ARTICLE VII.

Executive Department

Sec. 1.
Executive Power

FERDINAND E. MARCOS VS HON. RAUL MANGLAPUS (secretary of

Foreign Affairs) (residual power)

FACTS:
In February 1986, Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the
non-violent people power revolution and forced into exile. In his stead, Corazon C.
Aquino was declared President of the Republic under a revolutionary government.
The ratification of the 1987 Constitution enshrined the victory of “people power”
and constitutional moorings of Aquino’s presidency. This did not however stop
bloody challenges to the government.
Now Mr. Marcos in his deathbed, signified his wish to return to the Philippines to
die. But president Aquino considering the dire consequences to the nation of his
turn at a time when the stability of the government is threatened from various
directions and the economy is just beginning to rise and move forward, has stood
firmly on the decision to bar the return of Mr. Marcos and his family.

ISSUE: whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution,
the President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.

RULING: Yes.
ARGUMENT OF PETITIONERS:
The case for petitioners is founded on the assertion that the right of the Marcoses to
return to the Philippines is guaranteed under the following provisions of the Bill of
Rights, to wit:

Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due

process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits
prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court.
Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national
security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.
The petitioners further assert that under international law, the right of Mr. Marcos
and his family to return to the Philippines is guaranteed.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides:

Article 13. (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence
within the borders of each state.

(2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to
his country.

ARGUMENT OF RESPODENTS:
Respondents argue for the primacy of the right of the State to national security
over individual rights. In support thereof, they cite Article II of the Constitution, to
wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Section 4. The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people.
The Government may call upon the people to defend the State and, in the
fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be required, under conditions provided by law,
to render personal, military, or civil service.

Section 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and
property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment
by all the people of the blessings of democracy.

On right to return to one’s country

The right to return to one’s country is not among the rights specifically guaranteed
in the Bill of Rights, which treats only of the liberty of abode and the right to
travel, but it is our well-considered view that the right to return may be considered,
as a generally accepted principle of international law and, under our
Constitution, is part of the law of the land [Art. II, Sec. 2 of the Constitution.]
However, it is distinct and separate from the right to travel and enjoys a different
protection under the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, i.e.,
against being "arbitrarily deprived" thereof

On Executive Power

The Constitution provides that" [t]he executive power shall be vested in the
President of the Philippines." [Art. VII, Sec. 1]. However, it does not define what
is meant by "executive power" although in the same article it touches on the
exercise of certain powers by the President, i.e., the power of control over all
executive departments, bureaus and offices, the power to execute the laws, the
appointing power, the powers under the commander-in-chief clause, the power to
grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, the power to grant amnesty with the
concurrence of Congress, the power to contract or guarantee foreign loans, the
power to enter into treaties or international agreements, the power to submit the
budget to Congress, and the power to address Congress

The inevitable question then arises: by enumerating certain powers of the

President did the framers of the Constitution intend that the President shall
exercise those specific powers and no other? Are these enumerated powers the
breadth and scope of "executive power" ?

No.

It would not be accurate, however, to state that "executive power" is the power to
enforce the laws, for the President is head of state as well as head of government
and whatever powers inhere in such positions pertain to the office unless the
Constitution itself withholds it. Furthermore, the Constitution itself provides that
the execution of the laws is only one of the powers of the President. It also grants
the President other powers that do not involve the execution of any provision of
law, e.g., his power over the country’s foreign relations.

On these premises, we hold the view that although the 1987 Constitution imposes
limitations on the exercise of specific powers of the President, it maintains intact
what is traditionally considered as within the scope of "executive power."
Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the
specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is
more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated.

It has been advanced that whatever power inherent in the government that is
neither legislative nor judicial has to be executive.

The Power Involved (Residual power, Protector of the Peace)

The Constitution declares among the guiding principles that" [t]he prime duty of
the Government is to serve and protect the people" and that" [t]he maintenance of
peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and the promotion of
the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the
blessings of democracy.

Faced with the problem of whether or not the time is right to allow the Marcoses to
return to the Philippines, the President is, under the Constitution, constrained to
consider these basic principles in arriving at a decision. More than that, having
sworn to defend and uphold the Constitution, the President has the obligation
under the Constitution to protect the people, promote their welfare and advance
the national interest. It must be borne in mind that the Constitution, aside from
being an allocation of power is also a social contract whereby the people have
surrendered their sovereign powers to the State for the common good. 

The power involved is the President’s residual power to protect the general
welfare of the people. It is founded on the duty of the President, as steward of the
people. To paraphrase Theodore Roosevelt, it is not only the power of the
President but also his duty to do anything not forbidden by the Constitution or the
laws that the needs of the nation demand It is a power borne by the President’s
duty to preserve and defend the Constitution. It also may be viewed as a power
implicit in the President’s duty to take care that the laws are faithfully executed

More particularly, this case calls for the exercise of the President’s powers as
protector of the peace. The power of the President to keep the peace is not limited
merely to exercising the commander-in-chief powers in times of emergency or to
leading the State against external and internal threats to its existence. The President
is not only clothed with extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is also
tasked with attending to the day-to-day problems of maintaining peace and order
and ensuring domestic tranquillity in times when no foreign foe appears on the
horizon.

Djumantan v. Domingo (Executive power, valid exercise, deportation

FACTS:

Bernard Banez, the husband of Marina Cabael, went to Indonesia as a contract

worker. On April 3, 1974, he was converted to Islam. On May 17, 1974, he
married petitioner in accordance with Islamic rites. He returned to the Philippines
in January 1979.
On January 13, 1979, petitioner and her two children with Banez, (two-year old
Marina and nine-month old Nikulas) arrived in Manila as the “guests” of Banez.
The latter made it appear that he was just a friend of the family of petitioner and
was merely repaying the hospitality extended to him during his stay in Indonesia.

When petitioner and her two children arrived at the NAIA on January 13, 1979,
Banez, together with Marina Cabael, met them. Banez executed an “Affidavit of
Guaranty and Support,” for his “guests.”

As “guests,” petitioner and her two children lived in the house of Banez.

Petitioner and her children were admitted to the Philippines as temporary visitors
under Section 9(a) of the Immigration Act of 1940.

In 1981, Marina Cabael discovered the true relationship of her husband and
petitioner. She filed a complaint for “concubinage” with the MTC of Urdaneta,
Pangasinan against the two. This case was, however, dismissed for lack of merit.

On March 25, 1982, the immigration status of petitioner was changed from
temporary visitor to that of permanent resident under Section 13(a) of the same
law. On April 14,1982, petitioner was issued an alien certificate of registration.

Banez’ eldest son, Leonardo, filed a letter complaint with the Ombudsman, who
subsequently referred the letter to the CID. On the basis of the said letter, petitioner
was detained at the CID detention cell. She was later released pending the
deportation proceedings after posting a cash, Thereafter, she manifested to the CID
that she be allowed to depart voluntarily from the Philippines and asked for time to
purchase her airline ticket. However, she had a change of heart and moved for the
dismissal of the deportation case on the ground that she was validly married to a
Filipino citizen.

In September 1990, the CID, through public respondents, decided to revoke the
Section 13(a) visa previously granted to petitioner. It finds the second marriage of
Bernardo Banes to respondent Djumantan irregular and not in accordance with the
laws of the Philippines.

ISSUE:

1. W/N the admission of the petitioner into the country and the change of her status
from temporary visitor to permanent resident is legal.
2. whether the power to deport her has prescribed.

RULING:

1. There was a blatant abuse of our immigration laws in effecting petitioner’s entry
into the country and the change of her immigration status from temporary visitor to
permanent resident. All such privileges were obtained through misrepresentation.

Never was the marriage of petitioner to Banez disclosed to the immigration

authorities in her applications for temporary visitor’s visa and for permanent
residency.

The civil status of an alien applicant for admission as a temporary visitor is a

matter that could influence the exercise of discretion on the part of the immigration
authorities. The immigration authorities would be less inclined to allow the entry
of a woman who claims to have entered into a marriage with a Filipino citizen,
who is married to another woman.

Generally, the right of the President to expel or deport aliens whose presence is
deemed inimical to the public interest is as absolute and unqualified as the right to
prohibit and prevent their entry into the country (Annotations, 8 ALR 1286). This
right is based on the fact that since the aliens are not part of the nation, their
admission into the territory is a matter of pure permission and simple tolerance
which creates no obligation on the part of the government to permit them to stay (3
Am. Jur. 2d. 72).

The interest, which an alien has in being admitted into or allowed to continue to
reside in the country, is protected only so far as Congress may choose to protect it
(United States ex rel. Kaloudis v. Shaughnessy, 180 F. 2d. 489). There is no law
guaranteeing aliens married to Filipino citizens the right to be admitted, much less
to be given permanent residency, in the Philippines.

The fact of marriage by an alien to a citizen does not withdraw her from the
operation of the immigration laws governing the admission and exclusion of aliens.
Marriage of an alien woman to a Filipino husband does not ipso facto make her a
Filipino citizen and does not excuse her from her failure to depart from the country
upon the expiration of her extended stay here as an alien.
Under Section 9 of the Immigration Act of 1940, it is not mandatory for the CID to
admit any alien who applies for a visitor’s visa. Once admitted into the country, the
alien has no right to an indefinite stay. Under Section 13 of the law, an alien
allowed to stay temporarily may apply for a change of status and “may be
admitted” as a permanent resident. Among those considered qualified to apply for
permanent residency is the wife or husband of a Philippine citizen (Immigration
Act of 1940, Sec. 13[a]). The entry of aliens into the country and their admission
as immigrants is not a matter of right, even if they are legally married to Filipino
citizens.

2. Under clause 1 of Section 37(a), an “alien who enters the Philippines after the
effective date of this Act by means of false and misleading statements or without
inspection and admission by the immigration authorities at a designated port of
entry or at any place other than at a designated port of entry” is subject to
deportation.

The deportation of an alien under said clause of Section 37(a) has a prescriptive
period and “shall not be effected x x x unless the arrest in the deportation
proceedings is made within five years after the cause for deportation arises”
(Immigration Act of 1940, Sec. 37[b]).

Congress may impose a limitation of time for the deportation of alien from the
country.

The right of public respondents to deport petitioner has prescribed.

Petitioner was admitted and allowed entry into the Philippines on January 13, 1979
on the basis of false and misleading statements in her application and in the other
supporting documents submitted to the immigration authorities, Leonardo C.
Banez first complained with the CID on November 19, 1980 about the manner
petitioner was admitted into the country and asked for her deportation (Rollo, pp.
77–78). After the EDSA Revolution, he sent a follow-up letter to the CID
requesting action on his 1980 letter-complaint (Rollo, p. 78).

Tolling the prescriptive period from November 19,1980, when Leonardo C. Banez
informed the CID of the illegal entry of petitioner into the country, more than five
years had elapsed before the issuance of the order of her deportation on September
27, 1990.
The “arrest” contemplated by Section 37(b) refers to the arrest for the purpose of
carrying out an order for deportation and not the arrest prior to proceedings to
determine the right of the alien to stay in the country. When public respondents
revoked the permanent resident visa issued to petitioner, they, in effect, ordered her
arrest and deportation as an overstaying alien.

SALVADOR H. LAUREL vs. RAMON GARCIA, as head of the Asset

Privatization Trust, RAUL MANGLAPUS, as Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
and CATALINO MACARAIG, as Executive Secretary, respondents.

FACTS:

 Subject property in this case is one of the four (4) properties in Japan
acquired by the Philippine government under the Reparations Agreement
entered into with Japan in 1956:
o Nampeidai Property  at Tokyo - Philippine Embassy Chancery
o Kobe Commercial Property – commercial lot
o Kobe Residential Property -  a residential lot which is now vacant.
 These properties  were part of the indemnification to the Filipino people for
their losses in life and property and their suffering during World War II.
 The Reparations Agreement provides that reparations valued at $550
million.
 The Roppongi property was acquired from the Japanese government under
the Second Year Schedule and listed under the heading "Government
Sector"
o It consists of the land and building "for the Chancery of the Philippine
Embassy"
o It became the site of the Philippine Embassy until the latter was
transferred to Nampeidai
 A proposal was presented to President Corazon C. Aquino by former
Philippine Ambassador to Japan, Carlos J. Valdez, to make the property the
subject of a lease agreement with a Japanese firm - Kajima Corporation —
which shall construct two (2) buildings in Roppongi and one (1) building in
Nampeidai and renovate the present Philippine Chancery in Nampeidai.
o At the end of the lease period, all the three leased buildings shall be
occupied and used by the Philippine government. No change of
ownership or title shall occur.
 1987, the President issued Executive Order No. 296 entitling non-Filipino
citizens or entities to avail of separations' capital goods and services in the
event of sale, lease or disposition. The four properties in Japan including the
Roppongi were specifically mentioned in the first "Whereas" clause.
 the Executive branch of the government has been pushing, with great vigor,
its decision to sell the reparations properties starting with the Roppongi lot.
 The property had been set up for bidding for 225M USD.
 Petitioner Laurel asserted the Roppongi property is classified as one of
public dominion, and not of private ownership under Article 420 of the Civil
Code
o property intended for public service
o  no ownership by any one can attach to it, not even by the State
 Respondents’
o subject property is not governed by our Civil Code but by the laws of
Japan where the property is located.
o even assuming for the sake of argument that the Civil Code is
applicable, the Roppongi property has ceased to become property of
public dominion
 Has not been used for public service for 13 years
 There was the intent of the Executive to convert it to the private
use
 Petitioner Laurel was questioning the validity of EO 296
o executive order contravenes the constitutional mandate to conserve
and develop the national patrimony stated in the Preamble of the 1987
Constitution
o Sections 2 and 3, Article XII, Constitution; Sections 22 and 23 of
Commonwealth Act 141 (The reservation of the ownership and
acquisition of alienable lands of the public domain to Filipino
citizens.)
o Section 10, Article VI, Constitution (The preference for Filipino
citizens in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the
national economy and patrimony)
o The protection given to Filipino enterprises against unfair competition
and trade practices
o The guarantee of the right of the people to information on all matters
of public concern (Section 7, Article III, Constitution)
o The prohibition against the sale to non-Filipino citizens or entities not
wholly owned by Filipino citizens of capital goods received by the
 Philippines under the Reparations Act (Sections 2 and 12 of Rep. Act
No. 1789)
o The declaration of the state policy of full public disclosure of all
transactions involving public interest (Section 28, Article III,
Constitution)
 Petitioner Ojeda : use of public funds in the execution of an unconstitutional
executive order is a misapplication of public funds 

ISSUES:

1. Can the Roppongi property and others of its kind be alienated by the Philippine
Government?
2. Does the Chief Executive, her officers and agents, have the authority and
jurisdiction, to sell the Roppongi property?

RULING:

1. No.

As property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the commerce of

man. It cannot be alienated. Its ownership is a special collective ownership for
general use and enjoyment, an application to the satisfaction of collective needs,
and resides in the social group.

The purpose is not to serve the State as a juridical person, but the citizens; it is
intended for the common and public welfare and cannot be the object of
appropriation.

The Roppongi property is correctly classified under paragraph 2 of Article 420

of the Civil Code as property belonging to the State and intended for some public
service.

The Supreme Court emphasized the abandonment of the intention to use the
Roppongi property for public service and to make it patrimonial property under
Civil Code must be definite. Abandonment cannot be inferred from the non-use
alone specially if the non-use was attributable not to the government's own
deliberate and indubitable will but to a lack of financial support to repair and
improve the property.

Executive Order No. 296, though its title declares an "authority to sell", does
not have a provision in its text expressly authorizing the sale of the four properties
procured from Japan for the government sector. The executive order does not
declare that the properties lost their public character. It merely intends to make the
properties available to foreigners and not to Filipinos alone in case of a sale, lease
or other disposition. It merely eliminates the restriction under Rep. Act No. 1789
that reparations goods may be sold only to Filipino citizens and one hundred
(100%) percent Filipino-owned entities.

The respondents try to get around the public dominion character of the
Roppongi property by insisting that Japanese law and not our Civil Code should
apply. • There is no conflict of law situation in this case. A conflict of law
situation arises only when:

 There is a dispute over the title or ownership of an immovable, such that the
capacity to take and transfer immovables, the formalities of conveyance, the
essential validity and effect of the transfer, or the interpretation and effect of
a conveyance, are to be determined
 A foreign law on land ownership and its conveyance is asserted to conflict
with a domestic law on the same matters. Hence, the need to determine
which law should apply.

In the instant case, none of the above elements exists. The issues are not concerned
with validity of ownership or title. There is no question that the property belongs to
the Philippines. The issue is the authority of the respondent officials to validly
dispose of property belonging to the State. And the validity of the procedures
adopted to effect its sale. This is governed by Philippine Law. The rule of lex situs
does not apply.

2. The Chief Executive, her officers and agents, do not have the authority and
jurisdiction, to sell the Roppongi property.

No. The subsequent approval on October 4, 1988 by President Aquino of the

recommendation by the investigating committee to sell the Roppongi property was
premature…Moreover, the approval does not have the force and effect of law since
the President already lost her legislative powers. The Congress had already
convened for more than a year.

Assuming for the sake of argument, however, that the Roppongi property is no
longer of public dominion, there is another obstacle to its sale by the respondents.
There is no law authorizing its conveyance. Under the Admin Code of 1987, it is
not for the President to convey valuable real property of the government on his or
her own sole will. Any such conveyance must be authorized and approved by a law
enacted by the Congress. It requires executive and legislative concurrence.

LUIS C. BIRAOGO vs. THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION . ]

(power of the President to investigate)

FACTS:
Before the Supreme Court are two consolidated cases which assail the validity and
constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 Dated July 30, 2010 entitled “Creating
the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010”

The cases can be traced to the to the events prior to the May 2010 elections when
then Senator Benigno Simeon Aquino III declared his staunch condemnation of
graft and corruption with his slogan “Kung wala corrupt wala mahirap” this
convinced the Filipino people and catapulted him to the presidency.

To transform his slogan into reality, President Aquino found a need for a special
body to investigate reported cases of graft and corruption allegedly committed
during the previous administration.

Thus the President signed E.O. No. 1 which established the Philippine Truth
Commission.

The Philippine Truth Commission is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office
of the President with the primary task to investigate reports of graft and corruption
by third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and
accessories during the previous administration and to submit its findings to the
President, Congress and the Ombudsman.
To accomplish this task, the PTC has all the powers of an investigative body under
Section 37 Chapter 9 of the Administrative code. I cannot adjudicate.

Truth commissions have been described as bodies that share the following
characteristics: (1) they examine only past events; (2) they investigate patterns of
abuse committed over a period of time, as opposed to a particular event; (3) they
are temporary bodies that finish their work with the submission of a report
containing conclusions and recommendations; and (4) they are officially
sanctioned, authorized or empowered by the State.

Thus, their main goals range from retribution to reconciliation. The Nuremburg
and Tokyo war crime tribunals are examples of a retributory or vindicatory body
set up to try and punish those responsible for crimes against humanity. A form of a
reconciliatory tribunal is the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South
Africa, the principal function of which was to heal the wounds of past violence and
to prevent future conflict by providing a cathartic experience for victims.

The petitions
Petitioners ask the Supreme Court to declare E.O. No. 1 as Unconstitutional on the
following grounds:
(a) E.O. No. 1 violates the separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the
Congress to create a public office and appropriate funds for its operation.

(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code
of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of the
President to structurally reorganize the Office of the President to achieve
economy, simplicity and efficiency does not include the power to create an
entirely new public office which was hitherto inexistent like the "Truth
Commission."

(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and pertinent statutes when it
vested the "Truth Commission" with quasi-judicial powers duplicating, if
not superseding, those of the Office of the Ombudsman created under the
1987 Constitution and the Department of Justice created under the
Administrative Code of 1987.

(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for
investigation and prosecution officials and personnel of the previous
administration as if corruption is their peculiar species even as it excludes
those of the other administrations, past and present, who may be indictable.

(e) The creation of the "Philippine Truth Commission of 2010" violates the
consistent and general international practice of four decades wherein States
constitute truth commissions to exclusively investigate human rights
violations, which customary practice forms part of the generally accepted
principles of international law which the Philippines is mandated to adhere
to pursuant to the Declaration of Principles enshrined in the Constitution.

(f) The creation of the "Truth Commission" is an exercise in futility, an adventure

in partisan hostility, a launching pad for trial/conviction by publicity and a
mere populist propaganda to mistakenly impress the people that widespread
 poverty will altogether vanish if corruption is eliminated without even
addressing the other major causes of poverty.

(g) The mere fact that previous commissions were not constitutionally challenged
is of no moment because neither laches nor estoppel can bar an eventual
question on the constitutionality and validity of an executive issuance or
even a statute."

ISSUES: 1. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the principle of

separation of powers by usurping the powers of Congress to create and to
appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and commissions
2.Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman
and the DOJ

3.Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the equal protection clause;

RULING:

1. Power of the President to Create the Truth Commission.

Baka lang itanong, diniscuss muna ng SC na ang power create the PTC does not
find justification under the Power of the President to Restructure the Office of
the President, The power of control and the President was not delegated the
power to do so by the Congress:

To say that the PTC is borne out of a restructuring of the Office of the President
under Section 31 is a misplaced supposition, even in the plainest meaning
attributable to the term "restructure"– an "alteration of an existing structure."
Evidently, the PTC was not part of the structure of the Office of the President prior
to the enactment of Executive Order No. 1

In the same vein, the creation of the PTC is not justified by the President’s power
of control. Control is essentially the power to alter or modify or nullify or set aside
what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former with that of the latter.

According to the OSG, the power to create a truth commission pursuant to the
above provision finds statutory basis under P.D. 1416, as amended by P.D. No.
1772.
 The said law granted the President the continuing authority to reorganize the
national government, including the power to group, consolidate bureaus and
agencies, to abolish offices, to transfer functions, to create and classify functions,
services and activities, transfer appropriations, and to standardize salaries and
materials. This decree, in relation to Section 20, Title I, Book III of E.O. 292 has
been invoked in several cases such as Larin v. Executive Secretary.

The Court, however, declines to recognize P.D. No. 1416 as a justification for the
President to create a public office. Said decree is already stale, anachronistic and
inoperable. P.D. No. 1416 was a delegation to then President Marcos of the
authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the national government
including the power to create offices and transfer appropriations pursuant to one of
the purposes of the decree, embodied in its last "Whereas" clause

While the power to create a truth commission cannot pass muster on the basis of
P.D. No. 1416 as amended by P.D. No. 1772, the creation of the PTC finds
justification under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution, imposing upon the
President the duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. Section 17
reads:

Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments,
bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.

As correctly pointed out by the respondents, the allocation of power in the three
principal branches of government is a grant of all powers inherent in them. The
President’s power to conduct investigations to aid him in ensuring the faithful
execution of laws – in this case, fundamental laws on public accountability and
transparency – is inherent in the President’s powers as the Chief Executive. That
the authority of the President to conduct investigations and to create bodies to
execute this power is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution or in statutes
does not mean that he is bereft of such authority.

As explained in Marcos vs Manglapus:

“It would not be accurate, however, to state that "executive power" is the power to
enforce the laws, for the President is head of state as well as head of government
and whatever powers inhere in such positions pertain to the office unless the
Constitution itself withholds it. Furthermore, the Constitution itself provides that
the execution of the laws is only one of the powers of the President. It also grants
the President other powers that do not involve the execution of any provision of
law, e.g., his power over the country's foreign relations.
On these premises, we hold the view that although the 1987 Constitution imposes
limitations on the exercise of specific powers of the President, it maintains intact
what is traditionally considered as within the scope of "executive power."
Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the
specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is
more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated.”

Indeed, the Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully
executed. The powers of the President are not limited to those specific powers
under the Constitution. One of the recognized powers of the President granted
pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc
committees. This flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if
laws have been faithfully executed. Thus, in Department of Health v.
Camposano, the authority of the President to issue Administrative Order No. 298,
creating an investigative committee to look into the administrative charges filed
against the employees of the Department of Health for the anomalous purchase of
medicines was upheld. In said case, it was ruled:

The Chief Executive’s power to create the Ad hoc Investigating Committee

cannot be doubted. Having been constitutionally granted full control of the
Executive Department, to which respondents belong, the President has the
obligation to ensure that all executive officials and employees faithfully comply
with the law. With AO 298 as mandate, the legality of the investigation is
sustained. Such validity is not affected by the fact that the investigating team and
the PCAGC had the same composition, or that the former used the offices and
facilities of the latter in conducting the inquiry.

On the charge that Executive Order No. 1 transgresses the power of Congress to
appropriate funds for the operation of a public office, suffice it to say that there
will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing funds
already appropriated.

2. Power of the Truth Commission to Investigate

The President’s power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully
executed is well recognized. It flows from the faithful-execution clause of the
Constitution under Article VII, Section 17 thereof. As the Chief Executive, the
president represents the government as a whole and sees to it that all laws are
enforced by the officials and employees of his department. He has the authority to
directly assume the functions of the executive department.

nvoking this authority, the President constituted the PTC to primarily investigate
reports of graft and corruption and to recommend the appropriate action. As
previously stated, no quasi-judicial powers have been vested in the said body as it
cannot adjudicate rights of persons who come before it. It has been said that
"Quasi-judicial powers involve the power to hear and determine questions of fact
to which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the
standards laid down by law itself in enforcing and administering the same law."

"Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or delve

or probe into, research on, study. The dictionary definition of "investigate" is "to
observe or study closely: inquire into systematically: "to search or inquire into: x x
to subject to an official probe x x: to conduct an official inquiry." The purpose of
investigation, of course, is to discover, to find out, to learn, obtain information.
Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of settling, deciding or resolving a
controversy involved in the facts inquired into by application of the law to the facts
established by the inquiry.

"Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate,

judge, decide, determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary defines the term as
"to settle finally (the rights and duties of the parties to a court case) on the merits
of issues raised: x x to pass judgment on: settle judicially: x x act as judge." And
"adjudge" means "to decide or rule upon as a judge or with judicial or quasi-
judicial powers: x x to award or grant judicially in a case of controversy x x."

Contrary to petitioners’ apprehension, the PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman
or the DOJ or erode their respective powers. If at all, the investigative function of
the commission will complement those of the two offices. As pointed out by the
Solicitor General, the recommendation to prosecute is but a consequence of the
overall task of the commission to conduct a fact-finding investigation.

he phrase, "when in the course of its investigation," under Section 2(g), highlights
this fact and gives credence to a contrary interpretation from that of the petitioners.
The function of determining probable cause for the filing of the appropriate
complaints before the courts remains to be with the DOJ and the Ombudsman

At any rate, the Ombudsman’s power to investigate under R.A. No. 6770 is not
exclusive but is shared with other similarly authorized government agencies.
 3. Violation of the Equal Protection Clause

Although the purpose of the Truth Commission falls within the investigative power
of the President, the Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of
Executive Order No. 1 in view of its apparent transgression of the equal protection
clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution.
Section 1 reads:

Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.\

The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of
the legislature. Its inhibitions cover all the departments of the government
including the political and executive departments, and extend to all actions of a
state denying equal protection of the laws, through whatever agency or whatever
guise is taken. 

It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or
things without distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as
determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause
permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test
of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on
substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not
limited to existing conditions only; and

(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.

Applying these precepts to this case, Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down
as violative of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of the envisioned
truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth "concerning the reported
cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration"  only. The
intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest.
Mention of it has been made in at least three portions of the questioned
executive order.

US v. Nixon - 418 US 683 [1974] (general claim of executive privilege)

SUMMARY: This case arose from the Watergate scandal, following a burglary at
the Democrat Party headquarters in the Watergate building complex in
Washington, D.C. President Richard Nixon, who was contesting the 1972
presidential election against Democrat candidate George McGovern, sought to
quash a subpoena obtained by special prosecutor Leon Jaworski, who had been
appointed to investigate the burglary. (Nixon had fired the initial special
prosecutor, Archibald Cox, as well as Attorney General Elliot Richardson during
the infamous Saturday Night Massacre.)

US President Richard Nixon, a sitting President, was subpoenaed to produce

certain recordings and documents relating to his conversations with aids and
advisers. Seven advisers of President Nixon's associates were facing charges of
conspiracy to obstruct Justice and other offenses, which were committed in a
burglary of the Democratic National Headquarters in Washington's Watergate
Hotel during the 972 presidential campaign. President Nixon himself was named
an unindicted co-conspirator. The subpoena was designed to give Jaworski access
to tapes and papers that concerned meetings between Nixon and people who had
been indicted in connection with the burglary. There were reasonable grounds to
believe that this evidence contained statements that would be damaging to Nixon
as well as the indicted people. Nixon complied in part with the subpoena, releasing
edited versions of dozens of conversations and parts of 20 conversations that the
subpoena had named. However, he asked the federal court to quash the subpoena
based on lack of necessity and the President's executive privilege.

FACTS:
On March 1, 1974, a grand jury of the United States District Court for the District
of Columbia returned an indictment charging seven named individuals. with
various offenses, including conspiracy to defraud the United States and to obstruct
justice. Although he was not designated as such in the indictment, the grand jury
named the President, among others, as an unindicted coconspirator. On April 18,
1974, upon motion of the Special Prosecutor, a subpoena duces tecum was issued
pursuant to Rule 17 (c) to the President by the United States District Court and
made returnable on May 2, 1974. The subpoena required the production of certain
tapes, memoranda, papers, transcripts, or other writings relating to certain precisely
identified meetings between the President and others.
On April 30, the President publicly released edited transcripts of 43 conversations;
portions of 20 conversations subject to subpoena in the present case were included.
On May 1, 1974, the President's counsel filed a "special appearance" and a motion
to quash the subpoena under Rule 17 (c). This motion was accompanied by a
formal claim of privilege.

On May 20, 1974, the District Court denied the motion to quash and the motions to
expunge and for protective orders., it further ordered to deliver to the District
Court, on or before May 31, 1974, the originals of all subpoenaed items, as well as
an index and analysis of those items, together with tape copies of those portions of
the subpoenaed recordings for which transcripts had been released to the public by
the President on April 30. The District Court rejected jurisdictional challenges
based on a contention that the dispute was nonjusticiable because it was between
the Special Prosecutor and the Chief Executive and hence "intra-executive" in
character.

The District Court held that the judiciary, not the President, was the final arbiter of
a claim of executive privilege. The court concluded that, under the circumstances
of this case, the presumptive privilege was overcome by the Special Prosecutor's
prima facie "demonstration of need sufficiently compelling to warrant judicial
examination in chambers . . . ." On May 24, 1974, the President filed a timely
notice of appeal from the District Court order, and the certified record from the
District Court. On May 31, the petition was granted with an expedited briefing
schedule. On June 6, the President filed, under seal, a cross-petition for writ of
certiorari before judgment. This cross-petition was granted June 15, 1974, and the
case was set for argument on July 8, 1974.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the subpoena duces tecum is binding upon the President of the
United States based on the principles of executive privilege and separation of
powers.

RULING:
SUMMARY: The President cannot shield himself from producing evidence in a
criminal prosecution based on the doctrine of executive privilege, although it is
valid in other situations.The claim of privilege was based on the President’s
general interest in the confidentiality of his conversations and correspondence.
The U.S. Court held that while there is no explicit reference 6to a privilege of
confidentiality in the U.S. Constitution, it is constitutionally based to the extent
that it relates to the effective discharge of a President’s powers. It concluded that
"when the ground for asserting privilege as to subpoenaed materials sought for
use in a criminal trial is based only on the generalized interest in confidentiality, it
cannot prevail over the fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair
administration of criminal justice." Notably, the Court was careful to clarify that it
was not there addressing the issue of claims of privilege in a civil litigation or
against congressional demands for information.

The Supreme Court of the United States (“Supreme Court”) had to balance the
executive privilege against the rights of citizens to face their accusers and to have
a speedy and fair trial. The Court made the point that the President is not a
normal citizen, and therefore should receive great deference regarding executive
claims of privilege. However, executive privilege is not absolute and must be
balanced against the right of the accused in criminal proceedings.

A.
The first contention is a broad claim that the separation of powers doctrine
precludes judicial review of a President's claim of privilege. The second contention
is that if he does not prevail on the claim of absolute privilege, the court should
hold as a matter of constitutional law that the privilege prevails over the subpoena
duces tecum.
Our system of government "requires that federal courts on occasion interpret the
Constitution in a manner at variance with the construction given the document by
another branch." Powell v. McCormack, supra, at 549. And in Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S., at 211 , the Court stated:
"Deciding whether a matter has in any measure been committed by the
Constitution to another branch of government, or whether the action of that branch
exceeds whatever authority has been committed, is itself a delicate exercise in
constitutional interpretation, and is a responsibility of this Court as ultimate
interpreter of the Constitution."
We therefore reaffirm that it is the province and duty of this Court "to say what the
law is" with respect to the claim of privilege presented in this case.

B.
In support of his claim of absolute privilege, the President's counsel urges two
grounds, one of which is common to all governments and one of which is peculiar
to our system of separation of powers. The first ground is the valid need for
protection of communications between high Government officials and those who
advise and assist them in the performance of their manifold duties. Whatever the
nature of the privilege of confidentiality of Presidential communications in the
exercise of Art. II powers, the privilege can be said to derive from the supremacy
of each branch within its own assigned area of constitutional duties. Certain
powers and privileges flow from the nature of enumerated powers.

The second ground asserted by the President's counsel in support of the claim of
absolute privilege rests on the doctrine of separation of powers. Here it is argued
that the independence of the Executive Branch within its own sphere, it insulates a
President from a judicial subpoena in an ongoing criminal prosecution, and thereby
protects confidential Presidential communications.

Neither the doctrine of separation of powers, nor the need for confidentiality of
high-level communications, without more, can sustain an absolute, unqualified
Presidential privilege of immunity from judicial process under all circumstances.
When the privilege depends solely on the broad, undifferentiated claim of public
interest in the confidentiality of such conversations, a confrontation with other
values arises. Absent a claim of need to protect military, diplomatic, or sensitive
national security secrets, we find it difficult to accept the argument that even the
very important interest in confidentiality of Presidential communications is
significantly diminished by production of such material for in camera inspection
with all the protection that a district court will be obliged to provide.

To read the Art. II powers of the President as providing an absolute privilege as

against a subpoena essential to enforcement of criminal statutes on no more than a
generalized claim of the public interest in confidentiality of nonmilitary and
nondiplomatic discussions would upset the constitutional balance of "a workable
government" and gravely impair the role of the courts under Art. III.

C.

In this case the President challenges a subpoena served on him as a third party
requiring the production of materials for use in a criminal prosecution; he does so
on the claim that he has a privilege against disclosure of confidential
communications. He does not place his claim of privilege on the ground they are
military or diplomatic secrets. The presumptive privilege [confidentiality of his
conversations] must be considered with the historic commitment of the rule of law,
specifically the twofold aim that guilt shall not escape or innocence shall not
suffer. The Sixth Amendment explicitly confers upon every defendant in a criminal
trial the right "to be confronted with the witnesses against him" and "to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor." Moreover, the Fifth
Amendment also guarantees that no person shall be deprived of liberty without due
process of law.

In this case we must weigh the importance of the general privilege of

confidentiality of Presidential communications in performance of the President's
responsibilities against the inroads of such a privilege on the fair administration of
criminal justice. The President's broad interest in confidentiality of
communications will not be vitiated by disclosure of a limited number of
conversations preliminarily shown to have some bearing on the pending criminal
cases.
We conclude that when the ground for asserting privilege as to subpoenaed
materials sought for use in a criminal trial is based only on the generalized interest
in confidentiality. It cannot prevail over the fundamental demands of due process
of law in the fair administration of criminal justice.

D
We have earlier determined that the District Court did not err in authorizing the
issuance of the subpoena. If a President concludes that compliance with a subpoena
would be injurious to the public interest he may properly, as was done here, invoke
a claim of privilege on the return of the subpoena. Upon receiving a claim of
privilege from the Chief Executive, it became the further duty of the District Court
to treat the subpoenaed material as presumptively privileged and to require the
Special Prosecutor to demonstrate that the Presidential material was "essential to
the justice of the [pending criminal] case."

Those issues now having been disposed of, the matter of implementation will rest
with the District Court. "[T]he guard, furnished to [the President] to protect him
from being harassed by vexatious and unnecessary subpoenas, is to be looked for
in the conduct of a [district] court after those subpoenas have issued; not in any
circumstance which is to precede their being issued." Statements that meet the test
of admissibility and relevance must be isolated; all other material must be excised.
It is elementary that in camera inspection of evidence is always a procedure calling
for scrupulous protection against any release or publication of material not found
by the court, at that stage, probably admissible in evidence and relevant to the
issues of the trial for which it is sought.

It is therefore necessary in the public interest to afford Presidential confidentiality

the greatest protection consistent with the fair administration of justice. The need
for confidentiality even as to idle conversations with associates in which casual
reference might be made concerning political leaders within the country or foreign
statesmen is too obvious to call for further treatment.

*Akbayan v. Aquino
Facts:
Petitioners, as non-government orgs, congresspersons, citizens and
taxpayers, filed a petition for mandamus and prohibition seeking to compel
respondents, Department of Trade Industry (DTI) Undersecretary Thomas Aquino,
et al., to furnish petitioners the full text of the Japan-Philippines Economic
Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) including the Philippine and Japanese offers
(parts of the notes of negotiating parties) submitted during the negotiation process
and all pertinent attachments and annexes thereto.

The JPEPA, which will be the first bilateral free trade agreement to be
entered into by the Philippines with another country in the event the Senate grants
its consent to it, covers a broad range of topics which includes trade in goods, rules
of origin, customs procedures, paperless trading, trade in services, investment,
intellectual property rights, government procurement, movement of natural
persons, cooperation, competition policy, mutual recognition, dispute avoidance
and settlement, improvement of the business environment, and general and final
provisions.

Grounds relied upon by petitioners:

  said agreement violates their right to information on matters of public
concern and of public interest
 contravenes other constitutional provisions on transparency, such as that on
the policy of full public disclosure of all transactions involving public
interest
 non-disclosure of the same documents undermines their right to effective
and reasonable participation in all levels of social, political and economic
decision making
 In divulging the contents of the JPEPA only after the agreement has been
concluded will effectively make the Senate into a mere rubber stamp of the
Executive, in violation of the principle of separation of powers.

From the nature of the JPEPA as an international trade agreement, it is

evident that the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the negotiations
towards its execution are matters of public concern. This, respondents do not
dispute. They only claim that diplomatic negotiations are covered by the doctrine
of executive privilege, thus constituting an exception to the right to information
and the policy of full public disclosure.

Issue:
1. Whether the full text/content/negotiation of the JPEPA is under the
executive privileged and thus must be confidential?
2. Whether the privilege applies only at certain stages of the negotiation
process
3. Whether there is sufficient public interest to overcome the claim of privilege

RULING:
1. Yes.
The privileged character of diplomatic negotiations has been recognized in this
jurisdiction.
 In Chavez v. PCGG: "information on inter-government exchanges prior to
the conclusion of treaties and executive agreements may be subject to
reasonable safeguards for the sake of national interest.
 In PMPF v. Manglapus (RP – US Military Bases Agreement):  "secrecy of
negotiations with foreign countries is not violative of the constitutional
provisions of freedom of speech or of the press nor of the freedom of access
 to information. Also, the President is the sole organ of the nation in its
external relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations
Applying the principles adopted in PMPF v. Manglapus, it is clear that while the
final text of the JPEPA may not be kept perpetually confidential – since there
should be "ample opportunity for discussion before [a treaty] is approved" –
the offers exchanged by the parties during the negotiations continue to be
privileged even after the JPEPA is published. It is reasonable to conclude that the
Japanese representatives submitted their offers with the understanding that
"historic confidentiality"27 would govern the same. Disclosing these offers could
impair the ability of the Philippines to deal not only with Japan but with other
foreign governments in future negotiations.
But diplomatic negotiations only hold presumptive privilege. (TO BE
DISCUSSED IN #3 RULING)
2. No. The duty to disclose "definite propositions of the government" does not
apply to diplomatic negotiations. In Chavez v. PEA and Chavez v. PCGG,
the SC held that the constitutional right to information includes official
information on on-going negotiations before a final contract. The
information, however, must constitute definite propositions by the
government and should not cover recognized exceptions like privileged
information, military and diplomatic secrets and similar matters affecting
national security and public order.
It follows from this ruling that even definite propositions of the government
may not be disclosed if they fall under "recognized exceptions." The privilege
for diplomatic negotiations is clearly among the recognized exceptions, for the
footnote to the immediately quoted ruling cites PMPF v. Manglapus itself as an
authority.
3. No.
Petitioners claimed the non-involvement of the Filipino people in the JPEPA
negotiation process effectively results in the bargaining away of their economic
and property rights without their knowledge and participation, in violation of the
due process clause of the Constitution. The SC held that this issue a question of
fact which this Court need not resolve. Suffice it to state that respondents had
presented documents purporting to show that public consultations were
conducted on the JPEPA.
Petitioner-members of the House of Representatives additionally anchor their
claim to have a right to the subject documents on the basis of Congress’ inherent
power to regulate commerce, be it domestic or international. Also, they argue that
the President cannot exclude Congress from the JPEPA negotiations since
whatever power and authority the President has to negotiate international trade
agreements is derived only by delegation of Congress, pursuant to Article VI,
Section 28(2) of the Constitution 
The SC held that the subject of Article VI Section 28(2) of the Constitution is not
the power to negotiate treaties and international agreements, but the power to fix
tariff rates, import and export quotas, and other taxes.
As to the power to negotiate treaties, the constitutional basis thereof is Section 21
of Article VII – the article on the Executive Department – which states:
No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred
in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.
By constitutional fiat and by the intrinsic nature of his office, the President, as head
of State, is the sole organ and authority in the external affairs of the country. In
many ways, the President is the chief architect of the nation's foreign policy; his
"dominance in the field of foreign relations is (then) conceded." Wielding vast
powers and influence, his conduct in the external affairs of the nation, as Jefferson
describes, is "executive altogether."
As regards the power to enter into treaties or international agreements, the
Constitution vests the same in the President, subject only to the concurrence of at
least two thirds vote of all the members of the Senate. In this light, the negotiation
of the VFA and the subsequent ratification of the agreement are exclusive acts
which pertain solely to the President, in the lawful exercise of his vast executive
and diplomatic powers granted him no less than by the fundamental law itself. Into
the field of negotiation the Senate cannot intrude, and Congress itself is powerless
to invade it.
Immunity from Suit.

MAXIMO SOLIVEN vs. HON. RAMOM P. MAKASIAR

LUIS D. BELTRAN vs. HON RAMON P. MAKASIAR

FACTS: (Not from the case, ito source:

https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1987/10/13/aquino-sues-
philippine-journalist-for-libel/d6977cd8-5452-4a1b-a843-d70f351579f5/)

In 1987 then President Corazon Aquino filed a criminal complaint for libel against
Luis Beltran who wrote that Aquino hid under her bed during an aborted coup
attempt on August 28, 1987.

“The columnist, Luis Beltran of the Philippine Star, wrote in this morning's
edition: "The president hid under her bed while the firing was going on -- perhaps
the first commander-in-chief of the armed forces to have done so."

Luis Beltran contends that reasons which necessitate presidential immunity from
suit impose a correlative disability to file suit. He contends that if criminal
proceedings ensue the president may subsequently have to be a witness for the
prosecution bringing her under the trial court’s jurisdiction.

ISSUES: (1) whether or not petitioners were denied due process when
informations for libel were filed against them although the finding of the existence
of a prima facie case was still under review by the Secretary of Justice and,
subsequently, by the President;

(2) whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when
respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest without personally examining
the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause; and
 (3) whether or not the President of the Philippines, under the Constitution, may
initiate criminal proceedings against the petitioners through the filing of a
complaint-affidavit.

RULING:

1. Subsequent events have rendered the first issue moot and academic

It may also be added that with respect to petitioner Beltran, the allegation of
denial of due process of law in the preliminary investigation is negated by
the fact that instead of submitting his counter- affidavits, he filed a "Motion
to Declare Proceedings Closed," in effect waiving his right to refute the
complaint by filing counter-affidavits. Due process of law does not require
that the respondent in a criminal case actually file his counter-affidavits
before the preliminary investigation is deemed completed. All that is
required is that the respondent be given the opportunity to submit counter-
affidavits if he is so minded.

2. What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal

responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of
probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for
the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally
examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine
and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting
documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause
and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis
thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and
require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in
arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.

It has not been shown that respondent judge has deviated from the
prescribed procedure. Thus, with regard to the issuance of the warrants of
arrest, a finding of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction cannot be sustained.

3. Who may invoke presidential immunity from suit.

to restate Petitioner Beltran argues that "the reasons which necessitate

presidential immunity from suit impose a correlative disability to file suit."
He contends that if criminal proceedings ensue by virtue of the President's
filing of her complaint-affidavit, she may subsequently have to be a witness
 for the prosecution, bringing her under the trial court's jurisdiction. This,
continues Beltran, would in an indirect way defeat her privilege of immunity
from suit, as by testifying on the witness stand, she would be exposing
herself to possible contempt of court or perjury.

The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is
to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance
or distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a
job that, aside from requiring all of the office holder's time, also demands
undivided attention.

But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the
office and may be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other
person in the President's behalf. Thus, an accused in a criminal case in which the
President is complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as a defense to
prevent the case from proceeding against such accused.

Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from
waiving the privilege. Thus, if so minded the President may shed the protection
afforded by the privilege and submit to the court's jurisdiction. The choice of
whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the President's prerogative.
It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any other person.

As regards the contention of petitioner Beltran that he could not be held liable for
libel because of the privileged character or the publication, the Court reiterates that
it is not a trier of facts and that such a defense is best left to the trial court to
appreciate after receiving the evidence of the parties.

Poe-Llamanzares v. COMELEC
(qualifications of President)
FACTS :
Grace Poe was found abandoned as a newborn infant in the Parish Church of Jaro,
Iloilo by Edgardo Militar in 1968. Parental care and custody over her was passed
on by Edgardo to his relatives, Emiliano Militar and his wife. Emiliano reported
and registered Grace Poe as a foundling with the Office of the Civil Registrar of
Iloilo City. Fenando Poe, Jr. and Susan Roces adopted Grace Poe.

1991–Poe went to the US to be a permanent resident therein

2001 – She became a naturalized US citizen

First quarter of 2005 – she came back to the Philippines to permanently reside
herein•

February 14, 2006- she went back to the US to dispose family belongings

July 18, 2006 – she re-acquired Filipino citizenship

According to Poe in her 2013 COC for Senator, before the May 13, 2013 election,
she has been a resident of the Philippines for 6 years and 6 months (reckoned from
year 2006 when she re-acquired her Filipino citizenship under RA 9225).

Poe filed her COC for Presidency for the May 9, 2016 elections (hence, computing
from May, 2013, she has been a resident in the Philippines for 9 years and 6
months only)

However, in her COC, Poe declared that she is a natural born and her residence in
the Philippine up to the day before election would be 10 years and 11 months
counted from May 24, 2005 (when she returned from the US to the Philippines for
good).'

ISSUE :

W/N Poe is qualified to be a candidate for President in the National and Local
Election on May 9, 2016 despite being a foundling?

RULING:

Poe is qualified to be a candidate for President in the National and Local Election
on May 9, 2016.

1) Is Poe, a foundling, a natural-born citizen?

Yes, based on: a) Circumstantial evidenceb) Legislation c) Generally accepted

principles of international law

Circumstantial evidence. There is more than sufficient evidence that Poe has
Filipino parents and is therefore a natural- born Filipino. xxx. [T]here is a high
probability that her parents are Filipinos. The Solicitor General offered official
Statistics from the Philippine Statistics office that from 1965 to 1975, the total
number of foreigners born in the Philippines was 15,985. While the Filipinos born
in the country were more than 10 Million. On this basis, there is a 99% chance that
the child born in the Philippines would be a Filipino which in turn, would indicate
more than ample probability that Poe’s parents are Filipinos.

Other circumstantial evidence of the nationality of Poe’s parents are the fact that:1.
She was abandoned in a Roman Catholic Church in Iloilo 2. She has typical
Filipino features.

There are disputable presumptions that things have happened according to the
ordinary course of nature. On this basis, it is safer to assume that Poe’s parents are
Filipinos. To assume otherwise is to accept the absurd.

Legislation Foundlings are as a class, natural born citizens. The amendment to the
Constitution proposed by constitutionalist Rafols to include foundlings as natural
born citizens was not carried out, not because there was any objection to the notion
that persons of unknown parentage are not citizens, but only because their number
was not enough to merit specific mention. There was no intent or language that
would permit discrimination against foundlings. On the contrary, all three
Constitutions guarantee the basic right to equal protection of the laws. Likewise,
domestic laws on adoption support the principle that foundlings are Filipinos.
These laws do not provide that adoption confers citizenship upon the adoptee,
rather, the adoptee must be Filipino in the first place to be adopted. Recent
legislation all expressly refer to “Filipino children” and include foundlings as
among Filipino children who may be adopted.

Generally accepted principles of international law. The common thread of the

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention on the Rights of the Child
and the International Convent on Civil and Political Rights obligates the
Philippines to grant nationality from birth and to ensure that no child is stateless.
The principles stated in the:

1. Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relation to the Conflict of Nationality

laws (that a foundling is presumed to have the nationality of the country of birth)

2. Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (foundling is presumed born of

citizens of the country where he is found)

bind the Philippines although we are not signatory to these conventions.

Poe’s evidence shows that at least 60 countries in Asia, North and South America
and Europe have passed legislation recognizing foundlings as its citizens. 166 out
of 189 countries accept that foundlings are recognized as citizens. Hence, there is a
generally accepted principle of international law to presume foundlings as having
been born and a national of the country in which it is found.

2) After renouncing her American citizenship and after having taken her Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, has Poe re- acquired her status as a
natural-born Filipino citizen?

Yes, Poe’s repatriation resulted to reacquisition of natural born citizenship.

A natural born citizen before he lost his Philippine nationality will be restored to
his former status as natural born Filipino after repatriation (Benson v. HRET,
Pareno v. Commission on Audit etc).

3) Has Poe satisfied the 10 year residency requirement?

Yes, she will have been a resident for 10 years and 11 months on the day of the
election.

There is overwhelming evidence that leads to no to other conclusion that Poe

decided to permanently abandon her US residence and reside in the Philippines as
early as May 24, 2005.

Poe presented voluminous evidence showing that she and her family abandoned
their US domicile and relocated to the Philippines for good. These evidence
include former US passport showing her arrival on May 24, 2005 and her return to
the Philippines every time she travelled abroad, email correspondences with freight
company to arrange for the shipment of household items as well as with the pet
Bureau; school records of her children showing enrolment in the Philippine to the
Philippine schools starting on June 2005 etc. xxx These evidence, coupled with her
eventual application to reacquire Philippine citizenship is clear that when she
returned in May 2005, it was for good.

Poe was able to prove that her statement in her 2013 COC was only a mistake in
good faith. As explained by Grace Poe, she misunderstood the date required in the
2013 COC as the period of residence as of the day she submitted that COC in
2012. She said that she reckoned residency from April-May 2006 which was the
period when the U.S. house was sold and her husband returned to the Philippines.
In that regard, she was advised by her lawyers in 2015 that residence could be
counted from 25 May 2005. Such a mistake could be given in evidence against her
but it was by no means conclusive considering the overwhelming evidence
submitted by Poe.
*Funa v. Executive Secretary, GR No.191644, Feb 19, 2013
DENNIS A.B. FUNA, vs. CTING SECRETARY OF JUSTICE ALBERTO C.
AGRA, IN HIS OFFICIAL CONCURRENT CAPACITIES AS ACTING
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND AS ACTING
SOLICITOR GENERAL, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY LEANDRO R.
MENDOZA, OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, Respondents.

FACTS:
The petitioner Dennis Funa alleges that on March 1, 2010, President Gloria
M. Macapagal-Arroyo appointed Respondent Alberto Agra as the Acting Secretary
of Justice following the Secretary Agnes VST Devanadera in order to compete for
a congressional seat in Quezon Province.
On March 5, 2010, President Arroyo designated Respondent Agra as the
Acting Solicitor General in a concurrent capacity.
On April 7, 2010, the petitioner, in his capacity as a taxpayer, a concerned
citizen and a lawyer, is assailing that Agra’s concurrent appointments or
designations, claiming it to be prohibited under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution.
During the pendency of the suit, President Benigno S. Aquino III appointed
Atty. Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz as the Solicitor General; and that Cadiz assumed as
the Solicitor General and commenced his duties as such on August 5, 2010.
Despite Agra averred a different set of facts.
He represented that on January 12, 2010, he was then the Government
Corporate Counsel when President Arroyo designated him as the Acting Solicitor
General in place of Solicitor General Devanadera who had been appointed as the
Secretary of Justice.
On March 5, 2010, President Arroyo designated him also as the Acting
Secretary of Justice vice Secretary Devanadera who had meanwhile tendered her
resignation in order to run for Congress representing a district in Quezon Province
in the May 2010 elections. He then relinquished his position as the Government
Corporate Counsel; and that pending the appointment of his successor, Agra
continued to perform his duties as the Acting Solicitor General.
Notwithstanding the conflict in the versions of the parties, the fact that Agra
has admitted to holding the two offices concurrently in acting capacities is settled,
which is sufficient for purposes of resolving the constitutional question that
petitioner raises herein.
In Funa v. Ermita (2010 case), the Court resolved a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus brought by herein petitioner assailing the
constitutionality of the designation of then Undersecretary of the Department of
Transportation and Communications (DOTC) Maria Elena H. Bautista as
concurrently the Officer-in-Charge of the Maritime Industry Authority. The
petitioner has adopted here the arguments he advanced in Funa v. Ermita
Petitioner submitted that Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
does not distinguish between an appointment or designation of a Member of the
Cabinet in an acting or temporary capacity, on the one hand, and one in a
permanent capacity, on the other hand.
Acting Secretaries, being nonetheless Members of the Cabinet, are not
exempt from the constitutional ban. He emphasizes that the position of the
Solicitor General is not an ex officio position in relation to the position of the
Secretary of Justice, considering that the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) is
an independent and autonomous office attached to the Department of Justice
(DOJ).
Respondents’ contentions:
 Agra’s concurrent designations as the Acting Secretary of Justice and Acting
Solicitor General were only in a temporary capacity, the only effect of which
was to confer additional duties to him.
 They argue that an appointment, to be covered by the constitutional
prohibition, must be regular and permanent, instead of a mere designation.
 even on the assumption that Agra’s concurrent designation constituted
"holding of multiple offices," his continued service as the Acting Solicitor
General was akin to a hold-over
 OSG’s independence and autonomy are defined by the powers and functions
conferred to that office by law, not by the person appointed to head such
office; and that although the OSG is attached to the DOJ, the DOJ’s
authority, control and supervision over the OSG are limited only to
budgetary purposes.
ISSUE: Did the designation of Agra as the Acting Secretary of Justice,
concurrently with his position of Acting Solicitor General, violate the
constitutional prohibition against dual or multiple offices for the Members of the
Cabinet and their deputies and assistants?

RULING: Yes, The designation of Agra as Acting Secretary of Justice

concurrently with his position of Acting Solicitor General was unconstitutional and
void for being in violation of the constitutional prohibition under Section 13,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution:
Section 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their
deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution,
hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during
said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any
business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or
special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations
or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of
their office.
Section 7, paragraph (2), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution
Section 7. x x x
Unless otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions of his position, no
appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or
any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned
or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
Section 7, Article IX-B is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all
elective and appointive public officials and employees, while Section 13,
Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable only to the President, the
Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants.
The phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution" must be given a
literal interpretation to refer only to those particular instances cited in the
Constitution itself, to wit: the Vice-President being appointed as a member of the
Cabinet under Section 3, par. (2), Article VII; or acting as President in those
instances provided under Section 7, pars. (2) and (3), Article VII; and, the
Secretary of Justice being ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by
virtue of Section 8 (1), Article VIII.
Agra could not validly hold any other office or employment during his
tenure as the Acting Solicitor General, because the Constitution has not otherwise
so provided. It was of no moment that Agra’s designation was in an acting or
temporary capacity. The text of Section 13, Art. VII plainly indicates that the
intent of the Framers of the Constitution was to impose a stricter prohibition
on the President and the Members of his Cabinet in so far as holding other
offices or employments in the Government or in government-owned or
government controlled-corporations was concerned. This provision makes no
reference to the nature of the appointment or designation. The prohibition against
dual or multiple offices being held by one official must be construed as to apply to
all appointments or designations, whether permanent or temporary, for it is without
question that the avowed objective of Section 13, supra, is to prevent the
concentration of powers in the Executive Department officials, specifically the
President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet and their deputies and
assistants.
 According to Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Elma, the only two exceptions
against the holding of multiple offices are:
a. those provided for under the Constitution, such as Section 3, Article
VII, authorizing the Vice President to become a member of the
Cabinet; and
b. posts occupied by Executive officials specified in Section 13, Article
VII without additional compensation in ex officio capacities as
provided by law and as required by the primary functions of the
officials’ offices.
Jurisprudence clarified that Sec. 13, Art. VII, CONST specifically identified the
persons who are affected by this prohibition as secretaries, undersecretaries and
assistant secretaries; and categorically excluded public officers who merely have
the rank of secretary, undersecretary or assistant secretary.
The primary functions of the Office of the Solicitor General are not related or
necessary to the primary functions of the Department of Justice. Considering that
the nature and duties of the two offices are such as to render it improper, from
considerations of public policy, for one person to retain both,48 an incompatibility
between the offices exists, further warranting the declaration of Agra’s designation
as the Acting Secretary of Justice, concurrently with his designation as the Acting
Solicitor General, to be void for being in violation of the express provisions of the
Constitution.
Effect of declaration of unconstitutionality of Agra’s concurrent appointment;
the de facto officer doctrine
Agra was not to be considered as a de jure officer for the entire period of his tenure
as the Acting Secretary of Justice. A de jure officer is one who is deemed, in all
respects, legally appointed and qualified and whose term of office has not expired.
During their tenure in the questioned positions, respondents may be considered de
facto officers and as such entitled to emoluments for actual services rendered. It
has been held that "in cases where there is no de jure, officer, a de facto officer,
who, in good faith has had possession of the office and has discharged the duties
pertaining thereto, is legally entitled to the emoluments of the office, and may in an
appropriate action recover the salary, fees and other compensations attached to the
office. This doctrine is, undoubtedly, supported on equitable grounds since it
seems unjust that the public should benefit by the services of an officer de facto
and then be freed from all liability to pay any one for such services. Any per diem,
allowances or other emoluments received by the respondents by virtue of actual
services rendered in the questioned positions may therefore be retained by them.
Congress as National Board of Canvassers

PIMENTEL VS JOINT COMMITTEE GR No.163783, June 22, 2004 (non-

legislative)

FACTS: Petitioner Sentaor Aquilino Pimentel Jr. seeks to declare null and void
the continued existence of the Joint Committee of Congress to determine the
authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass and preliminary
canvass the votes cast for the Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates in May
10, 2004 elections following the adjournment of Congress sine die on June 11,
2004.

Petitioner argues that the adjournment sine die by the Twelfth Congress of the last
regular session, terminated and expired on the said day and the said Twelfth
Congresss passed out of legal existence and all pending matters and proceedings
terminate upon the expiration of congress.

Given the importance of the constitutional issue raised and to put to rest all
questions regarding the regularity, validity or constitutionality of the canvassing of
votes fro President and Vice-President in the recently concluded national elections,
this Court assumes jurisdiction over the instant petition pursuant to its power and
duty "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government" under Section 1 of Article VIII of the
Constitution and its original jurisdiction over petitions for prohibition under
Section 5 of the same Article.

ISSUE: Whether or not the continued existence of the Joint Committee of

Congress to canvass despite the Congress’ adjournment sine die is null and void.

RULING: No.

The legislative functions of the Twelfth Congress may have come to a close upon

the final adjournment of its regular sessions on June 11, 2004, but this does not
affect its non-legislative functions, such as that of being the National Board of
Canvassers. In fact, the joint public session of both Houses of Congress convened
by express directive of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution to canvass the
votes for and to proclaim the newly elected President and Vice-President has not,
and cannot, adjourn sine die until it has accomplished its constitutionally mandated
tasks. For only when a board of canvassers has completed its functions is it
rendered functus officio. Its membership may change, but it retains its authority as
a board until it has accomplished its purposes

Since the Twelfth Congress has not yet completed its non-legislative duty to
canvass the votes and proclaim the duly elected President and Vice-President, its
existence as the National Board of Canvassers, as well as that of the Joint
Committee to which it referred the preliminary tasks of authenticating and
canvassing the certificates of canvass, has not become functus officio.\

In sum, despite the adjournment  sine die  of Congress, there is no legal

impediment to the Joint Committee completing the tasks assigned to it and
transmitting its report for the approval of the joint public session of both Houses
of Congress, which may reconvene without need of call by the President to a
special session.

*Tecson v. Lim – 424 SCRA 277 [2005]

Facts:
On 31 December 2003, respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as
Fernando Poe, Jr. (hereinafter “FPJ”), filed his certificate of candidacy for the
position of President of the Republic of the Philippines. He represented himself as
natural born citizen.
Petitioner Fornier filed a petition to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or
to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by:
 claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to
Fornier, his parents were foreigners
 his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe,
was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject.
 Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his
Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien
mother.

Petitioner based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of respondent on two

assertions—first,Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita
Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second, even if no such prior
marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelley only a year after the
birth of respondent.
 The COMELEC Third Division dismissed the case for being lack of merit.
The COMELEC En Banc denied his motion for reconsideration.

Other petitions were questioning the jurisdiction of the COMELEC asserting

that, under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, only the
Supreme Court had original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue on
the case.

Issue: Whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the case?
No.
under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution The
Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and
may promulgate its rules for the purpose.”
Ordinary usage would characterize a “contest” in reference to a post-election
scenario. Election contests consist of either an election protest or a quo warranto
which, although two distinct remedies, would have one objective in view, i.e.,to
dislodge the winning candidate from office.
The Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal” promulgated by the Supreme
Court en banc on 18 April 1992 categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the
tribunal over contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
“President” or “Vice-President”, of the Philippines, and not of “candidates” for
President or Vice-President.
It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, defined by Section
4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, would not include cases directly brought
before it questioning the qualifications of a candidate for the presidency or vice-
presidency before the elections are held.
 ESTRADA VS DESIERTO
FACTS:
 From the beginning of his term, however, petitioner was plagued by a plethora
of problems that slowly but surely eroded his popularity.
 His sharp descent from power started on October 4, 2000. Ilocos Sur Governos,
Luis “Chavit” Singson, a longtime friend of the petitioner, went on air and
accused the petitioner, his family and friends of receiving millions of pesos from
jueteng lords.
 The exposé immediately ignited reactions of rage. The next day, October 5,
2000, Senator Teofisto Guingona Jr, then the Senate Minority Leader, took the
floor and delivered a fiery privilege speech entitled “I Accuse.”
 He accused the petitioner of receiving some P220 million in jueteng money from
Governor Singson from November 1998 to August 2000.
 He also charged that the petitioner took from Governor Singson P70 million on
excise tax on cigarettes intended for Ilocos Sur. The privilege speech was
referred by then Senate President Franklin Drilon, to the Blue Ribbon
Committee (then headed by Senator Aquilino Pimentel) and the Committee on
Justice (then headed by Senator Renato Cayetano) for joint investigation.
 Calls for the resignation of the petitioner filled the air. After several
resignations, On December 7, the impeachment trial started.
 The dramatic point of the December hearings was the testimony of Clarissa
Ocampo, senior vice president of Equitable-PCI Bank. She testified that she was
one foot away from petitioner Estrada when he affixed the signature “Jose
Velarde” on documents involving a P500 million investment agreement with
their bank on February 4, 2000.
 Then came the fateful day of January 16, when by a vote of 11-10the senator-
judges ruled against the opening of the second envelop which allegedly
contained evidence showing that petitioner held P3.3 billion in a secret bank
account under the name “Jose Velarde.”
 The public and private prosecutors walked out in protest of the ruling. In disgust,
Senator Pimentel resigned as Senate President. The ruling made at 10:00 p.m.
was met by a spontaneous outburst of anger that hit the streets of the metropolis.
By midnight, thousands had assembled at the EDSA Shrine and speeches full of
sulphur were delivered against the petitioner and the eleven (11) senators.
 General Reyes declared that “on behalf of your Armed Forces, the 130,000
strong members of the Armed Forces, we wish to announce that we are
withdrawing our support to this government.
 At about 12:00 noon, Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to respondent
Arroyo as President of the Philippines. At 2:30 p.m., petitioner and his family
hurriedly left Malacañang Palace. After
 her induction, she placed several members in her cabinet, elected a new Vice
President and the House
 secured their support to the newly elected President.
 After his fall from the pedestal of power, the petitioner’s legal problems
appeared in clusters. Several cases previously filed against him in the Office of
the
 Ombudsman were set in motion. These are: (1) OMB Case No. 0-00-1629, filed
by Ramon A. Gonzales on October 23, 2000 for bribery and graft and
corruption.
 On February 5, petitioner filed with this Court GR No. 146710-15, a petition for
prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin
the respondent Ombudsman from “conducting any further proceedings in Case
Nos. OMB 0-00-1629, 1754, 1755, 1756, 1757 and 1758 or in any other
criminal complaint that may be filed in his office, until after the term of
petitioner as President is over and only if legally warranted.”
 Thru another counsel, petitioner, on February 6, filed GR No. 146738 for Quo
Warranto.
 He prayed for judgment “confirming petitioner to be the lawful and
incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable
to discharge the duties of his office, and declaring respondent to have taken
her oath as and to be holding the Office of the President, only in an acting
capacity pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution.”

 While in MR he contends that Section 11 of Art 7 was misinterpreted by the

Court and that congress can only decide the issue of inability when there is a
variance of opinion between a majority of the Cabinet and the President.
 He also argues that declaration of incapacity is needed and it should not be
implied.
 Petitioner Estrada makes then two submissions:
first, the cases filed against him before the respondent Ombudsman should
be prohibited because first, he has not been convicted in the impeachment
proceedings against him; and second, therefore he still enjoys immunity from all
kinds of suit, whether criminal or civil as President.

Issues:
(1) Whether the petitioner resigned as President
(2) Whether the petitioner enjoys immunity from suit. Assuming he enjoys
immunity, the extent of the immunity
(1) Yes. It is a factual question and its elements are beyond quibble: there must
be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of
relinquishment.
Consequently, whether or not petitioner resigned has to be determined from his
acts and omissions before, during and after January 20, 2001 or by the totality of
prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence
bearing a material relevance on the issue.
Using this totality test, we hold that petitioner resigned as President.
In an article of Philippine Daily Inquirer entitled the Angara Diary wherein it
revealed the “state of mind” of the President in the last days of his office, he
retorted to Angara that he would “call for snap elections” The proposal for a snap
election for president in May where he would not be a candidate is an
indicium that petitioner had intended to give up the presidency
even at that time.
Also, when offered a graceful exit, the petitioner expressed no objection to the
suggestion for a graceful and dignified exit but said he would never leave the
country
The resignation of the petitioner was implied.
There were several negotiations about his terms for resignation.
In sum, we hold that the resignation of the petitioner cannot be doubted.

It was confirmed by his leaving Malacañang.

In the press release containing his final statement,
(1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the
Republic albeit with the reservation about its legality;
(2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the
sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation.
He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind of inability and that
he was going to re-assume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears;
(3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them.
Without doubt, he was referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the
people as President;
(4) he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come
ahead in the same service of our country. Petitioner’s reference is to a future
challenge after occupying the office of the president which he has given up; and
(5) he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive
national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.
Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be
attained if he did not give up the presidency. The press release was petitioner’s
valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency is now in the past tense.
It is, however, urged that the petitioner did not resign but only took a
temporary leave of absence due to his inability to govern. In support of this
thesis, the letter dated January 20, 2001 of the petitioner sent to Senate President
Pimentel and Speaker Fuentebella is cited. Again, we refer to the said letter, viz:
“Sir:
By virtue of the provisions of Section II, Article VII of the Constitution, I am
hereby transmitting this declaration that I am unable to exercise the powers and
duties of my
office. By operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice President shall be the
Acting President.
(Sgd.) Joseph Ejercito Estrada”
Though the letter is a mystery. Under any circumstance, however, the
mysterious letter cannot negate the resignation of the petitioner. If it was
prepared before the press release of the petitioner clearly showing his resignation
from the presidency, then the resignation must prevail as a later act. If, however, it
was prepared after the press release, still, it commands scant legal significance.
Petitioner’s resignation from the presidency cannot be the subject of a
changing caprice nor of a whimsical will especially if the resignation is the
result of his repudiation by the people. There is
another reason why this Court cannot give any legal significance to petitioner’s
letter and this shall be
discussed in issue number III of this Decision.
After petitioner contended that as a matter of fact he did not resign, he also
argues that he could not resign as a matter of law. He relies on section 12 of RA
3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which
allegedly prohibits his resignation, viz:
“Sec. 12. No public officer shall be allowed to resign or retire pending an
investigation, criminal or administrative, or pending a prosecution against him,
for any offense under this Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code
on bribery.”
Be that as it may, the intent of the law ought to be obvious. It is to prevent the act
of resignation or retirement from being used by a public official as a protective
shield to stop the investigation of a pending criminal or administrative case against
him and to prevent his
prosecution under the Anti-Graft Law or prosecution for bribery under the RPC.
However, the said cases filed against the petitioner cannot be considered as
pending for the Ombudsman lacked jurisdiction to act on them. Sec. 12 of RA
No. 3019 cannot therefore be invoked by the petitioner for it contemplates of
cases whose investigation or prosecution do not suffer from any insuperable
legal obstacle like the immunity from suit of a sitting
President.
Also, the exact nature of an impeachment proceeding is debatable. But even
assuming arguendo that it is an administrative proceeding, it cannot be considered
pending at the time petitioner resigned because the process already broke down
when a majority of the senator-judges voted against the opening of the second
envelope, the public and private prosecutors walked out, the public prosecutors
filed their Manifestation of Withdrawal of Appearance, and the proceedings were
postponed indefinitely. There was, in effect, no impeachment case pending
against petitioner when he resigned.

(2) No. This court believes that since the Impeachment Court is now functus
officio, it is untenable for petitioner to demand that he should first be impeached
and then convicted before he can be prosecuted. The plea if granted, would put a
perpetual bar against his prosecution. Such a submission has nothing to commend
itself for it will place him in a better situation than a nonsitting President who has
not been subjected to impeachment proceedings and yet can be the object of a
criminal prosecution. The cases filed against petitioner Estrada are criminal in
character. They involve plunder, bribery and graft and
corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes, especially plunder
which carries the death penalty, be covered by the allege mantle of immunity of a
nonsitting president. Petitioner cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing the
President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity
from liability.
It will be anomalous to hold that immunity is an inoculation from liability for
unlawful acts and\ omissions.
In US v. Nixon, US President Richard Nixon, a sitting President it concluded that
“when the ground for asserting privilege as to subpoenaed materials sought for use
in a criminal trial is based only on the generalized interest in confidentiality, it
cannot prevail over the fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair
administration of criminal justice.
In the Nixon v. Fitzgerald, the US Supreme Court further held that the immunity of
the President from civil damages covers only “official acts.”
Recently, the US Supreme Court had the occasion to reiterate this doctrine in the
case of Clinton v. Jones where it held that the US President’s immunity from suits
for money damages arising out of their official acts is inapplicable to unofficial
conduct.
There are more reasons not to be sympathetic to appeals to stretch the scope
of executive immunity in our jurisdiction. One of the great themes of the 1987
Constitution is that a public office is a public trust.
There are more reasons not to be sympathetic to appeals to stretch the scope
of executive immunity in our jurisdiction. One of the great themes of the 1987
Constitution is that a public office is a public trust.
CECILIO RAFAEL, doing business under the style EL BARATO ALCE
COMPANYv. Embroidery & Apparel Control Board – 2aaa1 SCRA 336 [1967]
(designation and ex-officio capacity)

FACTS:

Petitioner, who was engaged in the manufacture of embroidery and apparel

products for the purpose of
exportation, using imported raw materials and doing business under the style "El
Barato Alce Company", was authorized by the Collector of Customs, pursuant to
the provisions of the Tariff and Customs Code (RA 1937), to operate a
manufacturing bonded warehouse located at Santolan, Tenejeros, Malabon, Rizal,
known as Manufacturing Bonded Warehouse No. 88. Petitioner imported raw
materials exempt from duty and proceeed to manufacture them into finished
products for export under the terms and conditions required and specified in the
letterauthority.
In 1961, Republic Act No. 3137 was passed. This law created the Embroidery and
Apparel Control and Inspection Board (EACIB). Section 2 thereof also provided
that the Board shall be composed of:
(1) a representative from the Bureau of Customs to act as Chairman, to be
designated by the Secretary of Finance;
(2) a representative from the Central Bank to be designated by its Governor;
(3) a representative from the Department of Commerce and Industry to be
designated by the Secretary of Commerce and Industry;
(4) a representative from the National Economic Council to be designated by its
Chairman; and
(5) a representative from the private sector coming from the Association of
Embroidery and Apparel Exporters of the Philippines.

 In compliance with these provisions the Apparel Control and Inspection

Board (hereinafter referred to as the Board) was subsequently constituted
with the representative from the Bureau of Customs as Chairman and the
representatives from the Central Bank, the Department of Commerce and
Industry, and the National Economic Council as members, each of them
having been previously designated by their respective department heads
 Upon recommendation of the Philippine Association of Embroidery and
Apparel Exporters, Inc., the Department of Finance named Quintin Santiago,
association president, as the representative from the private sector.

 However, another organization, the Philippine Chamber of Embroidery and

Apparel Producers, Inc., to which petitioner was affiliated, questioned the
choice of Santiago, apparently because its own nominee to the Board had
been rejected.

 In upholding its original choice, the Board made reference to a letter of

Senator Alejandro D. Almendras, principal author of Republic Act 3137,
stating that the association referred to in Section 2 of said Act was none
other than the respondent association itself.

 On this basis of said letter the Board adopted on September 15, 1961
Resolution No. 2 (series of 1961) stating "that the Board entertains no doubt
that the P.A.E.A.E. Inc. is the association referred to in Section 2 of
Republic Act No. 3137 and that it is the only association entitled to
representation in the Board from the private sector.

 Presumably in the exercise of its powers, the Board, in a communication

dated August 31, 1961, requested petitioner to "submit to (the Board)
pertinent data called for in the attached form of application for license
(EACIB Form No. 1) which should be duly accomplished before a notary
public."

 In the same letter petitioner was "also requested to remit with the
aforementioned application the amount of P200.00 either in cash or in a
check drawn in favor of the Embroidery and Apparel Control Board.

 This amount will be charged against (petitioner's) future assessments as per

Sec. 4, par. XVI of Republic Act No. 3137.

 Unwilling to comply with the Board's request, petitioner filed an action for
prohibition with preliminary injunction in the court a quo (Civil Case No.
49087) for the purpose of enjoining or restraining respondents from
enforcing the provisions of Republic Act 3137.
  Primarily on the basis of documentary evidence presented by the contending
parties, the court a quo rendered judgment on March 31, 1962, the
dispositive portion of which reads:the Court renders judgment —
(a) declaring Section 2 of Republic Act No. 3137 unconstitutional;
(b) declaring the respondent Board created pursuant thereto to be illegally
constituted and, therefore, any and all acts and orders done and/or issued by
said respondent are considered null and void; and
(c) permanently enjoining respondents from enforcing the provisions of
Section 2, of Republic Act 3137.

The counterclaim filed by the Respondent Philippine Association of

Embroidery and Apparel Exporters, Inc. is hereby dismissed for
insufficiency of evidence.1awphîl.nèt

PETITIONERS ARGUMENTS:

 The argument is that while Congress may create an office it cannot specify
who shall be appointed therein;

 that the members of the Board can only be appointed by the President in
accordance with Article VII, Sec. 10, sub-section 32 of the Constitution;

 that since the Act prescribes that the chairman and members of the Board
should come from specified offices, it is equivalent to a declaration by
Congress as to who should be appointed, thereby infringing the
constitutional power of the President to make appointments.

Issue: Whether or not RA3137, Sec. 2 is constitutional

RULING:
 YES.
 The arrangement envisioned in section 2 is not violative of the established
doctrine that "the appointing power is the exclusive prerogative of the
President, upon which no limitations maybe imposed by Congress, except
those resulting from the need of securing the concurrence of the Commission
on Appointments and from the exercise of the limited power to prescribe the
qualifications to a given appointive office."
 No new appointments were made, as they were merely designated new
duties as ex-officio member in addition to their original duties. Hence, it
does not infringe upon the appointing power of the President.
  It is significant that Congress, took care to specify, that the representatives
should come from the Bureau of Customs, Central Bank, Department of
Commerce and Industry and the National Economic Council.
 The obvious reason must be because these departments and/or bureaus
perform functions which have a direct relation to the importation of raw
materials, the manufacture thereof
 into embroidery and apparel products and their subsequent exportation
abroad.
 An examination of section 2 of the questioned statute reveals that for the
chairman and members of the Board to qualify they need only be designated
by the respective department heads, thus making the claims of the petitioner
erroneous. With the exception of the representative from the private sector,
they sit ex-officio.
 The true distinction between delegation of the power to legislate and the
conferring of authority or discretion as to the execution of the law consists in
that the former necessarily involves a discretion as to what the law shall be,
while in the latter the authority or discretion as to its execution has to be
exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the
latter, no valid objection can be made. (Araneta, et al. vs. Gatmaitan, et al.,
101 Phil. 328, 346) Tested under this score, We see no valid reason to object
to the validity of Republic Act 3137.
 In order to be designated they must already be holding positions in the
offices mentioned in the law. No new appointments are necessary. This is as
it should be, because the representatives so designated merely perform duties
in the Board in addition to those they already perform under their original
appointments.

CLU( CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION) v. Exec. Secretary – 194 SCRA 317 [1991]
(stricter prohibition on the President’s official family against multiple offices)
FACTS:
Petitioner seeks a declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 284
issued by President Corazon C. Aquino on July 25, 1987. The pertinent provisions
of the assailed Executive Order are:
Sec. 1. Even if allowed by law or by the ordinary functions of his position, a
member of the Cabinet, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive
officials of the Executive Department may, in addition to his primary position,
hold not more than two positions in the government and government
corporations and receive the corresponding compensation therefor; Provided,
that this limitation shall not apply to ad hoc bodies or committees, or to boards,
councils or bodies of which the President is the Chairman.
Sec. 2. If a member of the cabinet, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other
appointive official of the Executive Department holds more positions than what is
allowed in Section 1 hereof, they (sic) must relinquish the excess position in favor
of the subordinate official who is next in rank, but in no case shall any official hold
more than two positions other than his primary position.
Sec. 3. In order to fully protect the interest of the
government in government-owned or controlled
corporations, at least one-third (1/3) of the members of the
boards of such corporation should either be a secretary, or undersecretary, or
assistant secretary.

Petitioners maintain that this Executive Order which, in effect, allows

members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to
hold other government offices or positions in addition to their primary
positions, albeit subject to the limitation therein imposed, runs counter to
Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution

According to petitioners, by virtue of the phrase "unless otherwise provided in this

Constitution," the only exceptions against holding any other office or employment
in Government are those provided in the Constitution, namely: (1) The Vice-
President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Section 3, par. (2),
Article VII thereof; and (2) the Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio member of the
Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Section 8 (1), Article VIII.

ISSUE:
w/n the prohibition in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution insofar as
Cabinet members, their deputies or assistants are concerned admit of the broad
exceptions made for appointive officials in general under Section 7, par. (2),
Article I-XB

RULING:
The qualifying phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution" in Section
13, Article VII cannot possibly refer to the broad exceptions provided under
Section 7, Article I-XB of the 1987 Constitution. To construe said qualifying
phrase as respondents would have us do, would render nugatory and
meaningless the manifest intent and purpose of the framers of the
Constitution to impose a stricter prohibition on the President, Vice-President,
Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants with respect to holding
other offices or employment in the government during their
tenure. Moreover, respondents' reading of the provisions in question would
render certain parts of the Constitution inoperative. This observation applies
particularly to the Vice-President who, under Section 13 of Article VII is
allowed to hold other office or employment when so authorized by the
Constitution, but who as an elective public official under Sec. 7, par. (1) of Article
I-XB is absolutely ineligible "for appointment or designation in any capacity to any
public office or position during his tenure." Surely, to say that the phrase "unless
otherwise provided in this Constitution" found in Section 13, Article VII has
reference to Section 7, par. (1) of Article I-XB would render meaningless the
specific provisions of the Constitution authorizing the Vice-President to
become a member of the Cabinet.

It is a well-established rule in Constitutional construction that no one

provision of the
Constitution is to be separated from all the others. Laws must also be in
harmony.
The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment under Art.
VII, §13 of the Constitution must not, however, be construed as applying to posts
occupied by the Executive officials specified therein without additional
compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the
primary functions of said officials' office. The reason is that these posts do no
comprise "any other office" within the contemplation of the constitutional
prohibition but
are properly an imposition of additional duties and functions on said officials.
To characterize these posts otherwise would lead to absurd consequences.
The Secretary of Labor and Employment cannot chair the Board of Trustees of the
National Manpower and Youth Council (NMYC) or the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA), both of which are attached to his department
for policy coordination and guidance. Neither can his Undersecretaries and
Assistant Secretaries chair these agencies.
EX-OFFICIO: The term "primary" used to describe "functions" refers to the
order of importance and thus means chief or principal function. The term is not
restricted to the singular but may refer to the plural. The additional duties must
not only be closely related to, but must be required by the official's primary
functions.
Examples of designations to positions by virtue of one's primary functions are the
Secretaries of Finance and Budget sitting as members of the Monetary Board, and
the Secretary of Transportation and Communications acting as Chairman of the
Maritime Industry Authority and the Civil Aeronautics Board.
If the functions required to be performed are merely incidental, remotely
related, inconsistent, incompatible, or otherwise alien to the primary function
of a cabinet official, such additional functions would fall under the purview of
"any other office" prohibited by the Constitution.
As earlier clarified in this decision, ex-officio posts held by the executive official
concerned without additional compensation.
During their tenure in the questioned positions, respondents may be considered de
facto officers and as such entitled to emoluments for actual services rendered.
It has been held that "in cases where there is no de jure, officer, a de facto officer,
who, in good faith has had possession of the office and has discharged the duties
pertaining thereto, is legally entitled to the emoluments of the office, and may in an
appropriate action recover the salary, fees and other compensations attached to the
office. This doctrine is, undoubtedly, supported on equitable grounds since it
seems unjust that the public should benefit by the services of an officer de facto
and then be freed from all liability to pay any one for such services. Any per diem,
allowances or other emoluments received by the respondents by virtue of actual
services rendered in the questioned positions may therefore be retained by them.

*De la Cruz v. COA, GR 138489, November 27, 2001 (alternates of Cabinet

member are also not entitled to additional compensation; see also Bitonio v.
COA – 437 SCRA 277 [2004] and Nat’l. Amnesty Com. v. COA – 437 SCRA
655 [2004])

Facts
 Petitioners are members of the National Housing Authority Board as
alternates to the NHA Board of Directors composed of the Secretary of
Public Works, Transportation and Communication, Director-General of the
National Economic Development Authority, Secretary of Finance, Secretary
 of Labor, Secretary of Industry, the Executive Secretary, and the General
Manager of the Authority; alternates whose “acts shall be considered the acts
of their principals” (Section 7 of the PD 757 creating the NHA).
 Commission on Audit denied petitioners’ appeal from the Notice of
Disallowance issued by NHA Auditor in 1997.
 Such notice disallowed payments to petitioners of their representation
allowances and per diems from August 19, 1991 to August 31, 1996
amounting to P276,000. Said notice by the NHA Auditor disallowed in
audit the payment of representation allowances and per diems of
“Cabinet members who were the ex-officio members of the NHA Board
and/or their respective alternates who actually received the payments.”
 This Notice is in line with a 1997 Memorandum by the COA and with a
Supreme Court decision (Civil Liberties Union) which declared EO 284
unconstitutional insofar as it allows Cabinet members, their deputies and
assistants to hold other offices, in addition to their primary offices, and to
receive compensation therefor.

Issue: Whether petitioners are entitled to the representation allowances and

per diems? Are they covered by the Notice of Disallowance issued by the NHA
Auditor in 1997?

RULING
No. they are not entitled to receive compensation. In the Civil Liberties Union SC
decision it has been held that “the prohibition against holding dual or multiple
offices or employment under Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution is not to be
interpreted as covering positions held without additional compensation in ex-
officio capacities as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of
the concerned official’s office. Exofficio = “from office; by virtue of office”.
Hence, the employment of the Executive officials into the NHA Board as stated in
Section 7 of PD 757 is primarily a function attached to the office of said officials
and hence, they need not be compensated independently for such employment.
The reason is that these services are already paid for and covered by the
compensation attached to his principal office.
Next, in response to the argument of the petitioners that they’re positions, as
alternates, are not covered by such disallowance notice, since they hold positions
lower than that of the Assistant Secretary, the Court held that:
“... The agent can never be larger than the principal. If the principal is
absolutely barred from holding any position in and absolutely
prohibited from receiving any remuneration from the NHA or any
government agency for that matter, so must the agent be.” Provided
 that the petitioners are alternates to the Directors of the Board
comprised of the Executives stated above, they are the “agents” the
Court talks about in the ratio

Sec. 13.
Prohibition against Holding Another Office or Employment

DENNIS A. FUNA vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA

(in relation to Art 9-B, Sec. 7)
FACTS: President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed respondent Maria Elena
H. Bautista as Undersecretary of the Department of Transportation and
Communications dated October 23, 2006.
On September 1, 2008, following the resignation of then MARINA Administrator
Vicente T. Suazo, Jr. Bautista was designated as Officer in Charge (OIC) of the
MARINA in concurrent capacity as DOTC undersecretary.
On October 21,2008, Dennis A. Funa in his capacity as taxpayer, concerned citizen
and lawyer filed the instant petition challenging the constitutionality of Bautista’s
appointment/ designation which is proscribed by the prohibition on the President,
Vice-President, he Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies and assistants to
hold any other officer or employment.
During the pendency of the petition, Bautista was appointed Administrator of the
MARINA vice Vicente T. Suazo and she assumed her duties and responsibilities as
such on February 2, 2009.
Petitioner argues that Bautista’s concurrent positions as DOTC undersecretary and
MARINA OIC is in violation of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
He points that while the prohibition does not apply to those positions held in ex-
officio capacities, the position of MARINA Administrator is not ex-officio to the
post of DOTC undersecretary under the provisions of its Charter, P.D. No. 474 as
amended by E.O. No. 125-A.
Petitioner further contends that even if Bautista’s appointment or designation as
OIC of MARINA was intended to be merely temporary, still, such designation
must not violate a standing constitution prohibition, citing the rationale in
Achacoso vs Macaragig.
ISSUE: Whether or not the designation of respondent Bautista as OIC of
MARINA, concurrent with the position of DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime
Transport to which she had been appointed, violated the constitutional proscription
against dual or multiple offices for Cabinet Members and their deputies and
assistants.
RULING: Undersecretary Bautista’s designation as MARINA OIC falls under the
stricter prohibition under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
Resolution of the present controversy hinges on the correct application of Section
13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their
deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold
any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said
tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any
business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or
special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or
their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of
their office.
On the other hand, Section 7, paragraph (2), Article IX-B reads:
Sec. 7. x x x
Unless otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions of his position, no
appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or
any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned
or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
In Civil Liberties Union, a constitutional challenge was brought before this Court
to nullify EO No. 284 issued by then President Corazon C. Aquino on July 25,
1987, which included Members of the Cabinet, undersecretaries and assistant
secretaries in its provisions limiting to two (2) the positions that appointive
officials of the Executive Department may hold in government and government
corporations. Interpreting the above provisions in the light of the history and times
and the conditions and circumstances under which the Constitution was framed,
this Court struck down as unconstitutional said executive issuance, saying that it
actually allows them to hold multiple offices or employment in direct
contravention of the express mandate of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the
1987 Constitution itself.

Noting that the prohibition imposed on the President and his official family is
all-embracing, the disqualification was held to be absolute, as the holding of
"any other office" is not qualified by the phrase "in the Government" unlike in
Section 13, Article VI prohibiting Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives from holding "any other office or employment in the
Government"; and when compared with other officials and employees such as
members of the armed forces and civil service employees, we concluded thus:
These sweeping, all-embracing prohibitions imposed on the President and his
official family, which prohibitions are not similarly imposed on other public
officials or employees such as the Members of Congress, members of the civil
service in general and members of the armed forces, are proof of the intent of the
1987 Constitution to treat the President and his official family as a class by itself
and to impose upon said class stricter prohibitions.
Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold
other office or employment in the government during their tenure when such is
allowed by law or by the primary functions of their positions, members of the
Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by
the Constitution itself. In other words, Section 7, Article IX-B is meant to lay down
the general rule applicable to all elective and appointive public officials and
employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable
only to the President, the Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies
and assistants.
Respondent Bautista being then the appointed Undersecretary of DOTC, she was
thus covered by the stricter prohibition under Section 13, Article VII and
consequently she cannot invoke the exception provided in Section 7, paragraph 2,
Article IX-B where holding another office is allowed by law or the primary
functions of the position. Neither was she designated OIC of MARINA in an ex-
officio capacity, which is the exception recognized in Civil Liberties Union.
The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment under
Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution was held inapplicable to posts
occupied by the Executive officials specified therein, without additional
compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the
primary functions of said office. The reason is that these posts do not comprise
"any other office" within the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition but are
properly an imposition of additional duties and functions on said officials.
Finally, the Court similarly finds respondents’ theory that being just a
"designation," and temporary at that, respondent Bautista was never really
"appointed" as OIC Administrator of MARINA, untenable.
Appointment may be defined as the selection, by the authority vested with the
power, of an individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office. When
completed, usually with its confirmation, the appointment results in security of
tenure for the person chosen unless he is replaceable at pleasure because of the
nature of his office. Designation, on the other hand, connotes merely the
imposition by law of additional duties on an incumbent official, as where, in the
case before us, the Secretary of Tourism is designated Chairman of the Board of
Directors of the Philippine Tourism Authority, or where, under the Constitution,
three Justices of the Supreme Court are designated by the Chief Justice to sit in the
Electoral Tribunal of the Senate or the House of Representatives. It is said that
appointment is essentially executive while designation is legislative in nature.
Designation may also be loosely defined as an appointment because it likewise
involves the naming of a particular person to a specified public office. That is the
common understanding of the term. However, where the person is merely
designated and not appointed, the implication is that he shall hold the office only in
a temporary capacity and may be replaced at will by the appointing authority. In
this sense, the designation is considered only an acting or temporary appointment,
which does not confer security of tenure on the person named.

*Funa v. Executive Secretary, GR 191644, Feb 19, 2013 (exception to the

general rule of prohibition to hold other govt offices) (supra., Art. VII, Sec. 3)

DENNIS A.B. FUNA, vs. ACTING SECRETARY OF JUSTICE ALBERTO

C. AGRA, IN HIS OFFICIAL CONCURRENT CAPACITIES AS ACTING
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND AS ACTING
SOLICITOR GENERAL, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY LEANDRO R.
MENDOZA, OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, Respondents.

FACTS:
The petitioner Dennis Funa alleges that on March 1, 2010, President Gloria
M. Macapagal-Arroyo appointed Respondent Alberto Agra as the Acting Secretary
of Justice following the Secretary Agnes VST Devanadera in order to compete for
a congressional seat in Quezon Province.
On March 5, 2010, President Arroyo designated Respondent Agra as the
Acting Solicitor General in a concurrent capacity.
On April 7, 2010, the petitioner, in his capacity as a taxpayer, a concerned
citizen and a lawyer, is assailing that Agra’s concurrent appointments or
designations, claiming it to be prohibited under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution.
During the pendency of the suit, President Benigno S. Aquino III appointed
Atty. Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz as the Solicitor General; and that Cadiz assumed as
the Solicitor General and commenced his duties as such on August 5, 2010.
Despite Agra averred a different set of facts.
He represented that on January 12, 2010, he was then the Government
Corporate Counsel when President Arroyo designated him as the Acting Solicitor
General in place of Solicitor General Devanadera who had been appointed as the
Secretary of Justice.
 On March 5, 2010, President Arroyo designated him also as the Acting
Secretary of Justice vice Secretary Devanadera who had meanwhile tendered her
resignation in order to run for Congress representing a district in Quezon Province
in the May 2010 elections. He then relinquished his position as the Government
Corporate Counsel; and that pending the appointment of his successor, Agra
continued to perform his duties as the Acting Solicitor General.
Notwithstanding the conflict in the versions of the parties, the fact that Agra
has admitted to holding the two offices concurrently in acting capacities is settled,
which is sufficient for purposes of resolving the constitutional question that
petitioner raises herein.
In Funa v. Ermita (2010 case), the Court resolved a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus brought by herein petitioner assailing the
constitutionality of the designation of then Undersecretary of the Department of
Transportation and Communications (DOTC) Maria Elena H. Bautista as
concurrently the Officer-in-Charge of the Maritime Industry Authority. The
petitioner has adopted here the arguments he advanced in Funa v. Ermita
Petitioner submitted that Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
does not distinguish between an appointment or designation of a Member of the
Cabinet in an acting or temporary capacity, on the one hand, and one in a
permanent capacity, on the other hand.
Acting Secretaries, being nonetheless Members of the Cabinet, are not
exempt from the constitutional ban. He emphasizes that the position of the
Solicitor General is not an ex officio position in relation to the position of the
Secretary of Justice, considering that the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) is
an independent and autonomous office attached to the Department of Justice
(DOJ).
Respondents’ contentions:
 Agra’s concurrent designations as the Acting Secretary of Justice and Acting
Solicitor General were only in a temporary capacity, the only effect of which
was to confer additional duties to him.
 They argue that an appointment, to be covered by the constitutional
prohibition, must be regular and permanent, instead of a mere designation.
 even on the assumption that Agra’s concurrent designation constituted
"holding of multiple offices," his continued service as the Acting Solicitor
General was akin to a hold-over
 OSG’s independence and autonomy are defined by the powers and functions
conferred to that office by law, not by the person appointed to head such
office; and that although the OSG is attached to the DOJ, the DOJ’s
 authority, control and supervision over the OSG are limited only to
budgetary purposes.
ISSUE: Did the designation of Agra as the Acting Secretary of Justice,
concurrently with his position of Acting Solicitor General, violate the
constitutional prohibition against dual or multiple offices for the Members of the
Cabinet and their deputies and assistants?

RULING: Yes, The designation of Agra as Acting Secretary of Justice

concurrently with his position of Acting Solicitor General was unconstitutional and
void for being in violation of the constitutional prohibition under Section 13,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution:
Section 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their
deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution,
hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during
said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any
business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or
special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations
or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of
their office.
Section 7, paragraph (2), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution
Section 7. x x x
Unless otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions of his position, no
appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or
any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned
or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
Section 7, Article IX-B is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all
elective and appointive public officials and employees, while Section 13,
Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable only to the President, the
Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants.
The phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution" must be given a
literal interpretation to refer only to those particular instances cited in the
Constitution itself, to wit: the Vice-President being appointed as a member of the
Cabinet under Section 3, par. (2), Article VII; or acting as President in those
instances provided under Section 7, pars. (2) and (3), Article VII; and, the
Secretary of Justice being ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by
virtue of Section 8 (1), Article VIII.
 Agra could not validly hold any other office or employment during his
tenure as the Acting Solicitor General, because the Constitution has not otherwise
so provided. It was of no moment that Agra’s designation was in an acting or
temporary capacity. The text of Section 13, Art. VII plainly indicates that the
intent of the Framers of the Constitution was to impose a stricter prohibition
on the President and the Members of his Cabinet in so far as holding other
offices or employments in the Government or in government-owned or
government controlled-corporations was concerned. This provision makes no
reference to the nature of the appointment or designation. The prohibition against
dual or multiple offices being held by one official must be construed as to apply to
all appointments or designations, whether permanent or temporary, for it is without
question that the avowed objective of Section 13, supra, is to prevent the
concentration of powers in the Executive Department officials, specifically the
President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet and their deputies and
assistants.
According to Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Elma, the only two exceptions
against the holding of multiple offices are:
c. those provided for under the Constitution, such as Section 3, Article
VII, authorizing the Vice President to become a member of the
Cabinet; and
d. posts occupied by Executive officials specified in Section 13, Article
VII without additional compensation in ex officio capacities as
provided by law and as required by the primary functions of the
officials’ offices.
Jurisprudence clarified that Sec. 13, Art. VII, CONST specifically identified the
persons who are affected by this prohibition as secretaries, undersecretaries and
assistant secretaries; and categorically excluded public officers who merely have
the rank of secretary, undersecretary or assistant secretary.
The primary functions of the Office of the Solicitor General are not related or
necessary to the primary functions of the Department of Justice. Considering that
the nature and duties of the two offices are such as to render it improper, from
considerations of public policy, for one person to retain both,48 an incompatibility
between the offices exists, further warranting the declaration of Agra’s designation
as the Acting Secretary of Justice, concurrently with his designation as the Acting
Solicitor General, to be void for being in violation of the express provisions of the
Constitution.
Effect of declaration of unconstitutionality of Agra’s concurrent appointment;
the de facto officer doctrine
Agra was not to be considered as a de jure officer for the entire period of his tenure
as the Acting Secretary of Justice. A de jure officer is one who is deemed, in all
respects, legally appointed and qualified and whose term of office has not expired.
During their tenure in the questioned positions, respondents may be considered de
facto officers and as such entitled to emoluments for actual services rendered. It
has been held that "in cases where there is no de jure, officer, a de facto officer,
who, in good faith has had possession of the office and has discharged the duties
pertaining thereto, is legally entitled to the emoluments of the office, and may in an
appropriate action recover the salary, fees and other compensations attached to the
office. This doctrine is, undoubtedly, supported on equitable grounds since it
seems unjust that the public should benefit by the services of an officer de facto
and then be freed from all liability to pay any one for such services. Any per diem,
allowances or other emoluments received by the respondents by virtue of actual
services rendered in the questioned positions may therefore be retained by them.

DOROMAL vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS:

In October 1987, Special Prosecution Officer II, Dionisio A. Caoili, conducted a

preliminary investigation of the charge against the petitioner, Quintin S. Doromal,
a former Commissioner of the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG), for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019), Sec.
3(h), in connection with his shareholdings and position as president and director of
the Doromal International Trading Corporation (DITC) which submitted bids to
supply P61 million worth of electronic, electrical, automotive, mechanical and
airconditioning equipment to the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (or
DECS) and the National Manpower and Youth Council (or NMYC).

On January 25, 1988, with the approval of Special Prosecutor Raul Gonzales,
Caoili filed in the Sandiganbayan an information against the petitioner.

“That in or about the period from April 28, 1986 to October 16, 1987, in Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, a public officer, being then Commissioner of the
Presidential Commission on Good Government, did then and there wilfully and
unlawfully have direct or indirect financial interest in the Doromal International
Trading Corporation, an entity which transacted or entered into a business
transaction or contract with the Department of Education, Culture and Sports and
the National Manpower and Youth Council, both agencies of the government
which business, contracts or transactions he is prohibited by law and the
constitution from having any interest.”

The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in this Court
questioning the jurisdiction of the “Tanodbayan” to file the information without the
approval of the Ombudsman after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution. On June
30, 1988, this Court annulled the information.

Upon the annulment of the information against the petitioner, the Special
Prosecutor sought clearance from the Ombudsman to refile it. In a Memorandum
dated July 8, 1988, the Ombudsman, Honorable Conrado Vasquez, granted
clearance but advised that “some changes be made in the information previously
filed.”
“the above-named accused [Doromal], a public officer, being then a
Commissioner of the Presidential Commission on Good Government,did then and
there wilfully and unlawfully, participate in a business through the Doromal
International Trading Corporation, a family corporation of which he is the
President, and which company participated in the biddings conducted by the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports and the National Manpower &
Youth Council, which act or participation is prohibited by law and the
constitution.”

On July 25, 1988, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the information for being
invalid because there had been no preliminary investigation; and defective because
the facts alleged do not constitute the offense charged.

The petitioner contends that as the preliminary investigation that was conducted
prior to the filing of the original information in Criminal Case No. 12766 was
nullified by this Court, another preliminary investigation should have been
conducted before the new information in Criminal Case No. 12893 was filed
against him. The denial of his right to such investigation allegedly violates his right
to due process and constitutes a ground to quash the information.

On the other hand, the public respondent argues that another preliminary
investigation is unnecessary because both old and new informations involve the
same subject matter·a violation of Section 3 (H) of R.A. No. 3019 (the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act) in relation to Section 13, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT the information should be quashed

RULING: NO. The absence of a preliminary investigation is not a ground to quash
the complaint or information (Sec. 3, Rule 117, Rules of Court), the proceedings
upon such information in the Sandiganbayan should be held in abeyance and the
case should be remanded to the office of the Ombudsman for him or the Special
Prosecutor to conduct a preliminary investigation.

There is no merit in petitioner’s insistence that the information should be quashed

because the Special Prosecutor admitted in the Sandiganbayan that he does not
possess any document signed and/or submitted to the DECS by the petitioner after
he became a PCGG Commissioner (p. 49, Rollo). That admission allegedly belies
the averment in the information that the petitioner “participated” in the business of
the DITC in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by law from having any
interest. (Sec. 3-h, RA No. 3019).

The Sandiganbayan in its order of August 19, 1988 correctly observed that „the
presence of a signed document bearing the signature of accused Doromal as part of
the application to bid xxxx is not a sine qua non‰ (Annex O, p. 179. Rollo), for,
the Ombudsman indicated in his Memorandum/Clearance to the Special
Prosecutor, that the petitioner „can rightfully be charged xxx with having
participated in a business which act is absolutely prohibited by Section 13 of
Article VII of the Constitution because “the DITC remained a family corporation
in which Doromal has at least an indirect interest.”

Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that “the President, Vice-
President, the members of the Cabinet and their deputies or assistants shall not xxx
during (their) tenure, x x x directly or indirectly xxx participate in any busi-ness.”
The constitutional ban is similar to the prohibition in the Civil Service Law (PD
No. 807, Sec. 36, subpar. 24) that “pursuit of private business x x x without the
permission required by Civil Service Rules and Regulations” shall be a ground for
disciplinary action against any officer or employee in the civil service.

ATTY. CHELOY E. VELICARIA-GARAFIL vs OFFICE OF THE

PRESIDENT and Hon. Solicitor General Jose Cadiz. (revocation of GMA
appointments)

FACTS:
Prior to the conduct of the May 2010 elections, then President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo, issued more than 800 appointments to various positions in several
government offices.
The ban on midnight appointments in Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution
reads:
Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end
of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except
temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein
will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
Thus, for purposes of the 2010 elections, 10 March 2010 was the cutoff date for
valid appointments and the next day, 11 March 2010, was the start of the ban on
midnight appointments. Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
recognizes as an exception to the ban on midnight appointments only "temporary
appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will
prejudice public service or endanger public safety." None of the petitioners claim
that their appointments fall under this exception.
The Appointments.
Atty. Velicaria-Garafill’s appointment as State Solicitor II at the OSG was dated
March 5, 2010. There was a transmittal letter dated on March 8,2010 of the
appointment paper from the Office of the President, but this transmittal letter was
received by the Malacanang Records Office only On May 13 2010. Atty.
Velicaria-Garafill took her oath of office on March 22, 2010 and assumed her
position on April 6, 2010.
Atty. Venturanza’s appointment as Prosecutor IV of Quezon City was dated on
February 23, 2010. It is apparent, however, that it was only on March 12, 2010 that
the OP, transmitted Atty. Venturanza’s appointment paper to the DOJ Secretary
Alberto C. Agra. Atty Venturanza took his oath of office on March 15, 2010 and
assumed his office on the same day.
Villanueva’s appointment as Administrator for Visayas of the Board of
Administrators of the CDA was dated March 3, 2010. She took her oath of office
on April 13, 2010. No transmittal of appointment of paper
Rosquita’s appointment as Commissioner, representing Region I and the
Cordilleras, of the NCIp was dated March 5, 2010. She took here oath of office on
March 8, 2010. No transmittal of appointment paper
Atty. Tamondong’s appointment as member , representing the private sector, of
the SBMA board of Directors was dated March 1, 2010. His appointment paper
war received by the SBMA chair on March 25, 2010 and took his oath on the same
day He again took his oath of office on July 6,2010.

Executive Order No. 2

President Benigno S. Aquino III took his oath of office as President on June 30,
2010. On the same date he issued E.O. No.2 recalling, withdrawing and revoking
appointments issued by the PGMA which violated the constitutional ban on
midnight appointments.
Effects of E.O no. 2
On 5 August 2010, Jose Anselmo Cadiz assumed office as Solicitor General (Sol.
Gen. Cadiz). On 6 August 2010, Sol. Gen. Cadiz instructed a Senior Assistant
Solicitor General to inform the officers and employees affected by EO 2 that they
were terminated from service effective the next day.
On 1 September 2010, Atty. Venturanza received via facsimile transmission an
undated copy of DOJ Order No. 556. DOJ Order No. 556, issued by DOJ Secretary
Leila M. De Lima (Sec. De Lima), designated Senior Deputy State Prosecutor
Richard Anthony D. Fadullon (Pros. Fadullon) as Officer-in-Charge of the Office
of the City Prosecutor in Quezon City.
On 6 October 2010, Atty. Venturanza received a letter dated 25 August 2010 from
Sec. De Lima which directed him to relinquish the office to which he was
appointed, and to cease from performing its functions.
The OP withheld the salaries of Villanueva and Rosquita on the basis of EO 2
The petitioners in this case filed separate petitions for certiorari before the
Supreme Court praying for the nullification of E.O. No. 2
The cases were referred to the CA
CA Decision: E.O No. 2 is constitutional
ISSUES (1) whether petitioners' appointments violate Section 15, Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution, and
(2) whether EO 2 is constitutional.
RULING: The petitions have no merit. All of petitioners' appointments are
midnight appointments and are void for violation of Section 15, Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution. EO 2 is constitutional.

Based on prevailing jurisprudence, appointment to a government post is a process

that takes several steps to complete. Any valid appointment, including one made
under the exception provided in Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution,
must consist of the President signing an appointee's appointment paper to a vacant
office, the official transmittal of the appointment paper (preferably through the
MRO), receipt of the appointment paper by the appointee, and acceptance of the
appointment by the appointee evidenced by his or her oath of office or his or her
assumption to office.
Aytona v. Castillo (Aytona) is the basis for Section 15, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution. Aytona defined "midnight or last minute" appointments for
Philippine jurisprudence.1âwphi1 President Carlos P. Garcia submitted on 29
December 1961, his last day in office, 350 appointments, including that of
Dominador R. Aytona for Central Bank Governor.
But the issuance of 350 appointments in one night and the planned induction of
almost all of them a few hours before the inauguration of the new President may,
with some reason, be regarded by the latter as an abuse of Presidential
prerogatives, the steps taken being apparently a mere partisan effort to fill all
vacant positions irrespective of fitness and other conditions, and thereby to deprive
the new administration of an opportunity to make the corresponding appointments.

The President exercises only one kind of appointing power. There is no need to
differentiate the exercise of the President's appointing power outside, just before,
or during the appointment ban. The Constitution allows the President to exercise
the power of appointment during the period not covered by the appointment ban,
and disallows (subject to an exception) the President from exercising the power of
appointment during the period covered by the appointment ban. The concurrence
of all steps in the appointment process is admittedly required for appointments
outside the appointment ban. There is no justification whatsoever to remove
acceptance as a requirement in the appointment process for appointments just
before the start of the appointment ban, or during the appointment ban in
appointments falling within the exception. The existence of the appointment ban
makes no difference in the power of the President to appoint; it is still the same
power to appoint. In fact, considering the purpose of the appointment ban, the
concurrence of all steps in the appointment process must be strictly applied on
appointments made just before or during the appointment ban.

The following elements should always concur in the making of a valid (which
should be understood as both complete and effective) appointment: (1) authority
to appoint and evidence of the exercise of the authority; (2) transmittal of the
appointment paper and evidence of the transmittal; (3) a vacant position at the
time of appointment; and (4) receipt of the appointment paper and acceptance
of the appointment by the appointee who possesses all the qualifications and
none of the disqualifications. The concurrence of all these elements should always
apply, regardless of when the appointment is made, whether outside, just before, or
during the appointment ban.

Appointing Authority
The President's exercise of his power to appoint officials is provided for in the
Constitution and laws. Discretion is an integral part in the exercise of the power of
appointment.
Transmittal
It is not enough that the President signs the appointment paper. There should be
evidence that the President intended the appointment paper to be issued. It could
happen that an appointment paper may be dated and signed by the President
months before the appointment ban, but never left his locked drawer for the
entirety of his term. Release of the appointment paper through the MRO is an
unequivocal act that signifies the President's intent of its issuance.
An appointment can be made only to a vacant office.
An appointment cannot be made to an occupied office. The incumbent must first
be legally removed, or his appointment validly terminated, before one could be
validly installed to succeed him.
Acceptance by the Qualified Appointee
Acceptance is indispensable to complete an appointment. Assuming office and
taking the oath amount to acceptance of the appointment. An oath of office is a
qualifying requirement for a public office, a prerequisite to the full investiture of
the office.
Excluding the act of acceptance from the appointment process leads us to the very
evil which we seek to avoid (i.e., antedating of appointments). Excluding the act of
acceptance will only provide more occasions to honor the Constitutional provision
in the breach. The inclusion of acceptance by the appointee as an integral part of
the entire appointment process prevents the abuse of the Presidential power to
appoint. It is relatively easy to antedate appointment papers and make it appear that
they were issued prior to the appointment ban, but it is more difficult to simulate
the entire appointment process up until acceptance by the appointee.

*Sarmineto III v. Mison – 156 SCRA 549 [1987] (1 st sentence – enumeration is

limited; 3rd sentence – use of the word “alone” as mere lapsus; head of bureau;
no CA confirmation)

ULPIANO P. SARMIENTO III AND JUANITO G. ARCILLA, petitioners,

vs. SALVADOR MISON, in his capacity as COMMISSIONER OF THE
BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, AND GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET, respondents,
COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, intervenor.

This case is a petition for prohibition while the petitioners are taxpayers,
lawyers, members of the Integrated bar of the Philippines and professors of
constitutional law seeking to enjoin the respondent Salvador Mison from
performing his as appointed Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs. The
petitioners would likewise enjoin respondent Guillermo Carague in his capacity as
Secretary of Budget Management from effecting disbursements in payment of
petitioner’s salary and emoluments.
Petitioner’s argument is grounded on the fact that Mison’s appointment is
unconstitutional on the grounds that it was not approved by the Commission of
Appointments.
Respondents aver that the appointment was in line with the constitutional
powers that are granted to the chief executive to appoint officials in government.
The court in this instance tried to construe the meaning behind Section 16,
Article VII of the constitution by grouping them into four groups. The first group is
stipulated to require approval from the COA. - First, the heads of the executive
departments; ambassadors; other public ministers and consuls; officers of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, from the rank of colonel or naval captain; and
other officers whose appointments are vested in the President in this Constitution; -
Second, all other officers of the government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law; - Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law
to appoint; and - Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress
may by law vest in the President alone

Issue: Whether the president needs approval from the Commission on

Appointments to appoint officers who fall in the 2nd, 3rd and 4th category.

No. The President does not need approval from the COA to appoint the
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs.

The court first looked at the history of the Constitution wherein in the 1935
constitution, much of the executive power was limited by the legislature and it
resulted in horse trading/seats were given to the highest bidder while in the 1973
Constitution, Marcos took absolute power in his appointments. The court construed
the 1987 constitution as a middle ground wherein there are officers that require no
confirmation from the COA.

According to the records of Constitutional Commission, the intent was to was to

exclude certain positions from confirmation by the COA as such in the case Bureau
Heads that were removed from the first group of individuals that required approval.
This is expressed as well in Sec. 601 of the tariff and customs code of the
Philippines as amended by PD 34 which states that the commissioner and the
deputy commissioner of customs shall be appointed by the president of the
Philippines.

As to the fourth group of officers whom the President can appoint, the intervenor
Commission on Appointments underscores the third sentence in Sec. 16, Article
VII of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:

The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in
the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies,
commissions, or boards.

The intervenors argued that since a law is needed to vest the appointment of
lower-ranked officers in the President alone, this implies that, in the absence of
such a law, lower-ranked officers have to be appointed by the President subject to
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; and, if this is so, as to lower-
ranked officers, it follows that higher-ranked officers should be appointed by the
President, subject also to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.

The respondents, on the other hand, submit that the third sentence of Sec. 16,
Article VII, abovequoted, merely declares that, as to lower-ranked officers, the
Congress may by law vest their appointment in the President, in the courts, or in
the heads of the various departments, agencies, commissions, or boards in the
government. No reason however is submitted for the use of the word "alone" in
said third sentence.

The Court is not impressed by both arguments. It is of the considered opinion, after
a careful study of the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, that the
use of the word alone" after the word "President" in said third sentence of Sec. 16,
Article VII is, more than anything else, a slip or lapsus in draftmanship.

In the 1987 Constitution, however, as already pointed out, the clear and expressed
intent of its framers was to exclude presidential appointments from confirmation
by the Commission on Appointments, except appointments to offices expressly
mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII. Consequently, there was no
reason to use in the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII the word "alone" after the
word "President" in providing that Congress may by law vest the appointment of
lower-ranked officers in the President alone, or in the courts, or in the heads of
departments, because the power to appoint officers whom he (the President) may
be authorized by law to appoint is already vested in the President, without need of
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, in the second sentence of the
same Sec. 16, Article VII.

POBRE vs MENDIETA

FACTS:

The controversy began on January 2, 1992, when the term of office of Honorable
Julio B. Francia as PRC Commissioner/ Chairman expired. At that time, Mariano
A. Mendieta was the senior Associate Commissioner and Hermogenes P. Pobre
was the second Associate Commissioner of the PRC.

On February 15, 1992, President Corazon C. Aquino appointed the petitioner, then
an Associate Commissioner, as the PRC Commissioner/Chairman. He took his
oath of office on February 17, 1992.

Even before Commissioner Pobre’s appointment, the private respondent, Mariano

A. Mendieta, as the Senior Associate Commissioner, filed a petition for declaratory
relief against Commissioner Pobre, Executive Secretary Drilon, and Acting
Secretary of Justice Eduardo Montenegro, praying that they be enjoined from
appointing, or recommending, the appointment of Associate Commissioner Pobre
as Chairman of the PRC because under Section 2 of P.D. No. 223, he (Mendieta),
as the senior Associate Commissioner, was legally entitled to succeed Francia as
Chairman of the PRC. Judge Somera denied the prayer for a restraining order as
well as the petition for declaratory relief for being moot and academic.

Consequently, Mendieta filed a petition for quo warranto contesting Pobre’s

appointment as chairman of the PRC because he (Mendieta) allegedly succeeded
Francia as PRC Chairman by operation of law.
In his answer to the petition for quo warranto, Pobre disputed Mendieta’s claim on
the ground that only the President of the Philippines, in whom the appointing
power is vested by law and the Constitution, may name the successor of retired
PRC Commissioner/Chairman Francia upon the expiration of the latter’s term of
office.

On August 5, 1992 Judge Somera rendered a decision in favor of Mendieta On

August 19, 1992, she issued a writ of prohibitory injunction directing the Deputy
Sheriff of Manila to stop Pobre from discharging the functions and duties of the
Chairman/Commissioner of the PRC, and from enjoying the rights and privileges
of that office.

In due time, Pobre came to this Court for relief by a petition for certiorari with a
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT Pobre’s appointment is valid

RULING: YES.

The petition raises an issue regarding the proper construction of the provision in
Section 2 of P.D. No. 223 that: “x x x any vacancy in the Commission shall be
filled for the unexpired term only with the most Senior of the Associate
Commissioners succeeding the Commissioner at the expiration of his term,
resignation or removal,” whereby the legality of Pobre’s appointment as PRC
Chairman may be determined.

In interpreting this section of P.D. No. 223, consideration should be accorded the
provision of the Constitution vesting the power of appointment in the President of
the Philippines.

This provision empowers the President to appoint „those whom he may be

authorized by law to appoint.‰ The law that authorizes him to appoint the PRC
Commissioner and Associate Commissioners, is P.D. 223, Section 2, which
provides that the Commissioner and Associate Commissioners of the PRC are “all
to be appointed by the President for a term of nine (9) years, without
reappointment, to start from the time they assume office x x x.”

In holding that Mendieta, as the senior PRC associate commissioner, has a valid
claim to the office of chairman/commissioner vacated by Francia, Judge Somera
relied on what she called the “succession clause” (p. 38, Rollo) in Section 2, P.D.
No. 223 which provides that:

“x x x any vacancy in the Commission shall be filled for the unexpired term only
with the most Senior of the Associate Commissioners succeeding the
Commissioner at the expiration of his term, resignation or removal.”

The Court holds that the succession clause operates only when there is an
“unexpired term” of the Chairman/Commissioner to be served. Otherwise, if the
Chairman’s term had expired or been fully served, the vacancy must be filled by
appointment of a new chairman by the President.

The Court finds unacceptable the view that every vacancy in the Commission
(except the position of “junior” Associate Commissioner) shall be filled by
“succession” or by “operation of law” for that would deprive the President of his
power to appoint a new PRC Commissioner and Associate Commissioners-all to
be appointed by the President‰ under P.D. No. 223. The absurd result would be
that the only occasion for the President to exercise his appointing power would be
when the position of junior (or second) Associate Commissioner becomes vacant.
We may not presume that when the President issued P.D. No. 223, he deliberately
clipped his prerogative to choose and appoint the head of the PRC and limited
himself to the selection and appointment of only the associate commissioner
occupying the lowest rung of the ladder in that agency. Since such an absurdity
may not be presumed, the Court should so construe the law as to avoid it.

In view of our ruling that said provision of P.D. 223 applies only to the unexpired
term of the Chairman/Commissioner, the underlined clause: “at the expiration of
his term, resignation or removal” can not possibly refer to the
Chairman/Commissioner for it would contradict the first clause providing that he
will be succeeded by the senior Associate Commissioner “for the unexpired
portion of his term only.” There can be no more “unexpired term” to speak of if the
Chairman stepped down “at the expiration of his term.” It is more logical to
assume that the underlined clause refers to the senior Associate Commissioner who
should serve only up to “the expiration of his term, resignation or removal.”
Hence, the preposition “at,” which appears to have been used inadvertently, should
be understood to mean “until” so that the provision will read thus:

“x x x any vacancy in the Commission shall be filled for the unexpired term only
with the most Senior of the Associate Commissioners succeeding the
Commissioner until the expiration of his term, resignation or removal.”
 Since the appointment of the petitioner as PRC Chairman/ Commissioner to
succeed Julio B. Francia, Jr. at the expiration of his term did not violate any
provision of P.D. No. 223 and in fact conforms with the Chief ExecutiveÊs
interpretation and implementation of the law, the legality of said appointment
should be upheld.

AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL vs EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R.

ERMITA. (ad interim appointment v. acting capacity)

FACTS:
The Senate and the House of Representatives commenced their regular session on
July 26, 2004. The Commission on Appointments, composed of Senators and
Representatives, was constituted on August 25, 2004.
Meanwhile, President Arroyo issued appointments to respondents as acting
secretaries of their respective departments.
Appointee Department Date of Appointment
Arthur C. Yap Agriculture 15 August 2004
Alberto G. Romulo Foreign Affairs 23 August 2004
Raul M. Gonzalez Justice 23 August 2004
Florencio B. Abad Education 23 August 2004
Avelino J. Cruz, Jr. National Defense 23 August 2004
Rene C. Villa Agrarian Reform 23 August 2004
Joseph H. Durano Tourism 23 August 2004
Michael T. Defensor Environment and Natural Resources 23 August 2004

On September 8, 2004, Aquilino Q. Pimentel at al filed the present petition as

Senators of the Republic of the Philippines.
Congress adjourned on September 22, 2004. On September 23, 2004, President
Arroyo issued ad interim appointments to respondents as secretaries of the
departments to which they were previously appointed in an acting capacity.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the Presidents Arroyo’s appointment of respondent as acting
secretaries without the consent of the Commission on Appointments while the
Congress is in session is constitutional.
RULING:
On the Nature of the Power to Appoint
The power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the legislature may not
interfere with the exercise of this executive power except in those instances when
the Constitution expressly allows it to interfere.6 Limitations on the executive
power to appoint are construed strictly against the legislature.7 The scope of the
legislature’s interference in the executive’s power to appoint is limited to the
power to prescribe the qualifications to an appointive office. Congress cannot
appoint a person to an office in the guise of prescribing qualifications to that office.
Neither may Congress impose on the President the duty to appoint any particular
person to an office.8

However, even if the Commission on Appointments is composed of members of

Congress, the exercise of its powers is executive and not legislative. The
Commission on Appointments does not legislate when it exercises its power to
give or withhold consent to presidential appointments.
The Constitutionality of President Arroyo’s Issuance of Appointments to
Respondents as Acting Secretaries
Petitioners contend that President Arroyo should not have appointed respondents
as acting secretaries because “in case of a vacancy in the Office of a Secretary, it is
only an Undersecretary who can be designated as Acting Secretary.” Petitioners
base their argument on Section 10, Chapter 2, Book IV of Executive Order No. 292
Petitioners further assert that “while Congress is in session, there can be no
appointments, whether regular or acting, to a vacant position of an office needing
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, without first having obtained
its consent.”
In sharp contrast, respondents maintain that the President can issue appointments
in an acting capacity to department secretaries without the consent of the
Commission on Appointments even while Congress is in session. Respondents
point to Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. Section 16 reads:
SEC. 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other
public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of
colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him
in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government
whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he
may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the
appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or
in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.
Respondents also rely on EO 292, which devotes a chapter to the President’s
power of appointment. Sections 16 and 17, Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of EO 292
read:

SEC. 16. Power of Appointment. — The President shall exercise the power to
appoint such officials as provided for in the Constitution and laws.

SEC. 17. Power to Issue Temporary Designation.— (1) The President may
temporarily designate an officer already in the government service or any other
competent person to perform the functions of an office in the executive branch,
appointment to which is vested in him by law, when: (a) the officer regularly
appointed to the office is unable to perform his duties by reason of illness, absence
or any other cause; or (b) there exists a vacancy.
The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is its temporary nature. It is
a stop-gap measure intended to fill an office for a limited time until the
appointment of a permanent occupant to the office.
In case of vacancy in an office occupied by an alter ego of the President, such as
the office of a department secretary, the President must necessarily appoint an alter
ego of her choice as acting secretary before the permanent appointee of her choice
could assume office.
Congress, through a law, cannot impose on the President the obligation to appoint
automatically the undersecretary as her temporary alter ego. An alter ego, whether
temporary or permanent, holds a position of great trust and confidence. Congress,
in the guise of prescribing qualifications to an office, cannot impose on the
President who her alter ego should be.
The office of a department secretary may become vacant while Congress is in
session. Since a department secretary is the alter ego of the President, the acting
appointee to the office must necessarily have the President’s confidence. Thus, by
the very nature of the office of a department secretary, the President must appoint
in an acting capacity a person of her choice even while Congress is in session. That
person may or may not be the permanent appointee, but practical reasons may
make it expedient that the acting appointee will also be the permanent appointee.
Finally, petitioners claim that the issuance of appointments in an acting capacity is
susceptible to abuse. Petitioners fail to consider that acting appointments cannot
exceed one year
In distinguishing ad interim appointments from appointments in an acting
capacity, a noted textbook writer on constitutional law has observed:
Ad-interim appointments must be distinguished from appointments in an acting
capacity. Both of them are effective upon acceptance. But ad-interim appointments
are extended only during a recess of Congress, whereas acting appointments may
be extended any time there is a vacancy. Moreover ad-interim appointments are
submitted to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation or rejection;
acting appointments are not submitted to the Commission on Appointments.
Acting appointments are a way of temporarily filling important offices but, if
abused, they can also be a way of circumventing the need for confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments.
*Lacson-Magallanes v. Pano - 21 SCRA 395 [1967] (Presidential power to
reverse decision of heads of executive positions; what is non-delegable is what
the President has to exercise in person)

LACSON-MAGALLANES CO., INC., plaintiff-appellant, vs.

JOSE PAÑO, HON. JUAN PAJO, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, and
HON. JUAN DE G. RODRIGUEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources, defendants-appellees.

Jose Magallanes, permittee and actual occupant, ceded his rights and interest to a
portion of a 1,103-hectare pasture land (public land) in Tamlangon, Basalan,
Davao to the plaintiff corporation, Lacson-Magallanes Co, Inc. The land ceded to
plaintiff was officially released from the forest zone as pasture land and declared
agricultural land. Jose Paño and 19 other claimants applied for the purchase of 90
hectares of the ceded land by Jose Magallanes. Plaintiff corporation in turn filed its
own sales application covering the entire released area. Jose Paño protested against
the plaintiff corporation and claims that they are actual occupants of the parts
thereof covered by their own sales application.
The Director of Lands, following an investigation of the conflict, rendered a
decision in favour of the plaintiff corporation. A move to reconsider failed. The
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, on appeal by Jose Pano, affirmed
the decision of the Director. The case was then elevated to the President of the
Philippines.
Executive Secretary Juan Pajo, by authority of the President decided the
controversy, modified the decision of the Director of Lands as affirmed by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, and : (1) Declared that “it would
be for the public interest that appellants, who are mostly landless farmers who
depends on the land for their existence, be allocated that portion on which they
have made improvements”; and (2) Directed that the controverted land (northern
portion, Block I, LC Map 1749, Project No. 27, of Bansalan, Davao, with Lantian
River as the dividing line) “ should be subdivided into lots of convenient sizes and
allocated to actual occupants, without prejudice to the corporation’s right to
reimbursement for the cost of surveying this portion.”

Plaintiff corporation took the foregoing decision to the Court of First Instance
praying that judgment be rendered declaring: (1) that the decision of the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources has full force and effect; and (2) that the
decision of the Executive Secretary is contrary to law and of no legal force and
effect.

Issue: May the Executive Secretary, acting by authority of the President, reverse a
decision of the Director of Lands that had been affirmed by the Executive
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources?

Yes. The plaintiff claim that according to the Public Land Act the decisions of the
Director of Lands as to questions of facts shall be conclusive when approved by
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. And that it is controlling upon
the courts and the President.

The SC held the position as incorrect. The President's duty to execute the law is of
constitutional origin. The President naturally controls all of the executive
departments. Control simply means the power of an officer to alter or modify or
nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his
duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.

The plaintiff also submits that the decision of the Executive secretary herein is an
undue delegation of power because it is the constitutional duty of the President to
act personally upon the matter.

The court ruled that the President is not expected to perform in person all the
multifarious executive and administrative functions. The Office of the Executive
Secretary is an auxiliary unit which assists the President. The rule which has thus
gained recognition is that "under our constitutional setup the Executive Secretary
who acts for and in behalf and by authority of the President has an undisputed
jurisdiction to affirm, modify, or even reverse any order" that the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, including the Director of Lands, may issue.

Lastly, the plaintiff argues that the Executive Secretary is equal in rank to the other
department head as alter egos of the President. In this case, the Exec Sec cannot
intrude into the zone of action allocated to another department head. The court
ruled that the plaintiff lack appreciation to the fact that the Executive Secretary acts
“by authority of the President” - his decision is that of the President’s. Thus, the
court must give full faith and credit to the decision. Only the President may
rightfully say that the Executive Secretary is not authorized to do so.

VILLALUZ vs ZALDIVAR

FACTS:

Petitioner seeks his reinstatement as Administrator of the Motor Vehicles Office

with payment of back salaries in a petition filed before this Court on April 1, 1964.

He alleged that he was nominated as chief of said office on May 20, 1958 and two
days thereafter his nomination was confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments; that on May 26, 1958 he took his oath of office as such after having
been informed of his nomination by then Acting Assistant Executive Secretary
Sofronio C. Quimson; that in a letter dated January 28, 1960 addressed to the
President of the Philippines by Congressman Joaquin R. Roces as Chairman of the
Committee on Good Government of the House of Representatives, the latter
informed the former of the findings made by his Committee concerning alleged
gross mismanagement and inefficiency committed by petitioner in the Motor
Vehicles Office.

The then Executive Secretary Natalio P. Castillo suspended petitioner as

Administrator of the Motor Vehicles Office, having thereupon created an
investigating committee with the only purpose of investigating the charges against
petitioner and his assistant Aurelio de Leon.

After the investigation said committee submitted its report to the President of the
Philippines who thereafter issued Administrative Order No. 332 decreeing the
removal from office of petitioner; that as a result of petitioner's removal Apolonio
Ponio was appointed to take his place as acting administrator; and that, after
having been officially notified of his removal, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration and/or reinstatement, and when this was denied, he filed the instant
petition before this Court.

Respondents also averred that the President of the Philippines, contrary to

petitioner's claim, has jurisdiction to investigate and remove him since he is a
presidential appointee who belongs to the non-competitive or unclassified service
under Section 5 of Republic Act No, 2260.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT the President has jurisdiction over petitioner

RULING: There is-merit in the claim that petitioner, being a presidential

appointee, belongs to the non-competitive or unclassified service of the
government and as such he can only be investigated and removed from office after
due hearing by the President of the Philippines under the principle that "the power
to remove is inherent in the power to appoint.”

Consequently, as a corollary to the foregoing ruling, we may state that the

Commissioner of Civil Service is without jurisdiction to hear and decide the
administrative charges filed against petitioner because the authority of said
Commissioner to pass upon questions of suspension, separation, or removal can
only be exercised with reference to permanent officials and employees in the
classified service to which classification petitioner does not belong.

There is, therefore, no error of procedure committed by respondents insofar as the

investigation and disciplinary action taken against petitioner is concerned, even if
he is under the control and supervision of the Department of Public Works, in view
of the reason we have already stated that he is a presidential appointee who comes
exclusively under the jurisdiction of the President.

With regard to the claim that the administrative proceedings conducted against
petitioner which led to his separation are illegal simply because the charges
preferred against him by Congressman Roces were not sworn to as required by
Section 72 of Republic Act No. 2260, this much we can say: said proceedings
having been commenced against petitioner upon the authority of the Chief
Executive who was his immediate administrative head, the same may be
commenced by him motu proprio without previous verified complaint pursuant to
Executive Order No. 370, series of 1941, the pertinent provisions of which are as
follows:
"(1) Administrative proceedings may be commenced against a government officer
or employee by the head or chief of the bureau or office concerned motu proprio or
upon complaint of any person which shall be susbscribed under oath by the
complainant: Provided, That if a complaint is not or cannot be sworn to by the
complainant, the head or chief of the bureau OF office concerned may, in his
discretion, take action thereon if the public interest or the special circumstances of
the case so warrant."

SATURNINO OCAMPO vs REAR ADMIRAL ERNESTO C. ENRIQUEZ

FACTS:
During the campaign period for the 2016 Presidential Election, then candidate
Rodrigo Duterte publicly announce that he would allow the burial of former
President Ferdinand E. Marcos at the Libingan ng Mga Bayani.
On August 7, 2016, the Secretary of National Defense Delfin Lorenzana issued a
memorandum to the the respondent Chief of Staff of the AFP General Ricardo
Visaga regarding the internment of Marcos at the LNMB
On August 9, 2016 respondent AFP Rear Admiral Enriquez issued a directive to
the Philippine Army Commanding General regarding the Funeral and Burial of
Marcos at the LNMB.
Dissatisfied with the issuance, various petitions were filed against the internment
of Marcos at the LNMB
ISSUES:
1. Whether the respondents Secretary of National Defense and AFP Rear
Admiral committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction, when they issued the assailed memorandum and directive in
compliance with the verbal order of President Duterte to implement his
election campaign promise to have the remains of Marcos interred at the
LNMB.
2. Whether the Issuance and implementation of the assailed memorandum and
directive violate the Constitution, domestic and international laws
3. Whether historical facts, laws enacted to recover ill-gotten wealth from the
Marcoses and their cronies, and the pronouncements of the Court on the
Marcos regime have nullified his entitlement as a soldier and former
President to interment at the LNMB
4.  Whether the Marcos family is deemed to have waived the burial of the
remains of former President Marcos at the LNMB after they entered into an
agreement with the Government of the Republic of the Philippines as to the
 conditions and procedures by which his remains shall be brought back to and
interred in the Philippines.
RULING:
I. Petitioners argue that the burial of Marcos at the LNMB should not be
allowed because it has the effect of not just rewriting history as to the
Filipino people's act of revolting against an authoritarian ruler but also
condoning the abuses committed during the Martial Law, thereby
violating the letter and spirit of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioners invoke
Sections 2, 11, 13, 23, 26, 27 and 28 of Article II, Sec. 17 of Art.
VII,Sec. 3(2) of Art. XIV, Sec. 1 of Art. XI, and Sec. 26 of Art. XVIIIof
the Constitution.
There is no merit to the contention. As the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
logically reasoned out, while the Constitution is a product of our collective history
as a people, its entirety should not be interpreted as providing guiding principles to
just about anything remotely related to the Martial Law period such as the
proposed Marcos burial at the LNMB.
The second sentence of Sec. 17 of Art. VII pertaining to the duty of the President
to "ensure that the laws be faithfully executed," which is identical to Sec. 1, Title I,
Book III of the Administrative Code of 1987, is likewise not violated by public
respondents. Being the Chief Executive, the President represents the government
as a whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees
of his or her department. Under the Faithful Execution Clause, the President has
the power to take "necessary and proper steps" to carry into execution the law.The
mandate is self-executory by virtue of its being inherently executive in nature and
is intimately related to the other executive functions. It is best construed as an
imposed obligation, not a separate grant of power.The provision simply
underscores the rule of law and, corollarily, the cardinal principle that the President
is not above the laws but is obliged to obey and execute them.
Consistent with President Duterte's mandate under Sec. 17, Art. VII of the
Constitution, the burial of Marcos at the LNMB does not contravene R.A. No. 289,
R.A. No. 10368, and the international human rights laws cited by petitioners.
A. On R.A. No. 289 (Authorized construction of the National Pantheon)
It is asserted that Sec. 1 of R.A. No 289 provides for the legal standard by which a
person's mortal remains may be interred at the LNMB
Petitioners claim that it is known, both here and abroad, that Marcos' acts and deed
- the gross human rights violations, the massive corruption and plunder of
government coffers, and his military record that is fraught with myths, factual
inconsistencies, and lies.
Petitioners are mistaken. Both in their pleadings and during the oral arguments,
they miserably failed to provide legal and historical bases as to their supposition
that the LNMB and the National Pantheon are one and the same. This is not at all
unexpected because the LNMB is distinct and separate from the burial place
envisioned in R.A. No 289.
Even if the Court treats R.A. No. 289 as relevant to the issue, still, petitioners'
allegations must fail. To apply the standard that the LNMB is reserved only for the
"decent and the brave" or "hero" would be violative of public policy as it will put
into question the validity of the burial of each and every mortal remains resting
therein, and infringe upon the principle of separation of powers since the allocation
of plots at the LNMB is based on the grant of authority to the President under
existing laws and regulations. 
B. On R.A. No. 10368
Certainly, R.A. No. 10368 recognizes the heroism and sacrifices of all
Filipinos who were victims of summary execution, torture, enforced or
involuntary disappearance, and other gross human rights violations
committed from September 21, 1972 to February 25, 1986. To restore their
honor and dignity, the State acknowledges its moral and legal obligation to
provide reparation to said victims and/or their families for the deaths,
injuries, sufferings, deprivations and damages they experienced.
This Court cannot subscribe to petitioners' logic that the beneficial
provisions of R.A. No. 10368 are not exclusive as it includes the prohibition
on Marcos' burial at the LNMB. It would be undue to extend the law beyond
what it actually contemplates. With its victim-oriented perspective, our
legislators could have easily inserted a provision specifically proscribing
Marcos' interment at the LNMB as a "reparation" for the HRVVs, but they
did not. As it is, the law is silent and should remain to be so. This Court
cannot read into the law what is simply not there. It is irregular, if not
unconstitutional, for Us to presume the legislative will by supplying material
details into the law. That would be tantamount to judicial legislation.

C. On International Human Rights Laws

Petitioners argue that the burial of Marcos at the LNMB will violate the rights of
the HRVVs to "full" and "effective" reparation, which is provided under
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).
We do not think so. The ICCPR, as well as the U.N. principles on reparation and to
combat impunity, call for the enactment of legislative measures, establishment of
national programmes, and provision for administrative and judicial recourse, in
accordance with the country's constitutional processes, that are necessary to give
effect to human rights embodied in treaties, covenants and other international laws.
The Philippines is more than compliant with its international obligations. When the
Filipinos regained their democratic institutions after the successful People Power
Revolution that culminated on February 25, 1986, the three branches of the
government have done their fair share to respect, protect and fulfill the country's
human rights obligations.
II. The President's decision to bury Marcos at the LNMB is not done
whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily, out of malice, ill will or
personal bias
A. National Shrines
As one of the cultural properties of the Philippines, national historical shrines (or
historical shrines) refer to sites or structures hallowed and revered for their history
or association as declared by the NHCP.
Excluded, however, from the jurisdiction of the NHCP are the military memorials
and battle monuments declared as national shrines, which have been under the
administration, maintenance and development of the Philippine Veterans Affairs
Office (PVAO) of the DND. 
Contrary to the dissent, P.D. No. 105 does not apply to the LNMB. Despite the fact
that P.D. No. 208 predated P.D. No. 105, the LNMB was not expressly included in
the national shrines enumerated in the latter.

Assuming that P.D. No. 105 is applicable, the descriptive words "sacred and
hallowed" refer to the LNMB as a place and not to each and every mortal remains
interred therein. Hence, the burial of Marcos at the LNMB does not diminish said
cemetery as a revered and respected ground.
The LNMB is considered as a national shrine for military memorials. The PVAO,
which is empowered to administer, develop, and maintain military shrines, is under
the supervision and control of the DND. The DND, in turn, is under the Office of
the President.

The presidential power of control over the Executive Branch of Government is a

self-executing provision of the Constitution and does not require statutory
implementation, nor may its exercise be limited, much less withdrawn, by the
legislature. This is why President Duterte is not bound by the alleged 1992
Agreement between former President Ramos and the Marcos family to have the
remains of Marcos interred in Batac, Ilocos Norte. As the incumbent President,
he is free to amend, revoke or rescind political agreements entered into by his
predecessors, and to determine policies which he considers, based on informed
judgment and presumed wisdom, will be most effective in carrying out his
mandate.

*Lansang v. Garcia - 42 SCRA 448 [1971] (habeas corpus reviewable by SC)

N THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF

TEODOSIO LANSANG RODOLFO DEL ROSARIO, and BAYANI
ALCALA, petitioners,
vs.
BRIGADIER-GENERAL EDUARDO M. GARCIA, Chief, Philippine
Constabulary, respondent.

In the evening of August 21, 1971, at about 9 p.m., while the Liberal Party
of the Philippines was holding a public meeting at Plaza Miranda, Manila, for the
presentation of its candidates in the general elections scheduled for November 8,
1971, two (2) hand grenades were thrown, one after the other, at the platform
where said candidates and other persons were. As a consequence, eight (8) persons
were killed and many more injured, including practically all of the aforementioned
candidates, some of whom sustained extensive, as well as serious, injuries which
could have been fatal had it not been for the timely medical assistance given to
them.

Soon after noontime, the President of the Philippines announced the

issuance of Proclamation No. 889, which suspended the writ of habeas corpus.
Petitioners had been apprehended and detained "on reasonable belief" that they had
"participated in the crime of insurrection or rebellion;" that "their continued
detention is justified due to the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus pursuant to Proclamation No. 889 of the President of the Philippines.
"continuing detention of the petitioners as an urgent bona fide precautionary and
preventive measure demanded by the necessities of public safety, public welfare
and public interest"; that the President of the Philippines has "undertaken concrete
and abundant steps to insure that the constitutional rights and privileges of the
petitioners as well as of the other persons in current confinement pursuant to
Proclamation 889 remain unimpaired and unhampered” if not completely curtailed,
by various safeguards contained in directives issued by proper authority."

These safeguards are set forth in: (1) No arrest shall be made without
warrant authorized in writing by the Secretary of National Defense (2) That
authority to cause arrest under the proclamation will be exercised only by the
Metrocom, CMA, CIS, and "officers occupying position in the provinces down to
provincial commanders"; that there shall be no indiscriminate or mass arrests (3)
Constabulary to establish appropriate Complaints and Action Bodies/Groups to
prevent and/or check any abuses Proclamation No. 889 was further amended by
Proclamation No. 889-D, lifting the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus in the following provinces, sub-provinces and cities of the
Philippine.

Issue: Is the proclamation of President of suspension base on its facts conclusive

upon courts?

There is only presumption but it is not conclusive.

Conclusiveness asserted by Respondents: 1. Relied heavily upon Martin v. Mott
involving the U.S. President's power to call out the militia, which — he being the
commander-in-chief of all the armed forces — may be exercised to suppress or
prevent any lawless violence, even without invasion, insurrection or rebellion, or
imminent danger thereof, and is, accordingly, much broader than his authority to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, jeopardizing as the latter does
individual liberty; and 2. The privilege had been suspended by the American
Governor-General, whose act, as representative of the Sovereign, affecting the
freedom of its subjects, can hardly be equated with that of the President of the
Philippines dealing with the freedom of the Filipino people, in whom sovereignty
resides, and from whom all government authority emanates. Though the Courts
find that US courts have been uncertain also about its conclusiveness. In our
resolution of October 5, 1971, We stated that "a majority of the Court" had
"tentatively arrived at a consensus that it may inquire in order to satisfy itself of the
existence of the factual bases for the issuance of Presidential Proclamations Nos.
889 and 889-A ... and thus determine the constitutional sufficiency of such bases.

Indeed, the grant of power to suspend the privilege is neither absolute nor
unqualified. The precept in the Bill of Rights establishes a general rule, as well
as an exception thereto. What is more, it postulates the former in the negative,
evidently to stress its importance, by providing that "(t)he privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus shall not be suspended ...." It is only by way of exception that it
permits the suspension of the privilege "in cases of invasion, insurrection, or
rebellion" — or, under Art VII of the Constitution, "imminent danger thereof" —
"when the public safety requires it, in any of which events the same may be
suspended wherever during such period the necessity for such suspension shall
exist. (In simple terms the burden of proof is on the President thus there is a need
to review). Much less may the assumption be indulged in when we bear in mind
that our political system is essentially democratic and republican in character and
that the suspension of the privilege affects the most fundamental element of that
system, namely, individual freedom. The untrammeled enjoyment and exercise of
such right — which, under certain conditions, may be a civic duty of the highest
order — is vital to the democratic system and essential to its successful operation
and wholesome growth and development. Although we must be forewarned against
mistaking mere dissent — no matter how emphatic or intemperate it may be — for
dissidence amounting to rebellion or insurrection, the Court cannot hesitate,
much less refuse — when the existence of such rebellion or insurrection has
been fairly established or cannot reasonably be denied. [The Court is called] to
uphold the finding of the Executive thereon, without, in effect, encroaching upon a
power vested in him by the Supreme Law of the land and depriving him, to this
extent, of such power, and, therefore, without violating the Constitution and
jeopardizing the very Rule of Law the Court is called upon to epitomize.

LAGMAN vs PIMENTEL (PART II)

FACTS:

These are consolidated petitions,[1] filed under the third paragraph, Section 18 of

Article VII of the Constitution, assailing the constitutionality of the extension of
the proclamation of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao for one year from January 1 to December
31, 2018.

On July 18, 2017, the President requested the Congress to extend the effectivity of
Proclamation No. 216. In a Special Joint Session on July 22, 2017, the Congress
adopted Resolution of Both Houses No. 2[6] extending Proclamation No. 216 until
December 31, 2017.

In a letter[7] to the President, through Defense Secretary Delfin N. Lorenzana

(Secretary Lorenzana), the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff,
General Rey Leonardo Guerrero (General Guerrero), recommended the further
extension of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus in the entire Mindanao for one year beginning January 1, 2018 "for
compelling reasons based on current security assessment." 

Acting on said recommendations, the President, in a letter [9] dated December 8,

2017, asked both the Senate and the House of Representatives to further extend the
proclamation of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao for one year, from January 1, 2018 to
December 31, 2018, or for such period as the Congress may determine.

On December 13, 2017, the Senate and the House of Representatives, in a joint
session, adopted Resolution of Both Houses No. 4[13] further extending the period
of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the
entire Mindanao for one year, from January 1, 2018 to December 31, 2018.

WHEREAS, the President informed the Congress of the Philippines of the

remarkable progress made during the period of Martial Law, but nevertheless
reported the following essential facts, which as Commander-in-Chief of all armed
forces of the Philippines, he has personal knowledge of: First, despite the death of
Hapilon and the Maute brothers, the remnants of their groups have continued to
rebuild their organization through the recruitment and training of new members
and fighters to carry on the rebellion; Second, the Turaifie Group has likewise
been monitored to be planning to conduct bombings, notably targeting the
Cotabato area; Third, the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters continue to defy
the government by perpetrating at least fifteen (15) violent incidents during the
Martial Law period in Maguindanao and North Cotabato; Fourth, the remnants of
the Abu Sayyaf Group in Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-tawi, and Zamboanga Peninsula
remain a serious security concern; and last, the New People's Army took
advantage of the situation and intensified their decades-long rebellion against the
government and stepped up terrorist acts against innocent civilians and private
entities, as well as guerrilla warfare against the security sector and public and
government infrastructure, purposely to seize political power through violent
means and supplant the country's democratic form of government with Communist
rule.

ISSUES: WHETHER OR NOT the Constitution allows only a one-time extension

of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, not
a series of extensions amounting to perpetuity.

RULING: NO.

Congressional check on the President's martial law and suspension powers thus
consists of:

First. The power to review the President's proclamation of martial law or

suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and to revoke such
proclamation or suspension. The review is "automatic in the sense that it may be
activated by Congress itself at any time after the proclamation or suspension is
made."[97] The Congress' decision to revoke the proclamation or suspension cannot
be set aside by the President.

Petitioners question the manner that the Congress approved the extension of
martial law in Mindanao and characterized the same as done with undue haste.
Petitioners premised their argument on the fact that the Joint Rules adopted by both
Houses, in regard to the President's request for further extension, provided for an
inordinately short period for interpellation of resource persons and for explanation
by each Member after the voting is concluded.

Second. The power to approve any extension of the proclamation or suspension,

upon the President's initiative, for such period as it may determine, if the invasion
or rebellion persists and public safety requires it.

The rules in question do not pertain to quorum, voting or publication. Furthermore,

deliberations on extending martial law certainly cannot be equated to the
consideration of regular or ordinary legislation. The Congress may consider such
matter as urgent as to necessitate swift action, or it may take its time investigating
the factual situation. This Court cannot engage in undue speculation that members
of Congress did not review and study the President's request based on a bare
allegation that the time allotted for deliberation was too short.[104]
Legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, do not have the imprints of permanence
and obligatoriness during their effectivity. In fact, they may be revoked, modified
or waived at the pleasure of the body adopting them. Being merely matters of
procedure, their observance are of no concern to the courts. [105] Absent a showing
of "violation of a constitutional provision or the rights of private individuals," the
Court will not intrude into this legislative realm. Constitutional respect and a
becoming regard for the sovereign acts of a coequal branch prevents the Court
from prying into the internal workings of the Congress.

The provision is indisputably silent as to how many times the Congress, upon the
initiative of the President, may extend the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of habeas corpus. Such silence, however, should not be
construed as a vacuum, flaw or deficiency in the provision. While it does not
specify the number of times that the Congress is allowed to approve an extension
of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,
Section 18, Article VII is clear that the only limitations to the exercise of the
congressional authority to extend such proclamation or suspension are that the
extension should be upon the President's initiative; that it should be grounded on
the persistence of the invasion or rebellion and the demands of public safety; and
that it is subject to the Court's review of the sufficiency of its factual basis upon the
petition of any citizen.

A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the law is clear and free from
any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for construction or interpretation, but
only for application.[108] Thus, whenever there is a determination that the invasion
or rebellion persists and public safety requires the extension of martial law or of
the suspension of the privilege of the writ, the Congress may exercise its authority
to grant such extension as may be requested by the President, even if it be
subsequent to the initial extension.

Section 18, Article VII did not also fix the period of the extension of the
proclamation and suspension. However, it clearly gave the Congress the authority
to decide on its duration; thus, the provision states that that the extension shall be
"for a period to be determined by the Congress." If it were the intention of the
framers of the Constitution to limit the extension to sixty (60) days, as petitioners
in G.R. No. 235935 theorize, they would not have expressly vested in the Congress
the power to fix its duration.
WILFREDO TORRES Y SUMULONG vs. HON. NEPTALO GONZALES,
Chairman, Board of Pardons and Parole. (violation of conditional pardon)
Facts: This is an original petition for habeas corpus filed on behalf of petitioner
Wildfredo S. Torres, presently confined at the National Penitentiary in Muntinlupa.
The Supreme Court issued the writ and during the hearing and from the return filed
by the respondents through the Solicitor General, and other pleadings the facts are:
Sometime before 1979 petitioner was convicted by the Court of First Instance of
Manila of the crime of estafa and was sentenced to an aggregate prison term of 11
years to 38 years 9 months and 1 day and to pay an indemnity of P127, 728. His
maximum sentence would expire on November 2, 2000.
On April 18, 1979 a conditional pardon was granted to the petitioner by the
President of the Philippines on the condition that petitioner would not again violate
the penal law of the Philippines. Should this condition be violated, he will be
proceeded against in the manner prescribed by law. He accepted the conditional
pardon and was released.
On May 21, 1986 the Board of Pardons and Parole recommended to the President
the cancellation of the conditional pardon granted to the petitioner. The evidence
before the Board showed that on March 22, 1982 and June 24, 198, petitioner had
been charged with twenty counts of estafa which cases were pending trial before
the Regional Trial Court of Rizal. That the petitioner had been convicted by the
Regional Trial Court of Rizal of the crime of sedition and that this case was
pending appeal before the Intermediate Appellate Court.
On June 4 1986 the respondent Minister of Justice wrote to the President informing
her of the resolution of the Board, the President cancelled the pardon of petitioner.
The petitioner was then accordingly arrested and confined in Muntinlupa to serve
the unexpired potion of his sentence.

Petitioner impugns the validity of the Order of Arrest and Recommitment. He

claims that he did not violate his conditional pardon since he has not been
convicted by final judgment the crimes charged against him.
ISSUE: Whether or not conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is
necessary before the petitioner can be validly rearrested and recommitted for
violation of the terms of his conditional pardon and accordingly to serve the
balance of his original sentence.
RULING: No.
This issue is not novel. It has been raised before this Court three times in the past.
This Court was first faced with this issue in Tesoro vs Director of Prison.
This Court, speaking through then Mr. Justice Moran, held that the determination
of whether the conditions of Tesoro's parole had been breached rested exclusively
in the sound judgment of the Governor-General and that such determination would
not be reviewed by the courts. As Tesoro had consented to place his liberty on
parole upon the judgment of the power that had granted it, we held that "he [could
not] invoke the aid of the courts, however erroneous the findings may be upon
which his recommitment was ordered."’
In Sales vs. Director of Prisons,
After serving a little more than two years of his sentence, he was given a
conditional pardon by the President of the Philippines, "the condition being that he
shall not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines
Sales held, firstly, that Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code did not repeal
Section 64 (i) Revised Administrative Code. It was pointed out that Act No. 4103,
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, which was enacted subsequent to the Revised
Penal Code, expressly preserved the authority conferred upon the President by
Section 64. The Court also held that Article 159 and Section 64 (i) could stand
together and that the proceeding under one provision did not necessarily preclude
action under the other. Sales held, secondly, that Section 64 (i) was not repugnant
to the constitutional guarantee of due process. This Court in effect held that since
the petitioner was a convict "who had already been seized in a constitutional was
been confronted by his accusers and the witnesses against him-, been convicted of
crime and been sentenced to punishment therefor," he was not constitutionally
entitled to another judicial determination of whether he had breached the
condition of his parole by committing a subsequent offense.
The executive clemency under it is extended upon the conditions named in it, and
he accepts it upon those conditions. One of these is that the governor may
withdraw his grace in a certain contingency, and another is that the governor shall
himself determine when that contingency has arisen. It is as if the convict, with
full competency to bind himself in the premises, had expressly contracted and
agreed, that, whenever the governor should conclude that he had violated the
conditions of his parole, an executive order for his arrest and remandment to
prison should at once issue, and be conclusive upon him.
In Espuelas vs. Provincial Warden of Bohol,
Due process is not necessarily judicial The appellee had had his day in court and
been afforded the opportunity to defend himself during his trial for the crime of
inciting to sedition, with which he was charged, that brought about or resulted in
his conviction, sentence and confinement in the penitentiary. When he was
conditionally pardoned it was a generous exercise by the Chief Executive of his
constitutional prerogative. The acceptance thereof by the convict or prisoner
carrie[d] with it the authority or power of the Executive to determine whether a
condition or conditions of the pardon has or have been violated. To no other
department of the Government [has] such power been intrusted. 12
The status of our case law on the matter under consideration may be summed up in
the following propositions:
1. The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and conditions of a
conditional pardon are purely executive acts which are not subject to judicial
scrutiny.
2. The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a condition of a pardon, and
the proper consequences of such breach, may be either a purely executive act, not
subject to judicial scrutiny under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative
Code; or it may be a judicial act consisting of trial for and conviction of violation
of a conditional pardon under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code. Where the
President opts to proceed under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code,
no judicial pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is necessary, much less
conviction therefor by final judgment of a court, in order that a convict may be
recommended for the violation of his conditional pardon.
3. Because due process is not semper et unique judicial process, and because the
conditionally pardoned convict had already been accorded judicial due process in
his trial and conviction for the offense for which he was conditionally pardoned,
Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code is not afflicted with a
constitutional vice.

*People v. Casido - 269 SCRA 360 [1997] (amnesty)

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
WILLIAM O. CASIDO @ "MARIO," and FRANKLIN A. ALCORIN @
"ARMAN," accused-appellants.

The case started when the court released a resolution on 30 July 1996. The
court ruled that the conditional pardons granted in this case to accused-appellants
William Casido and Franklin Alcorin are void for having been extended on 19
January 1996 during the pendency of their instant appeal. They were re-arrested
and REQUIRE the officers of the Presidential Committee for the Grant of Bail,
Release, and Pardon to SHOW CAUSE why they should not be held in contempt
for approving the applications for the pardon of the accused-appellants despite the
pendency of their appeal.
 Presidential Committee for the Grant of Bail, Release or Pardon (hereinafter
Committee) stated that the applications for conditional pardon of the aforenamed
prisoners were recommended by the Committee to the President for the grant of
Conditional Pardon after the Secretariat had evaluated the crimes for which they
had been charged in pursuit of their political belief. Such recommendation was
approved by the President. They also allege that prior to their release, subject
prisoners filed an Urgent Motion to Withdraw Appeal which was received by the
Supreme Court on January 11, 1996.
Unfortunately, the Committee failed to verify first whether the counsel of
the accused had also withdrawn their appeal or that the NGO lawyers had filed in
their behalf a motion to Withdraw their Appeal. There was no intention on the part
of the Secretariat and the Presidential Committee to violate Section 19, Article VII,
of the Constitution, but that what happened was a clear misappreciation of fact.

Solicitor General additionally alleged that the accused-appellants in this

case, in an effort to seek their release at the soonest possible time, applied for
pardon before the Presidential Committee on the Grant of Bail, Release or Pardon
(PCGBRP), as well as for amnesty before the National Amnesty Commission
(NAC). They claim that the effect then is that since the amnesty, unlike pardon,
may be granted before or after the institution of the criminal prosecution and
sometimes even after conviction, the amnesty then granted to accused-appellants
William Casido and Franklin Alcorin rendered moot and academic the question of
the premature pardon granted to them.

Issue: Whether the amnesty rendered the question on pardon moot.

Yes.
Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which
must be pleaded and proved by the person pardoned, because the courts take no
notice thereof; while amnesty by Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the
concurrence of Congress, and it is a public act of which the courts should take
judicial notice. Pardon is granted to one after conviction; while amnesty is granted
to classes of persons or communities who may be guilty of political offenses,
generally before or after the institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes
after conviction. Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the
consequences of an offense of which he has been convicted, that is, it abolishes or
forgives the punishment, and for that reason it does nor work the restoration of the
rights to hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly
restored by the terms of the pardon, and it in no case exempts the culprit from the
payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence (article 36,
RPC). While amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the
offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged
that the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he
had committed no offense.

Accordingly, while the pardon in this case was void for having been
extended during the pendency of the appeal or before conviction by final judgment
and, therefore, in violation of the first paragraph of Section 19, Article VII of the
Constitution, the grant of the amnesty, for which accused-appellants William
Casido and Franklin Alcorin voluntarily applied under Proclamation No. 347, was
valid. This Proclamation was concurred in by both Houses of Congress in
Concurrent Resolution No. 12 adopted on 2 June 1994. The release then of
accused-appellants William Casido and Franklin Alcorin can only be justified by
the amnesty, but not by the pardon.
SALVACION MONSANTO vs. FULGENCIO FACTORAN

FACTS:

In a decision rendered on March 25, 1983, the Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner

Salvacion A. Monsanto (then assistant treasurer of Calbayog City) and three other
accused, of the complex crime of estafa thru falsification of public documents.

Petitioner Monsanto appealed her conviction to this Court which subsequently

affirmed the same. She then filed a motion for reconsideration but while said
motion was pending, she was extended on December 17, 1984 by then President
Marcos absolute pardon which she accepted on December 21, 1984.

By reason of said pardon, petitioner wrote the Calbayog City treasurer requesting
that she be restored to her former post as assistant city treasurer since the same was
still vacant.
Petitioner’s letter-request was referred to the Ministry of Finance for resolution in
view of the provision of the Local Government Code transferring the power of
appointment of treasurers from the city governments to the said Ministry. In its 4th
Indorsement dated March 1, 1985, the Finance Ministry ruled that petitioner may
be reinstated to her position without the necessity of a new appointment not earlier
than the date she was extended the absolute pardon. It also directed the city
treasurer to see to it that the amount of P4,892.50 which the Sandiganbayan had
required to be indemnified in favor of the government as well as the costs of the
litigation, be satisfied.

Seeking reconsideration of the foregoing ruling, petitioner wrote the Ministry on

April 17, 1985 stressing that the full pardon bestowed on her has wiped out the
crime which implies that her service in the government has never been interrupted
and therefore the date of her reinstatement should correspond to the date of her
preventive suspension which is August 1, 1982; that she is entitled to backpay for
the entire period of her suspension; and that she should not be required to pay the
proportionate share of the amount of P4,892.50.

The Ministry of Finance, however, referred petitioner’s letter to the Office of the
President for further review and action. On April 15, 1986, said Office, through
Deputy Executive Secretary Fulgenio S. Factoran, Jr. held:

This Office holds that Salvacion A. Monsanto is not entitled to an automatic

reinstatement on the basis of the absolute pardon granted her but must secure an
appointment to her former position and that, notwithstanding said absolute
pardon, she is liable for the civil liability concomitant to her previous conviction.

Her subsequent motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed the
present petition in her behalf.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT a public officer, who has been granted an absolute
pardon by the Chief Executive, is entitled to reinstatement to her former position
without need of a new appointment.

RULING: NO.

A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes no amends for the
past. It affords no relief for what has been suffered by the offender. It does not
impose upon the government any obligation to make reparation for what has been
suffered. “Since the offense has been established by judicial proceedings, that
which has been done or suffered while they were in force is presumed to have been
rightfully done and justly suffered, and no satisfaction for it can be required.” This
would explain why petitioner, though pardoned, cannot be entitled to receive
backpay for lost earnings and benefits.

Pardon granted after conviction frees the individual from all the penalties and legal
disabilities and restores him to all his civil rights. But unless expressly grounded
on the person’s innocence (which is rare), it cannot bring back lost reputation for
honesty, integrity and fair dealing. This must be constantly kept in mind lest we
lose track of the true character and purpose of the privilege.

Thus, notwithstanding the expansive and effusive language of the Garland case,
we are in full agreement with the commonly-held opinion that pardon does not
ipso facto restore a convicted felon to public office necessarily relinquished or
forfeited by reason of the conviction although such pardon undoubtedly restores
his eligibility for appointment to that office.

The rationale is plainly evident. Public offices are intended primarily for the
collective protection, safety and benefit of the common good. They cannot be
compromised to favor private interests. To insist on automatic reinstatement
because of a mistaken notion that the pardon virtually acquitted one from the
offense of estafa would be grossly untenable. A pardon, albeit full and plenary,
cannot preclude the appointing power from refusing appointment to anyone
deemed to be of bad character, a poor moral risk, or who is unsuitable by reason

For petitioner Monsanto, this is the bottom line: the absolute disqualification or
ineligibility from public office forms part of the punishment prescribed by the
Revised Penal Code for estafa thru falsification of public documents. It is clear
from the authorities referred to that when her guilt and punishment were expunged
by her pardon, this particular disability was likewise removed. Henceforth,
petitioner may apply for reappointment to the office which was forfeited by reason
of her conviction. And in considering her qualifications and suitability for the
public post, the facts constituting her offense must be and should be evaluated and
taken into account to determine ultimately whether she can once again be entrusted
with public funds. Stated differently, the pardon granted to petitioner has resulted
in removing her disqualification from holding public employment but it cannot go
beyond that. To regain her former post as assistant city treasurer, she must reapply
and undergo the usual procedure required for a new appointment.
ISABELITA C. VINUYA vs. HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ALBERTO
G. ROMULO 2010 and MR 2014
FACTS: This is an original petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court with an application for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against
the Office of the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the
Secretary of the DOJ and the OSG.
Petitioners are all members of the MALAYA LOLAS, a non-stock, non-profit
organization registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission established
for the purpose of the providing aid to the victims of rape by Japanese Military
forces in the Philippines during Second World War.
Petitioners claim that since 1998 they approach the Executive Department through
the DOJ, DFA and OSG, requesting assistance in the filing of claim against the
Japanese officials and military officers who the establishment of “comfort women”
stations in the Philippines. However, officials of the Executive Department
declined to assist the petitioners and took the position that the individual claims of
the comfort women for compensation had already been fully satisfied by Japan’s
compliance with the Peace Treaty between the Philippines and Japan.
ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the respondents committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting lack or excess of discretion in refusing to espouse their claims for the
crimes against humanity and war crimes committed against them and
2. Whether or the Court can compel the respondents to espouse their claims for
official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan before the
International Court of Justice and other international tribunals.
RULING: This petition lacks merit.
From the Domestic law Perspective, the Executive Department has the exclusive
prerogative to determine whether to espouse the petitioner’s claim against Japan.
Baker vs Carr,remains the starting point for analysis for the political question
doctrine. The US Supreme Court ruled:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards
for resolving it, or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or the impossibility of a
court’s undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect
due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning
adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on
question.
In Tanada vs Cuenco, we held that political questions refer to “ to those questions
which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the People In the their
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of government. It is concerned with
issues dependent upon the wisdom, not the legality of a particular measure.
Certain types of cases often have been found to present political questions. One
such category involves questions of foreign relations. It is well-established that
“the conduct of the foreign relations of our government is committed by the
Constitution to the executive and legislative—’the political’—departments of the
government, and the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this
political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision. The US Supreme
Court has further cautioned that decisions relating to foreign policy are delicate,
complex, and involve large elements of prophecy. They are and should be
undertaken only by those directly responsible to the people whose welfare they
advance or imperil. They are decisions of a kind for which the Judiciary has neither
aptitude, facilities nor responsibility.
To be sure, not all cases implicating foreign relations present political questions,
and courts certainly possess the authority to construe or invalidate treaties and
executive agreements However, the question whether the Philippine government
should espouse claims of its nationals against a foreign government is a foreign
relations matter, the authority for which is demonstrably committed by our
Constitution not to the courts but to the political branches. In this case, the
Executive Department has already decided that it is to the best interest of the
country to waive all claims of its nationals for reparations against Japan in the
Treaty of Peace of 1951. The wisdom of such decision is not for the courts to
question. Neither could petitioners herein assail the said determination by the
Executive Department via the instant petition for certiorari.
US vs. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. the US Supreme Court held that The
President is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations and its sole
representative with foreign relations.
The Executive Department has determined that taking up petitioners’ cause would
be inimical to our country’s foreign policy interests, and could disrupt our relations
with Japan, thereby creating serious implications for stability in this region. For us
to overturn the Executive Department’s determination would mean an assessment
of the foreign policy judgments by a coordinate political branch to which authority
to make that judgment has been constitutionally committed.
The Philippines is not under any international obligation to espouse petitioners’
claims.
In the international sphere, traditionally, the only means available for individuals to
bring a claim within the international legal system has been when the individual is
able to persuade a government to bring a claim on the individual’s behalf. Even
then, it is not the individual’s rights that are being asserted, but rather, the state’s
own rights. 

Even the invocation of jus cogens norms and erga omnes obligations will not alter
this analysis. Even if we sidestep the question of whether jus cogens norms existed
in 1951, petitioners have not deigned to show that the crimes committed by the
Japanese army violated jus cogens prohibitions at the time the Treaty of Peace was
signed, or that the duty to prosecute perpetrators of international crimes is an erga
omnes obligation or has attained the status of jus cogens.

The term erga omnes (Latin: in relation to everyone) in international law has been
used as a legal term describing obligations owed by States towards the community
of states as a whole. The concept was recognized by the ICJ in Barcelona Traction:

x x x an essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations of a State

towards the international community as a whole, and those arising vis-à-vis
another State in the field of diplomatic protection. By their very nature, the former
are the concern of all States. In view of the importance of the rights involved, all
States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection; they are obligations
erga omnes.
Such obligations derive, for example, in contemporary international law, from the
outlawing of acts of aggression, and of genocide, as also from the principles and
rules concerning the basic rights of the human person, including protection from
slavery and racial discrimination. Some of the corresponding rights of protection
have entered into the body of general international law … others are conferred by
international instruments of a universal or quasi-universal character.

The Latin phrase, ‘erga omnes,’ has since become one of the rallying cries of those
sharing a belief in the emergence of a value-based international public order.
However, as is so often the case, the reality is neither so clear nor so bright.
Whatever the relevance of obligations erga omnes as a legal concept, its full
potential remains to be realized in practice.

Motion for Reconsideration. 2014

Petitioners pray that the Court reconsider its April 28, 2010 decision, and declare:
(1) that the rapes, sexual slavery, torture and other forms of sexual violence
committed against the Filipina comfort women are crimes against humanity and
war crimes under customary international law; (2) that the Philippines is not bound
by the Treaty of Peace with Japan, insofar as the waiver of the claims of the
Filipina comfort women against Japan is concerned; (3) that the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs and the Executive Secretary committed grave abuse of discretion
in refusing to espouse the claims of Filipina comfort women; and (4) that
petitioners are entitled to the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against
the respondents.

Petitioners also pray that the Court order the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the
Executive Secretary to espouse the claims of Filipina comfort women for an
official apology,legal compensation and other forms of reparation from Japan.

RULING:

Petitioners did not show that the assailed act was either judicial or quasi-
judicial on the part of respondents.

Petitioners were required to show in their petition for certiorarithat the assailed act
was either judicial or quasi-judicial in character. Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of
Courtrequires such showing, to wit:
Section 1. Petition for certiorari.—When any tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition
in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be
rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer,
and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order,
or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and
pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of nonforum shopping as provided in
the third paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46. However, petitioners did notmake such a
showing.

Petitioners were not entitled to the injunction.

Here, the Constitution has entrusted to the Executive Department the conduct of
foreign relations for the Philippines. Whether or not to espouse petitioners' claim
against the Government of Japan is left to the exclusive determination and
judgment of the Executive Department. The Court cannot interfere with or
question the wisdom of the conduct of foreign relations by the Executive
Department. Accordingly, we cannot direct the Executive Department, either by
writ of certiorari or injunction, to conduct our foreign relations with Japan in a
certain manner.