the Koran and an

comprehension of Sharia & hadith. Those who provide a very reactive viewpoint and

interpretation dictate the dars circuit. The UK based association Hizbut-Tehrir is also part of this

practice. When the dars phenomenon and its impact on society are analyzed, it is revealed that

these meetings are used to popularize peculiar philosophies of religious morality. Occasionally,
these are also considered as the ‘women’s piety movements’. Such movements tend to have

long-term influence as a woman’s perception on life affects her household as well. In the same

way, there are study circles for men and a practice of their re-conversion to a specific

interpretation of Islam. For example, the Deobandi Jamia Rasheediya of Karachi is setting up

partnership with the the Lahore Chamber of Commerce and Industry (LCCI) to teach religious

education to the business community.116 Some would debate that the LCCI-Jamia Rsahidya

partnership does not specify an atypical conduct for two reasons. First, there is a general

tendency even amongst the Pakistani elite to move from the hereditary secular-liberalism

towards more religionism. This in itself could be a sign of the effect that years of weak-

nationalism/strong-religionism have on a society. This does not essentially turn them entirely

radical. Nonetheless, in the absence of a more plural discourse and explanation of religion they

seem to be submitting to the available narrative presented by the Ahl-e-Hadith & Deobandis

schools of thought. This will not turn people radical but, at least, put a major chunk in the

category of latent-radicals. So, the study circles or lecture series denote modern forms of

madrassas that furnish the need of the particular socio-economic class.

Another phenomenon that has been present in the province for decades is giving away charity

which tends to shape fraternities that have a social recognition. So, a person may get greater

social standing in the society if he/she has constructed a mosque or given considerable amount of

donation to a certain religious organization. Gradually we see that in urban and rural centers of

Punjab people with sound financial background but little social & political recognition tend to

dedicate assets & financial resources as well as conducting social welfare activities, building

infrastructure so that they may earn a reputable place in the community and then based on this

standing they can move ahead to accomplish any desired agenda. It becomes hard to uproot such
elements due to their contacts with the influential and general public of the locality. One of such

many examples is the Ahl-e-Hadith organizations which have been able to gain great social

influence in Okara & Sahiwal districts. The outfit seems to have enlarged its fund-raising activity

which is gradually being developed around the need for establishing welfare activities in

Baluchistan & Sindh as well. Remarkably, there is a colossal propaganda campaign to re-brand

Hafiz Saeed & JuD as a relief and welfare worker rather than a jihadi. 117 This could well be, as

thought by political commentator Mohammad Taqi, as part of a bid not to raise suspicion in the

US regarding Pakistani military and its operations before American troops leave Afghanistan in

2014.118

The geographical element is also significant from the perspective that there are numerous

Afghan settlements in South Punjab mainly in Bahawalpur. These settlements in district

Bahawalpur goes back to the decades of 1980s and the 1990s and are generally located in

Deobandi areas. Although a causal association has not been made, towns and small cities in

proximity to these settlements have experienced a surge in radicalism. But there are other

dynamics as well such as people working in the Gulf & Middle East regions. The emergent

middle class and lower-middle class that has benefitted from foreign remittances is also one of

the most vulnerable to radicalism. So, areas like Uch Sharif that are recognized for its Sufi saints

seem to have transformed to new ideas and have become a center of SSP influence. The

Deobandi effect in this sub-region has a past as well. Some of the noticeable Deobandi scholars

& madrassas are based in Rahim Yar Khan which is also one of the hubs of Deobandi madrassas

and militant influence. Malik Ishaq, ex leader of Lashkar-e-Jhangvi used to live in Rahim Yar

Khan. Interestingly, some of the people claim that Deobandi has historical presence in the region

to argue that radicalism is not something new here and is part of the local culture.119
It is a reality that the social face of Punjab is altering. In the sub-region of South Punjab there are

now new emerging actors like Jamshed Dasti who are latent-radical in their philosophy. Their

standpoint on women’s rights, as could be observed in Dasti’s reaction on cases like Mukhtaran

Mai, who was sexually molested in that area, indicate his thought process towards women’s

rights & religious norms. Dasti himself made his wealth through extortion in the gas & oil

business in this area. Even though popular amongst people, he also signifies changing value

structure of the society. People like Dasti may not essentially be part of religious violence, but

they are part of inspiring the trend. Dasti himself is known to be close to the LeJ/SSP network.

Like the other areas, this part of Punjab will experience greater radicalization of all kinds and

levels, especially as the society underwent the process of material & social modernity.

The peculiar evolution of the society is an important factor. Looking at Punjab it is

understandable that radicalism denotes an important shift in social trends. In the region called

Central & North Punjab it is largely the new money that has carried radicalism with it. The North

and Central Punjabis are far more susceptible to the world and exposed to the ‘clash of

civilizations’ argument. There is also a factor of the influence of the diaspora, particularly in

Europe, that has become more unsettled in their countries of dwelling after ‘the war on terror’,

which is commonly viewed as a war on Islam. Consequently, these biases add up to those of

people residing in Punjab. Greater prosperity has brought greater confidence and a feeling of the

Ummah which has to be protected. This makes jihadism more popular in urban areas & even

rural regions.

The often ignored & overlooked far-flung Provincially Administered Tribal Area (PATA) of

Punjab reflects the worst political, social, economic & cultural conditions. Geographically in

proximity to all provinces of the country, this particular area has a vital importance for the
province. This area has a meagre social & physical infrastructure to encourage development.

The people of the area are deprived & backward. There is very little social cohesion among them

due to marginalization during the colonial period and stranglehold of bureaucracy before and

after gaining independence. The public development & policies neither support, nor encourage

indigenous growth, and globalization is creating impediments for economic and cultural

development. The provincial government is ignoring this area and with global establishments at

work, gap is being created for extremists and cartels to abuse the local resources and create class

disparities. The most influenced are the low-income households or communities whose earning

is between the poverty line & national average. Additionally, the customary practices supporting

dogmatic norms which are harmful to the rights and privileges of the common person in general

and the female population in specific have shaped such a state whereby PATA residents are

unable to find a way out of the mire of the contemporary and emergency problems. Accordingly,

the cultural, social, & political environment has become violent & retrogressive which handicaps

people coming together into unity and restricts the process of progress. Incapacity to compete

has pushed all the competing stakeholders to resort to fundamentalism & violence. The Baloch

separatist in Balochistan and the religiously motivated extremist in the adjacent South Waziristan

have begun to recruit people from this under privileged area. Operatives of these outfits have

been caught on multiple occasions but they have certainly shown their strong presence. In recent

years a number of acts of terrorism have proved that this part of Punjab is under great jeopardy.

A suicide bomber almost took the life of a ruling party MNA Amjad Khosa in his office at

Taunsa Shariff. The bomb blast at Sakhi Sarwar shrine and at the house of Ex-chief minister

Dost Muhammad Khosa in Dera Ghazi Khan are the events that proves the far-reaching and

pervasive influence of the radicalized elements in this region of Punjab. These obstacles are
rather breeding violence & insecurity and facilitate the radicalized elements operating in

neighboring provinces to gain the benefits from the troubles of residents of PATA.120

Another social caused behind creeping radicalization in Punjab is radicalization on university

campuses which is swiftly becoming Pakistan’s next chief counterterrorism challenge. Since

Pakistan launched its National Action Plan (NAP) to address terrorism in December 2014,

military and paramilitary actions have resulted in the killing & detention of thousands of

suspected militants across the country. But there is no plan yet to confront what officials fear is

mounting radicalization among Pakistan’s rich, middle-class population, mainly university

students. Pakistan’s campus radicalization is a development with global security repercussions.

Militants with higher education are better placed to plan sophisticated attacks, penetrate elite

government & military circles, & enable better connections between Pakistan-based groups &

transnational movements.

The 13th issue of Dabiq,121 the propaganda magazine of the Iraq & Syria-based militant group the

Islamic State (IS), acclaims the bravery of Tashfeen Malik, the woman of Pakistani origin who

alongside her husband, Syed Rizwan Farook, killed 14 people on 2nd December, 2015, in a mass

shooting in San Bernardino, California.122 Instantly after the attack, Malik’s violent actions raised

eye brows to her alma mater, Bahauddin Zakariya University (BZU), in Multan, Pakistan, where

she remained a student of pharmacy between 2007 & 2012, and to her registration in the local

franchise of a system of Islamic schools for women, al-Huda.123 Multan, in the south of Punjab

province, is the breeding base and key recruiting ground for many militant groups in Pakistan,

especially anti-Shi`a sectarian outfits, and Islamic institutes in the region are known to be feeders

for these groups. Universities in the area are not resistant to militant intrusion. Since the launch

of NAP to counter terrorism in December 2014, the BZU campus and its 35,000-strong student
population have been under 24-hour surveillance. Intelligence agency officials have also been

positioned at the university to observe militant activities, mainly recruitment, that may be

underway.124

While some recently detained students have been suspected of maintaining relations to Tehrik-i-

Taliban Pakistan (TTP) or anti-Shi`a groups like Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), most students

who are arrested are accused of having links to transnational militant groups such as Al-Qa`ida

or Islamist activist organizations such as Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT), both of which have traditionally

targeted more educated people.

The threats carried by radicalized students—and the degree of their networks & resources in

Pakistan—are demonstrated by the case of Saad Aziz, a graduate of the Institute of Business

Administration (IBA), one of Pakistan’s leading privately owned business education institution.

In May 2015, Aziz admitted to killing civil rights activist Sabeen Mahmud, who on April 24,

2015, was shot dead by attackers in Karachi.125Police have also indicted him with participating in

many other attacks in Karachi, including an armed attack on April 16, 2015, against Debra Lobo,

a U.S. citizen then employed as a professor at a dental college; an attack on May 13, 2015, by 8

assailants against a bus carrying Ismaili community members—a sub-sect of Shi`a Islam—

resulting in murder of 46 people; and several small-scale assaults against security targets & co-

educational schools. Aziz’s partner for Mahmud’s assassination, according to police reports, was

Allure Rehman, earned engineering degree from National University of Sciences and

Technology (NUST) in the northern city of Rawalpindi.126

In September 2013, 9 people alleged of links to al-Qa`ida were arrested from hostel in Punjab

University at Lahore. These included six possible suicide bombers, two facilitators with technical

proficiency in information technology and Improvised Explosive Device (IED) manufacturing.

While some of the suspected militants lived outside the university across the city of Lahore, the

handler was based at the hostel of Punjab University & would hold gatherings with his

collaborators on campus.127

A long-running bar against politics and student unions at universities is backing the rise of

extremist elements on campuses. In 1984, then military ruler General Zia-ul-Haq forced a ban on

student unions and banned political parties from keeping a presence on campuses. Many political

parties, like the Karachi-based Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) & the Pakistan People’s

Party (PPP), continue to induct student members, but there is no place for political debate or

student elections, & because campus politics are officially banned, universities do not have

official means in place to observe or regulate the campus-based activities of such political

groups. In this gap, religious-political parties that have had a strong presence on university

campuses in Punjab in the past, have consolidated their existence and appeared as the dominant

groups on campus.

In the absenteeism of a holistic approach to counter radicalization of university students in

Punjab, this demographic will continue to carry a rising threat within Pakistan. Militants with

higher education will be better placed to conduct sophisticated attacks and penetrate elite

government & military circles. They will also enable increased linkages between Pakistan-based

groups & transnational movements, swelling the ambition and resilience of the former. Also,

owing to their greater ability for exposure & skills, educated militants will be well positioned to

operate internationally. As such, the development of on-campus militancy is forming up to be

one of Pakistan’s major counterterrorism challenges.

There are some other sophisticated groups like the Al-Huda network which now has its own

university in the capital city and is extended in most urban centers of Pakistan, especially
certainly Punjab. This is an educational system for middle class & upper-middle class women to

teach them about religion, the Koran, hadith, & sharia in general. Farhat Hashmi, who belongs

from Central Punjab, set up the Al-Huda network in 1994. Though her religious lessons do not

call for jihad, the rest of the curriculum uses a peculiar explanation of the Koran, Sunnah and

sharia that inspires a radical perspective. Anyhow, there are others taking non-religious

education who were believed to have latent-radical inclinations. For instance, in a study

conducted in 2010 to evaluate the socio-political outlooks of youth in elite universities in three

big cities of Pakistan, out of which two were from Punjab, it was found that the thoughts of these

students was not very dissimilar compared with those of madrassa going children in smaller

towns and villages. Islamabad, which lies in the North Punjab belt, was one of the cities

studied.128

While the democratic process is getting matured, regrettably, the federal and provincial

government has no strategy to integrate society into the broader social and cultural persona. Due

to the inflation & the price surge, there is no apparent sign of betterment in the social life of

masses in the foreseeable future. Consequently, a serious problem is inevitable in coming days

and months where common people may also be pushed to extremism/radicalism.

Nationalist threat is another menace which is promoting radicalization in Punjab. The nationalist

are the sub-nationals within the province that fight for proper identification & acknowledgment

within the federation, and their fight is motivated by the fears & apprehensions of pre-dominant

character of other ethnic groups or nationalities inside the federation. In Pakistan, Punjab is the

most populated province and as such Punjabis constitute a large part in armed forces and civil

bureaucracy. The smaller provinces are unsatisfied by the prospects of permanently facing the

majority of a province. They always feel endangered that their social, economic, and cultural
interests will not be safeguarded in the wake of dominance of one majority province. They also

think that their local resources are being exploited by other regions & they are not paid the

appropriate price for it. The deficiency of development and poverty irritates the population and

foreign hands exploit the situation to indoctrinate a sense of deprivation thus instigating violent

insurgency. The ruling elite view these nationalist activities as a kind of rebellion against the

state and the denunciation of federation. The sub nationalist’s terrorism has been developing

intermittently in smaller provinces of Pakistan since decades of 1960s and often has outside

backing. So far, the state has endured the ethnic and sub nationalist terrorism in a reasonable

way. Nevertheless, it is extremely vital that legitimate fears of sub nationalities are seriously

taken care of so that the very reasons of such feeling of sidelining are eliminated for good. This

phenomenon has been a major cause of radicalization in Punjab. Some of the examples of sub

nationalist movements are the demand for a separate Saraiki province comprising of South

Punjab and other voices of making Bahawalpur a province.129

An entrenched social crisis had been continuing for decades in southern Punjab. It is observed

that impoverished Sunni peasants were deadlocked in contracts & dealings with rich Shia

landlords for many decades, while nothing was being done to address this at the federal level.

Indeed, as the central government in the 1980s was still overwhelmed by the descendants of the

refugees that reached Pakistan in 1947, there was no interest in incapacitating any intervention

by fellows of the establishment, who wanted to safeguard their rural landowner brethren. This

occurred against the backdrop of a gradually prosperous group of newly rich local Sunnis who

had attained their riches from family remittances sent from the Middle East, where they had been

working. This “new money” could not successfully challenge the might of old powers of the

feudal elite, who were often entangled in the structure of piri-muridi. The feudal elite thus had to
be confronted by conventional religion. In this situation, Deobandi movements started supporting

masses at the grassroots level that had little prospects for any type of social movement. Soon

Deobandis opened madrassas and started to challenge the old feudal systems in society, &

violence through the activities of the uncompromising SSP (1984 onwards) & LeJ (1990

onwards) became one way to fight prejudices at the local level in Punjab. Orthodox movements

depict themselves as pure, without any un-Islamic intrusion, and thus challenge the clout of the

traditional Sufi-inspired Islam, which comprises many pre-Islamic rituals & practices. This in

turn means that a lot more emphasis is laid on building traditional madrassas and mosques –

which in turn act as “social equalizers”, weakening the role of the traditional ruling elites.130

4.2. (c) Economic Determinants of Radicalization in Punjab

A number of researchers are attempting to find a relationship between economic status and

radicalization. Some of the researches suggested that there is no connection between poverty

(Becker 1968)131 & radicalization yet other asserted that both are directly proportional to each

other (for example, Ehrlich, 1973)132 (Freeman, 1996)133 (Piehl, 1998).134 In case of Pakistan both

of the conditions exists i.e. direct connection & no link at all. There are cases when the terrorist

are well learned & educated and economically sound but they are the progeny of long years of

political subjugation.

In the 60 years since independence, various regions of Pakistan’s Punjab province has witnessed

irregular economic development, and the affluent and fully developed areas of the Punjab clearly

belies the oft-quoted sociological theories connecting religious extremism to underdevelopment

& poverty.

On the other hand, perhaps no other area of the world proves the direct link between extremism

& poverty and underdevelopment better than the southern parts of Punjab. Industry is almost
absent here, and public and private sector jobs are few and far between. Even the agricultural

industry is overwhelmingly dominated by tribal chiefs.

Nonetheless, in the troubled areas of Pakistan which are experiencing repeated drone strikes—

the radicals are mostly the ones who are economically underprivileged (Zaidi 2010). 135 Economic

status is, although not a major, but crucial variable in defining the causes of radicalization in

Pakistan. The circumstances in Pakistan is far more intricate is many ways. In many regions even

working people fall under the class of poor as they are not earning adequate wages for covering

their needs. So it will not be wrong to say that in particular situation both employed & poor

occupies same status. In the northern region poverty is the main cause for making of radicals and

radical groups. Joining hands with radical group is type of a job for them that offer them their

basic needs. Yet political influential of the country are not able to overcome these issues as they

are just skimming rather than sorting out the root cause of the problem.

Poverty is usually viewed as a major contributing factor for violence. A recent study by an

economist for the Pakistan Institute for Development Economics (PIDE) determined food

insecurity, landlessness as the most noteworthy driver of violence.136

Another research conducted by the Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad also

concluded that violence had amplified due to bigger incidence of food insecurity in Pakistan

where 61 per cent of the 113 districts were found to be food insecure. Poverty, though, is a

substantial factor in compelling people to send their children to madrassas. The religious

seminaries, which are thought as less problematic as far as violence is concerned,137 are critical in

contributing to the radical atmosphere. It is not just a matter of a single child going to a madrassa

but the whole family eventually getting influenced by the child’s association with the seminary.

These madrassa students are adequately inculcated and could be deployed in a jihadi war if and
when required. So poverty may be a chief driver towards radicalization especially in South

Punjab.

One more scenario that has existed for some time in Pakistan’s urban centers, predominantly in

Punjab, has developed around the trading community which is inherently orthodox or pre-

radical. The traders in Gujrat, Sahiwal, Okara, Gujranwala, Lahore, Renala Khurd, Daska,

Sialkot & other small cities are willing donors to jihadi and religious parties funds. Part of it is a

quid pro quo as jihadi organizations can return the favor when needed in terms of providing

support against a rival or giving physical protection, if and when required. But more importantly,

this provides a sense of atonement & relief from sins like bribery, usury, and cheating that the

trading community often does. The trader-merchants of Pakistan like the bazaaris in Iran are

two-faced in their conduct.

The economic reason behind radicalization & violence in Central Punjab can be found back to

early independence era. According to the famous ‘Justice Munir Report’138 that examined

violence against Ahmedis in 1953, Gujranwala remained as one of the hubs of the movement.

The movement is marked with agitation against the Ahmedis but safely preserved behind the veil

were financial motives too which instigated people to use religion as a cause and unsettle

businesses of local Ahmedis and those with sound financial background. Same happened with

Hindu families of this particular area few years back when post partition migration was at full

swing. Muslim families and individuals had then enriched themselves in 1947 by looting Hindu

families.

The LeT/JuD network has built its clout around the business community in Punjab. The pre-

radicalism of the society, especially those with sound financial standings like the traders, allow

the militant outfits a great infiltration in urban and semi-urban centers a lot of which exist in
central Punjab. The JuD is very methodical in its fund-raising campaign. For example, it has

kissan (farmer) committees in agriculture rich areas to get charities in cash, crop & kind. It is

also crucial to understand that the farmers in this part of Punjab are also connected with the

market as the new-ones (as compared to the traditional landowning elite) prone to have ahrat

agriculture-marketing business as well to increase gains. Instead of plummeting profits by

routing through middlemen, these farmers themselves become the ahrtis or middlemen. Not

astonishingly, Hafiz Saeed collected as much as over Pakistan Rupee (PKR) 20 million during

one of his visits in September/ October 2012 to Sahiwal. These visits are highly choreographed

which means the greater you pay the better & easy access you get to the top- tier leadership of

the jihadis. It is relying on jihadi star-power, just like in the film industry or the media. Such

inspiration fascinates the middle class or the upper middle class who donate to fund raising

activities. Charities raise funds both in the name of welfare & jihad. The money collection

undertaking is not merely about collecting money but also about Showcasing.139

Radicalism is not only about political goals or ideology. Rather, it is also about material gains.

Given the reality that the militants now have better muscle power, the new industrial class or the

business community & trader- merchant tends to support these elements for mutual profits. The

land grabbing mafia, in particular is deeply related with the jihadis. There has also been an

upsurge in the cases of kidnap for ransom in which the jihadis are indulged. Nonetheless, these

groups in Punjab have not been seriously involved in too much crime. They have extended

through relief & welfare activities, at least, in particular areas. But more important, with support

from sections of the state and & states, money is not in short quantity. Additionally, the

madrassas have also transformed into commercial organizations and there is an growth of what

can be called as Jihad Inc.

The upsurge in extremism across Pakistan in general & Punjab in particular in the last decade is

a perturbing phenomenon which has been confirmed in various studies & reports. Growing

intolerance, as documented by religiously-guided violence and sectarian unrest, are ugly

reminders of the imminent dangers to Pakistani society. The extremist threat is not just confined

to the northwest of the country, but has sneaked in deeper to regions of Punjab. The case of

swelling radicalization in South Punjab, in a province which is the economic nucleus of Pakistan,

is of supreme importance. The province of Punjab is the most affluent province, yet within

Punjab, there is a manifest difference between the northern and the southern belts.

The absence of efficient state institutions, lack of physical infrastructure and corruption among

the public officials are among the chief factors to weak state grip across South Punjab. Here too,

governance crisis have allowed freedom of exploitation to illicit actors. Absence of monopoly on

means of compulsion brought about by the prevalence of armed religious groups has made

governance challenging and unpleasantly affected the law and order situation in this region.

South Punjab encompasses three administrative divisions of Pakistan’s largest province: Multan,

Bahawalpur, & Dera Ghazi Khan. These three divisions together represent 22 districts of the

area. As per population statistics of 2010, Punjab has 93 million citizens, of whom 32% live in

the Southern Punjab. Given the size and great population density of this region, the upsurge in

radicalization poses real threat to the stability of the country.

Growing radicalization is intricately related to the entrenched poverty in the area. Estimates

reveal that out of all 34 districts of Punjab, the least-developed ones are located in South Punjab.

The poverty incidence is high at 43% and the unemployment ratio in rural & urban areas is also

higher compared to northern districts of the province. Over 55% of labor in South Punjab is
working in the primary sector. Poverty is mostly acute and its occurrence is much higher in

southern Punjab.140

It does not appear to be a coincidence, consequently, militancy & radicalization is gaining faster

support in south of Punjab where poverty is widespread and illiteracy and unemployment is

greater leading to relatively higher potential of jobless and frustrated youth providing assistance

to the militant activities. This is a significant hypothesis that needs to be tested in a more

systematic & rigorous and a manner.141

In some of the southern districts such as the district of Bahawalpur, Rajanpur, Muzaffargarh, &

Dera Ghazi Khan, the occurrence of poverty is even higher than the districts of rural Sindh that

are often considered as the most impoverished areas of Pakistan. Interestingly, these are the very

same districts that also historically happen to be the "fertile recruiting ground", as one study by

Ahmed (2008)142 suggests, for groups that are indulged in suicide bombings in Pakistan. The

same study unveils that many of the madrassas established during the days of state-sponsored

jihad in Afghanistan were established in southern Punjab. The Bahawalpur district alone has

around 638 registered madrassas apart from hundreds of illegal ones. Jaish-e-Mohammad, a

militant organization founded by Maulana Masood Azhar, has its strongest incidence in the

southern districts of Bahawalnagar, Bahawalpur, Layyah, Bhakkar & Rahim Yar Khan. Sipah-e-

Sahaba Pakistan, according to this work, dominates in Multan & Muzaffargarh that are again

amongst the poorest districts of southern Punjab region.

Many of the madrassas in South Punjab are used by militant organizations to draw groups of

young men, by offering them privileges such as accommodation & food. The recruits are

ideologically inculcated to be used as foot soldiers in implementing the international and local

terror agenda of militant organizations, including that of al-Qaeda and its operators. Intelligence
reports have assessed that about 5,000 recruits from South and North Punjab entered South

Waziristan back in 2005, and about 1,000 newly trained ones returned to the province.

The scarcity of employment opportunities make militant factions appear rewarding options to

idle youth, contributing to a mounting trend towards radicalization and extremism. In the same

way, other socio-economic indicators such as health, education, and housing are low, indicating

acute underdevelopment & weak governance. The state has been incapable to frame & enforce a

system of accountability to address these issues.

Unquestionably, the Afghan war of the 1980s against the former Soviet Union played a crucial

role in creating jihadis in this sub-region. A number of poor and lower-middle class men went

for jihad, a development in which the geography of the area proved a significant factor. Certain

parts of South-West Punjab like Rajanpur are neighbor to Baluchistan. This area mentioned as

kacha is Punjab’s tribal area where crime is a majora activity & there are no land records. This

also functions as a suitable passage to Afghanistan through Baluchistan. Another kacha area is

alongside the Indus River on the border of Punjab & Sindh which is one of the favorite refuges

for those engaged in kidnapping for ransom. There have been multiple incidents of kidnapping

for ransom, some even involving Afghan kidnappers.143

Some of the new wealth money that has arrived at South Punjab, particularly in areas like Dera

Ghazi Khan, Bahawalpur, Rahim Yar Khan, and Multan belong to people who fall in the pre-

radical or latent-radical category. Dera Ghazi Khan is a thought-provoking case study as it is one

of the illustrations of how Saudi money can decide local politics. This, for example, refers to the

Hafiz Abdul Kareem case who contested elections against the local Baloch chieftains, Lagharis

in 2008. Government officials, who had worked in the area, claimed that at start they did not take

his influence seriously. Nevertheless, he is now a madrassa tycoon with unaccounted for sources
of influence & money. The conventional power elite cannot compete with these people in the

long run. Dearth of financial resources and questionable integrity are two factors in this regard.

In this specific case, for example, Kareem has access to greater number of resources. The

Lagharis, on the other hand, can only contest this by indulging in bribery and extortion which

tends to make them disputed in the eyes of the masses. 144 After all this, not surprisingly Hafiz

Abdul Karim contested 2013 general election & became Member of National Assembly. The

role that Saudi influence & money has played in shaping up social behavior & local politics is a

matter for a separate study.

South Waziristan borders the South Punjab, and the chief of the local Qaisrani tribe that resides

in this region, Mir Badshah Khan Qaisrani, who had been a member of the Punjab provincial

legislature, acknowledged that some of his tribesmen crossed into the FATA to fight in

Afghanistan. This behavior was mainly driven poverty, hunger & unemployment that has

haunted the said region for decades

Over the recent years, a widespread acceptance of Al Qaeda’s anti-Western stance has infiltrated

large swathes of the population. In this scenario, the US policy of targeting Al Qaeda and its

associates through drone strikes has compelled its leaders to spread out and find new hideouts

within urban Pakistan. Karachi, for example, has been mentioned as a major ground for the

persistence of its operations, in addition to Lahore, Faisalabad, & other areas. Furthermore, Al

Qaeda may have entered into a coalition with indigenous militants such as the TTP and old

sectarian groups. Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and its linked groups have claimed

responsibility for several sectarian attacks. This tendency discloses the close nexus between the

Taliban and several major militant & sectarian groups in Punjab, which are now branded as

‘Punjabi Taliban’. This alliance between the sectarian outfits & Taliban is now expanding its
targets. While Al Qaeda may be receding from FATA, its local cronies especially from Southern

Punjab are a major source of instability and have grave repercussions for the region.145

Punjab is also suffering a serious rise in crime, especially amplified levels of brutal robberies,

targeted killings and kidnappings for ransom.146 Generally, this adverse development is in part

connected to the poor economic condition in the country, especially that of south Punjab. In

addition to this, radicals have taken greater charge of this criminality. The weakened influence of

al-Qaeda may have led to diminishing levels of funding for its extremist associates in Pakistan.

Indeed, extremists like LeJ, Tehreek-eTaliban – the purported Pakistani Taliban – and others

often participate in violent activities to fund their own terrorist undertakings. Also, in the last two

years extremists have gradually been involved in several kidnappings for ransom, violent

robberies, and assassinations. The fact that Shahbaz Taseer & Ali Haider Gillani were kidnapped

in broad day light from Lahore & Multan respectively proves the audacity of the extremists now.

This trend is not restricted to Punjab alone, although the condition there may be somewhat

dissimilar to that in other provinces, because the province has mostly been spared such

happenings in the past.147 The situation in Punjab is particularly troublesome because of the

growing indulgence of banned radical groups such as Lashkar-eJhangvi & Lashkar-e-Islam

(based in Khyber agency) in abduction for ransom cases as a way to finance their activities. The

nature of crime has transformed over the last few decades because of rapid population growth

and economic & social changes in our society.148