This is a petition for review on certiorari of an order of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Third
No. L-37007. July 20, 1987.* Judicial District, in Criminal Case No. D-529 entitled 'The People of the Philippines versus Juan Tuvera,
RAMON S. MILO, in his capacity as Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan, and ARMANDO
VALDEZ, petitioners, vs. ANGELITO C. SALANGA, in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan (Branch IV), and JUAN TUVERA, SR., respondents.
Criminal Law; Evidence; Arbitrary Detention; Concept of and elements of the crime of arbitrary
detention.—Arbitrary Detention is committed by a public officer who, without legal grounds, detains a
person. The elements of this crime are the following: 1. That the offender is a public officer or employee.
2. That he detains a person. 3. That the detention is without legal grounds.
Same;  Same; Same;  Public officers liable for arbitrary detention must be vested with authority to
detain or order the detention of persons accused of a crime.—The public officers liable for Arbitrary
Detention must be vested with authority to detain or order the detention of persons accused of a crime.
Such public officers are the policemen and other agents of the law, the judges or mayors.
Same;  Same; Same;  Barangay captains recognized as persons in authority.—Long before
Presidential Decree 299 was signed into law, barrio lieutenants, (who were later named barrio captains and
now barangay captains) were recognized as persons in authority. In various cases, this Court deemed them
as persons in authority, and convicted them of Arbitrary Detention.
Same;  Same; Same;  Same; One need not be a police officer to be chargeable with arbitrary
detention; A barrio captain having the same duty as the mayor of maintaining peace and order, he can be
liable for arbitrary detention; Case at bar.—One need not be a police officer to be chargeable with
Arbitrary Detention. It is accepted that other public officers like judges and mayors, who act with abuse of
their functions, may be guilty of this crime. A perusal of the powers and function vested in mayors would
show that they are similar to those of a barrio captain except that in the case of the latter, his territorial
jurisdiction is smaller. Having the same duty of maintaining peace and order, both must be and are given
the authority to detain or order detention. Noteworthy is the fact that even private respondent Tuvera
himself admitted that with the aid of his rural police, he as a barrio captain, could have led the arrest of
petitioner Valdez. From the foregoing. there is no doubt that a barrio captain, like private respondent
Tuvera, Sr., can be held liable for Arbitrary Detention.
Same;  Same; Same;  Criminal Procedure; Motion to quash;  Courts in resolving a motion to
quash cannot consider facts contrary to those alleged in the information or which do not appear on the
face of the information because said motion is a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the
information; Exception.—Next, private respondent Tuvera, Sr. contends that the motion to quash was
validly granted as the facts and evidence on record show that there was no crime of Arbitrary Detention;
that he only sought the aid and assistance of the Manaoag Police Force; and that he only accompanied
petitioner Valdez to town for the latter's personal safety. Suffice it to say that the above allegations can
only be raised as a defense at the trial as they traverse what is alleged in the Information. We have
repeatedly held that Courts, in resolving a motion to quash, cannot consider facts contrary to those alleged
in the information or which do not appear on the face of the information. This is because a motion to
quash is a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the information. Matters of defense cannot be
proved during the hearing of such a motion, except where the Rules expressly permit, such as extinction of
criminal liability, prescription, and former jeopardy. In the case of U.S. vs. Perez, this Court held that a
motion to quash on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense cannot allege new facts
not only different but diametrically opposed to those alleged in the complaint. This rule admits of only one
exception and that is when such facts are admitted by the prosecution.
Same;  Same; Same;  Same; Same;  An order granting a motion to quash is a final order, not
merely interlocutory, and is immediately appealable; Double jeopardy cannot be claimed by the accused
as the dismissal of the case was secured not only with his consent but at his instance.—Respondent's
contention holds no water. An order granting a motion to quash, unlike one of denial, is a final order. It is
not merely interlocutory and is therefore immediately appealable. The accused cannot claim double
jeopardy as the dismissal was secured not only with his consent but at his instance.
PETITION for certiorari to review the order of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Br. IV.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
GANCAYCO, J.:
Sr., et al.," granting the motion to quash the information filed by accused Juan Tuvera, Sr., herein
respondent. The issue is whether a barrio captain can be charged of arbitrary detention.
The facts are as follows:
On October 12, 1972, an information for Arbitrary Detention was filed against Juan Tuvera, Sr.,
Tomas Mendoza and Rodolfo Mangsat, in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, which reads as
follows:
"The undersigned Assistant Provincial Fiscal accuses Juan Tuvera, Sr., Tomas Mendoza and Rodolfo
Mangsat alias Rudy, all of Manaoag, Pangasinan, of the crime of ARBITRARY DETENTION, committed
as follows:
That on or about the 21st day of April, 1973, at around 10:00 o'clock in the evening, in barrio
Baguinay, Manaoag, Pangasinan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused
Juan Tuvera, Sr., a barrio captain, with the aid of some other private persons, namely Juan Tuvera, Jr.,
Bertillo Bataoil and one Dianong, maltreated one Armando Valdez by hitting with butts of their guns and
fists blows and immediately thereafter, without legal grounds, with deliberate intent to deprive said
Armando Valdez of his constitutional liberty, accused Barrio captain Juan Tuvera, Sr., Cpl. Tomas
Mendoza and Pat. Rodolfo Mangsat, members of the police force of Mangsat, Pangasinan, conspiring,
confederating and helping one another, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, lodge
and lock said Armando Valdez inside the municipal jail of Manaoag, Pangasinan for about eleven (11)
hours. (Italics supplied.)
CONTRARY TO ARTICLE 124 of the R.P.C.
Dagupan City, October 12, 1972.
(SGD.) VICENTE C. CALDONA
Assistant Provincial Fiscal"
All the accused, including respondent Juan Tuvera, Sr., were arraigned and pleaded not guilty.
On April 4, 1973, Tuvera filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the facts charged
do not constitute an offense and that the proof s adduced at the investigation are not sufficient to support
the filing of the information. Petitioner Assistant Provincial Fiscal Ramon S. Milo filed an opposition
thereto.
Finding that respondent Juan Tuvera, Sr. was not a public officer who can be charged with Arbitrary
Detention, respondent Judge Angelito C. Salanga granted the motion to quash in an order dated April 25,
1973.
Hence, this petition.
Arbitrary Detention is committed by a public officer who, without legal grounds, detains a
person.1 The elements of this crime are the following:
1. 1.That the offender is a public officer or employee.
2. 2.That he detains a person.
3. 3.That the detention is without legal grounds.2
The ground relied upon by private respondent Tuvera for his motion to quash the information which was
sustained by respondent Judge, is that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, 3 that is, that the facts
alleged in the information do not constitute the elements of Arbitrary Detention.
The Information charges Tuvera, a barrio captain, to have conspired with Cpl. Mendoza and Pat.
Mangsat, who are members of the police force of Manaoag, Pangasinan in detaining petitioner Valdez for
about eleven (11) hours in the municipal jail without legal ground. No doubt the last two elements of the
crime are present.
The only question is whether or not Tuvera, Sr., a barrio cap-
_______________
 2
 Supra; U.S. vs. Braganza, et al., 10 Phil. 79; Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Book Two, 1981 Ed.,
p. 39.
3
 Under Rule 117, Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court, the following are the grounds on which an accused
may move to quash a complaint or information on any of the following grounds.
1. (a)That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;
2. (b)That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged or
the person of the accused;
3. (c)That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;
4. (d)That it does not conform substantially in the prescribed form;
5. (e)That more than one offense is charged except in those cases in which existing
laws prescribe a single punishment for various offenses;
6. (f)That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;
7. (g)That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or
justification; and
8. (h)That the accused has been previously convicted or in jeopardy of being
convicted, or acquitted of the offense charged.
Respondent Tuvera set forth another ground in his motion to quash which is not included in the
above enumeration and will therefore not be discussed in this decision.
118
118 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Milo vs. Salanga
tain, is a public officer who can be liable for the crime of Arbitrary Detention.
The public officers liable for Arbitrary Detention must be vested with authority to detain or order the
detention of persons accused of a crime. Such public officers are the policemen and other agents of the
law, the judges or mayors.4
Respondent Judge Salanga did not consider private respondent Tuvera as such public officer when
the former made this finding in the questioned order:
"Apparently, if Armando Valdez was ever jailed and detained more than six (6) hours, Juan Tuvera, Sr.,
has nothing to do with the same because he is not in any way connected with the Police Force of
Manaoag, Pangasinan. Granting that it was Tuvera, Sr., who ordered Valdez arrested, it was not he who
detained and jailed him because he has no such authority vested in him as a mere Barrio Captain of Barrio
Baguinay, Manaoag, Pangasinan."5
In line with the above finding of respondent Judge Salanga, private respondent Tuvera asserts that the
motion to quash was properly sustained for the following reasons: (1) That he did not have the authority to
make arrest, nor jail and detain petitioner Valdez as a mere barrio captain; 6 (2) That he is neither a peace
officer nor a policeman,7 (3) That he was not a public official; 8 (4) That he had nothing to do with the
detention of petitioner Valdez;9 (5) That he is not connected directly or indirectly in the administration of
the Manaoag Police Force;10 (6) That barrio captains on April 21, 1972 were not yet considered as persons
in authority and that it was only upon the promulgation of Presidential Decree No. 299 that Barrio Captain
and Heads of Barangays were decreed among those who are persons in authority; 11 and that the proper
charge was Illegal Detention and Not Arbitrary Detention. 12
We disagree.
Long before Presidential Decree 299 was signed into law, barrio lieutenants (who were later named
barrio captains and now barangay captains) were recognized as persons in authority. In various cases, this
Court deemed them as persons in authority, and convicted them of Arbitrary Detention.
In U.S. vs. Braganza,13 Martin Salibio, a barrio lieutenant, and Hilario Braganza, a municipal
councilor, arrested Father Feliciano Gomez while he was in his church. They made him pass through the
door of the vestry and afterwards took him to the municipal building. There, they told him that he was
under arrest. The priest had not committed any crime. The two public officials were convicted of Arbitrary
Detention.14
In U.S. vs. Gellada,15 Geronimo Gellada, a barrio lieutenant, with the help of Filoteo Soliman, bound
and tied his houseboy Sixto Gentugas with a rope at around 6:00 p.m. and delivered him to the justice of
the peace. Sixto was detained during the whole night and until 9:00 a.m. of the next day when he was
ordered released by the justice of the peace because he had not committed any crime, Gellada was
convicted of Arbitrary Detention.16
Under Republic Act No. 3590, otherwise known as The Revised Barrio Charter, the powers and
duties of a barrio captain include the following: to look after the maintenance of public order in the barrio
and to assist the municipal mayor and the municipal councilor in charge of the district in the performance
of their duties in such barrio;17 to look after the general welfare of the barrio; 18 to enforce all laws and
ordinances which are operative within the barrio; 19 and to organize and lead an emergency group
whenever the same may be necessary f or the maintenance of peace and order within the barrio. 20
In his treatise on Barrio Government Law and Administration, Professor Jose M. Aruego has this to
say about the above-mentioned powers and duties of a Barrio Captain, to wit:
"Upon the barrio captain depends in the main the maintenance of public order in the barrio. For
public disorder therein, inevitably people blame him.
"In the event that there be a disturbing act to said public order or a threat to disturb public order, what
can the barrio captain do? Understandably, he first resorts to peaceful measures. He may take preventive
measures like placing the offenders under surveillance and persuading them, where possible, to behave
well, but when necessary, he may subject them to the full force of law.
"He is a peace officer in the barrio considered under the law as a person in authority. As such, he may
make arrest and detain persons within legal limits. "21 (Italics supplied.)
One need not be a police officer to be chargeable with Arbitrary Detention. It is accepted that other
public officers like judges and mayors, who act with abuse of their functions, may be guilty of this
crime.22 A perusal of the powers and function vested in mayors would show that they are similar to those
of a barrio captain23 except that in the case of the latter, his territorial jurisdiction is smaller. Having the
same duty of maintaining peace and order, both must be and are given the authority to detain or order
detention. Noteworthy is the fact that even private respondent Tuvera himself admitted that with the aid of
his rural police, he as a barrio captain, could have led the arrest of petitioner Valdez.24
From the foregoing, there is no doubt that a barrio captain, like private respondent Tuvera, Sr., can be
held liable for Arbitrary Detention.
Next, private respondent Tuvera, Sr. contends that the motion to quash was validly granted as the
facts and evidence on record show that there was no crime of Arbitrary Detention; 25 that he only sought
the aid and assistance of the Manaoag Police Force; 26 and that he only accompanied petitioner Valdez to
town for the latter's personal safety.27
Suf f ice it to say that the above allegations can only be raised as a defense at the trial as they traverse
what is alleged in the Information. We have repeatedly held that Courts, in resolving a motion to quash,
cannot consider facts contrary to those alleged in the information or which do not appear on the face of the
information. This is because a motion to quash is a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the
information.28 Matters of defense cannot be proved during the hearing of such a motion, except where the
Rules expressly permit, such as extinction of criminal liability, prescription, and former jeopardy. 29 In the
case of U.S. vs. Perez,30 this Court held that a motion to quash on the ground that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense cannot allege new facts not only different but diametrically opposed to those alleged
in the complaint. This rule admits of only one exception and that is when such facts are admitted by the
prosecution.31
Lastly, private respondent claims that by the lower court's granting of the motion to quash jeopardy
has already attached in his favor32 on the ground that here, the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated
without his express consent.
Respondent's contention holds no water. An order granting a motion to quash, unlike one of
denial, is a final order. It is not merely interlocutory and is therefore immediately appealable. The accused
cannot claim double jeopardy as the dismissal was secured not only with his consent but at his instance.33
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for certiorari is GRANTED. The questioned
Order of April 25, 1973 in Criminal Case No. D-529 is hereby set aside. Let this case be remanded to the
appropriate trial court for further proceedings. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
     Teehankee  (C.J.), Narvasa, Cruz and Paras, JJ., concur.
Petition granted. Case remanded to trial court for further proceedings.
Notes.—There is no criminal delay in the delivery of the accused to the court, where the two days
following his arrest, were holidays. (Medina vs. Orosco, 18 SCRA 1169.)
 A public officer or employee who detains a person without legal grounds is guilty of arbitrary
detention, but the person so detained will not be released if afterwards he is detained under a valid
information. (Medina vs. Orosco, 18 SCRA 1169.)

——o0o——

No. L-26723. December 22, 1966.

ARTHUR MEDINA Y. YUMUL, petitioner, vs. MARCELO F. OROZCO, JR., Acting City Warden
of Caloocan City, respondent.
Arbitrary detention; Where there was no criminal delay in the delivery of the accused to the court.
—Where the accused was arrested for murder at midnight of Sunday, November 7, 1965 and at around
nine o'clock of the following morning he was brought to the fiscal, who conducted the proper preliminary
investigation and filed the information against him, at around three p.m. on November 10, 1965, it was
held that there was no delay in the delivery of the accused to the court, as contemplated in article 125 of
the Revised Penal Code, because the two days, following his arrest, were holidays.
Same; Habeas corpus;  Detention under valid information distinguished from arbitrary detention.
—Detention under a valid information is one thing, arbitrary detention anterior thereto is another. They
are separate concepts. Simply because at the inception the detention was wrong is no reason for releasing
the accused after the serious charge of murder has been clamped upon him and his commitment was
ordered by the court. The first is illegal; but the second is not. Habeas corpus would not lie after the
warrant of commitment was issued by the court on the basis of the information against the accused.
Same; Preliminary investigation; Where claim that there was no preliminary investigation was
baseless.—Where the accused has not proven his averment that there was no preliminary investigation and
it appears that he asked for a reinvestigation of the case, the presumption is that official duty was regularly
performed and that the proper preliminary investigation had been conducted.
Same; Lack of preliminary investigation must be raised in the trial court.—The proper forum
before which the absence of preliminary investigation should be ventilated is the Court of First Instance,
not the Supreme Court. Absence of preliminary investigation does not go to the jurisdiction of the court,
but merely to the regularity of the proceedings. It could even be waived. Indeed, it is frequently waived.
These are matters properly to be inquired into by the trial court, not by an appellate court.
Criminal procedure; Speedy trial.—The accused cannot complain that he was deprived of his right
to a speedy trial where the delay in the trial was due to his motions for postponement.
ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Habeas corpus.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Federico Magdangal for petitioner
      Francisco A. Garcia for respondent.
SANCHEZ, J.:
On application for habeas corpus. The facts are:
At about 12:00 p.m. on November 7, 1965, petitioner Arthur Medina y, Yumul was arrested and
thereafter incarcerated in the Caloocan City jail, allegedly as one of those responsible for the death of one
Marcelo Sangalang y, Diwa which occurred on October 31, 1965 in said city. At about 9:00 o'clock in the
morning of the same day, November 7, 1965, the case against Medina and two others for Sangalang's
murder was referred to a fiscal, who forthwith conducted a preliminary investigation in petitioner's
presence. At about 3:40 p.m. on November 10, 1965, an information for murder was filed against
petitioner Arthur Medina y, Yumul, and Antonio Olivar y, Flores and Alexander Enriquez y, Raginio in
the Caloocan branch of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, docketed as Criminal Case No. C-1197 of said
court. By court order, they were promptly committed to jail. Arraigned, Medina and his co-accused stood
trial—which has not yet terminated.
1. First to be considered is the charge of arbitrary detention. Petitioner claims violation of Article 125
of the Revised Penal Code. The crime—for which petitioner is detained—is murder, a capital offense. The
arresting officer's duty under the law1 was either to deliver him to the proper judicial authorities within 18
hours, or thereafter release him. The fact however is that he was not released. From the time of petitioner's
arrest at 12:00 o'clock p.m. on November 6, to 3:40 p.m. on November 10 when the information against
him for murder actually was in court, over 75 hours have elapsed.
But, stock should be taken of the fact that November 6, was a Sunday; November -a was declared an
official holiday; and November 8, (election day) was also an official holiday. In these three no-office days,
it was not an easy matter for a fiscal to look for his clerk and stenographer, draft the information and
search for the Judge to have him act thereon, and get the clerk of court to open the courthouse, docket the
case and have the order of commitment prepared. And then, where to locate and the uncertainty of
locating those officers and employees could very well compound the fiscal's difficulties. These are
considerations sufficient enough to deter us from declaring that Arthur Medina was arbitrarily detained.
For, he was brought to court on the very first office day following arrest.2
2. Nor could discharge from custody, by now, be justified even on the assumption that detention was
originally arbitrary.
Petitioner at present is jailed because of the court's order of commitment of November 10, 1965 upon
a murder indictment. No bail was provided for him, because he is charged with a capital offense. Such
detention remains unaffected by the alleged previous arbitrary detention. Because, detention under a valid
information is one thing, arbitrary detention anterior thereto another. They are separate concepts, Simply
because at the inception detention was wrong is no reason for letting petitioner go scot-free after the
serious charge of murder has been clamped upon him and his detention ordered by the court. The first is
illegal; but the second is not.3 Thus,, the petition for habeas corpus came too late.4
3. As unavailing is petitioner's claim that no preliminary investigation was conducted by the fiscal
before the criminal charge against him was registered in court. Other than that averment in the petition
herein, petitioner has nothing whatsoever to show for it. Upon the other hand, the assertion that such
investigation was made on the very day of petitioner's arrest and in his presence, is confirmed by the fact
that on November 12, 1965 he moved the office of the city fiscal for a reinvestigation of his case. And that
reinvestigation was held on December 1, 1965. Thereafter, the case against him proceeded to trial. Add to
all of these the legal presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties, 5 and the question of
lack of preliminary investigation is well nailed down.
4. Besides, the proper forum before which absence of preliminary investigation should be ventilated
is the Court of First Instance, not this Court. Reason is not wanting for this view. Absence of preliminary
investigation does not go to the jurisdiction of the court but merely to the regularity of the proceedings. It
could even be waived. Indeed, it is frequently waived. 6 These are matters to be inquired into by the trial
court, not an appellate court.
5. The cry of deprivation of a speedy trial merits but scant consideration. The arraignment of
petitioner set for December 1, 1965 was postponed to December 20, 1965, thence to February 28, 1966, to
March 14, 1966, all on petition of counsel for the accused, including petitioner. Then, on April 14, 1966,
petitioner's counsel moved to reset the date of hearing on the merits. And again, the hearing scheduled on
July 26, 1966 was transferred to September 6, 1966 on motion of defendant Alexander Enriquez with the
conformity of petitioner's counsel. Finally, on motion of petitioner's counsel, the hearing on September 6,
1966 was recalendared for December 6, 1966. In this factual environment, we do not see denial to
petitioner of the right to speedy trial. Delay 'of his own making cannot be oppressive to him. 7
For the reasons given, the petition herein to set petitioner Arthur Medina y, Yumul at liberty is
hereby denied. Costs against petitioner. So ordered.
     Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon,
J.P., Zaldivar and Castro, JJ., concur.
     Barrera, J., took no part.
Petition denied.
______________
[No. 46250. July 26, 1939]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff and appellee, vs. VICENTE P. ANCHETA,
defendant and appellant.
1. 1.CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE; ARBITRARY DETENTION.—In
crimes of arbitrary detention (article 124 of the Revised Penal Code, which is
equivalent to article 200 of the old Penal Code), the legality of the detention made
by a person in authority or an agent thereof does not depend upon the juridical
and much less judicial fact of a crime which, at the time of its commission, is not
and cannot definitively be determined for lack of the necessary data and of
jurisdiction, but upon the nature of the deed, wherefrom such characterization
may reasonably be inferred by the officer or functionary to whom the law at that
moment leaves the decision for the urgent purpose of suspending the liberty of the
citizen.
1. 2.ID.; ID.—The obligation of an agent of authority to make an arrest by reason of
a crime, does not presuppose as a necessary requisite for the fulfillment thereof,
the indubitable existence of a crime. For the detention to be perfectly legal, it is
sufficient that the agent or person in authority making the arrest has reasonably
sufficient grounds to believe the existence of an act having the characteristics of a
crime and that the same grounds exist to believe that the person sought to be
detained participated therein.
3.ID.; ID.; THE DOCTRINE LAID DOWN IN UNITED STATES vs. SANTOS
(36 PHIL., 853), REITERATED.—This ruling was upheld not only by the
Supreme Court of Spain but also by this court in several cases, among them being
that of United States vs. Santos (36 Phil., 853), where it was stated that the
reasonable or probable cause which must exist to justify an arrest without warrant
consists in a ground sufficient in itself to convince a reasonable man to believe
that the person arrested by him is guilty; and that, besides reasonable ground of
suspicion, action in good faith is another protective bulwark for the peace officer
making the arrest. It was likewise stated therein that under such conditions, even
if the suspected person is later found to be innocent, the peace officer who
arrested him is not liable, adding that one should not expect too much of a
policeman, and the same is true with a constabulary officer as the appellant,
because both are not presumed to have the training and preparation of a judicial
officer, not having as they do not often have the opportunity to make proper
investigation but must act in haste on their own belief to prevent the escape of the
criminal.
1. 4.ID.; ID.; ID.; WHEN ARRESTS MAY BE MADE WITHOUT
WARRANT; CASE AT BAR.—It should likewise be borne in mind that the law
 (section 848 of the Administrative Code and article 124 of the Revised Penal
Code) allows members of the Constabulary or policemen to make arrests without
warrant, not only when a crime is being committed or is about to be committed in
their own presence, but also when they reasonably believe or have ground to
suspect that a crime has been committed and that it has been committed precisely
by the person arrested (U. S. vs. Fortaleza, 12 Phil., 472; U. S. vs. Samonte, 16
Phil., 516; U. S. vs. Batallones, 23 Phil., 46; U.
S. vs. Santos, supra; People vs. Kagui Malasugui, 63 Phil., 221). The detention of
B. S. ordered by the appellant took place exactly under these same circumstances.
DECISION upon petition for reconsideration.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
Claro M. Recto for appellant.
Solicitor-General Ozaeta for appellee.
PER CURIAM:
Again this case occupies the attention of this court by reason of the petition filed by the accused and
appellant Vicente P. Ancheta for reconsideration of the judgment rendered against him, which affirms that
formerly entered by the Court of First Instance of Palawan sentencing him to the indeterminate penalty of
from six months of arresto mayor to four years of prisión correccional, with the costs of the proceedings.
His petition is based on the following grounds:
1. "I.That it is an error to hold that the detention of Bibiana Sanson ordered by the
appellant was not justified on the ground that it has not been proven that she had
conspired with her brothers to assault said appellant.
2. "II.That the conviction of the appellant in this case, after this Supreme Court has
found in its decision that 'there are circumstances in support of the theory of the
defense' that the appellant ordered the arrest of Bibiana Sanson for having
conspired with her brothers and with the deceased Salazar to assault said
appellant, is a deviation from the uniform ruling that peace officers are
empowered to make arrests without warrant when they have reasonable cause to
believe that an offense or violation of law has been committed and that the
accused is guilty thereof, and is likewise contrary to the express provision of
section 848 of the Administrative Code pertinent thereto."
We have reviewed the record and firmly adhere to the finding that it was the accused-appellant who really
ordered the arrest of Bibiana Sanson upon the belief that she had taken part in the assault committed upon
him by the Sanson brothers, Rufo and Cirilo and by justice of the peace Guillermo Salazar. The only
question now to be determined anew is: "Was the detention of said woman arbitrary under said
circumstances?"
Without making a' tedious repetition of the facts pertinent to the case, which already appear in the
decision rendered in case G. R. No. 45344 (37 Off. Gaz., 620), and in the one under reconsideration, it
should be stated, however, that the assault committed by the Sanson brothers and justice of the peace
Salazar upon the accused-appellant took place immediately after the latter had been approached by
Bibiana Sanson in the middle of the street, while he was passing in front of the store situated under the
house owned by the Sansons. Under said circumstances, the appellant undoubtedly had well founded
reasons to believe that Bibiana Sanson was not innocent of said aggression: first, because it was strange
for her, an unmarried woman, after the appellant had broken with her, to approach him in the middle of
the street feigning friendship, a thing she had never done before, and for her brothers Rufo and Cirilo and
justice of the peace Salazar, immediately afterwards and knowing him to be a peace officer, to fall upon
him and assault him, punching and kicking him until he fell to the ground, and at the same time wresting
from him the revolver which he carried in his belt; second, because the four of them harbored a grudge
against him, and he knew it, by reason of his break with Bibiana and of the slander of which she had
allegedly been informed and which had reached the ears of the Sansons thereby naturally offending them,
that he had been spreading the news that she had in his possession some of Bibiana's innermost garments,
and by reason of having complained of the behaviour and investigated the conduct of justice of the peace
Salazar in various cases in which the latter had intervened as such justice of the peace; third, because
Bibiana made no efforts to prevent her brothers and said justice of the peace from maltreating as they in
fact maltreated him; and lastly, because after the assault, all the four went up the house of the Sansons,
locking up themselves therein until they were compelled to surrender by the Constabulary.
There is no doubt that the above-stated facts constitute in themselves strong circumstantial evidence
that the aggression was premeditated and was the result of a previous conspiracy in which Bibiana Sanson
could not but have a part. Anybody who found himself in the same circumstances as the appellant, would
have believed so himself and would have made the same decision, all the more so because the person
involved was not merely a peace officer but a commanding officer of a detachment of constabulary
soldiers, called upon, by reason of his position, to act promptly in order to preserve order and to bring to
the authorities those whom he believes in good faith to be violators of the law. It should be borne in mind
that on the same day on which the appellant ordered the detention of Bibiana Sanson, he caused the
presentation of a complaint for frustrated homicide, which was so done in fact not only against her but
also against her two brothers, because he was then of the opinion that such was the crime committed by
them against him. The complaint was filed with the acting vice-president Emilio Castro, on the belief that
said official could act upon it, in the absence of the justice of the peace and of the municipal president of
Balabac. It seems clear that the appellant ceased to have any responsibility from the time the complaint
was filed with the authorities, because it was not then incumbent upon him to take the steps subsequent to
said act, such as that of effecting the provisional release of Bibiana Sanson on bail, or that of dismissing
the complaint against her for the reason that she does not appear to be liable for any crime, after the
corresponding preliminary investigation.
In crimes of arbitrary detention (article 124 of the Revised Penal Code, which is equivalent to article
200 of the old Penal Code), the legality of the detention made by a person in authority or an agent thereof,
as stated by the Supreme Court of Spain in its decision of January 27, 1885, does not depend upon the
juridical and much less judicial fact of a crime which, at the time of its commission, is not and cannot
definitively be determined for lack of the necessary data and of jurisdiction, but upon the nature of the
deed, wherefrom such characterization may reasonably be inferred by the officer or functionary to whom
the law at that moment leaves the decision for the urgent purpose of suspending the liberty of the citizen.
The obligation of an agent of authority to make an arrest by reason of a crime, does not presuppose as a
necessary requisite for the fulfillment thereof, the indubitable existence of a crime. For the detention to be
perfectly legal, it is sufficient that the agent or person in authority making the arrest has reasonably
sufficient grounds to believe the existence of an act having the characteristics of a crime and that the same
grounds exist to believe that the person sought to be detained participated therein (Decision of the
Supreme Court of Spain of November 5, 1892).
This same ruling was upheld by this court in several cases, among them being that of  United
States vs. Santos (36 Phil., 853), where it was stated that the reasonable or probable cause which must
exist to justify an arrest without warrant consists in a ground sufficient in itself to convince a reasonable
man to believe that the person arrested by him is guilty; and that, besides reasonable ground of suspicion,
action in good faith is another protective bulwark for the peace officer making the arrest. It was likewise
stated therein that under such conditions, even if the suspected person is later found to be innocent, the
peace officer who arrested him is not liable, adding that one should not expect too much of a policeman,
and the same is true with. a constabulary officer as the appellant, because both are not presumed to have
the training and preparation of a judicial officer, not having as they do not often have the opportunity to
make proper investigation but must act in haste on their own belief to prevent the escape of the criminal. It
should likewise be borne in mind that the law (section 848 of the Administrative Code and article 124 of
the Revised Penal Code) allows members of the Constabulary or policemen, and in general. every public
officer or employee, to make arrests without warrant, not only when a crime is being committed or is
about to be committed in their own presence, but also when they reasonably believe or have ground to
suspect that a crime has been committed and that it has been committed precisely by the person arrested
(U. S. vs. Fortaleza, 12 Phil., 472; U. S. vs. Samonte, 16 Phil., 516; U. S. vs. Batallones, 23 Phil., 46; U.
S. vs. Santos, supra; People vs. Kagui Malasugui, 63 Phil., 221). Bibiana Sanson's detention ordered by
the appellant took place exactly under these same circumstances.
Wherefore, judgment is rendered acquitting the appellant Vicente P. Ancheta, lieutenant of the
Constabulary, of the crime of arbitrary detention with which he was charged, the detention of Bibiana
"Sanson ordered by him being as it is now declared sufficiently justified, in view of the circumstances
surrounding the same, with the costs de oficio. So ordered.
Avanceña, C. J.,  Villa-Real, Imperial, Diaz,  Concepcion, and Moran, JJ.
Judgment reversed and defendant acquitted.

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