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Daniel Lees
Janet Leake (on behalf of the estate of Edmund Bojarski, copyright holder)
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Texas Tech University Press, Daniel Lees, Janet Leake (on behalf of the estate of
Edmund Bojarski, copyright holder) are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and
extend access to Conradiana
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THE "VALUE" AND "SIGNIFICANCE'
OF HEAR T OF DARKNESS
Juliet McLauchlan
Must we interpret Heart of Darkness "in the light of the final incident"
in order to see the story's coherence, worth, and essential meaning? Or
not? Recent consideration of some of the more representative yet diver
gent critical views has prompted this fresh attempt to answer the basic
question. The starting point must be Conrad's own words: "... in the light
of the final incident, the whole story... shall fall into place - acquire its
value and its significance."1
It has been claimed by a recent critic that Conrad "bungled the
scene,"2 and from time to time others have challenged its success.3 The
very extent of critical disagreement has itself convinced many readers and
students that it is useless to go on trying to link the ending meaningfully
to the story as a whole: since interpretations differ so radically, Conrad
must have failed to do what he thought he was doing. Yet uneasy doubts
persist. Suppose Conrad did succeed. Suppose we are missing the whole
point of the story. After a glance at some relevant criticism I shall argue
for the success of the scene in Conrad's terms.
Something akin to the supposed "botching of the end of 'Heart of
Darkness' "4 seems to be implicit in the dismissive notion that Kurtz'
savage consort "has no status in the essential fable. Nor has the other
woman."5 Such a view can only discourage serious consideration of th
final scene, as may views which imply that the Intended has no metaphor
ical or symbolic significance but is just a young woman bereft, to whom
Marlow lies to "Preserve the 'saving illusion' of another."6 Marlow's lie is
then seen as "analogous to that of Captain Allistoun's to Jimmy... to give
her 'something to live with.' "7
Such views are clearly at odds with the notion that, since the Intended's
"home is a graveyard," Kurtz is to be seen as "degraded, exalted, tragic"
while "Brussels is civilised, hypocritical, dead."8 On a very much deeper
note: "the light" if taken with its usual positive connotations has become
so "degraded" by the time the scene occurs, that it is a mere "cold and
artificial brightness" capable of imparting no more than:
the cold phosphorescent glow of idealism, but sick and pallid indeed compared
with the other tragic and heroic woman whom Kurtz abandoned in the heart
of darkness... [we have] moved from a realisation of the overwhelming
power of darkness in the psychological, moral and spiritual realm, to a larger
and intangible change of a metaphysical kind, in which light seems to have a
peculiar affinity with unnaturalness, hypocrisy, and delusion, and [even] to be
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4 / Conradiana
quite as contrary to the positive values in human life as the worst manifesta
tions conventionally attributed to darkness.9
In a sense the whole view of this critic is based upon the assertion that:
"Whether political, moral, or psychological, mendacity is the most mortal
of sins, against ourselves and others.11 Through the gradual development
of my own argument it will be clear why I reject this view as simply too
narrow to illuminate the tale in toto through consideration of its final
scene. I shall from time to time take issue with other specific points from
this essay.
Further critical views point towards what I hope to demonstrate. Al
though I feel especially indebted to these critics, I make no claim that any
of them would agree wholly with my own approach. Without Marlow's lie
"the passionate devotion of the Intended would be shattered, and one of
the few islands of naive idealism in the world would be conquered."12
"As Kurtz's savage consort symbolizes the soul of the jungle, Kurtz's
financée... symbolizes the soul of civilization. By lying to Kurtz's Intend
ed, Marlow presents civilization with a slender ray of light with which to
keep back the darkness."13 Marlow's "feeling of infinite pity [is not only]
compassion for the fragility of the woman's illusions [but] for the fragility
of the civilization... however corrupt and hollow, the best of which the
girl represents... [she] represents all the best of Kurtz's ideals — all the
best of what he has 'intended' for the world as well as for himself...
[Marlow is then] a barrier between the degraded and the exalted... [his
function lies in] maintaining the part of civilization worth saving [and],
however tenuously, man's humanity."14 The Intended and the savage
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6 / Conradiana
and, especially, as "a man who had come out equipped with moral ideas of
some sort" Kurtz has piqued Marlow's curiosity: would, or could, such a
man succeed? - if so, how would he comport himself? There has been a
further puzzle in Marlow's first "distinct glimpse." He seems to have
"seen" Kurtz, as it were, when Kurtz has turned back and is again "setting
his face towards the depths of the wilderness." Ominous doubt is suggest
ed: "Perhaps he was just simply a fine fellow who stuck to his work for its
own sake" (my italics, 90). There is a further ominous note in the noxious
uncle's advice to the manager to leave Kurtz "to this" - to the unspecified
but probably fatal effects of the wilderness (92). There is doubt, yes, but
nothing to prepare auditors or reader for the shock of that shattering
image of an exhumed corpse mouthing the words,"My Intended":
You should have heard the disinterred body of Mr. Kurtz saying "My Intend
ed". You would have perceived directly then how completely she was out of
it. (115)
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8 / Conradiana
at the bottom of a precipice where the sun never shines" (149). Infinitely
high above shines the cliff of crystal. In this fine contrast, Conrad's touch
is very sure. Both extremes are remote from the fully human, which must
dwell between, working doggedly at the task in hand, and even breathing
"dead hippo" — but upwards humanity must continue to look and strive.
Surrounding the Intended, and pervading the scene, there is even more
ominous and less hopeful imagery. Details in the description of the street,
the house, and the furniture suggest death and burial. In every sense
Kurtz's intentions must be seen as dead and entombed; so it is appropriate
that the Intended should be depicted as shut in, cut off, dead to and for
the rest of the world and its normal activities.
Before proceeding further, we can come to terms (at least partially)
with a large claim which Marlow has made early in the story: "What
redeems it [the conquest of the earth] is the idea only. An idea at the
back of it; not a sentimental pretence but an idea; something you can set
up, and bow down before, and make a sacrifice to..." (51). Can any idea,
or ideal, be felt to be redemptive, given the darkness which has to be
contemplated in this tale? Redemptive of what? Certainly not redemptive
of the actual situation in any practical way, whether it be in the corrupt
civilization of the sepulchral city, or still less in the wilderness, where
people are made to slave and die by the emissaries of such "civilization."
Marlow, "the moral man"22 (mature humanity) has to learn finally that,
however debased the human may become, human nature has also the
capacity and the need to look towards exalted ideals in aspiration and
worship - with less sense here of a "dubious idolatry"2 3 than of human
ity's often inexplicible willingness to make sacrifices, even the ultimate
sacrifice, in the service of an ideal. Ideas themselves are not invalidated by
even the gravest human failure to make them the reality of human experi
ence.
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McLauchlan / Value / 9
All that Kurtz had intended, or persuaded himself that he intended, sur
vives here, embodied physically, before Marlow's eyes. During that "sup
reme moment of complete knowledge" (149) when Kurtz has seen and
judged his abysmal fall from his intentions, he has experienced the "hor
ror" precisely because he, too, sees "together" his intentions and his fail
ure. In an ordinary metaphorical sense, a person is said to be wedded to his
work, to that into which he puts his heart and soul. Instead of thus
wedding himself to his Intended, Kurtz has espoused the wilderness. The
vision of Kurtz which accompanies Marlow into the house of the Intended
is associated with "the best of the drum... like the beating of a heart, the
heart of a conquering darkness" (155-56). Kurtz's heart has come to beat
to the beat of that heart. Betraying the soul of civilization, his soul has
come to be possessed by the soul of the wilderness.
Despite this, Kurtz has continued to the end to talk of his "ideas" and
"plans," of his "Intended." Because of this, and because Marlow has him
self seen "together" the horror of Kurtz's failure and the loftiness of his
intentions, we can now see the nature of the "struggle" within Kurtz's
tormented soul, a struggle which culminates in his "eternal condemna
tion." We must be quite clear that this is self-condemnation - not damna
tion. To one critic, Kurtz's words, "The horror!" with their repetition,
constitute both "summation" and "judgment" and he goes on: "There is
the horror that has been perpetrated [the nature of this is not made clear
in the article cited], the horror that descends as judgment either in this
pitiless and empty death or in whatever damnation there could be to
come1,25 (My italics). These vague personifications of the horror cast no
light on the basis of Kurtz's self-condemnation — indeed the italicized
words (which are especially vague) lead away from the crucial point: that
Kurtz has eventually "pronounced a judgment upon the adventures of his
soul on this earth" (150). Damnation must involve some external agent or
force, and nothing of the sort is shown in Heart of Darkness. Any specif
ically Christian reading of Kurtz's fate would be equally inappropriate, and
Kurtz neither makes a pact with a "real" devil, nor is he diabolically
possessed in a theological sense. The story is not recounted in those terms.
The basis is humanistic and ethical. Kurtz retains, or rather regains, a
capacity to judge himself, largely because of Marlow's determination to
struggle with his "mad soul" and prevent Kurtz from surrendering his
humanity once and for all to "the heavy, mute spell of the wilderness"
which has called him back by "the awakening of forgotten and brutal
instincts... the memory of gratified and monstrous passions" (144). It is
central to my argument that Heart of Darkness is set in a completely
indifferent universe, and that Kurtz's debasement grows from within, and
not through any "actively malign force",26 represented by "the wilder
ness." True, the wilderness is frequently personified by Marlow, as a huge,
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10 / Conradiana
brooding, even threatening presence, but this is clearly his subjective reac
tion - as when it "seemed [to Marlow] to draw [Kurtz] to its pitiless
breast" (144). Not only does Marlow find "no moral darkness in the black
inhabitants of Africa",27 but the "pure, uncomplicated savagery" of the
wilderness is never shown to be in any way aggressive.2 8
Kurtz's "brutal instincts" bring about his surrender to "monstrous pas
sions"; yet at the end Marlow tells us that he "struggled! He struggled!"
The struggle indicates the presence of some moral awareness as well. What
counts in the end is that Kurtz can judge himself in the light of his own
expressed ideals. When "his values at last connect with his life [they]
reveal it to be a 'darkness'. .. and by recognizing that the values to which
he had paid hp-service apply to himself, Kurtz has made them real at
last".29 This is a fine insight which clarifies enormously the whole ques
tion of positive value in this story. In particular, it refutes certain other
views: "If Kurtz somewhere held to any glimmer of his original 'idea', he
must have lost sight of it entirely amid the blackness of his end."30 Not
so, as has just been shown. Since (referring to the same center) Kurtz not
only "died at the hands of his own traitorous neglect of the ideal" but dies
fully aware of his treachery (and loathing it), it follows that his "gifts of
insight" must extend beyond insight merely "into darkness." His "cruel
and lucid death" must be diminished if his lucidity is seen as expressive of
nothing beyond "an abject and profound darkness." And why should
Kurtz's "so-called tragic recognition " (I italicize the phrase because it is
never explained) be seen as not only "nihilistic" (as this critic consistently
argues) but "throttled"? Not, it is to be hoped, by Marlow's lie. A fatal
weakness in this critic's argument is his failure even to mention the central
issue of Kurtz's "victory."
When Marlow sees "together" Kurtz and the Intended, he sees not
simply the "horror" of Kurtz's realization of his debasement but the
deeper realization involved in his "moral victory." The tremendous power
of Heart of Darkness consists in its revelation of the capacity of a human
soul, without external religious sanctions of any sort, to struggle with
itself, to find within itself values by which it can and must judge its actions
- and condemn them. That is Kurtz's undoubted victory, a confirmation
of the validity of his ideals, intentions, even his words. This is the great
moral center of Heart of Darkness - and this is what robs the "darkness"
of any "overwhelming" power.31
Marlow calls Kurtz's judgment: "an affirmation, a moral victory paid
for by innumerable defeats, by abominable terrors, by abominable satisfac
tions. But it was a victory!" (151). This quotation leads directly to consid
eration of the nature of the inner conflict which culminates in Kurtz's
victory, a conflict from which, it appears, he is never free. Marlow defines
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12 / Conradiana
bear to follow him even in thought, Kurtz looks out from its depths with a
gaze "piercing enough to penetrate all the hearts that beat in the darkness"
(151). Here he is seeing in terms of humanity's downward potential and
can gaze straight into those hearts which, like his own, have been con
quered by the darkness - and into all those which might be so conquered.
As is clearly shown in Heart of Darkness, there are hearts and souls
which do not follow humanity's downward potential, and could never do
so. Yet the wholly "light" hearts and souls are not endowed with full
humanity. The Harlequin is too naïve, immature, dazzled by ideas, to see
the evil which is plainly before his eyes. The Intended is too exalted, too
remote from ordinary reality to see or hear anything but the "unearthly"
and "heavenly." Marlow, the fully human, can comprehend the primitive;
he can (because he must) look into the extremes in human nature, from
the debased to the exalted. Significantly, at the beginning of the story, he
calls for imaginative insight into past human experience which then paral
lels very closely the "present" experience of Kurtz. This imparts a strong
sense of continuity between past and present, but timelessness and univer
sality come only with Kurtz's all-embracing gaze. Among conflicting emo
tions at his death, Kurtz experiences "despair." It is, precisely, some slight
hope which survives through Marlow's he: the survival of ideals and aspira
tions will provide a standard by which humanity can at least continue to
judge its degradation - as Kurtz has judged his.
But what, exactly, is the nature and extent of Kurtz's debasement? In
particular, what is it that most appalls Marlow, as "the moral man"? Why
does he find many aspects of savagery readily comprehensible while other
aspects (all connected with Kurtz) are "unspeakable" and "incomprehen
sible" — and must remain, I would argue, literally unspeakable and incom
prehensible. (These and similar words called down F. R. Leavis's strictures
upon Conrad's "adjectival insistence" and his "making a virtue out of not
knowing what he means."33 I contend that Conrad knew and expressed
exactly what he meant, and that Leavis's strictures are inappropriate, as
are suggestions of "rhetorical overemphasis" or "attitudinizing."34 To
Marlow, the shrunken heads are simply "a savage sight," when contrasted
to the proffered details of the "ceremonies used when approaching Mr.
Kurtz." Marlow angrily prevents the Harlequin from giving him these de
tails, which seemed, significantly: "to have transported [him] into some
lightless region of subtle horrors, where pure, uncomplicated savagery was
a positive relief, being something that had a right to exist - obviously - in
the sunshine" (132). Rather similarly, Marlow experiences later "a moral
shock" when he discovers that Kurtz has left his cabin and gone ashore. He
feels: "as if something altogether monstrous, intolerable to thought and
odious to the soul, had been thrust upon me unexpectedly" (141, my
italics). These italicized words point a contrast to Marlow's previously
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McLauchlan / Value / 13
expressed conviction that the "mind of man" could contain and under
stand ("comprehend") all of humanity's past and future - for here he
faces something which the human mind cannot bear to entertain or pene
trate. The fact is that Kurtz has gone quite outside the human. He has
descended below the savage in specific ways yet to be discussed — which
must be discussed, since Marlow has recently been rebuked (not for the
first time) for "opposing" Kurtz instead of "joining" him in his attempt to
return to the wilderness.35 It is a recurring critical view that Kurtz is not
degraded at all.
He is. His debasement consists, in part, in the very heights to which he
has permitted himself to be exalted while "getting himself adored" among
the "simple people" of the wilderness; more important, it consists in the
nature of the "rites" which Marlow denominates simply "unspeakable."
Paradoxically, to the extent that Kurtz's "unlawful soul" has aspired to
godhead and assumed it, to that same extent Kurtz as a human being
becomes debased. But what, precisely, is the "lightless region of subtle
horrors" — so horrible that Marlow cannot and will not admit it to his
mind? What are the "unspeakable rites"? To go further, we must consider
a question which seems naïve when posed (as it often is) by a newcomer to
Heart of Darkness: but what did Kurtz do? It is not naïve at all, but
absolutely basic. What did Kurtz do? Uncertainty has frequently led to
vague hints that Kurtz sinks to "cannibalism" - but "cannibalism" as such
does not lead very far. As one aspect of "pure, uncomplicated savagery"
the potential cannibalism of Marlow's native companions has been quite
comprehensible, prompted, as it was, by "all the gnawing devils of
hunger." What amazes Marlow is "one of these human secrets," the re
straint which prevents these "cannibals" from making a good meal of
Marlow and the pilgrims. Restraint is a quality which Kurtz lacks - lacks,
generally, but lacks specifically with regard to those rites over which he
has presided. Conrad attaches precise and subtle significance to "cannibal
ism" in Heart of Darkness - a significance which has absolutely nothing to
do with actual cannibalistic practice as it may, or may not, have been
known in Africa or anywhere else. Conrad is not recording facts or judging
actual practice.
Within the story, and in line with the painstaking development of its
themes, "cannibalism" takes on great thematic importance. There are two
circumstances in which those who are called "cannibals" in Heart of Dark
ness would be likely to eat human flesh. They would certainly eat the flesh
of a vanquished enemy: "Eat 'im!" the headman says to Marlow, gazing
pensively towards the attackers on the shore. They might (Marlow believes
they would) eat one of their own number (the helmsman) once he has
somehow met his death. Otherwise we see no evidence at all that the
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McLauchlan / Value / 15
to warfare, thus destroying the peace of the whole area. He has robbed of
their human dignity his people and their chiefs by making them "crawl"
into the presence of his assumed godhead. He has been responsible for the
ruthless execution of so-called "rebels." Finally, instead of "humanizing,
improving, instructing" (91), he has encouraged and perhaps, again, "ag
gravated" the worst aspects of primitive worship: the ritual killing of
human beings for sacrifice - not even for sacrifice to some (supposedly)
supernatural being but to a man who has arrogated to himself a quite
spurious godhead. Here we see the essence of Kurtz's debasement. We have
penetrated "the lightless region of subtle horrors" so far below the natural
savagery which has every right to live "in the sunshine." Kurtz's expressed
intentions have embodied the most elevated concern for other human
beings; from these intentions he has sunk to the "inconceivable ceremo
nies" of "initiation" into "rites" which involve the deliberate sacrificial
killing and eating of other human beings.
What of Marlow's deep sense of moral shock and revulsion? It has been
forcibly argued that: "the total reversal of moral attitudes in the interven
ing decades [since Conrad wrote Heart of Darkness] means that Marlow's
moral outrage at Kurtz's participation in human sacrifices is bound to
seem exaggerated or false to modern readers."40 This seems quite unac
ceptable for, however relativist our moral views may have become, how
ever unwilling we may be to call "manifestations of another culture
'ugly,' " we must surely marvel with Marlow: "How can man, and espe
cially civilized man, be and do what he [Marlow] has seen?" as this critic
himself asks.41
Within this whole context, what is to be made of Marlow's "choice of
nightmares"? Since Marlow declares himself to be incapable of compre
hending, conceiving, penetrating, tolerating, thinking of, speaking of, the
details of what Kurtz has done, how does he come to feel that some
meaningful "choice" is "enforced" upon him? What can be worse than
that "lightless region"? One critic would have us believe that there is an
easy answer: "However intolerable to thought or odious to the soul, Mar
low must at last understand that one's choice of nightmare is perfectly
simple. One either wants forest or sepulchre, dance or death, being or
nothingness."4 2 Inclusion here in that generalizing "one" must entitle us
to protest that one's choice cannot be reduced to these naively simplistic
and ludicrously false antitheses. They take no account of the actual terms
of Marlow's choice. At the moment of choice, Marlow comes to feel that
he has "never breathed an atmosphere so vile" (138). Why? Why "sovile
[that] I turned mentally to Kurtz [from whom he has mentally recoiled]
for relief — positively for relief'? He seeks relief from the atmosphere
surrounding the manager — "vile" echoing precisely Conrad's own descrip
tion of the ivory trade as "the vilest scramble for loot that ever disfigured
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McLauchlan / Value / 17
refers scornfully to Kurtz's "talk" he really hates and fears the ideas which
the talk may disseminate. Coldly malevolent, motivated only by greed and
ruthless ambition, he sees humane and idealistic intentions as no better
than noxious nonsense: "pestiferous" and "absurdity" are exactly expres
sive of Conrad's meaning. To the manager, Kurtz's talk is dangerous be
cause it may communicate high ideals which would ruin his business pro
spects if they were put into practice. Elsewhere (especially in Nostromo)
Conrad shows many (quite different) ways in which eloquence must be
suspect, even dangerous. There are, in fact, real dangers which spring from
Kurtz's eloquence - not least the self-deception of Kurtz himself. Yet
ideas must be formulated and communicated: words are essential prelimi
naries to putting them into practice. There is, therefore, no inherent falsity
in words. The expressed aims to humanize, to improve, to instruct, would
constitute, indeed, the only redeeming idea behind what Kurtz sets out to
do in Africa among its primitive people. The aims must be affirmed. Fal
sity supervenes only when words are not realized in appropriate action.
Once ideals have been expressed in words, everything depends upon the
way they are understood and accepted. In Heart of Darkness idealistic
aims, together with the words which express them, remain constant, but
responses to them convey crucial differences in tone.
Conrad presents these with the greatest subtlety. Marlow becomes
aware that his aunt has "represented" him as being an "exceptional and
gifted creature" and "something like an emissary of light." She makes him
feel "quite uncomfortable" with her talk of "weaning those ignorant mil
lions from their horrid ways" (59). The aunt is parroting these words as
part of that mindless "rush" of reiteration which makes them "humbug"
and "rot." Basic civilizing aims are simply travestied by total unawareness
of individual, different needs: the generalized "millions" are all necessarily
"ignorant"; all their "ways" are necessarily "horrid." Mere parroting
occurs again, but on a spiteful and cynical note, as the envious and ambi
tious "brickmaker" calls Kurtz: " 'a prodigy... an emissary of pity, and
science, and progress, and devil knows what else. We want,' he began to
declaim suddenly, 'for the guidance of the cause intrusted to us by
Europe, so to speak, higher intelligence, wide sympathies, a singleness of
purpose.' " (79). Not only Kurtz, but "lots of them" declaim thus, he tells
Marlow. The cynical tone sharpens to sarcasm as he classes Marlow himself
with "the new gang - the gang of virtue." As noted above, the manager at
one and the same time parrots "civilizing" aims and angrily rejects their
worth.
He is at one extreme. At the opposite extreme is the Intended, to
whom Kurtz's words have been communicated directly as "the illuminat
ing, - the most exalted... the pulsating stream of light" (113-14). Doubt
less her lover has spoken the "noble, burning words" with passionate
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18 / Conradiana
intensity and an air of deep conviction. She has quite simply accepted
them. She goes on believing in him (to return to an earlier point) because
she never receives any hint of his failure. She continues to the end to
believe in the worth of his ideals and to reaffirm them as faithfully and
truly as an echo - and with no more originality or real force than an echo.
The Harlequin speaks of Kurtz with "severe exaltation" (123) as one who
"has enlarged my mind" (125), "made me see things - things" (127).
Marlow does not envy this "disciple" his blind devotion to Kurtz. In
contrast to the Intended, his is a wilful blindness: "transported" by the
flow of Kurtz's words, he remains faithful despite all he has actually seen.
What of Marlow? He can appreciate well enough the loftiness of Kurtz's
intentions and can even be moved by them: when Kurtz "soared" in his
"beautiful piece of writing" (118) he carries Marlow with him — for a
time. Marlow's experience of Kurtz's practical failure enables him to see
that the same words may serve the light or the darkness, becoming, in the
latter case, "the bewildering... the most contemptible... the deceitful
flow from the heart of an impenetrable darkness" (113-14). First publish
ed in 1898, Heart of Darkness embodies an insight which has been brought
home to humanity time and time again during the Twentieth Century:
elevated words can serve the light or the dark depending upon the way
their embodied ideas and aims are, or are not, put into practice.
Finally, it is now possible to understand more clearly the insight which
enforced Marlow's fidelity to his choice of nightmares in the story's final
scene (which should not now be felt to have been "treated in a rather
strained, melodramatic, and repetitive way").4 6 Of the two nightmares,
the worse consists in the rejection and denial of expressed human values.
The mentality which rejects and denies is a mentality obsessed by sheer
rapacity, ruthless ambition, deep malevolence - "mentality" must be the
word, since neither the manager himself nor any of his ilk, in Heart of
Darkness, is granted a "soul." The lesser nightmare (though still unequivo
cally a nightmare) is Kurtz's degradation. Although he is "hollow" in that
he has been false in practice to his ideals, ideas, and words, he can never
reject human values or deny their worth. They make possible his "moral
victory"; they "survive" in his Intended as an ideal, with all the limitations
noted. There is no strong positive hope at the end of Heart of Darkness.
Mere survival is assured. Yet the importance of the "saving illusion" is
plain. Without Marlow's lie, all "light of visionary purpose," any "slender
ray of light" would be extinguished and, with these, the whole concept of
humanity's upward potential. Humanity, in future, could never know the
struggle or the victory of a Kurtz, could never gain the insight of a Marlow
into the "two extremes that can exist within the human mind." All hearts
would have no choice but to "beat in the [triumphant] darkness."4 7
"It would have been too dark - too dark altogether."
Aylesbury, England
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McLauchlan / Value / 19
NOTES
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20 / Conradiana
28. See again McLauchlan, "The 'Something Human' " for further discussion of
this point.
29. Berthoud, p. 59, my italics.
30. Garrett Stewart, p. 327.
31. Watt, p. 251.
32. Garrett Stewart, pp. 322-23.
33. Leavis, pp. 179-80.
34. Watt. p. 233.
35. Peter J. Glassman, Language and Being: Joseph Conrad and the Literature of
Personality (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976), p. 229.
36. Daleski, p. 57.
37. Daleski, p. 57.
38. Daleski, p. 67.
39. See Stephen A. Reid, "The 'Unspeakable Rites' in Heart of Darkness," in
Conrad: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. Marvin Mudrick (Englewood Cliffs, New
Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1966). The whole argument is most interesting, but relies too
heavily upon speculative material unsupported by textual evidence. Reid starts from
accounts in Fraser's The Golden Bough of ceremonies "to circumvent the inevitabil
ity of the man-god's aging and dying" which involved "the sacrifice of a young and
vigorous man, and the consuming of a portion of his body" in order to revivify the
ailing man-god. It seems wrong to postulate a Kurtz who is not only ill but aging and
growing physically frail over a considerably longer period than that covered by the
story.
40. Watt, p. 233.
41. Watt, p. 240.
42. Glassman, p. 228.
43. Joseph Conrad, Last Essays (London: Dent, 1926), p. 25.
44. Watts, p. 83.
45. See Garrett Stewart. Present-day readers can readily accept Stewart's detesta
tion of nineteenth century (or any) "imperialism" with its "inevitable brutality," and
can see this as "a mode of death." But they must reject his facile and total equation
of imperialistic notions of "white supremacy" with "European [and all Western]
idealism." All forms of idealism, it seems, are imperialistic masks and lies. Marlow is,
of course, tainted, and indicted by Stewart for "deep-seated racism." Not surprisingly
he adduces no proof of the charge, which he would doubtless extend to Conrad as
well. Although Conrad and Marlow shared some of the assumptions and misconcep
tions of their time, they transcend such categories as "racist." Human and humane
qualities are their deepest concern, whether these are found in black or white human
ity; and the full savagery of Conrad's undoubted attack in Heart of Darkness is
levelled at white cruelty and rapacity. A related point embodies Stewart's most
incomprehensible and, certainly untenable, view: that Marlow's "he of idealism [is]
unconsciously resurrected from its own death in order to be traded in as the barter of
return, the inevitably exacted price of repatriation to the European community."
Where does Conrad (or Marlow) ever indicate that Marlow wants any such "repatria
tion" - or that he wants to "come back and go on"? In fact, having seen in Africa
the unbelievable depths of European exploitation, greed, and hypocrisy, Marlow
"come[s] back" to experience a lasting revulsion from the "European community"
- and what sense of "community" is conveyed in the Europe of the sepulchral city,
which is all we see? Having lied to save "the part of civilization worth saving,"
Marlow follows the sea and, so far as we are ever told, never feels the slightest
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McLauchlan / Value / 21
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